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Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute for International Studies

Moravcsik and the climate issue.

Investigating European environmental policy from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Perspective

Pleier, Zita Alexandra

International Studies

European Studies Major

Thesis advisor: Kiss J., László

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CONTENTS 1. 1. Introduction.....................................................................................................................3

1. 2. Structure and methodology.........................................................................................4 2. Outlining the theoretical framework: classic theories of European integration .................6

2. 1. Integration by spillover: neofuntionalist explanations of European political cooperation..........................................................................................................................6 2. 2. Bringing domestic interests on stage: theory of intergovernmentalism .....................9 2. 3. Two responses to the changing context of integration: 'new institutionalism' and multi-level governance .....................................................................................................11

2. 3. 1. New institutionalism: institutionalism with a `twist`?......................................11 2. 3. 2. Rational choice institutionalism and rule-bound interactions...........................12 2. 3. 3. Historical institutionalism and institutional 'lock-ins'.......................................13 2. 3. 4. Sociological institutionalism and the culture card............................................14

2. 4. Multi-level governance and the `governance turn`...................................................15 3. Liberal intergovernmentalism: bridging the domestic-community gap ...........................17

3. 1. Theoretical baselines of liberal intergovernmentalism.............................................17 3. 2. The core argument and beyond.................................................................................19 3. 3. What is at stake for liberal intergovernmentalism? ..................................................20 3. 4. Contending criticisms of liberal intergovernmentalism............................................22

4. Putting theory into practice: the Europeanization of European environmental policy.....28 4. 1. What waters does Europe stir? Europeanization and domestic impact ....................28 4. 2. European environmental policy in the making: major principles and characteristics..........................................................................................................................................30 4. 3. The European approach towards climate change .....................................................35

5. Emission reduction efforts as empirical evidence for liberal intergovernmentalist theory..............................................................................................................................................38

5. 1. Two Member States, one desired role: a comparison of German and British environmental regulatory approaches ...............................................................................38

5. 1. 1. German environmental policy and domestic preferences.................................38 5. 1. 2. Environmental considerations of the United Kingdom ....................................41

5. 2. Introducing a pilot testing ground: competing regulatory approaches towards air pollution abatement...........................................................................................................44 5. 3. Defeat of a market-based incentive: controversy and failure over a carbon tax.......47

5. 3. 1. The influence of domestic actors in agenda-setting..........................................49 5. 3. 2. Stalemate in the Council due to domestic concerns .........................................50

5. 4. The Emission Trading Scheme of the European Union ...........................................53 5. 4. 1. Emissions trading envisioned by Europe..........................................................54 5. 4. 2. Germany’s stance on the ETS...........................................................................56 5. 4. 3. The United Kingdom's domestic ETS and its impact on EU-wide emission trading ...........................................................................................................................62

6. Concluding remarks and potential directions for future research.....................................66 LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................71

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'the primary source of integration lies in the interest of the states themselves and the relative power each

brings to Brussels' (Andrew Moravcsik, 1991)

1. 1. Introduction

Ever since the first steps were taken towards the construction of a well-functioning

environmental policy framework in Europe, the effectiveness and feasibility of this policy

field has been in the forefront of heated debates. The continuously growing relevance and

importance of this particular policy area has already attracted a considerable body of

scholarly work coming from both European and international experts of environmental

policy investigating the policy-making structure and the integration process of the

European Union (EU). Being one of the most complex policy-making entities in

international politics, the EU has come a long way in working out lasting and operational

policy modes that serve as a path to follow for numerous other countries that aspire for an

influential role as international agenda-setters.

Environmental policy itself, despite being regarded as one of the youngest, if

dynamically developing, policy areas, has also been given considerable attention due to its

cross-boundary effects. These latter also motivate Member States of the EU to engage in

the policy-making process. This observation is especially relevant in relation to climate

change, a policy area where the EU itself wishes to pursue an exemplary role on the global

level and serve as an example to follow for other members of the international community.

In the study of European integration, many competing theories have been constructed

with the objective to provide plausible explanations for the nature of the integration process

itself and European policy-making patterns as well. Although theories aimed at tackling the

issue of European integration differ in their basic assumptions, their common goal is to

explain the course of juncture points leading to a certain political decision with the help of

a neatly designed analytical toolkit.

No matter which classical theory of European integration one takes a closer look at,

the main question remains the same, namely what factors influence the outcome of the

European bargaining process and to what extent Member States exert influence on this

process. The two classic macro theories of integration, neofunctionalism and

intergovernmentalism approach the issue of European integration from diverse starting

points; yet they resemble each other in their central objective to provide theoretical

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explanations to the above question. However, with the alteration and developments

observed in the course of European integration, new theories were also created in order to

sharpen the picture on one hand and open up new perspectives for the study of European

policy-making on the other.

The liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework elaborated by Andrew G.

Moravcsik was motivated by the desire to bridge the gap between the two most influential

theories of integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism and approach European

bargains from the viewpoint of national preferences drawing on political economic

considerations. Although the original framework was designed to tackle the issue of

historic European treaty-making, liberal intergovernmentalism can successfully be applied

to the integration process of several policy areas within the European Union, as well.

Investigating and applying the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, the aim of

my thesis is to investigate the impact of Member States on the policy-making process in the

field of environmental policy, more specifically the issue areas of pollution abatement and

climate change. Bearing `Moravcsikian` rhetoric in mind, the thesis seeks to underpin and

demonstrate the importance of domestic preferences in the course of policy-making and

explain why sovereign Member States, while engaging in a rational interstate bargaining

process transfer their sovereignty in order to create a well-functioning policy dimension on

the European level. At the end of the research, the result of the examination should lead us

to the conclusion that the Europeanization of environmental policy depends on domestic

preferences of the Member States and the bargains struck between them.

Since issues related to climate change occupy an ever growing space on the European

agenda, deep understanding of the main operating mechanisms and principles is an

essential prerequisite for further integration of the policy area. In due course, preferences

and the impact of Member States on the overall policy-making process should be given

enhanced attention by future scholarship, given the fragile balance between decision-

makers in the investigated policy field.

1. 2. Structure and methodology

The first part of the paper presents the major theories of European integration

commencing with classic theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. It is

followed by the outline and critical analysis of liberal intergovernmentalism, the applied

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theoretical framework. The second section of the paper focuses on empirical evidence taken

from the field of European environmental policy and applies the presented theoretical

framework to empirical examples. The empirical analysis starts from an introduction of the

concept of Europeanization and outlines major characteristics of the environmental and

climate change policy of the European Union devoting special attention to its most

important procedural characteristics, actors and decision-making patterns. The empirical

examples related to the research are taken from the domain of pollution abatement, more

precisely the use of best available technologies, the carbon/energy tax proposal and the

European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The empirical research is based on

German and British approaches towards the issue of climate change and uses the two very

diverging regulatory approaches of these Member States to justify the main hypothesis.

In keeping with the above agenda, the paper is structured as follows. Chapter II presents the

theoretical framework by presenting classical theories of European integration, namely

neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and the new institutionalist discourse. Chapter III

highlights the main theoretical observations and the argumentative framework of liberal

intergovernmentalism along with critical observations formulated by other scholars.

Chapter IV prepares the ground for empirical analysis by introducing the reader into

relevant concepts of Europeanization and presenting major characteristics of environmental

policy in case of the EU and the European framework on climate change. Chapter V moves

on to empirical evidence and introduces the two domestic regulatory approaches towards

climate change by presenting a pilot testing ground for pollution abatement followed by

two specific case studies on the carbon/energy tax and the European Union's Emission

Trading Scheme. Chapter VI concludes and draws up possible directions for future research

in the investigated policy field.

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2. Outlining the theoretical framework: classic theories of European integration

With the objective to understand the nature of policy-making in the European Union,

the main theoretical assumptions of basic theories investigating the process of European

integration have to be analyzed in greater detail. This goal is further strengthened by the

overall intention to channel the presented theoretical assumptions towards the chosen

theoretical framework applied in this thesis.

The theoretical debate that evolved around the process of European integration has

initially revolved around the competing predictions of two streams of analysis,

neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Later on, as a reaction to the development

observed in the integration process and new tendencies apparent in policy-making, new

theoretical bases were presented, which sought to provide novel theoretical explanations for

the new phenomena. Thus, the classic theoretical debate between neofunctionalism and

intergovernmentalism was later on completed and sharpened by an institutionalist and a

governance aspect. Liberal intergovernmentalism in the 1990s sought to reflect on these

innovations while also preserving the fundamental rationalist argumentation of classical

theories.

The overview of the major integration theories will move along the following

analytical questions. First, the historical background of each theory will be introduced with

special regard to underlying political and economic processes. Secondly, major

assumptions of each theory will be presented along with the reasoning used by scholars and

their relevant findings in relation to current research. Lastly, an overall conclusion will be

provided summarizing the most relevant theoretical assumptions and their forward-reaching

findings for further research in the field.

2. 1. Integration by spillover: neofuntionalist explanations of European political cooperation

As it was already pointed out in the introduction, the formulation of theories tackling

European integration is substantially linked to significant milestones of the integration and

policy-making process itself. Hence, in order to understand each separate theory, the

historical context in which it originally stems from must also be considered.

The historical embeddedness of the neofunctionalist stream of thought rests on the

period between 1958 and 1963 when the initial decision-making patterns of the European

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Community were formulated. In political terms, the period was characterized by the

creation of the Common Agricultural Policy and the customs union whose success

depended on a strong consensus amongst the six founding members of the Community.

With the so-called Luxembourg crisis and the politics of empty chairs however, the initially

dynamic pace of integration was thrown back partly as a consequence of political moves

partly initiated by France (Pollack, 2005: 16).

The major assumptions of neofunctionalist theory were first elaborated by Ernst Haas

(1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963). In a book titled The uniting of Europe (Haas, 1958), he

provides a concise introduction of the major premises and concepts of neofunctionalist

theory. Lindberg's book, The political dynamics of European economic integration

(Lindberg, 1963) deals with the process and context of decision-making within the

European Steal and Coal Community. These two works, especially Haas’ volume are

regarded as pivotal starting points for further analysis and understanding of neofunctionalist

theory.

Concerning the major theoretical concepts and premises of neofunctionalism, one of

the most important characteristics of this stream of thought is the fact that it recognizes the

reinstatement of political agency into the integration process and regards actors involved in

this process as self-interested and having articulated interests (Rosamond, 2000:55,

emphasis added). Stemming from this argument, neofunctionalist thinkers look at

integration as a process, not an outcome and thus the interaction between actors becomes

essential in the course of integration (ibid, emphasis added). For neofuntionalist thinkers,

investigation of the process also entails that integration at some point comes to a

completion as well.

In order to provide a feasible explanation to the integration process, neofunctionalist

introduce the concept of 'spill-over' into their theoretical reasoning. The process of spill-

over describes a situation in which a goal by two actors can only be realized by means of

further action thus creating preconditions for even additional actions and thereby creating

cooperation between affected actors (Lindberg, 2003: 159). In other words, regional

integration takes place when two Member States engage in effective cooperation in a given

economic sector that eventually leads to integration of other sectors. In order to facilitate

interaction, actors appoint a supranational 'high authority' to make cooperation more

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effective (Rosamond, 2000: 58). As a result of the ever deepening and beneficial

cooperation in the given economic sector, pressures for further economic integration are

created in the sector that would eventually result in political integration between the actors

analyzed (Ibid: 60). This line of reasoning demonstrates similarity with the model put

forward by political economist Bela Balassa (1975) who claimed that steps taken towards

the creation of a free trade area are capable of generating pressures for the establishment of

a customs union, a common market and in the end, the process of economic integration

would culminate in political integration having an institutional background to complete the

process (Balassa et al., 1975: x).

While analyzing the neofunctionalist stream, one has to keep in mind that the

currently presented theory seeks to find feasible answers to the phenomenon of regional

integration that initially took place between the six funding Member States. Therefore, the

process of spillover is the main reason why a decision made by a government to place a

specific sector under the authority of central institutions creates pressure for these

institutions to extend their authority into other policy areas, thereby affecting additional

issue areas and bringing the process of integration closer to completion (Pollack, 2005: 15).

This is the logic of regional integration along which the result at the end is a bulk of policy

areas that represent a well-integrated policy framework and are able to carry out the process

of integration in the long run.

As for decision-making patterns, neofunctionalist theory had a relatively easy job

explaining politics formulated in the Community. Initially, it was the so-called `Community

method` that dominated policy-making. In a nutshell, the 'Community method' assumed

that Member States and the Commission engage in a problem-solving interaction and

mutually recognize the importance of concessions for the achievement of long-term gains.

With the desire to come up with mutually beneficial gains, unanimity was applied,

especially after 1966, as the dominant voting procedure that necessitated the need for an

overall consensus amongst members implying that no piece of legislation could be passed

unless all Member States cast their vote in favor of the Commission proposal (Pollack,

2005: 16). This method stands in line with the basic prerequisite of neofunctionalist

reasoning that predicts the rise of a supranational `high-authority` that is capable of interest

representation and articulation with the overall support of Member States.

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In the context of the coexistence of interest representation and a high authority with

delegated responsibilities, the latter has the important task to upgrade the joint interest

articulated by actors. Interest representation by the high authority is usually termed

`cultivated spillover` in the integration scholarship (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991: 6).

Cultivated spill-over demonstrates how economic integration in the long run affects

political institutions and thus results in a closer political cooperation between the actors.

As outlined earlier, neofunctionalist reasoning can primarily provide answers to initial

phases of European cooperation. Towards the middle of the 1960s however, as a result of

emerging domestic preferences, the basic fundamentals of the integration framework were

questioned and necessitated the need for new approaches. The 'empty chairs crisis'

demonstrated French reluctance towards the acceptance of forward-moving political

decisions. Opposition culminated in the Luxembourg compromise in 1966 that allowed

Member States to veto political decisions once their domestic interests were threatened.

This decision clearly marked a turning point in integration history and cried for a renewed

approach towards the process of European integration (Rosamond, 2000: 75). Theoretical

assumptions based on neofunctionalist ideas were not entirely disregarded later on but were

completed and polished with a new theoretical framework that included the investigation of

domestic interest into its analytical toolkit. In the following section, basic features of the

intergovernmentalist theoretical stream will be taken into consideration.

2. 2. Bringing domestic interests on stage: theory of intergovernmentalism

As the empty chairs crisis and the bargain between Member States that eventually

resulted in the Luxembourg compromise indicated, tendencies outlining the ever increasing

role of the nation-state in the course of European policy-making were more prominent than

ever. The above developments inspired scholars to tackle the process of integration from a

novel standpoint.

Bearing these objectives in mind, intergovernmentalist theory attempted to come up

with a theoretical framework that assigns more importance to the nation-state and domestic

interests in decision-making and at the same time evaluates the role of supranational

institutions and their impact on policy outcomes as well.

According to one of the most prominent advocates of the intergovernmentalist theory,

Stanley Hoffmann (1966), the nation-state turned out to be 'obstinate' in influencing the

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course and outcome of European integration. Analyzing the circumstances in which the

crisis of empty chairs and the 'Community method' evolved, Hoffmann claims that in the

process of European integration, the role of the nation-state increased and European

integration is incapable of developments without paying attention to domestic preferences

(Hoffmann, 1966: 863). As the course of integration has so far shown, the gradual

delegation of tasks to the Community temporarily came to a halt and was replaced by the

nation-state was given priority in the investigation (Pollack, 2005: 17). With suggesting the

above, Hoffman points out that the nation state is yet again an essential part of the process

and finds new roles and assumes new functions in integration. Its impact can be discovered

in its changing patterns of tasks assigned to it.

While neofunctionalism had the objective to analyze regional integration with the

inclusion of a high authority to which Member States can delegate some part of their

sovereignty, intergovernmental theorizing looks at the integration process from the

viewpoint of domestic actors. The neofunctionalist framework perceives the integration

process using as a spill-over and explains political and economic developments with the

help of the above concept. Intergovernmentalist accounts on the other hand turn their

attention from process to the context. As Hoffmann puts it: 'emphasis on the process led to

a certain neglect of the context or at least to a view of the context that may have been too

selective' (Hoffmann, 1964: 85). In other words, recent developments in the field of

European integration necessitate the need to look at the underlying causes of integration

and involve interests by nation-states in the investigation, namely research the context in

which they articulate their interests and try to what lies behind their articulation.

In sum, neofunctionalism, partly due to the historical context in which it was born, is

mostly capable of explaining the first phases of European integration and, stemming from

one particular historical period it provides a more static picture of the process of decision-

making. Further developments towards the end of the 1960s suggested the need for

rethinking basic neofunctionalist assumptions. The first round of enlargement and the new

political and economic issues cried for a reinterpretation of basic theoretical concepts in

relation to institutions and the role of domestic actors. With that in mind,

intergovernmentalism emerged as a more dynamic theory to investigate the context of

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integration from a novel perspective and highlight the importance of domestic influence on

decision-making.

The two macro theories both contributed a great deal to the further study of

integration. One of their most important contributions for newer research is that they

highlighted the most essential analytical tools that assigned directions for further research.

These features include the impact of the nation-state on decision-making and the role of

institutions. Theories further dealing with European integration also base their assumptions

partly on these key concepts. Besides the two classic theories, the three new

institutionalisms and multi-level governance tackle the concept of integration and complete

the theoretical discourse that are eventually taken up by the liberal intergovernmentalist

reasoning.

2. 3. Two responses to the changing context of integration: 'new institutionalism' and

multi-level governance

Having overcome the dilemma of finding feasible theoretical explanations for the first

accession period and the temporarily fading role of supranational actors in decision-

making, the 1980s brought a new impetus to the process of integration. The Single

European Act in 1987 that was meant to reform decision-making processes and facilitate

institutional reform in the EC was the first step to stimulate theoretical responses to new

developments (Rosamond, 2000: 99). Besides the neofunctionalist/intergovernmentalist

debate having a brief moment in the sun as proper theoretical explanations to recent

phenomena, comparative political science pulled out the `institution card` to provide

feasible theoretical ground for the integration process. Hence, in the following sections,

new institutionalism and its sub-theories will be looked at more closely.

2. 3. 1. New institutionalism: institutionalism with a `twist`?

Most scholars of comparative political science agree that institutions have a deep

impact on political outcomes. In the analysis of European integration, three separate

streams of institutionalism emerged to assess the role of institutions in the policy-making

process. The common observation these counterparts share is the recognition of

supranational institutions as contributors to policy outcomes.

First of all, new institutionalist accounts emphasize the importance of institutions as

venues of information exchange. Secondly, institutions are regarded as intervening

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variables linking together the preferences of actors with the actual outcome in policy-

making resulting in a positive-sum bargain (Rosamond, 2000: 114). This leads one to

observe that there is actually one leading institutionalist stream whose assumptions stem

from the central role of institutions. Let us consider the three sub-areas within the new

institutionalist discourse.

2. 3. 2. Rational choice institutionalism and rule-bound interactions

Rationalist accounts of insitutionalism are derived from neo-classical economic

theory and thus and view actors as utility-maximizers capable of ranking their priorities

possessing fixed and exogenous preference scales (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 10).

