Mind, Language, and Epistemology: Toward a Language Socialization Paradigm for SLA

Mind, Language, and Epistemology: Toward a Language Socialization Paradigm for SLAAuthor(s): Karen Ann Watson-GegeoSource: The Modern Language Journal, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 331-350Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the National Federation of Modern Language TeachersAssociationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3588782 .Accessed: 16/07/2011 20:13

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Mind, Language, and Epistemology: Toward a Language Socialization Paradigm for SLA KAREN ANN WATSON-GEGEO School of Education

University of California, Davis 81 Bonnie Lane

Berkeley, CA 94708 Email: kawatsongegeo@ucdavis. edu

For some time now second language acquisition (SLA) research has been hampered by un- helpful debates between the "cognitivist" and "sociocultural" camps that have generated more acrimony than useful theory. Recent developments in second generation cognitive science, first language acquisition studies, cognitive anthropology, and human development research, however, have opened the way for a new synthesis. This synthesis involves a reconsideration of mind, language, and epistemology, and a recognition that cognition originates in social interaction and is shaped by cultural and sociopolitical processes: These processes are central rather than incidental to cognitive development. Here I lay out the issues and argue for a language socialization paradigm for SLA that is consistent with and embracive of the new research.

WE ARE AT THE BEGINNING OF A PARADIGM shift in the human and social sciences that is revo-

lutionizing the way we view mind, language, epistemology, and learning, and that is fundamentally transforming second language acquisition (SLA)I and educational theory and research. This paradigm shift is being stimulated by new research in the cognitive sciences (Churchland, 2002; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Levy, Bairaktaris, Gullinaria, & Cairns, 1995; Rumel- hart, McClelland et al., 1986; Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Solso & Massaro, 1995; Spitzer, 1999; Varella, Thompson, & Rosch, 2000), human and child development (Burman, 1994; James & Prout, 1997; Jessor, Colby, & Shweder, 1996; Lewis & Watson-Gegeo, 2004; Mayall, 2002; Shon- koff & Phillips, 2000; Wozniak & Fischer, 1993), first language acquisition and socialization (Gib- son, 11982; K. Nelson, 1996; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Seidenberg, 1997; Slobin, 1985; Watson- Gegeo, 2001), cognitive anthropology (Chaiklin & Lave, 1996; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Hol-

The Mlodern LanguageJournal, 88, iii, (2004) 0026-7902/04/331-350 $1.50/0 ?2004 The Modern Language Journal

land & Quinn, 1987; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Shore, 1991; Strauss & Quinn, 1997; Watson-Gegeo &

Gegeo, 1999a), cognitive linguistics (Ungerer & Schmid, 1996), and the critical social sciences, including cultural and cross-cultural psychology (M. Cole, 1996; L. M. W. Martin, Nelson, & To- bach, 1995; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1999; Sinha, 1997; Stigler, Sweder, & Herdt, 1990).

The shift is also prompted by the flow of research from the periphery to the center of political power. Third wave feminist studies (Alcoff & Potter, 1993; Bhavnani, Foran, & Kurian, 2003; Weedon, 1997), and ethnic studies from colonial and postcolonial societies, including currently colonized indigenous and ethnic minority peoples within dominant societies, are consonant with the new findings in the human sciences. And in turn, the voices of these scholars and their claims for indigenous and other standpoint epistemologies (Collins, 2000; Gegeo, 1994; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, 2003; Wautischer, 1998) are supported by the new research. The emergence of formerly silenced voices is part of the contemporary process of globalization in which peoples on the periphery within and out-

I

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side dominant or center societies, rather than

being passively affected by globalization, are ac-

tively reacting to and participating in it. They are

speaking on their own behalf to the centers of

knowledge construction and power, in order to

promote their interests and the ongoing decolo- nization process. This remarkable and creative combination of sociopolitical events and tra-

jectories in mainstream and non-mainstream research has already seriously eroded the univer- salist assumptions that have until now determined mainstream theory and method and that are anchored in Anglo-Euro-American cultural

ontology and epistemology. The paradigm shift has begun to be felt in SLA

scholarly social spaces through new cognitive science-based theories of language (see Doughty &

Long, 2003; also Atkinson, 2002; Martinez, 2001), including emergentism theory (N. C.

Ellis, 1998; MacWhinney, 1999), and criticalist sociocultural studies of second language learn-

ing and teaching (e.g., Canagarajah, 1999; Tol- lefson, 1995). The conventional paradigm for SLA research has come under increasing criti- cism since the late 1970s for (a) its exclusive reli- ance on Cartesian, positivistic assumptions about

reality, (b) its experimental modes of inquiry that cannot incorporate cultural and socio-

political context into its models, (c) its basis in structuralist or other problematic linguistic theo-

ries, and (d) its inability to produce implications for pedagogy that actually work for second lan-

guage teaching, especially in the periphery (i.e., third- and fourth-world situations; Block, 1996; Crookes, 1997; Firth & Wagner, 1997; Jacobs &

Schumann, 1992; Kramsch, 1995; Lantolf, 1996; Liddicoat, 1997; Pallotti, 1996; Pennycook, 1994;

Rampton, 1997a, 1997b). However, recent developments have opened

the way for a new synthesis involving a reconsideration of mind, language, epistemology, and

learning, based on the recognition that cognition originates in social interaction and is

shaped by cultural and sociopolitical processes. That is, cultural and sociopolitical processes are central, rather than incidental, to cognitive de-

velopment. My purpose here is twofold. First, I overview in

brief, outline fashion some of the diverse lines of research and thinking that converge on a set of

general principles for cognitive development and social practice, which are still to be understood in full through further research. In being indicative rather than exhaustive, I highlight some of the subtleties in issues of social influences and experience in shaping mind and lan-

The Modern Language Journal 88 (2004)

guage skills that are undertheorized in SLA, and I identify lines of work that have not yet entered SLA social spaces. Second, I argue for a language socialization paradigm for SLA. Such a paradigm would be embracive of and consistent with the new research.

NEW UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT MIND AND LANGUAGE FROM THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES

What do we now know about cognitive processes and the human brain? The shift from cognition to mind in much of the research discourse on

cognitive development reflects current under-

standings about the brain and thinking. First, neuroscience research (Churchland, 1986, 2002; Dacey, 2001; Edelman, 1992; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Goldblum, 2001; Quartz & Sej- nowski, 2002) has demonstrated that the body- mind dualism of Western philosophical and mainstream scientific thought, in which cognition rides in a detached fashion above the body and is in some sense distinct from it-an idea still

implicit in much educational and SLA research and teaching-is fundamentally mistaken. What we humans understand about the world we understand because we have the kinds of bodies and

potential for neural development that we have

(Regier, 1995, 1996; Varela et al., 2000). Even our scientific instruments are an extension of our

bodily capacities, and built on the assumptions we make about the nature of reality (ontology) and our way(s) of creating knowledge about real-

ity (epistemology), and based on our body's ways of detecting and relating to the world. All cognitive processes are thus embodied.

