Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation: A Theoretical Framework

Draft version

Work in progress, for discussion only.

Bjorn Fagersten

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

This paper suggests an analytical framework for the analysis of multilateral intelligence

cooperation. More specifically, it aims to explain why current European institutional

structures have developed along different trajectories under similar circumstances. The

paper does so by employing a variety of concepts from the New Institutional toolbox in

tandem with propositions from the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. It argues that states

establish and develop multilateral intelligence cooperation based on four core interests:

intelligence gains, policy gains, sovereignty costs, and risk. While a cost benefit analysis

of these interests explain institutional design at a specific point in time it offers an

incomplete picture of institutional development over time. The paper thus continues by

suggesting how and why the balance between these contradictory interests changes.

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INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................... 3

CONCEPTUALIZING COOPERATION ................................................................................................ 4

EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................... 8

STATE INTERESTS ................................................................................................................................. 8

Intelligence Gains ..................................................................................................................................... 10

Policy Gains ........................................................................................................................................... 11

Safeguarding sovereignty............................................................................................................................. 12

Minimize risk ......................................................................................................................................... 12

Summary................................................................................................................................................ 13

DRIVERS ................................................................................................................................................ 15

Internal Demand ..................................................................................................................................... 16

External Pressure .................................................................................................................................... 18

Cooperative momentum.............................................................................................................................. 19

Summary................................................................................................................................................ 23

FROM INTERESTS TO INSTITUTIONS – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................. 24

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INTRODUCTION

This paper will analyze and explain the development of multilateral forums for intelligence

cooperation. The phenomenon under scrutiny – intelligence cooperation – is in itself

somewhat of an oxymoronic concept. Intelligence activities are traditionally thought to be at

the heart of national security and prerequisites for a state’s sovereignty. The prospects for

international integration or even cooperation in this field therefore seem modest. This is the

opinion expressed in the vast majority of scholarly works dealing with the intelligence field.

Lack of trust, the need for secrecy, cultural conflicts and divergent interests are thought to

render intelligence cooperation complicated at the bilateral level and nearly impossible to

achieve at the multilateral level.

Nevertheless, multilateral intelligence cooperation exists and recent developments

suggest that it is on the rise. For decades, even the word intelligence carried with it negative

connotations from the murky world of spies and covert activities, and as a result the less

threatening label information was applied. Just recently, the Military Adviser to the UN

Secretary General, Major-General Patrick Cammaert, could report with relief that the word

intelligence has finally become acceptable in the UN system. Nato opened its first intelligence

fusion centre in Molesworth, Great Britain, in 2006. The EU has also established structures

for intelligence cooperation in a variety of policy areas, the most prominent of these being

the Joint Situation Center in Brussels.

This development of multilateral intelligence cooperation challenges general

assumptions about international cooperation and intelligence cooperation in itself. First of

all, why do states choose multilateral forms of cooperation in such a sensitive area as

intelligence? The risks that come with such an arrangement are substantial: ones’ sources and

methods may be compromised due to leaks; ones’ strengths and weaknesses will inevitably

be known to others, the information shared may have unintended consequences and/or

reach unintended recipients. All of these risks increase in a multilateral setting which is never

stronger than its weakest link.

In addition, we must ask ourselves why the form the cooperation takes varies to such

an extent. Even though membership in some of the cooperative arrangements is the same

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and all of the areas covered represent high-policy domains, current multilateral structures for

intelligence cooperation display a wide variety of institutional1 design. Some arrangements

take the form of informal, decentralized regimes, while others function as formal

organizations assisted by secretariats and managed at multilateral headquarters.

This paper sets out to analyze both of these questions. In order to solve this puzzle,

an explanatory model of multilateral intelligence cooperation must address the underlying

motives for cooperation as well as the variation in form of the cooperation. The model

should thus explain institutional development, and not simply institutional creation or

change. The following paper will present a model designed to achieve this.

CONCEPTUALIZING COOPERATION

The aim of this paper is to present a model of the development of multilateral intelligence

cooperation. As illustrated already in the introduction, intelligence cooperation can mean

numerous things and hence the developmental process of such cooperation is difficult to

conceptualize in a relevant manner. In order to preserve some level of parsimony, I will

focus on two vital dimensions of cooperation: scope and depth. I define scope as the

number of tasks subject to cooperation. Translated into the world of intelligence this would

mean whether crucial tasks such as tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination are

performed within joint structures. By depth I mean the level of density of cooperation. Low

density could imply voluntary coordination where states occasionally share information

about what they are doing on their own. The relevant forum may be one of many choices if

the states choose to cooperate. Cooperation with high density implies regular interaction

with joint commitments within the chosen areas of cooperation. The forum will be the

natural venue for cooperation and states will turn to it by knee jerk reaction when facing new

challenges in the field. If we bring these dimensions together we attain a relevant indicator of

the nature of multilateral intelligence cooperation. Using this conceptualization of

1 Borrowing from institutional theory I will refer to the diverse intelligence cooperation taking place within a specific policy area as an institution. Thereby I follow Aspinwall and Schneiders definition of institutions as “a set of formal rules and procedures, or informal practices, that structure relationships” (2000:11).

