REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINESS./lJVWIQ.Mv<BjIrt"jf3{Quezon City

MINUTES of the proceedings held on June 29, 2017

HON.AMPAROM. CABOTAJE-TANGHON. SARAHJANE T. FERNANDEZHON. BERNELITOR. FERNANDEZ

....... ChairpersonAssociate Justice

..... .. Associate Justice

The following resolution was adopted:

Case No. SB-16-CRM-0462 - PEOPLE vs. DELFIN TELANTING

For resolution is the prosecution's ((Motion to AdmitAmended Information" dated March 21, 2017.1

The prosecution prays that the amended Information2

dated February 27, 2017, which was approved by OmbudsmanConchita Carpio Morales on March 1, 2017, be admitted in thiscase. According to the prosecution, said amendment to theInformation is necessary so that it will contain only ultimatefacts and omit evidentiary matters. 3

Invoking Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure, the prosecution maintains that theInformation may be amended, in form or in substance, withoutleave of court at any time before the accused enters his plea.4

Attached to theFebruary 24, 2017,

said motion is the Memorandum datedwhich was approved by ombUdS~

1 pp. 268-271, Record2 pp. 276-278, Record3 p. 268, Record4 p. 268, Record

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Conchita Carpio Morales on March 1, 2017.5 Therein, theprosecution notes that the phrase in the original Informationwhich reads: ((in the private property inherited by privatecomplainant"6 should no longer be alleged since this phrase isevidentiary in nature.7 The prosecution asserts that theallegation that the subject property is privately owned by thecomplainant and that the impounding dam was constructedthereon without payment of just compensation, is enough toshow that the element of undue injury exists, while the fact ofinheritance as a mode of acquisition by the complainant can bepresented during trial. 8

In the same Memorandum, the prosecution likewisesubmits that the phrase, "give unwarranted benefit, advantageor preference to the farmers of Libag, Tuguegarao City," waserroneously included.9 It points out that after a reading of theResolution10 dated August 30, 2013 of the Office of theOmbudsman, there was no discussion on the alleged giving ofunwarranted benefit to the farmers. 11The prosecution reasonsthat in the said Resolution, what was appreciated in thedetermination of the existence of probable cause is the elementof causing undue injury to the complainant and not the givingof unwarranted benefit to the farmers.12

In his "Comment and/ or Opposition (To the Motion to AdmitAmended Information) with Motion to Quash with Leave" datedApril 10,2017,13 accused DelfinTelan Ting avers, among others,that: (1) the amendments that the prosecution seeks to make inthe Information are material or substantial that will prejudice hisrights;14 (2) the proposed amendments to the Information willalso render the accused unable to countervail the newaverments that are sought to be adopted since the amendmentsto the existing Information give rise to a different cause ofaction;15(3) contrary to the prosecution's claim, the reference tothe "unwarranted benefits advantage or preference to the far~

5 pp. 276-278, Record /' /"6 Underscoring supplied by the prosecution ~7 p. 273, Record8 p. 273, Record9 p. 273, Record \.A..10 pp. 4-11, Record ,~ ~11 pp. 273-274, Record12 p. 247, Record13 pp. 287-291, Record14 p. 286, Record15 p. 286, Record

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of Libag, Tugegarao [sic] City" was in fact passed upon in theResolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dated August 30,2013;16 (4) in the said Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsmanfound that the accused "manifestly gave the farmer-beneficiariesunwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge ofhis administrative official functions." Thus, by amending thepresent Information, the prosecution effectively admits theinsufficiency of the allegations regarding manifest partiality andgiving of unwarranted benefits, effectively showing a glaringvariance between the findings in the Resolution and theAmended Information;17 (5) the totality of the AmendedInformation ultimately attempts to change the cause of actionthrough the allegation of undue injury caused to the privatecomplainant Raymundo Z. Annang by the construction of thesmall water impounding dam in the complainant's privateproperty without his consent, which is obviously a differentcrime;18 and, (6) the prosecution is looking to amend theInformation to cure the defect that the accused committed nocrime against the private complainant due to the prosecution'sadmission that there is no unwarranted benefit given to thefarmers. 19