Second, most cognitive scientists estimate that more than 95% of all thought is unconscious- what Lakoff and Johnson (1999) called the

"cognitive unconscious"-and it is this unconscious thought, lying outside our awareness, that

"shapes and structures all conscious thought" (p. 13; see also Baumgartner & Payr, 1995; Jacoby, 1991; Naatanen, 1992; Schneider, Pimm-Smith, & Worden, 1994; Solso & Massaro, 1995). In- cluded in the cognitive unconscious is all im-

plicit knowledge that we have learned through socialization beginning in the prenatal months.

Third, mind is a better term than cognition because the latter tends to focus on only parts of the

mind, typically what Vygotsky (1981) called the

higher mental functions of voluntary memory, logical reasoning, language, metacognitive skills, and some forms of categorization. Most of our theoretical models of cognitive skills acquisition

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo

assume that these higher-order cognitive skills are independent of other mental processes. How- ever, through research on patients who have lost emotional capacity via brain damage, cognitive scientists have shown that without emotional ca-

pacity, people cannot make rational judgments, including moral decisions. Emotions are essential to logical reasoning (Damasio, 1994). As developmentalist Kurt Fischer and his colleagues argued (Fischer, Wang, Kennedy, & Chang, 1998), emotions "have well-defined roles in human activity" and are "not opposed to cognition, as is assumed in Western culture; to the contrary, [emotion] links closely with cognition to shape action, thought, and long-term development" (pp. 22-23). Three neuroscientific models have been proposed and are being investigated to account for emotions and their role in human activ-

ity (network, Halgren & Marinkovic, 1995; polyvagal, Porges, 1995; and hemispheric asymmetry, Davidson, 1992, Fox 1991; see Byrnes, 2001, for a

summary). Fourth, our earlier conception of cognition

has been further expanded to incorporate many other components of a human mental life, including symbolic capacity, self, will, belief, and desire (e.g., Ingvar, 1999; E. K. Miller, 2000; Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Shweder, 1996; Silber- sweig & Stern, 1998).

Fifth, not only is language metaphorical, but because of the kind of neural networks we build in our brains, thought itself is metaphorical and made possible through categorization that is typically conceptualized as prototypes (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981; Taylor, 1989). Some categories and prototypes are inherent in the kind of body and mind we human beings have, and therefore may be said to be universal. A great many categories and prototypes, however, in fact probably the majority, are socio- culturally constructed and therefore vary cross- culturally.

Sixth, until now we have conceptualized the brain metaphorically as a container of intelligence, knowledge, and cognitive skills, and the individual as a container for the brain and as pos- sessing (or failing to possess) societally desired cognitive skills. Our metaphor has thus very much determined the way we look at human thinking and behavior, and certainly the way we measure and assess the cognitive abilities of students in schools and language classes. Some of the most interesting research in human development over the past several years has up-ended this conception of cognition. Research demon- strates that "both the content and process of

333

thinking ... are distributed as much among individuals as they are packed within them" (M. Cole & Engestrom, 1993, p. 1). The discovery of distributed cognitions-that people think in con- junction with others, that cognition is socially constructed through collaboration (Resnick, Le- vine, & Teasley, 1991; Salomon, 1993)-links to the work that is going on in cognitive anthropology and by standpoint epistemologists on the nature of knowledge construction (see below). Even Vygotskian theory (1978, 1981; Rogoff, 1990) is subject to the critique of not being social enough, and as yet continuing to treat the mind as a container for the transfer of knowledge (Atkinson, 2002; Brandt, 2000; Watson-Gegeo, 1990).

What have we discovered about language from cognitive science research? First, research has discovered no structure in the brain that corre- sponds to a Language Acquisition Device as argued by Chomsky and others. Language is not completely a human genetic innovation because its central aspects arise via evolutionary processes from neural systems that are present in so-called "lower animals" (Bates, Thal, & Marchman, 1991). There can be no pure syntax separate from meaning, emotion, action, and other dynamic aspects of the mind and communication. Linguistic concepts, like all other cognitive processes, arise from the embodied nature of human existence and through experience (Langacker, 1990, 1991). Language develops through the same general processes as other cognitive skills, and grammar is a matter of highly structured neural connections (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, 1996; Plunket & Elman, 1997).

Second, innateness is usually equated with language universals. However, if we are to be consistent with cognitive science, emergentism, connectionism, and cognitive linguistics, what we take to be universal typically involves universals of common human experience starting after birth. In other words, it is not just a matter of what we are born with, but the fact that we human beings occupy a set of environments with and within which our body-mind has co-evolved and that present us with common experiences. These experiences include, as Lakoff and John- son (1999) phrased it, "the conceptual poles of grammatic constructions, universals of spatial relations, and universals of metaphor" (p. 508; see also Fauconnier, 1997; Koenig, 1998). The rest is culturally variable (see Chafe & Nichols, 1986); it is shaped by gender, ethnicity, social class, and sociohistorical, sociopolitical processes (Chaik-

334

lin & Lave, 1996; Segall et al., 1999; Stephens, 1995) in very powerful ways that affect perceptions, assumptions, language(s), and other un-

derstandings of the world. While some theorists continue to defend or re-

invent Chomsky's theories, or both (e.g., Chom- sky, 1995; Fodor, 1998; Pinker, 1994; White, 2003), biologists and neuroscientists have shown that a built-in Universal Grammar (UG) or lan-

guage acquisition structure is unnecessary for ex-

plaining language universals. Chomskyian the-

ory failed a major test when McWhorter (1997) devastatingly critiqued Bickerton's (1988, 1990) Chomsky-based "bioprogram" model of creole

language formation, showing that, for instance, the grammatical structures that Bickerton claimed Surinam Creole speakers had suppos- edly created from UG turned out to be trans- ferred from the African substrate. Evolutionary biologist/primatologist Terence Deacon (1997) convincingly demonstrated that languages have had to "adapt to children's spontaneous as-

sumptions about communication, learning, social interaction, and even symbolic reference"

(p. 109)-placing the social in the center of the

linguistic:

The theory that there are innate rules for grammar commits the fallacy of collapsing the irreducible social evolutionary process [of language evolution and

change] into a static formal structure.... The link from psychological universals to linguistic universals is exceedingly indirect at best .... The brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the adapting. (pp. 121-122)

Chomskyian theory is but one account of lan-

guage in linguistic theory, yet Pinker's (1994) and Krashen's (1985) works have been read by a wider public, and language teachers at all levels often assume a Chomskyian perspective (perhaps unconsciously) on language that affects

teaching moments with students, even if they are

attempting to teach according to "best practice" that incorporates language use and sociocultural

issues (as modeled or argued in, e.g., Berns,

1990; Kramsch, 1995; Kern, 2000; McGroarty, 1998; or Larsen-Freeman, 2000).

