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TheAccountability
ofPower
Toward aResponsible Presidency
by
Senator
WALTER F. MONDALE
David McKay Company, Inc.New York
1T
heP
residency
inC
risis
TheP
residentof
theU
nitedStates
isa
man
ora
wom
anor
whatever
who
is,like,
pickedby
thepeople
tolead
thecountry.
And
theytry
tom
akethe
personalm
ostperfect..
.becauseif
aperson
isgoing
tobe
thehead
ofacountry
likethe
United
Statesforfour
years,he
/usthas
tolust about
beperfect.
—T
welve-year-old
boy,interview
edby
FredG
reenstein,1970
Inever
questionedanything.
Igrew
upduring
World
War
IIand
honestlythought
thatG
odw
ason
ourside,
butI
won’t
beso
naïveagain
andneither
will
my
children.I
havea
four-year-oldw
how
atchesthe
hearingsand
keepsasking
ifthey
aregoing
toput
theP
residentinlail.
—M
otherof five,
Westchester
County,
N.
Y.,interview
edin
August
1973
Security
guardF
rankW
illscould
nothave
known
itat
thetim
e,but
onJune
17,1972,
hehelped
endan
ageof
jun
ocence
forA
mericans.
His
discoveryof
astrip
oftape
ona
doorin
aplush
Washington
officebuilding
known
asW
atergate
ledto
disclosuresof
wrongdoing
beyondanything
thatA
mericans
hadbelieved
theirP
residentsw
erecapable
ofundertaking.
Watergate—
andall
itcam
eto
representand
1
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
The
Presidency
inC
risis
symbolize—
forcedA
mericans
tofocus
onthe
natureof
theP
residency,w
hichhad
beenfashioned
overhistory,
andon
thepersonalities
ofthe
Presidents
who
hadheld
thatoffice.
Since
theP
residencyof
Franklin
Roosevelt,
Am
ericanshad
become
accustomed
tothe
ideaof
agrow
ingand
everm
orepow
erfulP
residencyat
thehead
ofa
growing
andever
more
powerful
federalgovernm
ent.A
mericans
lookedto
theirP
residentsfor
moral
leadership,a
senseof
directionin
theform
ulationof
publicpolicy,
andstatesm
anshipin
pro
tectingA
merica
fromcontinuing
threats—real
orim
agined—
fromoverseas.
Roosevelt
hadtransform
edboth
theex
pec
tationsof
thepeople
toward
theirP
residentsand
thenature
ofthe
Presidential
establishment
itself.F
osteredby
aw
orldw
arand
thenby
thecold
war,
thedevelopm
entof
nuclearw
eaponsand
bythe
needsof
agrow
ingnation
athom
e,A
mericans
hadbecom
eaccustom
edto
theidea
ofP
residen
tialleadership
ona
scalenever
beforeexhibited
inthe
his
toryof
ourrepublic.
The
pullof
apow
erfulP
residencybecam
ea
dynamic
relationshipbetw
eenthose
occupyingthe
officeand
theinstitution
itself.T
hosew
hosepersonalities
welcom
edgreater
Presidential
power
encouragedthe
development
ofan
aggressiveP
residency.A
ndeven
thosew
hobegan
with
limited
conceptionsof
therole
ofthe
Presidency
oftencam
eto
accepta
broaderview
ofP
residentialpow
er.D
wight
Eisenhow
ercam
eto
officein
1953desiring
alim
itedP
residentialrole.
Under
Harry
Trum
an,a
yearly,de
tailedP
residentiallegislative
packagehad
beendeveloped,
which
hadgreatly
changedthe
relationshipbetw
eenC
on
gressand
theP
residencyin
theP
resident’ssym
bolicrole
in
theform
ulationof
legislativeprogram
sfor
thenation.
But
Eisenhow
erin
1953refrained
fromsubm
ittinga
Presidential
legislativeprogram
.T
hecriticism
was
massive
andthe
resultw
aspredictable.
In1954,
hepresented
apackage
ofhis
own
containingsom
esixty-five
proposalsfor
newlegislation.
As
Richard
Neustadt
hasnoted,
“Throughout,
onethem
ew
as
emphasized:
herew
asa
comprehensive
andcoordinated
inventory
ofthe
nation’scurrent
legislativeneeds
reflecting
theP
resident’sow
njudgm
ents,choices
andpriorities
in
everym
ajorarea
ofF
ederalaction.”
Thus
Eisenhow
erw
as
forcedby
publicdem
andto
takethe
initiativein
proposinga
comprehensive
legislativepackage.
That
much
ofthis
legislativepackage
was
neveradopted
—indeed,
was
neverseriously
pursuedby
Eisenhow
er—m
issesthe
point.T
hepressures
ofthe
Roosevelt
legacyhad
impelled
Eisenhow
er,an
essentiallypassive
successor,into
theposition
ofproviding
symbolic
leadership.A
mericans
expectedtheir
Presidents
toprovide
thiskind
ofleadership;
andw
hilesom
eP
residentsw
erepushed,
most
eagerlyre
spondedto
andindeed
helpedcreate
andencourage
thisview
ofthe
Presidency.