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intelligence cooperation we can – however tentatively – plot the multilateral forums

discussed above in a chart:

The UN has the least developed intelligence cooperation of the forums above. Few tasks are

executed on a multilateral basis and where it happens, a within the Situation Centre at the

UN headquarters in New York, the output is modest. (Smith 1994; Champagne 2006)

Multilateral intelligence cooperation has also been established within two pillars of the

European Union, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and The Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP). Of these two the CFSP comes out as a far more functionally centralized

policy field concerning intelligence cooperation. While cooperation within the internal

security field only incorporates the sharing of national intelligence - the dissemination task –

the CFSP has moved further. Joint analysis is taking place within all the CFSP intelligence

structures. Even tasking takes place within the common structures; the Situation Center and

the Intelligence Division task member states by sending out Requests for Information (RIF),

and to some extent the Situation Center may also task the external representations of the

Communities and the Satellite Center. Finally, even at an embryonic level, the CFSP has also

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taken on the task of collection with its Satellite Center (especially if the Galileo project ever

flies) and its ESDP monitors. Looking at the tasks of the intelligence cycle, it is thus obvious

that intelligence cooperation within the CFSP is more ambitious in scope. The recorded lack

of interest to actually use the functions established within the JHA-field compared to the

relative success of the CFSP-structures illustrates the difference of density between the two. 2

Finally, we find intelligence cooperation also within NATO where the Intelligence Division

supplies other units with day-to-day strategic intelligence. It relies on the NATO nations and

NATO Commands for its basic intelligence needs since it has no independent intelligence

gathering function or capacity. (NATO 2001) A new function is the intelligence fusion

centre, opened in 2006 in Molesworth, Great Britain. The centre aims at supplying NATO

missions by “collate and distribute intelligence”. (UK defence news 2006) Nevertheless, the

cooperation still builds on the willingness of the states to share the products of national

collection and analysis. Indeed, the lack of truly ‘common’ intelligence within NATO was

stressed by Donald Rumsfeld as a complicating actor in the run up to the Iraq invasion.

(quoted in Aldrich 2004) Or, as Richard Aldrich states: ‘States will happily place some of

their military forces under allied command, but hesitate to act similarly in the area of

intelligence, where coordination rather than control is the most they will accept’. (Aldrich

2004)

The forms of cooperation discussed here are multilateral cooperation taking place

within established intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Intelligence cooperation also

takes place within clubs and arrangements without links to any formal IGO. Examples are

the UKUSA agreement between the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Club of Bern comprised of

the EU25 + Norway and Switzerland and Alliance Base which consists of officers from

GB, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the US. Although these forums can be

analyzed by much of the same concepts suggested in this study they are not the prime focus

of this paper.

2 This part rests on earlier work where the differences between the two pillars of the EU are further

analyzed. Fägersten, B. (2007). International Intelligence Cooperation and Organizational Characteristics

International Studies Association. Chicago.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Britainhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germanyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

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The figure above can also be used to illustrate the developmental process of intelligence

cooperation. Enhanced cooperation is thus defined as any movement towards higher density

of cooperation or towards increasing scope of cooperation. Naturally, as indicated by the

arrow below, enhanced cooperation can also involve both of these dimensions:

Development of Intelligence Cooperation

This process towards enhanced intelligence cooperation constitutes the explanandum of this

inquiry: What drives this process and why does it turn out so different in various multinational settings?

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EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STATE INTERESTS

A natural point of departure when analyzing the reason for a specific institutional

arrangement, such as multilateral intelligence cooperation, would be to study the interests of

the actors. The writings on rational design that have evolved within the rational choice

branch of the New Institutionalism illustrate this ambition. The basic idea presented is that

institutions emerge and survive because they fulfill important functions for utility-

maximizing states, acting out of self-interest. Unlike societal functionalism – or what Wendt

calls ‘invisible hand’ functionalism - this kind of actor-centered functionalism focuses on

the intended effects of institutions rather than the actual ones. Moreover, while the societal

functionalists stress the fulfillment of public goods, the latter version is solely focused on

the interests of a specific actor.(Wendt 2001; Pierson 2004)

While the debate on international institutions has traditionally been a question of

whether or not institutions matter, rational design theorists try to shift the focus by

investigating how institutions function and how they relate to state preferences.

