Motions for Summary Judgment:

A Report to the Law Institute

Proposed Legislative Changes to Article 966

Moderator:

Judge Guy Holdridge

Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit

Panelists:

Judge Piper D. Griffin Orleans Parish Civil District Court

Rep. Neil Abramson Chair, Louisiana House Civil Law and Procedure Committee

Sen. Edwin Murray Louisiana Senate Judiciary A Committee

Donald W. Price Dué, Price, Guidry, Piedrahita & Andrews

2015 Evidence and Procedure Seminar LOUISIANA JUDICIAL COLLEGE

LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

February 26, 2015 . Windsor Court Hotel . New Orleans, Louisiana

Although the author is a member of the Subcommittee, the views expressed herein are1

purely his own, and should not be interpreted as any official statement on behalf of theSubcommittee as a whole.

The LADC comments are scheduled to be considered at a February 5, 2015 meeting of2

the Subcommittee, and that meeting will likely result in further modification of theSubcommittee’s proposal.

La. C.C.P. article 966, Official Revision comment (a) (1960).3

La. C.C.P. article 969; Comment, Summary Judgment, 21 La. L. Rev. 209, 211 (1960)4

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An Update on Proposed Revisions to the LouisianaSummary Judgment Statute

by Donald W. Price

Since its introduction to Louisiana civil procedure forty-five years ago, summary judgmentprocedure in Louisiana state courts has evolved from a rarely used process focused on documentaryevidence cases to a tool that is utilized by both plaintiffs and defendants in virtually every complexcase. While its use has expanded, the statute has not always reflected that expansion. Over the lastseveral years, this has resulted in annual amendments to La. Code Civ. P. article 966, some of whichhave been drafted and amended during the legislative session. These amendments have createdsignificant controversy and dismay among both the courts and practitioners. In an attempt tocomprehensively address the issues that have arisen with the statute, the Louisiana State LawInstitute appointed a Summary Judgment Subcommittee to propose changes in the statute. Thispaper sets forth the work of the Subcommittee, which is still in progress, and the author’s impressionof that work. Attached is the draft amendment of article 966 as it exists following December1

recommendations by attendees of the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel Seminar inDecember of 2014.2

Background

When summary judgment was first introduced to Louisiana law with the promulgation of theCode of Civil Procedure in 1960, the official revision comments predicted that motion “will not besuccessfully utilized often, [but] the availability of the device and its potential for expeditiousdisposition of frivolous, but well pleaded, demands and defenses should go very far in discouragingsuch demands and defenses.” A contemporaneous law review comment pointed out a few of the3

significant differences between the Louisiana articles and Federal Rule 56. Unlike the federal rule,which applies to “all actions,” article 969 limited the availability of summary judgment in certainfamily law cases. Further, while Rule 56 allowed interlocutory judgments, the Louisiana version4

did not allow partial summary judgment. The author indicated that some of the reporters on therevision favored that provision, but it was excluded in an attempt to simplify summary judgment and

Comment, supra note 4, at 218-19.5

477 U.S. 317 (1986).6

1996 La. Acts No. 9, § 1 (1st Extraordinary Session).7

See, e.g., Taylor v. Rowell, 98-2865 (La. 5/18/99), 736 So.2d 812, 814.8

99-2181, pp. 18-19 (La. 2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 236.9

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because Louisiana then had few civil jury trials.5

Although the summary judgment statutes were occasionally amended, not much changeduntil 1996. That year, and as clarified in 1997, the Legislature amended the summary judgmentarticle by adopting the burden-shifting approach taken by the United States Supreme Court inCelotex Corp. v. Catrett. Under that approach, the burden of proof on summary judgment rests with6

the party who will bear the burden of proof at trial, who may or may not be the party moving forsummary judgment. Further, the Legislature explicitly stated that summary judgment is now apreferred means of resolving cases. The 1996 amendment also introduced the requirement thatsummary judgment motions be ruled upon at least ten days before trial.

