This article reports on the proceed- ings of WARC-ORB-85 held in Gene- va in August and September this year. Agreements reached included a priori allotment planning for new frequen- cies, improved coordination, with the possibility of burden sharing in accommodating new entrants for cur- rently used C band and Ku band frequencies, and first come, first served for other frequencies - a mixed planning approach. The article also considers the issues remaining after the conference that will dominate the intersessional period to WARC- ORB-88.

Heather Hudson is Associate Professor in the Department of Radio-Television-Film, CMA 6.118, College of Communication, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin. TX 78712-1091, USA.

Comment

Mixed planning approach at Geneva

Heather Hudson

The International Telecommunication Union’s World Administration Radio Conference on the Use of the Geosta- tionary Orbit and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It (WARC ORB-85) concluded in mid- September that a pot potrrri of plan- ning approaches would be the most equitable means of providing access to the geostationary orbit. The confer- ence was the first of two, the second session being scheduled for July 1988.

The main task of the conference, as set out in Resolution 3 of the 1979 WARC, was ‘to guarantee in practice

for all countries equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit and fre- quency bands allocated to space ser- vices’. The 1985 session was to ‘decide which space services and frequency bands should be planned: establish the principles, technical parameters and criteria for the planning . ., establish guidelines for regulatory procedures in respect of services and frequency bands not covered [by a plan]‘. and ‘consider other possible approaches that could meet the objective [of guaranteeing equitable access]‘.

The question of how (or indeed, whether, for some industrialized coun- tries) to plan the geostationary orbit occupied the conference delegates for several weeks. First. the conference agreed that only the fixed satellite service (FSS) would be subject to planning (although some nations had proposed other services including meteorological and mobile). After a near deadlock and many late-night

sessions, a compromise of a mixed planning approach was adopted. The final agreements call for planning of 300 MHz of uplink and 300 MHz of downlink frequencies in C band (614)

GHz and 500 MHz in Ku band (14/12

GHz) in new frequencies or ‘expan- sion bands’ allocated to the fixed satellite service at the 1979 WARC. The approach for these expansion bands is a regional allotment plan. under which each country would be guaranteed at least one unspecified slot in a regional orbital arc. Improved procedures would be used for the rest of C and Ku bands. These procedures were to be developed during the intersessional period between confer- ences, and were expected to he a method of multilateral cyclical co- ordination, versions of which had been proposed by the USA, France, and several other industrialized coun- tries. Existing procedures for notifica- tion and coordination through the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), with simplification, would be continued for other frequen- cies.

Thus, the agreements included a priori allotment planning for new fre- quencies, improved coordination. with the possibility of burden sharing in accommodating new entrants for

currently used C band and Ku band

frequencies, and ‘first come first

served’ for other frequencies. The

conference also decided to adopt the

Final Acts of the 1983 Region 2

RARC on Satellite Broadcasting, af-

ter an operational agreement was

worked out in a memorandum of

understanding through which adminis-

tration in Region 1 which may be subject to interference from systems planned in Region 2 have worked out a mutually agreeable solution for phasing in their use of assigned chan-

nels.

The final agreements were not total-

ly accepted by all administrations. The

USA took a reservation based on its

270 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY December 1985

Commenr

There were a large number of de- veloping country abstentions in vot- ing, in part not to publicly break solidarity with other developing na- tions (eg on the issue of sovereignty over the geostationary orbit by equatorial nations) and in part be- cause the small delegations from many countries often lacked the expertise or authority from their governments to make official endorsements.

There was a great deal of develop- ing country suspicion of proposals put forward by industrialized countries, and particularly the USA. not only because of historical suspicion of powerful nations and former colonial powers, but also because of a percep- tion that the privatization and liber- alization of telecommunications in North America and Western Europe would be detrimental to developing country interests. INTELSAT repre- sentatives did not appear to discour- age this view.

Many developing country delegates indicated that they were attempting to hedge their options in what they per- ceived to be an increasingly uncertain international and regional policy en- vironment. Although generally strong supporters of INTELSAT. they felt it was also necessary to retain flexibility to use other systems in case INTEL- SAT were to suffer as a result of competition. They also wanted to protect their options to participate in one or more regional or subregional systems, and in some cases, to procure their own domestic systems. In the face of this uncertainty. many de- veloping countries emphasized their need for a ‘guarantee of access’ that would keep all these options open.

Previous experience with planning for the Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) convinced many countries of the difficulty of implementing rigid a priori planning. The Region I plan established in 1977 is already co&i- dered obsolete in that new technical solutions are now available. The dis- advantages of locking in orbital loca- tions and frequencies for each nation have become evident, as European system designers attempt to fit chang- ing requirements for regional and national systems within the constraints of the 1977 plan. The Region 2 plan

belief that there was no need to plan Ku band frequencies. Some develop- ing country advocates of a priori plan- ning took reservations because they felt that other bands including 718 GHz and 20/30 GHz should be plan- ned. However, the mixed planning approach was considered to be a workable compromise.

