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Fred ChernoffScience, Progress and Pluralism in the Study of International Relations

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MILLENNIUMJournal of International Studies

Science, Progress andPluralism in the Study ofInternational Relations

Fred ChernoffColgate University

AbstractThe article looks at one of the central arguments of Patrick Jacksons book The Conduct of Enquiry

in International Relations: the attempt to advance methodological pluralism and dialogue among

contending metatheoretical schools of International Relations. The article supports the goal of

pluralism but argues that there is a significant gap in Jacksons support of it and that his version of

pluralism inhibits metatheoretical engagement of different schools of thought. The latter in turn

limits the possibility of progress in the field. The article outlines the missing steps in Jacksonsargument, the way in which he unduly limits the contribution that the philosophy of science can

make to scientific progress and an alternative argument for pluralism that leaves a role for genuine

philosophical engagement and the possibility of progress in IR.

KeywordsMethodological pluralism, philosophy of science, social science enquiry

Patrick Jacksons The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations1offers one of the

most clearly formulated and comprehensive guides to current debates in InternationalRelations (IR) metatheory. The book outlines a range of positions at a very fundamental

level of investigation. It provides an evolutionary history of the positions staked out in

those debates, and an analysis of their presuppositions and implications. The book

makes an effort to explicate some of the abiding differences between proponents of the

contending approaches and to offer a basis for a dialogue between them.

Corresponding author:

Fred Chernoff, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346 USA.

Email: [email protected]

MIL41210.1177/0305829812464405Millennium: Journal of International StudiesChernoff

Forum

1. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (New York: Routledge,

2011).


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Chernoff 347

Professor Suganamis contribution to this forum does a very good job of assessing

Jacksons conceptualisation of his four methodological positions. Rather than add to that

discussion, the present article looks at Jacksons core effort to broaden debate in IR and

advocate dialogue by advancing an argument for pluralism. This article maintains that

Jackson is right about the need for theoretical and methodological pluralism in IR andthat pluralism does not entail that anything goes in terms of methodology. But the

article shows in the first section that Jacksons argument for pluralism has gaps, largely

owing to problems with his discussion of the science debate in IR. This leads to a sub-

stantial underestimation, treated in the second section, of the role and value of philoso-

phy of science for progress in IR debates. Jacksons argument for pluralism leaves all

research traditions insulated from one another, at least insofar as IR scholarship is con-

cerned, an issue that pertains to the possibility of progress in the field, which is discussed

in the third section. The problems noted with Jacksons advocacy of pluralism lead to the

need for a more adequate defence of that view, adumbrated in the fourth section.This article argues that the need for IR scholars to be aware of the presuppositions and

implications of the onto-methodological starting points is much greater than simply to

help ensure that research proceeds within the standards appropriate for that particular

starting point. As the second section stresses, authors should recognise that their theories

are only as justifiable and persuasive as the set of the claims on which they logically rely.

Thus, while IR authors need not write extensively about their philosophical assumptions,

they should understand what those assumptions are, what the alternatives positions are,

and the strengths and weaknesses of those assumptions. Powerful philosophical critiques

of those principles weaken the basis for accepting their theoretical conclusions in thesame way that the conclusions would be undercut by the discovery of deficiencies in any

other assumptions they make, for example, about the reliability of interview subjects

testimony or relevance for their research design of statistical methods they employ.

It should be noted at the outset that Jacksons book is not an empirical study of world

politics; it does not aim to tell us about the role of international institutions or the causes

of war. It is a work in IR metatheory and the philosophy of social science, and as such the

argument can only be evaluated on philosophical standards of cogency and rigor. As

Suganami puts it, the book is not itself a work of science but a contribution to meta-

science concerning world politics.

2

Pluralism Defended by Denying Exclusive Claim to the

Authority of Science to any One Standpoint

The Conduct of Inquiryexamines and compares the consequences of different method-

ologies used in IR. Jackson develops a pair of distinctions that are basic to most contem-

porary debates in the philosophy of the social sciences between the mind-dependent

2. H. Suganami, Meta-Jackson: Rethinking Patrick Thaddeus Jacksons Conduct of Inquiry,Millennium:

Journal of International Studies41, no. 2 (2012): 2. Suganami adds, Jackson dedicates more space to

discussing foundational philosophers and social theorists of the four categories than contemporary IR

scholars who exemplify them (ibid., 2).


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348 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(2)

and mind-independent character of social phenomena and between phenomenalism and

transfactualism. He then employs the notion of a wager to argue that the choice of any

one of the different methodological approaches used in IR is tantamount to the accept-

ance of a particular sort of wager. Jackson seeks to move methodological debates

forward by finding common ground among the various standpoints which will allowhim to resolve the dispute between several approaches, each of which claims for itself,

and denies to the others, the status of being scientific. His strategy involves defining

science in a way that would presumably satisfy theorists no matter which of the four

starting points they adopt, and in a way that qualifies them all as scientific.

Jackson provides an analysis of the science debate in Chapter 1, develops the wager

framework in Chapter 2, surveys each of the standpoints in the four chapters that follow

and finishes the dialogue and pluralism arguments in Chapter 7. The position he develops

in Chapter 1 is that no one definition from the philosophy of science may be used by IR

scholars to delimit the range of legitimate inquiry. After surveying the different defini-tions, he concludes that the only solution that does not presume a non-existent philo-

sophical consensus about the definition of science would be an account that, in effect,

equated science with empirical inquiry designed to produce knowledge.3 He begins

Chapter 2 by reiterating that the discussion in Chapter 1 effectively makes science

equivalent to systematic empirical inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge.4

Jackson ultimately argues, citing Weber, that a broad definition of science is needed,

which can accommodate all four standpoints.5Jackson thus argues that none of the com-

peting positions may justifiably dismiss as illegitimate the other sorts of inquiry and

discourse.

Structure of One Major Argument in Chapter 7

In the final chapter, Jackson ties his discussion of the science debate to his analyses of

the various starting points to develop several conclusions. One of the key arguments is

designed to show the presence of common ground and comparability among the contend-

ing positions, and it proceeds by arguing that none of the standpoints can claim to be

scientific at the expense of the others. Jackson draws important inferences that, as will

be argued later, are not warranted by the discussion of Chapters 16. The structure of theargument in question appears to be the following (with justifications in parentheses):

1. There are four ideal-types of onto-methodological starting points that are used in

IR, each with its own presuppositions and consequences and each instantiated by

IR publications (premise drawn from observation of IR literature and philosophi-

cal analysis of central concepts).