Third, language structure, language use, and

language acquisition are inseparable because ex-

perience shapes all our neural networks. These

processes are therefore also shaped by sociohistorical, sociocultural, and sociopolitical processes, because language change, use, and learn-

ing occur in social, cultural, and political contexts that constrain and shape linguistic forms in various ways, and mark their significance. The politi-


cal nature of language learning and use is increas-

ingly a focus of research in complex first language and second language situations, from a variety of critical perspectives (Caldas-Coulthard & Coult- hard, 1996; Canagarajah, 1999; Chouliaraki &

Fairclough, 1999; Huebner & Davis, 1999; Kroskrity, 2000; Peirce, 1995a, 1995b; Penny- cook, 1994; Phillipson, 1992; Tollefson, 1995; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1994,1995).

The latter issues are at the heart of ontology, epistemology, and learning. To move into issues of ontology and epistemology, we first need to examine what we currently understand about how knowledge is organized by and in the embodied mind.

ONTOLOGY, CULTURAL MODELS, AND EPISTEMOLOGY: COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VOICES OF THE OTHER

Ontology refers to what there is, and epistemology to how we know. Work in cognitive an-

thropology over the past two decades has revis- ited the once discredited issue of linguistic relativity, and through empirical research, has demonstrated that differences in languages do have a significant impact on differences in think-

ing (Gumperz & Levinson, 1996). Levinson

(1996), Lee (1996), and Silverstein (2000), in

particular, have launched brilliant reconsider- ations of Whorfs (1956) principle of linguistic relativity and the data at its basis, correcting the

gross misrepresentations of the past. Lee's devas-

tating critique of Pinker's (1994) carelessness in

confusing data completely undermines his dis- missal of Whorf's ideas, for instance.

The new work on linguistic relativity is closely related to empirical research on cultural models for thinking and behaving by cognitive anthro-

pologists using schema and prototype theory (D'Andrade & Strauss, 1992; Holland, Lachi- cotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998; Holland & Quinn, 1987; Shore, 1991). In turn, the work on cultural models is parallel to research by psycholinguist K. Nelson (1996) and her colleagues on children's language development, which also draws on schema and script theory. Nelson (1996) ar-

gued that "Human minds are equipped to construct complicated 'mental models' that represent . . . the complexities of the social and

cultural world" (p. 12). She proposed the term Mental Event Representation (MER) for the basic flexible structures of children's cognitive devel-

opment, in the form of schemas and scripts that


become a mental context for future behavior in similar situations.

Cognitive anthropologists argue that culturally shared knowledge is organized into cultural models, defined as "prototypical event sequences in simplified worlds" (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 24; Holland et al., 1998, expanded this idea into "figured worlds"). Cultural models frame and in-

terpret experience and guide a variety of cognitive tasks, including setting goals, planning, di- recting action, making sense of action, and verbalization (Quinn & Holland, 1987). They operate below the surface level of behavior and the linguistic level of morphology and syntax, to shape perception, information processing, and the assignment of values (Gegeo & Watson-

Gegeo, 1999). Analytically, cultural models are

compatible with a neural network model of the embodied mind.

Typically in psycholinguistic research, the com-

plex interrelationships among forms of cultural knowledge across domains are not addressed. In contrast, an important insight from cognitive an-

thropology is the relationship between cultural models and the systematic or thematic nature of cultural knowledge. Quinn and Holland (1987) argued that this "thematicity" is the result of "a small number of very general purpose cultural models that are repeatedly incorporated into other cultural models" (pp. 10-11) in hierarchi- cal and other arrangements. General-purpose models or premises operating across several cultural domains give a culture its distinctiveness and reduce the total amount of cultural knowledge to be mastered by the learner.

Knowledge encoded in cultural models is brought to bear on specific tasks in the form of metaphorical proposition-schemas and image- schenmas (Lakoff, 1984; Quinn & Holland, 1987). A proposition-schema specifies "concepts and the relations which hold among them" (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 25), such as (among Ameri- cans), ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980), versus, for instance, in Kwara'ae, Solomon Islands, ARGUMENTATION IS STRAIGHTEN- ING OUT (Watson-Gegeo, 1995), or, to take an- other example from Kwara'ae, FAMILIES SHARE FOOD WITHOUT EXPECTATION OF RETURN. An image-schema is more gestalt-like and usually metaphorical, such as the American image-schema MARRIAGE IS A JOURNEY (Quinn, 1987, 1997), or the Kwara'ae image- schema EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS ARE ALL ONE HEARTH (or one basket/house- hold/garden/cluster of baking stones). This latter image-schema means that extended family

335

members are all one family, and thus the

proposition-schema FAMILIES SHARE FOOD WITHOUT EXPECTATION OF RETURN ap- plies to all of them.

Cultural models-which are usually tacitly understood, and often unconscious-lie at the heart of cultural identity, ontology, and indigenous and local epistemology. Until very recently, ontology and epistemology were treated as what Western philosophy and science had invented, while everybody else had only a "world-view" and commonsense strategies for discovering knowledge needed to survive in the local environment. Today, scholars from third-world societies and from indigenous societies living under colonial conditions in first- and second-world societies are challenging the privileging of Western ontology and scientific epistemology. This challenging has come in the wake of the critique of mainstream epistemology by third wave feminist scholars against the Anglo-Euro-American patriarchal positioning of mainstream epistemology.