One such ambition is set forth by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal

who have constructed a framework for analyzing the rational design of international

institutions:

We explore - theoretically and empirically - the implications of our basic presumption that

states construct and shape institutions to advance their goals. The most direct implication is

that design differences are not random. They are the result of rational, purposive interactions

among states and other international actors to solve specific problems” (2001: 762)

This view is challenged by scholars who distrust the general assumptions of rational

choice, such as rationality and self interest, or those who see a lack of broader contextual

understanding in the rational design approach. Paul Pierson asks how much weight we can

place on the desire of actors to obtain the main effects of a specific institution when we try

to explain institutional forms. (Pierson 2004: 108) Even though he is positive about the

contributions made by rational choice scholars to the understanding of institutional

formation, he discusses several of limitations in the rational design approach. Pierson

scrutinizes the rational design focus on intentional and farsighted choices of purposive,

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instrumental actors, by questioning all the key components. Actors may not be instrumental

or far-sighted, major institutional effects may be unintended, or actors may make rational

choices; nonetheless changes in social context or within the actors may dissociate the

institutional arrangements from the actors over time. (Pierson 2000: 447; Pierson 2004: 108)

All this makes it perilous to deduce institutional origins from their contemporary function

or the moment of their birth.

When scholars of rational design have studied institutions as entities deliberately

designed to fulfill actors’ joint interests, little attention has been given to historical legacy

(Pollack 2004). Contrary to this, historically oriented scholars argue that institutional choices

taken in the past can persist and thereby shape and constrain actors at a later time (Pollack

2004: 139). These scholars have, however, been rightly criticized for being unable to offer

any hypothesis that may explain institutional change; in stead they put forth compelling ex-

post narratives of a specific development. Thus, by following a rational design track and

study a specific institution from a snapshot view you risk drawing erroneous conclusions

about actors’ preferences or institutional outcomes. You may also lose track of vital

interaction between institutions and the important legacies of history. On the other hand,

from a historical institutionalist viewpoint one may end up with the single finding that

“history matters”, but not knowing when, how, and under what preconditions it does. In

trying to avoid any of these pitfalls, this article will try to synthesize concepts drawn from

historical and rationalistic scholarship into a coherent model.

Many writers have argued for possible synergy between the historical and the

rational choice version of neo institutional analysis. (Hall and Taylor 1996; Katznelson and

Weingast 2005) Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, in their seminal article, argue that even

though historical institutionalism has its own distinct character when it comes to temporal

analysis its institutionalist part rests on either a ‘calculus’ logic or on a sociological ‘culture’

approach.(1996) Often however historical institutionalists use both of these approaches just

as rational and sociological institutionalists have inspired each other on issues such as

culture and agency. (Hall and Taylor 1996, 1998) Coming from the ‘calculus’ camp, Mark

Pollack argues that historical institutionalist assumptions about actor preferences and

behavior are fully consistent with those of rational choice. For both schools institutions

matter in shaping the policy process and policy outputs while ‘the actors themselves are

assumed to remain unchanged in their fundamental preferences’ [italics added]. (Pollack 2004:

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141, 2005: 22) Focusing less on the fundamental character of preferences, Bary Weingast

and Ira Katznelson suggests that historical and rational new institutional analysis converge

on the idea that institutions ‘constrain and shape the repertoire of available preferences’

(2005: 2)

To summarize, many scholars acknowledge the possible synergy effects between

rational and historical approaches to institutional analysis. Rationalists see the value of a

historical perspective on institutional development and preference formation. On the other

side, writers from the historical-institutionalist field does not reject the idea of linkages

between actor preferences and institutional formation, but deems it unfortunate that this

assumption often serves as an end-point rather than a starting point for analysis. (Pierson

2004: 108) Picking up this thread, this article will start by discussing vital state interests in

the area of intelligence and then move forward by discussing how these preferences are

formed and eventually turned into functional institutions.

Constructing a Model

Writings on intelligence, in general, and intelligence cooperation, in particular, mostly

consist of historical cases where specific state interests and dilemmas are illuminated. The

results of these writings can be, and often are, presented as cost/benefit or

threats/possibilities tables. While these - often highly specific - listings are of value in an

intelligence context they hardly lend themselves for more general social scientific modeling.

One way to conceptualize this discussion is to develop a framework where specific state

motives can be grouped into more general entities. The great majority of state interest at

play can then be summarized as a simple trade-off: reaching intelligence and policy gains

without ceding sovereignty or compromising one’s sources and methods.

Intelligence Gains

The general preference of states, entering any form of intelligence cooperation, is to enhance

their intelligence capacity. The wish to enhance intelligence capability can be explained by

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two interrelated goals: projecting power abroad and securing the ‘home’ territory.3 Even

though clear cut examples of these logics can be found the boundary between them tends to

get blurred. In the case of the US, the policy of preventive strikes has in deed made doctrine

out of this blurred line. Whatever the reason, most states want to enhance their intelligence

capability and cooperation with other states offers ways of achieving this.