The basic assumption from which rational choice institutionalism departs is that

intergovernmental models explaining European policy-making neglect the influence of

formal EU rules that can shape policy outcomes (Pollack, 2005: 20). These rules are

created during a strategic exchange of self-interested Member States that use institutions to

carry out the task of representing their own preferences.

Rational choice institutionalism defines institutions as formal sets of rules that impose

obligations on actors that claim to be self-interested and maximizing their own profits

(Rosamond, 2000: 115). In other words, institutions provide a context to which individual

decisions are placed while outlining the importance of individual preferences (Aspinwall

and Schneider, 2000: 11). Institutions are hence regarded as a set of 'formal and informal

rules that regulate and shape human interactions' (ibid, 12).

In this view, institutions are created by states, which pursue self-interested aims and

try to reduce transaction costs by assigning tasks to institutions. Preference formation of

these actors is therefore exogenous and institutions serve as decisive constraints in the

pursuit of self-interest (ibid, 117, emphasis added). Examining the time scope investigated,

it is to point out that in case of rational choice institutionalism, short-term decision-making

periods are taken into account with direct effects of institutions (Aspinwall and Schneider,

2000: 5). Thus, they do not necessarily consider the effect of a policy decision in the long

run but more likely the strategic impact of a decision on European integration.

As for the creation of institutions, focus is put on the competition between European

actors and the extent to which actors exploit the uncertainty due to imperfect power

distribution (ibid, 13). A typical example for power distribution is the change of voting

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patterns to which rational choice institutionalism provides explanations along with an

impact on participating actors. Change in voting patterns, especially the overall tendency

towards qualified majority voting in European decision-making underpins the relevance of

the argument. Based on its major predictions, the above outlined theoretical reasoning is

rather similar to the one put forward by Moravcsik. However, it differs a great deal in terms

of its methodology, to be discussed in relation to critical accounts of liberal

intergovernmentalism (see Garrett and Tsebelis (1996), forthcoming).

2. 3. 3. Historical institutionalism and institutional 'lock-ins'

Historical institutionalism, contrary to its rational counterpart examines the effects of

institutions in the long term (Pollack, 2005: 20). It implies that on institutional effects over

time. Hence, institutions are assigned a more complex role and point out their impact on the

overall integration framework.

Regarding the definition of institutions, the historical standpoint conceives them as

'formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the

relationships between individual units of the polity and the economy' (Hall, 1986: 19). This

observation indicates that historical institutionalists see institutions embracing a more

decisive role in the course of decision-making than perceived by former theoretical

accounts.

The two key concepts historical institutionalism operates with are 'institutional lock-

ins' and 'path dependency'. Both of these notions attempt to highlight the way institutions

engage in the course of European political processes. Institutional lock-ins entail that

institutions are capable of shaping political agendas by altering the context in which

decisions are made (Rosamond, 2000: 117). To put it differently, institutions do not only

carry out tasks delegated to them by states but mutually shape the context in which

decisions are born. Although institutions were initially adopted for the reasons of self-

interest, they can get 'locked in' and be institutionalized in politics. That is why historical

institutionalism is often referred to as assuming a 'thick institutions' environment (Checkel,

2003: 354).

'Path dependency' for historical institutionalism entails that actors articulate their

preferences in an endogenous way based on historical events. History created the structure

of institutions and this shapes the policy choice as well (Aspinwall-Schneider, 2000: 16,

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emphasis added). The fact that the main bulk of decision-making in Europe is carried out

on the supranational level presupposes a historical context in which this feature is deeply

embedded, making the presence of supranational institutions unavoidable (Rosamond,

2000: 117).

To sum up, historical institutionalism emphasizes the importance of a conditioned

interaction between actors and institutions accounting for a historically embedded structure.

The context in which decision-making is carried out is given priority and institutions play a

long-term role in contextualizing the behavior of actors that created these institutions

themselves. Historical institutionalist accounts hence are especially relevant explaining the

historical development of institutions in the European Community.

2. 3. 4. Sociological institutionalism and the culture card

When taking a look at institutions from a sociological perspective, it becomes clear

that this stream of thought conceives institutions as independent variables that shape the

behavior of actors. As DiMaggio and Powell (1991) put it, 'Institutions do not just constrain

options; they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences'

(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:11).

Institutions in European decision-making are therefore not a mere strategic

battleground for self-interested actors who wish to maximize their individual gains but

active shapers of actors and their choices. This is what clearly distinguishes sociological

institutionalism from its rationalist counterpart.

When comparing the three streams of institutionalisms, it becomes clear that

institutions play the strongest role in the last account while they matter the least in the first

one. As institutional analysis proceeds from considerations based on rational choice to

more norm-based observations, it becomes apparent that institutions do not only constrain

the behavior of actors but also helps agents formulate a clear understanding on their own

interests and identities (Checkel, 2003: 354).

The three sub-theories of new institutionalism fairly neglect looking at the role of

domestic actors but provide a concise understanding of the impact of institutions on

European integration. No matter which account one takes a closer look at, institutions are

placed in the midst of analysis and theories resting on this major principle contribute a great

deal to the investigation of decision-making.

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2. 4. Multi-level governance and the `governance turn`

The theoretical framework of MLG can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate

the complexity of the European policy system and further point out its multi-actor character

and its influence on policy outcomes (Rosamond, 2000: 111).

The starting point of assumptions of MLG is to acknowledge the fact that by its

unique decision-making patterns. Thus, the European Union can be looked at as a domestic

polity. By recognizing the interconnectedness of sub-national, national and supranational

actors, the theory takes a comparative approach and demonstrates that an approach that

only takes domestic actors into consideration is somewhat irrelevant in analyzing policy-

making (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 281).

The framework does not put aside considerations based on domestic influence but

maintains the view that 'states in the European Union are being gently melded into the

multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous subnational and

supranational actors' (Marks et al., 1996: 371). Thus, influence on the overall decision-

making is relatively dispersed among these levels. This way, MLG framework partly

opposes the state-centric view in the study of policy-making.

Major observations made in the multi-level analysis present an updated version of

theories that look deeper into the decision-making process. With the emphasis on multi-

level structures, focus is shifted from one-sided examinations of either the state or

supranational actors to a more complex outlook that takes into account both domestic actors

and other levels of decision-making. This is what is termed the 'governance turn' in the

study of integration as an attempt to recognize the multi-faceted nature of European politics

(Rosamond, 2000: 110).

While it might seem unnecessary to engage in deep theoretical analysis in order to

eventually define the main theoretical focus of this research, the introduction of classical

theories and new approaches serves as an essential preparatory step for positioning the

theory tackled in greater detail in this thesis. The goal of the theoretical introduction was to

highlight concepts that will be used not only in relation to liberal intergovernmentalism but

in the empirical part of the paper as well. These include domestic interest, institutional

impact and policy-making outcomes. The theories presented above all try to explain why

and under what conditions integration between Member States occur. However, none of

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them deals explicitly with the underlying preferences of domestic actors in the process, the

strategic interplay between them and their impact on policy outcomes and how it eventually

influences the course of integration. In order to make up for this shortcoming, the following

chapter presents a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework conceptualized by

Andrew Moravcsik and presents its novel concepts in relation to former and contemporary

European integration theories.

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3. Liberal intergovernmentalism: bridging the domestic-community gap

The framework of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was conceptualized by Andrew

G. Moravcsik (1998). His widely known and acknowledged book titled The Choice for

Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht published in 1998 is

regarded as the first overarching theoretical account of liberal intergovernmentalism.

All major theories of European integration can be traced back to classic concepts of

International Relations (IR). This holds true for liberal intergovernmentalism as well. By its

objective to direct the concept of the state back into the contemporary debate on European

integration process, it reaches back to the classic realist stream of IR in its approach to

states as self-interested, rational and unitary actors, which define their interests relative to

the position to other states (Rosamond, 2000: 131, emphasis added). This basic assumption

has to be remembered throughout the whole analysis.

The Choice for Europe uses major European treaty decisions as empirical evidence to

'explain why sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to coordinate their

core economic policies and surrender their sovereign prerogatives within an international

institution' (Moravcsik, 1998: 1). In other words, the core issue investigated by Moravcsik

is to answer why the gate-keeping capacity of states (their ability to influence policy

decisions) does not erode in the European decision-making process despite obvious

movement towards more and deeper integration.

In order to understand the complex theoretical framework of liberal

intergovernmentalism, the following sections will present the outline of the theory, the

major focus of its research agenda along with its most relevant critical accounts.

3. 1. Theoretical baselines of liberal intergovernmentalism

As the terminology already suggests, liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory that

draws upon different theoretical assumptions and tries to combine findings of various

theoretical account with the intention to provide a novel approach towards the integration

process in Europe. Although it might seem that Moravcsik wants to create a completely

new framework by providing a critique on former integration theories, an analysis of his

argumentation dissolves such claims. Concerning its relation to classic integration theories

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however, the liberal intergovernmentalist framework does not wish to contrast classical

theories per se. Rather, it has the aim to reach back on older concepts while creating a new

approach.

The framework of liberal intergovernmentalism is primarily applied to distinguish a

set of assumptions that are used to disaggregate the phenomenon of European negotiations

(Moravcsik, 1998: 19). It makes use of previously conceptualized integration theories that

build upon the prevalence of domestic politics in policy-making and on assumptions of

two-level games.

First of all, the importance of domestic politics must be considered. The liberal notion

that domestic interest matters and the role of the state in the integration process cannot be

set aside appears in the line of reasoning put forward by Simon Bulmer (1983). According

to him, the national polity serves as a basic unit of the European Community and its

decision-making system (Bulmer, 1983: 354). Thus national preferences have to be taken

into account during the course of analysis. With the reintroduction of domestic politics into

the discourse, Bulmer seems to have paved the road for Moravcsik's theory.

Second of all, a number of ideas stem from the concept of 'two-level games'

introduced by Robert Putnam (1988). Putnam, by reflecting on various theories tackling the

relationship between the domestic and the international level comes to the conclusion that

in the course of international negotiations, national governments pursue a two-level game.

On the national level, governments are exposed to the immense pressure by domestic

groups to adopt favorable policies. On the international level, national governments are

obliged to satisfy domestic preferences while trying to reach a favorable international

agreement. In order to achieve this, national government representatives face strong

incentives to be present on both levels (Putnam, 1988: 434). Hence, this line of reasoning

can successfully be applied to the negotiation process in general.

As referred to above, the argument of liberal intergovernmentalism, apart from using

classic integration theories as its argumentative starting point also draws on the notion of

two-level games and the priority of national preferences in international negotiations. As

suggested in the previous chapter, that is why the theory of Moravcsik is rather similar to

rational choice institutionalism. However, before too much is said about the origins of the

19

liberal intergovernmental thought, the time has come to tackle what lies in the very heart of

the framework itself.

3. 2. The core argument and beyond

Similarly to classic integration theories, liberal intergovernmentalism was created as a

response to the re-launch of the integration process in the mid-1980s that resulted in a

revived theoretical debate on the real nature of the integration process. As a contribution to

the debate, Moravcsik suggested the need for revised intergovernmental model that

emphasized the power and preferences of Member States (Pollack, 2005:17). The result of

such revision was the central claim made by Moravcsik that integration was a result of a

series of rational choices made by national leaders who pursued economic interests. When

the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and macroeconomic preferences

of ruling governmental coalitions converged, integration could advance successfully

(Moravcsik, 1998:3).

In order to underpin the basic observation, Moravcsik introduced a so-called

'rationalist framework of international cooperation' to underpin its major assumptions

(ibid, 18, emphasis added). This rationalist framework implies a negotiation process that

consists of three stages respectively, namely national preference formation, interstate

bargaining and choice of international institutions, also referred to as pooling or delegation

of sovereignty (Wallace, 2005: 18). What makes this a liberal and at the same time an

intergovernmentalist account is the fact that the stage of national preference formation

evokes the liberal tradition that focuses on the re-emergence of state preferences

(Moravcsik, 1997:519). In addition to that, the intergovernmentalist line of reasoning can

be discovered as strategic bargaining between states (Rosamond, 2000:136). To put it

differently, the rationalist framework rests on considerations for the economic interests of

states, their relative power and credible commitments made in favor of cooperation

(Moravcsik, 1998: 3). Although the primacy of economic interests suggests a mere

economic approach, the novelty of the 'Moravcsikian' argument lies in the fact that it is

based on a political economy account highlighting the importance of distributional conflicts

in the process of interstate bargaining and the asymmetrical interdependence of states

engaging in negotiations (ibid). The mention of distributional conflicts relates back to two-

20

level games where conflicts of interests between domestic groups and the state result in

enhanced interest representation on the domestic level whose outcome also impacts the

negotiation process on the international level.

Several scholars successfully understood and reflected on the argumentative

framework by Moravcsik. A rather comprehensive interpretation is provided by Rosamond

(2000). In his account, the liberal side of the theory points out the demand side of

integration by articulating possible integration outcomes by nation states. National

consequences are the result of state-society interaction and therefore liberal

intergovernmentalism is more than a classic intergovernmentalist theory. What makes this a

novel approach is that while intergovernmentalist accounts claim that national interests

arise in the context of the domestic politics of Member States, liberal intergovernmentalism

stresses the importance of the context provided by sovereign states and their relative

position in the system (Rosamond, 2000: 137). This distinction points at the importance of

policy coordination on the European level and the impact of Member States in formulating

the conditions for the outcome of policy-making.

3. 3. What is at stake for liberal intergovernmentalism?

The rationalist framework of international cooperation seeks to answer three

fundamental questions. First of all, it looks for an explanation of national preferences and

motivations in relation to underlying support for economic integration. In his view,

domestic preferences reflect issue-specific consequences, no hierarchy of interests prevails

and policy is coordinated for the sake of a profitable economic exchange between domestic

actors (Moravcsik, 1998: 6). By pinpointing the importance of distributional consequences

Moravcsik demonstrates that underlying domestic preferences depend on the ability of the

state to articulate its economic interests and thus influence domestic political patterns so

that the given issue can be bargained on the European level (ibid).

The second crucial question concerns the process of interstate bargaining. Linked to

the previous argument of national interests, Moravcsik claims that the interstate bargaining

process is shaped by the relative power of states. In other words, governments that benefit

the most from agreements are the ones that are ready to sacrifice the most in favor of

reaching them (Moravcsik, 1998: 8). Tackling the issue of bargaining, Moravcsik reaches

21

back on the intergovernmentalist account of bargaining theory and highlights the

importance of 'asymmetrical interdependence', a term applied by realist scholars Keohane

and Nye (1989) and entrepreneurship carried out by governments (Moravcsik, 1998: 62). It

stresses the argument that states engage in strategic interactions with the goal of

maximizing their benefits from a potential cooperative agreement that leaves them better

off than before the agreement was struck.

Thirdly, liberal intergovernmentalism observes state choices in the light of strategic

bargains and hence explains why states transfer some parts of their sovereignty to European

institutions. The framework suggests that pooling of sovereignty must be interpreted as an

effort to control or constrain one another and by doing so, to enhance the credibility of

commitments towards each other. When there is a strong temptation to defect, this

delegation of sovereignty is more likely to occur to escape the prisoner’s dilemma. In

addition to that, a good indication of the pooling of sovereignty is the change of voting

patterns in European decision-making. In Moravcsik's view, the shift towards qualified

majority voting (QMV) from unanimity in more and more regulatory areas strengthens this

argument (Moravcsik, 1998: 75). However, it must be pointed out that the liberal

intergovernmentalist framework is rather weak in explaining the reason why the gate-

keeping capacity does not eventually erode in the long run.

To sum up, liberal intergovernmentalist theory builds up a rationalist framework of

international cooperation by placing the nation state in the midst of analysis and looks at it

as the primary actor to shape international negotiations. The state itself is a unitary and

rational actor in the negotiation process, meaning that it expresses coherent national

strategy on the European level and pursues its underlying preferences using a constrained

choice of means and takes into account its relative position to other states in the course of

bargaining (Ibid, 24).

Putting the state as a central analytical unit and emphasizing the relation between the

state and society makes it a liberal theory while it recalls intergovernmentalist

argumentative logics when outlining the importance of interstate bargaining. Therefore,

liberal intergovernmentalism provides a novel approach towards European integration. Its

real added value to the study of integration, as referred to in the previous section is that it

22

reintegrates the nation-state as a gate-keeper of interests into the European integration

discourse and explains why the gate-keeping capacity of Member States stays intact during

the decision-making process.

3. 4. Contending criticisms of liberal intergovernmentalism

The argumentative stream put forward by Moravcsik naturally attracted criticism by

various scholars. The framework of liberal intergovernmentalism has already been analyzed

by several scholars, each of them focusing on different assumptions. Criticism usually

stems from institutionalist and social constructivist scholars. While advocates for the first

approach generally point out the weakness of an efficiency-based explanation for

cooperation that is carried out between self-interested Member States, the latter approach

lacks the inclusion of ideas and norms in the investigation.

The Member State-centered argumentative discourse by Moravcsik received harsh

criticism from institutionalists who, stemming from their general assumptions detect the

lack of a proper role assigned to institutions in the liberal intergovernmentalist framework.

In a very early critical assessment, Garrett and Weingast (1993) took the challenge to

examine the creation of the Single European Act investigating the role of ideas. Their

central claim is that the rational theoretical framework that is exclusively based on

transaction costs and the collective gains of cooperation achieved by self-interested actors

has a major weakness, namely that it ignores the real incentives for cooperation. To

underpin its observation, the creation of the internal market is brought into the discourse.

The goal to create the internal market provided a mutually acceptable 'focal point' for

cooperation: the mutual recognition of goods and services. In order to achieve the above

aim, the role of ideas articulated by institutions was an essential precondition. Institutions

take the leading role in the bargaining process by assigning directions towards which the

bargaining process can continue its way (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 186).

The theory based on the role of ideas, as the authors put it, points to three interrelated

phenomena, namely expected gains from cooperation, an idea that articulates these gains

and the ability of this idea to translate itself into a shared belief system on which

cooperation could be based on (ibid: 203). This is how the principle of mutual recognition

of goods became the base for cooperation on the internal market.

23

As a closing remark, it must be noted that the argumentation of this article does not

entirely contradict the claim that the basic principle of the internal market was actually the

preferred economic principle articulated by the most powerful political and economic

actors, namely the French, German and British counterparts (ibid, 191). This observation

indeed recognizes at least some elements of the rational argumentative framework and

highlights the importance of a holistic approach towards European integration using

manifold theoretical argumentations.

In later published article, Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) focus on institutional rules that

impact decision-making (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996: 270). More broadly, institutional

choices and their policy consequences are taken into consideration. This is done with the

help of a procedural analysis of European decision-making. Garrett and Tsebelis draw the

conclusion that there is a considerable power shift to be noted that is characterized by a

shift from the agenda-setter (the European Commission) towards the European Parliament

(ibid, 272) and does not remain with the Council of Ministers. This is the real difference

between liberal intergovernmentalist argumentation and rational choice institutionalism.