Accused Ting invokes the case of Matalam v.Sandiganbayan20 wherein the Supreme Court ruled, viz:

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudicedby the amendment has been. said to be whether adefense under the information as it originally stoodwould be available after the amendment is made, andwhether any evidence [thel defendant might have wouldbe equally applicable to the information in the one formas in the other. An amendment to an informationwhich does not change the nature of the crime allegedtherein does not affect the essence of the offense orcause surprise or deprive the accused of anopportunity to meet the new averment had each beenheld to be one of form and not of sUbstancen

16 p. 286, Record17 p. 287, Record18 p. 287, Record19 p. 287, Record20 455 SeRA 736 (2005)21 Emphasis supplied by the accused

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Furthermore, the accused maintains that the AmendedInformation will alter the recital of facts which constitutes theoffense charged; hence, the defenses available to him under theoriginal Information will not be the same defenses, once theInformation is amended;22 that he should not be undulyburdened to alter his defense just to conform to the AmendedInformation submitted by the prosecution; and, that the failureof the prosecution to properly prepare the Information should betaken in his favor as part of his constitutional rights to dueprocess and be presumed innocent of the accusations againsthim.23

In the alternative, the accused prays that a Motion toQuash be incorporated to his present comment on the groundthat the original Information states no cause of action.24

The prosecution filed a "Comment (to the Motion to Quashwith Leaver dated April 21, 2017.25 Therein, the prosecutioncontends that the original Information in this case sufficientlyalleges all the essential elements of the offense of violation ofSection 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 3019.26 According to theprosecution, the fundamental test in considering a motion toquash anchored on the ground of insufficiency of the avermentsin the Information is whether the facts alleged, if hypotheticallyadmitted, would establish the essential elements of the crimecharged as defined by law.27

Moreover, the prosecution asserts that the filing of asecond motion to quash is merely dilatory and not a properremedy.28The prosecution notes that the accused had alreadyfiled an Omnibus Motion to Quash and to Suspend Arraignmentdated September 25, 2016. This was denied by the Court in itsMinute Resolution dated December 14, 2016 ;29the accused fileda motion for reconsideration thereof, which was likewisedenied;30 and, that the accused should have included all the

/722 p. 289, Record23 p. 289, Record24 p. 289, Record25 pp. 294-297, Record26 p. 295, Record27 p. 294, Record28 p. 295, Record29 p. 295, Record30 p. 295, Record

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grounds available to him when he filed his first motion toquash.31

After a thorough review of the arguments presented by theparties, the Court finds the subject motion meritorious.

1. The amendment sought by theprosecution in the subjectInformation is substantial;however, under the obtainingfacts, there is no longer a need toremand the case to the Office ofthe Ombudsman for anotherpreliminary investigation.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court laysdown the procedure for the amendment of a criminalInformation:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. Acomplaint or information may be amended, in form or insubstance, without leave of court, at any time before theaccused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial,a formal amendment may only be made with leave of courtand when it can be done without causing prejudice to therights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, whichdowngrades the nature of the offense charged in orexcludes any accused from the complaint or information,can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, withnotice to the offended party and with leave of court. Thecourt shall state its reasons in resolving the motion andcopies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especiallythe offended party. 32 ~

31 p. 295, Record32 Emphasis supplied

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If it appears at any time before judgment that amistake has been made in charging the proper offense, thecourt shall dismiss the original complaint or informationupon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense inaccordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accusedshall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court mayrequire the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at thetrial.