Policy Gains

Even though most forms of intelligence cooperation can be explained by the participating

states will to enhance their intelligence capacity this is not true in all cases. States can be

motivated less by the functional intelligence gains and more by what a specific cooperation

means to the institution where it takes place or for the actors who takes part in the

cooperation. Jennifer Sims argues that ‘preferences of intelligence professionals will tend to

take a back seat to political or military necessity if the purpose of the intelligence liaison is

simply to bolster political or military alliances initiated for nonintelligence reasons’

(2006:202). An anti-terrorist coordinator may lend some more credibility to the European

Union without playing a decisive role for the EU anti-terrorism cooperation. An

independent assessment function within UN headquarters may increase the authority of that

organization without carrying any obvious benefits regarding analytical functions. A bilateral

intelligence sharing deal may be signed more as way to strengthen, or even repair, the

relation between to countries but has little to do with the exchange o f intelligence. The logic

is well known in the national context where much of new policy initiatives seem to be

motivated by an urge to lend credibility to a specific actor or institution rather than provide

for functional needs. Even though we can assume that most actors strive for both

intelligence and policy gains, and probably at the same time, it can be useful to keep an

analytical distinction between the two concepts.

3 A third alternative, strengthening intelligence in order to exert power at home is usually seen as a

repressive policy used by authoritarian states but have a history also in democratic states. The Watergate

affair in the US and the IB affair in Sweden are good examples of this logic.

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Safeguarding sovereignty

If states may enhance their intelligence capacity by establishing cooperation with other stats, why is not such

cooperation legio in international affairs? According to the traditional view on national sovereignty,

states reject any form of centralized international authority (Koremenos et al. 2001: 771).

Sovereignty cost is thus the price states pay when accepting any development that curtails

their authority or control over their territory. As discussed by Kenneth W. Abbot and

Duncan Snidal, sovereignty cost can in some situations actually be negative, as when the

participation in international arrangements enhances a state’s international and domestic

position. (2003: 439) This could also be explained as a situation when a state trades parts of

its Westphalian sovereignty (by allowing – via contract or convention – some external

authority to influence its policy) for the sake of strengthening its interdependence

sovereignty, e.g. regulating the flow of drugs over its borders. However, with the chosen

definition of sovereignty cost I will treat any curtailment of authority as a cost and let the

eventual positive outcomes of this cost be a gain in intelligence capacity rather than a

negative sovereignty cost.

Minimize risk

Apart from minimizing sovereignty costs, states are above all interested in avoiding risks.

Risk can be defined as a product of the probability and consequences of a disclosure of a

country’s methods, sources or other secrets that are vital for national security. Risk is thus at

its highest when there is a high probability for disclosure and when this eventual disclosure

would imply considerable consequences.

The wider information is disseminated, the higher is the risk for leaks. These can be

caused by irresponsible partners or by differences in judicially systems where for example the

courts right to evidence is ranked higher than the intelligence agencies wish for secrecy in a

partner county. It is also hard to ensure that shared information is not passed on to a third

party against the will of the originator. Even when information is not leaked it can be used in

ways not foreseen by the originator. Israel’s use of US satellite imagery in the strike against

the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981 damaged the US-Israeli relation and illustrates this point well

(Sims 2006:204). A high level of intelligence interdependence also means that partners will

become familiar with each others strengths and weaknesses which could effect a country’s

strategic situation negatively. Also, new priorities or a regime shift can be a hard loss for a

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dependent intelligence liaison as proved by the total loss of intelligence on Iran that the US

suffered after the fall of the Shah (ibid). Many of the above mentioned factors are even more

problematic in a multilateral context where the quality of the cooperation will be determined

by the least trusted member of the group (ibid).

Most cases of risk can be mitigated if trust exists between actors. A trusting

relationship is one where actor A trust actor B to manage her interests and expects Actor B

to do “the right thing” (Hoffman 2002). The more trust, the more risk the actors are willing

to take on behalf of each other. Nevertheless, even in a trusting relationship some risks can

not be mitigated. These are risks that are based on technical failures, unexpected events or

misunderstandings rather than opportunistic behavior on behalf of the trustee. Trust thus

implies risk, but risk-taking does not necessarily imply trust. (Hoffman 2002)

Summary

As discussed above these key state interests can be seen as a simple trade-off: reaching

intelligence and policy gains without ceding sovereignty or compromising one’s sources and

methods. By enhancing intelligence cooperation states hope to gain intelligence and/or

policy gains. This process thus comes with a price in the form of sovereignty costs and

increased risks. In most historical cases the costs of intelligence cooperation has outweighed

the benefits. The status quo of this trade-of is thus non-cooperation. Only where benefits

are particularly high, or costs and risks especially low, can we expect states to enter into, or

develop further, structured intelligence cooperation.

