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COPY NO.
NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
Standing Group
R E G R A D E D N A TO U N C L A S S IF IE D
Per Authority IMSM-431-99 B y l S D a t e S t t I t .Z C ü D
Groupe Permanent
SGM-611-59
30 October 1959
Pages 1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE
SUBJECT:
References :
1959 Annual Review: Military Comments and Final List of Military Recommendations - UNITED KINGDOM
a.b. c.
I e.f.
h.1.
C-M(59)60 C-M (59)6l MC 70 (Final)MC 55/1 (Final)SGM-378-59SHAPE/98/59 AG 2100 PROG (United Kingdom), 10 October 1959SACLANT Ser. C-991, 12 October 1959 CINCHAN/CINCMAIRCHAN msg I31617Z Oct 59 SGM-5I7-59
1. In accordance with references a, b and e, the Standing
Group forwards herewith the military comments and recommendations
on the United Kingdom. The remarks contained in paragraphs 1
through 3 and 5 of reference j. apply equally in the case of this
country.
£0
0°- oo
n5
C -c7\
2, The Standing Group n otes that the current military study
on the United Kingdom, has not yet been completed and therefore no
conclusions have been reflected in these comments. The results of
the study may, however, make It necessary for the comments and
recommendations to be amended in due course.
FOR THE STANDING GROUP:■. î \K \ V-J
■ ■ 'iiy ßti
MPIs/vv
JÇÜSS/FICAtiohy/, ■
Date_
V . FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary
2 ENCLOSURES1. Military Comm ents2. Final List of Military Recommendations
DISTRIBUTION: A I - 1 3 , B2, 5, 8> D4(239 Eng, 114 Fr lorMiastr as Indicated in STAND 3235), E10, F, Gl, 2, 3, J3.L4
(PSo*n
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ENCLOSURE 1
Pages 1
MILITARY COMMENTS ON THE UNITED KINGDOM
SHAPE AND SACLANT COMMENTS
The Standing Group has noted SHAPE and SACLANT comments on
the United Kingdom contained at Appendices A and B .
CINCHAN/CINCMAIRCHAN COMMENTS
The Standing Group has noted CINCHAN/CINCMAIRCHAN conclusions
on the United Kingdom contained at Appendix C. Detailed comments
will be forwarded when received.
SGM - bll-59-1- Enclosure l
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Reproduced by ;of 3HAFE/98/59 «ftteä 10 Oct 59;
by SO f r m Copy Ho;. 5‘ *' " et '
i
AFFEMDIX A
F&ges 1 ~ 10 j incl SECRET
X 9
1 . In order to assist» nations in their defense planning» oFLPE ia currently developing country studies regarding the applications of resources towards meeting, the minimum requirements set forth in ,'.C 70. The Country“ Study on the United Kingdom has not yet been coupleted and no conclusions therefrom have been reflected in these comments on the ÎJK defense program* In due time, SHAPE will confer with the riOD, United XIradom, on the results of the study and may subsequently wish to amend the comments and recommendations on thé UK Reply to ARQ{ 59 },
2 * SKAPù emphasises the growing gravity of the training area problem in the Federal Republic of Genaany* SHäx32 , appreciates the cooperation of the UK authorities in having made training tias available in the major German training areas to meet th e growing needs of the German Army, Although the training area problem requires the attention of the FRG authorities and those of other nations whose forces are stationed in t-he FRG, 3HAPE requests the continued cooperation of the UK authorities in providing an equitable allocation of training time in the major German training areas» . ,
3» SHAPE appreciates the build-up cf RAF V-bombor forces as a significant contribution to the deterrent forces of the free world«
Ut While information on the UK Army contribution to ACE was limited to the current year* SHAF2 has assess ad the information contained in the UK Reply to ,<AiQ{59)» The following arc the most important factors which affect the effectiveness of the UK contribution to ACE:
a. Shortfalls in assigned Ar.i../, Navy and Air forceforces,,
b. Low manning levels in the UK Army units inGermany.
c» Lack of an air defense capability in the Central Region beginning in I96I*
d* Insufficient non-organic combat and service supp«rt for UK divisions in Germany*
e. Lack of 2/3Ts division as a Strategic Reserve for 3ACS0R,
NATOSECRET
I!V> ira1* ^ 3) a _____________________
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II. BXJSTIHQ AMD ]gm*NBD FORCES
A* /-PHY.
1. Tabulation of Existing and ?.Lf>vuied /'progs g nr! '='C ?Q F.eguiraiii&nte
I S Ï >, T U £ I’ PlSiïVan/ and î-îecuircriäntsMajor Units &j Weapons Units;
ISohe- Aotua.1| End Î 95Ï1 End 1960 I End 1 6-1 . i Sad 1363- 1?63l*n 1 July Plan1d MO 70:Firm
(CoalsMC 70
..Prov.Coals
KO 70 [Plan1 djMC 70 MG' 70 Heqa.
Infantry Divs M -■5/3 5/3 3 !r \3
* ■3 3
Armored Livjs « 2/5 2/5 - - - : - - ■Infantry Divs (Str&t. Sees.) M - - 2/3 ß/5 2/3 2 /3 2/3
Î0ÏAL WTS »M 7/3
(a)7/3(5)
3-2/3 Cb) >-2/5 'O) 3-2/3 '0»> 3-2/3 3-2/3
Gnd-Jtel Btrys. (o)
M 1 3 3
Gnct Del Ena' 0) M 1 .2
*2
Laorosaa 3ns 4- Lotira e^cn H 1 1 1
HJ Btrya if 3 4. J k i 5 4 3 3
HJ Bn» M 11 ï 1 1 1
Redst»ne Bns 2 Lc«rs
¥.i
i1 1
Cpl/Sgt BUS j £ Loto'ß W 1{q) 1 (d) Z «(<0 2 Z 2.!
1.______\t 2
.a
NOTESs
(a) Plus three divisional na&d^uarters
(b) Tne UK Reply states tnat present forces will be vao.in- tailed f o r & » unspecified time beyond end 1939.