Epistemology refers to both the theory of knowledge and theorizing knowledge (Gold- man, 1986, 1999). Epistemology is concerned with who can be a knower, what can be known, what constitutes knowledge, sources of evidence for constructing knowledge, what constitutes truth, how truth is to be verified, how evidence becomes truth, how valid inferences are to be drawn, the role of belief in evidence, and related issues (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001; see also Williams & Muchena, 1991). Social epistemologists (e.g., Fuller, 1988) and feminist epistemologists (e.g., Code, 1991; Grosz, 1990; Haraway, 1988; L. H. Nelson, 1993) recognize with sociolo- gists of knowledge (Bloor, 1991; Dant, 1991; Stehr, 1994) that "epistemological agents are communities rather than individuals. In other words, knowledge is constructed by communities-epistemological communities-rather than collections of independently knowing individuals" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58), and "such communities are epistemologically prior to individuals who know" (L. H. Nelson, 1993, p. 124). Feminist epistemologists, parallel to neuroscientists, recognize the embodiment of knowledge. Grosz (1993) cogently argued that the current crisis of reason in Western culture and philosophy is a "consequence of the historical privileging of the purely conceptual or mental over the corporeal," and the "inability of Western knowledges to conceive their own processes of (material) production, processes that simulta- neously rely on and disavow the role of the body" (p. 187). Both of these points are consistent with

336

the new findings of cognitive science and devel-

opmentalist research just reviewed. However, feminists add the additional and crucial insight that human bodies are not all the same. In particular, Western positivistic research typically as- sumes a male body and usually a White middle- class heterosexual male experience of and in the world.

Moreover, the feminist and third-world chal-

lenge to Western rationality and normal science takes all these arguments a step further to chal-

lenge the taken-for-granted objectivity on which much of Western science depends for its claim that the knowledge it produces is necessarily universal and always superior to all other forms of

knowledge. Particularly relevant to the present discussion is standpoint epistemology as developed by feminists, which recognizes that "Knowledge claims are always socially situated" (Harding, 1993, p. 54). That is, all knowledge is subjective, positioned (i.e., from a standpoint, not objective in a final sense), historically variable, and specific, even when what is constructed turns out to have universal implications. With the realization that all knowledge is situated comes the recognition of the importance of who gets to be the

knowledge producers versus those who are only allowed or able to be knowledge consumers, and

why there is so much power in the hands of those who control knowledge. Knowledge is political as well as cultural, and for this reason, researchers must ask, who gets to represent whom?

Typically, it has been White Anglo-Euro-Ameri- can researchers who study and represent mainly non-European "Others" who are not allowed voice to represent themselves as they wish to be or are positioned. As Yeatman (1994) put it, "Who must be silenced in order that these representations prevail?" (p. 31).

However, the prevailing relations are in a very early stage of changing, through the new research by third-world scholars writing about their own cultures' ontologies, epistemologies, and cultural models. Indigenous epistemology refers to an indigenous "cultural group's ways of

thinking and of creating, reformulating, and the-

orizing about knowledge via traditional discourses and media of communication, anchor-

ing the truth of the discourse in culture" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58; see also Gegeo, 1994; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2002). Local epistemology refers to processes of creating knowledge that are situated in local conditions and relation-

ships and may be partially or wholly shared across cultural groups. As concepts, indigenous and local epistemology focus on the process

The Modern LanguageJournal 88 (2004)

through which knowledge is constructed and val- idated by a cultural group and on the role of that

process in shaping thinking and behavior. Un-

derlying these concepts is the assumption that "all epistemological systems [are] socially constructed and (in)formed through sociopolitical, economic, and historical context and processes" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58). Together, ontology, epistemology, and cultural models constitute deep culture (Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 2004).

Culture is not uniform and unchanging; it is variable, an ongoing conversation embodying conflict and change, shaped by the dialectic of structure and agency (Giddens, 1979), inher-

ently ideological, and prone to manipulation and distortion by powerful interests (Foucault, 1980; Gramsci, 1978; Habermas, 1979). Bhaba

(1994) argued that cultures and cultural forms are in a continuous process of hybridity, creating a "third space" (p. 38) for new cultural posi- tionings to develop or be constructed, (re)creating current versions of cultures, and so on. That means, as Chaudhry (1995) pointed out, that hybrid individuals "exhibit hybrid identities as well as hybrid world-views deriving from different systems of meaning" (p. 49). Nevetheless, people usually have an internal sense of their cultural

positioning(s). As Hall (1991) argued, cultural

identity and knowledges involve two senses of the self: of "one shared culture, a sort of collec- tive 'one true self,' hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves,' which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common"; and of identity and knowl-

edges produced by "the ruptures and discontinu- ities" that result in "critical points of deep and

significant difference" (p. 223). Although hybridity is associated now with diaspora(s), colonial-

ism, postcolonial history, and globalization, the

complexity it evokes (Canclini, 1995) is perhaps more easily grasped in multicultural/multilin-

gual nations than in the United States (where mainstream interests try to suppress or downplay multilingualism and multiculturalism). Even with the reality that culture(s) is/are always mov-

ing and changing, people undertake their own critical reflection on culture, history, knowledge, politics, economics, and the sociopolitical contexts in which they are living their lives. They act on these reflections, and in all known societies, there exist formal contexts for direct teaching of cultural knowledge and values.

Latour (1986) pointed out that to gain West- ern recognition as "useful" and meaningful, traditional and local knowledges typically must be


translated into Western scientific discourse- that is, the parts that seem "relevant" to a West- ern science are extracted from the whole and re-

organized into discourse that looks "scientific" to Westerners, transforming acceptable elements into "universal knowledge" (see also Vos, 2000). This treatment of the knowledge systems of cultural Others is an indication of the role of power and sociopolitical processes in knowledge construction and use, including language learning and discourse forms. As anthropologist Raffles (2002) argued:

Explanatory power results less from intrinsic truth- fulness than from the successful collaboration of political, cultural, and biophysical actors.... In this account, scientific knowledge is as much a local knowledge [as any other] ... all knowledges are also intimate . . . [and] intimacies are necessarily relational. [Intimate knowledge] draws attention to the embeddedness of social practice in relations of power. (pp. 327-328)

The recognition that all knowledge is positioned and situated in sociohistorical, sociopolitical contexts brings us to the questions, What do the new understandings about body- mind imply for context? And how do people learn?

CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, SITUATED LEARNING, AND CONTEXT

The new research has made older cognitivist theoretical assumptions about development and learning obsolete. One of the best accounts of how our understandings have changed is found in the National Academy of Sciences book, published in 2000, From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000). First, by asserting that "human development is shaped by a dynamic and continuous interaction between biology and culture," the national panel stated that the nature versus nurture debate is thus "scientifically obsolete" (p. 3). As Spitzer (1999) pointed out:

We have demonstrated that the connections between the neurons in a human brain cannot possibly be genetically determined, because the entire human genome is by far too small to contain the necessary information. Instead, humans learn through interactions with the environment that change the connections in our biological brains. (p. 38)

Second, genetics and environment not only affect but are affected by a child's agency in development. The transmission model of develop-

337

ment and socialization is therefore also scientifi-

cally obsolete. Not only adults, but also children are "active participants" in their own development and help to shape their environment (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 24).