Based on the first paragraph of the afore-quotedprovision, the amendment of an Information, whether as toform or substance, IS A MATTER OF RIGHT on the part of theprosecution BEFORE arraignment. The prosecution is thusfree to amend the Information WITHOUT leave of court BEFOREarraignment. 33

However, there is a need to determine whether theamendment sought to be introduced by the prosecution issubstantial or merely formal in nature because the prevailingrule in our jurisdiction is that before or after a plea, asubstantial amendment in an Information entitles an accused toanother preliminary investigation. The only exception theretois that, if the amended information contains a chargerelated to or is included in the original information, a newpreliminary investigation is not required.34

The test as to when the rights of an accused areprejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information iswhen a defense under the complaint or information, as itoriginally stood, would no longer be available after theamendment is made, and when any evidence the accusedmight have, would be inapplicable to the complaint orinformation as amended. On the other hand, an amendmentwhich merely states with additional precision something whichis already contained in the original information and which,therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crimecharged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.35 A substantial amendment, on the other hand,consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense Ch~

33 People V5. Daclldao, 170 SCRA 489 (1989)34 Matalam V5. Sandiganbayan, supra35 Albert V5. Sandiganbayan, 580 SCRA 279 (2009)

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and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All othermatters are merely of form.36

The following have been held to be merely formalamendments, viz.: (1) new allegations that relate only to therange of the penalty that the court might impose in the eventof conviction; (2) an amendment that does not charge anotheroffense different or distinct from that charged in the originalone; (3) additional allegations that do not alter theprosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to theaccused and affect the form of defense to be assumed; and (4)an amendment that does not adversely affect any substantialright of the accused, such as the right to invoke prescription,37and an amendment that merely adds specifications toeliminate vagueness in the information and not to introducenew and material facts, and merely states with additionalprecision something which is already contained in the originalinformation and which adds nothing essential for convictionfor the crime charged.38

With the aforesaid precepts as guide, the Court will nowascertain whether the amendment being sought by theprosecution in the subject Information is merely formal orsubstantial.

For better appreciation, the original and the proposedAmended Informations are respectively reproduced in full, to wit:

That on or about 23 February 2010, or sometimeprior or subsequent thereto, in Libag, Tuguegarao,Province of Cagayan, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, DELFIN TELAN TING, a high ranking publicofficial, being then the City Mayor of Tuguegarao City,while in the discharge of his official and administrativefunctions, taking advantage of his official position, andcommitting the offense in relation to his office, actiny;

36 Matalam vs. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, 495 Phil. 664 (2005); 455 SCRA 726 (2005)37 Villaflor vs. Vivar, 349 SCRA 194 (2001); citing Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag, 207 SeRA 134 (1992)

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with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligenceor manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and criminally give' unwarranted benefits,advantage or preference, to the farmers of Libag,Tuguegarao City by allowing39 the construction of asmall water impounding dam in the private propertyinherited by private complainant without payment ofjust compensation to the damage and prejudice ofprivate complainant.

That on or about 23 February 2010, or sometimeprior or subsequent thereto, in Libag, Tuguegarao City,Province of Cagayan, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, DELFIN TELAN TING, a high-ranking publicofficial, being then the Mayor of Tuguegarao City, whilein the discharge of his official and administrativefunctions, taking advantage of his official position, andcommitting the offense in relation to his office, actingwith evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminallycause the construction of a small water impoundingdam in the private property of Raymundo Z. Annangwithout his consent and the payment of justcompensation, thereby causing undue injury to thelatter.

Plainly, the accused is being charged under the originalInformation for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 becausehe allegedly gave "unwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference, to the farmers of Libag, Tuguegarao Citu bU allowingthe construction of a small water impounding dam in the privateproperty inherited by private complainant without payment of

-39-D-e-Ie-te-d-in-th-e-a-m-en-d-e-d-In-ifi-or-matian N ~40 p. 1, Record ...--61 ~ ~41 pp. 274-275, Record; The name of the private complainant is added in the amended Information

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just compensation to the damage and prejudice of privatecomplainant. "

On the other hand, under the proposed AmendedInformation, the accused is being charged with the same offenseon the ground that he allegedly caused "the construction of asmall water impounding dam in the private propertu ofRaumundo z. Annang without his consent and the paument ofjust compensation) thereby causing undue injury to the latter."