(e) Little Jctm equivalent, Specific weaoons unlnown : t this time. -
(&) An additional C*rpor&l battalion is located in tne UK awaiting deployment to "erraeny.
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B, NAVY - Category A
1, Tabulation of Existing and Planned Forces and MC-70 Requirements
i 'ï t’* l : •' * 3
S T A T U S Pl a n n i n g a n d R e q u i r e m e n t s
T Y P E A c t u a l En d 1975 En d I960 En d 1 9 É 1 En d 19Ô2 1 9 ^ 1
S H I P 1959 P l a n n e d
G o a l s
MC-70 F i r m
G o a l s
M C - 7 0 P R O V .G o a l s
M C-70 Pl a n n e d
G o a l s
M C - 7 0 M C-70Goals
C L 1 1
■
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
D O 6 5 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0
O E 4 4 11 4 12 4 1 3 4 1 3 1 3
C M { b ` 1 1 1 1 1
MSC 9 9 6 9 6 9 6 9 9
MPfc & ! 8 1 4 Ô L 1 6 8 1 6 & 16 16
MC-70 Requirements, as amplified by SHAPE Planning Guidance.
NOTES: (a) The figures given represent an average over the whole year rather than a census on a particular day. This method of presentation is welcomed by SHAPE,
(b) £M, One C M Category A is reported in Navy Table 1 of the UK reply as earmarked for ACLANT in support of ACE Northern Flank» It has been assumed that this ship represents the C M required for SACEUR in the MC-70 force goals,
(c) MP aircraft requirements are also included in Section II, C* 1, Air Force.
M A i u
SECRETSGM-611-59
- 3 - Appendix A to Enclosure 1
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C. .AIR ?UI».CE
1 , Tabulation. of Kxi»'ciR& fr-fld -rccs o^nar oj.fti.ts
i S ? A T U S ! Piannir.« a*«i c.-qvsir e. «r.ts . „ 1T Actual; Kni 1 rj;in j Bnô 1960 '... Knd 1 >61....... j Knd vJSâ ‘!l ;b.3_ j
.«iJJÜÜ i
. J
1 Juty l&R 59 HG 70 ;F±rm 'HC 70 |î?r*v. ; MC 70] ? ' i Goals : i Goals i j
Plan’djwC 70 ;
Goals 1
..:c 70
— -*+
! LP./Fï ! STRIKE
Î7/9É | %/i 12 * y % \ 6/112 ! 7/72 ; $/i i 2 ! 1/12 8/ H 2 V 112
f
& ;
AÏ-T.
lb / fb
ATTACK
y ti? * ;— — > > ■ — *—■ - ■■■- - — f—---- “ ^12/32 t - ï 1/16 - j- - i
* S i
- i
HïlCCE 2/55 jé/72 )4/7é ^S/sS A/7Ö « ^ /7 * t
> i ! . . ! . . ! . . i . i
é/sA 4/7Ö
-----------------------
v?â^
■AIR
TJEP.
taux k /V lk/h.8 .4-/48 :-V4S ! 4-/48 !o : *4»* : 0 4/48 4/4S
IESP 5/54 :5/5o ;5/60 ’ 5/60 j 5/1*2: . . i . . _ i .... !
0 . y / u j0 0I — —
0
; « .AU'■' ' ;...............................!................................. i
- — ■~1 . i .
0 '2 0 ; 2" - •| -3
0 ï zu -
£
SAM -
| L . A11- |- !-
.........0 0 0 . 1 1 ! 2 !
i------------------— .-i*
— ,—
} WfflAt TACTICAL StÿW/ACFT
\—* -T- 'f 1
t £4-/259 ; 24/308; 21/ 29Öi ; ;
23/276 ; 1
1
13/ 12*i i A
iâA»o| 13/128 16/239« î
- ■ i---------------------------
i6/? 3c
0TÏ®i| îiSRIIISB | 1/6 i 1 / e :
( e ) i ; ...1/3 1/G 2/16
! !‘ i / £ \ 3 / l 6! ........ -4--------------------- -
2/15
■ * ■ * > . ■— w i ........................... . ■ ■ - y ■ ■ ■ ■ — — ■ y ■ — — " - f -------------- ■ ï " 1
S a c f Î AL i 25/267 j25/316! 23/31 2 : 24/231, j 21/ 2% i ü / t & l fcl/296 i----_ï---
1[14-/136: it/lÇSjl
î1^254
KOTEt~ (a) /iltnouwn tne reply sticks 9/55 writine -patrol aircraft ft-cm
19éO to 1962 assigned tc MAT0, only \ / b maritime patrol aircraft are earmarked for C3?'C#iFTiiD, Toe rest are. provided for otnoa* raajW NATO ocsRiRßiids (S'.CXJif'T arid oIK^^IsiCLiAli)« ïtxs ? LP aircraft requirements are also snov.n in Section II,B. 1, Navy,
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11 -` SPFBCTXVENE3S OF FORGES àtC$^f
A« Army
SHAPE notes that the.British Army communications systsm Is bèing modernised. Daring the period" under- review, it is expected that the operational effectiveness of.the command eomftunications n etwork will Improve considerably* SHAPS hopes that thé full scale re-equipment of the UK units in Germany will be completed as planned and that the UK will develop ECM capabilities in accordance with guidance contained in SACEUR *3 ECM Plan (AG 1460.1, dated 29 December 195&)*
2. Êssaaassi
a* Although gratified to note the decision t o■ .maintain t h e UK A m y in Germany at its present strength of 55*000 men beyond 1959, 3HAPE still considers that a land force contribution of 55,000 man is not sufficient to provide the combat equivalent of three divisions and the necessary balanced combat and service support, SHAPE continues to urge the United Kingdom-to meet the requirements of M C 70*
b. SHAPE is pleased to n o te the increase of the proportion of regulars in t h e UK forces due to satisfactory recruiting of volunteers. . SHAPE hopes the planned levels of regulars can be attained since the combat effectiveness of ACE units will thereby be increased.