Third, the idea that development is entirely and necessarily universal with regard to the spe- cifics of stage and trajectory is now obsolete. "The effects of culture on child development are pervasive," the panel declared. "Culture influences every aspect of human development" and is "fundamental" to what happens (Shonkoff &

Phillips, 2000, p. 25; see also P.J. Miller & Good- now, 1995). The determination that culture is formative entails recognizing the influence of the family and family organization. Today there is a turn towards seeing the family rather than the individual child as the unit of analysis. Some of the leading human development departments in U.S. universities are changing their names to reflect this new emphasis. For instance, the de- partment at the University of Wisconsin-Madi- son recently changed its name from "Human Development" to "Human Development and Family Studies," and faculty have begun collabo- rative research projects, using qualitative and ethnographic methods.

Fourth, "critical period" as a description or boundary for certain kinds of development is now a "dispreferred term," having been replaced in cutting-edge research by "sensitive period" (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 195). Research has found that "the developing brain is open to in- fluential experiences across broad periods of development" (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 183; see also Barlow, Petrinovich, & Main, 1982).

Drawing on activity theory, critical psychology, ecological psychology, and cognitive anthropology, Lave (1993) defined learning as "changing participation [and understanding] in the culturally designed settings of everyday life" (pp. 5-6). She pointed out that cognitivist theories of learning have heretofore claimed that "actors' relations with knowledge-in-activity are static," that is, "they do not change except when subject to special periods of 'learning' and 'development,"' and that "institutional arrangements for incul- cating knowledge are the necessary, special circumstances for learning, separate from everyday life" (p. 12). The weight of evidence, however, is moving towards sociocultural theories that em- phasize learning as "ubiquitous," as an aspect of all activity (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 38). In any situation, people will learn, even if what they learn is to fail, an all-too-common consequence of formal schooling.

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Underlying the split between older cognitivist theories and contemporary sociocultural theories of learning is an epistemological gulf. Older

cognitivist theories viewed knowledge as a collection of real entities, located in heads (the container metaphor), and learning as a process of in-

ternalizing these entities (what Freire, 1970, called the "banking model" of education in which

"deposits" of prepackaged knowledge are made into the heads of students). Today some scholars in education and language teaching are attempting to apply aspects of neuroscience directly, ahead of the research and without regard to the

complexities of cognitive scientific understand-

ings (see Knudson, n.d., and Wolfe, 2001). In

contrast, sociocultural theories, which are receiv-

ing support from the new research, regard know-

ing and learning as "engagement in changing processes of human activity" (Lave, 1993, p. 12).

Even as cognitivist theories have not recognized the heterogeneity of knowledge, they also do not take into account situated activity and the fact that "conflict is a ubiquitous aspect of human existence" (Lave, 1993, p. 15). As we have

seen, power issues cannot be detached from

knowledge, and thus all learning is political in nature.

Then what is meant by situated cognition and situated learning? Both terms have wide usage today in various pedagogical fields, where their mean-

ings are often diluted. Situated cognition refers to the position that "every cognitive act must be viewed as a specific response to a specific set of circumstances" (Resnick, 1991, p. 4). This fram-

ing of cognition challenges experimental psychology and psycholinguistic assumptions that the research laboratory (or a test-taking situa-

tion) is a neutral environment in which valid

findings about people's skills can be discovered, measured, or both. Research has shown, for in-

stance, that children's conversational inexperi- ence, rather than their cognitive incompetence, can produce inaccurate results about their abilities in an experimental situation (Siegal, 1991). Research has also shown that adults often attend to figuring out the social meaning of the experimental situation rather than the cognitive features of the task given them (Perret-Clermont, Perret, & Bell, 1991). In short, there is no decon-

textualized, neutral environment: Everything oc- curs in and is shaped by context.

Situated learning refers to more than the idea that learning takes place somewhere and through doing, or that the meaning of activity depends on social context. Situated learning is a general theoretical perspective on the "relational character of


knowledge and learning," the "negotiated character of meaning," and "the concerned (engaged, dilemma-driven) nature" of the learning activity for people involved in it. Thus, "there is no activ-

ity that is not situated," the whole person is involved in learning, and "agent, activity, and the world mutually constitute each other," as Lave & Wenger (1991, p. 33) argued. A situated learning perspective rejects the notion that there can ever be decontextualized knowledge or a decontextualized activity. By definition, everything that

happens in the human world is in a context with

specifiable characteristics. Even so-called general knowledge can be learned only in specific contexts. And the usefulness of general knowledge is only in its applicability to (re)negotiating or (re) con-

structing meaning in specific circumstances

(Lave & Wenger, 1991). Context is also a much more complex concept

than is usually recognized in experimental SLA research (for a review of the history of context as a

concept in linguistics, see Berns, 1990). From an

activity theory point of view, context is "histori-

cally constituted between persons engaged in so-

cioculturally constructed activity and the world with which they are engaged" (Lave, 1993, p. 17). Ongoing social structures shape but do not

fully determine context, because context is also

negotiated, and all interactions involve contra- dictions and political dimensions. Meaning is re-

lational, that is, among individuals and activity systems or institutions. Context is open and is

partially renegotiated in every interaction, but it is not completely so. It is the fluid, dynamic, complex, heterogenous nature of context that is

usually reduced to a list of features or elements in SLA research, a mistaken notion of how context is constructed in interaction and across time and space. Even in communicative language teaching, much more attention is given to creat-

ing lessons that contain examples with specified typical contexts in which the language/discourse to be learned is realistic, than to the relational/ contextual, dialogic (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986) nature of the learning/teaching interaction within the complex context of the classroom. Teachers

teach, but they co-create context with others

(administrators, institutional culture, students, etc.), and they respond to and are constrained by context.

The social construction of cognition and learn-

ing challenges our basic notions of cognition, even as second-generation cognitive science has

challenged these notions. Social structures are often hidden and taken for granted, yet can influence our assumptions about cognition, assess-


ment of cognitive skills, and pedagogy. Lave (1988), for instance, pointed out that our society's organization around capitalist production and exchange of commodities creates a metaphor in which work can be divided into sets of

separate activities and skills. As Resnick (1991) argued:

What we take as knowledge in school and to a large extent in cognitive research reflects [the] assumption that competence can be decomposed into con- stituent parts and decontextualized for purposes of instruction and evaluation, without losing anything essential. So our very definition of the cognitive ... is subtly colored by assumptions that derive from social and economic arrangements with long historical roots. . . . The social, then, invisibly pervades even situations that appear to consist of individuals

engaged in private cognitive activity. (p. 7)

How can we move SLA theory onto a firm grounding that takes into consideration the new research we have just reviewed and found to be

converging across the social, human, and behavioral sciences and that creates a more realistic and useful basis for research and practice? A language socialization paradigm for SLA would re- solve many of these issues and have significant application to language teaching.