From a policy perspective. it appears that both developed and de- veloping countries will be able to say that their interests were protected at this session. Developed countries were able to persuade the have-nots that it was not necessary to plan the heavily used portions of C band and Ku band, although improved multi- lateral procedures may include a means of sharing the burden involved in accommodating new users among all affected. Developing countries have 800 MHz of spectrum which can be planned to guarantee an orbital

‘The amount of rhetoric location and frequencies for each na- tion, and which can be effectively

was inversely doubled using dual polarization. The

proportional to a 300 MHz at C band looks particularly attractive because it could use re-

nation’s requirement for latively low cost proven C band tech-

a satellite’ nology. Also, C band is not subject to rain attenuation, and is thus more suitable than Ku band for tropical countries.

At times, it appeared that the amount of rhetoric was inversely pro- portional to a nation’s requirement for or commitment to procuring its own domestic satellite.

Several points appear significant concerning developing country poli- cies and strategies at the conference. While the conference often split on predictable developed/developing country lines, developing countries which now have their own satellite systems joined developed countries in their concern to protect their orbit positions. India was the exception, in advocating that other frequencies be- sides the expansion bands be planned. Indonesia helped in the search for a compromise, while Mexico and Brazil remained relatively mute.

When confronted with a vote, re- gional and ideological blocs (eg the non-aligned) broke down, and coun- tries voted according to their per- ceived national interests.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY December 1985 271

‘Developing countries lost an opportunity to capture the attention of the industrialized world’

developed in 1983 is perceived by Region 2 countries as a workable flexible plan that can accommodate changes in requirements and technolo- gies. Thus, while may developing countries continued to favour a priori planning, flexibility was seen as an important attribute.

The conference agreed to take into consideration the requirements of multi-administration systems created by governments and used collectively, without affecting the rights of adminis- trations with respect to national sys- tems. In other words. common user organizations such as INTELSAT, IN- MARSAT, EUTELSAT. and ARABSAT would be included in an allotment plan, but not given priority over national systems. The wording specifically excludes private interna- tional systems (such as PANAMSAT) which the ITU does not distinguish from national systems. Thus. the in- terests of the common user organiza- tions were protected, but not given priority.

Several major issues remain. First. a great deal of work was left to the intersessional period. This places a heavy burden on the ITU not only to conduct studies and develop propos- als, but to communicate the findings and recommendations effectively to administrations. Industrialized coun- tries will also be expected to carry out studies on the implications of the 1985 proposals and to contribute to de- velopment of computerized planning techniques and multilateral planning procedures during this period. Yet, unless the results of these studies and proposals are effectively communi- cated to developing country adminis- trations and unless they decide to evaluate their merits for workably achieving equitable access, much of

the 1988 conference could be taken up with ‘reinventing the wheel’.

A larger issue is the gap in access to telecommunications between indus- trialized and developing countries, which was identified in the Maitland Commission’s report The Missing Link. These issues were not overtly raised at the conference. with have- not nations choosing to focus on a guarantee of orbital access rather than a strategy for guaranteeing improve-

ments in Third World telecommunica- tions. The official reason was that these broader issues were not on the agenda. While literally true, it could certainly be argued that ‘equitable access’ may mean more than a labelled orbital position. By not finding a means of raising this issue. developing countries lost an opportunity to cap- ture the attention of the industrialized world when it had some incentive to respond.

It can be argued that the proper venue for this issue is the Centre for Telecommunications Development, recommended by the Maitland Com- mission and approved by the ITU’s Administrative Council in July. Much of the hope for the Centre lies in support from the operating entities and from equipment suppliers. ie largely from the private sector. Yet it may be difficult to find a compelling incentive for the private sector to participate in an era of increasing competition within the industrialized world. Equipment suppliers and oper- ating entities are increasingly pre- occupied with short term profitability and the threat of competition at home. Are they likely to pledge substantial financial and personnel resources to the Centre to assist the developing world?

Of course, there are compelling reasons why support for improving Third World telecommunications is a sound strategy. Better operated and maintained Third World telecom- munications systems mean higher traf- fic volumes domestically and interna- tionally. Higher priorities for invest- ment in telecommunications in de- veloping countries will mean immense new markets for telecommunications equipment. And the benefits of more and faster exchanges of information through better telecommunications are likely to extend not only to the devel- oping countries themselves but to the interdependent global economy.

Thus, the most important task in the intersessional period will be not to devise improved planning schemes for access to the geostationary orbit but to address the more fundamental issue of improving access to telecommunica- tions facilities and service throughout the developing world.

272 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY December 1985