Monitoring and Control Technology

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    Operation, Monitoring and Control

    Technology of Power SystemsCourse 227-0528-00

    Dr. Marek Zima

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Course Outline

    1. Introduction

    2. Monitoring and Control Technology

    3. Operation Principles

    4. Algorithms and Computations

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Contents

    Hierarchical Concept

    SCADA/EMS

    Power Systems Protection

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Functions

    Tasks Crossing Hierarchical Layers

    (SCADA/EMS) Local Autonomous Functions

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Hierarchical Concept

    Control Center Level

    - SCADA/EMS

    Substation Level

    - SCADA/EMS

    - Local Autonomous Functions

    Bay Level

    - SCADA/EMS

    - Local Autonomous Functions

    Process Level

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    Hierarchical Concept

    Control Center Level

    Substation Level

    Bay Level

    Process Level

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    Process Level

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    Bay Level

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    Intelligent Electronic Device

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    Bay Level Functions

    Components protection:- Protection

    - Fault location, Autoreclosure and synchrocheck (for line protection) Data acquisition:

    - Rectification

    - A/D conversion

    Disturbance recording

    Control:- Switching operations (manual or automatic initiated by protection):

    Sequencer and Interlocking

    - Tap-changer control

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    Physical principle layout

    Source: ABB Switzerland Ltd.

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    IED Example

    Same hardware platform for: Line protection

    Transformer protection Generator protection

    Substation control unit

    Functionalities chosen and set in engineering process

    Source: ABB Switzerland Ltd.

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    Hierarchical Concept

    Control Center Level

    Substation Level

    Bay Level

    Process Level

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    Substation Level

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    Substation / Field PC

    Industrial PC Example ABB PCU400

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    RTU

    - RTU:

    Remote Telemetry Unit

    Remote Terminal Unit

    - Flexibility in application areas

    (electric networks, oil, gas etc.)

    - Usually modular structure:

    I/O modules (analog input, binary

    input, binary output)

    Communication modules

    - Number of data points:

    Small: < 100

    Medium: 100 1000

    Large: > 1000

    - Usually RTU input data are

    preprocessed, i.e. RMS values

    are computed etc.- Example:

    SIEMENS SICAM RTU 6MD201

    Source: SIEMENS

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    Substation Level Functions

    Station protection (busbar protection)

    Gateway for remote communication:

    - Allows integration within SCADA concept Time synchronization:

    - GPS master clock, or mutual communication and time server

    Switching operations:- Sequencer and Interlocking

    Archiving

    Components condition monitoring:- E.g. circuit breaker lifetime estimation

    Station monitoring:

    - Measurements display, alarms etc.

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    Hierarchical Concept

    Control Center Level

    Substation Level

    Bay Level

    Process Level

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    Control Center Level

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    Contents

    Hierarchical Concept

    SCADA/EMS

    Power Systems Protection

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    1930 199019801970196019501940

    Local measurements,

    Phone Communication

    Analog data acquisition and transfer

    Digital data acquisition and transfer, SCADA

    Frequency control

    Computer for off-line studies

    Central control loop

    State Estimation, Optimal Power Flow

    Integrated SCADA/EMS,

    Security Assessment

    Training simulator

    Preventive and corrective control actions

    Full-graphics interface

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    SCADA

    SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

    Although not explicitly mentioned in the name, SCADA implies

    on-line remote monitoring of systems spread over large

    geographical areas

    Application areas of SCADA systems:

    - Electric transmission systems

    - Water networks

    - Gas, oil networks

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    SCADA

    - SCADA functionality:

    Continuous collection of measurements (very individual sample rate!)