In retrospect, perhaps the most significant portion of the 1996 legislation was its amendmentof paragraph E to allow summary judgments “dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery,cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summaryjudgment does not dispose of the entire case.” 7

One of the immediate effects of the new statute was to add a new layer of boilerplate languageto courts’ recitations of the law of summary judgment, setting forth its purpose and its favored status.8

There also seems to be much greater use of the summary judgment procedure. A simple Westlawsearch for summary judgment cases by the Louisiana Supreme Court returns 576 such cases in thethirty-five years before the effective date of the 1996 amendment, but it returns 581 in the eighteenyears following the amendment. In essence, Louisiana has imported federal court motion practice intoits state courts.

Another important development in summary judgment procedure was the supreme court’srecognition, in Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp. that article does not preclude expert9

opinion testimony in the form of an affidavit or deposition submitted in support of or opposition toa motion for summary judgment. If there is no credibility determination at issue, the trial judge mustconsider this evidence if it would be admissible at trial. If qualifying evidence is submitted inopposition to a motion for summary judgment which creates a dispute as to a genuine issue of

The legislature amended article 967 to make the allowance of expert opinions explicit in10

2003. See 2003 La. Acts No. 967.

Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, pp. 5-6 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 883-843.11

MB Industries v. CNA Ins. Co., 11-303, pp. 15-16 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1173, 1184.12

La. C.C.P. article 966(B)(1).13

06-175, p. 1 (La. 5/5/06), 928 So.2d 536, 536 (per curiam).14

10-0564 (La. 4/9/10), 32 So.3d 800 (per curiam).15

2010 La. Acts No. 690.16

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material fact, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. In cases where expert testimony10

is required, such as non-obvious medical malpractice, the failure of the plaintiff to produce an expertaffidavit is grounds for granting summary judgment. And when expert testimony is necessary, the11

defendant need not wait to file its motion until expert deadlines established in a scheduling order havepassed; it may file it at any time.12

There have been several statutory amendments setting forth the time for serving and filingaffidavits and oppositions; the statute currently refers to Uniform District Court Rule 9.9 to establishthose times. The Supreme Court has made it clear that these timelines are mandatory. In Buggage13

v. Volks Constructors, the court found that the court of appeal erred as a matter of law in considering14

a late-filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The opposition had been disallowed bythe trial court when it was filed a few minutes before the scheduled hearing on the motion. And inNewsome v. Homer Memorial Medical Center, the court found that the trial court abused its15

discretion in granting a continuance of a long-pending medical malpractice case to allow the plaintiffto timely file her expert’s affidavit.

Recent legislation has attempted to change the way issues are identified and evidence issubmitted on summary judgment. The long-standing rule was that the court on summary judgmentcould consider matters “on file.” Some developed the perception that this provision was too broad,in that it empowered trial court judges to search through the record for any basis to grant summaryjudgment, whether it was argued by the mover or not. This led first to the 2010 amendment, whichadded a new paragraph E, which provided, “A summary judgment shall be rendered or affirmed onlyas to those issues set forth in the motion before the court at that time.” The amendment also added16

a new paragraph F, designed to make summary judgment effective as to all parties throughout thecase. It provided:

When the court determines, in accordance with the provisions of this Article,that a party or nonparty is not negligent, not at fault, or did not cause, whether inwhole or in part, the injury or harm alleged, that party or nonparty may not be

Id.17

2012 La. Acts No. 257.18

Id.19

2012 La. Acts No. 741.20

Aydell v. Sterns, 98-3135 (La. 2/26/99), 731 So.2d 189, 189-90 (per curiam); Levine v.21

TK Valve & Mfg. Co., 550 So.2d 620 (La. 1989) (per curiam).