3 .* I r a i , n .in g 1 Q K g f l a j a f l f e la a .,. .a n d _ .I g a i a a a p f r
* a, SHAPa) appreciates the cooperation of the British authorities in providing training time in the major training areas of the FRG to- meet the growing needs of the German Army, The training area problem, however, will become critical by end-1961, The situation requires the attention of the FRG authorities as well as those of other nations with forces' stationed in the FÜG, Consequently, SHAPE requests the continued cooperation of t h e UK authorities to ensura an equitable allocation of training time in major training areas in the FRO.
, fc* SHAPE is pleased to note that the SSM rangein the'Hebrides is now in use and that range time for two NATO Corporal battalions will be available during 1960# SHAPE welcomes the establishment of a SAM range -in Anglesey.
c, SHAPE is greatly concerned that the United Kingdom units in Germany are below their wartime strength*SHAPE!,notes the proposed plan that the United Kingdom ia studying for the movement of 67,500 men to Germany within 7 daysin order to bring UK units in Germany up to strength and t o . provide first reinforcements, SHAPE awaits with interest farther information on this plan* , SHAPE also notes that it is hoped to improve the posted'strength of inf ant ry‘regiments in Go xiu&ixy* *
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Ö. SHAPE is concerned that the United Kingdom ri a s not earmarked 2/3 infantry, division with balanced combat and service support as SACEUH* s S t r a t e g e R eserve as required by K C 70, SHAPE emphasizes the continuing requirem ent for this force.
e, SHAPE i3 pleased to note that the first Corporal unit is now l ocated.in Germany and that the second unit has completed its training*. SKA?Hi urg&s the UK t o ' expedite the deployment of the second unit t o Germany, SHAPE notes with satisfaction that an Honest John unit (# lchrs)is planned to be formed and moved to Germany in I960,'- As no information is given about the organization of the additional units required by MC 70, SHAPE stresses the importance of the missile program for the defense of ACE,
f, SHAPE ia concerned at the decrease in M-day non-organic combat support. SHAPE considers that the effectiveness' of the. UK Army in Germany is seriously impaired by this inadequacy,
g, SHAPE is pleased to note the progress being made in modernising equipment and the development of modern weapons,
4» Evaluation of the General Effectiveness of the United Kingdom Army Contribution to ACS
SHAPE considers that although UK units in German;' are well trained, nevertheless their combat effectiveness, is hampered by low manning levels and a lack of non-organic . support «
B* NAVY
1 * Command. Communie-at ions and Control
SHAPE note£j that -modernization of the: Royal Navy com&mni cat ions system progresses satisfactorily,. By the . end of the period under revievj. the operational effectiveness^ of the C&E system is expected to improve considerably, SHAPE hopes that the modernization program will be completed within the planned period,
2, Personnel
SHAPE is pleased to note that the recruiting and re-engagement position is r e ported as- being very favourable and consequently the R oyal Navy is expected to be manned entirely by regulars by end-1061,. This situation will make it easier to maintain the required number of highly skilled technicians and improve their quality.
3* Organisation. Training and Fleet Units
a. The training of individuals, ships and organized units has proved to' be excellent thrrsnehoirt t.h^ NATO exercises,
b, SHAPE notes that facilities for training have been provided by the UK for NATO countries particularly
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In the Joint A/S Ship Course at Londonderry, In addition, the West German Fleet Air Arm crews hive bsen trained in Royal Naval air stations,
. e . Although the reply shows an increase inMF aircraft in the EASriAWT and Channel area?, SHaPB notes that only Ö aircraft out of a requirement oi' 16 are earmarked for S^CEUH, SHAPE is concerned by this shortfall and urges that, every effort be made to meet the MC 70 goals,
d, The shortfall in Category A US is a matter of concern to SHAPE and the UK authorities are urged to meet the MC 7G requirements»
e, SHAPE considers that the shortfall of 3 MSC should be overcome, possibly by phasing forward feSCs from lower categories.
4* Logistics
The UK reviex* of the war reserves« being carried out in the light of the latest British planning concepts, renders the position of stocks vis-a-vis days of support for the forces earmarked to ÂLYÏO difficult to define, The United Kingdom ,Reply states that it is unable to use tbs SHAPE planning factors for computation of naval stockpiles. ^îhile it appears that current deficiencies would be unlikely to affect materially the efficiency of the Royal Naval units earmarked for SACEUR, SHAPE considers that its logistic planning factors should be used to compute naval stockpiles for these forces,
5 « Evaluation of the General Effectiveness... of. J & e
SACEUR1s Combat Effectiveness Report 195$ assessed the ships of the Royal Mavy e araarked for SACEUR as being fully combat ready with the MP aircraft squadron temporarily having a hi^h combat potential. During the period under review, SH^PS considers that although the individual units of the earmarked forces will be fully combat ready, the force as a whole will have a moderate combat potential until the shortfalls in M P aircraft, escort ships and M SCs are overcome»
C. AIR FORCE
1« Comm and. Commun!oat ions and Control
a, SHAPE notes the plans for the transfer to the German Air Force, between end-1959 and mid-1961, of four C&R stations in the 2 ATAF area*
b* SHAPE hopes that the progress toward establishment of the EVf station of CAPE GRECO (Cyprus) will continue without further delay,
4 ■ c. It is noted that new long range radar equipment, capable of giving Si and of controlling both fighters and SAMs will be introduced in the UK in I960, but no mention is made of electronic data handling and transmission -equipment. In this connection, the UK is encouraged to continue cooperation
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iirinex x tw SHAPE/93/59
in the' development cf an improved ground environment system} in so doing, consideration should b e given to the t entative guidance issued by SHAPE' ( AG 1250 A D E F , dated 20 July .19595 -■
d. No mention is made in the reply of SC$ planning. In this regard, the United Kingdom is urged tb develop iSCM capabilities in accordance with guidance contained in SACEURfs ECM Plan (AG 1460 p i G / E L d a t e d 29 December 1 9 5 3 ),
2 * jPeSâÀônçl
„ The build-up-o-f the planned- all-'.regular content of the H A F i s proceeding 'satisfactorily, A. slight increase by number In technicians is noted; however, as the authorization was increased, the percentage dropped to ^0%, SHAPE hopes that measures being taken to overcome shortages in ■specialists will permit the EAF to reach t h e -MC 55/1 standard in the near future.