In Ampil v. Ombudsman,42 the Supreme Court ruled thatthere are two r21 ways by which Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019may be violated: r 11 by causing undue injury to. any party,including the government; or, r21 by giving any private party anyunwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neithermode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be chargedunder either mode or both. The use of the di~iunctive "or"connotes that the two (2) modes need not be present at thesame time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice forconviction.43

Pursuant to the aforesaid pronouncement of the SupremeCourt, the Court is of the view that the allegations in theAmended Information) that the accused caused undue injury toAnnang, give rise to a different cause of action against theaccused as it modifies the prosecution's original theory thataccused Ting allegedly gave the farmers of Libag) Tuguegarao)unwarranted benefits) advantage or preference.44 Undeniably,the allegations in the proposed Amended Information present adifferent mode of committing a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.No. 3019 as compared to the allegations stated in the originalInformation. Perforce, the said proposed amendment is asubstantial one considering that it changes the recital of factsconstituting the offense charged in the original Information.

Thus, the issue left for resolution is whether there is aneed to remand this case to the Office of the Ombudsman forthe conductofanother preliminaryinveStigatio/7

42 703 SCRA 1 (2013)43703 SCRA 1 (2013)44 Italics supplied

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In Matalam vs. Sandiganbayan,45 the Supreme Courtheld that there was a substantial amendment of theinformation charging Matalam with the crime of violation ofSection 3 (e) of R.A.No. 3019. The original Information in thesaid case charged Matalam with committing the prohibited actof illegal and unjustifiable refusal topay the monetary claims ofthe private complainants therein. On the other hand, in theamended Information, the prohibited act was replaced byillegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. Inruling that the said amendment was substantial andnecessarily required another preliminary investigation, theSupreme Court held:

The third element of the offense states that the publicofficer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibitedact. Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal contained in theamended charge gave rise to the original charge of failure topay the monetary claims of private complainants. It cannotbe disputed that petitioner already discussed circumstancessurrounding the termination of services of the privatecomplainants in his counter-affidavit. However, we findnothing therein that would show that he had alreadytouched the issue of evident bad faith or manifestpartiality. As can be gathered from the counter-affidavit,there were arguments tending to counter the presence ofevident bad faith, manifest partiality or grossinexcusable negligence, but the same refer to theallegation of failure to pay the monetary claims and notto the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegationstemmed from the other, the court a quo and the publicprosecutor cannot say the element of evident bad faith,manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence is thesame in both. This being an element of the offense charged,petitioner should be given the opportunity to thoroughlyadduce evidence on the matter. 46

Notably, in ruling that there was a need to conduct a newpreliminary investigation in Matalam, the Supreme Courtlooked at the record of the preliminary investigation of the saidcase to determine whether the allegations in the amendedInformation were already addressed by the parties th/7

4~45 supra46 Emphasis supplied

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during that stage of the proceedings. After finding that theallegation in the amended Information relative to the prohibitedact of the accused, i.e., the illegal dismissal from the service ofthe private complainants therein, was not addressed by himduring the preliminary investigation of the case, the SupremeCourt ordered the conduct of a new preliminary investigationconsistent with Matalam's right to due process.

Here, the indictment of the accused is based on theComplaint-Affidavit dated July 30, 2011, executed by RaymundoZ. Annang, the herein private complainant. 47 Therein, theprivate complainant made the followingmaterial allegations:

7. Sometime in October, 2010, I went to TuguegaraoCity to visit our property. I was surprised and shocked to findout that there were already diggings and excavations thereinostensibly by Mayor Ting and his men, who had unlawfullyentered our property without any authority of law, without ourpermission as property owners and in violation of our verbalagreement mentioned in the preceding paragraph;48

9. Mayor Ting acted fraudulently and in bad faithbecause while asking for more time to sign the Memorandumof Agreement as he was allegedly busy, he already ordered hismen to enter the portion of our property, made clearings bycutting down trees, started the diggings, making theexcavations and other phases of work for the project withoutour knowledge and without written contract or agreementwhich constituted a clear violation of law and the constitutionwhich provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, libertyand property without due process of law";