According to Garrett and Tsebelis, '(n)ational governments are not the only important

decision makers in the EU. The Commission of the European Communities and the

European Parliament also play important legislative roles. It is only by analyzing the effects

of institutional rules on the interactions among these institutions that one can understand

the policies that are produced every day in the EU and hence the integration process itself'

(ibid, 294, emphasis added).

From a historical institutionalist perspective, the criticism put forward by Pierson

(1996) still stands today as the most coherent engagement to liberal intergovernmentalism.

During the critical assessment, Pierson points at the constrained role of Member States in

the process of integration. He investigates why gaps can emerge in Member State control

over the evolution of European institutions and why these gaps are difficult to overcome.

The exclusive importance of Member States in the integration process is criticized

highlighting the fact how the above-mentioned control gaps provide other actors with the

opportunity to influence decision-making and thus constrain the room for maneuver for

other actors (Pierson, 1996: 126).

24

By its ability to analyze the effects of institutions over time, Pierson argues that

historical institutionalism is more capable of providing sufficient explanations for

cooperation since Member States are preoccupied with short-term gains and as a result can

face unanticipated consequences. As a consequence of shifting domestic preferences,

formal institutions can be created that do not fit the current needs of states. Even if Member

States realize that the institutions to which they delegated some parts of their authority have

too much influence, they might rein them in. The gaps created in the process of integration

however encourage supranational actors to make autonomous decisions and influence

decision-making. The new rules created by these institutions might make the reassertion of

control by states too troubled (Ibid, 147).

Besides being an advocate for the enhanced importance of institutions in the process

of integration and constraints of Member States to influence policy outcomes, Pierson

reaches back to the theoretical foundations of neofunctionalism regarding the role of

supranational actors. While neofunctionalists focus on gradual transfer of authority from

Member States to supranational actors, historical institutionalism concentrates on the

evolution of rules and policies along which the process of social adaptation creates a policy

that in the end restricts the options available for political actors (ibid, 148, emphasis added).

The final conclusion of Pierson’s historical institutionalist critique in relation to

liberal intergovernmentalism is thus to warn advocates of the approach of the apparent

dangers of exclusive focus on the impact of domestic actors and the time lag in the frames

of which liberal intergovernmentalist observations prevail. Repeated emphasis on the long-

lasting process of integration points to constraints of Member State and calls for the

inclusion of the above assumptions in the course of later research.

To sum up, institutionalist critiques emphasize that the major weakness of the liberal

intergovernmentalist approach lies in its inability to properly analyze interactions between

European institutions and Member States. The exclusive focus on the impact of the nation-

state poses boundaries for investigation and hence liberal intergovernmentalism is

insufficient in explaining the integration phenomenon.

Having introduced the most influential institutional critiques of liberal

intergovernmentalism, it is time to take a closer look at constructivist critical assessment.

Not surprisingly, a liberal theory based on rational assumptions attracts criticism from

25

social constructivist scholars that strive to prove pure rational assumptions wrong. A

constructivist critique is provided by Checkel (1999), one of the most influential

constructivist scholars in International Relations. In his critical writing, Checkel makes the

central claim that the liberal intergovernmentalist analytical framework has to be

supplemented by a sociological insight that helps understand the role of institutions and

stress their importance in shaping interests and identities. This, as Checkel argues, is

possible with the introduction of social learning and normative diffusion (Checkel, 1999:

546, emphasis added). While the writer the rational choice observation that perceives

European integration as a strategic exchange, his contribution to bring back the 'thick

institutional' element into the discourse (ibid, 548). The novelty in the social constructivist

analysis lies in the latter objective and, in addition to that, it tries to bridge the gap between

rational theories using institutions as intervening variables and social constructivism that

acknowledges them as independent variables in the process of social learning.

The constructivist argument as a potential critique of intergovernmentalism can

further be tracked in an article written by Checkel and Moravcsik (2001). Similarly to his

previous critical writings, Checkel advances his observations on methodological challenges

of social constructivism with regard to the study of European integration. Repeatedly,

Checkel stresses the emphasis on social interaction and argumentative persuasion that is

capable of initiating preference change (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001: 221). The final

claim Checkel makes related to theoretical considerations is that constructivist research still

lacks a proper social science theory (ibid, 226).

Speaking of the importance of ideas, Moravcsik points out that the liberal

intergovernmentalist framework does not dispute the role of collective ideas in preference

formation since integration decisions are also understood in some parts as alterations of

social actor calculation. However, rationalists, by questioning the fact that external

variations in other sources of these ideas actually affect policy outcomes distinguish

themselves from the constructivist stream, assigning a non-central role to ideas (ibid, 230).

In his words, 'what distinguished rationalist and constructivist ideas is not the fact that

states and societal actors hold ideas consistent with their actions but the causal

independence of those ideas' (ibid, 230, emphasis added).

26

Last, but not least, liberal intergovernmentalist observations on the delegation process

are challenged Pollack (2003). The central investigated issue here is why Member States

delegate some of their functions to institutions and what side effects can arise in this

process. Pollack applies the rational concept of control mechanisms by Member States in

order to explain the above argument. He argues that delegation occurs as Member States

(principals) make supranational institutions (agents) perform certain functions and reflect

their preferences in order affect policy outcomes (Pollack, 2003: 259). As to avoid side-

effects of integration, namely supranational institutions carrying out their functions

independently and not taking into account member state preferences, control mechanisms

were established by agents (Ibid, 278). By using the European Commission and the

European Court of Justice as empirical examples, Pollack points out the constraints

Member States embed into principal-agent relations.

The article has a two-sided relationship to liberal intergovernmentalism. First of all, it

agrees with Moravcsik in the sense that `supranational institutions act within the constraint

of member state preferences, which must be taken into account during all supranational

[…] functions` (ibid, 277). Concerning the issue of delegation however, the novelty of the

argumentation by Pollack is that it addresses the scenario when institutions exploit

diverging preferences by Member States in order to avoid sanctions. In Pollack`s view, this

is the aspect that liberal intergovernmentalism does not address directly (ibid, 256).

Moravcsik can explain why delegation occurs but he does not look at the situation when

institutions act independently of their principals and formulate their own agenda.

To sum up the above outlined critical assessments, the following observations can be

made. In relation to liberal intergovernmentalism, both institutionalist and social

constructivist accounts lack the inclusion of institutional norms and learning processes into

the rationalist framework. In their view, Moravcsik does not sufficiently address the impact

of ideas and rules in the integration process and fails to analyze the scenario when pooling

of sovereignty by Member States generates institutional learning that might take away core

competences from the domestic level. Liberal intergovernmentalism reflects on the

interaction between the domestic and the institutional level ignoring the phase after

interstate bargains are struck. However, the main focus of the theory is the bargaining

process itself and the impact of states as entrepreneurs whose domestic preferences are

27

transferred to the level of European institutions. Therefore, a critical assessment is crucial

in emphasizing the need for a complex examination of the integration process but cannot

oversee the prevalence of rational interest articulation in decision-making.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is closely linked to the Europeanization

discourse that also takes the integration process into account. In the course of decision-

making in the European Union, the regulatory policy of the environment has been one of

the most intense regulatory battle-ground for Member States since the 1970s. Empirical

evidence from the field of the environment is a rather challenging task since it not only

demonstrates the asymmetrical interdependence of domestic actors in terms of their very

different regulatory approaches but also points to the gate-keeping capacity of states and

the process through which different regulatory practices are shaped into a European policy

framework supposing credible commitments by actors involved.

Although Moravcsik justified his theoretical assumptions with the help of treaty

bargains, the current research will outline important cornerstones of environmental

regulation to make us of the theory outlined above. Hence, the following chapters will

move on to empirics and attempt to demonstrate the prevalence of liberal

intergovernmentalist assumptions in the climate change policy of the European Union.

28

4. Putting theory into practice: the Europeanization of European environmental

policy

After having outlined and introduced the most relevant theories of European

integration and the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism respectively, theoretical

observations shall be put to a test with the help of empirical evidence taken from the field

environmental policy. The following chapter will examine the domestic impact of Member

States on the decision-making process. Furthermore, the chapter will provide an outline of

major characteristics of European environmental policy and the EU's approach towards

climate change more respectively. Last, but not least, main features of Germany's and the

United Kingdom's environmental regulatory patterns will be presented in order to

demonstrate domestic impact in the empirical case studies.

4. 1. What waters does Europe stir? Europeanization and domestic impact

It is an observation commonly shared by scholars investigating European policy-

making that not only are domestic patterns of decision-making are altered as a consequence

of policy decisions taken jointly by Member States but domestic regulatory structures also

exert considerable influence on the policy outcome on the European level. In the literature,

this phenomenon is usually referred to as Europeanization and is conceptualized differently

depending on the theoretical orientation of scholarship.

As for definitions of Europeanization, various concepts are in use. The definition

considered in this thesis is the one conceptualized by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001).

In their account, Europeanization is the 'emergence and the development at the European

level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions

associated with political problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and

of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules' (Risse,

Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 3). The definition, even though it is a general one, suggests

that Europeanization is a mutually understood interaction during which both European and

domestic (institutional) patterns are altered. This can take us to look at the two approaches

usually used in the Europeanization discourse.

The process of Europeanization is mostly investigated using a 'top-down' perspective,

meaning that effects of a community decision are studied from the perspective of domestic

politics. This investigative approach is favored by Börzel and Risse (2000) who stress the

29

importance of 'domestic misfit' in the course of Europeanization. In their account, misfit

indicates some degree of 'incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and

institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions, on the

other' (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). Thus, this misfit is a necessary precondition to provoke

processes on the domestic level that provide answers to what takes place on the European

level.

Applying the top-down logic, Börzel and Risse recall observations of rational choice

and sociological institutionalism in order to account for the real nature of domestic change.

Although the two institutionalist accounts reach back on different effects of adaptational

pressures that in the end result in an alteration of domestic political patterns as well, they

share one thing in common, namely that the above mentioned misfit is the necessary

precondition for domestic change (ibid, 12).

Concerning the way liberal intergovernmentalism conceives of European integration,

another approach is applied that looks at how domestic politics affect the outcome on the

European level. This is known as the 'bottom-up' approach. The major focus of the latter is

to determine how domestic policies influence institution-building on the European level

and the overall outcome of the policy area per se. Advocates of the 'bottom-up'

investigative patterns such as Héritier (1999) and Moravcsik himself (1998) opt for

observing the course of policy-making as a rational-strategic interaction conducted between

self-interested and goal-oriented actors (Héritier, 1999: 13). This argumentation stands in

line with the one Moravcsik applies when looking at policy-making in The Choice for

Europe (see previous chapter). What Héritier's value added to the bottom-up approach is

that she goes beyond mere national preferences and also looks at corporate lobbying as an

important determinant in the policy-making process (ibid, 14).

In case of the latter viewpoint, it must be outlined that it is not only the direction that

matters in case of the interplay between domestic and supranational actors but the

substance of the interaction as well. While the top-down approach stresses the way

competences are distributed between the two layers by institutions providing national

players with competence and knowledge, the bottom-up approach, especially the one

introduced by Moravcsik, emphasizes how the interest of Member States is uploaded on the

level of European institutions through the bargaining process. In case of national preference

30

formation, it is primarily the interest that matters and that is what creates the real substance

of the uploading process and the bargain.

4. 2. European environmental policy in the making: major principles and characteristics

'Ask a European what the continent is good at, and sooner or later he or she will say

protecting the environment. Our economies may be struggling. We may be failing to

integrate Muslims. But, by golly, we are green and cuddly, like a Martian teddy bear' (The

Economist, 2006). The above ironic account on European environmental attitudes

succinctly summarizes the overall attitude towards environmental issues and certainly holds

some elements of truth. Initial stages of policy-making in the field of the environment were

not as smooth as the above article points out.

The making of environmental policy is somewhat different from other policy areas in

the EU. There are generally two main reasons for its uniqueness. First of all, the domain of

environment is a rather segmented one and there is actually no coherent environmental

policy framework to distinguish, only areas that are given enhanced interest depending on

the importance of the issue (Grant et al., 2000: 7). In terms of current empirical research for

instance, climate change and pollution abatement within the environmental policy has been

given priority for the last few decades partly due to emerging public concerns and

economic consequences.

The mention of economic concerns takes us to the second major feature of

environmental policy, namely its dependence on economic circumstances. Although it is a

general observation, the paper will demonstrate in the case studies that considerations of

domestic industry play a crucial role in the shaping of environmental policy as well.

The first overall attempt to react to growing public pressure regarding environmental

matters was in 1972 when the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government

gathered in Paris (Moussis, 2005: 262). The summit was designed to provide a basic

starting point for implementation of a common policy. This is to be observed through the

publication of the so-called environmental action programs (later on named EAPs) that

contained the main objectives of environmental policy in Europe. Currently, the European

Union's Sixth Environmental Action Program lists environmental priorities covering the

31

period between 2002 and 2012. The decade-long time period the EAPs cover suggest that

the EU wishes to articulate goals that are to be achieved in the long run.

As for its legal bases, European environmental policy did not have a treaty base until

the Single European Act was adopted in 1986. As suggested above, the emergence of

environmental legislation was closely linked to economic considerations and the single

market. This is underpinned by Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European

Community (TEC) on the single market that contained explicit reference to environmental

matters, namely for Commission proposals to be 'packaged' as market regulations in order

to remove non- trade barriers between Member States and to regulate such matters in areas

that affect the creation of the internal market (Lenschow, 2005: 307). In addition to that, an

unregulated policy area bears potential of free-riding by states not willing to sacrifice

anything for the success of integration. As for its cross-boundary nature, the environmental

policy is one area typically exposed to that.

Before the entry into force of the Single European Act, the Treaties of Rome (1957)

contained some implicit references to environmental issues. Article 95 Paragraph 3 of the

Treaty Establishing the European Community states that: 'The Commission, in its proposals

envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer

protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any

new development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European

Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective' (Treaties of Rome,

1957). A possible reason for such a late inclusion of environmental policy into the overall

European framework could be that the creation of the Single Market took up the policy

space and domestic regulations of Member States were sufficient to deal with minor

environmental issues. The first round of enlargement in 1973 that welcomed the United

Kingdom in the European Community that was widely known to have quite distinct

regulatory traditions compared to its continental counterparts, a change in attitudes towards

environmental policy ensued.

The fact of the enlargement also implied that the inclusion of states with different

environmental focus necessitate the need for a more coherent set of environmental

regulations and enhanced policy coordination as well. Another impetus for policy

coordination was the ambition of the EC to become an influential 'norm entrepreneur' and

32

participate on global environmental negotiations as an entity with mutually endorsed

standpoints.

In terms of the directions environmental policy takes and the set of environmental

regulations applied, a general observation to make is that the policy process is driven by a

limited number of Member States that are more environmentally conscious and progressive

than the rest (Sbragia, 1996: 236). It is especially true for Germany, the United Kingdom,

France or the Netherlands who, by their relative size, economic development and

population are more capable of exerting impressive influence on policy outcomes. As

Börzel (2002) puts it, Member States that actively shape European policy outcomes are

called 'pace-setters', referring to their favorable position, namely that by their ability to

influence outcomes on the European level, states can reduce the costs of adaptation while

implementing a policy (Börzel, 2002: 198).

In terms of voting patterns in the domain of the environment, a mixed pattern can be

observed. Throughout the years, environmental regulation varied between various voting

patterns ranging from qualified majority voting (QMV) to cooperation procedure. While

the former referred to environmental measures directly related to the internal market, the

practical consent of the European Parliament and thus cooperation was applied to regulate

matters not directly linked to market-related questions (Lenschow, 2005: 307). Economic

interdependence of environmental issues is clearly underpinned by the application of

qualified majority voting. The use voting pattern also suggests that environmental policy

belongs to the areas where there is a strong domestic interest observable. The QMV voting

procedure in environmental affairs supports the above argument on economically more

developed Member States hence environmental 'pace-setters' such as Germany influence

the domain to the greatest extent. Currently, environmental policy issues are most

dominantly decided by QMV and co-decision procedure (ibid, 309). In case of climate

change policy, questions are decided over by co-decision.

For the sake of upcoming empirical analysis, an important procedural characteristic is

that environmental measures that involve some considerations for taxing require the total

consent of Member States in the Council of Ministers and thus are decided by unanimity

voting (Grant et al., 2000: 17). Therefore, one weak point of the effectiveness of the policy

area is that Member States cannot impose taxes without the overall consent of others. This

33

procedural shortcoming came under closer scrutiny in case of the energy/carbon tax and

points to the weakness of fiscal measures in environmental regulation, let alone its

implication for regulatory competition.

A promising sign for the political consolidation of the field is the emergence of more

clear-cut voting patterns. It demonstrates the end of 'incidental policy-making' as well

(Leschow, 2005: 308). However, political consolidation does not make the policy are

exempt from considerable regulatory conflict between more and least developed Member

States. The firm treaty base and procedural layout rather imply that the area of the

environment has been given enhanced importance and thus a new stage for domestic

preference formation that eventually leads to integration.

Procedural development of the policy area also implies a firm institutional base.

Firstly, the European Commission`s role is assessed. Originally, the directorate-general

(DG) for environment was established paired up with other directorate-generals earlier on

(Grant et al., 2000: 19). To refer back to its initial structural setup, its merger with the

transport DG, for instance, was due to British domestic preferences in 1988. The United

Kingdom held the Council presidency that year and had just merged its transport and

environment departments during the presidency back at home (ibid 21). Therefore, the

British wanted to minimize the costs of structural adaptation by implementing their

domestic practice on the European level, which they did successfully. However, the

environment was given a separate directorate-general later that further demonstrates its

enhanced importance. In the process of environmental policy-making, the European

Commission is usually regarded as a hard-core promoter of strict regulations. By doing so,

it most often highlights positive economic and developmental effects of more stringent

proposals in order to alienate domestic concerns for budgets or the industry (Lenschow,

2005: 312). The more successful the Commission is to present an issue as a 'European'

matter, the more likely favorable agenda-setting takes place.

In the proposal preparatory phase, the Commission is highly dependent on domestic

expertise on one hand and already existing European or international practices on the other,

as it will later be seen in the case studies.

Second of all, the role of the Council of the European Union also known as the

Council of Ministers deserves attention. Being the most important decision-making organ

34

besides the European Parliament, the Council's impact is pivotal in policy outcomes. In

terms of environmental policy however, one can come across surprising observations.

To start with, domestic preferences do matter in the Council but vary accordingly to

the attention given to environmental issues in the Member State. Thus, the Council is a

rather typical venue for interstate bargaining that has the potential to weaken the

restrictions put forward by the Commission (Sbragia, 1996: 247). Different regulatory

traditions by Member State become apparent in the Council, too, also reflecting the

importance a certain Member State assigns to environmental issues (Lenschow, 2005: 313).

Thus, there is a clear dividing line between environmental leaders being Northern Member

States and Mediterranean laggards whose environmental attitudes significantly differ and

might influence policy outcomes and adaptation (Börzel, 2000: 142).