2. There is no consensus in the philosophy of science on how to define science

(empirical observation by surveying philosophy literature).

3. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 19.

4. Ibid., 24.

5. There are small variations in Jacksons statements of the definition. For example, in some cases he

includes the work to improve their extant stock of knowledge (ibid., 3). In Chapter 7, without acknowl-

edging the change, he adds that science must be systematic and public.


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Chernoff 349

3. Many scholars have tried to extract a definition of science by analysing exam-

ples of good science (empirical observation by surveying philosophy of science

debates).

Therefore:

4. It is a mistake, at least for social scientists, to define science by choosing

examples of successful science and extracting from them conclusions about

what makes them good science (inference from 2, 3).

5. IR cannot adopt any definition of science found in the philosophy of science lit-

erature (from 2, 4).

Therefore:

6. The definition of science used by IR scholars should be formulated to accom-

modate what exists in the IR literature (inference from 1, 2, 4, 5).

Therefore:

7. Science should be defined for the purposes of the study of IR as inquiry that is

systematic, public, and produces worldly knowledge or systematic, empirical

inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge (justified by steps 1, 5, 6).

Therefore:

8. All four onto-philosophical starting points fit the definition of science, and the

field of IR should acknowledge all as sufficiently scientific, even though it is

not the case that anything goes (p. 196) (inference from 1, 6, 7).

Step 2 and the Character of Debates in the Philosophy of Science

Step 2 of the argument correctly points out that philosophers do not agree on a singleaccount of science. Jackson refers a number of times to the non-existent consensus,6

which strongly suggests that the argument should be interpreted as placing a good deal

of weight on it. But any use of this observation would benefit from some context. Two

points are particularly relevant.

One point of context is that there is very rarely consensus on the precise best

answers to philosophical questions. The significance of this bit of context is that it

would mean that relying only on consensus philosophical claims is tantamount to

rejecting all use of philosophical claims (see later discussion on the use of this step in

deriving step 7). A second contextual comment is that, despite the differing accounts

6. For example, ibid., 11, 1516, 25.


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of science, there is an enormous amount of agreement among philosophers both on

what does and does not properly count as science, and on which particular scientific

theories are superior to which others. They concur that Newtons, Lavoisiers and

Bohrs theories were advancements over the theories they supplanted.7Disagreement

over cases in the natural sciences is very much at the margins. The major disagree-ments are generally over the best explanations for the vast area of overlap regarding

what is good science.

Step 5 and the Problem of the Consensus Requirement

Step 5 does not follow directly from steps 2 and 3; some further general principle is

required. But a problem arises here because any principle capable of justifying the infer-

ence turns out, upon examination, to be dubious at best.

It is certainly possible to reconstruct Jacksons science argument in ways that differon specifics from the preceding. But however one does it, a general principle is needed

to allow Jackson to move from the observation that there is no consensus science defi-

nition, and the claim that successful examples cannot serve as a basis for a definition, to

the conclusion that it is not justifiable for IR scholars to pick out any philosophers defi-

nition of science to limit legitimate study in IR. Why is it impermissible for an IR theo-

rist to study the philosophical issues pertaining to the starting points, draw conclusions

about what accounts of science are more cogent and defensible than others, and then

argue that her position is stronger than rivals that make use of less cogent philosophical

premises? The argument against permitting the use of any philosophers definition oraccount of science would have to arise from some general principle or rule that justifies

the prohibition. So we ask, what would that general principle look like?

Jackson asks rhetorically, If philosophers of science as a group do not agree on what

science is, what warrant do we have to pluck out one or another position on science?8

The general principle appears to be something like the following: if there is no consensus

on a philosophical principle or definition, then it may not legitimately be cited in an

argument by an IR author.9

In whatever way one chooses to formulate this suppressed major premise, if it is

strong enough to allow the move from 2 and 3 to 5, then it runs into trouble on severalfronts, which are discussed later in connection with the definition of science in step 7.

At this point, we note only that Jackson criticises plucking a definition of science from

philosophers, but he then appears to violate the ban when he offers a definition of sci-

ence drawn from Weber. This is, at least on the surface, a clear contradiction of the state-

ment that IR cannot state what is and is not acceptable scholarship by citing a philosophers

definition of science.

7. See, for example, Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding,Journal of Philosophy

71 (1974): 519. Philosophers are more likely to reach consensus on the failure of a doctrine. The positive

role that the philosophy of science can play in IR is discussed more fully in the third section.

8. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 25; see also statements of it at 11, 1516.

9. This is a conservatively stated version, since there is no obvious reason why the justifying generalisation

would be acceptable if confined only to the use of claims from philosophy and only to their use by IR

researchers.


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Chernoff 351

Furthermore, Jackson relies on a number of other non-consensus metatheoretical

principles and claims, beyond the definition of science. He approvingly cites metatheo-

retical arguments by a number of authors, including Weber, Taylor and myself, even

though there is no consensus on any of those views. One crucial example is Jacksons

acceptance, without discussion, of the factvalue distinction.10The debate on this is vastwithin philosophy and it is disputed by a wide array of IR theorists and philosophers,

some of whom Jackson cites on other matters.11Another important example is his accept-

ance of Kuhns analysis of scientific language,12a view that is far from a consensus in

the philosophy of science.

Step 6

Jacksons basis for his definition is that all four sorts of standpoints are used extensively

in IR publications and IR should operate under a big tent. Accordingly, the definitionshould be tailored to fit what in fact exists in the field (step 6). This essentially substi-

tutes existing IR scholarship with scientific IR. But not everyone who publishes IR

work claims to be doing science. And those who claim to be doing scientific work

mean that they are doing something that has at least some significant features in com-

mon with what natural scientists do; they do not merely mean that they are doing sci-

ence in the sense that their sort of work is publishable in IR journals. In the debate over

science, all parties use the term to refer to a form of inquiry that associates the social

sciences with what the natural sciences do and to separate it from what is generally

regarded as pseudo-science.

Step 7

As just noted, Jackson repeatedly states that there is no consensus on the definition of

science and holds that it is impermissible for IR authors to invoke a definition of sci-

ence to support their positions. The general principle that would justify this inference

appears to be questionable. And, Jackson appears to violate it when he presents his own

Weberian definition, according to which science is systematic, empirical inquiry

designed to produce factual knowledge. Is there a way to see Jacksons use of his defini-tion as remaining consistent with the general principle discussed earlier that is needed to

justify the inference to step 5?

10. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 21. Nicolas Onuf, Worlds of our Making: The Strange Career of

Constructivism in International Relations, in Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic

Field, ed. D.J. Puchala (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 11941.

11. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science(London: Routledge, 1958), 1114; see also Charles Taylor,

Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, inPhilosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), II, 1557, and Alastair MacIntyres commentary on

Winch, The Idea of a Social Science,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes.

V. 41 (1967): 95114. Other ways in which Jackson underestimates the role of the philosophy of science

are discussed later.



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There are at least two responses to the charge of inconsistency. One is that Jackson is

not merely plucking Webers definition but is offering a justification for it. However, the

other conceptions of scientific knowledge that we find presented by IR authors are

often supported by equally extensive arguments. So the mere existence of a defense is

not enough. A second retort is that Jacksons definition is better because his supportingargument is more cogent and his definition is broader, thus conferring legitimacy upon a

range of work that would be excluded by other definitions. This reply would open up

debate by recognising that philosophical definitions are in principle legitimate, and

thereby alter what appears to be the direction of Jacksons argument. Secondly, it would

require a fuller comparison of Jacksons definition to the others on a range of criteria,

which might well bring out shortcomings of Jacksons definition, even with regard to

breadth. For example, those social scientists who reject the factvalue distinction may

well argue that Jacksons definition is not broad enough, as it excludes moral-normative

content that should qualify as science.13And at the same time it might confer scientificstatus on approaches that should not be so regarded, since it would appear to count astro-

logical theories of IR, which fulfil all of Jacksons conditions.14

The Role of the Philosophy of Science in IR and Social

Science Inquiry

Jacksons view of the lack of interaction of the onto-methodological standpoints imposes

limits on the role of the philosophy of science, discussed in this section, and on the pos-

sibility of progress in IR, discussed in the next section. In my view, the philosophy ofscience has a much greater and a more complex role to play in IR debates than Jackson

envisions. It is important to emphasise at the outset, though, that the analysis here does

not interpret Jackson as claiming that philosophy of science is incapable of valuable

work, but only as claiming that arguments and developments in the philosophy of sci-

ence cannot be applied by IR scholars for the purpose of arguing for the advantages of

one theory over another.

To begin with, philosophy of science debates have a bearing on the philosophy of science

principles one adopts as a grounding for IR and social science research. While Jackson says

that one must make choices between the two sets of options, he offers little hope of anyrational progress on how to choose one among them, that is, on how to decide on the best

pair of wagers. Presumably, one should not adopt one of Jacksons four standpoints by flip-

ping a coin, but his analysis does not leave room for rational alternatives. In my view,

13. David Thomas defends naturalism compatible with a value-laden social science. He draws on post-

empiricist philosophy of science to defend the view that social study must be evaluative. The argument,

as he presents it, depends on three premises. The statements of social theory are underdetermined

by the social world. Values act as an extra criterion of theory choice in social study. [And] The

significance of valuations for social study, from the point of view of both truth-judgments and meaning-

relations, cannot be segregated in any specific area of social theory.Naturalism and Social Science: A

Post-empiricist Philosophy of Social Science(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 137.

14. Many astrologers work on statistical associations and propound empirical generalisations. All in this cat-

egory are engaged in systematic, empirical, public inquiry that is designed to produce factual knowledge.


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Chernoff 353

rational grounds are available for a researchers choice of one or another onto-philosophical

position. The grounds are found in the philosophy of science and the empirical study of IR

and social science theories that perform well. The evaluation is based on various theoretical

and practical criteria, even though the principles that justify such criteria are fallible.

Jacksons view concurs with my own on at least three major points. Firstly, founda-tional positions drawn from the philosophy of science do not tell us which specific IR

theory or policy is better than all rivals, even though such positions play an essential role

in IR scholarship. In the process of defending a theoretical or empirical conclusion in IR,

one must rely, implicitly or explicitly, on a range of foundational propositions. Secondly,

the commitments to most foundational propositions are almost always unstated in IR

scholarship. Among the claims in metaphysics are those concerning the nature of truth

and causation; among those in ontology are those regarding what is taken to be real, and

whether there is a world of entia that exists independently of any individuals concept of

them; among those in epistemology are those regarding what is taken to count as knowl-edge; and among the methodological premises, which may be shaped by those of step 1,

are those concerning the legitimate forms of observation and generalisation. And, thirdly,

the fact that foundational statements are often unstated and unacknowledged, and pos-

sibly unknown to the author herself in any explicit or conscious way, does not remove the

logical reliance of the conclusion on such statements. Still, a philosophy of science posi-

tion, whether implicit or explicit, is only one element of an argument.

An argument for an IR theory, T, would typically rely on different sorts of premises,

which may be summarised in the following schema:

Schema

1. P (metaphysical/epistemological claims typically suppressed in IR publications)

2. Q (methodological claims sometimes suppressed in IR publications)

3. R (defence of research design)

4. S (empirical evidence)

Therefore

5. T

With the above points of agreement clarified, it is now possible to summarise my

view of the role of the philosophy of science. The following subsections will discuss: (1)

what makes one IR argument stronger than alternatives; (2) the difference between sup-

porting foundations and foundational theories of knowledge; (3) rhetorical strategies

for advancing a position in scholarly debates; and (4) the possibility of a rational basis

for choosing a starting point.

Strength and Vulnerability of Arguments

When a scholar defends an IR theory, T, the persuasive strength of the argument for T

will depend on the quality of the research design, the nature of the evidence, the strength

of the alternative theories and so on, but also, as noted, on foundational propositions of

premise 1-type. The foundational principles constitute implicit premises in the argument


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for T. A valid argument may have a false conclusion if one or more of the premises is

false. A sound argument is by definition a valid argument with true premises; the conclu-

sions of such arguments are always true. The truth of the premises of two sound argu-

ments may not be equally plausible on the surface (without support) and thus may not be

equally likely to persuade a given audience. The persuasive power of a valid argumentdepends upon how credible and how well supported the premises are. For example, since

empirical observations, coding of cases and a research design are typically part of the

overall argument for a conclusion, an author wants to show that the observations are

accurate, the coding is reliable and the research design is appropriate.