Dyes v. Isuzu Motors, 611 So.2d 126, 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).22

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considered in any subsequent allocation of fault. Evidence shall not be admitted attrial to establish the fault of that party or nonparty nor shall the issue be submitted tothe jury. This Paragraph shall not apply when a summary judgment is granted solelyon the successful assertion of an affirmative defense in accordance with Article1005.17

These measures were deemed inadequate, which led to another attempt to fix these perceivedproblems in 2012. That act deleted the words “on file” from paragraph B(2), in an attempt to limitthe decision to the matters specifically placed before the court on the motion. It also explicitly18

stated, “Only evidence admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment shall be consideredby the court in its ruling on the motion.” A separate 2012 amendment required the trial court to19

provide reasons for denial of a motion for summary judgment.20

The first 2012 amendment caused problems in those areas of the state where it was notcustomary to offer, file and introduce one’s evidence on summary judgment. Because of the “on file”language, the supreme court had held that documents submitted in support of or in opposition tosummary judgment need not be formally introduced into evidence. Despite this, the practice21

developed in the first circuit (and perhaps elsewhere) of formally introducing all of the summaryjudgment evidence; this was in response to first circuit cases suggesting that documents attached tomemoranda were not in the record because memoranda are not technically pleadings. Accordingly,22

there was now a new requirement that documents be formally introduced into evidence that wasinconsistent with the practices elsewhere in the state, and thought to preclude the parties from waivingthe hearing. The 2013 amendment, among other things, attempted to fix this problem by deemingall attachments to the motion or the opposition memorandum admitted into evidence. This provision,in turn, created an issue of whether by “deeming” the attachments were admitted, courts were requiredto consider the attachments without regard to whether they constituted competent evidence.

In 2014, in SB 373, Senator Ronnie Johns proposed a comprehensive rewrite of article 966.This bill was largely drafted by Judge James Genovese of the third circuit, and it essentially calledfor a pretrial-order type procedure in which each party identified the documents it intended to submit

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in support of or in opposition to the motion. The bill passed the Senate, and then an ad hoc group oflawyers, judges and legislators drafted proposed amendments to the bill before it was brought up inthe House Civil Law and Procedure Committee. That committee, however, involuntarily deferredthe bill, thus killing it for the 2014 session.

LSLI’s Summary Judgment Subcommittee

In response to the ongoing issues concerning summary judgment procedure, RepresentativeNeil Abramson (the chair of the House Civil Laws committee) and Judge Guy Holdridge wereinstrumental in having the Louisiana State Law Institute create a Summary Judgment Subcommitteeto study potential changes in the statute. The Subcommittee consists of a cross-section ofpractitioners and judges interested in summary judgment procedure. At the time of its formation, itconsisted of two district court judges (Judge Piper Griffin of the Civil District Court, and its chair,Judge Holdridge, then of the 23rd Judicial District Court, since elevated to the first circuit), twoappellate court judges (Judge Genovese and Judge Madeleine Landrieu of the fourth circuit), twolegislators (Representative Abramson and Senator Edwin Murray, who serves on the Senate JudiciaryA committee), a law professor (Professor William Corbett of LSU), practitioners on the defense sideof the bar (Karen Eddlemon, William Forrester, Jr., and Harry “Skip” Philips, Jr.), and practitionerson the plaintiff side (Robert David and your author). The Subcommittee has had several meetings,and will have met again before the seminar for which this paper is prepared. If it reaches agreement,it will submit a proposal to the full Law Institute and, if it agrees, the Law Institute will be submit itto the Legislature.

The Work of the Subcommittee

One of the primary goals of the Subcommittee has been to reorganize article 966, so thatprovisions of the statute that address particular issues are set forth in a logical and organized fashion.As the draft currently exists, paragraph A defines the motion and its purpose, when it can be brought,and what can be used to support or oppose it. Paragraph B sets forth time limits and briefingopportunities. Paragraph C sets forth the burden of proof and the documents the court may considerin deciding the motion. Paragraph D allows partial summary judgments. Paragraph E limits theissues that the courts may consider on the motion, and paragraph F defines the effect of a grantedsummary judgment on the remaining parties in the case. Finally, paragraph G addresses the issue ofprocedure for reversal of a denied summary judgment by the appellate courts.