Any change of the status quo, i.e. a development of intelligence cooperation, can be

explained by a change in the balance between costs and benefits. These costs and benefits

represent the aggregated preferences of the participating states in a given context. If we, as

an analytical concept, stick with the notion of evolutionary rounds the premise is that every

round ends at an equilibrium point between costs and benefits. This leaves us with the

following cooperative outcomes:

B>C

As mentioned above will states only enhance intelligence cooperation in cases where the

benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs. This would be the case when states find that

because their preferences are altered (they now accept higher risk, are more inclined to seek

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gains etc) the existing cooperation does not reflect an equilibrium point of their aggregated

preferences. The cooperation will be enhanced until equilibrium is reached, i.e. states will

maximize their cooperative gains until they reach their limit in terms of sovereignty costs and

risk. Such enhancement often involves layering, that is, the “partial renegotiation of some

elements of a given set of institutions while leaving others in place” (Thelen 2003:225) or by

adding an institution to an already existing network of institutions.

B=C

In situations where the costs and benefits of cooperation are balanced there is little room for

development. The cooperative arrangements already represent the preferences of the

involved actors. However, if the stakes are high (high possible gains stands against high

costs) and preferences are asymmetrically distributed between the cooperating states4 there

may be a split and some states will pursue further cooperation as a sub-group. If the risks

and/or costs are specific to a certain institution the result may be that some or all member

states seeks to reach the perceived gains through an alternative institution or by creating a

new institution. Pierson labels such wholesale replacements of institutions diffusion (Pierson

2004:138).

B

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seldom closed down; they are left in the cold. If lucky, they may take on new roles and re-

emerge in a new guise, a process known as institutional conversion. Thelen 2003, Pierson 2004.

It is worth pointing out that the assumption that the cooperative output will mirror the

aggregated preferences of the states is valid only in a longer time perspective. In the short

term factors like bureaucratic resistance and institutional inertia may breach the link between

preferences and outcomes. Over time, this gap will be bridged, either by states finding their

preferences altered by current situation or by the states circumventing the barriers that stand

in their way.

We have now investigated what institutional development we can expect under a

certain configuration of interests. In order to understand and explain the evolution of

international intelligence cooperation over time, we must therefore investigate how and why

the balance between these conflicting interests change.

DRIVERS

I’ve choose to use the term drivers for any factor that sway states towards cooperation,

either by making states more inclined to seek cooperative gains or by rendering them more

willing to accept the costs and risks of cooperation. Within Foreign Policy Analysis it has

long been custom to discuss a variety of independent variables and their impact on

outcomes. Sometimes this is done with a division between positive and negative factors.

Kjell Goldman for examples explains policy change by looking at providers of change versus

stabilizers. (Goldman 1988) Others make no division based on the nature of the impact and

thus present a plausible list of change agents (see for example Hermann 1990). This paper

will follow only look at driver that have a positive effect on cooperation since stabilizing

mechanisms are inherent in the state interests. A problem for FPA has been that the factors

discussed are so different in nature. Structural factors such as the distribution of power are

mixed with highly context-specific factors such as the impact of a specific historical event or

person. The ambition of this paper is to present theoretically based drivers that could be

valid over time and place. The drivers presented here are not mutually exclusive but rather

complementary. The ambition is to analyze if, when and how they affect state preferences.

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When discussing the various drivers focus will be on how they actually affect state

preferences. The importance of specifying the causal mechanisms at play when studying

political processes has lately been stressed by various writers such as Alexander George and

Andrew Bennet (2005), Peter Hall (2006), Jeffrey Checkel (2006) and Charles Tilly (2001).

The nature of the explanatory factors will be further discussed in the concluding part of this

paper.

Internal Demand

Internal demand implies that the reason for cooperation is to be found within the

cooperating states. These demands can originate from the public or the political world,

especially after a national intelligence failure or an attack on the domestic soil.

Perceived National functional needs:

This driver implies that the establishment of a European intelligence capacity is the answer

to one or many member states’ perception that they face domestic problems they are unable

or unwilling to address unilaterally. Such domestic needs could spring from a detereating

domestic security situation, home grown terrorism or lack of confidence in the national

intelligence capacity. Depending which domestic player that perceives a national need for

increased cooperation the outcome will vary. A government will typically seek intelligence

gains from cooperation if it perceives a national need thereof. This would also be the case if

the need for cooperation is put forth by the practitioners. If the need for cooperation instead

stems from the public or the media rather than the government the state may enter

cooperation in pursuit of policy gains5. Perceived national needs thus drives cooperation by

increasing the intelligence and policy gains available.