One argument is more persuasive than another if it is harder to prove that within the

premises set, call it set K, there is a false statement. Given any two valid arguments, the

stronger and more persuasive argument is the one that has the more minimal premise

set, where minimal is understood as asserting less or having less content. A premise

set K asserts less than K if K is consistent with a greater range of other statements thanis K. The greater the range of other statements that is consistent with K, the harder it is

to prove K false. That is, the less the content of the premises, the harder it is to prove the

premises untrue. If someone advances an IR argument that relies on methods consistent

with a range of philosophers, such as Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper and Quine (i.e. any of those

philosophers or their followers will accept the starting point), it will be less vulnerable

and thus more persuasive than an argument that requires a stronger, or more specific, set

of premises, for example, that Kuhn is right and the others wrong.15To cite an extreme

example, consider the following pair of propositions that state both mechanisms and

outcomes: Democratic dyads have greater structural constraints on crisis escalation thanother sorts of dyads, which leads them to be less war-prone than other types of dyads and

The political institutions realised through the unfolding of Absolute Spirit will exhibit

perfection. The former is compatible with a wider range of premise 1-type principles;

the latter would be accepted only by Hegelian Idealists.16

Research proceeds by means of comparisons of competing theories. The strength of

the argument for any theory is a function of the evaluation of steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 in

schema . It is a mistake to exclude appraisals of any of them because the grounds may

not be indubitable or absolutely certain. Indeed, the grounds for appraising philosophical

premises of step 1 in schema are fallible, just as is the case for the grounds for apprais-ing methodological and research design premises 24 in schema . Because there is no

requirement of certainty placed on the grounds for supporting premises 24, it would

be entirely inconsistent to require certainty for evidence for step 1-type premises.

For example, if a theoretical argument relied on a step 2-type methodological perspec-

tive that presumed the Logical Positivists verification principle, then it is hard to see why

Jackson would say that the powerful philosophical criticisms in the mid-20th century of

Logical Positivism and the verification principle would not lessen the persuasiveness of

15. Data-gathering publications are part of any science. In IR publications of an empirical/descriptive nature,

for example, dealing with treaties, cables and so on, the authors can avoid commitment to anything even

as specific as one of Jacksons philosophical standpoints.

16. Will Dudley, Introduction, in Hegel and History, ed. Dudley (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 114,

esp. 12.


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Chernoff 355

the theoretical conclusion. Similarly, suppose that the philosophical (step 1) premise of a

theory included reliance on (the verification-related view of) phenomenalism, as philoso-

phers use the term. It would be an unjustifiable limitation on the comparative evaluation

of such a theory to ignore the fact that nearly all philosophers abandoned phenomenalism

following Chisholms devastating critique of that doctrine in the 1940s and 1950s.17

Foundations Do Not Depend upon Foundationalism

It is worth remembering at this juncture that when we speak of foundations for a con-

clusion, the reference is only to the development of a logical argument. There is no pre-

sumption of acceptance of a foundationalist theory of knowledge, which is the view

that an edifice of truth can be erected on a foundation of certainty. This view is rejected

by many social scientists. But this should not incline anyone to hesitate to accept the

need for foundations in the natural or social sciences. Foundations for conclusions donot imply indubitability or certainty and do not require adoption of the specific doctrine

of foundationalism in the theory of knowledge. Elsewhere, I explicate these two very

distinct concepts and point out the serious error that results from confusing them.18

The metaphor of foundations of an edifice illuminates the concept of rational or

rhetorical foundations without requiring certainty, since a buildings foundations, how-

ever much they may add to the strength of the superstructure, are not completely invul-

nerable. Foundations which are flawed in the sense that they are not the best currently

available as compared with what a builder with unlimited resources could supply may

still render the building more secure than it would be without any foundation. Moreover,even if the foundations are the best available, they may erode over time. There is nothing

in the notion of the foundation of a building that would lead us to expect that they must

render the superstructure invulnerable to any and all assaults. Hence, the metaphor of

providing a foundation for a natural or social science theory should carry no presumption

of indubitability or apodictic certainty.

Choosing a Winning Strategy

All works of scholarship seek to provide firmer grounds for the audience to accept a con-clusion, whether it is a work of economics, physics or IR. The scholarly work must pro-

vide a way of persuading the audience that the conclusion is true. There are always many

rhetorical strategy paths to this destination. An effective strategy will take into account,

among other things, the character of the audience. The author seeks the most powerful

method of persuasion that leaves the fewest points of vulnerability open to criticism.

How much attention should be paid by IR scholars to philosophical questions like

those Jackson raises? Because works of IR theory must rely on propositions of many

sorts (as in schema ), ones chosen rhetorical strategy will influence which among the

17. See, for example, Roderick Chisholm, The Problem of Empiricism,Journal of Philosophy45 (1948):

51217; andPerceiving(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957).

18. See Chernoff, Defending Foundations for International Relations Theory,International Theory1, no. 3

(2009): 46677.


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various (foundational, theoretical and empirical) statements should receive explicit

attention, which may be left unstated and how far the author should go to defend each of

those that are explicitly identified. The choice of a rhetorical strategy is in turn partially

shaped in part by the particular target audience. For one sort of audience, one set of

claims may be left unsupported because the audience would be unlikely to questionthem, and thus unlikely to see them as points of vulnerability in the argument, while for

another audience, those statements would require support.

If an author wants to defend a particular explanatory claim on an IR question, the

amount of attention that should be paid to any of the sorts of premises identified in

schema will depend on what the audience accepts before reading the piece. The author

of a statistically oriented article is committed to the claim that statistical models have, for

example, explanatory power, and she should ideally be able to defend it, though depend-

ing on the journal, it may be unnecessary to do so in a particular article. Readers of

British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly and AmericanPolitical Science Reviewgenerally accept the value of statistical tests before picking up

the latest issue of the journal. So it would be strategically inefficient for the author of a

statistical article in one of those journals to launch into a defence of the explanatory

value of statistical modelling when that space could be used for a fuller defence of the

research design, specific modelling techniques, coding procedures, data sources and so

on. In contrast, the reader of an article published in Review of International Studies,

International Theoryor the present journal would be more likely to question the value of

statistical models as explanatory tools, and at least some space might be devoted to a

metatheoretical defence of statistical methods in the philosophy of social science, andhow statistical models are better than others for the problem at hand.19

An author should have an idea of how to present a defence of her position, which

includes a defence of premises on all levels in schema . But in a publication, she should

muster the most powerful arguments for the types of premises that are most likely to be

challenged by the target audience. Waltzs Theory of International Politics20had such a

major impact on IR debates in part because of the concise nature of the theory and in part

because of the careful way Waltz uses the opening chapter to specify the naturalist, empir-

icist and instrumentalist foundational positions he holds. Of course, for those who reject

his foundational principles, the argument that follows has reduced persuasive force.Because Theory of International Politicsis a work of IR theory, Waltz does not offer

a defence of those foundational views. His audience can be persuaded to some extent by

his statement of the empiricist metatheoretical principles, but that audience did not

expect or require a philosophical defence of those principles. A defence would have been

appropriate, and perhaps necessary, had the book been primarily a work in the philoso-

phy of social science or IR meta-theory. What Waltz does, rather, is to state his position

on foundational questions in a way that lends support to the theory he defends and that

19. In a recent paper, Helen Turton surveys the nature of the articles published in a dozen US and European

journals of IR and shows the sharp differences in methodologies typical in them. See Helen Turton, A

Dearth of Data: A Critical Realist Solution (paper presented to BISA workshop, McGill University,

March 2011).

20. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).


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Chernoff 357

forecloses certain sorts of objections one might level (e.g. that structures are not real

enough to be the key focus of analysis for an IR theory). Waltz then proceeds to offer

positive arguments for his theory and negative arguments against rival IR theories, but

not against rival philosophical starting points. For the sort of work he was publishing and

for the target IR audience, Waltz chose an effective and appropriate rhetorical strategy.One might lament that the need to take into account the nature of the intended audi-

ence in choosing what to foreground in a rhetorical strategy is a pitiable feature of impre-

cise fields like IR or dubious social-scientific enterprises like political science, and thus

highlights yet another dimension of social sciences inferiority to natural science.

However, as just mentioned, the same holds true for works in physics, mathematics and

the like. Mathematics would seem to be the hard case for the claim that audience rele-

vance affects rhetorical strategy and the level of persuasiveness. Consider that when it

comes to how proofs are formulated, authors of articles in journals of mathematics and

formal logic skip the steps that are obvious to their journal-reading peers, even thoughthey might well include those steps for a different audience, for example, readers of a

textbook or an audience in a classroom lecture. More to the point of how mathematicians

deal with foundational questions in different contexts, today, authors who publish in

leading academic journals employ indirect proof without justification of that method.

However, there are certain times and places where a mathematician may not want to rely

on reductio proof without comment. For example, after Browers intuitionist attacks in

the 1920s on the law of excluded middle, and by implication doubts be raised about the

validity of indirect proof, a mathematician who employed that strategy, especially soon

after Browers publications, may have considered it rhetorically advantageous to devoteat least some space to defending indirect proof.

To return to the discussion of the persuasive strength of arguments, we note that since

foundational positions are typically not defended in IR works, it is a wiser rhetorical

strategy to make foundational assumptions that are consistent with more philosophical-

foundational doctrines. The wider the range of possible foundational positions that is

consistent with the authors method and theory, the less attention she needs to devote to

defending foundations. It is harder for an opponent to disprove (a disjunction of) a wide

range of foundational doctrines than to disprove a specific one. But if the theory requires

a very specific and less widely accepted set of views in philosophy of social science, thenit may be strategically wise to allot some attention to the most limiting and controversial

foundational principles and to give some indication of how they are best substantiated.

This is the same tactic an author would use for any empirical, methodological or theoreti-

cal claim; the more unfamiliar and apparently dubious a claim may appear to the target

audience, the more useful it will be for the author to devote explicit support for the

claims.

A strong argument makes use of as few premises and assumptions as is possible. To

argue for an IR theory does not always require the author to declare herself, for example,

a Popperian who opposes Lakatos, Kuhn and Latour. If the research design and argument

can be formulated in a way that is consistent with all of them (as virtually all natural sci-

ence research is), then one should avoid endorsing Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn or Latour

specifically. The goal of research is to get the best answers, and the goal of formulating

arguments for ones conclusions is to persuade the target audience.


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Rational Grounds for Starting Points

While Jackson and I agree that IR scholarship commits authors to philosophical princi-

ples, we differ greatly on the ability to choose principles rationally and on how much

such choices limit the power of the IR scholarship that rests upon them. As this and theprevious subsection argues, my view is that the nature and extentof the philosophical

commitments of different IR authors may be very different from one another because

there are substantial variations in the breadth-versus-specificity of the commitments a

particular theoretical argument may require. Since not all wagers or philosophical com-

mitments are equally sweeping, it follows that not all are equally limiting of the audience

that will have to accept each step leading up to the termination of the argument. For many

sorts of IR research, only minimal philosophical assumptions need be made to state the

propositions and to justify the methods of study. For others, much more needs to be

included in premise set P (in step 1) of schema .An author should understand the set of presuppositions and assumptions that are

implicit in a work of scholarship and should be able to defend them. But she need not do

so explicitly in any particular published work. Which assumptions or premises receive

explicit support depends on the authors understanding of the intended audience. And the

authors acceptance of one or another set of philosophical principles that ground the

methods of study need not and should not be a matter of fiat. An understanding of philo-

sophical and methodological debates should inform the authors position. This is not to

say that all authors will choose the one best position in the philosophy of science. There

is room for disagreement. But the points accepted by each side should be grounded in

rational discourse and should not be a matter of religious faith even if Jackson is right

that methodological positions are often treatedin that way by their adherents. If IR is to

be a rational and intellectual enterprise, more dialogue is needed than merely the respect-

ful conversations in which no change of beliefs are in the offing.21

Jackson correctly states that IR requires certain philosophical commitments. He

argues further that the philosophical debates do not produce consensus on science (or

other philosophical questions), and then infers that it is impossible for IR scholars to

know which philosophical positions are correct. He concludes that it is best to move to

post-foundational IR. Scholars should pick a set of philosophical principles, be explicit

about those choices and use them consistently to guide research methodologies. But onsuch a view, we cannot know if we have picked wisely or unwisely (or even extremely

foolishly). This undercuts the notion that good philosophical arguments can advance

natural or social science knowledge.

Philosophical developments are not irrelevant to progress in science. Consider, for

example, how critiques of Newtons concepts of absolute time and absolute space by

21. Jackson adds the public condition to his account of science. This is added to his claim that since all

`science produces worldly facts. He argues as well that there should be cross-disciplinary dialogue and a

resultant possibility of progress in our knowledge of the international. But it is hard to see how this argu-

ment can be made compatible with his clearly stated account of what each scholarly research tradition

in IR can do within itself and cannot do with the others, which is to evaluate results. So the addition of

public-ness does not help to increase the sort of all-discipline dialogue and cross-checking of results that

Jackson lauds in Chapter 7.


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Chernoff 359

philosophers like Leibniz had a role in the development of modern relativistic theories.

And consider how Duhems principle of underdetermination of theory by data has aided

the understanding of what scientific experiments can and cannot establish.22The list goes

on. Since Jackson and others discount the value of philosophy and treat it as a sort of

debating arena in which no progress is made that could be applied to the social sciences,they would have difficulty explaining how arguments in metaphysics and the theory of

knowledge can have had such important effects on scientific progress in physics and

astronomy. Jacksons view eliminates the chances for such philosophical arguments to

aid the advancement of IR in a similar way.