3. iaiLaflOaidJaiasat
a. (1) SHAPE appreciates the contribution of the uAF to the effectiveness of the NATO air forces by providing a considerable number of flying instructors to the German Air Force,
(2) ■ The aircrew/aircraft' ratio has dc- _ creased slightly over the past si* months to 1,4 to 1# SHAPE considers that the RAP..should again- reach the standard of 1%5 to 1 .set forth ih MC 55/1 »
(3) SHAPE notes that the aircrew combat ready rate is 79$ and that the remainder of the'aircrews assigned to 2 <VIAF are limited combat ready, SHAPE considers that the plans.to improve fl.3n.ng training should pert?!it the RAF to meet the MG 55/1 standard.
(4/ /J.though there is no comment in,the, UK R e p l y3 SHAPE notes that .îr, the last two years the average flying hours per pilot per ye^r in the BAF were below MC 55/1 standards, SHAPE urges the RAF to make every effort to attain the standard of 24O hours per pilot,
b, (1 ) öi-ii^ü appreciates the introduction of 4 IRBM squadrons by the RAF, Although SHAPE believes that these squadrons would havts a g reater value if placed under SATO control, it is nevertheless .our. via* that u n d e r ;national command they will increase the deterrent posture of the free world,
> _ (2) SHAPE notes the. planned introductionof Valiant aircraft in some strifes squadrons which will be a qualitative improvement in the force effectiveness, ■ SACIUH*s agreement referred to in the -UK Reply was intended to indicate- tnat, in general,, one Valiant aircraft could, be substituted for each two Canberra aircraft. The Valiant- will have increased range and will provide an- all-weather capability which is not available to the Canberra force,, . The substitution of :24 . Valiant aircraft} each possessing a multiple nuclear Capability, for 48 Canberras would not reduce SUCEUR*g nuclear delivery capability* It is noted, however, that- the UK plans to eliminate 64 Canberras ana therefore the UK strike force will
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be short by the equivalent of 16 Canberra aircraft at end-1961,
(3 ) SHAPE notes with concern t h e shortfall of 22 decce aircraft by end-1960, SHAPE urges the UK to provide additional Recce aircraft to eliminate this shortage.
c* SHAPS is gravely concerned that the UK does not plan to provide the SAM. units required by ï*iC 70. The air defense situation will be even more critically affected by the d ecision to withdraw air defense forces in 2 ATAF beginning in 1961« The weakness of the air d efense of the Central Region, resulting fron these shortfalls, will jeopardize the security of ACE forces in the Center, SHAPE stresses its concern in this regard and urges the UK to meet the requirements for air defense forces in the Central Region as set forth in MC 70,
d. The reply shows in the Air Force tables- that 9/56 MP are under NATO commands SHAPE notes, however, that out of these only l/B MP are earmarked to SAClUR {CÏNCAFa E D ) » SHAPE urges the UK to provide to SaCFUR the 2/I6 M P as set forth in the 1959 3R.tPi3 Planning Guidance.
4* Logistics
a. Aircraft Combat Readiness R a t e , The average combat readiness rate fo r the past seven m onths is reported to be 54$. This figure shows no improvement from last year. Although it is realized that re-oquipping and unforeseen mechanical dcfects must acco unt for a continued low aircraft; combat ready r ate, SKAPS urges that special efforts be made to raise the figure to the MC 55/1. rate of 70%*
b. On-base Support. On-base stocks of item s of equipment and supply m e et, in general} the MC 55/I standards except for a continued shortage of Javelin and Hunter drop fuel tanks*
c. Off-basa Support Units. Regrettably,■the UK Reply does not show the situation regarding technicians, a point which 3TtLJ?iS considers to be essential when examining the adequacy of off-base support.
d. ¥ar Reserves. War reserve holdings of equipment and supplies are good except for a continued critical shortage of 30 mm ammunition and drop fuel tanks for Hunter and Javelin aircraft*
5» Evaluation of the General Effectiveness of the Roval Air Force
SHAPE considers the combat potential of the RAF units assigned to SUCEUR as high at present-»
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[V. CONCLUSIONS
4»
From the foregoing -.5valuation, SIA'.PE considers that the United Kingdom Army contribution to ACE bas at pres e n t ,- and will have in I960, a moderate capability to carry out its mission. The critical x‘actors p.re :
a. The continuing lack of personnel and equipment accessary to provide thr- combat equivalent of throe divisions and the required balanced coB'bat and srrvico support »
b. The leek of two-thirdfs of a division earmarkadas 3.».0 ;"UIIf s 3t n t eri ïSCTvG .
B. N.PvY
In view of the foregoing evaluation, SK-.PS considers that ehe UK naval forces earmarked for S^CSUP have at present, and w ill have during the per: od under review, a moderate capability to carry out their assigned missions. The critical factors are:
a. Shortfall in FP aircraft (see Air Force Conclusion , Se c bio n 1V . C . } .
b. Shortfall- in Category A escort ships.
C. .aR FQPCF
From the foregoing evaluation, SHAPE, considers that the RAF squadrons assigned to S.'»C5UR hav? a high capability to carry out thuir missions. 3y the end of the period under review, this capability will decrease considerably. The critical factors arc:
a. Shortfall in 3trike and Pecce squadrons and rireraft ,
b. Lack of air defense squadrons and SAM units beginning in 196],
c. Shortage of 1 maritim« patrol squadron of eight aircraft .
d. L o w aircraft combat ready rate.
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1. ~ t n c i .