    Providing input data for further processing by advanced (i.e. SE/EMS) applications

    Continuous display of measurements, topology and SE/EMS applications results (10 seconds

    several minutes update rate)

    Alarms

    Save Case

    - Hierarchical System Architecture:

    Network (National) Control Center data collection and provision to other processes Regional Control Centers

    Communication data transfer

    Substation level data measurement

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    SCADA - Communication

    Protocols, network types:

    - Ethernet ISO 8802.3 (IEEE 802.3) - LAN Communication

    - TCP/IP - LAN und WAN Communication

    - X.25/3 - WAN Communication

    - ICCP - Inter Control Center Communication Protocol

    - IEC 870-5-101, IEC 870-5-104, RP570/571, DNP 3.0 Protocols in

    the lower hierarchical part, i.e. substation

    Communication media:

    - Power line carrier

    - Fiber optics

    - Telecommunication: analog/ISDN

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Siemens ST1

    ECMA 24 Mobitex

    Teleconnect II (Q3-02) DNP 3.0 GCOM

    HNZ (Q2-02) TG800 SPA-bus

    Netcon8830 MODBUS RTU LON

    Teleconnect III Conitel 300Field Buses

    WISP+ Indactic2033

    WISP Indactic33,33/ 41A Teleconnect III

    Indactic35 RP570/ 571 RP570

    SINAUT 8 FW (DPDM) ADLP180 ADLP80

    USART ADLP80 ADLP180

    TG065 IEC 870-5-104 DNP 3.0

    TG709 IEC 870-5-101 IEC 870-5-101

    Master ProtocolscontdMaster ProtocolsSlave Protocols

    Siemens ST1

    ECMA 24 Mobitex

    Teleconnect II (Q3-02) DNP 3.0 GCOM

    HNZ (Q2-02) TG800 SPA-bus

    Netcon8830 MODBUS RTU LON

    Teleconnect III Conitel 300Field Buses

    WISP+ Indactic2033

    WISP Indactic33,33/ 41A Teleconnect III

    Indactic35 RP570/ 571 RP570

    SINAUT 8 FW (DPDM) ADLP180 ADLP80

    USART ADLP80 ADLP180

    TG065 IEC 870-5-104 DNP 3.0

    TG709 IEC 870-5-101 IEC 870-5-101

    Master ProtocolscontdMaster ProtocolsSlave Protocols

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    SCADA Redundancy

    - Important SCADA functions have to be available ~100%:

    Security:

    Monitoring (Substations -> Network Control Center)

    Control (Network Control Center -> Substations)

    Billing

    - Redundancy:

    Definition outage of a HW or SW component can not lead to an outage of an

    important SCADA function (this includes also data !)

    Possible causes:

    HW outage, SW crash

    Maintenance, system upgrades

    - Solution Concepts:

    Distributed design:

    Possibility to distribute applications freely on many servers

    Multiple components operated in parallel

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Line Switch Line Switch Line Switch Line Switch Line Switch

    ModemSharing

    RTU 1 ModemModem

    Modem Modem

    RTU 2 ModemModem

    RTU 3 ModemModem

    RTU 1 Modem

    Modem Modem

    COM500 A COM500 B

    Line Switch

    SPIDER

    Server 1

    SPIDER

    Server 2

    Operator

    Workplace

    RTU 2 Modem RTU 3Modem

    RTU 4Modem

    Type AType C

    1 4 29

    1 4 29 32 1 4 29 32

    Source: ABB

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    StationA

    B8 B9

    C1T1 T2

    B1 B2

    B3 B 4 B 5 B6 C7

    C2

    B7

    125 456 678 345 567 678

    125 456678

    DEC 3000 AXPAlpha

    125 456678

    System Control

    Center

    StationA

    B8 B9

    C1T1 T2

    B1 B2

    B 3 B 4 B 5 B 6 C7

    C2

    B7

    125 456 678 345 567 678

    125 456678

    DEC 3000AXP

    Alpha

    125 456678

    Emergency

    Back-up

    Control Center

    StationA

    B8 B9

    C1T1 T2

    B1 B2

    B 3 B4 B 5 B 6 C 7

    C2

    B7

    125 456 678 345 567 678

    125 456678

    DEC 3000 AXP

    Alpha

    125 456678

    RTUs and

    SAS

    SCADA &

    Applications

    Servers

    DEC3000 AXPAlpha

    Data

    Warehouse

    DEC3000 AXPAlpha

    DEC3000 AXPAlpha

    SCADA &

    Applications

    Servers

    Data

    Warehouse

    Process

    Comm.

    Process

    Comm.