10. The intrusion and trespass into our private titledproperty done by Mayor Ting and men acting under hisdirection and control, and the diggings, excavation andconstruction being undertaken by them are in blatantviolation of our rights as property owners there being nounlawful authority on their part to do so, and not a singlecentavo was paid to us as owners thereof; this is confiscationof titled private property without due process of law;49

11. Although only a portion of 4. 13 hectares of ourproperty is intended for the water impounding dam,/?

47 p. 17, Record48 pp. 2-3, Complaint-Affidavit of Raymundo Z. Annang; pp. 18-19, Record ~

"p. 3, id; p.19, id ~~.

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remaining portion of 19 hectares more or less, left to uscannot be of great use and benefit to us anymore because thewater impounding dam unlawfully constructed by Mayor Tingthrough his men under his control and command is located atthe middle of our land xxx

13. The continued intrusion and trespass by MayorTing and men under his direction and control into ourprivate property is a patent violation of our rights, andthe diggings, construction and excavation being doneinside the premises of our property constitute unlawfultaking and destruction of our property without dueprocess of law. Mayor Ting's malicious and fraudulent actshave caused us undue injury, giving himself unwarrantedbenefits by his unilateral taking of our private property in thedischarged of his official functions through evident bad faith,thereby making him liable for violation of R.A. No. 3019 of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.50

The aforesaid allegations were refuted by thehis Counter-Affidavit dated August 31, 2012,submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman, thUS:51

accused inwhich he

4. It was the utmost need for an irrigation project, asmall water impounding dam for the local farmers of easternbarangays of Tuguegarao City that moved the City'sofficialdom to undertake the construction of a Small WaterImpounding Project (SWIP) located at Lingaling-Libag,Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.

5. In earnest cooperation with the National IrrigationAdministration (NIA), I, together with the city's officers,undertook this joint-venture project into (sic) of theconstruction of this SWIP for the farmer beneficiaries at theeastern barangays. In going into this project, I could not beaccused of giving any party any unwarranted benefit,advantage or preference in the discharge of my officialadministrative functions through manifest partiality orevident bad faith considering that the benefitted farmerswere given all the advantages and preferences andbenefits accruing from the constructing the SWIPfor theirwater needs, especially when the "EINino" phenomenon -widespread dry spell, is again at han

50 p. 4, id; p. 20, id; emphasis supplied51 p. 445, id

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6. I did not commit any of the above individualand/ or separate distinct modes of the 2nd element bywhich I may have committed the offense penalized underSection 3 (e), RA 3019. I did not also cause any injury tothe government because the consequential benefitsderived and received by the Tuguegarao City governmentfrom the construction of the Lingaling-LibagSmall WaterImpounding Project can now be seen as a substantialwater needs of the agricultural sector at the easternbarangays of TuguegaraoCity.

7. I did not cause any Injury to the complainantand/ or his siblings because the terms and conditions formy possible purchase of the totality of the land to includethe area covered by the SWIPon their land has not beenclosed.

11. At present, the finished government jointventure SWIPproject is now filled up with rainwaters andis now being used by the more than three hundred (300)farmer-beneficiaries whose farmlands shall be irrigatedthereby. Even an ocular inspection of the SWIP wouldshow its completion and functionality.

12. As of this writing, however, the negotiationsbetween the complainant and his siblings on the one hand,and the respondent on the other hand, have reached the stageof offers and counter-offers being made for the possibleamicable settlement of the case; thus, it is premature ofclaiming injury from me as respondent, since I did notcommit any injury to the complainant and/or hissiblings. 52

In its Resolution dated August 30, 2013,53 the Office of theOmbudsman found probable cause to indict the accused forviolation of Section 3 (e)of R.A.No. 3019 based on the followingfindings:

In the instant case, all the elements for violation of Sec.3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 are present. Respondent, who is ahigh-ranking public official while in the discharge of hisofficial functions, manifestly gave the farmer-beneficiariesunwarranted benefit, advantage or preference inn