A related puzzle for Jacksons view is that social scientists occasionally change

their methodological orientations. Is this always a process that is outside of the domain

of the rational, essentially a religious conversion? It seems reasonable to conjecture

(though an empirical study would be intriguing) that the changes in social scientists

methodological orientations stem, in at least some cases, from philosophical dialogueand study of the works of philosophers of science or IR authors who write about

metatheory like Cox, Dessler, Lebow, Little, Wendt and Wight. This is the sort of dis-

course that books like the Conduct of Inquirypromotes. Even new observations can

lead to rationally grounded shifts in the philosophical foundations of ones preferred

theory. For example, while we have noted examples of philosophical ideas affecting

scientific theory, we note also that developments in 20th-century physics led a number

of philosophers of natural science to abandon some of their philosophical views, like

thorough going phenomenalism.

Jackson understates what philosophy of science can contribute to IR, since he doesnot see philosophical arguments as able to strengthen substantive theories. He sees them

only as able to create commitments or wagers, which may differ from various other

authors commitments or wagers. But the philosophy of science can add (or subtract)

force to various starting points, as I have tried to show in The Power of International

Theory.All starting points are not equal in terms of their ability to strengthen the case for

an IR theory.

Progress in the Study of IR

In order for the field of IR to advance, there needs to be considerable improvement

in the relationship between the study of metatheory on which Jackson focuses and

22. Even though Duhem was a physicist and Leibniz was a mathematician and natural philosopher, the

principles just cited were clearly the sort of arguments that we would classify as epistemological; see

Samuel Clarke, The LeibnizClarke Correspondence (Notes and Introduction by H.G. Alexander;

Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956); and Chernoff, Leibnizs Principle of the Identity of

Indiscernibles,Philosophical Quarterly31 (1981): 12638. E.A. Burtt sees the effect in a similar way.

He says that Newton gave new meanings to the old terms space, time and motion. In so doing, Newtonwas constituting himself as a philosopher rather than a scientist as we now distinguish them. These meta-

physical notions were carried wherever his scientific influence penetrated. E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical

Foundations of Modern Physical Science(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1925), 20. See

also Thomas,Naturalism in Social Science, 140.


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the study of substantive empirical and normative IR. I have argued elsewhere that

progress in IR, especially on empirical questions, is possible. My conclusion is based

on the claim that progress has, in fact, occurred. Without taking sides on how to

define scientific progress, I have examined the definitions advanced by five of the

most influential philosophers of science of the past century and a half, and showedthat there is at least one area of IR study, the democratic peace debate, that satisfies

all of their necessary conditions. I explained, based on the causal conventionalist

position that I have advocated, just what it is about that debate that enabled it to

achieve that success.23

Jackson uses the science argument to promote dialogue across methodologies. He

says the result of his efforts is a lexicon within which we can, as a field, have a

number of philosophically richer and logically more coherent contentious discussions

about world politics.24 If what constitutes valid knowledge can only be settled

according to the standards internal to that methodology,25it becomes unclear whatthe dialogue is to be about. This concern is deepened by Jackson choosing to open the

final chapter with a comparison between the debate over science in IR and the typi-

cal debates between adherents of different religions in which each claims to have a

monopoly on Truth. While Jackson acknowledges that the two are not the same in all

respects, he cites a long list of parallels. Dialogue can be respectful but the intellec-

tual progress to be achieved is very limited. Indeed, the main common ground indi-

cated by this approach is the simple, let us agree to disagree. In his view, progress is

possible withineach starting point, but it will remain internal to each, and each will

proceed on non-intersecting tracks. This does not seem to be consistent with the factthat philosophical developments have had an impact in advancing dialogue across

starting points. For example, refutations of Logical Positivism noted earlier did have,

and should properly have had, an effect on what fields outside of philosophy consid-

ered superior forms of inquiry.

Progress requires recognising the importance of the philosophy of science and the

need to emphasise good philosophical foundations and avoid weak ones. As the previous

section attempted to show, there is simply no way for social scientists to get around the

fact that their theories rely on various philosophical principles; Jackson acknowledges

this much. But further, the strength of those theories relies on the merits of the philo-sophical principles. One sometimes encounters policy advocates who dismiss IR theory,

claiming that their policy prescriptions are not soiled by any connection to it. But they

are always wrong about this. Any policy prescription requires, implicitly or explicitly,

various causal claims of the form: doing X under circumstances C will (usually or some-

times) result in Y, the desired policy outcome. There is no way around reliance on

(causal) IR theory for policy prescriptions. The desire to avoid theory is understandable

for the practical-minded, given the presence of so many controversies in IR theory, but

23 See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 6; and The Study

of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations, International Studies Review6 (2004):

4977.


25. Ibid., 191.


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Chernoff 361

the goal is a chimera. In the same way, some IR theorists claim that metatheory and the

philosophy of social science can be avoided. The desire is, again, understandable but the

goal is equally unattainable.26

How is the progress lauded at the outset of this section, and the rebalancing of philo-

sophical and substantive material, to be achieved? Two necessary conditions are that IRscholars be made aware of the unavoidable reliance of empirical and normative IR upon

various sorts of philosophical principles, as the previous section illustrated, and that IR

scholars be trained more satisfactorily in the foundational questions they must ask, and

in the strengths and weaknesses of the contending answers. At a recent conference, an

audience member asked participants on a methodology panel what balance of readings

each thought, ideal for a one-semester graduate-level IR methodology course. After a

moments thought, I was ready, when my turn came, to take a pro-philosophy hard line

by suggesting at least one-third. Before I had a chance to deliver my answer, a co-panel-

list, a distinguished empirical researcher who was then ISA president, outbid me by say-ing it should be at least half. That is one concrete suggestion. The study of the philosophy

of social science cannot displace the study of IR; but since IR conclusions do depend on

certain philosophical claims, IR scholars should be aware of the connection and the

power of various doctrines.