Indeed,this
viewof
theP
residency
asthe
preeminent
sourceof
nationalpow
erand
wisdom
acquiredever-increasing
strengththroughout
most
ofthe
1960s.S
urroundedby
weak
institutionsand
encouragedby
a
23
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
The
Presidency
inC
risis
publicperception
ofthe
Presidency
asthe
oniyinstitution
capableof
moving
anoften
sluggishgovernm
ent,the
escalation
ofP
residentialpow
erproceeded
nearlyunchecked.
Within
afew
years,this
inflatedsense
ofP
residentialpow
er,so
dangerousin
thelong
runto
ourdem
ocracy,tripped
overV
ietnamand
fellover
Watergate.
By
thelate
1960s,w
ithA
merica
engagedin
aseem
inglyendless
andunw
innableland
war
inA
sia,thepeople’s
confidencein
theirgovernm
entalinstitutions—
andinevitably
inthe
Presi
dency—had
begunto
erode.A
ndjust
asA
mericans’
per
ceptionof
theinflated
senseof
theP
residentialrole
haddistorted
reality,so
thefall
fromgrace
was
distortedand
magnified
asw
ell.
IfV
ietnamburst
thebubble
ofP
residentialascendency
andom
niscience,W
atergatebegan
aw
holesaledecline
inA
mericans’
beliefin
theviability
andhonesty
oftheir
gov
ernrnentalinstitutions.
The
measures
ofthis
disillusionment
arem
any,and
theyare
frightening.In
1960,63.1
percentof
thenation’s
electoratevoted
inthe
Presidential
election;by
1972,the
figurew
asdow
nto
55.6percent.
Ina
techniquedeveloped
andused
ineighteen
countriesby
Cantril
andF
reeto
measure
individuals’faith
intheir
nation’sach
ieve
ments,
theU
nitedS
tatesin
1971becam
eonly
thesecond
nation—the
Philippines
in1959
was
thefirst—
tojudge
thatits
presentcondition
was
worse
thanit
hadbeen
fiveyears
before.
The
declinein
Am
ericans’faith
inall
keyinstitutions
in
thelate
1960sand
early1970s,
asm
easuredby
pollsterL
ouis
Harris,
was
astounding.In
1966,41percent
ofthenation
hadconfidence
inthe
executivebranch
ofthe
government;
by1973,
thefigure
was
down
to19
percent.C
ongress,the
Suprem
eC
ourt,businessand
laborw
erealso
notspared
fromthis
decliningsense
ofconfidence
inour
institutions.In
just
oneyear—
from1972
to1973—
theravages
ofW
atergateon
thepeople’s
faithin
theinstitution
ofthe
Presidency
became
evident.T
heU
niversityof
Michigan
Instituteof
Social
Science
Research
foundthat
while
in1972,
41.4percent
of
thosequestioned
feltthat
theP
residentw
asthe
branchofthe
government
most
oftentrusted
todo
what
was
right,by1973
thefigure
was
down
to23.7
percent.S
ignificantly,the
same
surveyindicated
thatslightly
more
ofthose
questionedin
1973felt
thatthe
Presidency
was
them
ostpow
erfulin
stitu
tionin
government—
35.3percent,
asopposed
to33.6
per
centin
1972.T
heA
merican
peopleseem
edto
realizethat
theP
residencyw
aspow
erful,in
deed
,that
itw
asthe
most
powerful
institutionin
ourgovernm
entalapparatus.
And
yetA
mericans
profoundlydoubted
whether
thispow
erw
asbe
ingused
properly—w
hetherthe
Presidency
was
avehicle
forthe
achievement
ofproper
goalsthrough
properm
eans.F
undamental
questionsw
erebeing
askedabout
theP
residency,
bothby
thosew
hohad
supportedand
bythose
who
hadopposed
theexpansion
ofP
residentialpow
er.T
hese
45
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
The
Presidency
inC
risis
questionsposed
afundam
entalchallenge
tothe
strengthof
ourgovernm
entalinstitutions.
While
Am
ericansin
theearly
1970shad
seriouscause
to
wonder
aboutthe
acceptableboundaries
ofP
residential
power,
theycertainly
were
notthe
Firstto
ponderthe
pro
b
1cm.
Indeed,no
questionhad
more
absorbedthe
groupof
talentedrevolutionaries
meeting
in1787
toham
mer
outthe
formof
government
forour
newA
merican
nation.T
hey
were
deeplyw
aryof
theaccu
mu
latio
nof
power
inany
one
institutionof
government,
afear
fosteredby
thetyrannical
abuseof
power
underthe
King
ofE
nglandand
bythe
inept
mism
anagement
bystate
legislaturesduring
theC
onfed
era
tion.P
erhapsthe
classicstatem
entof
thisfear—
andof
the
solutionfor
it—w
asM
adison’scom
ment
inF
ederalistP
aper
No.
51:To
what
expedient,then,
shallw
efinally
resort,for
maintaining
inpractice
thenecessary
partitionof
power
among
theseveral
departments,
aslaid
down
in
theC
onstitution?.in
orderto
laya
duefoundation
forthat
separateand
distinctexercise
ofthe
different
powers
ofgovernm
ent,w
hichto
acertain
extentis
admitted
onall hands
tobe
essentialto
thepreservation
ofliberty,
itis
evidentthat
eachdepartm
entshould
havea
will
ofits
own.