TOWARD A LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION PARADIGM FOR SLA

As a theoretical and methodological perspective, language socialization (LS) began as a response to concerns with the narrowness of mainstream first language acquisition and child development research models of the 1960s and 1970s, and to the realization that language learning and enculturation are part of the same process (Watson-Gegeo, 1992). Since the early 1980s, a series of rigorous, detailed studies of children's first (sometimes involving aspects of second) language socialization have been under- taken in a variety of societies. Initial studies were carried out in the South Pacific (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Hawai'i), Af- rica, Asia, Europe, and the diverse cultures of the United States (e.g., Boggs, 1985; Cook, 1999; Cook-Gumperz, Corsaro, & Streeck, 1986; De- muth, 1986; Heath, 1983; Kulick, 1992; Ochs, 1988,; Philips, 1983; Schieffelin, 1990; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Tudge, 1990; Watson, 1975; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1986a, 1986b).

Language socialization studies of second language classroom learning, both oral and written language, have also begun appearing (e.g., At- kinson & Ramanathan, 1995; Duff, 1995; Eckert,

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2000; Harklau, 1994; He, 1997; Hoyle & Adger, 1998; Kanagy, 1999; Li, 2000; Losey, 1995; Pal- lotti, 1996; Poole, 1992; Schecter & Bayley, 1997; Siegal, 1996; Watson-Gegeo, 1992, 2001; Wat- son-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1994, 1995, 1999a; Willet, 1995; for a review of some of the better LS studies in SLA, see Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003). The most exciting development in LS studies in SLA is the arrival of Bayley and Schecter's (2003) excellent collection of research pieces, most from a critical, sociopolitical perspective, on second language socialization in more than 10 bilingual/multilingual sociocultural situations around the world, in home, school, and community contexts, across the life-span. This volume sets a new, higher standard for LS research in SLA and pushes the paradigm shift forward. Al- though individual authors in the Bayley and Schecter volume make important statements about the shifts going on in LS theory and research, an overarching theoretical statement does not emerge from the book. What I try to do here, therefore, is move us towards a LS paradigm for SLA by briefly laying out some of the key premises of LS theory. We need to recognize that a new paradigm will be socially constructed by an epistemological community, not individu- ally announced, and that what we are seeking to build is an open, not a closed, paradigm. In other words, we are not seeking to construct a new grid or new walls, we are instead opening up spaces.

The basic premise of LS is that "linguistic and cultural knowledge are constructed through each other," and that language-acquiring children and adults "are active and selective agents in both processes" (Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003, p. 165, drawing on Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986). The learning of language, cultural meanings, and social behavior is experienced by the learner as a single, continuous (though neither linear nor necessarily unparadoxical) process (Watson- Gegeo & Gegeo, 1995). Learners construct "a set of (linguistic and behavioral) practices that en- able" them to communicate with and live among others (Schieffelin, 1990, p. 15) in the highly complex, fluid, and hybridized cultural settings in which they may find themselves and need to act. This premise coincides with our understandings that language and language varieties adapt to human circumstances and biology, that culture shapes development (including language learning), and that language, culture, and mind interactively shape each other through interac- tive practices and discourses. Language socialization research offers us an opportunity, as well, to

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extend Whorfs (1956) principle of linguistic relativity by examining how, in the process of learning first, second, and additional languages, learners also learn multiple representations (ontologies and epistemologies) of the world.

A second premise of LS theory is that all activities in which learners regularly interact with others in the family, community, workplace, or classroom are not only by definition socially organized and embedded in cultural meaning systems, but are inherently political. People learn

language(s) in social, cultural, and political contexts that constrain the linguistic forms they hear and use and also mark the social significance of

linguistic and cultural forms in various ways. These insights apply to second language learners as well as to first language learners because learn-

ing is ubiquitous, there is no context-free lan-

guage learning, and all communicative contexts involve social, cultural, and political dimensions that affect which linguistic forms are available or

taught and how they are represented. As Bour- dieu (1985) argued, there is no disinterested social practice. In fact, the study of language socialization processes allows us to recover "how

language forms correspond with the values, be-

liefs, and practices of a particular group and how novices can come to adopt them in interaction," because through language, "social structures and roles are made visible and available" (K. Cole &

Zuengler, 2003, p. 99). Discourse organization then becomes central to understanding in classrooms, for example, the ways that language varieties and forms are used to create expectations, meanings, and judgments about learners, their

knowledge(s) and indigenous/local/standpoint epistemologies, and so on, especially through interactional routines that invite while limiting agency (Sato & Watson-Gegeo, 1992; Ulichny &

Watson-Gegeo, 1989; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1999b).

A third premise of LS theory has to do with the

complexities of context essential to analysis. Over the past decade, SLA research has demonstrated that social identities, roles, discourse patterns, and other aspects of context all affect the process of language learning, including motivation

(Peirce, 1995a) and consciousness (Schmidt, 1990). Conventional SLA research has often treated aspects of context in ways that are reductionist and superficial. R. Ellis and Roberts'

(1987) approach to context, for example, drew on Hymes' (1974) "SPEAKING" model, which

Hymes intended as sensitization for researchers to the multidimensionality of context, but in fact, R. Ellis and Roberts followed Brown and Fraser's


(1979) reductionist approach in limiting context to a few dimensions. Roberts and Simonot (1987) wanted to "deepen" context beyond such narrow uses, yet included only three levels in their analysis, omitting many historical and sociocultural dimensions that cannot be dismissed beforehand. These problems persist even in the criticalist work of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL; e.g., Halliday & Hasan, 1989; for excellent cri-

tiques of SFL, see Bronson, 2001; Hyon, 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; J. R. Martin, 1997; Sullivan, 1995).

The limitations placed by prior, and often con-

temporary, SLA research on what counts as context typically derives from the positivistic, experimental model of research that attempts to control variables rather than account for the

complexities of people's real lived situations, and, in any case, reflects a felt need to reduce

complexity in order to arrive at firm, codable cat-

egories. Berns (1990), Resnick (1991), Kramsch

(1995), the authors in Bayley and Schecter's

(2003) work, and especially Lave (1993) represent advances in encompassing the complexities of context. In LS research, "context refers to the whole set of relationships in which a phenomenon is situated" (Watson-Gegeo, 1992, p. 51), in-

corporating macrolevels/macrodimensions of institutional, social, political, and cultural as-

pects, and microlevels/microdimensions involv-

ing the immediate context of situation (Good- win & Duranti, 1992; Malinowski, 1923). The

history of macro- and microdimensions, includ-

ing interactants' individual experiences and the

history of relationships and interactions among them, are important to the analysis. In this re-

spect, LS study aims to go beyond Geertz's

(1973) notion of "thick description"-which he borrowed from the philosopher Gilbert Ryles (as cited by Geertz, 1973, p. 7)-to thick explanation. Thick explanation "takes into account all relevant and theoretically salient micro- and macro- contextual influences that stand in a systematic relationship to the behavior or events" (Wat- son-Gegeo, 1992, p. 54) to be explained. "Sys- tematic relationship" is the key for setting boundaries (Diesing, 1971, pp. 137-141), with attention to data collection to the point of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This

premise of LS theory is consistent with the new

understandings about the ubiquitous and fundamental role of context in human experience.