Decisions taken by qualified majority voting led to the observation that

environmental leaders sometimes loose their ability to veto proposals that threaten their

domestic interests (Grant et al., 2000: 29). This mostly prevails in relation to more stringent

regulatory questions that also exert influence on other sectors, for instance energy policy.

Last, but not least, the shift from cooperation to co-decision procedure in

environmental issues demonstrates the growing importance in the European Parliament in

decision-making. Enhanced procedural influence also suggests more influence on the

substance of the policy. The veto power assigned to the Parliament due to co-decision also

implies that the institution could be made more accountable for decision-making failures as

well (Lenschow, 2005: 317). Thus, overall, due to the introduction of co-decision

procedure, the role of the European Parliament is more significant than before.

To sum up the impact of institutional layout in terms of domestic interest and

Europeanization, it must be concluded that Member States engage in strategic bargains

mostly based on their regulatory approaches in the field of the environment and the

importance of the issue at stake. When it comes to agenda-setting however, the impact of

the European Commission must be considered in the first place. As for the European

Parliament, the fact that it is an institution whose members are directly elected national

politicians puts it aside in terms of interstate bargaining. For the sake of recent analysis, the

two important institutions examined are the European Commission as a gate-keeper of

interests and the Council where matters are decided and coalitions are formed. The two

35

case studies will consider the impact of these two institutions in the empirical analysis.

Before doing so, the following section will introduce the examined policy field of climate

change by outlining its most important features.

4. 3. The European approach towards climate change

As it was mentioned in the previous section, the policy area of the environment is

characterized by segmented sub-policy areas that each deal with different aspects of the

domain. Since the 1970s, partly as a reaction to global concerns, a new sub-area emerged

that gradually came to enjoy great public attention and led to enhanced legislative

outcomes. Climate change is one of the most dynamically developing policy domains

within the environment and its future development is crucial in terms of the EU's role as an

influential leader in climate-related issues today. Naturally, Member States, especially

`pace-setters` are eager participants of the climate change dispute and seek to influence

policy-making to the best of their abilities.

Overall European attention towards climate change and global warming, however,

was not a result of domestic concerns but institutionally underpinned scientific evidence.

The second Assessment Report (AR2) published by the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific intergovernmental body operated by the United

Nations pointed out in its report that major driving forces behind climate change and global

warming are the so-called greenhouse gases (IPCC Second Assessment, 1995: 4).

Therefore, the Fifth Environmental Action Plan, climate change was identified as a priority

(Grant et al., 2000: 120).

In the assessment of measures applied in order to combat climate change, European

decision-makers share the view that even despite uncertainty, preventive action is needed in

order to curb future damages due to global warming (Collier, 1996: 123). As the most

integrated economic area of the world, the EU has a relatively great share in greenhouse

gas emissions that further underpins the need for joint action. Especially since the

enlargement that extended the EU to include least developed Member States, its share in

greenhouse gas emissions grew significantly and currently accounts for almost 25% of

global GHG emission levels. Thus, the EU has a clear strategic aim to Europeanize the

policy area and engage in emission reduction efforts as part of demonstrating its image as a

global environmental leader.

36

The ambitious call for preventive action inspired European policy-makers to take part

in issue-specific negotiations to prove their commitments. Thus, the European Union

became a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2002 proving its ambition to take

measures in frames of an international framework to fight climate change (European

Commission, 2002).

Besides international commitments, the European Union has its climate agenda of its

own. What distinguishes the EU from other signatories from such protocols is the fact that

the EU is in the position to use both domestic regulatory traditions and international

experience to follow its strategy in emission reductions. So far, climate change-related

policies have been focusing on the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions as it is the main

greenhouse gas held accountable for growing temperatures. The Communication released

by the European Commission in 1992 titled 'A EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions'

presented a framework directive where energy efficiency, a combined energy/carbon tax

and renewable energy resources were given priority (Grant et al., 2000: 121), the failure of

the former being introduced forthcoming. Later on, new approaches were integrated into

the framework of which the EU-wide system of emission trading is the most recent

development. All in all, environmental policy-making in relation to climate change set the

goal of visibly reducing emission levels and hence proves that an intergovernmental

organization is capable of taking effective measures in order to achieve the above aim.

Abatement of environmental damages however presupposes compliance by Member

States and successful integration of novel environmental practices into already existing

domestic regulatory systems. In terms of climate change policy and the environment in

general, domestic actors consider a number of factors. According to Sprinz and

Vaahtoranta (1994), the two major aspects Member States are mostly concerned about in

international environmental policy-making are the degree to which pollution threatens their

own territory and the costs eventual compliance generates (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994:

78). Once the costs of emission reductions are higher than those of the domestic

abatement's, countries are usually reluctant to support international regulations (ibid, 80).

The following chapter will evaluate the feasibility of the above observations by

directing attention to two empirical examples of climate change abatement. By doing so,

emphasis will be put on two conflicting regulatory philosophies in terms of a fiscal measure

37

and a market-based incentive as two ways of tackling the issue of emission reductions. At

the end of the research, liberal intergovernmentalist claims on domestic influence, interstate

bargaining and the gate-keeping capacity of Member States in terms of integration should

be justified meaning that policy outcomes are a result of strategic bargaining between

domestic actors as an effort to reduce transaction costs and reduce policy misfits.

38

5. Emission reduction efforts as empirical evidence for liberal intergovernmentalist

theory

After a profound assessment of the European Union's climate change policy, the

paper proceeds towards case studies in order to demonstrate major theoretical assumptions

through concrete examples taken from policy-making. Since it would require a longer

research to take each individual Member State under closer look, current investigation

concentrates on German and British domestic regulatory approaches and their impact on

policy outcomes. Hence, the chapter shortly outlines the main differences between the two

countries in terms of environmental regulation. Afterwards, case studies are presented

including a pilot case study of air pollution measures and case studies on the carbon/energy

tax and the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme.

5. 1. Two Member States, one desired role: a comparison of German and British

environmental regulatory approaches

In relation to domestic influence on the European Union's environmental policies,

there are usually two countries that stand out as environmental leaders, namely Germany

and the United Kingdom. While both of them share the common goal, namely to shape

policy outcomes to the best extent preferable to their domestic pattern of environmental

policy, they move along different basic principles and apply distinct regulatory and policy

toolkits to achieve this aim. Alleged and actual differences in German and British

environmental policy become quite apparent when it comes to several environment-related

issues that are debated on the European level. For recent analysis, these differences have to

be understood in order to investigate the national preferences and interstate bargaining of

these two actors in terms of climate change policy of the EU. Let us look at the German and

British way of handling environmental matters.

5. 1. 1. German environmental policy and domestic preferences

It is a mutually shared belief amongst scholars that Germany is a pro-integrationist

and pro-active Member State of the European Union that assigns rather high importance to

environmentally-related issues. Before its reunification, it was already a funding member of

the European Community and its role as an environmental leader has not faded ever since

the EC started to devote more attention to environmental regulations.

39

Throughout its history in the EU, Germany has always been trying hard to minimize

transaction costs in the field of the environment by uploading its domestically formulated

regulatory policy structure to the level of the EU as a whole. As highlighted above, the

lower the costs of implementation in case of a regulatory policy are and the, Member States

are more likely to become active shapers of the given policy area. In case of a regulatory

policy such as the environment that is capable of imposing considerable costs of

implementation, a well-bargained national standpoint is essential in reaching this aim.

As for its public policy approach, Germany prefers consultation and consensus in

articulating its domestic preferences (Wurzel et al., 2003: 119). Not only does it actively

shape policy outcomes but exports (uploads) its domestic policies to the European level so

that other Member States can adopt them (Börzel, 2002: 197). Germany was also one of the

first countries in Europe to publish a national program concentrated on environmental

issues already in 1971. Around that time, basic principles of Germany's environmental

policy measures were institutionalized. These include the so-called precautionary principle

(Vorsorgeprinzip), which foresees the use of pollution abatement measures in case of an

irreversible environmental damage even in the lack of sufficient scientific proof; the

principle of proportionality (Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip) and the principle of cooperation

(Kooperationsprinzip). If one looks at the basic principles of European environmental

policy, a great similarity to these principles can be identified, underpinning the success of

German environmental policy uploading (Wurzel, 2004: 103). The German approach

towards the precautionary principle is based on strict emission standards. As it will be

outlined later on, one of the most intense debates between Germany and the UK in terms of

environmental regulation centered around the use of the German approach in an EU-wide

policy (Börzel, 2002: 198).

As for policy instruments, Germany uses a wide variety of these in the course of

environmental policy-making. On one hand, it applies the so-called 'command-and-control'

regulations that entail strict regulation and heavy fines. In addition to that, voluntary

agreements (VAs) between the German government and the industrial sector were the norm

since mandatory measures were not advocated by the former one. Besides the Netherlands,

Germany has the highest number of VAs in place in the EU (Wurzel et al., 2003: 128).

Voluntary agreements are legally non-binding an important exemption being climate

40

change (ibid, 129). In case of greenhouse gas emissions, German governments mostly favor

this approach regardless of political orientation (Wurzel, 2004: 105). Last, but not least,

there is a growing tendency in Germany for the application of new environmental policy

instruments (NEPIs) that are characterized by the use of market-based instruments instead

of stricter command-and-control mechanisms (Wurzel et al., 2003: 115).

As for the institutional interplay in German environmental policy-making, the role of

the Ministry of Environment (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und

Reaktorsicherheit) has to be highlighted. The BMU is 'one of the most Europeanized

ministries' in Germany, its terms of the quality of environmental regulations (ibid, 108).

When it was founded in 1986, the BMU took over the tasks of the Ministry of Interior

(Binnenministerium des Innern) and switched to a more scientific-based approach (ibid,

118). By its renowned role, the BMU is highly capable of policy formulation that can have

important considerations on the European level as well.

As for the administrative system, policy-making in Germany centers around a 'static

core', the central government (Knill, 2001: 135). Secondly, federal states that are

represented in the Committee of Regions usually articulate contending viewpoints towards

environmental policy opposing the central government (Wurzel, 2004: 110). In addition to

that, Europeanization actually had some positive implications for these federal states since

some competences were given back to them from the central government. Usually, federal

states claim the principle of subsidiary when demanding more competences on the sub-

national level and were successful in re-claiming competences for water management or

nature protection for instance (ibid, 2004: 109). However, in the overall course of decision-

making, it is the central government that has the final say since it is the one that is

represented in the Council of Ministers. Controversially, the central state also gains access

to regional competences (Börzel, 1999: 582). The occasional confusion over competencies

in a federal state makes the implementation of environmental laws slightly more complex

(Wurzel, 2004: 109).

In addition to domestic institutions, German expert knowledge is regarded as a

pivotal key in the development of environmental policy. Hand in hand with experts coming

from the Netherlands, another 'pace-setter' in environmental matters, German expert

presence in environmental committees is rather remarkable. Being a high-regulatory

41

country, Germany is supposed to offer its renowned technical expertise to European

institutions as well (Börzel, 2002: 200). However, no matter how well-funded German

knowledge is in terms of issues related to the environment and more specifically climate

change and emissions, Germany has so far been demonstrating a weaker performance in

diplomatic skills. When it comes to 'political staffing', German under-representation is

visible in key political positions (Wurzel, 2004: 113). Thus, pace-setting in terms of

Germany is mostly characterized by providing professional expertise and demonstrating

excellent environmental compliance on the domestic level that serves as a pattern to follow

for the rest of Europe. Germany has mostly been successful in pushing through its domestic

preferences on the European level and hence proved to be both a hard-line bargainer and an

innovative agenda-setter as well.

5. 1. 2. Environmental considerations of the United Kingdom

Aspirations of Germany to become the ultimate leader in environmental affairs EU-

wide were partly shattered in 1973 when a self-nominated environmental leader was

welcome to the European Community. The United Kingdom when it joined the EC in 1973

was absolutely convinced of her role as a pioneer in environmental issues and demonstrated

strong willingness to persuade others of her ambitions.

Environmental policy-making in the United Kingdom had an early start relative to

other European (continental) states. Three historical developments stand out that will bear

crucial importance in terms of domestic preferences of the UK. First of all, Britain was the

first country in the entire world to assign a separate ministry with the task of dealing with

environmental problems (Jordan, 2004: 208). It indicates that environmental interest

representation in case of the UK is deeper embedded in the institutional setting than in

other European countries and thus it is harder to introduce changes to it.

Secondly, the United Kingdom stands out as the world's first country to levy a tax on

petroleum already in 1909 as part of a package by Lloyd George aiming at generating

progressive income tax (Tindale and Holtham, 1996: 22). Even though the goal of the tax

was simply to generate income, the British can claim that the fact it was levied on a fuel

makes it one of an environmental nature (Jordan et al., 2003: 185). The strong support for

market-related instruments such as taxes as opposed to stricter regulatory measures will

play an essential role in case of the carbon tax as well.

42

Speaking of leadership, Britain took a leading role in the introduction and launch of

the world's first Emission Trading Scheme that came several years earlier than the one

started by the European Union. On one hand, the UK ETS suggested a pattern to follow for

the EU-wide scheme and bore important institutional consequences as well (Sorrell, 2002

in Engels et al., 2008: 288). In relation to the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme

from the perspective of national interest, British domestic experiences with emission

trading play a pivotal role in suggesting a proper structure for the scheme.

There are several outstanding characteristics of British environmental policy, there

are several outstanding characteristics. The major elements of British environmental policy

rest on the following principles. All in all, the approach of the United Kingdom towards

environmental issues is reactive, formulated on a case-by-case basis and pragmatic. Instead

of being involved in a planning procedure that is designed for achieving objectives in the

long run, 'muddling through' problems was initially regarded as a more feasible strategy to

follow for British policy-shapers on the domestic level (Ashby and Anderson, 1981 in

Jordan et al., 2003: 181). This was especially prevalent right after the United Kingdom

joined the EC.

As for policy instruments, the British pollution abatement measures measures

concentrate only a narrow bulk of issues and initially, only human health-related issues

were given attention. In addition to that, the issue of the environment was regarded

marginal and bearing little political importance, namely a 'self-contained area of policy'

(Jordan, 2004: 208). British domestic concerns over the intrusion of the EU into their

environmental taxing will also underpin this argument.

The political leadership of the United Kingdom is generally more in favor of so-

called 'gentleman's agreements' struck between the industry and the government. In other

words, voluntarism, discretion and practicability of measures were the leading principles in

British policy-making. Standards set to tackle pollution were created in the spirit of finding

optimal solutions rather than reduction at the source using proper technologies for

abatement (Weale et al., 2000: 387). It implies that the British approach stands is sharp

contrast to the one advocated by Germany. This contrast is best seen in the debate on the

best available technologies between Germany and the United Kingdom.

43

In terms of gentleman's agreements, British policy-makers apply a cautious strategy

when striking environmental deals with polluters, the British industry itself. Similarly to the

German industry, the British counterpart is also in opposition towards any kind of

regulation that is based on mandatory measures. This is especially true when there is choice

to make between a negotiated agreement (usually implying an unwritten code of conduct)

and a tax (Jordan, 2003: 190). Hence, the British industry is very keen on a policy outcome

in the environmental domain that is settled on a voluntary agreement that is non-binding,

based on a mutual agreement between the government and the industry and does not

necessarily impose any considerable costs (ibid). A good example for a voluntary

agreement is the Climate Change Levy Agreement (ibid, 192). However, getting the

agreement accepted by the British industry took the government a compromise that allowed

an 80% discount for companies in the energy-intensive sector who sign the bill (ibid, 189).

From this bargaining outcome, the strong impact the British industry exerts on decisions

taken by the central government is rather clear-cut.

Speaking of the role of the central government, power relations between different

levels of government had to be taken into account. When it comes to environmental

problems, local governments were given responsibility over technical officials (Jordan,

2004: 215). From 1997 however when the New Labour party took over the office, there

was a clear power shift between these two units. Along with growing politicization of

environmental issues and instead of fine-tuned regulatory measures that were originally

designed to resolve domestic disputes, a more coherent approach suggesting shared

responsibility from the side of stakeholders emerged (Jordan, 2003: 183).

At the same time, the habit of the United Kingdom to block proposals on the

European level changed significantly. Attitude change is also significant in case of the

Environmental Protection Act released as early as 1990 that dealt with several European

environmental policy areas (Börzel, 2002: 201). Within the EU, the United Kingdom

discovered the policy areas that it had practical experience in and it went from veto player

to a shaper who still preferred non-regulatory measures but wanted to upload the content of

British environmental policy in areas where the UK had experience on the domestic level

(Jordan, 2004: 214). In case of the Emission Trading Scheme for instance, British domestic

experience was the main incentive for the participation in the interstate bargaining process.

44

To sum up, the environmental policy-making style and the principles along which the

United Kingdom articulates its domestic environmental preferences is significantly

different from other continental examples. Initially, the UK interpreted Europeanization as

an external burden and tried its best to resist inclusion of European regulations into

domestic practices claiming its overall competence in the field. Change really occurred

once Europeanization touched upon issues that challenged British good practices and

inspired the UK to share its expertise with the rest of Europe. In case of the carbon tax and

the ETS, it becomes obvious that once domestic issues are dealt with on the European level,

the UK is obliged to have a say on the policy-making process and try to shape policy

outcomes. Naturally, the diverging nature of policy formulation sparks heated debates with

other environmental leaders such as Germany, however, the general assumption is that the

United Kingdom cannot be left out of key policy discussions and its domestic preferences

do matter both in terms of the outcome and in the policy-making process itself.

5. 2. Introducing a pilot testing ground: competing regulatory approaches towards air

pollution abatement

Before presenting the case studies on climate change, an pilot case study from the

field of air pollution is presented. The case outlined highlights the conflict between German

and British regulatory approaches in relation to air pollution control. The policy debate on

the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP), the first overall European attempt to regulate

industrial emissions demonstrates how Germany and the UK attempted to upload their

domestic preferences in order to shape the outcome. Although the main principles applied

in the directive reflected the triumph of German regulatory approaches, the final outcome

points to a successful interstate bargain.

The LCP directive is part of the 1985 Framework Directive that is aimed at

combating air pollution caused by industrial plants. The Directive prescribes that all plants

that are listed in the schedule are obliged to possess authorization to operate. Its objection

to provide an adequate response to environmental damages caused by acid rain that result

in forest die-backs clearly makes it an important regulation milestone (Knill, 2001: 126).

Hence, its implementation is seen as an essential part in pollution abatement.

Given the importance of the directive, both Germany and the United Kingdom felt obliged

to insert their own regulatory philosophies into policy-making. However, it is not only the

45

wind that blows differently on the other side of the ocean but regulatory approaches also

take different directions in the two countries.