..T
hegreat
securityagainst
a
gradualconcentration
of theseveral
powers
inthe
same
department,
consistsin
givingto
thosew
hoadm
inistereach
department
thenecessary
constitutionalm
eansand
personalm
otivesto
resistencroachm
entsof
theothers
Am
bitionm
ustbe
made
tocounteract
ambition.
Basically,
thefram
ersdecided
thathum
annature
was
suchth
atthe
occupantsof
publicoffice
must
besubject
toclear
restraints.If
apublic
institutionperm
itsunrestrained
accii—
mulations
ofpow
er.
theyreasoned,
theholder
ofthat
power
might
actin
ways
entirelyinconsistent
with
theneeds
ofthe
public,the
nationand
thelaw
.A
ndit
was
thereforeco
nsid
erednecessary
todivide
power.
tocheck
it,and
torequire
thosew
hoexercised
thatpow
erto
explainits
useand
give
theA
merican
publica
basicveto
power
inthe
formof
recurrentelections
which
couldbe
conductedw
itha
fullunderstanding
ofthe
interplayand
tensionbetw
eenthe
branchesof
government.
And
thistension
would
helpensure
thatw
hendisputes
arosebetw
eenthe
branchesof
govern
ment
theyw
ouldbe
forcedinto
publicview
,so
thatthe
peoplew
ouldhave
theability
tosw
aythe
recalcitrantbranch.
By
sotransform
ingintragovernm
entaldisputes
into
publicm
attersfor
discussion,the
Constitution
helpeden
surepublic
participationin
thegoverning
process.T
hedanger
was
notconceived
tolie
ina
particularbranch
ofgovernm
ent,but
ratherin
thepotential
forthe
con
cen
trationof
excessivepow
erin
anybranch.
The
fearw
asnot
of
67
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
theexercise
ofpow
er,but
ofthe
exerciseof
unaccountablepow
er.A
ndthe
solutionw
asnot
thedeprivation
ofpow
erfrom
thefederal
government,
butthe
separationof
powers
which
would
make
thatpow
eraccountable.
The
questionsA
mericans
were
askingin
thelate
twentieth
centuryw
erealm
ostprecisely
thoseexpressed
inP
hiladelphianearly
two
hundredyears
earlier.H
adthe
power
ofthe
executiveso
outstrippedthe
power
ofthe
othercom
petinginstitutions
inour
government
that
thererem
ainedno
means
ofrestraining
thearbitrary
useof
thatpow
er?A
ndw
how
asgoing
torestrain
theexercise
ofunaccountable
power,
ifit
was
tobe
restrainedat
all?In
deed,for
many—
includingm
any
previouslycom
mitted
sup
portersof
theconcept
ofexpanding
Presidential
power—
theansw
ersto
thosequestions
seemed
todeterm
inew
hetherour
democratic
institutionsw
ouldsurvive
theshocks
theyhad
suffered.Jefferson
hadw
arnedthat
“thetyranny
ofthe
legislature
isreally
thedanger
most
tobe
fearedand
will
con
tinueto
beso
form
anyyears
tocom
e.T
hetyranny
ofthe
executivepow
erw
illcom
ein
itsturn
butat
am
oredistant
period.”H
isw
arningnow
seemed
tohave
beenrealized,
andthe
Presidency
hadbeen
thrown
intocrisis.
This
crisishad
beenthe
resultofan
accumulation
ofpow
erbegun
firstand
most
noticeablyin
foreignaffairs.
As
Arthur
Schlesinger,
Jr.,observed,
“The
Imperial
Presidency
was
essentiallythe
creationof
foreignpolicy.”
For
many
years,a
bipartisancoalition
with
abroad
ideo
The
Presidency
inC
risis
logicalbase
choseto
overlookthe
ever-increasingability
of
theP
residencyto
dominate
thoseother
institutionsinside
andoutside
government
thatm
ightact
asrestraints
onthe
unaccountableuse
ofpow
erin
internationaldealings.
In1944,
JusticeJackson
observedin
theK
orematsu
case
that“T
hechief
restraintupon
thosew
hocom
mand
the
physicalforces
ofthe
countryin
thefuture
asin
thepast
must
betheir
responsibilityto
thepolitical
judgments
of
theircontem
porariesand
tothe
moral judgm
entsof history.”
Unfortunately,
bythe
middle
1960s,m
anyof
theinstitutions
capableof
renderingthat
politicaljudgm
enthad
atrophied
sobadly
that
onlythe
moral judgm
entsofhistory
were
acting
asrestraints
onP
residentialpow
er.
Institutionsw
hichhad
traditionallyshared
power—
most
notably,C
ongressand
thepolitical
parties—seem
edto
have
brokendow
nas
effectivechecks.
Abipartisan
foreignpolicy
which
haddom
inatedso
much
ofthe
post—W
orldW
arII
era
hadcontributed
tothis
breakdown.
By
necessityor
choice,
foreignpolicy
hadbecom
ethe
chiefm
eansfor
exercising
Presidential
power.