..cqjfflags ON THE TIMMD KINGDOM R&FLY TO M C 1959
feneral
1# Critical Asaee^a
b<* Navy
Cl) Qvarwfl.il Shortfall of ASW Forces In the Atlantic
w i r e" - 4;c, i
(a) Although the m&rçr stepsRoyal Navy and Boyal Air Force are
. _ . jtB currently being taken toPa4§ï*nise the ships and aircraft of the' „ ' _ .ïlQit§é. and appreciated^ SàCLAKT oust nevertheless express hia continued ieftöärn over the liiaited forces provided, and over the grave gap which ßes fsquently «gists between the forces declared to Î&TO by the United liRgêota, end those requested in KD 70«
(b) While it is appreciated that the United Kingdom has ffiêKÿ defense c^mdLtmenfes outside the îfiüEQ area, and that the forces provided te Biset these eoææ&tmeïïts are indeed» in many cases, operating in the general IfitS est of the Western Alliance, there remains the fact that the forces grsvided in the Atlantic are insufficient to meet the threat in that area*
(c) Of particular concern to SàCLaHT is the over-all ^ f t f a H in A2¥ forces despite the undiii&nisheâ. gravity of the submarinethyn&t in the Atlantic,
(2) ShortgaU_ln-fegW Carriers
(a) By 1960-61, it now «ppears that only 6 ASW carriers « a be available to SACLAïfT in Category %*’ as opposed to the 12 requested 48 W 70s Of these six, two are provided by countries possessing only one tarier and not therefore able to guarantee their continuous availability«It Ä L thus be seen that lees than. 50$ of the carriers reauired will be available*
(b) The Royal Navy has a very considerable background of $£pgf£ence in the opération of ASW carriers, and the shortfall indicated for th§§§ ships in their forces is therefore of grave concern to SACLANT*
(3) Shortfall in Sforitfote P&trol A ir c r a f t
(a) Although Much has been said previously on this subject, £$& Ihe reconsideration given by the British authorities to the original plans le? 8V6A greater reduction are appreciated, SkCLAKP feels bound to reiterate th® £&ct that the total now being provided remains well below that requestedâa m 70, . " '
(b) The number provided to S^CLA® by the United Kingdom in nste to be 34 as opposed to the 72 requested, and again there is a serious
shortfall of these aircraft tliroughout AGLAtf?,
(«) In aggregate, the reduction in availability of ASW ®&?rl&rs, the removal of the Garnet fixeu vdng aircraft from ttie remaining Aüf §<àrtfiers, and the liniited number of shore based maritime patrol aircraft pïwiàed, all contribute to a grave over-all shortage of available ASW air §£¥§ü?&gs throughout the Atlantic area«
(4) &rer~age of Escort Vessels
(a) It will be noted frosa the Table in Section III of consents that the majority of DCs and SEs presently allocated to SaGLd®
if®?« ©osspleied ir the immédiate post war period, and will thus be approaching{}fe§9l.3QC<anc<3 by 1963*
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(b) lo addition, there is aa aggregate shortfall In DDs and ÜEa of 10 eMps in Category for the year 1962» Thus, programs are required both to increase the number of ships available and to replace existing ship a at a sufficient rate to prevent farther ©bseleaoence*
2« Gengral Concluaiojig
In the opinion of SäGLANI the naval and maritime anti-submarine air forces provided by the United Kingdom fall bo far short of thos® requested in I® 70 that the ability of SACLAN? to perform his KftTO Missions is prejudiced.
XX*
1* b. 1TABLE
gACLAHF KlÜlS ONLY BCCgAGT FROH AMMBK 1 TO TABLE 1
(D (a) (3Ï (4) <5) £:£ A2S2 1 2 & 12&
(5) - U)PITT BY CAT rm m &
OVA A 1 1 1 1 2 -1B 1 lb 0 2.0 » jfee0 0 0 0 0 «*
cvs/cth A 1 2 0 1 1(cm,) B 3 1 3 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 “
Cü/CL/CG À â 2 a z 2B i 2 2 2 » /20 0 0 0 0 e»
SS/SSG/3SR k 26 24 27 25 25B 5 6 é 6 60 0 0 0 0 *"
DD/DDG A e 9 7 4 24)B 17 17 13 14 3D)C 0 0 0 0 -5 »
5 -10 C«,ï àm (1) A 14 12 11 15 5) / 4 CàT B
B 10 10 14 10 »)0 0 0 0 0
» (2) A . 34 34 34 34 72 -3«B 0 0 0 0 «C 0 0 0 0 «w
b In commission outside 3SWÎ0 area
o 1 in coiSK&eaion outside NATO area,1 vssrkirjg during th® following year*
Includes Caaamndo Carrier BULWARK* 1 other outside HtiTO area and 1 working vüp or carryiïïg out trials*
In operational r sa erve in UJU
This is the over-all KaT0 declaration. Allocation between ShCLaïIT and SAOFJE has not yet been settled»
Included in fee CaT B figures for DD and DE are 8 ships deployed outside the NATO area*
(1) Cap&blo of 24 knots or toore*
(2) Total NATO cocaaamd A/C shown ae 56»planning purpoaw® 7C$ earmarked SäSLATO mid 305S «aamarked CHâlBHEL
8 e&noarked Cxww^ïiüu leaving i*aENEL)*
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(1) IM M é ,M . of -• ' > i Ô
(a) In paragraph 6 of Part II B oi the Jmted Kin^dt^^T douerai Meraorandum in Reply to the 1959 *naual Review, reference is saade to g Ckm&rsl Wot® in Table I, Navy Section, hereby declaration &rn based on
average member of ships likely to be av&ilable throughout the year fallowing each 3let December*
(b) 3.4CLAKT cannot accept tida method of declaration of «toe» applied to Annual R«view procedure, since it conflicts with
ê&r&graph I of the Preface to tbs Annual Review Questionnaire which ijMScifically requires careful observance of the principle of consistency.
(c) Sforeover, it cannot be determined what is meant by "äYßföge number available1'j since this can be calculated in a nwaber of âiêferent ways*
(d) Mtîîle it is appreciated that there will always be variations in the actual numbers available by Category throughout the year,, it ii felt that such variations should be reported through normal staff §hA®ele to the M T O Conmanders concerned.