The German regulatory approach on air pollution was highly influenced by the

country's disappointing experience with acid rain. 'Waldsterben', namely damage to forests

due to acid rain was one of the most catastrophic consequences of environmental damage

ever experienced in Germany and its prevention has been a policy priority ever since it

occurred (Weidner and Mez, 2008: 359). With these negative domestic experiences deeply

embedded into German environmental registries, policy responses concentrated on curbing

cross-boundary effects of air pollution. Therefore, the Germans emphasized the importance

of precautionary measures that impose strict emission standards regardless of scientific

evidence. Germany used best available technologies (BAT) as a policy response to

pollution (Knill and Lenschow, 1997: 3). Pollution abatement thus focuses on the

regulation of the sources of potential damage, in other words, control over the means, in

this case best available technologies was given overall priority (Sbragia, 2000: 308). In the

domestic environmental policy framework, Germany followed strict rules and concentrated

its potential to nip alleged environmental damages right in their source.

On the other side of the Channel Tunnel, the British, probably due to the strong wind

blowing away any potential damaging pollution from the shores were least enthusiastic

about playing the strict one in air pollution abatement matters. Contrary to Germany, the

United Kingdom could only be convinced of steps taken for the betterment of

environmental damages once there was sound scientific evidence to underpin their

relevance. Pollution is not reduced regardless of cost-benefit analysis but it is optimized

according to potential benefits for human health. Flexible policy instruments are in place

that are by no means uniform and allow negotiations between the government and the

industrial sector, also taking into account the economic situation of the latter (Knill and

Lenschow, 1997: 4). Regulatory intervention British style does not concentrate on the

source of pollution but on the environmental quality of the affected medium to be achieved.

To put it differently, emphasis is put on the 'targeting of the ends'. In relation to the best

technology to apply, the British supported the BATNEEC contrary to the German BAT,

namely best available technology without excessive economic costs. (Sbragia, 2000: 308).

46

The pollution abatement approach favored by the United Kingdom thus is lousier and does

not necessarily involve the consent of every actor involved.

The Large Combustion Plant Directive brought a strong wind of change into the

island of Britain and took policy-makers by surprise. Since it demanded mandatory

pollution reduction measures from the side of the industry, it seemingly broke already

existing British practices and implied high costs of adaptation costs. On the other hand, the

fact that the directive supported the application of best available technologies required

almost no domestic compliance from the side of Germany and generated a competitive

advantage for the German industry with the help of the BAT (Börzel, 2002: 199). As a

result, almost perfect domestic 'fit' with the European policy was observable in case of

Germany while for the UK, meaningful compliance costs were envisioned.

As a result of the implemented directive, Germany gained competitive advantage

compared to its British counterpart. The bargain was not complete at that stage however

and the directive on Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control (IPPC) that was

implemented as a follow-up directive reflected British regulatory philosophies.

Experiencing ever harsher competition especially in relation to the German industry, the

United Kingdom had a considerable incentive to opt for a regulatory approach this time that

foresaw stricter standards. This desire was further enhanced by the fact that one version of

the draft directive permitted industrial plants a delay in switching to best available

techniques until 2005. On the contrary, the British domestic legislation prescribed

upgrading earlier (Sbragia, 2000: 310). In addition to that, the British bargain for a

centralized system of issuing permits was also apparent. This was underpinned by domestic

practices, namely the British Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control Act that stepped

into force in 1990 (ibid). Thus, making up for the competitive lag for the industry on one

hand and the ambition to demonstrate environmental leadership on the other, the IPPC

directive was a good occasion to achieve both of the above goals. This time, it was the

German industry that suffered implementation deficits and more costly measures.

As the case of air pollution shows, there is no clear winner to appoint in terms of

regulatory competition. Germany and the UK engaged in a strategic interaction with the

goal of minimizing transaction costs and avoiding significant alterations in their domestic

policy patterns. In the case of Germany, growing public concern over environmental

47

damages forced decision-makers to adopt stricter measures and bargain in favor of a more

stringent measure on the European level as well, a desire they fulfilled in terms of the LCP

directive. In case of the United Kingdom however, there was a lesser degree of domestic

concern and rather a domestically well-integrated policy structure whose alteration implied

high costs and thus it had to be avoided. The domestic preference of the British was to

make the issue of air pollution less relevant for European countries and suggest no need for

institutional intervention. The British could use the regulatory shift on the European level

to demonstrate a leading role that pushed Germany into a less desirable position. Thus, the

outcome of the bargain was a compromise between the use of best available technologies

and concessions were made in the support of countries least enthusiastic about the deal. All

in all, policy implementation did not have any clear losers or winners but a middle-way

regulation was implemented that could serve as a policy baseline for future references.

The above example points to a typical interstate bargain that takes place between two

environmental leaders and results in a regulation that by its nature enhances credible

commitments from the participants. In the following parts of the paper, the two empirical

examples will further demonstrate how the gate-keeping capacity of states can shatter on

one hand and support policy integration.

5. 3. Defeat of a market-based incentive: controversy and failure over a carbon tax

According to the Economist, the Commission proposal for a joint European tax levied

on carbon dioxide emissions was the biggest EC lobby ever witnessed until that time (The

Economist, 1992: 85). As part of the joint Community effort to battle emerging concerns

and alleged consequences of climate change, the proposal went from being an initially

favorable idea to provoking intense opposition from Member States. In the end, the

proposed tax measure did not live up to its original expectations and was taken off the

political agenda.

Before going into details, an important observation has to be made. As it was already

emphasized earlier, issues related to taxing, namely the application of financial incentives

is subject to unanimity voting needing the joint approval of Member States. This predicts

the conflicting nature of the proposal.

The idea that carbon dioxide emissions should be taxed was part of the holistic effort

of the European Community to face challenges posed by global warming and climate

48

change. In the beginning of the 1990s, anthropogenic effects of climate change and its

future consequences were surrounded both by scientific and policy uncertainties that made

policy planning less predictable (Zito, 1999: 88).

A tax to be levied on emissions was part of a more complex framework enacted by

the European Commission. In its communication titled 'A Community strategy to limit

carbon dioxide emissions', the EC identified a framework directive including reductions in

energy demand, increase in energy efficiency and modification of existing energy resources

(European Commission, 1992). The strategy also entailed a framework directive that

consisted of four components, namely a directive on energy efficiency, a combined

carbon/energy tax, directive on the use of renewable energy sources and a monitoring

scheme for carbon dioxide emissions (Collier, 1996: 125). In the framework aimed at

battling alleged effects of climate change, the carbon/energy tax was expected to achieve

the bulk of reductions, thereby accomplishing the overall goal to implement 12% reduction

in order to reach the 1990 emissions baseline. Within this effort, the tax combined with

national measures would add up to 6.5% in expected carbon dioxide reductions (Ibid, 126).

Taxing measures were therefore expected to be the most effective means for pollution

abatement.

The proposal was designed to replace a former environmental proposal, the Large

Combustion Plant Directive that proposed limits of emissions from industrial plants (Zito,

1999: 88). However, it did not foresee the introduction of fiscal measures as sanctions for

compliance.

The goal of the carbon tax was to integrate economic and environmental policies

given the interdependent relationship between the two areas. This idea was also proposed

by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which was the

first international organization to do so (Zito, 2002: 245). In addition to that, the

Commission could rely on already existing domestic practices. The application of

economic incentives to fight pollution was not a novelty in the Netherlands for instance. In

1988, before the issue of carbon tax emerged, the Dutch already levied taxes on fuels,

including gasoline, oils, certain gases and coal as well. In addition to that, Denmark also

indicated in 1991 that they would be willing to create the first EU tax on carbon dioxide,

which they realized a year afterwards (Ibid, 246). Last, but not least, taxing petroleum was

49

not a strange practice in the United Kingdom, either as pointed out in the previous chapter.

However, it must be noted that the aim of taxing in case of Britain was income generation

and not pollution control. In case of the other Member States mentioned, it was primarily

used for emission reduction efforts.

In its proposal, the Commission also outlined the exact mechanism for taxing. With

the goal to cut the predicted level of carbon dioxide emission with 12% by 2000 and to

stabilize emissions by 2000 on the 1990 levels, the tax would start at $3 on an oil barrel

equivalent in the starting year of 1993 and would be later on raised to $10 by the end of the

planned period, 2000. Half of the tax was about to be imposed on energy use from any

source than renewable energy and half of it would be levied on carbon emissions (The

Economist, 1992: 85). Thus, it would be a hybrid tax whose imposition would grow by 1%

annually (Collier, 1996: 127). Control of the incoming tax revenue was planned to remain

in the hands of Member States (Zito, 1999: 104). The expected reduction achieved in

carbon dioxide emissions was calculated between 3 and 5.5% (European Commission,

1992). The major condition for its successful application was that all Member States accept

the taxing framework so that it could be harmonized in all countries of the European

Community.

5. 3. 1. The influence of domestic actors in agenda-setting

In the European Community, one of the typical ways environmental policy was

brought to the attention of decision-makers was through the initiatives of Member States

with apparent regulatory traditions (Zito, 2002: 246). Harmonization was not only

important from the perspective of sustaining the competitiveness of domestic industries but

also for the sake of minimizing transaction costs and costs for adaptation as well. Domestic

pressure for a tax that can be applied on the European level originated from environmental

leaders such as Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands (Grant et al., 2000: 122). The three

Member States were also ready to introduce a tax unilaterally in case of its rejection on the

community level, which bore dangers for the proper functioning of the single market

(Collier, 1996: 127).

Germany a Member State heavily reliant on the consumption of fossil fuels, more

was at stake than a mere tax on carbon emissions. Germany, being the largest emitter of

carbon dioxide in the Community (ibid, 141) needed taxing on the domestic level in order

50

to harmonize its own domestic emissions. It was highly needed after the reunification of the

country. The industrial sector in the East was in strong need for investments and

harmonization was the only feasible way to balance developmental differences. Thus, the

strategy of Germany was to initially keep to stricter targets on the domestic level that

allowed scope for other Member States to increase their emissions or stabilize them later on

(ibid).

Besides domestic influence, an important incentive for the Commission to take steps

was the upcoming Rio Summit, a global intergovernmental conference whose aim was to

discuss issues related to climate change and work out solutions. During these negotiations,

the European Union wished to present a climate change-related agreement that could

demonstrate how its Member States are willing to engage in a joint effort for emission

controls (Zito, 1999: 100). Hence, the Commission came up with a political argument in

order to demonstrate what is at stake.

Besides political considerations, there was a clear issue linkage with energy policy as

well. The White Paper drafted by the Commission wanted to extend taxing to energy

production. With creating a hybrid tax, the environmental and energy directorate-generals

could seemingly share the burden for a decision (Zito, 2002: 247). Since energy policy is a

more politically sensitive area, linking its taxation to emissions also suggests the

‘politicization’ of the tax issue. Last but not least, linkage to a strategic sector such as

energy could possibly evoke more understanding and success.

5. 3. 2. Stalemate in the Council due to domestic concerns

The stalemate that took shape in the Council of Ministers proved the above

calculations essentially wrong. As suggested earlier, the key factor behind the failure was a

procedural one, namely that all matters in the Council are decided by the unanimity vote.

This is especially true in cases like this one where, according to Article 130s that set the

criteria for voting in environmental issues, qualified majority voting does not refer to cases

'significantly affecting a member state's choice between different energy sources and the

general structure of its energy supply (ibid, 126).

Decisions related to taxation belonged to the ECOFIN committee that, besides

usually defining itself slightly superior to the rest of the other ministries also represents a

clear sectoral bias towards domestic ministries (Zito, 2002: 248). Thus, a successful vote

51

was almost doomed to failure before it was put on the voting list. No matter how stringent

officials during the Belgian presidency in the second half of 1993 seemed in attempting to

create another issue linkage that this time wished to link competitiveness, growth and

employment and suggesting that the environmental tax would be a good way to gain

revenue while decreasing taxes on labor (ibid: 250), Member States stuck to their initial

national preferences. Let us look at the most important ones.

As for the biggest player, Germany, we can observe a commitment towards the

promotion of mandatory and harmonized tax that does not allow any kind of burden-

sharing between Member States (Grant et al., 2000: 141). Despite its initial strategy

together with Denmark and the Netherlands to push for strict regulations but allowed some

form of burden-sharing, the German position went from being tolerant to a hard bargainer

and a true environmental leader. This is especially underpinned by German efforts to set

emission reduction targets by 25% by 2005 (Collier, 1996: 129).

Being the largest emitter, the Germans had it relatively easy to push their domestic

interests through the process. The success of a Europe-wide scheme on emission control

stabilization depends on how strict Germany keeps itself to the reduction of its national

emissions (Ibid, 142). When the carbon tax issue came up in the beginning of the nineties,

Germany was slightly over the reunification dilemma that not only put the newborn

German policy-making to a test but posed new challenges for the freshly unified industrial

sector as well. The only way to build a strong German economy was through mandatory

taxes and enormous financial transfers from the West to the East. Understandably, having

the issue of burden-sharing present at home, German politicians did not want to face the

same financial problem on the European level and hence tried to lower their transaction

costs by suggesting something that was closer to their domestic practices: uniform taxes

without considerable exceptions. The German dilemma over burden-sharing will reappear

in case of the Emission Trading Scheme in 2005 with the same arguments formulated

towards new Member States.

As for the United Kingdom, the issue was of a different nature. Already when the

initial emissions reduction plan was outlined by the Commission the British refused to

move their emissions target date that was 2005 instead of 2000 proposed in the draft

(Collier, 1996: 125). This signaled that the UK wished to move along its domestically-set

52

goals. The main argument the British reached back on actually was fiscal sovereignty,

meaning that taxes a government is about to impose should be decided in national premises

(Zito, 2002: 250). Not surprisingly, a direct intervention into domestic matters was a

sufficient reason for the UK to object the idea. The British 'no' in the Council therefore was

absolutely predictable. In addition to that, the British could play the 'subsidiarity card' by

stating that issues similar to the taxing should be taken care of by Member States. To

demonstrate this, the British imposed value added tax (VAT) on domestic fuel in March

1993 (Collier, 1996: 131).

The difference between German and British regulatory approaches was clearly

demonstrated in the tax debate. While Germany was in favor of uniform measures and

proposed its own domestic practices to be applied on the European level as well, the UK,

having a taxing system that operated along a different rationale pulled the ‘fiscal

sovereignty card’ to avoid European regulatory measures. The interstate bargain thus

resulted in the refusal of the directive and, despite the fact that it was repeatedly put back

on the agenda, the carbon tax did not come to operation at that time. Taxation remained in

domestic domains and Member States were given a free hand in deciding over these

measures. Germany thus could profit from continuing domestic taxes coming from the

Eastern regions and the United Kingdom could maintain its domestic practice of using

taxes in the field of the environment for the sole purpose of revenue generation.

To sum up, the carbon tax fiasco failed because it wanted to transfer a traditional

Member State competence to the European level. Taxing measures are fundamental

elements of domestic fiscal policies and any experiment to transfer this competence is a

quite risky business. What might have scared all participants away in the debate is the idea

that emissions can be taxed. It breaks with already existing regulatory practices like

command-and-control regulations (Zito, 1999: 89). Using an economic argument for

taxation that highlights the complexity of carbon dioxide sources regarding their origin and

spicing it up with evident scientific uncertainty over the actual cause of global warming

indicates the fragile nature of market-based incentives that entail taxing (Zito, 2002: 242).

The overall weakness of the tax proposal is demonstrated by the concessions and

special exemptions that were made in the domain. Member States in the end were

authorized to grant special tax reductions up to 75% (!) to firms whose energy costs amount

53

to at least 8% of the value added of their products. Moreover, reductions applied to those

whose competitiveness would be seriously hampered by the introduction of the tax (Collier,

1996: 128). In the end, the tax, partly due to the concessions made to make it a feasible

market incentive, shattered initial hopes over a joint and economic effort towards climate

change and cried for new approaches and solutions.

5. 4. The Emission Trading Scheme of the European Union

The failure of the carbon/energy tax proved market-based incentives that wish to

intervene into fiscal domains of nation states to be a wrong path to go to tackle the issue of

climate change. However, the basic idea of treating the problem keeping in mind the major

mechanisms of the single market remained in the forefront of the European approach and

new ways were explored in order to demonstrate a more successful and effective European

climate agenda this time.

Based on a proposal in 2001 by the European Commission that foresaw a new type of

emission reduction with the help of a trading scheme, debate on the ETS was launched and

a result, the scheme commenced to operate from 2005. Within three years, the European

Union achieved significant reduction in emissions for the first time in 2008, indicating hope

for the EU to become an international player in climate issues (Euractiv, 2009). In the

middle of December 2008, as a result of a compromise struck between the Council of

Ministers and the European Parliament, the climate and energy package of the European

Union was endorsed (Euractiv, 2008).

As it was already set forth in the 6th Environmental Action Program by the EU, the

energy and climate package provided a partial answer to the climate dilemma since it was

articulated as one of the goals included in the program. The 6th EAP formulated four main

priority issues of which the tackling of climate and the reduction of greenhouse gases

according to the Kyoto Protocol were confirmed. The Program set the Community target to

reduce emissions by 8% by 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990 levels and in the second

phase set the reduction effort to 20 to 40% by 2020 with the help of structural changes and

stronger efforts aimed at energy-sharing. In addition to that, a European-wide Emission

Trading Scheme was envisioned that was designed to embrace the above objectives with

the help of market instruments (Moussis, 2005: 264).

54

5. 4. 1. Emissions trading envisioned by Europe

The notion of a trading scheme aimed at controlling the degree of emissions is not a

novelty globally. In the United States for instance, a well-functioning ETS was already

established in the 1970s (Egenhofer, 2007: 454). However, the EU's trading scheme is the

first attempt to make the system work as a cross-border operation that involves all Member

States of the Union and creates a unified monitoring system with overall sanctions for non-

compliance. The Emission Trading Scheme that is regarded as the most integrated part of

the climate package has so far proven to be an intense bargaining ground for national

interests and conflicting preferences.

After the failure of a market-based fiscal initiative, the European Commission had to

reconsider its stance related to emission abatement. After withdrawing the tax proposal for

good in 2001, heads of state during the Gothenburg Council the same year have reaffirmed

their commitment to ratifying the Kyoto agreement (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003: 7).

The results demonstrated on the global level thus contributed to at least finding a new type

of policy response to emissions that does not involve a common policy yet but tries to

channel policy-making into global processes.

In addition to institutional learning showed by the Commission, an essential feature

of the new legislation was its procedural character. While the carbon tax, being a fiscal

matter fell under unanimity voting in the Council, the ETS was planned to be decided on

with the help of qualified majority voting in the Council (Ibid). The negotiations on

emission trading were also signaled by a period where the European Parliament gained

increased importance due to the co-decision procedure that has been the dominating

legislative procedure in the EU since the Treaty of Maastricht. This procedure also applies

to issues related to the environment, especially climate change. However, legislative

success depends on what the outcome of the proposal is in the Council of Ministers in the

first place.

As for the structure of the ETS, it consists of three phases each of them lasting for

three years respectively. Phase I dates from 2005 to 2007 while Phase II was kick-started in

2007. Currently, Phase III is planned to be launched in 2013 if no significant problems

emerge. A good sign for the future is that the Council of the European Union, in mutual

understanding with the European Parliament accepted the EU's Energy and climate change

55

strategy that contains essential reformist characteristics for the ETS directive as well.