De
Tocqueville’s
predictionhad
been
fulfilled:“If
theexistence
ofthe
unionw
ereperpetually
threatened,if
itschief
interestw
erein
dailyconnection
with
thoseof
otherpow
erfulnations,
theexecutive
government
would
assume
increasedim
portancein
proportionto
the
measures
expectedof
itand
tothose
which
itw
ould
execute.”
Presidents
discoveredthat
foreignpolicy
hadm
anyad-
89
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
The
Presidency
inC
risis
vantagesfor
aleader
seekingto
avoidtrue
accountability.It
canbe
intoxicating.T
hesw
eepand
drama
ofdiplom
aticinitiatives,
theneed
foronly
limited
consultation,the
ten
dencyof
Am
ericansto
rallybehind
Presidents
inin
terna
tionalefforts
duringtim
esof
crisis,and
thefrequent
absenceof
powerful
opposinginterest
groups,so
oftenpreent
indom
esticaffairs,
enabledthem
tom
aintainsecrecy
andavoid
realpow
er-sharing.
Recent
Presidents
haveconcentrated
heavilyon
foreignaffairs.
Anum
berof
White
House
aidesof
recentad
min
istrations,
interviewed
bypolitical
scientistT
homas
E.C
roni
estimated
thatthe
Presidents
forw
homthey
worked
spentbetw
een60
percentand
two-thirds
oftheir
time
exclusively
concentratingon
nationalsecurity
activitiesor
foreignpolicy
crises.F
orR
ichardN
ixonthis
seemed
tocom
enaturally,
ashis
interestslay
inthe
areaofforeign
policy.B
utthe
lureof
foreigninvolvem
entconsum
edeven
Lyndon
Johnson,w
ithhis
deepcom
mitm
entto
domestic
impro
ve
inent.H
isdream
sfor
am
orejust
andhum
aneA
merica
were
smothered
inthe
junglesof
Vietnam
where
over55,000
Am
ericanlives
and$150
billionin
Am
ericantreasure
were
lost.Yet
thetragedy
ofV
ietnamw
asnot
thetragedy
ofP
residents
alone.V
ietnamw
asa
trauma
begunin
aspirit
ofA
merican
omnipotence,
aspirit
thatw
ecould
solvethe
world’s
problems
andreshape
much
ofthe
world
inour
own
image.
Only
painfullydid
we
learnthe
limits
ofA
merican
power.
Together
we
sufferedas
ourblood
andresources
were
fruitlesslysquandered
inS
outheastA
sia.W
ecam
eto
seethe
Presidency
nolonger
asthe
sourceof
omniscience
supported
bythe
Pentagon’s
computers,
butas
anoffice
occupiedby
mere
mortals
who
couldm
akeserious
mistakes.
We
came
to
seethe
needfor
aC
ongressw
hichchallenged
andquestioned
executiveleadership
andasserted
itspow
ersunder
thelaw
s
andthe
Constitution.
Then,
justas
theend
ofdirect
Am
ericanm
ilitaryin
vo
lve
ment
inV
ietnamconcluded
onenational
nightmare,
we
begananother.
The
useof
secrecyand
nationalsecurity
to
justifyany
actionhad
beentransferred
fromthe
foreign
policyarena
andused
againstthe
Am
ericanpeople.
As
the
lateS
tewart
Alsop
observed:“to
transfersuch
secretservice
techniqueson
anobviously
plannedand
organizedbasis
to
theinternal
Am
ericanpolitical
processis
agenuinely
terri
fyinginnovation.
The
Watergate
scandal,it
isclear,by
now,
isdifferent—
trulydifferent,
differentin
kind—from
allthe
scandalsthat
havepreceded
itin
Am
ericanhistory.
Itis
this
differencethat
makes
itso
frightening.”
This
“difference”m
eantuse
ofthe
IRS,
theC
IA,
theF
BI
andthe
Departm
entof
Justicefor
corruptends
designedto
subvertthe
politicalprocess
andpunish
theenem
iesof
the
Nixon
Presidency.
The
“difference”m
eantdeceit,
perjury
andthe
cover-upof unlaw
fulactivity
involvingthe
President
ofthe
United
States.
Itm
eanta
full-scaleattem
pt
todestroy
theintegrity
ofthe
electionprocess
itselfthrough
theuse
of
1011
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
The
Presidency
inC
risis
secretagents,
theexaction
oflarge
corporatecontributions
fromm
ajo
rA
merican
companies
with
theexpectation
of
government
favors,and
theuse
ofsom
eof
thefunds
soraised
toseek
todestroy
thecredibility
ofhonorable
men
seeking
thenom
inationfor
President
ofthe
United
States.
The
catalogof
Watergate
horrorsis
seemingly
endless.
We
couldhave
lostour
democracy.
The
Presidential
men
talityw
hichbred
Watergate
alsoled
tothe
illegalim
poundment
ofhuge
sums
ofcongressionally
appropriated
hindsto
frustratepolicy
objectivesadopted
bythe
Congress;
acam
paignof
media
harassment
andintim
idationbeyond
anythingseen
before;and
therejection
bythe
President
of
therole
ofhis
own
politicalparty
inany
meaningful
way
duringthe
electionof
1972.It
bredcontem
ptfor
theA
mer
icanpeople
andour
institutionsand
shatteredthe
trustof
the
Am
ericanpeople.