5 Public demand for intelligence cooperation is quite a rarity in most countries. The intelligence business is

mostly held out of public insight and knowledge and thus attracts few activists or public movements. In the

case they do, the demand is often for tighter control or even the abolishment of certain intelligence agencies

rather than calls for enhanced cooperation. Nevertheless, there exist cases where the public demands visible

efforts, especially after intelligence failures or during periods of increased threat. Much the same can be said

about (non-executive) political demand for intelligence cooperation.

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If national functional needs were the driver of cooperation we would expect (1) that

the member state or states with the most urgent needs will be the proponents of the

establishments of common capabilities; (2) that the European capability is relevant to the

problems state perceive they face and; (3) the common function is geared towards assisting

national agencies rather than Union level demands.

Perceived common functional needs:

The argument here is that intelligence cooperation has been developed to cater for common

needs that have become evident due to more general developments within the EU. This is

essentially the neo-functional idea assuming that one political solution will lead to demands

for another and that functional spill over will gear the integration process. The establishment

of a free trade area in North America consequentially leads to demand for increased border

cooperation between the US and Mexico etc. In the case of intelligence it could be reasoned

that common policies on internal and external security has accentuated the need of

“common” information to underpin these policies. Perceived functional needs hence drive

cooperation because they raise the intelligence gains of cooperation.

If common functional needs was the driver of cooperation we could expect that (1)

the intelligence cooperation would have developed in interplay with the general framework

of the EU although with a lag; (2) various references to the general development of the EU

would have been made in the discussions that preceded the establishment of these

structures; and (3) that the existing structures for cooperation serves Common EU policies

rather than assisting national polices.

Specialization

The third internal driver does not necessarily imply that there is a need for an increased

intelligence capacity but rather that states perceive that they can reach more cost-efficient

solutions together. One example is when states pool intelligence resources and thus save

costs at the national level. So, an economy of scale logic may sway states to seek intelligence

gains from cooperation since such gains enables the sates to save costs at the national level.

It’s better to have an analyst in Brussels watching Darfur than to have one in every one of

the 27 capitals of the EU.

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If economy of scale arguments was the driver behind increased intelligence

cooperation we would expect states to (1) dismantle their national capabilities as the

equivalent capability is produced at the multilateral level or (2) only produce jointly what

they lack in terms of capabilities at the national level.

External Pressure

This perspective explains changes in state preferences by looking at drivers exogenous to the

cooperating states. In traditional realism, external pressure is a vital explanatory factor when

analyzing state behavior. External is then usually translated to systemic, i.e. states have a

small freedom of maneuver within the international system. Change in the international

system thus generates changes in state behavior. The strength of systemic explanations is

also their weakness. While they can give clear answers to “big” questions such as the fall of

empires or the logic behind wars they prove quite a blunt tool when analyzing “small”

questions such as why specific forms of cooperation takes place or why common institutions

are designed in a specific way. This paper will work with a more narrow focus where specific,

and not necessarily systemic, external processes provokes changes in state preferences. How

then do external events influence state interests concerning intelligence cooperation?

Balancing Allies

One example is when the intelligence power in the world changes. Intelligence power is simply

the level of intelligence capabilities at disposal for a specific actor6. Changes in the

international intelligence power balance may put pressure on a specific state or group of

states in two ways. If actor A (a friend to actor B) increases its intelligence capabilities, actor

B may feel the need to balance the relationship to avoid a situation of intelligence

dependency. Thus, in order to become a more attractive partner or in order to reach a higher

6 Michael Herman defines intelligence power as a specific form of state power that allows a state to

produce more advantageous effects than otherwise would have been the case. Se Herman, Michael.

Intelligence Power in Peace and War. 2001. Cambridge University Press.

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degree of intelligence autonomy, actor B may choose to increase its own intelligence

capability. The increasing intelligence power of allies thus influences state preferences in two

ways. First by increasing the intelligence gains of increasing cooperation, and second, by

lowering the sovereignty cost of cooperation in cases where cooperation is the only way to

preserve autonomy vis-à-vis a third actor.

Balancing Threats

If actor C (who actor B perceives as posing a threat) increases its intelligence capabilities this

could sway actor B to increase its intelligence capabilities in order to balance against the

threat. For example, the European countries could join forces in order to stand up

against Chinese cyber attacks or foreign countries spying on their fellow

countrymen that have immigrated to Europe. The threat scenario could be relevant

even though actor C lacks intelligence power as long as actor C in some way challenges actor

B’s intelligence power. A terrorist organization as Al Qaeda can thus threaten a state’s

intelligence power even if it lacks equivalent power itself. If actor B wants to increase it

intelligence capabilities it can do so by inserting more resources at home or by seeking

intelligence gains thru cooperation with other actors. If external threats challenges a states

intelligence power this may render the state more inclined to seek intelligence gains through

cooperation.