Speaking of kick-starting, one of the most usual observations made in relation to the

European ETS is its rapid pace by which it was 'up and running' despite its great geological

scope (Wahl, 2008). It refers to the time scope from the Commission drafting the proposal

in 2001 and in six years, an already established market for carbon allowances was in

operation.

In order to analyze the above mentioned compromise, we need to reach back to Phase

1 of the ETS and reflect on problems and issue areas that emerged in that period. For that

purpose, one has to look at key elements of the ETS directive and how these were set in

motion within the two implementation years. Besides that, the recently adopted Energy and

climate package has to be looked at in terms of these key aspects.

The ETS directive entails three important characteristics. First of all, a simplified

cap-and-trade system is in place that rests on National Allocation Plans (NAP) aimed at

distributing emission permits. In practical terms, it means that Member States are charged

with the task of appointing a regulator that provides allowances to installations. Allowances

are emission rights defined in terms of the emission of one ton of CO2 equivalent (CO2e).

Out of the total amount of these allowances, installations were allowed to cover 95% of

their emissions free of charge while the rest 5% should have been met by means of

pollution cuts or investments in greener technologies. Most importantly and

controversially, the remaining 5% could be bought on the market so as to make up for their

total allowance needs (Petroleum Economist, 2006: 1).

The former method, namely distributing free allowances to the industry is called

'grandfathering' and was originally based mostly on historical emissions or according to a

defined performance standard, also known as 'benchmarking' (Egenhofer, 2007: 456).

Contrary to other, formerly known emission trading schemes in the United States, Canada

or the United Kingdom, the EU's cap-and-trade scheme was more simplistic since it only

contained previsions for one greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide and thus makes trading easier

to operate effectively (Wahl, 2008). In some ways, including the most widely-spread

greenhouse gas was the only feasible way to involve industries to take part in the scheme,

amounting to 10.000 recently representing approximately half of the total emissions on the

56

European level. These industrial branches cover the power generation sector, the iron and

steel industry, glass, pottery and brick as well (Euractiv, 2007).

A compromise that allows Member States the composition of National Allocation

Plans meaning that absolute limits of allocation are set by the individual countries can be

interpreted as the price to pay from the side of the European Commission to get the scheme

started and decentralization was thus the condition for support in the Council (Egenhofer,

2007: 455). Actually, that it was led to shortcomings of the scheme in the two-years run of

Phase 1. In addition to that, the European Union could not agree on a common

methodology of allocation, only that the main method should be free of charge (ibid). The

outcome stands in line with the argument made in the previous chapter that Member States

are usually least reluctant to give up their national sovereignty entirely in areas that are

pivotal in their economic development. This is especially true in case of energy-related

sectors where there is a growing tendency of innovative technologies observed along with

state ownership projecting a significant revenue income.

Economic concerns were also voiced during the bargaining process in terms of the

allocation of these allowances. Namely, Member States count as winners regarding their

NAPs since they could distribute their national allowances according to industrial plants to

the best cost-effective way keeping in mind to what extent national economies are best

suited (Wahl, 2008). It might also imply, by means of a domestically allocated allowance

system that the government of the given Member States can pursue the strategy of selling

more allowances to companies that historically emit more than the permitted level.

The importance of the above outlined observations is demonstrated in case of German

and British attitudes towards the overall success of the ETS. The following sections will

look at German and British domestic considerations and their impact on the institutional

outcome.

5. 4. 2. Germany’s stance on the ETS

In terms of emission reduction efforts, Germany’s contribution is an essential

prerequisite for success. As outlined in the previous sections, successful German efforts in

effectively tackling the issue of climate change lie in the 'pace-setting' nature of German

environmental policy. Since global warming and stagnating emissions impose irreplaceable

57

environmental damages, the precautionary principle (see Chapter 5) was a possible way to

go, given its risk-averse nature (Weidner and Mez, 2008: 360).

When it comes to environmental leadership both within the EU and on the global

level, the strong presence and impact of German national leadership is undoubtedly

apparent. Starting from the 1995 Berlin Mandate and the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have

been put on the agenda by Germany, leading to a protocol outlining a strategy in

greenhouse gas reduction beyond the year 2000 (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007: 36). In

terms of the launch of the European Union's ETS, even double German leadership can be

observed. On one hand, Germany headed the Council Presidency in 2007 when a

communiqué was published stating that increases in temperatures should be limited up until

2 degrees above pre-industrial times. On the other hand, having a strong political consensus

behind her, former Minister of the Environment and current German Chancellor Angela

Merkel has exerted considerable political pressure on efforts aimed at reducing greenhouse

gas emission both during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 and in Bali the

following year underpinning the meaningful initiating role of German leadership

(Clémencon, 2008: 71). In addition to that, Merkel claimed climate protection to be the

biggest challenge of the century during the German Energy Summit that was held on July

3, 2007 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2007). All in all, the stringent agenda-setting role

of Germany is evident in matters linked to climate issues.

Germany did not only have an impact on general objectives and articulations of

greenhouse gas reductions but influenced major characteristics of the EU's carbon dioxide

reduction targets as well. This holds true for the baseline year for GHG reductions and

targets aimed at fulfilling in areas related to renewable energy as well. The massive

national preference formation process is strengthened by several factors on the domestic

level. Let us consider each of these.

First of all, the question of baseline year for achieving greenhouse gas reduction

targets should be outlined. As known, the EU jointly agreed to reduce emissions by 8% by

2005 relative (below) to 1990 levels. Germany's intensive national lobby was mainly the

reason why the 1990 baseline year was agreed. Already during the chancellorship of

Helmut Kohl, the German government had formulated its first own domestic emissions

58

target (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007: 37). Later on, in 1995, following the reunification of

the country, plans for reductions were intensified calling for a revised carbon dioxide target

of 25% by 2005, also based on the year 1990. The establishment of Germany's first carbon

dioxide reduction goals were attributed to a special parliamentary committee on

'Precautions for the Protection of the Athmosphere' (Enquete-Kommission des Bundestags

'Vorsorge um Schutz der Erdatmosphäre') leading to developments later on (Weidner and

Mez, 2008: 362). The existence of an institution representing the most essential

environmental interest demonstrates the strong institutional structure on the domestic level

that have been constantly contributing to the successful implementation and formulation of

German national climate policy frameworks.

Aspirations for tackling climate-related issues were later on confirmed by an

agreement between the government and the German industry in November 2002 to reduce

carbon dioxide emissions by 20% from 1996 to 2005, completed by another promise for an

additional reduction rate of 28% by 2005 that was also based on 1990 levels (Weidner,

2005: 38).

Setting 1990 for a basis for reduction came handy for Germany because of economic

considerations as well. Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the re-unification of the

country, environmental clean-up induced rather heavy costs for Germany on one hand but

necessitated the need to fight pollution on the other. Therefore, the worrying domestic

economic situation encouraged investment into environmental measures to be taken for the

betterment of the situation. Financial incentives have proven to be efficient in overcoming

discrepancies and shutting down heavily polluting industries in the West resulted in

significant cuts in emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007: 37). Thus, these so-called

'wall-fall profits' coming from the East were the major driving forces for declining

emissions (Weidner, 2005: 39).

Partly due to the re-unification as well, German concern over air pollution control

policies already observable in the 1980s also contributed to agenda-setting on the European

level. Plus, emission control through the ETS as being one of the three major principles of

German climate protection policies besides renewable energy resources and energy

efficiency made the ETS the most important energy-related climate policy for Germany

(Weidner and Mez, 2008: 366).

59

Declining reductions, namely domestic success demonstrated in terms of emission

cuts inspired the Germans to announce the reductions of GHG emissions by 40% until 2020

(ibid, 364). On the European level, this resulted in a compromise known as the '20, 20, 20

by 2020 goal', namely reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing energy

efficiency of total energy consumption by 20% and enlarging the share of renewable energy

sources in energy production to 20% of total energy consumption (European Commission,

2008). The former set of objectives clearly stands in line with the triple goals of German

climate change-related policies, another outcome on the European level that was the result

of domestic preference formation successfully carried out and ready to be adopted by other

countries.

Behind the strong position that is to be obvious in case of Germany stands a rather

remarkable pattern for institutional development on the domestic level toppled with an

ambitious industrial lobby. First of all, the nature of integrated interests that is omnipresent

between the government, the society as a whole and the industrial sector has to be pointed

out. Not only are the Germans one of the most environmentally conscious national group

within the European Union, as demonstrated by domestic surveys where 67% of Germans

implied that Germany shall be further demonstrating progress in environmental matters

(Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 2006: 25), climate

related-issues highly depend on goals formulated by the German industrial sector. This

becomes apparent when recalling the 2002 agreement between government and the industry

to set emission reduction targets jointly (Weidner, 2005: 38, see above). As it was already

seen in case of the carbon tax as well, the German industrial sector is hugely in favor of

voluntary agreements primarily and highly opposes fiscal measures such as taxes or other

regulatory measures (Weidner and Mez, 2008: 363).

On the level of domestic incentives, compromises struck between the industry and the

central government show the presence of voluntary agreements in GHG reductions that is

the result of a successful lobby of industries in the energy-related sector that as a side-effect

created the so-called 'windfall profits', namely unexpected income (Schafhausen, 2007:

106). Moreover, German National Allocation Plans in Phase I set more generous targets to

coal-fired power plants compared to other Member States of the EU. Hence, the over-

allocation of permits meant extra profits for these companies that could sell their excess

60

permits on the carbon dioxide market. In 2008, the German Bundestag announced that each

year, 40 million emissions allowances would be sold, 10% of the overall emission

allowances EU-wide (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and

Nuclear Safety, 2007). Such share in total allowances demonstrates the strong impact of the

German industry and a clearly effective lobbying carried out on the domestic level.

Last, but not least, German national preference formation was apparent in terms of

the burden-sharing agreement or the final result being the principle of differentiated

obligations. The burden-sharing agreement was a mutually beneficial bargain between

Germany, cohesion countries and the European Commission. The Commission, bearing in

mind that no effective measure on climate change is successful on the European level

without taking German domestic considerations into account, used the trend in emission

cuts observable in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy to propose differentiated

obligations (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2008: 34).

The Commission could use the remarkable obligations taken up by the Germans (a

25% of reduction in GHG emissions) to master burden-sharing. Germany did not interpret

the pressure on its own reductions as a burden at that time, given the fact that contrary to

other Member States, climate action is not considered to be an economic burden (Weidner

and Mez, 2008: 374) but a challenge to face for an integrated economy. This way, the

trade-off was a success that resulted in a mechanism on the European level that did not

impose higher transaction costs on Germany than those already in place by grounds of

industrial reforms. Germany could even achieve emission cuts in 2005 when the ETS was

launched despite the persistent industrial bargain that envisioned lower reduction levels

with burden imposed on consumers. Despite this domestic issue, Germany ranked first

concerning carbon dioxide reductions (Weidner, 2005: 34).

The currently adopted package including major provisions for energy and climate

policy on the European level bears some implications for Germany as well. As for the

allocation of allowances, Article 10 of the recent ETS directive foresees that between 2005

and 2008, hence in Phase I, 95% of allowances should be allocated free of charge while in

Phase II, this percentage is altered to 90% (Council of the European Union, 2008). In other

words, in Phase II, the available amount of free allowances is reduced and governments are

to determine the sectoral distribution of the remainder of free allocations. It means that 10%

61

of allowances can be put to auctioning contrary to the 5% indicated before (Hepburn et al.,

2006: 147).

In Germany, the Ministry of Economics and the Environment initially opposed the

idea of auctioning but later on, the Ministry agreed to the EU-wide plan, moreover, the

country turned out to have received the biggest share of allowances in the entire EU

(Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007).

However, the essential element of truth here is that the federal ministry managed to get an

exemption from auctioning for new market entrants that are expected to get full and free (!)

allocation for a period of 14 years (Weidner and Mez, 2008: 375). In the case of new

entrants, it literally covers up the whole period of Phase II so the German government does

not have to have any concerns over these market players and the degree to which their

emission affects the overall state of German emission allowances. Bearing in mind the

observation made by Engels et al. (2008), in Phase I, the German government did not really

used the opportunities provided by auctioning and thus the German rate of trading is rather

low despite the fact that Germany has the highest number of companies that are involved in

the ETS scheme EU-wide (Engels et al., 2008: 291).

To sum up, the domestic interest formulated by Germany in the process of the

creation of the ETS is mostly due to the meaningful interests by the industry that advocated

a voluntary approach towards emission trading. Having a big share of carbon emissions

motivated Germany to take up the challenge of issuing the biggest number of allowances

and inspiring companies to take part in the scheme to the best of their efforts and

opportunities. The conflict between the Ministries of Economy and Environment was

balanced in the end so that the scheme could be introduced in a consolidated way, namely

with strong participation.

The fact that the Commission left the allocation to Member States with the help of

National Allocation Plans helped Germany foster an outstanding performance in terms of

burden-sharing. On the other hand, the role of Germany as an advocate and experienced

leader in environmental affairs and maintained its impact on climate change-related matters

in the European Union. Even though the German influence remain just as important as it

was Phase I depends on future developments of the EU's ETS, it is clear that domestic

62

preferences of Germany cannot be left out of the overall debate on greenhouse gas

emissions.

5. 4. 3. The United Kingdom's domestic ETS and its impact on EU-wide emission trading

As it was indicated in relation to the overall patterns observable in British

environmental policy-making, the fact that the European Union is mostly regarded as a

constraint upon the development of domestic environmental policy was acknowledged.

Moreover, it was claimed that this was a rather visible feature in connection with efforts to

tackle the issue of climate change (Jordan et al., 2003: 196). Understandably, the mere

existence of the EU ETS fueled intense discussions on the domestic level and led to various

results.

When the European Union as an international organization announced its

commitment to reduce greenhouse gases, the United Kingdom was amongst the seven

Member States that were expected to reduce emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007:

33). Amongst the other countries, the UK took up the burden of reducing 12.5% that it even

over-achieved in Phase I. It was mostly due to a very ambitious participation of companies

(Engels et al., 2008: 292). Thus, besides Germany, the United Kingdom can be regarded as

one of the Member States that exerted significant influence on the creation of the EU's

ETS.

Clearly, the United Kingdom has it easy dealing with Emission Trading Schemes.

Having launched the first economy-wide greenhouse gas trading system in the entire world,

it served as a pattern to follow by the rest of the European Union. The basis for the UK's

ETS was a report issued by the British government in 1998. The so-called Marshall report

explored options for limiting the business-related use of energy resources and thus

suggested that a trading scheme should be set up (Jordan, 2003: 189). It also evoked a

debate nation-wide on flexible mechanisms and the participation of major polluters in

tackling the issue of GHG reductions (Engels et al., 2008: 288). Participation in the debate

was also strengthened by the fact that the United Kingdom showed more willingness to

engage in policy discussions in cases where it could demonstrate more apparent national

expertise (Jordan, 2004: 214). In no cases was it more relevant than in emission trading.

63

The general operating mechanisms of the British ETS were shaped according to the

needs and preferences of industrial actors. As a response to the proposals of the New

Labour government that aimed for the introduction of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) in

2001 (see in the section on British environmental policy), the industry started to search for

alternative solutions that could curb the inclusion of a market-based incentive into

reduction efforts. Taking the British government by surprise, the industrial sector grouped

into an association named emission trading group (ETG) and announced the launch of a

pilot scheme in 1999 that could serve as the right way to reduce GHGs (Jordan, 2003: 189).

In addition to that, the former existence of another internal trading scheme that was being

operated by British Petroleum (BP) served as an almost-perfect model to be followed by

other companies as well (Engels et al., 2008: 288). As a result of business initiatives,

compliance was also high, approximately 98% (Duggan, 2008).

The domestic ETS in the United Kingdom was an integral part of the Climate Change

Program and partly completed the levied taxes by the British government (Nye and Owens,

2008: 5). The first phase of the British ETS was set to operate between 2002 and 2006 and

the objective of the starting phase was to integrate a learning process that explores eventual

shortcomings to be improved in the following phases (Engels et al., 2008: 288). Thus,

when the European Union's ETS was launched in 2005, the British ETS was almost in the

last year of its first assigned trading period. This bears important implications regarding

similarities and differences between the EU-wide and the British scheme.

A noticeable difference between the EU and the UK scheme is the scope of

greenhouse gases whose reduction it foresees. While the United Kingdom's scheme

contains six greenhouse gases of which carbon dioxide is naturally a part of, the European-

wide scheme concentrates exclusively on reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Nye and

Owens, 2008: 2). In addition to that, participation in the British scheme was based on

voluntary measures, namely companies could choose whether they wish to engage in the

emission trading game or rather not (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003: 13). In terms of the

first difference, it is easy to understand why the EU chose carbon dioxide to include it in

the scheme, given the fact that carbon dioxide is the main gas causing global warming.

Concerning the nature of voluntary agreements, as explained in detail above, there was a

long debate between the industry and the EU political leadership concerning the nature of

64

regulation. While the EU decided for a mandatory measure, the strong industrial lobby in

the UK, taken into consideration the rather apparent interest-articulation of the industry, a

voluntary scheme seemed more feasible to realize in the long run.

The imagined long run never really materialized in case of the UK ETS since the EU-

wide effort to tackle the issue made policy-makers in Britain reconsider, assess and adjust

to the European counterpart in emission trading. Joining the ETS of the European Union

was no real question for the United Kingdom, rather the nature of regulation in the long run

was more in stake. However, domestic preferences were undoubtedly in favor of the

adjustment to the European ETS. In a White Paper titled 'Meeting the Energy Challenge',

prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry, the following remarks are made on the

European-wide Emission Trading Scheme:

'The EU, with a strong lead from the UK, has built on the Kyoto Protocol to take the

world’s most significant step in establishing a carbon price by establishing the EU

Emissions Trading Scheme. The scheme already covers approximately half of the UK and

EU’s carbon dioxide emissions, including emissions from electricity production and major

industrial sectors…[underlining] the central role that emissions trading must play in the

EU's long-term goals to reduce GHG emissions, and [stressing] the importance of the

review by the Commission of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in delivering an improved

EU ETS that provides a market-based, cost-effective means to deliver emissions reductions

at minimum cost – including as regards energy-intensive industries – and to make a major

contribution to the EU's overall targets' (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007: 334,

emphasis added).

Based on the above documents, several observations can be made. First of all, the

United Kingdom maintains the just view that the EU ETS would not have become possible

if it had not been for an already up-and-running British pioneer ETS. This statement also

implies that British policy-makers expect their best practices and experiences to be

incorporated into the upcoming phases of the EU ETS.

To sum up to what extent German and British domestic interests have contributed to

the current state of the scheme, the following can be said. Firstly, Germany as the biggest

industrial emitter and one of the economically most developed Member States had a clear

interest to endorse the operation of an EU-wide scheme that imposes uniform measures to

65

all actors involved. Considering the emerging costs of costs, Germany’s cooperation in the

ETS was a good way of taking off the burden of domestic policy-makers in terms of

finding feasible pollution abatement approaches that are operational in the long run. Both

the baseline year on which emission reductions were based on and the degree of

foreseeable emission reductions were reachable for Germany and realizing the above

objectives within a European-wide trading system was a guarantee of commitment from

other Member States.