How
hadthis
allhappened?
How
hadthe
Am
ericanpeo
ple,the
Congress,
theparties,
them
edia,indeed
virtuallyall
ourA
merican
institutionsperm
ittedthese
tragediesto
oc
cur?T
hatA
merican
involvement
inthe
war
inV
ietnamw
as
ended,that
Watergate
was
discoveredand
dealtw
itheffec
tivelyby
thesesam
einstitutions
shouldgive
ussom
eco
m
fort.Y
etthe
inabilityof
theseinstitutions
tocheck
arbitrary
Presidential
behaviorat
theouts
et
must
befully
explored
andunderstood.
For
unlessw
edeal
effectivelyw
iththe
causesof
theseP
residentialexcesses,
we
may
well
seethem
12
happenagain.
And
we
canprevent
Presidential
excessw
ithoutfundam
entallyw
eakeningthe
much-needed
power
ofthe
Presidency.
To
learnfrom
theordeals
ofV
ietnamand
Watergate,
however,
we
must
analyzecarefully
theirsim
ilaritiesand
differences.B
othV
ietnamand
Watergate
havehelped
changeA
mericans’
viewof
theirP
residentsand
theP
residency.
Am
ericanshave
awakened
tothe
needfor
institu
tionalchange
ifsuch
tragediesare
tobe
avoidedin
thefuture.
Yet
each—w
hilereflecting
inpart
thehigh
pricew
epay
forunaccountable
Presidential
conduct—occurred
ina
differentenvironm
ent,and
fromeach
we
must
learnim
por
tantlessons.
The
disastrousconsequences
ofA
merican
involvement
inthe
Vietnam
eseW
ardestroyed
boththe
notionof
Am
erican
omnipotence
andthe
conceptofP
residentialom
niscience.It
was
theproduct
ofa
beliefin
Presidential
authorityand
competence
inthe
areaof
foreignaffairs
accumulated
overtw
odecades.
Follow
ingW
orldW
arII
andthe
Korean
War,
following
the“loss”
ofC
hinaand
thespread
ofcom
munism
inE
asternE
urope,w
ebecam
eincreasingly
willing
todefer
toP
residents,to
assume
thatP
residentsknew
,or
couldknow
,all
thefacts
andknew
howbest
todeal
with
them.
There
was
deceptionby
Presidents
Johnsonand
Nixon
concerningtheir
Vietnam
policies.B
othconcealed
fromthe
Am
ericanpeople
theirtrue
intentionsand
plansregarding
Vietnam
.In
April
of1965,
when
thefirst
large-scaleescala
I
13
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
tionof
thew
aroccurred
with
theintroduction
of20,000
troopsinto
Vietnam
,a
topadvisor
tothe
President
wrote
in
aninternal
andsecret
mem
orandumth
at“the
President
desiresthat
premature
publicitybe
avoidedby
allpossible
precautions.T
heactions
themselves
shouldbe
takenas
rap
idlyas
practicablebut
inw
aysthat
shouldm
inimize
the
appearanceof
suddenchanges
inpolicy.
The
President’s
desireis
thatthese
movem
entsand
changesshould
beu
n
derstoodas
beinggradual
andw
hollyconsistent
with
exist
ingpolicy.”
Follow
ingclosely
onthe
heelsof
theG
ulfof
Tonkin
resolution_approvedby
theC
ongresson
thebasis
of
dubiousinform
ation_thispolicy
ofsecrecy
was
continued
throughoutthe
prosecutionof
thew
arin
Vietnam
.
In1968,
thepeople
narrowly
choseR
ichardN
ixonto
b
President
onthe
basisof
hisprom
isesto
bringthe
war
toan
end.L
essthan
oneyear
later,secret
bombing
raidsin
Cam
bodiabegan,
andm
orethan
100,000tons
ofbom
bsw
ere
droppedin
3,500sorties.
Infact,
PentagG
nfigures
show
about3
million
tonsof
bombs
were
droppedin
Indochina
duringthe
firstthree
yearsof
theN
ixonP
residency,m
ore
thanhad
beendropped
duringthe
threefinal
yearsof
Ly
n
donJohnson’s
Presidency.
Along
with
thesecret
bombings
came
acontinued
expansionof
thew
arinto
otherareas
of
Indochinaand
theloss
ofover
15,000A
merican
livesin
the
years1969
through1972.
Itis
trueth
atC
ongressm
ayhave
beenprovided
mislead
inginform
ationto
justifythe
Gulf
ofT
onkinresolution.
And
14
The
Presidency
inC
risis
itis
truethat
theP
entagonP
apersreveal
aP
residentialstrategy
atodds
with
what
theC
ongressand
theA
merican
peoplew
erebeing
told.B
utthe
unavoidablefact
jsthat
them
ainoutline
andrealities
ofthe
war
inV
ietnamw
ereo
bvi
ousfor
allto
see.T
hew
arin
Vietnam
was
thebest-reported
war
inA
merican
history.W
hateverdeception
may
havebeen
attempted,
theA
merican
people—and
theC
ongress—w
ereable
tosee
thedestruction
ofinnocent
lives,the
burn
ingof
villages,the
entiregam
utof
physicaland
psychological
warfare
fromthe
comfort
oftheir
easychairs.