A fourth premise of LS theory, also supported by research, is that children and adults learn culture largely through participating in linguisti- cally marked events, the structure, integrity, and


characteristics of which they come to understand

through primarily verbal cues to such meanings. The construction and learning of syntax, seman- tics, and discourse practices is especially fundamental to learners' socialization in framing and

structuring their development of both linguistic and cultural knowledge, including ontology and

epistemology. Second language classrooms exhibit and teach-with varying degrees of explicit- ness--a set of cultural and epistemological as-

sumptions that often differ from those of the second language learner's native culture(s). Cer-

tainly such differences have been well docu- mented for linguistic and cultural minorities in a

variety of national and international settings and have often been shown to be problematic for child and adult second language or second dia- lect learners.

A fifth premise of LS theory incorporates the

insights on cultural models and Mental Event

Representations from cognitive anthropology and K. Nelson's (1996) work in human development. What this means is that cognition is built from experience and is situated in sociohistorical, sociopolitical contexts, as argued by Lave (1993). The construction of event representations and other cultural models is the building of new neural networks or links between networks, from the perspective of cognitive science. Be- cause cognition is created in social interaction, contemporary LS theory is concerned with participation in communities of practice and learn-

ing, more specifically, the learning process which Lave and Wenger (1991) called legitimate peripheral participation. They emphasized the crucial importance of learners' access to participa- tory roles in expert performances of all knowledge skills, including language.

The term legitimate peripheral participation refers to the incorporation of learners into the activities of communities of practice, beginning as a legitimated (recognized) participant on the edges (periphery) of the activity, and moving through a series of increasingly expert roles as learners' skills develop. Capacities and skills are therefore built by active participation in a variety of different roles associated with a given activity over a period of time, from peripheral to full participant. Lave and Wenger (1991) thus moved beyond the Vygotskian notion of "internaliza- tion" into a more fluid, realistic, and criticalist perspective on learning. Their theory of social practice is related to the work of Giddens (1979) and Bourdieu (1977) and is congruent with what cognitive anthropologist Hanks (1991) de- scribed as "the radical shift [in the human sci-

341

ences] from invariant structures to ones that are less rigid and more deeply adaptive," with structure "more the variable outcome of action than its invariant precondition" (p. 17).

Lave and Wenger's (1991) formulation speaks to the "relational interdependency of agent and world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning, and knowing," and emphasizes the inherently so-

cially "situated negotiation and renegotiation of

meaning in the world" (pp. 50-51). This perspective is important to focusing our attention on how learners are brought into or excluded from various activities that shape language learn-

ing. The importance of studying access, negotiation, and the roles of second language learners' movement from beginner to advanced second

language speaker status is foregrounded. These issues have critical importance for linguistic minorities and immigrants, who often face social and political hostility or exclusion and may react to that exclusion with resistance. Moreover, if we were to take Lave and Wenger's legitimate peripheral participation model seriously, we would need to rethink education from the ground up, including all the assumptions we have about classrooms as settings for learning.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR SECOND LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION

A language socialization paradigm is eclectic with regard to research methods and design but

emphasizes ethnographic and other forms of qualitative research as the key empirical methods. In the past few years, a number of discussions of qualitative and ethnographic methods in SLA and English as a second language research have appeared (Davis, 1995; Edge & Richards, 1998; Lazaraton, 1995; Peirce, 1995b; Ramana- than & Atkinson, 1999; Watson-Gegeo, 1990), but only two so far (Watson-Gegeo, 1992; Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003) flow from a LS perspective. Quality LS research requires a combination of ethnographic, sociolinguistic, and discourse analytic methods at a minimum, and often includes quantitative and sometimes experimental methods, as well. However, quantitative and experimental work must be ecologically valid (M. Cole, Hood, & McDermott, 1978) that is, incorporate all relevant macro- and microdimensions of context; and, going beyond the psychologist's notion of ecological validity, incorporate whole events and behavior rather than short strips of time with coding into preset categories (Watson-Gegeo, 1992). LS research is built on fine-grained longitudinal studies of lan-

342

guage and culture learning in community or classroom settings, or both, systematically docu- mented through audiotape, videotape, and care- ful fieldnote records of interaction. Central to the analysis are tape-recorded naturally occur-

ring interactions that are analyzed for linguistic and sociolinguistic features (including paralin- guistic, kinesic, and suprasegmental features), participant structures, genres, presentation of self, indexicality, discourse organization, and other aspects of interaction. In-depth ethno-

graphic interviews of learners are conducted, fo- cused around their goals, inferences, and other

understanding of interactions in which they or others participated; emergent patterns in data; and theoretical issues salient to the research

questions that evolve, grounded-theory style, from accumulating data and continuous analysis. (For further discussion of methods in LS research, see Watson-Gegeo, 1992, and Watson-

Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003.)

CONCLUSION

A language socialization paradigm would transform SLA research, which is already moving towards becoming consistent with the new research in the human, social, and neurosciences, and make it more relevant to learners' actual ex-

perience (e.g., Kern, 2000). A language socialization paradigm would also transform the way we

attempt to teach languages in classrooms. We would have to reexamine our pedagogical strate-

gies, the assumptions we make about classroom

organization, lesson structure, and effective ma-

terials, including current assumptions about sociocultural strategies. Our concern with multiculturalism would be radically changed, as well, from the rather superficial and anemic treatment of cultural variability to a serious and inten- sive consideration of how our perceptions of the world are shaped by the interaction between our embodied experience in the world and the cul-

turally based ontology/ies and epistemology/ies into and through which we are all socialized in the course of learning our first language (s) and

culture(s) (however hybridized they may be); and then (re)socialized or partially (re)socialized in the process of learning a second or third

language and culture. Moreover, political issues in language, mind,

culture, interaction, ontology, epistemology, and

learning would be foregrounded rather than noted and then treated as peripheral or ignored altogether. With criticalist applied linguists and SLA researchers in sociopolitical perspectives, we


would all have to ask ourselves and our students, Why are we teaching/learning English (or an- other language)? What does this teaching/learning imply in our highly diverse but rampantly po- litically structured world? What are the political implications of our teaching, learning, and re-

searching language learning and pedagogy? Whom does this work empower and whom does it

disempower? Finally, I want to address briefly an aspect of

human experience that is largely missing from the new neuroscience research, and which may make some readers uncomfortable. So let me be- gin from the periphery. In all known human societies, the "schism between transcendentality and appearances is recognized," as Wautischer