As for the United Kingdom, having a domestically operational ETS on the domestic

level and thus possessing a significant degree of expert knowledge left British

policyümakers in a rather favorable position. The environmental regulatory philosophy of

the United Kingdom was in line with the basic characteristic of the EU ETS, especially

leaving the allocation of emission permits on the level of Member States. Like in the case

of Germany, there was great economic interest to opt for a European scheme that comprises

of all Member States and thus enhances the credibility of commitments of others by means

of its control mechanisms. As for costs of adaptation, the UK had to invest lesser amount of

money into the transformation of its own ETS.

All in all, both Germany and the UK have so far been able to profit from the

operation in the ETS and the pooling of sovereignty to an international emission scheme

left both parties in a more favorable position on the market than before the implementation

of the ETS.

66

6. Concluding remarks and potential directions for future research

The aim of this thesis was to look at the policy field of the environment within the

European Union through the lenses of liberal intergovernmentalism and investigate the

main reasons why Member States repeatedly chose to pool an important degree of their

domestic competences to international institutions in order to enhance the credibility of

their commitments and realize mutual gains from cooperation.

With the help of available theoretical toolkits, research focused on the clear

understanding of major theories of European integrations in order to prepare the theoretical

ground for liberal intergovernmentalism. In the course of the theoretical analysis, the two

classic concepts of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were introduced and their

basic assumptions in relation to the role of domestic actors, institutions and the underlying

causes for the process of European integration were taken into consideration.

The theoretical analysis pointed out the major differences between approach and the

use of relevant concepts and maintained the view that while neofunctionalism is a theory to

explain the process of regional integration with the help of the spillover concept and to

point to the finality of the process itself, it is suitable for giving answers to how regional

cooperation took shape initially. In addition to that, institutions were looked at as organs in

charge of representing delegated tasks of states that possessed clearly assigned tasks. On

the other hand, intergovernmentalism aimed at re-introducing the concept of the nation

state into the theoretical discourse and point out the importance of domestic actors in the

course of integration, defining the role of institutions as ones reflecting the preferences of

nation states.

The theoretical stream of new insitutionalism completed the above introduced macro

theories and provided three various approaches in relation to institutions. While rational

choice institutionalism conceives institutions as the result of a strategic cooperation

between self-interested actors and defines institutions as the result of the interplay between

domestic actor, sociological institutions highlights the influence of ideas and institutional

learning processes that shapes the behavior of states. As a middle way, historical

institutionalism looks at the general impact of institutions over time and points out their

pivotal role in shaping domestic preferences in the long run. Last, but not least, the multi-

67

level governance approach draws attention to the interplay between supranational, domestic

and sub-domestic actors and the importance of these three levels in the integration process.

After the analytical assessment of major theories of European integration, the theory

of liberal intergovernmentalism conceptualized by A. Moravcsik was presented. By doing

so, the most relevant theoretical baselines were presented along with the main

argumentative framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. In the course of analysis, the

rationalist framework of international cooperation was given primacy and the complex

theoretical baselines of the theory were given explanations exploring liberal and

intergovernmental sides of the theory. It was stressed that the inclusion of domestic actors

as self-interested and utility-maximizing actors whose aim is to strive for a Pareto optimal

outcome suggests that domestic preference formation is the most important characteristic of

the process of European integration. The rationalist framework entails that states, in the

course of a strategic bargaining process have the clear intention to achieve mutually

optimal gains from cooperation with other domestic actors and thus realized their

domestically articulated objectives in frames of a European cooperation that leaves them

better off than they were before they engaged in the strategic bargain. The question to what

Moravcsik’s theory tries to find an answer is why the gate-keeping capacity does not erode

in the interstate bargaining process and for what reasons is it a rational choice to pool some

part of sovereignty into European institutions. Moravcsik’s answer to the above question is

simple: states engage in a strategic bargain and pool their sovereignty into institutions is to

enhance the credibility of their commitments towards each other. That is the theoretical

framework with the help of which liberal intergovernmentalism perceives the creation of

treaties.

Following the presentation of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, critical

assessments of liberal intergovernmentalism have been presented in order to point out

conflicting theoretical concepts. What is articulated mostly by institutionalist and

constructivist scholars is the way Moravcsik deals almost explicitly with domestic

preferences and leaves little ground for the importance of ideas and institutional learning in

the analysis.

The empirical part of the paper, while providing a critical assessment of European

environmental policy took exact cases from policy-making in the field of climate change

68

abatement in order to demonstrate the relevance of the argumentation of liberal

intergovernmentalism. By doing so, major characteristics of European environmental

policy were outlined. It was argued that environmental policy by its rather segmented

nature serves as an excellent study ground of regulatory competition between

environmental leaders. This is especially apparent in the case of Germany and the United

Kingdom. Germany as an environmental leader is in favor of uniform regulatory measures

that are based on strict emission standards that are applied using the best available

technology in order to tackle the issue of pollution. The use of voluntary agreements

suggests strong industrial representation that is more in favor of non-mandatory

regulations. The overall German attitude stems from the country being the biggest emitter

of greenhouse gases, its unique economic situation after reunification and last, but not least,

its ambitions to use its well-funded environmental principles in order to become a leader in

environmental matters. The United Kingdom on the other hand possesses rather distinct

environmental regulatory patterns were the use of gentleman’s agreements is more typical

and in the British case reflects relationships between the industry and the government. The

analysis on competing regulatory structures points to the long-lasting environmental

traditions of Britain and its aspiration to become an environmental leader besides Germany.

Dynamics of domestic preference formation are demonstrated with the help of case

studies. In the first case, the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the Integrated Pollution

and Prevention Control highlights the above mentioned apparent differences between

German and British regulatory structures and presents an interstate bargain where a

changing leadership role varying between German and British domestic practices uploaded

on the European level determine outcomes and draw attention to the importance of mutual

concessions in the process of European environmental policy-making.

The case study on the combined carbon and energy tax demonstrates a least

successful attempt of interstate bargain that resulted in a failure of the proposal and its

disappearance as potential optional tool for emission reductions. The case study points out

that although both Germany and the United Kingdom had already existing domestic

taxation measures at hand, interstate bargaining did not move along the same objection,

mainly to reduce emissions since the domestically applied measures did not have similar

objectives. In addition to that, unanimity in the Council could not be achieved since the

69

British perceived the above measure as a direct intervention into matters of exclusive state

competence.

Last, but not least, the case of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme

present a successful outcome of domestic preference formation and interstate bargaining

that entail mutually beneficial gains for both Germany and the United Kingdom. The EU

ETS that was launched in 2005 was partly based on the British domestic emissions trading

scheme and thus the British were eager to set an example to follow for the rest of Europe

and contribute to the creation of the scheme uploading their domestic preferences to the

European level. On the other hand, Germany, in order to prove its apparent leadership in

climate related issues posed very ambitious targets and advocated the notion of burden-

sharing in order to transfer its already working domestic burden-sharing practices to the

European level. The EU ETS is an institution where domestic actors pooled some parts of

their environmental competencies. However, the fact that the allocation of emission

allowances has so far remained in the hands of Member States maintains the gate-keeping

capacity of domestic actors in the field of climate change. The success of the ETS thus

highly depends on the willingness of Member States to operate it using current principles.

As the course of the application of the theoretical framework underpinned by

empirical examples has clearly demonstrated, liberal intergovernmentalism cannot only be

used to explain ‘grand bargains’ of European integration but also to explain the integration

of a regulatory policy like the environment. As the evolution of environmental measures

has demonstrated, Germany and the UK, being the two most influential domestic actors

were willing to engage, along with other Member States in strategic interactions whose aim

was to create mutually beneficial bargaining process that eventually leads to an outcome

that repeatedly rests on the gate-keeping of domestic actors. Out of the three cases

examined, it is undoubtedly the EU ETS that has proven to be the best testing ground for

the theory. Not only does it serve as the yet most successful intergovernmental effort to

tackle the issue of emissions but its operational structure is to the most extent based on

domestic patterns originating from the domain of Member States. Thus, liberal

intergovernmental theory has proven to be a possible way to look at the development of

European environmental policy and emission reduction efforts more respectively.

70

As it was outlined in the theoretical assessment, one of the trivial shortcomings of

Moravcsik’s theory is its inability to account for a scenario when institutions created along

domestic preferences take over the gate-keeping capacity of Member States and create their

own institutional patterns. In case of the ETS, such scenario is likely to emerge in later

phases of implementation that will challenge the statements formulated in this thesis.

However, as it was also emphasized earlier on, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism

is a proper way to explain why bargains took place in the initial stages of policy-making

and what the major underlying causes were. Thus, what happens in later stages of

environmental policy development and how the influence of domestic actors is altered is

left for other contending theories to explain. One thing is for sure: environmental pace-

setters bring their relative power to the negotiating table in Brussels and engage in domestic

bargains for the purpose of pooling their sovereignty into institutions that enhance the

credibility of mutual commitments. Seeing the example of the environmental domain, this

strategy stands the ground so far. What happens after the blue skies are gone is left for

others to explain.

71

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78

MAGYAR NYELVŰ ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ

Az Európai Unió (EU) környezetvédelmi politikájának hatékonysága és jövőbeli

szerepe a politikaterület kezdeti kialakításától kezdve heves viták tárgya. A határokon

átívelő környezeti hatások kapcsán számos európai és nemzetközi kutató vette alaposabb

elemzés alá az európai környezetvédelmi politika legfőbb csomópontjait, a területen

fellelhető konfliktusokat és nem utolsósorban az Európai Unió szerepét a nemzetközi

környezetvédelmi együttműködésekben. Az egyik legfiatalabb politikának számító

környezetvédelem mozgalmas színtere a tagállami érdekütközéseknek is, hiszen az Unió

államai sok esetben saját, hazai keretek között kialakított politikai hagyományaikat és

gyakorlatukat szeretnék az uniós politika szintjére emelni.

Az elmúlt évtizedekben számos elmélet kísérelt meg érthető magyarázatot találni az

EU politikájának működésére és egyes politikaterületek integrációjára. Attól függetlenül,

hogy az elemzés a klasszikus integrációelméletek keretein belül mozog vagy újabb

érvrendszereket alkot a problémakör szélesebb megértése céljából, az alapkérdés nem

változik: mi befolyásolja egy adott politikaterület integrációját és milyen szerepet játszanak

ebben a folyamatban az EU tagállamai?

A klasszikus elemzés keretein belül maradó neofunkcionalista, illetve

intergovernmentalista elméletek mellett megjelentek újabb elméleti irányzatok, melyek

igyekeztek időszerű válasszal szolgálni az EU fejlődésében végbement változásokra. A

fenti célt igyekszik megvalósítani ndrew Moravcsik liberális intergovernmentalista (liberal

intergovernmentalism) integrációs elmélete is. A klasszikus integrációelméletek közötti űrt

betölteni kívánó liberális intergovernmentalizmus elsősorban az EU alapszerződéseinek

kialakulásának magyarázatára szolgál, és a szerződésekhez vezető főbb csomópontokat

vizsgálja a tagállamok és nemzeti érdek szemszögéből. Újszerű és összetett jellegéből

fakadóan azonban Moravcsik elmélete sikerrel alkalmazható egy adott uniós politikaterület

integrációjánal elemzése során is.

A szakdolgozat célja ennek tükrében az Európai Unió környezetvédelmi politikai

integrációs folyamatának vizsgálata a tagállami érdekérvényesítés tükrében. A megjelölt

cél elérésének érdekében a dolgozat áttekintést nyújt a legfontosabb integrációelméletekről

és bemutatja a liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet legfontosabb megállapításait és

elemzési módszerét. Ezt követően a dolgozat empirikus része a választott elmélet alapján

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esettanulmányok segítségével megvizsgálja a német, illetve brit nemzeti érdek szerepét és

érvényesülését a légszennyezés, energia-és szénadó, illetve az EU emissziókereskedelmi

rendszerén keresztül. A dolgozat fő állítása, hogy a német és brit környezetvédelmi

megközelítés jelentős hatást gyakorolt az uniós szinten kialakult politikai gyakorlatra, és az

összeurópai szinten formált politikai megközelítés a tagállamok között végbement

racionális alkufolyamat eredménye, melynek során a tagállamok igyekeztek elkerülni a túl

magas alkalmazkodási költségeket. Az alkufolyamat eredménye egy összeurópai szinten is

működőképes környezetvédelmi politika, mely továbbra is a tagállamok érdekeit tükrözi.

Módszertanát tekintve a dolgozat elemző jellegű, hiszen az áttekintett európai

integrációelmélet, ezen belül is a liberális intergovernmentalista irányvonal megállapításait

alkalmazza a környezetvédelmi politika, azon belül is a klímaváltozás területéről vett

gyakorlati példák segítségével.

A dolgozat elméleti része áttekinti a klasszikus neofunkcionalista, illetve

intergovernmentalista elméletek érvrendszerét, majd bemutatja a két irányvonalra adott

elméleti válaszokat, és felkészít a liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet befogadására. Az

elemzés empirikus részében bemutatja a választott politikaterület europanizációját és a

politikaterület gyakorlati érvényesülését a német, illetve brit környezetvédelmi

szabályozással egyetemben. Végül, de nem utolsósorban a fent már említésre került

légszennyezés, szénre kivetett adó és emissziókereskedelmi rendszer példáján keresztül

mutat rá a német és brit nemzeti érdek szerepére.

A dolgozat elméleti része a neofunkcionalista és intergovernmentalista elméletet

mutatja be. Ennek során kiemeli a két elmélet létrejöttének főbb körülményeit, és ismerteti,

hogyan értelmezi a két elmélet az európai integráció folyamatát. Az E. Haas és L. Lindberg

által konceptualizált neofunkcionalista gondolatmenet fokozatos, politikaterületenként

végbemenő regionális integrációs folyamatot vázol fel, melynek során az elsősorban

gazdasági területeken kialakuló együttműködés politikai integrációban csúcsosodik ki

(spill-over). Ennek során az államok a gördülékenyebb fejlődés érdekében egy nemzetek

feletti hatóságra bízzák (supranational high authority) a folyamat felügyeletét, előrevetítve

egy végpontot az integrációs folyamatban. Ezzel szemben az intergovernmentalista elmélet

bevezeti a nemzeti érdekérvényesítést az európai együttműködés folyamatába, és az

integrációt úgy értelmezi, mint önérdeket (self-interested) követő nemzetállamok

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alkufolyamatát. Stanley Hoffman intergovernmentalista elmélete visszaemeli a

nemzetállamot az integrációs folyamat szereplői közé, és alátámasztja létjogosultságát mint

az alkufolyamat részvevőjét.

A két klasszikus integrációelmélet mellett az ún. 'új institucionalista' ('new

institutionalism') és többszintű kormányzás-elmélet (multi-level governance) igyekszik az

állami szereplők mellett az intézmények, illetve a több szinten lejátszódó interakciók

fényében értelmezni az európai együttműködést. Az új institucionalizmuson belül az

intézmények szerepe háromféle alelmélet szerint értelmezhető. Az ésszerű választáson

alapuló intézményi elmélet (rational choice instiutionalism) az önérdeket követő állami

szereplők racionális választásaként értelmezi az

intézmények megjelenését, míg a szociológiai intézményi elmélet (sociological

institutionalism) az intézményeket mint a normatanulás és eszmék őrzőjének tükrében

állítja központi helyre. A köztes intézményi elmélet, a történeti institucionalizmus

(historical institutionalism) az intézmények szerepét a hosszú távon kifejtett hatásuk miatt

emeli bele az integrációértelmezésbe.

Meglehetősen újszerű értelmezést szolgáltat a többszintű kormányzás elmélete,

hiszen nemcsak a nemzetek feletti intézmények és a nemzeti szint bevonásával elemzi az

európai integrációs folyamatot, hanem az államon belüli szereplők (sub-national level)

szerepét is hangsúlyozza és az integráció a három szint dinamikus interakciójának

eredményeként tűnik fel.

A liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet koherens összefoglalása Moravcsik 1998-

ban megjelent, "The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to

Maastricht", című műve, mely újszerű megközelítése és elemzési keretei okán joggal

tekinthető az európai integrációelmélet úttörő értelmezésének. Az eddig magyar nyelven

meg nem jelent mű az Unió alapszerződéseinek megalkotása során lejátszódó

alkufolyamatok elemzésére törekszik a tagállami érdekérvényesítést helyezve az elemzés

középpontjába, és arra a kérdésre keresi a választ, hogy az európai integráció során miért

döntenek úgy nemzetállamok, hogy szuverenitásukat többször is európai intézményeknek

delegálják.

Moravcsik a fenti kérdésre egy összetett elméleti rendszer segítségével adja meg a

választ, mely a nemzetközi együttműködést racionális döntések folyamataként ábrázolja

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(rational framework of international cooperation). Elnevezéséből fakadóan az elmélet

liberális alapokon nyugszik, mivel az állami érdek szemszögéből kutatja az együttműködés

okait, és intergovernmentalista, mivel kormányközi interakciók folyamataként elemzi a

nagy tagállamok között végbemenő alkufolyamatokat (grand bargains). Moravcsik állítása

szerint az európai integráció folyamata önérdekeket követő tagállamok között végbemenő

stratégiai cserefolyamatok sorozata (strategic exchanges between self-interested Member

States). Az egyes tagállamok hazai nyomásra az alkufolyamat szintjére emelnek bizonyos

nemzeti szinten elfogadott preferenciarendszereket (domestic preference formation), céljuk

ezzel az általuk kiemelt prioritások minél hatékonyabb képviselete az európai politika

szintjén annak érdekében, hogy az unió szintjén meghozott döntések az adott tagállam

részéről a lehető legkevesebb alkalmazkodást követelje meg. Annak érdekében, hogy az

unió szintján az adott politikaterületen belül hosszú távú együttműködés alakulhasson ki, a

nemzetállamok ésszerű döntésének eredménye, hogy intézményekre ruházzon bizonyos

hatásköröket annak érdekében, hogy az intézmények felügyeljék a többi tagállam

elköteleződését a közös cél érdekében (credible commitments). Ennek eredménye

Moravcsik reményei szerint egy kölcsönös előnyökkel járó, hosszú távú együttműködés,

mely a részvevő államok mindegyike számára egy Pareto-hatékony helyezetet teremt, azaz

a létrejött megegyezés megléte jobb helyzetbe hozza a részvevőket, mint azok a

megegyezés létrejötte előtt voltak. Az elmélet újszerűségét tehát részben az szolgáltatja,

hogy megmagyarázza, miért nem erodálódik a tagállamok "gátvédő" szerepét (gate-keeping

capacity) az integráció során.

A liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet újszerű érvrendszerét, mely kiemeli a

nemzetállami érdekeken alapuló együttműködés létjogosulságát, számos kritika érte a.