We
inthe
Congress
kneww
hatw
ew
eredoing
when
we
regularlyvoted
continuingappropriations
forA
merican
troopin
volvement
inV
ietnam.
The
Am
ericanpeople
kneww
hattens
ofbillions
oftheir
taxdollars
were
payingfor
eachyear.
We
knew,
andyet
fortoo
longw
ew
erew
illingto
paythe
price.W
eknew
what
was
happening,but
we
somehow
thoughtw
ecould
win,
thatw
ecould
“toughit
out.”W
edidn’t
andw
ecouldn’t,
andas
asociety
we
paida
highprice.
Vietnam
’scosts
wentbeyond
evenits
terribletoll
inlives
andm
oney.It
provokeda
confrontationbetw
eengenerations
andpoisoned
Am
ericanpolitics.
Itw
asa
tragedycaused
bythe
nearlyunquestioned
dominance
ofP
residentialasser
tionsof
power
inforeign
affairs,the
weakness
ofco
ngres
sionaldissent,
andthe
illusion—w
idelyshared
byA
mericans
—of
thelim
itlessnature
ofA
merican
power,
resourcesand
wisdom
.W
atergatew
asfundam
entallydifferent,
andyet
shared
L
15
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
many
comm
onelem
entsof
Presidential
excess.T
hew
arin
Vietnam
was
knowable
toeveryone;
Watergate
was
not,
at
leastat
first.T
hetragedy
ofW
atergatew
asnot
atragedy
of
Am
ericanm
iscalculation,led
bya
visionof
Presidential
power
which
hadoutgrow
nreality.
Rather,
inits
broadest
scope,it
was
thetragedy
ofm
enw
hofundam
entallylacked
respectfor
thesystem
ofA
merican
valuesw
hichgoverned
ourhistory
andused
thew
eaknessof
many
othergovern
mental
institutionsas
anexcuse
toattem
ptto
changethe
natureof
thoseinstitutions.
The
men
ofthe
Nixon
White
House
were
notresponding
toa
publicw
hichseem
edeager
toattem
pt
toim
Am
ericaninvolvem
entin
aforeign
nation.T
heyw
ereiii—
steadresponding
totheir
own
visionof
asociety
inw
hich
individualfre
edom
sw
erecheapened,
inw
hichthe
powers
of
theC
ongressw
eresystem
aticallydisregarded,
inw
hichthe
partiesw
ereignored,
andin
which
them
ediaw
eretreated
as
objectsfor
intimidation.
And
yetthe
weakness
ofthe
insti
tutionssurrounding
thesem
enm
usthave
playeda
part
in
givingthem
thesense
ofsecurity
neededto
undertak
ethe
massive
violationsof
lawth
atthey
undertook.
Vietnam
and\V
atergate
were
fundamentally
differentin
theirorigins,
intheir
development,
andin
theireffects
onour
society.Y
etboth
showed
thecom
plexin
terplay
betw
een
Presidential
personality,institutional
strengthand
public
opinionw
hichm
arksour
politics.
The
personalityof
Lyndon
Johnsonw
asclearly
important
16
The
Presidency
inC
risis
inthe
escalationof
thew
arin
Vietnam
andthe
imprin
tit
lefton
Am
ericansociety.
Yet
heinherited
involvemeit
inthe
war
fromother
Presidents,
andw
asencouraged
inhis
esca
lationsby
anA
merican
publicw
hichw
antedA
merican
involvement
anda
Congress
basicallyresponding
tothat
desire.W
ithoutpublic
support,there
might
havebeen
less
congressionalw
illingnessto
goalong
with
Am
ericanpolicy.
With
astrong
Congress
ableto
helplead
publicopinion,
we
might
haveshow
nthe
Am
ericanpublic
earlierthe
tragic
consequencesof
ourV
ietnaminvolvem
ent.W
itha
different
Presidential
personality,there
might
havebeen
lessof
adesire
toattem
pt
toshow
Am
erica’sability
topolice
thew
orld.B
utif
thepublic
hadbeen
more
stronglyopposed
tothe
war,
evenjohnson
orN
ixonm
ighthave
relentedfar
earlierthan
theydid.
So,too,
them
ixtureof
personalityinstitutions
andpublic
opinionis
complex
evenw
ithW
ate
rgate
.W
itha
man
dif
ferent
fromR
ichard
Nix
on_w
itIoit
hisdistru
stof
the
med
ia,
ofth
eC
ongress,of
the
parties
andeven
ofth
econ
stitutio
nal
syste
mw
ate
rgate
pro
bab
lynev
erw
ouldhave
occu
rred.
Yet
evenw
ithN
ixon,had
there
beena
vigorous
Congress
check
ing
many
ofth
eearly
excessesof
hisad
min
istration.
hem
ight
havebeen
restrained
inhis
unacco
untab
le
assertionsof
power.