Introductory Provisions

Paragraph A(1) retains the bulk of the current A(1), making a few stylistic changes: thedefinite article “the” is replaced by the indefinite article “a,” and the phrase “with or withoutsupporting affidavits” was deleted as it was deemed unnecessary and duplicative of other provisions.Paragraph A(2) remains the same, setting forth the purpose and the favored nature of summaryjudgment procedure.

The default times for filing motions and oppositions can be altered with a case23

management order.

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In paragraph A(3), the committee moved the existing paragraph C(1) and made onesubstantive change. The phrase “after adequate discovery” was replaced with “after an opportunityfor adequate discovery.” The change was made to avoid denials of summary judgment whenopposing parties have had substantial time to complete discovery, but have not actually done so.

Paragraph A(4) incorporates the first sentence of current paragraph B(1), and it sets forth theexclusive list of documents that can be submitted in support of or opposition to the motion. Itbroadens that list slightly by adding memoranda, certified medical records and (proposed by LADC)written stipulations. The idea is to create a self-contained, finite “package” that contains everythingto be considered on decision or review of the motion; anything otherwise in the record that is not inthat “package” cannot be relied upon to grant or deny the motion, as will be seen in paragraph C(2).This paragraph also allows the filing of documents in electronically stored formats approved by courtrules or by the clerk of court; this carries forward a 2014 amendment to current paragraph F(2).

Timing and Briefing

Changes to the briefing schedule are among the most significant changes in theSubcommittee’s proposal. The proposal suppresses the current reference to the Uniform DistrictCourt Rules in favor of explicitly setting forth the briefing schedule in the statute itself, and it furtherextends those deadlines. This was because those deadlines have been interpreted as mandatory andsubstantive, thus affecting not only the ability to orally argue the motion but whether a party whosesubmission is late can be considered to have responded at all. It was also felt that the deadlinesshould be expanded given the magnitude of evidence and briefing now often required for motions andoppositions, and to allow more time for appellate review.

In the absence of a case management order, paragraph B(1) requires the motion to be filed23

and served on all parties not less than sixty days before trial. This provision is new. The motion mustalso be set for hearing not less than thirty days from filing, which is also new. Paragraph B(2)provides that the opposition and supporting documents are to be filed not less than fifteen days priorto the hearing date; this effectively increases the current Uniform Rules provision of eight days priorto the hearing. This paragraph also allows the court to continue the hearing for good cause shown.Paragraph B(3) provides that the reply memorandum must be filed at least five days before thehearing, and increase from the current two days. This paragraph also includes a new provision thatno additional documentation can be filed with the reply memorandum. The thought is that if factualissues are established by the opposing documents, additional documents will not make those issuesgo away.

Unless all parties agree, the hearing must occur no later than thirty days prior to the trial dateunder paragraph B(4). Judgment must be rendered not later than twenty days before trial, an increasefrom the ten days required by current paragraph D. Current paragraph B(2) states that the court

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“should” provide reasons in the event the motion is denied; this proposal suppresses that provision.Instead, paragraph B(5) provides that a party may request written reasons if an appealable judgmentis granted, but that the court in all cases should state on the record the reasone fo granting or denyingthe motion.

Burden of Proof

Paragraph C(1) rewrites and clarifies current article C(2) concerning the allocation of theburden of proof. It replaces the current term “movant” with “mover.” It also makes it explicit thatthe burden of producing “factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue ofmateral fact” is shifted to the adverse party, or “non-mover,” when that party will bear the burden ofproof on a particular issue at trial.

Paragraph C(2) limits the universe of documents that can be considered to the “package” ofdocuments filed with or in opposition to the motion. It further requires that any objection to anydocument must be raised in a timely-filed memorandum. Thus, the opposing party must make anyobjections in its opposition memorandum, and the moving party must make any objections in its replymemorandum. The court must consider all objections prior to rendering judgment, and the court musteither state on the record or in written reasons what evidence, if any, it found inadmissible or declinedto consider. This paragraph is a substantial re-write of current paragraph F(2), and it suppresses the“deemed admitted” language.