    DEC3000 AXPAlpha

    DEC3000 AXPAlpha

    Rerouted DAQ in emergency

    mode after failure

    Data Back-upin normal mode

    of operation

    DAQ in normal mode

    of operation

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    TERNA: System Owner (CCI)

    National data acquisition and controlinfrastructure:

    ICCP Inter-center communications(IEC TASE.2)

    22 communication nodes (SIA-R)

    245 new IEC-104 RTUs

    Interface to 800 existing TIC1000RTUs

    3 Regional Control Centers at Dolo,Rondissone and Bari

    Centralized data engineering and testsystem

    GRTN: Independent System Operator(CTI)

    3 Regional Control Centers at Scorze,

    Torino and Pozzuoli Interface to National Control Center (CNC)

    3 GenCo Control Centers (SCP):

    ENEL Produzzione, EUROGEN,ELETTROGEN

    ICCP

    Laufenburg

    (EGL)

    ICCP

    CNC

    SIA-C

    CCI 1

    CTI 1

    CCI 2

    CTI 2

    CCI 3

    CTI 3

    IEC-104

    SIA-R 22

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    TIC1000

    SCP 1

    SCP 3

    SCP 2

    IEC-104

    SIA-R 22

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    R

    T

    U

    TIC1000

    DE &

    Test

    Source: ABB

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    EMS

    Energy Management System (EMS)

    - Overall concept of an integration of various computational tools,

    serving to transmission system operators

    State Estimation

    - Reconstruction of the present system state from measurements

    Power Flow

    - Exploration how an uncontrolled system change (e.g. spontaneousload increase) would affect the system state

    Optimal Power Flow

    - Determination how to properly choose controls values to achieve a

    desired system state

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    EMS

    Goal of EMS is to provide:

    - Decision support to operators

    EMS applications can be divided to categories:- Market oriented

    - Security oriented

    EMS characteristics:

    - Flexible (minimal engineering effort related to the particular power

    system)

    - Scalable

    - Independent software modules

    - Distributed structure (also in Hardware)

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    EMS

    EMS receives on-line data from State Estimator

    EMS employs within its modules Power Flow and

    Optimal Power Flow computations

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    Contents

    Hierarchical Concept

    SCADA/EMS

    Power Systems Protection

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    Protection

    To eliminate faults or unacceptable operating conditions for a

    component and related effects on the network. Form of fault elimination is usually isolation of the affected

    component

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Requirements on Protection

    - Reliability: assurance the protection will perform correctly

    Dependability: the degree of certainty that a relay or relay system will operate

    correctly (sensitivity: ability to determine fault conditions).

    Security: the degree of certainty that a relay or relay system will not operateincorrectly (selectivity: maximum continuity of service with minimum system

    disconnection).

    - Speed of operation: minimum of fault duration and consequent

    equipment damage

    - Simplicity: minimum protective equipment and associated circuitry toachieve protection objective

    - Economics: maximum protection at minimal total costs

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    Short-circuit Types

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    Components Protection

    Focus on the protection of the supervised component

    Usually no consideration of the system wide impact

    (integrity)

    => disconnection of one component may induce a

    higher stress on other components thus yielding their

    overloads and subsequent tripping => cascading

    spreading

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    Dr. Marek Zima / Power Systems Laboratory / [email protected]

    Components Protection

    - Distribution, Consumers:

    Overcurrent protection

    - Lines:

    Overcurrent protection

    Distance protection

    Differential protection

    Fault location

    - Busbar:

    Phase comparison protection

    Differential protection

    - Transformer:

    Overcurrent protection

    Differential protection

    - Generator

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    Overcurrent Protection

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    Differential Protection

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    Distance Protection

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    Distance Protection

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    Permissive Overreaching Scheme

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    IfL1 or L2 is off

    shedd load

    end

    IfL1 or L2 is off

    shedd load

    end

    status sensor

    IfL1 or L2 is off

    shedd

    generator

    end

    System Protection

    usually a specially designed

    coordination of the local

    relays

    off-line simulation to identify

    the worst scenarios =>

    formulation of the relays

    operation rules

    usually a topology change

    driven