Even
with
Rich
ardN
ixonin
office,had
the
Am
eric
an
public
reactedm
orestro
ngly
and
s\viftlyafter
‘Watergate
disclosuresbeg
anto
beknow
flin
mid-1972,
the
grievous
L
17
The
Presidency
inC
risisT
heA
ccountabilityof
Pow
er
damage
doneto
ourcountry
inthe
yearand
ahalf
beforethe
President
resignedm
ighthave
beenlessened.
An
earlier
Presidential
resignationw
ouldhave
accomplished
much.
Again,
theblend
ofpersonality,
institu
tion
sand
public
opinionis
inseparable.T
hechallenge
we
face,therefore,
in
thew
akeof
Vietnam
andW
atergateis
complex.
We
must
electP
residentsw
horespect
thelaw
andthe
otherinstitutions
which
surroundthe
Presidency.
We
must
strengthenthose
institu
tions
inw
ays
which
increasetheir
effectivenessand
theirability
tocheck
unaccountableP
res
identialpow
er.A
ndas
Am
ericansw
em
ustbe
aware
ofthe
importance
ofa
restrainedyet
strongP
residency,of
theneed
forP
residentsw
horespect
theneed
foraccountability
while
assertingthe
validpow
ersof their
office,and
of theneed
fora
Congress,
partiesand
media
which
canand
will
check
otherwise
unaccountableP
residentialconduct.
The
taskw
eface
isclear:
toredefine
therole
ofthe
Presidency
toacknow
ledgethe
importance
ofP
residential
power,
butto
insiston
thegreater
importance
ofacco
un
t
ableP
residentialpow
er.T
he“end
ofinnocence”
ofthe
Am
ericanpeople
with
theirP
residentscan
turnout
tobe
a
healthydevelopm
entby
allowing
usall
tosee,
asL
ordA
cton
saw,
that
“thereis
now
orseheresy
thanthat
theoffice
sanctifiesthe
holderof
it.”
This
restraintcan
beaccom
plishedonly
throughthe
re
formof
theinstitutional
relationshipsbetw
eenour
Presi
18
-J
dentsand
otherbodies
inour
societyand
bychanging
the
ways
thatA
mericans
examine
thecharacter
andpersonality
ofthose
personsw
how
ishto
leadthe
nation.W
em
ustsee
thatboth
thereform
ofinstitutions
andthe
changesin
the
way
we
lookat
Presidential
characterm
ustbe
more
than
passingphenom
ena.W
ecannot
forgetW
atergateand
Viet
nam,
andw
ecannot
allowthe
resignationof
aP
residentto
endour
searchfor
ways
toavoid
theirrepetition.
Since
Gerald
Ford
hasbecom
eP
resident,our
mem
oriesof
Vietnam
andW
atergatehave
faded.T
he“Im
perialP
resi
dency,”w
eare
told,is
acreature
ofthe
past,unlikely
tobe
repeated.W
ithoutdoubt,
theF
ordpersonality
isfar
more
openand
accountablethan
isR
ichardN
ixon’s.W
ithout
doubt,the
Congress
hascontinued
toreassert
itsinstitutional
prerogativesunder
President
Ford,
thoughnot
always
as
vigorouslyas
many
ofus
would
hope.W
ithoutdoubt,
Presi
dentF
ordhas
usedthe
Cabinet
more
thanm
anyof
his
predecessorsand
inm
ostinstances
hasbeen
fairin
his
dealingsw
iththe
media.
Gerald
Ford
hasonce
againproven
thepow
erfulinfluence
ofa
President’s
personalityon
thatoffice.
Ironically,though
hew
asnot
elected,G
eraldF
ordhas
shown
theenorm
ous
valueof
electingP
residentsw
hoare
healthyem
otionally.
Yet
evenhe
grantedan
unconditionalpardon
toR
ichard
Nixon,
anact
takenw
ithlittle
consultationand
verylittle
perceptionof
thepublic
reactionto
itsenorm
oussig
nif
i
cance.
19
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
Presidential
personalitygiveth
andP
residentialperso
nal
itycan
takethaw
ay.A
ndw
eshould
thereforenot
assume
thatour
problems
with
Presidential
overreachingscan
be
solvedif
we
onlyhave
theright
personin
theoffice.
Those
who
believethat
we
needonly
elect“good
people”
andthat
theinstitutions
andpublic
awareness
will
takecare
ofthem
selvesoverlook
thedam
ageto
ourinstitutions
which
anotherprolonged
periodof
institutionalneglect
coulden
sure.In
oursatisfactio
nover
thepresence
inthe
White
House
ofan
individualw
hoseem
sto
havea
healthyperso
n
ality,w
ecan
not
forgetthe
needto
continuethe
institutional
changesbegun
inrecent
years.In
ourrelief
thatthe
lawis
onceagain
beingrespected
byour
Presid
ent,
we
cannot
forgetthe
dangersof
anunrestrained
andunaccountable
Presidency.
We
canneither
completely
“Watergate-proof”
nor
“Vietnam
-proof”our
Presidency.
But
we
canattem
pt
to
constructnew
institutionalrelationships
thatreduce
the
possibilityof
Presidential
illegality.W
ecan
attempt
toen
surecloser
scrutinyof
thepersonality
andcharacter
ofour
Presidents
sothat
thelikelihood
ofanother
Richard
Nixon
becoming
President
islessened.