Cooperative Momentum

The third and last driver to be included in this analytical framework is cooperative

dynamics. So far it has been implied that cooperation is generated by factors either outside

of, or within, the involved states. Contrary to these views, cooperative dynamics builds on the

idea that cooperation originates from the cooperative process itself. As soon as a cooperative

structure is established, there will be mechanisms that drive the cooperation further.

The drivers of this group thus have in common that they are endogenous to the cooperation

itself. Hence institutions, in the form of cooperative arrangements, are both an effect and a

cause of cooperation. Or to quote David Lake: “Actors create institutions to serve their

interests, and these institutions influence subsequent behavior”. Various types of

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institutionalisms offer different suggestions to how this institutional influence should be

understood. In the following, this text rest heavily on – and indeed tries to integrate –

concepts from the rational choice branch and the historical branch of the institutionalism

literature.

Trust building

Just as it is hard to establish intelligence cooperation in the absence of trust it is difficult to

further develop intelligence cooperation if trust doesn’t increase proportionally. If risk is a

factor holding intelligence cooperation back then trust building may be a forceful driver of

increased cooperation7. Even though trust can also be seen a positive feedback effect of

cooperation it will be treated separately here since it is based on a cognitive logic rather than

a functional one and hence influences states by way of different mechanisms. What is it then

that generates trust building in a relationship? Aaron Hoffman convincingly argues that a

trusting relationship must include a risk of opportunistic behavior. Without risk there would

be no need for trust. Relationships characterized as collaboration games such as prisoner’s

dilemma where opportunism on the short term are rewarded naturally involves the

trustworthiness of the actors. To the contrary, coordination games that lacks incentives for

opportunistic behavior post decision, is less about trustworthiness. (2002: 379) Trusting

someone is thus a gamble where you expect the trustee not to betray your interest. The

behavior of the trustee deems the trusting relationship a failure or success. Trust building is

thereby a process with its own momentum where every successful act of risk taking on

behalf of others generates trust. It follows that if the risk taking backfires, for example due

to opportunistic behavior by the trustee, the accumulated trust may vanish: trust is a volatile

commodity. So, one way to establish trust is by taking risks. Another, although similar, way is

to get familiar with the preferences of others. Uncertainty about others preferences are an

inexhaustible source of distrust. Stalin never understood Churchill’s preferences and thus

mistrusted his warnings of a coming Nazi invasion. The first process is essentially inductive,

knowing that another actor wouldn’t ‘let you down’ due to your recorded history. The

second is more deductive in the sense that prior knowledge about the preferences of others

7 Se page 13 for the relationship between trust and risk.

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makes it plausible that it is not in this actor’s interest to let you down. Both processes thus

generate over time, by taking common risks and getting familiar with the preferences of

others trust accumulates. Trust building mechanisms have in common that they drive

intelligence cooperation by increasing the levels of risk that the actors are willing to take in a

specific cooperation.

If increased intelligence cooperation is caused by increasing level of trust between

the relevant actors we would expect (1) that such cooperation has increased gradually over

time; (2) that such a process has been actively supported by the practitioners and (3) that the

increase is not solely based on expansion of tasks but also of higher density of cooperation.

Institutional dynamics

The second driver relates to the effects of institutional design. Does the chosen form of a

cooperative structure drive the states to cooperate more or less? A vital design question is

how the institution is going to be controlled. Who decides over the current functioning and

future development of a specific institution? Who sets the rules that structure the

relationship? Control can be viewed as a continuum between two endpoints. One contains

no centralization of control. Any state is a full and equal member of the institution, and rules

are established and changed by traditional bargaining, deliberations or by technical expertise

that represent states. This is the model of control for most cooperative arrangements that

deal with coordination problems: i.e. the nature of the outcome is less important than the

fact that an outcome is achieved. Negotiations over standards and technical regimes are

examples of such cooperative arrangements. A more centralized model is one that includes

elements of hierarchy in the cooperation. Some members are thus more powerful than

others. This is a sensitive point since it goes against one of the most prominent principles of

international relations, the sovereignty of states. Nevertheless, elements of formal or

informal hierarchy characterize many institutional settings such as the Security Council of

the UN or the US hegemonic role in the development of the Breton Wood institutions and

NATO during much of the 20th century. Some form of hierarchy may be a precondition for

powerful states if they are to take part in intelligence cooperation. The lack of control may at

the same time restrain other actors to take part due to the increase in sovereignty cost.

Fagersten 22

Elements of hierarchy may thus offer net intelligence gains in cases where it empowers

actors with high intelligence capabilities.