Kiemelendők institucionalista és konstruktivista elméleti irányból érkező kritikai

észrevételek. Az institucionalista alapokon nyugvó bírálat elsősorban az európai

együttműködésben részt vevő intézmények szerepének téves értelmezését hányja

Moravcsik szemére, kiemelve, hogy a liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet nem

foglalkozik kellőképpen az intézmények szemléletformáló szerepével, illetve nem képes

választ adni arra a kérdésre, hogy mi történik, miután a nemzetállamok szuverenitásuk egy

részét az intézményekre ruházzák. A kritika fényében ugyanis Moravcsik elmélete

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alkalmatlan hosszú távon értelmezni az integrációs folyamatot éppen a fenti hiányosság

miatt.

A konstruktivista alapokon nyugvó kritikai elemzés szintén az intézmények szerepét

emeli ki az együttműködésben részt vevő tagállamok tanulási folyamatainak és

normarendszerének formálása kapcsán. Az ötletek, társadalmi folyamatok és intézményi

tanulást középpontba helyező konstruktivizmus meglehetősen értetlenül áll a pusztán

ésszerű döntéseket és stratágiai cserefolyamatokat hangsúlyozó liberális

intergovernmentalizmus állításai előtt, és előrevetíti a konstruktivista és liberális állításokat

összehasonlító elemzés szükségességét, mely a két elmélet eszközrendszerét felhasználva

igyekszik minél teljesebben áttekinteni az európai együttműködés folyamatát.

A dolgozat empirikus része a moravcsiki elmélet főbb kulcsfogalmait emeli át az

empirikus elemzés talajára, és a német és brit nemzeti érdekérvényesítést elemzi az Unió

környezetvédelmi, azon belül is klímaváltozással szembeni politikai irányultság tükrében.

A teljes elemzéshez szükséges az adott politikaterület europanizációjának bemutatása a

főbb csomópontok ismertetésével egyetemben.

Az europanizációval foglalkozó megközelítések főbb jellegzetessége, hogy egy adott

politikaterület kialakítása során mind a tagállamok uniós politikára gyakorolt hatását

figyelembe veszik, mind pedig az uniós szinten kialakított politika gyakorlati érvényesülése

elemzésük tárgya. Függetlenül attól, hogy az europanizáció alulról felfele történő (bottom-

up) vagy felülről lefelé (top-down) folyamat, kiemelt szerep jut az alkalmazkodásnak. Az

alkalmazás folyamata arra vonatkozik az europanizació eseteben, hogy az uniós politika

irányvonalához való alkalmazkodás mennyi áldozatot követel meg a tagállamok részéről.

Minél nagyobb különbség áll fenn ugyanis a kialakítani kívánt uniós gyakorlat és a

tagállami szinten használt irányelvek között, az alkalmazkodás annál nagyobb költségeket

igényel, és kényelmetlenné válik az szemlélt állam számára (domestic misfit). Egy

politikaterület europanizációja során tehát figyelembe kell venni a felmerülő tranzakciós

költségeket is annak elemzése során, hogy milyen eszközöket használnak fel a tagállamok a

politikaterület formálása során. Az europanizáció a környezetvédelmi politika esetén, más

politikaterületekhez hasonlóan szintén megkíván tagállami alkalmazkodást. A liberális

intergovernmentalista elmélet szemszögéből szemlélve ez az alkalmazkodási folyamat

racionális döntések folyamata, melyek stratégiai interakció keretein belül valósulnak meg

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és végső eredményként a tagállamok átruháznak számukra kulcsfontosságú hatásköröket az

uniós intézményekre, elősegítve az adott politikaterület további fejlődését.

A dolgozat empirikus részében bemutatásra kerül az EU környezetvédelmi

politikájának rövid, szigorúan csomópontokat kiemelő története, illetve a

környezetvédelem terén végbemenő döntéshozatal intézményi jellegzetességei. A

bemutatás hangsúlyozza az Európai Bizottság környezetvédelmi főigazgatóságának

jelentősége az irányelvek meghatározásában (agenda-setting), illetve a Miniszterek

Tanácsának kulcsfontosságú befolyása a politikai kimenetelre (policy outcomes). A

környezetvédelmi (szak)minisztereket tömörítő kormányközi szervben alkalmazott

egyhangú döntéshozatal (unanimity voting) következtében a Tanács nélkülözhetetlen

szerepet játszik a politikaterület fomálásában, és a minden tagállam feltétlen hozzájárulását

igénylő döntések határozzák meg elsősorban a követendő irányvonalakat. A fenti

procedurális sajátosség különösen nagy jelentőséggel bír a szén-dioxidra kivetni kívánt

uniós adó viszonylatában. Másik fontos szem előtt tartandó jellegzetesség a

környezetvédelmi politika esetében a tagállamok eltérő hazai szabályozásaiból eredő

szabályozási verseny (regulatory competition) megléte, melynek tétje az adott hazai

szabályozás minél szélesebb körű átvitele az uniós politika szintjére, csökkentve a már

feljebb említésre került alkalmazkodási költségeket.

A környezetvédelmi politikán belül az elmúlt évtizedekben egyre jelentősebb szerep

jutott a klímaváltozás és következménye, a globális felmelegedés minél szélesebb körű

vizsgálatának. Az EU, hasonlóan a nemzetközi gyakorlathoz, a tudományos kutatások által

képviselt állásponttal összhangban elsősorban az üveghatást okozó gázok, azon belül is a

széndioxid-kibocsátás minél hatékonyabb mérséklésére koncentrál. Az EU nem titkolt célja

ennek során, hogy összeurópai együttműködésre törekedjen, mellyel tovább erősítheti

vezető szerepét a klímaváltozás elleni küzdelemben, és bebizonyítsa, hogy különböző

gazdasági fejlettségű tagállamok képesek kölcsönösen elfogadott célok mentén

együttműködve hatékony választ nyújtani a globális felmelegedés okozta kihívásokra.

Az elmúlt évtizedek során meglehetősen eltérő módokon került sor a kiemelt cél

elérésére az Unió szinjén. A sikeres és kevésbé sikeres kísérletek között szerepeltek olyan

szabályozások, melyek adó formájában képzelték el a kibocsátáscsökkentésre való

ösztönzést, és olyanok is, melyek piaci ösztönzőket helyeztek kilátásba a legnagyobb

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mértékű szennyezést elérők részére, amennyiben csökkentik kibocsátásaikat. A 2005-ben

az EU által indított emissziókereskedelmi rendszer a legutóbbi, jelenlegi állás szerint

sikeresnek mondható módszer, mely kölcsönös konszenzus ereménye mind a tagállamok,

mind pedig az Európai Bizottság részéről.

Annak érdekében, hogy a német és brit nemzeti preferenciák minél erőteljesebb

érzékeltetésre kerüljenek a környezetvédelmi politika vizsgálata során, kiemelendők az

említett két ország esetében fennálló szabályozásbeli különbségek.

Németország mint az Európai Unió egyik legfejlettebb és legnagyobb kiterjedésű

alapító tagja szervesen részt vett a politikaterület kialakításában, és koherens hazai

környezetvédelmi szabályozási mechanizmusait figyelembe véve joggal tekinthető az uniós

politika egyik legfontosabb mozgatórugójának. A német szabályozás főszerepet szentel a

szigorú kibocsátáskorlátozási mechanizmusok alkalmazásának, szem előtt tartva az erős

képviselettel bíró német ipari szektor érdekeit. Az ipari szektor érdekérvényesítési

képességének köszönhetően jellemzőek az önkéntes megegyezések (voluntary agreements)

a kormány és az ipar között.

A környezetszennyezésre adott válaszai során nem támaszkodik kizárólag a

tudományos megközelítésre, hanem a szennyezés okának megszüntetése a fő cél. Ennek

során a leghatékonyabb rendelkezésre álló technológiát alkalmazza (Best Available

Technology). A szövetségi állam szerkezetét figyelembe véve hangsúlyozandó a központi

kormányzat szerepe a környezetvédelmi politika irányvonalainak meghatározásában, mely

kulcskompetenciáktól is megvonhatja a szövetségi államokat, amennyiben hatékonyabbnak

látja a szabályozás megvalósulását a szövetségi kormánytól kiindulva. A német

uniformizált szabályozás negatív tapasztalaton alapul, nevezetesen a légszennyezés

határokon átívelő jellegéből, melynek következtében Németország jelentős környezeti

károkat szenvedett el. Ilyen volt a nyolcvanas években a savas esők okozta erdőpusztulás

(Waldsterben) is.

Az Egyesült Királyság abban a tudatban lépett be az Európai Unió tagállamai közé

1973-ban, hogy saját környezetvédelmi normái és régi korokra visszanyúló irányelvei és

intézményrendszere feltétel nélküli követendő példa a többi tagállam számára. A britek

adóztattak meg elsőként a petróleumfogyasztást 1909-ben, környezetvédelmi

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minisztériumuk az első különálló intézmény a világon, mely ezzel a politikaterülettel

foglalkozik, a britek tehát joggal tekinthettek magukra mint irányadó államra.

A brit megközelítés ezzel szemben tudományos alapokra támaszkodva igyekszik

megítélni a szabályozások helyes kialakítását, és a bevatkozást függővé teszi olyan

tényezőktől mint az emberi egészségre gyakorolt hatások. A brit kormány és az ipari

szektor között is jellemzőek önkéntes alapon megvalósuló megegyezési formák, utóbbi

esetben azonban kötetlenebb feltételrendszer mentén valósul meg az együttműködés ú. n.

"úriemberek közötti megállapodás" (gentleman's agreements) formájában. Az

alkalmazandó technológiák tekintetében a britek pénzügyi megfontolások alapján döntenek

az alkalmazni kívánt eszközről (Best Available Technologies without Excessive Economic

Costs).

A német és brit környezetvédelmi szabályrendszerek különbsége szemmel láthatóvá

vált a légszennyezésre vonatkozó uniós szabályozás kialakítása során. A dolgozatban

szereplő esettanulmány célja a német, illetve brit nemzeti érdek érvényesülése az ipari

üzemek szennyezőanyag-kibocsátásának korlátozására vonatkozó 1988-as irányelv (Large

Combustion Plant Directive) esetén. Mivel adott irányelv minden tagállamra kötelező

érvényű korlátozást szorgalmaz, mely szigorú előírásokat tartalmaz a szennyezőanyagokat

kibocsátó üzemekre vonatkozóan, alapelveiben közelebb áll a német nemzeti gyakorlathoz.

Ez nemcsak kevesebb alkalmazkodási költséget kíván a német állam részéről, mivel a

legjobb rendelkezésre álló technológia alkalmazását írja elő, hanem a szinte minimális

mértékű tranzakciós költség a német ipari szektort is komparatív előnyhöz juttatta. A britek

ezzel szemben jelentős költségeket könyvelhettek el, melyet az ipari szereplők is nagy

mértékben megéreztek.

Az Egyesült Királyság, miután fájdalmas kiigazításokat kellett végrehajtania saját

környezetvédelmi szabályozásrendszerében, megpróbált olyan politikai kimenetelekre

törekedni, melyek nem feltétlenül a brit ipart terhelik. Ebből a megfontolásból kísérletet tett

egy, az országban sikeresen alkalmazott irányelv uniós szintre emelésére. Az integrált

szennyezésmegelőzésen és ellenőrzésen fontosságát kiemelő irányelv (Integrated Pollution

and Prevention Control) központi engedélyek kiosztását helyezte kilátásba a szennyezést

generáló ipari üzemek számára, mely gyakorlat az Egyesült Királyságban megszokott volt,

és figyelembe vette az adott ipari üzem gazdasági felkészültségét is. Ezzel szemben a

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német szabályozás nem a kiadható engedélyek, hanem az uniformizált ellenőrzési

mechanizmusok mellett foglalt állást. Jelen esetben azonban a brit stratégia bizonyult

hatkényabbnak, és fordult a kocka; most a német iparnak kellett egy tőle meglehetősen

szokatlan szabályozást elfogadnia.

A szabályozások közötti versengés eredménye egy olyan összeurópai szintű

megegyezés lett, mely amellett, hogy szigorúbb előírásokat tartalmazott, megengedett

bizonyos időt az átállásra és sok esetben gazdasági helyzettől tette függővé az irányelv

alkalmazását.

A fentiekből nyilvánvalóvá válik, hogy a környezetvédelmi politika szabályozási

mechanizmusainak sokfélesége a politikaterületet leginkább egy szabályozási

'fércmunkához' (regulatory patchwork) teszi hasonlatossá, mely hűen tükrözi a különböző

tagállami hozzájárulások jelentőségét.

A széndioxid-kibocsátásra kivetett adó esetében világosan megfigyelhető az angol és

német szabályozási politika különbségei. Az adó a Bizottság által szorgalmazott

kibocsátáscsökkentést volt hivatott megadóztatni, de erős tagállami ellenállásba ütközött,

melynek több oka is volt. Az Egyesült Királyság a fiskális ügyekbe való beavatkozásként

értelmezte az adót, mely ellentmondott hazai adózási mechanizmusainak is. Az országban

ugyanis a benzinre kivetett adó elsősorban nem a környezetvédelmi károk mérséklésére,

hanem bevételnövelésre szolgált, így céljai ellenkeztek az európai szinten kivetni kívánt

adóval, melynek célja a kibocsátás mérséklése volt megfelelő szankciórendszer

alkalmazásával.

Németország esetén a javaslat a német ipar ellenállásán bukott meg, mely a német

állami-ipari viszony sajátosságaiból eredendően nem viselte túlzottan jól a kötelező

jelleggel kivetett adókat. A német újraegyesítés óta eltelt időszakban jelentős mértékű

pénzügyi forrás került át az ország keleti részére, mely az ott található ipari üzemek

modernizálása mellett magasfokú alkalmazkodást is igényelt az ipari szektor részéről. A

nyolcvanas években a német környezetvédelmi szabályozás meg nem látta szükségességét

a más tagállamokkal szembeni teherviselésnek sem, mely további ellenérv volt a közösségi

szinten kivetett adó ellen. Az fiskális hatásörbe tartozó adóügyek ráadásul a Gazdasági és

Pénzügyminiszterek Tanácsa (ECOFIN) alá tartoztak, és egyhangú támogatástól tették

függővé a javaslat elfogadását, melyre nem került sor. Az sem segített a helyzeten, hogy a

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Bizottság végső kétségbeesésében a szén-dioxid kibocsátás mellett az energiafogyasztást is

meg szerette volna adóztatni, kialakítva egy hibrid adófajtát. Az adó kudarca tehát

irányelvei újragondolására késztette a Bizottságot.

A kilencvenes évek elejére előtérbe került az a szemlélet, mely egy

emissziókereskedelmi rendszer keretein belül látta elérhetőnek a kibocsátás közösségi

szinten való csökkentését. Az Európai Unió Emissziókereskedelmi Rendszere (Emission

Trading Scheme, ETS) 2005-ben indult el, jelenleg második fázisában jár. Az ETS példája

szolgál igazi bizonyítékként arra, hogy az Unió tagállamai igenis képesek a kölcsönös

előnyökkel járó cél érdekében egy intézményi struktúrának delegálni egy hazai szinten

rendkívüli fontossággal bíró kulcsterületet.

Németország mint az EU legnagyobb széndioxidkibocsátó állama meglehetősen

ambíciózus kibocsátási kvótákat tűzött ki maga elé, hogy ezzel is bizonyítsa vezető szerepét

a klímaváltozás ellen folytatott harc terén. Németország ezen kívül, változtatva korábbi

álláspontján késznek mutatkozott a kibocsátási terhek bizonyos szintű átvállalására más,

kevésbé fejlett tagállamoktól. Az ETS azért is állt összhangban a német igényekkel, mivel

meglehetősen széles réteget vont be a kibocsátási kvóták kereskedelmébe, mely erősítette a

németek esetében ismert legjobb technológia használata iránti törekvéseket.

Az Egyesült Királyság azért fogadta örömmel az uniós emissziókereskedelmi

rendszert, mert már az EU ETS hatályba lépése előtt rendelkezett saját és hatékonyan

működő emissziókereskedelmi rendszerrel odahaza. Mivel az EU saját sémájának

kialakítása során nagy mértékben támaszkodott a brit gyakorlatra, ez kevés átállási

költséget kívánt meg az ország részéről. A britek számára az sem volt utolsó szempont,

hogy az ETS egy kulcsfontosságú kompromisszum során nemzeti hatáskörben hagyta a

kibocsátási kvóták kezelését.

A fentiek értelmében tehát az EU ETS támogatásra talált mind a németek, mind a

britek, nem utolsósorban pedig a többi tagállam részéről is. Működése és az európai

kibocsátászintek csökkentésében elért sikere azt mutatja, hogy egyelőre a rendelkezésre

álló leghatékonyabb módja az EU egyik legfontosabb környezetvédelmi politikájának

összehangolásának. A tény, hogy a németek és a briek is sikeresen tudták hazai

szabályozási gyakorlatukat érvényesíteni az ETS kialakítása során hűen példázza a

kormányközi alku hatékonyságát és a nemzeti kompetenciák átruházását egy olyan

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intézményre, mely őrködik a játékszabályok betartása mögött. A tény, hogy az ETS a

legfontosabb piaci mechanizmust, az allokációelosztást nemzeti kézben hagyja

egyértelműen mutat az erős nemzeti érdekérvényesítő képességre is. Utóbbi állítás

alátámasztja a nemzeti szereplők gátlókapacitásának meglétét is.

A dolgozat a moravcsiki liberális intergovernmentalizmus keretein belül tehát

kiemelte azokat a területeket a környezetvédelmi politikán belül, ahol erős nemzeti

érdekérvényesítés és stratégiai alkufolyamat figyelhető meg. A leghatékonyabb színtere

ennek a fenti három példa közül az ETS, mely jelenlegi szerkezetében sikeres bizonyítéka

az alkalmazott elméletben alátámasztott állításoknak.

Ahogy az a dolgozat elméleti bevezetőjében is említésre kerül, Moravcsik elmélete

nem kíván választ adni az integráció olyan szakaszaira, ahol a nemzetállamok által

létrehozott intézmények átveszik a fentiekben vázolt gátőrző szerepet, és saját maguk által

meghatározott irányelvek alapján jelentősebb befolyást gyakorolnak a tagállamokra. Mivel

az emissziókereskedelmi rendszer jelenlegi szakaszában még nem ért el olyan szintet, hogy

ez bekövetkezzen, megfelelő terep a liberális intergovernmentalista elmélet alkalmazására.

Jelenlegi szerkezete, mely még a tagállamok kezében hagyja a kvótakiosztások

ellenőrzését, megfelel a moravcsiki elméletben vázolt intézmény képének, mely a

tagállamok hiteles elköteleződésén alapul. Az emissziókereskedelem terén a jövőben

megfigyelhető fejlődés következtében a felvázolt kép átalakulhat és több kulcsfontosságú

nemzeti kompetencia is erodálódhat, mai képében azonban az uniós környezetvédelmi

politika liberális intergovernmentalista alapokon nyugszik. Jövőbeli fejlődési irányainak

meghatározása azonban újabb elméletek bevonásával teljesíthető.