Pluralism May also Be Supported by Question-Driven IR

Research

One of the chief objectives of The Conduct of Inquiryis to advance methodological plu-ralism, a position that I believe is entirely correct. However, because of the difficulties in

his argument, described earlier, it is important to seek more effective and defensible

ways to support the sort of pluralism Jackson endorses. Jackson makes his case by defin-

ing each category of IR research as a type of science. I have defended pluralism in a

different way, by arguing: (1) that the various forms of theorising published in IR jour-

nals, while perhaps not science, must at least be regarded as legitimate IR scholarship;

(2) that the best and most appropriate methods and methodologies are a function of the

sorts of questions those works seek to answer; (3) that there are different kinds of ques-

tions asked about IR; (4) that different kinds of questions are best answered by differentsorts of methods, which are grounded in different philosophical principles;27and (5) that

there is no available theory that shows the superiority of one methodology in handling

26. Jackson is not the only one to attempt to defend ones philosophical foundational claims in IR; see, for

example, Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven G. Ruby, IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations,

International Theory1, no. 1 (2009): 1548, and my reply Defending Foundations for International

Relations Theory.

27. Jackson finds it curious that IR is organised along the lines of substantive topics rather than along con-

ceptual or philosophical lines (Conduct of Inquiry, 39). In contrast, I would regard it as odd if a field,

especially an interdisciplinary field, like IR, should not have been organised along substantive lines. The

field is defined by subject matter events and processes that cross the borders of states, nations and socie-

ties and the ways to develop and evaluate theories should clearly be question-driven.


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the wide range of kinds of questions posed in IR to the point of successfully degrading

all others as illegitimate forms of IR.28

Why should someone pursue the study of IR? People in fact do it for various reasons

to answer questions based on their desire to understand the workings of international

politics, to produce cause-and-effect principles that will allow policy formation to reduceviolence, to produce principles that will enable their government to rule the world, to

publish works that will earn them royalties or enhance promotion chances, to name a

few. Obviously, there is no one right or best reason to study world politics. These vari-

ous motivations stimulate different sorts of questions, such as: why did X happen? What

is the best explanation for X? What can we know about what happened (or what patterns

can be found in interstate behaviour)?29Which side was right in that conflict? What is

likely to happen under condition Y? And the scholar seeks answers.

The diverse reasons to study IR relate to the wide range of questions scholars ask. A

more powerful argument for pluralism can be based on the observation that the study ofIR is driven by the questions scholars pose, and the range of types of questions they pose

is wide. As I have argued, IR research is question-driven and there is no available argu-

ment to counter this claim. In The Power of International Theory, I argue, along these

lines, that there are very different kinds of questions that are legitimately asked in the IR

literature. All deal properly with social processes, events and phenomena across the bor-

ders of states, nations and societies. The position I develop there may be summarised as

follows.

The methodological pluralism advocated in this study not only finds room for both to co-exist,but emphasises the positive need for both sorts of theories. One of the bases of the methodological

pluralism here is the recognition of the wide array of questions asked by scholars.30

The book offers examples of questions that are legitimately within the domain of

IR, such as: are bipolar systems more stable than multipolar systems? Was the US

nuclear alert in 1973 aimed at enhancing military readiness or a warning to Brezhnev?

Are preventative wars ever morally justifiable? Respected IR journals and presses pub-

lish the works of scholars seeking to answer these and similar questions. But the kinds

of methods appropriate for pursuing answers to them are highly divergent. Empirical

and statistical methods are appropriate, perhaps among others, for answering the first

question; interpretative methods are appropriate for the second; and moral-normative

methods of argument are appropriate for the third.31

28. See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory; and Methodological Pluralism and the Limits of

Positivism in the Study of Politics, in Theory and Evidence, eds Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Lichbach

(New York: Palgrave, 2007), 10741. Because of space limitations, only a rough outline of the argument

is presented here.

29. See Gary Goertz, Descriptive-Causal Generalizations: Empirical Laws in the Social Sciences?, in The

Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science, ed. Harold Kincaild (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2012), 85108.

30. Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, 25.

31. These, interestingly, correspond to the three types of questions Suganami identifies (Meta-Jackson, 17).

Suganami argues the differences between the IR schools that Jackson identifies are better understood by

reference to the different types of questions that they pose.


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Chernoff 363

While many authors advocate methodological pluralism, most advocates have little

tolerance for empiricist methodology, which is employed in most IR publications. It is

interesting to note, firstly, that according to the recent TRIP survey, more IR academics,

even in the US, self-identify as constructivists than realists,32and, secondly that while

the US journals publish a great deal of empirical work, books and articles on meta-theoryare nevertheless dominated by opponents of empiricism and positivism. In this climate,

my book, The Power of International Theory, deals with methodological pluralism by

defending also empiricist methods against the array of interpretivist and post-structural

attacks often found in IR organs.33

Complexity, Inconvenience and Messiness

The social world is very complex and has manifold dimensions. Different kinds of ques-

tions may be asked and different kinds of methods of study are appropriate to answerthem. A plurality of methods is essential, and Jackson is right to support this stance. He

is right also to say that the best arguments are to be judged by the standards of a particular

methodology. But he does not leave room for assessing the methodologies themselves.

He is wrong to conclude that post-foundational IR is the solution and all four sorts of

standpoints on social knowledge should be accepted as wagers whose pay-off is unknow-

able.34The social world is too complex for scholars to have confidence that one method

is right, and, for that matter, to have as much confidence in grand, sweeping philosophi-

cal claims as in more modest claims. As I have argued:

There is no single, unified IR or social-science field equation into which all must ultimately

be made to fit, though there are some specific forms of reasoning that are applicable to all.

32. Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney, TRIP around the World: Teaching, Research,

and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries.Available at: http://irtheoryandprac-

tice.wm.edu/projects/trip/TRIPAroundTheWorld2011.pdf. Constructivism, realism and liberalism were

the self-described approaches by 22%, 16% and 15%, respectively.

33. See Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, esp. 25, 21617. Suganamis article also identifies dif-

ferences in the types of questions IR scholars pose and he argues that this difference is a more significant

one dividing groups of IR scholars than Jacksons distinction between Z and Y.

34. Jackson does not discuss the extensive literature on the applicability of the notion of the wager to

science and knowledge. It plays a central role in subjectivism in philosophical studies of probability

developed by DeFinetti, in Bayesian epistemology generally, in the theory of knowledge developed by

Isaac Levi in his classic Gambling with Truth, and subsequent works. Secondly, one might question

whether accepting the consequences of a methodological position bears any resemblance to making a

wager. For example, since the answer to the question Which is the best starting point? is unknowable

for IR theorists, according to Jackson, one might ask whether thepresuppositionsof the wager analogy

apply. While Jackson scrutinizes the presuppositions of various starting points, he offers no analysis of

the presuppositions of his own framework. Space limitations prevent a fuller discussion here. See, for

example, Bruno DeFinetti, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources (translation of the 1937

article in French) in Studies in Subjective Probability, eds H.E. Kyburg and H.E. Smokler (New York:

Wiley, 1964); Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967; London: Routledge

& Kegan Paul, 1967) and The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability,

and Chance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); and H. Leitgeb and R. Pettigrew, An Objective

Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy,Philosophy of Science77 (2010): 20135.