(2) Exclusion of Category “C" Forces
It is noted from note (it) of the General Notes on Table 1 Navy of the Reply that it is no longer the United Kingdom's intention to ûml&TG Category UG” forces to KàTO,
(a) The availability of Category “a” aircraft carriers for th® peried binder review for the 31st of December of each year as extracted from the "Forecast of carrier availability” (enclosure to Adrairalty letter
34/56 of 30th July 1959) appears to be as follows:
1959
VICTORIOUS OVA
I960
ARK R O m CVA HERMES CUL
(b) From the carrier loadings reported on page 7 o f Navy isetion,, Table I of the United Kingdom Reply, it is i»ted that HERMES will be Quipped with 6 Scimitar Strike fig h ters , io Vixen fighters, 12 Wessex fe#lioopters and A. Gannet A M aircraft.
(c) This loading indi c e s the ability to fill either the Strike fleet or A3W role0
(d) The same type of mixed loading is indicated for CENTAUR Vfh«oa she baeosies available to SaCLAK? in 1961*
(e) Combining the CVAs and CVLs, therefore* the total (Wrier shortfalls for the years under review appear to be*
1959
2
miI
1962
1
(f ) These shortfall» contribute to a generally unsatisfactory«&rrter situation in. the Atlantic*
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a*
0,) The list comprises tboso ships now believed toess Mtmpic«! for aseigOT3rït fco SACLa® (a® obtained from JOXNTCIKCKkSTLnMr ^ïÜ-Aïmed Hbployment ar4 35^1o|ra&nt of Forces Earmarked for Assi^naent toSäCUUt" m m I Bvptmbw 1959b
SOT3Wfl!®D DATE HULL aGE
H E m m LAimÇHSp ÖBSGLESCEMCE
c m n cToaiom? 1959 1941 After 1963 24*QEM’AbH 194? 1953 After 1963 l6
00 m m m i m 1942 ? 22CO TIOSR 1945 19 #9 ? 18CC SH8FFELJD 193^ 193? 1962 2?
S3 W R p o m 1956 1958 after 1963 7IS RCfîQtfAL 195* 1953 After 1963 788 ASFUÏB 1945 1945 After 19 63 18m ACHEEÖN 3,94? 194a After 1963 16m m m a 1945 1946 After 1963 18ss m m m 1946 194? After 19 63 1783 t i m m X945 19 47 After I963 1 £BU ALDHtfŒY 1945 1945 After 1963 ieSB W I M M » 1942 1943 I960 21S3 m m 1944 1944 1962 1983 TABAKÖ 1945 1946 After 1963 18
TmsLaas 1943 1945 1963 20s% TIPTOE 1943 3-944 After 1963 20S3 t m m m L m 1945 1945 After 19 63 18S3 TJOMP 1945 1945 1963 10SS THSSPASSIH 1943 1942 1960 21S3 SKA DSVÎL 1945 1945 1962 18Si S M SüO'Ji' 1944 1944 1962 19ss s c o m n m i m 1945 1963 1933 GRAMPUS 195? ? After 1963 6S3 AW3B8W 1946 194a After 19 63 17$$ T M % C H V B 1943 1943 1959 20B$ TBEMCRftNX 1943 19*4 1961 20B$ Ï0EIN 1943 1945 1963 20m TURWM 1944 1944 After I963 19m ÜÏÏTTO 194? 1948 After 1963 16
a s m 1945 1945 1961 10m M » 1957 ? ? 6m Aimia 1945 1946 ? IS
ds TffiWB 1942 i m ? 218$ ANCH ΠU F 1946 1947 ? 1?
3D t r a p æ g &r 1944 1945 ? 19DP &UNORK 1945 1946 ? 18DD HRfiM)SNCSt& 1946 194Ô ? 17W JUTLAND i m 1947 ? 17m m m m 1943 1945 î 20m s t m m 1944 194* ? 19m c m m w m X944 1945 ? 19m o A v m m 1944 1944 rtfter 1963 19
^VICTORIOUS ro*.1ox -ftonvôï,*lot» aud. refit, in 1956*
« » P BAppendix E to
w « 1
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ESOSiiTED DaTK HULL *G3TYPE Ml®• x i i** LAUNCHED COliFLEJfED»Jyri Winn u m « mm 'I -»«w OBSOLESCENCE IN 1963 Ô
HD CQïîlTSr 1944 1945 1959 19DD FIlSIâTEEHS 1944 1945 1962 19DD OffiSQUBRS 1944 1945 1962 19DD SLUIS 1945 1946 1962 18DO ÄTAPAK 1945 1947 After 1963 18DD SCLKBâY 1944 1945 1962 19DD LAGOS 1944 1945 1962 19DD HOGUE 1944 1945 I960 19DD ChSSSFOST 1944 1945 After 1963 19
BE/DDE SaLISBURI 1953 1957 After 1963 10DE/DDE CHICHESTER 1955 1950 After I963 &DI/DDE LLAÎS3AFF 1955 195Ö After 1963 êDE/DES EASTBOURNE 1955 195S After 1963 sDE/DD3 wtcrar 1954 1956 After 1963 9DE/DDE ESST 1943 1944 After 1963 20DIÎ/DDE RrLPID 1942 1943 ? 21ÛS/DDE VIRAGO 1943 1943 ? 20DS/DDE 70IAGE 1943 1944 1 SODE/DDB POtTLOCK BAY 1945 1946 I960 18 19.5 ktaLWDDE LOCH DUKVEGAN m u 1944 I960 19 19«5 fetaDi/DDE LOCH KILLXN 1943 1944 1961 20 19*5 kfcsDE/DDE LOCH M3RË 1944 1945 1961 19 19*5 ktaDS/DDE LOCH VEYaTIE 1945 1946 I96I IS 19,5 ktaDE/DDE SCAilBOROUŒ 1955 1957 After 1963 8DE/DDE TENS? 1955 1957 After 1963 8DE/DBS TORQUAY 1954 1956 ? 9DE/DDE PALLI3ER 1956 1957 2 7DE/.DÎE ROEBUCK 1942 1943 1963 21DE/DDE ULSTER 1945 1943 After 1963 21DE/DDE TROUSRIDG® 1942 1943 After 1963 21BE/DBS VIGILANT 1942 1943 1963 21BE/DDE PETARD 1941 m a ? 22DE/BOS » 1954 1957 % 9DE/DDK URANIA 1943 1944 After 1963 20DE/DDE nsLaK 1942 1943 1963 21DE/DDE TERPSICHORE 1943 1944 ? 20
(2) Eael&cement_pf. Carrier.. Fixed M m Helicopters
Th« plan to r«$>lac© the Garaiet ASVI airoraft by Wesasx ASVÎ helicopters i3 noted3 and the small time laps® before the availability of the 9®sJX*weath«rH helicopter is satisfactory®
(3) Despite the undoubted effectiveness of the ASM helicopter and it a superiority to the fixed ■wing aircraft at the present tiaa® for51 close-in1' ASW operation* there vrill still remain the long range patrol requirement, and it is not considered f at the füll effectiveness of the aircraft carrier can be achieved unless some fixed wing aircraft are carried for this purpose» .