(1998, p. 9) argued in the introduction to his ed- ited volume, Tribal Epistemologies: Essays in the Phi-

losophy of Anthropology. In the West, we typically divide spirituality from science; even those scientists who themselves experience or are open to the notion of spirituality tend to separate spiritual matters from their daily professional work. This is not an unimportant issue because, for most indigenous and ethnic minority peoples, spirituality and the sacred are at the core of their

indigenous and local knowledge systems. Many third- and fourth-world peoples feel that when their languages and cultures are recorded and

analyzed by Anglo-Euro-American researchers, they are desanctified in both the spiritual and the epistemological sense. When indigenous and ethnic minority peoples talk about their indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, much of what they say "falls outside any perspective consistent with our age of reason," as Wautischer

(1998, p. 4) commented. He went on to say that mainstream researchers' own experiences with

aspects of body-mind which we cannot explain- such as intuition or intention-are "ubiquitous ... [and] show that our twentieth century sense

of science is incomplete: objectifying methodol-

ogies cannot account for qualitative experiences, while introspective methodologies collapse under the scrutiny of noetic [i.e., intellectual] in- trusion" (p. 4). Nevertheless, spiritual traditions and formal religions are on the rise in first- and second- world societies everywhere.

In Western science, with the exception of a few

pioneers primarily in physics, we have closed off from reality-grounded science the recognition of the strong human seeking for transcendental and immanent meaning. The resulting dichot-

omy resembles the body-mind dualism that has been so physically and emotionally destructive to us since Descartes and which is now crumbling


under the weight of evidence from a variety of

methodological perspectives. Part of the postmodern realization is that knowledge is now going to move from the periphery of world power to the center, instead of always from the center to the periphery, as has been the case under co- lonialism whether internal or external, and in the divisions between the formally (especially higher) educated and the less schooled. Post- modernism is able to embrace the diversity of human experience. As Johnson (1999) argued:

"Constructivist" versions of postmodernism seek to reunite dichotomies between subjective and objective, fact and imagination, secular and sacred ... immanent and transcendent .... The inclusion of a

spiritual perspective may permit acceptance of the

paradoxes inherent in these dichotomies. If our culture of separation arises partially from an overem-

phasis on the intellect and the ego, then the re-

balancing of spirit and rationality are necessary to nurture life. (p. 157)

These issues are even more important in a time when the ecological sciences are beginning to make headway in changing the modernist paradigm. Physicists in the "new physics" have been

developing a quantitative model of local and nonlocal energetic/information healing (Tiller, 2003b), demonstrating mathematically and

through controlled experiments that spiritual ex-

periences are real. Tiller (2003a) argued:

Today, we once again have abundant experimental evidence concerning nature's expression that is being "swept under the rug" by the scientific establish- ment because it doesn't fit into the current prevailing paradigm. This concerns the issue of whether or not human qualities of spirit, mind, emotion, consciousness, intention, etc., can significantly influence the materials and processes of physical reality. The current physics paradigm would say "no" and in- deed there is noplace in the mathematical formalism of the paradigm where any human qualities might enter. ]However, the database that supports an un-

qualified "yes" response is very substantial. (p. 1)

The new physics "posits both individual particles and wave-like patterns of probabilities of inter- connectedness," reversing the "Cartesian notion that the world is comprised of independent parts" (Johnson, 1999, p. 160). Physicist Capra (1983) argued that quantum and relativity theories share ontology with mystics throughout history.

The reconsideration of spirituality in light of the entrance of marginalized Others into the ongoing conversation about learning, knowledge, language, literacy, and sociopolitical processes, I believe, will become a significant dimension of

343

the paradigm shift in the human and social sciences that revolutionizes the way we view mind, language, epistemology, and learning. It will affect how we think about learning languages and cultures and the values we hold in relation to lo-

cal/indigenous languages and knowledges, moving us away from instrumentalism towards a gen- uine recognition and appreciation for differing ways of being, learning, teaching, and under-

standing in language teaching. And it will ex-

pand how we think about mind, cognition, and intelligence.

A paradigm shift of the dimensions I have at-

tempted to outline in this article is painful because such shifts shatter the old in the interest of

making room for new growth and new visions. By definition, paradigm shifts question all that we hold dear, all that we have assumed, the theories close to our hearts, the methods we have be- lieved in, the goals we have set for our careers. In this case, normal science which we have taken to be the hallmark of our very technologically oriented (and distorted) society is from here on challenged. It will be a new kind of science that emerges, far more holistic and open than in the

past, integrating more of human experience and understanding than in the past. It will incorporate voices and knowings from the periphery of world power, from standpoints of indigeneity, hybridity, ethnicity, color, gender, and sexual orientation. As noted Nobel laureate (chemis- try) Prigogine commented (as cited in Jantsch 1980; see Prigogine, 1980):

The world is far too rich to be expressed in a single language. Music does not exhaust itself in a se- quence of styles. Equally, the essential aspects of our

experience can never be condensed into a single de-

scription. We have to use many descriptions which are irreducible to each other .... Scientific work consists of selective exploration and not of discovery of a given reality. It consists of the choice of questions which have to be posed. (p. 303)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This revised article was originally presented as an in- vited plenary talk at the Pacific Second Language Re- search Forum (PacSLRF), 5 October 2001, in Hono- lulu, via distance technology. I am indebted to Kandace Knudson, Matthew C. Bronson, and Sarah E. Nielsen for our many significant conversations on the issues and sources in cognitive science and SLA dis- cussed here. I am also grateful to Michele Favreau- Haight, Suzanne Romaine, Kathryn Davis, David Welchman Gegeo, Julia Menard-Warwick, Sally Sieloff Magnan, and three anonymous reviewers, for their

344

helpful comments on an earlier draft. I dedicate this

paper to Charlie (Charlene) J. Sato, in memory of our conversations in 1991 when, while working on our "Discourse Processes in Hawai'i Creole English" project, I first began proposing the ideas developed here, catalyzed by our synergistic, free-ranging, and wonder-

fully electric discussions of mind, language, culture, and epistemology.

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Mind, Language, and Epistemology: Toward a Language Socialization Paradigm for SLA