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Because the social world is complex and multifaceted, even questions about a possible war

between the US and North Korea yields questions that, though related, sometimes require

orthogonal and cross-cutting theoretical approaches and methods.35

Jackson acknowledges complexity and supports methodological pluralism, buthis argument is based on his assessment of science in IR, and it is not, as stated,

persuasive.

This argument relies on premises concerning the fact that IR scholarship includes a

diverse range of questions posed and concerning the diversity of methods appropriate to

answer those questions. These premises are compatible with a wider range of philosophi-

cal and methodological doctrines than Jacksons argument for pluralism in The Conduct

of Inquiry. Based on the standard developed earlier, this argument would appear to be a

stronger one than Jacksons.

Conclusion

The Conduct of Inquiryis an ambitious work that fulfils a number of important functions,

particularly in formulating a valuable typology of philosophical starting points for IR dis-

course and in clarifying some of their presuppositions and implications. This article has

argued that Jacksons attempt to advance dialogue and progress in IR through advocacy of

methodological pluralism encounters several problems. One is that there are gaps in his

argument for pluralism, and another is that Jackson sees the starting points as largely taken

on faith, which means there are strict limits on genuine exchanges between the groups.With regard to the argument for pluralism, Jackson argues that definitions of science

cannot be imported from the philosophy of science, but he then uses just such a definition

to draw a set of boundaries of science. While it is true that the boundaries Jackson draws

are wider than most, that feature does not qualify his account as superior. The argument

that maximum breadth is imperative relies on the general rejection of philosophical prop-

ositions on which there is no consensus, a general claim that is difficult to justify. 36

Determining whether or not the Weberian definition is better would require a comparison

on a number of dimensions beyond breadth. Jacksons argument for pluralism depends

35. Chernoff, The Power of International Theory, 20. This predictive superiority of multiple and limited

theories, as against all-encompassing theories overarching principles, is supported by the empirical tests

of Philip Tetlock,Expert Political Judgment(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); he argues

that foxes with smaller-scale hypotheses and frequent updates on belief sets predict much better than

hedgehogs who emphasise grand generalisations.

36. The requirement that consensus or certainty is needed for an author to make use of a published con-

clusion in her own argument is misplaced and inconsistent with all existing social science scholarship.

For example, while authors seek the most reliable data available, there is no requirement of infallibility

of the data in order for authors to use them to support their arguments. The author citing the work then

must acknowledge that any errors in the cited work will weaken her conclusions. But the work may still

be cited, despite its status as fallible and lacking consensus. Similarly, consensus is not required in order

for an IR author to make use of a previously published work. As this forum suggests, there may be no

consensus on Jacksons typology or conclusions, but that should not prohibit others from citing them

approvingly; they must, as noted, acknowledge that any argument that relies on them is thus vulnerable

if flaws are found in Jacksons.


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on highly contestable premises to justify all of the essential inferences. Based on the

standard of strength of arguments developed in the second section, Jacksons argument

for pluralism appears not to be as strong as that sketched in the fourth section.

With regard to the level of dialogue that remains possible, Jackson argues the four

standpoints are distinct, separate and irreconcilable, and that standards of argument forIR can only be internal to each approach. While he offers an encouraging prescription for

civil discourse among adherents of the standpoints, he underplays the possibility of dia-

logue that could lead to progress stating: (1) that all of the methodological approaches

are equally scientific; (2) that the standards of proof are strictly internal to each stand-

point; and (3) that there is no rational way to choose among standpoints, especially given

that arguments in the philosophy of science are not helpful all that scholars can do is to

make explicit their starting points. While I agree with Jacksons conclusion about plural-

ism, the way he reaches it has gaps and it limits scientific-style progress in IR.

Jackson tries to finesse the divide that has been created among adherents of the differ-ent standpoints by invoking Kuhns later view of scientific language. Here, Jackson

again relies on a philosopher of science to solve a problem, using a doctrine upon which

there is no consensus. One might reply that Kuhns view is only an argument about lan-

guage. But of course most of 20th-century Western philosophy is centred on the role of

language for approaching all philosophical issues. Even staunch empiricist philosophers

of science, who are treated harshly by so many commentators, view any scientific theory

as itself a language. Jackson moves on to argue for civility and open-mindedness. But

those are matters of the tone of the debate; neither resolves, or even suspends, the funda-

mental disputes that must be aired for progress to be possible.When there are good philosophical arguments against a foundational position, it

should be rejected, or at the very least the starting point should be viewed with great

suspicion. But because Jackson admits only internal assessment and discounts philo-

sophical debate about methodologies, he is forced to reject any such grounds for criticis-

ing the value of conclusions based on flawed philosophical premises or for extolling the

merits of conclusions based on firm ones. As noted earlier, Logical Positivists came to

dominate thinking about scientific character and method. Natural and social scientists

developed methodologies that drew from the core principles of this school. When fis-

sures were discovered in this foundational doctrine, researchers had good philosophicalreason to find alternatives; and those who continued to rely on this doctrine were appro-

priately subject to criticism. It is hard to see how this process, which my approach regards

as essential to progress in a field, can be accommodated when each foundational position

for IR theories is immune from criticism from any other group.

Philosophical questions are not amenable to simple solutions. They add complexity to

the problems of discovering the best empirical and theoretical conclusions in IR. IR con-

clusions depend, in part, on philosophical principles, just as much as they rely on empiri-

cal claims, and IR conclusions will be more persuasive the stronger are the principles on

which they rest. The social sciences would welcome the easing of its burden if someone

were to find a way to avoid having to deal with them. This temptation has led a number

of authors, including Jackson, to try to find a path to do just that. But no proposal of

which I am aware is successful at circumnavigating the philosophy of science. The role

of philosophy in IR and social science theory is inconvenient but there is no evident way

around it.


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Author Biography

Fred Chernoff is Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations at Colgate University,Hamilton, NY, USA. He has also taught at Brown, Yale and Wesleyan Universities. He is

author of After Bipolarity (University of Michigan Press, 1995), The Power of

International Theory (Routledge, 2005) and Theory and Metatheory in InternationalRelations(Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and has contributed to journals of international

affairs, such asInternational Studies Quarterly,Review of International Studies,Journal

of Conflict Resolution, and analytic philosophy, such as Mind,Analysis,Philosophical

Quarterly.

Documents

Millennium Journal of International Studies 2013 Chernoff 346 66