(4) From a study of the proposed carrier loading plans it is assumed that this function will in part be carried out by the ÂEW Gennete*
(5) It is hoped that every effort will be isade to ensure the timely execution of the ¥3$a«x Prograta*
N Ä 1 Ö
SECRET
s a ^ S î T - s ÿAppendix B to
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Raa.illnggs., of Cafce&ar?/ »S» Forets .di&jayedoutaide the Atlantic
(6) lb© intention of the United Kingdom authorities to continue tbs declaration of ships on foreign stations as îtsîO Category "B" forces is noted*
(7) In the opinion of S.aCL^ff > vihile the actual state of consbat readiness of these units is unquestionably greater than that of reaarv© fleet shipsj, their redeployment during the opening stages of a global war appears unlikely. This would se«a particularly applicable to the helicopter carrier ElîLîtVHK which would not only have to redeploy, but would have to do so in a different role (assuming that she could be relieved of her role as a helicopter carrier} >Mch itself sesas unlikely in a global war)*
(S) à further objection to this practice is that it might well ba adopted by other KA!TQ nations, notably Portugal, the Netherlands and France, a condition -which wuld thus render quite unrealistic the MC 70 minium force requirements which are based solely upon meeting the threat in the Atlantic,
(9) Should NATO become involved in war# it does not appear likely that the GÉNTÛ and SÊAT0 areas would remain imcoKraitted, and that the United Kingdom would be in a position to withdraw forces from those waters«The arrival of these forces cannot therefore be relied on; nor can ShCLaNT agree that it is realistic to describe them as Category "B" forces»
DDa and KBa
(10) The building programs for modern escort vessels reported in paragraphs 21 to 25 of Part II B of the General Hsœorandum are noted with satisfaction.
(11) From the list of ships now allocated to Î&T0 it voll be seen that of 44- vessels of this type listed, 14 will have a hull age of 20 years or ever by 1963 and & further 20 will be over 17 years of age,
(12) The extensive building programs proposed must therefore be regarded as a matter of urgency if a sufficient replacement rate is to be obtained to prevent serious obsolescence«
(13) In this connection the concluding sentence of the first paragraph of Part II B reporting the good progress of the modernization progress is noted vtilth satisfaction.
Submarines
(14) The extent of the submarine building program is noted with satisfaction, but it will be seen from the declared ships list that of 31 submarines declared during 1959, 22 are 14 years old or more and will be 10 years old or core by 1963#
(15) This again emphasises the urgency of accelerated building programs if serious obsolescence is to be avoided»
(16) The fitting of the Type 137 long range sonar in submarines is welcomed* This program also should be accelerated#
(17) S&GUAKT wishes to emphasize the value which he places upon the SSK submarine as an anti,- submarine weapons system,
Ooraatand. Coau rilcatjona and Electronics
(18) The progress in the construction of the new Headquarters and Communication Center for JOIfffCIKGEkSTLAMF is noted with satisfaction as
- 6 Appendix B to En c l o s e ® 1
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is Ui« Improvement of ftomaasnic&tion f&ailitiea in Gibraltar# The prograffl&èÿiiCi VLF station projert should b© completed «,,3 eooa as possible*
(19) In the UHF conversion progrsrn the differences in timing of thé ^ahip-ship“, "aircraft®, and fiship-airsî programs are noted with concern* Every effort should he mad« to avoid the serious cosæa&iications problem created by these differencsa» It would appew: that the "ship-air" program requires accélération to match the aircraft program^
<2£>) The advent of guided missiles* ehor®, submarine arid air launched, places added aphasia o& the need for fully effective EQM equipment* This ia particularly applicable to those forces allocated to the Strike Fleet, and it is requested that every effort be mad® to ensure the fitting of Active ECM equipment in these shipc«
(1) The state qf training jf units allocated te ShŒtiïffî is entirely aatisfaetory.
(2) The training facilities reported aa being made available to other M T Ô nations are greatly appreciated, and are of considerable value in raising the o^ar-alX standard of training throughout the ACLAM! forces*
(3} The participation of ships of the Hoysl Navy in NATO exercises during the past year baa been welcomed. Particularly effective was the performance of KNS VICTORIOUS during her recent escercdses in the W 5TLANT ar^a»
£4) The appointaient of a Flag Officer Sea Training reported in paragraph 50 of Fart II B of the Reply # and the availability of his services for ships of other NaTO nations are also appreciated*
0.
(1) Detailed comments on the United Kingdom. Infra structure Program are contained in the SACLANF Quarterly'' Progress Eeport on Common Infrastructure. S&CLANT serial tJ-ôEC of 23rd July 1959*
(2) The current progress baing made on the N&T0 infrastructure projects ia th® United Kingdom ia noted with satisfaction, and the appointment of the CaptaiRf-in-Charge >1iose duties «ill include overseeing the progress of all the Clyde Ba m projects should fee of considerable assistance.