Most
importantly
ofall,
we
canseek
throughall
thesem
eansto
restrainthe
exerciseof
unaccountablepow
erso
thatthe
wisdom
ofthe
Am
erican
experiment
isonce
againgiven
newm
eanin
g.
Many
publicand
privateinstitutions
must
bestren
gth
ened.T
heC
ongressshould
employ
itsw
idepow
ersover
a
broadrange
ofdom
esticand
internationalaffairs
asan
active
20
The
Presidency
inC
risis
forcein
helpingshape
Am
ericangovernm
ent;it
shouldnot
merely
reactto
Presidential
usesof
thatgovernm
entalap
paratus.T
heC
abinet’srole
asP
residentialadvisors
shouldnot
precludethe
exerciseby
Cabinet
officersof
creativeleadership
ofthe
departments
whose
functionsthey
oversee.T
herole
ofthe
politicalparties
iscrucial
torestrain
runaway
Presidents
andto
focusand
channelthe
feelingsof
Am
ericans
abouttheir
government.
The
media’s
importance
inforcing
Presidents
toface
realitycannot
overshadowtheir
responsibilityto
serveas
vehiclesfor
expressionof
aw
idevariety
ofideas
inareas
relatingnot
onlyto
government
butalso
toa
broadscope
ofhum
anconcerns.
Yet
theability
ofeach
ofthese
institutionsto
nowserve
asrestraints
onP
residentiallack
ofaccountability
acquiresan
importance
unequaledin
nearlytw
ohundred
yearsof
dem
ocraticgovernm
ent.T
hetests
andupheavals
ofthe
pastdecade
dictatethat
eachbe
givengreater
strength,not
toreduce
legitimate
Presidential
power
asretribution
forpast
excessesbut
toreduce
unaccountableP
residentialpow
eras
aprotection
forour
dem
ocracy
.
We
will
requirestrength
inour
Presidency,
butno
Piesi
dentin
thefuture
shouldbe
ableto
usethat
strengthto
weaken
oursystem
ofgovernm
ent.T
herisks
ofnot
actingnow
aregreat.
As
Richard
Neustadt
observedjust
beforethe
resignationof
Richard
Nixon:
We
arenow
ina
periodof
anti-politicalpolitics
with
journalistsand
politiciansplaying
totheir
own
senseof
21
a
The
Accountability
ofP
ower
successive,cum
ulative,public
disillusionments.
‘Wa
tergatefeeds
them
ood.W
hensuch
aperiod
descended
uponus
inthe
early50’s,
we
gotE
isenhower
forP
resi
dent,the
heroabove
politics.Since
we
lackheroes
nowadays,
thenext
time
couldbe
worse.
Moreover,
the
renewed
constraintson
Nixon
cannotlast
forever.W
a
tergate’seffects
will
wear
offover
time,
perhapsby
his
successor’ssecond
term,
takingus
nofurther
than1984.
As
thisoccurs,
thew
eakenedstate
ofold
constraints
would
beexposed
oncem
ore.T
heparties
gonebeyond
recall,the
Congress
mortgaged
toticket
splitting,the
cabinetfrayed, by
overlappingjurisdictions,
thede
pendenceof
allthe
reston
theP
resident’sow
nstyle.
This
isa
somber
prediction,as
frighteningnow
asw
henit
was
firstoffered.
Itneed
notcom
eto
pass.It
must
notif
our
democracy
isto
survivethe
increasingstrains
tow
hichit
will
besubjected.
And
itw
illnot
ifw
einsist
thatthe
tragediesof
recentyears
aregiven
aredeem
ingvalue
throughthe
lessons
theyteach
usas
we
beginthe
thirdcentury
ofour
de
mocracy.
2T
heR
oadto
theW
hiteH
ouse
ThePresidency
isnota
prizeto
bew
onby
mere
glitteringprom
ises.Itis
nota
comm
odityto
besold
byhigh
pressuresalesm
anshipand
nationaladvertising.
ThePresidency
isa
most
sacredtrust
andit
oughtnottobe
dealtwith
onany
levelotherthan
anoppealto
reasonand
humanity.
—Franklin
D.
Roosevelt
I’mnot
anold
experiencedhand
atpolitics.
But
Iam
nowseasoned
enoughto
havelearned
thatthe
hardestthing
aboutany
politicalcam
paignis
howto
win
without
provingthat
youare
unworthy
ofw
inning.
—A
dlajStevenson,
1956
One
ofthe
most
popularlines
circulatingin
politicalW
ashingtonduring
1975w
asthat
theD
emocrats
would
bea
surething
torecapture
theW
hiteH
ousein
1976if
onlythey
didn’thave
tonom
inatea
Presidential
candidate.U
nfo
rtunately
forthe
Dem
ocrats,no
onehas
yetcom
eup
with
aw
ayof
gettingaround
thatnecessity,
and,if
theexperiences
of1968
and1972
areof
anyvalue,
itm
ayagain
proveto
bea
chiefobstacle
intheir
effortto
defeatthe
Republicans
inN
ovember.
For
reasonsthat
fewclaim
tofully
understand,
2223