Partial Summary Judgment

Paragraph D continues current paragraph E without change.

Issues to Be Considered

Paragraph E is partial redrafting, for the sake of clarity, of current paragraph F(1). It limitsthe issues on summary judgment to those specifically raised in the motion itself, both in the trial andthe appellate courts. Thus, for instance, a motion that raises cause-in-fact issues alone cannot bedecided on the basis of breach of duty.

Effect on Remaining Parties

Paragraph F is a substantial redrafting of current paragraph G. The intent is to require that asummary judgment finding that a party is not at fault or not a cause of the alleged harm be the lawof the case, and that the remaining parties are thus precluded from introducing evidence of theirliability, arguing their liability, or including that party on the jury verdict form. The current paragraphincludes confusing exceptions for affirmative defenses and requires an explicit certification of theapplicability of the paragraph; those provisions have been removed.

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Appellate Review

Paragraph G is a new provision that is perhaps the most controversial part of the proposal thusfar. The controversy mainly concerns whether it should be a part of the statute or part of the courtof appeal and supreme court rules. It provides, in essence, that an appellate court should not overturna denial of a summary judgment without full briefing and oral argument.

Conclusion

As noted, the Subcommittee plans to continue its work, and it looks forward to any input theattendees at the Judicial College February seminar can offer. We hope to clarify and improve thisaspect of our civil procedure.

LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Suggested Changes Recommended by the

Attendees of the December 12, 2014

Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel Seminar

Prepared for the

Meeting of the Subcommittee

February 5, 2015

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Hon. Guy Holdridge, Subcommittee Head

Claire Popovich, Staff Attorney

Summary Judgment Subcommittee

Neil C. Abramson New Orleans

William R. Corbett Baton Rouge

Robert J. David New Orleans

Karen Eddlemon Plaquemine

William R. Forrester, Jr. New Orleans

James Genovese Opelousas

Piper Griffin New Orleans

Madeleine Landrieu New Orleans

Edwin R. Murray Baton Rouge

Donald W. Price Baton Rouge

Harry J. "Skip" Philips, Jr. Baton Rouge

***************

Hon. Guy Holdridge, Subcommittee Head

Claire Popovich, Staff Attorney

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C.C.P. Art. 966. Motion for summary judgment; procedure 1

A. (1) The A plaintiff or defendant in the principal or any incidental action, 2

with or without supporting affidavits, may move for a summary judgment in his favor for 3

all or part of the relief which he has prayed. The A plaintiff’s motion may be made at 4

any time after the answer has been filed. The A defendant’s motion may be made at any 5

time. 6

(2) The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and 7

inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969. The 8

procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. 9

(3) After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment 10

shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and other supporting documents show that 11

there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a 12

matter of law. 13

(4) Documents that can be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are 14

pleadings, memoranda, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, 15

written stipulation1 and admissions together with affidavits that have been timely filed in 16

connection with a motion or opposition. The court may permit documentary evidence to 17

be filed in any electronically stored format authorized by court rules or approved by the 18

clerk of the district court for receipt of evidence. 19

B. (1) The motion for summary judgment, memorandum in support thereof, 20

and supporting affidavits shall be served within the time limits provided in District Court 21

1 The double underlining indicates changes recommended by the LADC during its December 12, 2014 meeting.

2

Rule 9.9. For good cause, the court shall give the adverse party additional time to file a 1

response, including opposing affidavits or depositions. The adverse party may serve 2

opposing affidavits, and if such opposing affidavits are served, the opposing affidavits 3

and any memorandum in support thereof shall be served pursuant to Article 1313 within 4

the time limits provided in District Court Rule 9.9. 5

Unless otherwise provided in a case management order, a motion for summary 6

judgment and all documents in support of the motion shall be filed and served on all 7

parties not less than sixty days prior to the trial. The motion shall be set for hearing not 8

less than thirty days from filing. 9

(2) Unless there is a case management order that provides a different filing 10

deadline, any opposition to the motion and documents in support of the opposition shall 11