Another aspect of design is the delegation of leadership to institutional actors. As soon

as states have established a cooperative structure there will be actors with an interest in the

continuous strengthening of that entity: Or, in the words of Terry Moe: ‘Once an agency is

created, the political world becomes a different place. Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own

right […] They are now players whose interests and resources alter the political game.’(1990) Alec Stone

Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein suggest that institutional entrepreneurs and

socially skilled actors can find ways to induce cooperation: ‘Crises and breakdowns within

organizations and institutions frequently provide skilled social actors the opportunity to

generate and sell new frames, to redefine the grounds for cooperation. The Policy

entrepreneur generates and attempts to propagate ideas that will define problems and

solutions in ways that other actors find convincing and useful’ (2001) Perhaps more

succinctly, they help the parties to help themselves. (Young 2003) Although human agency

is central to this approach, light has been shed on structural conditions that facilitate

individual entrepreneurial efforts, conditions such as access to multiple social networks.

(Pierson 2004) It thus seems plausible to argue that actors other than states influence the

form and function of multilateral institutions. But when, and how, does the existence of an

institutional actor lead to, for example, a more pro-integrative outcome? One way to analyze

this is to think about autonomous institutional agency as delegated leadership. In accordance

with their perceived gains of cooperation – relative to the costs of delegating leadership –

states will be more or less inclined to empower a secretary general or a supranational

institution to reach a better cooperative outcome. The function, or the form, of this

delegated leadership depends on the kind of collective-action problem faced by the states.

The two most prevalent problems inherent in international intelligence cooperation are free-

riding and manipulation. The former refers to actors who benefit from cooperation without

contributing to it themselves. The latter concerns the risk of one actor who purposefully

supplies only intelligence in support of its preferred policy or outcome, and thus

manipulating the common good for its own benefits. The solution to both of these

problems could well be some neutral control function – a solution that for natural reasons

comes with a rather high cost in terms of national sovereignty. If governments find this price

worth paying, there will be a demand for leadership. If there is also an available supplier – i.e.

Fagersten 23

an actor with skills and reputation great enough to take on the task – leadership may be,

formally or informally, delegated to this actor. As soon as an agent is empowered, it may

soon establish an agenda of its own. Even though the principals of an institution anticipate

continued authority, differing preferences and information asymmetry may induce agents to

pursue their own interests and not those of the principal – i.e. to ‘shirk’ in the P-A

vocabulary. (Tallberg 2003) The possibility for such opportunistic behaviour on the part of

an agent increases in times of turmoil when the preferences of the principals are unclear. In

most cases, the preference of institutional actors will be to advance the cooperation they are

empowered to facilitate. Jonas Tallberg, for example, explains that ‘Supranational secretariats

hold preferences of their own, normally the furthering of the political ideals embodied in the

international organization or conference they serve’ (Tallberg 2003). It can thus be argued

that secretariats and institutional actors to whom power have been delegated may drive

cooperation in a pro integrative direction by making possible higher intelligence gains to the

involved actors. They can do so by helping states reach the Pareto frontier of cooperation or

by identifying focal points around which agreements can be reached. (Beach 2005) The

leverage of such actors will increase if (a) the actor has access to multiple political arenas and

(b) the principals of an institution are divided over preferred institutional outcomes or their

preferences are unclear.

Summary

This part has suggested drivers of the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation.

The drivers affect the development by altering key state interest concerning intelligence

cooperation. Causal mechanisms have been specified within all drivers. They are summarized

below.

Fagersten 24

FROM INTERESTS TO INSTITUTIONS – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

So far this paper has tried to conceptualize the development of multilateral intelligence

cooperation and how this development can be explained by the configuration of key state

preferences. Further more it has suggested reasons to why and how these preferences

change. Bringing these aspects together, the following figure illustrates a composite model of

the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation:

Fagersten 25

Three drivers, alone or in tandem, influence state interest. By way of various mechanisms,

summarized in the table above, these drivers render states more or less inclined to seek

intelligence and policy gains, safeguard their sovereignty, and accept risks in a specific

context. The configuration of the interests will then determine what kind of institutional

development we can expect. In cases of enhanced cooperation, mechanisms such as spill

over, positive feedback and trust building may eventually provide impetus for further

development. This possibility implies that institutions shape preferences, thus challenging

the bulk of rational choice scholarship. In sum, the model explains how preferences bring

about institutions in the form of intelligence cooperation, in accordance with a rational

design approach. Furthermore, it suggests how these preferences are generated and changed,

in relation to already achieved cooperation, hence incorporating valuable insights from the

historical strand of the institutionalist literature.

The model should be employed as a tool in a close study of the developmental

process in one or a few of the cases discussed in this paper. Depending on the material at

hand it lends itself for process tracing and/or congruence testing in line with what has been

suggested by Alexander George and Andrew Bennet (2005). By so doing, the model can help

explain an interesting empirical process, as well as offering some theoretical impetus into a

sometimes too anecdotic science.

Fagersten 26

Fagersten 27

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