52 pp. 3-4, Counter-Affidavit of Accused; pp. 47-48, Record; emphasis supplied

~p.4,Rem,d . 4 AD

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discharge of his administrative of (sic) official functions.By initiating the construction of the small water impoundingdam without the observing the steps enunciated in Section 19of the Local Government Code (LGC),he caused undue injuryto the complainant and his family. Respondent's defensethat there was no undue injury cannot be appreciated inhis favor. In the context of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, themeaning of undue injury is consistently interpreted as "actualdamage." xxx Thus, the illegal intrusion on the propertyrights of complainant and his family by respondentwithout just compensation is highly illegal, not properand wrongful. While this Office acknowledges the powerand prerogative of the local government units to utilizeprivate property for public use, such as the projectundertaken by respondent and the NIA, it cannot besimply done gratis but should be with just compensationto the landowners. The partiality, evident bad faith andinexcusable negligence of respondent were highlightedwhen he failed to observe Section 19 of the LGCxxx.54

As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted portions of therecord of the preliminary investigation of this case, the privatecomplainant already raised the issue that the accused's act ofallegedly ordering the digging and construction of the waterimpounding dam in his property without his consent andpayment of just compensation caused him undue injury. Thiswas directly and actually rebutted by the accused in hiscounter-affidavit wherein he claimed that he did not cause anyparty, particularly the private complainant, undue injuryconsidering that the construction of the said water impoundingdam was with the cooperation of the NIA and was approved bythe officials of Tuguegarao City. The accused further assertedthat he did not cause any injury to the private complainantand/ or his siblings because the terms and conditions of thepossible purchase of the latter's land to include the areacovered by the water impounding dam has not been closed.

Evidently, the issue relative to the subject matter of theproposed amendment to the Information, i.e.) the accusedcaused the construction of a small water impounding dam inthe private property of Raymundo Z. Annang without hisconsent and payment of just compensation, thereby causingundue injury to the latter, was already sufficientlyraised/?

" pp. 4-5, Ombud'man', R"olution; pp. 7-8, Rew,d; empha,is 'UPPlie~r/~

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traversed by the private complainant and the accused in theirrespective affidavit and counter-affidavit. This was passed uponby the Office of the Ombudsman when it resolved the saidcomplaint during the preliminary investigation stage.

The Court is mindful of the general rule that a newpreliminary investigation is necessary in case of substantialamendment to the criminal Information. However, the Courtdoes not see any compelling need to remand this case to theOffice of the Ombudsman for the conduct of anotherpreliminary investigation since it will not serve any usefulpurpose. On the contrary, it will only cause further delay in theresolution of this case.

The non-conduct of a new preliminary investigation doesnot violate the accused's right to due process. As hereinbeforedemonstrated, this issue of the accused allegedly causingundue injury to Annang was litigated during the preliminaryinvestigation. In fact, the accused contested such allegation inhis counter-affidavit. Thus, he was already heard on the saidIssue.

11. Accused Ting's Motion toQuash is rendered academicwith the admission of theAmended Information.

In his Comment and/ or Opposition (to the Motion to AdmitAmended Information) with Motion to Quash with Leave datedApril 10, 2017, the accused prays for the dismissal of the caseagainst him on the ground that the original Information statesno crime allegedly committed by him nor did the facts chargedtherein constitute an offense.55

The Court finds the said argument devoid ofmerit.

The accused's assertion that the allegations in the originalInformation purportedly failed to state a cause of action againsthim or that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense

"p. 290, Reco,d /7

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is erroneous. The original Information actually charges anoffense albeit the modality of its alleged commission is on thesecond mode.

In any case, the accused's motion to quash has beenrendered moot and academic with the admission of theAmended Information in this case.

1. GRANTS the prosecution's ((Motion to Admit AmendedInformation" dated March 21, 2017 and ADMITS the AmendedInformation dated February 27,2017; and

2. DENIES the accused's ((Comment and/or Opposition (tothe Motion to Admit Amended Information) with Motion to Quashwith leave" dated April 10, 2017, for lack of merit.