be filed and served in accordance with Article 1313 not less than fifteen days prior to the 12

hearing date. For good cause shown, the court may order a continuance of the hearing on 13

a motion for summary judgment to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 14

taken or discovery to be had. 15

(3) Any reply memoranda shall be filed and served not less than five days prior to 16

the hearing on the motion. No additional documents may be filed with the reply 17

memorandum. 18

(4) Unless agreed to by all of the parties, a contradictory hearing on the motion 19

for summary judgment shall be heard not less than thirty days prior to the trial. The court 20

shall hear and render judgment not later than twenty days prior to the trial. 21

3

(5) If an appealable judgment is granted, a party may request written reasons for 1

judgment. However, in all cases the court shall state on the record the reasons for 2

granting or denying the motion. 3

C. (1) After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a motion which 4

shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to 5

judgment as a matter of law shall be granted. 6

(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will 7

not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion 8

for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate 9

all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point 10

out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements 11

essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party 12

fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his 13

evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. 14

(1) The burden of proof rests with the mover. However, if the mover will not bear 15

the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary 16

judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential 17

elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the 18

court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse 19

party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the burden is on the non-mover to produce 20

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or 21

that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 22

4

(2) The court may only consider documents filed in support of or in opposition 1

to the motion for summary judgment. Any objection to any document shall be raised in a 2

timely-filed memorandum. The court shall consider all objections prior to rendering a 3

judgment. The court shall specifically state on the record or in written reasons what 4

evidence, if any, it held to be inadmissible or declined to consider. 5

D. The court shall hear and render judgment on the motion for summary judgment 6

within a reasonable time, but in any event judgment on the motion shall be rendered at 7

least ten days prior to trial. E. A summary judgment may be rendered dispositive of a 8

particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more 9

parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire 10

case as to that party or parties. 11

F. (1) E. A summary judgment may2 shall be rendered, or affirmed, or reversed 12

only as to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration by the court at that 13

time. 14

(2) Evidence cited in and attached to the motion for summary judgment or 15

memorandum filed by an adverse party is deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for 16

summary judgment unless excluded in response to an objection made in accordance with 17

Subparagraph (3) of this Paragraph. Only evidence admitted for purposes of the motion 18

for summary judgment may be considered by the court in its ruling on the motion. The 19

court may permit documentary evidence to be filed in the record with the motion or 20

2 The double strikethrough indicates recommended deletions by the LADC during its December 12, 2014 meeting.

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opposition in any electronically stored format authorized by the local court rules of the 1

district court or approved by the clerk of the district court for receipt of evidence. 2

(3) Objections to evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 3

judgment may be raised in memorandum or written motion to strike stating the specific 4

grounds therefor. Any such memorandum or written motion to strike shall be served 5

pursuant to Article 1313 within the time limits provided in District Court Rule 9.9. 6

F. When the court grants a motion for summary judgment, in accordance with the 7

provisions of this Article, that a party or nonparty is not negligent, not at fault, or did not 8

cause, whether in whole or in part, the injury or harm alleged, that party or nonparty shall 9

not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault. Evidence shall not be admitted at 10

trial to establish the fault of that party or nonparty. During the course of the trial, no 11

party or person shall refer directly or indirectly to any such fault nor shall it be submitted 12

to the jury or included on the jury verdict form. 13

G.(1) When the court grants a motion for summary judgment in accordance with 14

the provisions of this Article, that a party or nonparty is not negligent, not at fault, or did 15

not cause, whether in whole or in part, the injury or harm alleged, that party or nonparty 16

shall not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault. Evidence shall not be 17

admitted at trial to establish the fault of that party or nonparty nor shall the issue be 18

submitted to the jury nor included on the jury verdict form. This Paragraph shall not 19

apply when a summary judgment is granted solely on the basis of the successful assertion 20

of an affirmative defense in accordance with Article 1005, except for negligence or fault. 21