(3) The general statue of logistic support for United Kingdom forces appears satisfactory.
d* Personnel
(1) The increase in regular force personnel and the high rat-ss of re-engagement reported are most encouraging,
(2) The intention of the Royal Mavy to have all regular fore® personnel by 1963 is noted with satisfaction*
lï» Conclusions
1» Although- massy satisfactory improvements are noted in the readiness, tr&iriing and personnel status of the United l&bigdosi force contributions to S&SLkW; the forces provided remain trail below those requested in MS 70»
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3» While the various werld-wlde cocrasitraents faced by the United Xitigdom ere recogrdzod. and their requirements for forces to iseet these coinmitmer.ts are appreciated, this in no m y compensates for the serious shortfall in forces recjuired to meet the threat in the Atlantic*
3» Of particular significance and concern to S&CLANF are the fallowing factors*
&» The stortfall of 30 Category nAH Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
b» The fact that there is a continuing shortfall of at least one aircraft carrier, and that in 1961 no ASW carrier will be available in Category »A!,a
c. The shortfall of 10 escort vessels in Category "&w*
d* The aerioua degree of obsolescence which appears likely to ââYelop in both escort vessels and submarines In the near futures
4* SACLAOT wishes to reiterate the £&et that the minimum force -requirements stated in I® 70 were based upon the aosuaçtlon that a21 unite provided would be of modern design and fitted with the b o et effective weapon systems available,
5* While the various modernisation programs being undertaken and the increased effectiveness resulting from installation of modern equipment are greatîy appreciated, these do not compensate for the shortfall in a m ber a r ported*
6» The aggregate shortfalls reported in the 1959 Annual Review, particularly in À3W aircraft, escort vessels and submarines are such that the ability of SiGLàNT to meet the increasing ensrçy submarine threat, both to targets ashore and ships at sea, is nsoet seriously prejudiced,
?. SACHANT fully appreciates the very large defense effort being ssade by the United Kingdom and the paramount need to avoid overloading the national econtasy. Nevertheless, SACLANT is charged by the NATO nations (including the United Kingdom) with the defense of the Atlantic, and his adnimuai force requirements for this task have not been challenged. The fact remains that tho necessary forces are not forthcoming*
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APPENDIX C
Pages 1
m oSECRET
CINCHAN/CINCMAIRCHAN CONCLUSIONS ON THE UNITED KINGDOM
1 . Due to financial and manpower limitations the United
Kingdom has not been able to make any substantial increases over
last year's figures in the numbers of naval forces and maritime
patrol aircraft earmarked for ACCHAN.
2. There has, however, been a welcome increase in the stan
dard of quality of the ASW surface forces earmarked for ACCHAN,
whilst the earmarking of HPS will further improve the A/S capability
of the command.
3. Notwithstanding the above mentioned improvements, however,
there still exist shortfalls in Category A requirements for ASW
surface forces and M/P aircraft. These deficiencies, particularly
in r egard to the shortfall of over one third of the Category A
escorts required, impose serious limitations on the commanders'
ability to accomplish their assigned missions.
NATO SECRET
-1- Appendix C toËiiëlosure 1
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APPENDIX C
ges 1
cincha n/cincma; USIONS ON THE UNITED KINGDOM
1. Due to financial and manpower limitations the United
Kingdom has not been able to make any substantial increases over
last year's figures in the numbers of naval forces and maritime
patrol aircraft earmarked for ACCHAN.
2. There has, however, been a welcom e increase in the stan
dard of quality of the ASW surface forces earmarked for ACCHAN,
whilst the earmarking of HPS wilüolçÂther improve the A/S capability
of the command.
3. Notwithstanding the above mentioned improvements, however,
there still exist shortfalls in Category A requirements for ASW
surface forces and M/P aircraft. These deficiencies, particularly
in regard to the shortfall of over one third of the Category A
reports required, impose serious limitations on the comm anders'
ability to accomplish their assigned missions.
SÖM-611-59Appendix C to
NAToölosure 1 ljïÏLl J
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ENCLOSURE 2
Pages 1 - 2, Incl.
FINAL LIST OF MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Standing Group has approved the following final list of
military recommendations which it urg es that the United Kingdom
should implement in order to attain the requirements of MC 70 and
standards of readiness of MC 55/1* These recommendations are
listed in order of urgency without regard to service.
1. Provide 16 Canberra aircraft, or the equivalent in Valiants,
additional to the planned force of 24 Valiant aircraft in the strike
squadrons.
2. Provide Recce aircraft as set forth in MC 70*
3. Provide the personnel and equipment necessary to constitute
the combat equivalent of three divisions and expedite the deployment
of the second CORPORAL unit to Germany.
4. Make further efforts to provide the number of Category A
ASW surface forces required by MC 70 including an additional ASW
carrier.
5. Provide the air defense squadrons (AWX and IDF) and SAM
units as set forth in MC 70.
6. Make the necessary provisions for meeting the minimum force
requirements of MC 70 in maritime patrol aircraft.
7. Provide adequate balanced non-organic support in the UK
Army contribution to ACE,
8. Accelerate if possible the replacement program to overcome
obsolescence of submarines and escort vessels.
9. Place very high priority on the fitting of long-range sonar
in submarines and escort vessels.
10. Increase the aircraft combat ready rate to the MC 55/1
standard.
•1- Enclosure 2
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o , a. • - ` ■
11, Earmark 2/3 of an M-Day division, with balanced support,
for SACEU R1s strategic reserve in accordance with MC JO.
-2- Enclosure 2SOM-61
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(Mu® CDAPPROVED FOR PUBLlS'ÏÏÎS^ ^ I f f l îÉ
12 November 1959
NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
Standing Group Groupe Permanent
CORRIGENDUM NO. 1
Pages 1
to SGM-611-59
1. Holders of SGM-611-59 (1959 Annual Review: Military
Comments and Final List of Military Recommendations - UNITED
KINGDOM) are requested to replace Appendix C to Enclosure 1
with the attached page.
2. The removed page will be destroyed by burning or
reducing to pulp.
3 . This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when
attached page has been removed.
I &'3ùU COL _______________ .
e'G. rH . DOS WELLLt, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Secretary
GHD/vv
1 ENCLOSURE (l page) App C to Enel I to SC-M-611-59
a
DISTRIBUTION: same as for basic
a H i
- i -
SG M ^ 1 - 3 T - ^ r F i g endum No. 1
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