6

(2) If the provisions of this Paragraph are applicable to the summary judgment, 1

the court shall so specify in the judgment. If the court fails to specify that the provisions 2

of this Paragraph are applicable, then the provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply to 3

the judgment. 4

On review, an appellate court shall not reverse and grant a summary judgment that 5

was denied by the trial court dismissing a case or a party without the appellate court 6

setting the matter for briefing and oral argument. 7

Moderator & Panelist Biographies: JUDGE GUY HOLDRIDGE serves on the First Circuit Court of Appeal. Judge Holdridge previously served as a District Judge of the 23rd Judicial District Court. He served as a district court judge since 1991 and was the chief judge in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2014. Judge Holdridge earned a B.A. Degree from Louisiana State University in 1974 and a J.D. in 1978 from the LSU Law Center where he was a member of the Order of the Coif and the Louisiana Law Review. He is a member of the LSU Law Center Hall of Fame.

Judge Holdridge serves on the adjunct faculty of LSU Law Center where he teaches LA Civil Procedure I and II. He is a member of the council of the Louisiana Law Institute. He is also a member of the Children’s Code, Child Custody, Expropriation, Prescription, Bail Bond’s, Summary Judgment, and Adult Guardianship Committees of the Law Institute and is the reporter of the Expedited Jury Trial Committee, Summary Judgment, and Bail Bonds Committee. He also served as past chairman of the Louisiana Certified Shorthand Reporter’s Board. He is a past president of the Louisiana District Judges’ Association, a member of the Executive Committee and the Chairman of the District Judges “Best Practices Committee”. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Louisiana Judicial College, currently serving as immediate past president. He is also a member of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Strategic Planning committee and Jury Instructions Committee. JUDGE PIPER GRIFFIN is a judge of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Division “I,” where she has served since her election to the bench in 2001.

During her 14 years of practice, Piper worked primarily in the area of casualty litigation, including products liability, workers’ compensation, personal injury, construction litigation and employment relations. Prior to ascending to the bench, Piper was special counsel to the firm of Leake, Andersson and Mann, LLC (presently Leake Andersson), and she worked with George J. Nalley, Jr., APLC and with Carmouche, Gray and Hoffman (presently Hoffman Siegel, et al.). In 1999, the Louisiana Supreme Court appointed her judge pro tempore for the Civil District Court for the parish of Orleans, and she served in that capacity for almost a year.

Piper holds a B.A. degree from the University of Notre Dame where she received the Leonard A. Collins Senior Honorary Award in recognition of her contributions to student life at the university. In 1997, she was recognized as one of the 50 most distinguished black graduates in the history of the university. Piper received her Juris Doctor degree from Louisiana State University School of Law in 1987 and was admitted to practice in Louisiana in that year. While in law school, Piper was a national finalist in the Frederick Douglas Moot Court Competition.

Piper is admitted to all courts in Louisiana, Mississippi and to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals.

Piper has been active with many professional and civic organizations. She presently serves as the constitutional law bar examiner for the Louisiana State Bar and is a member of the Board of Trustees at the Second Baptist Church Sixth District. Piper is also a member of various local and national bar associations and previously served as a member of the Board of Directors of her alma mater Xavier Prep High School; president of the Board of Directors of the YWCA; was the first African American female chairperson of the Young Lawyers section of the New

Orleans Bar Association; a member of the Executive Board of Directors of the New Orleans Bar Association; treasurer and corresponding secretary of the Louis A. Martinet Legal Society and on various other boards and committees.

Piper is a frequent community and continuing legal education speaker and has received numerous awards and certificates in recognition of her accomplishments and her commitment to the community. These include being recognized as a YWCA Role Model; being listed in Who’s Who in American Law; receipt of the Louis A. Martinet Legal Society 2003 Ernest N. Morial Judicial Pacesetter Award and the 2003 Alliance for Good Government Civic Award. DONALD PRICE practices with Dué, Price, Guidry, Piedrahita & Andrews, APA, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He is a 1989 Order of the Coif graduate of the LSU Law Center, where he was both a member and senior editor of the Louisiana Law Review. Before beginning practice with his current firm, he served as a law clerk to Justice James Dennis of the Louisiana Supreme Court. He has a diverse plaintiffs’ practice, including complex liability cases, admiralty, medical malpractice, commercial and environmental litigation, and a particular concentration on appellate work.

He is a former president of Louisiana Association for Justice, having also previously served as a governor, director, member of the Executive Committee and chair of the Legislation Committee of the association. He has been recognized in Best Lawyers in America, named a Louisiana SuperLawyer by Law & Politics, and is a member of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. He is a former member of the Board of Governors of the American Association for Justice. REP. NEIL ABRAMSON Professional Liskow & Lewis, Partner; American and State Bar Associations; Louisiana State Law Institute Education LSU Law School, J.D. (First in Class); Editor-in-Chief of Louisiana Law Review; Order of Coif Dartmouth College, B.A. Government; Four Years College Football Episcopal High School (Baton Rouge); Salutatorian; Student Body President; Four Sport Letterman: Football (All-State), Basketball, Track, Swimming Civic New Orleans Outreach - former Board Member Junior Achievement of Greater New Orleans - former Board Member New Orleans Contemporary Arts Center - former Board Member Involved with Audubon Institute and Unity of Greater New Orleans Fleur de Lis Ambassador for City of New Orleans

Government Page for Louisiana Senate; Office Assistant for LA Senator Joseph Sevario Internships: U.S. Senator J. Bennett Johnston & U.S. Representative Jimmy Hayes State Representative Re-Elected for District 98 in 2011, with 74% of the vote again. District encompasses Uptown and Broadmoor Elected for District 98 in 2007, first run for political office, with 74% of the vote. District encompassed Uptown, Broadmoor and Central City Committees: Civil Law and Procedure, Chairman La. Hurricane Recovery Committee, first person to be chairman of committee Health & Welfare, former member Judiciary, former member La. Legislative Audit Advisory Council, former member Hurricane Katrina Memorial Committee, former member Awards: Alliance for Good Government, Legislator of the Year, 2009 New Orleans City Business, Leadership in Law Award, 2009 New Orleans Magazine, People to Watch, 2008 In Top 10 of legislators for number of bills passed from 2008-11 (First Term in Office). SENATOR ED MURRAY EMPLOYMENT Partner in General Law Practice Murray, Darnell & Associates, L.L.C. Louisiana Senate District 4 January 1, 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives District 96 1991 - 2004 COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS Chairman, Legislative Audit Advisory Council Appropriations House & Governmental Affairs Labor and Industrial Relations House Executive Committee

Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget State Bond Commission EDUCATION Loyola University School of Law New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 Juris Doctorate Degree: May 1985 Admission to Louisiana State Bar October 1985 Loyola University New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 B.A. degree, May 1982 Major: Political Science HONORS Who’s Who In American Politics 19th Edition Legislator of the Year, 1999, 1998 and 1997 Dean’s Honor List Two-Year Scholarship Recipient Alpha Phi Omega National Service Fraternity Friend of the Parishes City of New Orleans Floor Leader ACTIVITIES Food for Seniors Fellow Loyola Institute of Politics, Loyola Law Clinic, Student Practitioner Student Bar Association Black Law Student Association, BLSA Moot Court Team Alpha Phi Omega, Inc. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS National Conference of State Legislators National Black Conference of State Legislators National Conference of Insurance Legislators American Bar Association Louisiana State Bar Association Louis A. Martinet Legal Society National Bar Association Louisiana Association for Justice AFFILIATIONS Community Access Corporation (CAC), Past Treasurer Friends of the Health Department

Treme Improvement Political Society (Treme Tips) Who’s Who Among American Colleges & Universities N.A.A.C.P. Life Member New Orleans Committee for Judicial Reform, Chairman Urban League of Greater New Orleans ZULU Social Aid & Pleasure Club JUGGS Social Aid & Pleasure Club