Human Rights in Danish Development Aid 1975-2010

Kristine Midtgaard

Introduction

Human rights, democracy and good governance have played a central role in the policies of donors

in development cooperation since the late 1980s and in particular in the 1990s. Whereas economic

conditionality already formed part of the development approach of major international financial

institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) in the 1980s, political conditionality in

development cooperation only arrived in the 1990s.1

This chapter will show that the international tendency in the 1990s to impose political

conditionality may be traced back to the 1970s when human rights were discussed in connection

with development in both the IBRD and in the European Community (EC) such as in the

negotiations leading to the renewal of the Lomé Convention with the African, Caribbean and

Pacific (ACP) countries.2 The discussions of human rights and aid in the IBRD followed closely

upon the legislation introduced by the Carter administration and passed by the US Congress in

October 1977 that made respect for human rights a prerequisite for American aid through the

international financial institutions.3 The so-called like-minded states, i.e. Canada, the United

Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark adopted policies in the mid to late

1980s which made aid conditional upon respect for human rights.4

Denmark was the last of the like-minded states to join when parliament in May 1987 voted to

make human rights part of Danish development aid.5 Existing research has already identified

Denmark as a late-comer in this respect.6 However, the topic of human rights in Danish

development aid has not been the subject of an in-depth historical study on its own. It has been dealt

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with by development researchers in legal studies in particular, and by political scientists who have

focused on the implementation of human rights in development aid in the form of democratization

from the 1990s onwards.7

Central to this chapter is to analyze Denmark’s policy on human rights in development aid

from the mid-1970s until 2010. The following key questions are posed: what was the nature of

integration of human rights into Danish development aid? Were Danish policy makers equally

concerned with civil rights, political rights and socio-economic rights? How did Danish decision-

makers conceive of aid as a lever of human rights? What was the Danish perception of

conditionality? And finally, why was Denmark a relative laggard among the like-minded states?

The chapter consists of two main parts and may be seen as a hybrid between a chronological

and an institutional approach. The first part deals with the Cold War period. This part analyses

Denmark’s policy on human rights in development aid in four international institutions: the United

Nations (UN), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the European Community (EC). It also

includes a short analysis of the 1987 parliamentary decision to integrate human rights principles in

the development policy and the subsequent development aid strategy paper published by the Danish

aid agency, Danida, in January 1988. The first part of the chapter is primarily based on material in

the archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the second and shorter part of the

chapter, archival materials are still classified and thus not available for researchers. Consequently,

in this section I mainly discuss human rights strategies. The analysis of the development aid

strategies of the last two decades will be followed by a section on the status of human rights in

Danish development aid and the status of development aid in Denmark’s foreign policy which is

seen as an interdependent relationship with a central explanatory value.

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Human Rights, Democracy and Approaches to Linking Human Rights to Development Aid

As human rights are a minefield of competing, conflicting and overlapping concerns, we need an

initial classification of the issues. Firstly, human rights are commonly defined in terms of three

categories (or generations) of rights: political-civil rights, socio-economic rights and the right to

development. The two first categories are commonly understood as individual rights. The right to

development was promoted by Third World countries as a collective right.8 The chapter focuses on

the categories of rights that Danish decisions-makers considered central when shaping the policy on

human rights and development aid.

Secondly, it is useful to distinguish between human rights on the one hand and democracy as

one aspect or part of the political rights category on the other hand. In donor policy guidelines after

1990 human rights, democracy and good governance are often treated as one package. Furthermore,

the concepts are both controversial and hard to define and hence rarely operationalized.9 While

liberal democracy and human rights (in particular the first generation of rights) appear clearly

related, Danish decision-makers, particularly (as we will see) during the Cold War, explicitly sought

to focus considerations of human rights in aid policy on democratization as one particular aspect of

human rights. They did not, however, clarify the conceptual content of ‘democracy’ and ‘human

rights’.

Hence, for analytical purposes it is necessary to retain a distinction between human rights and

democracy. The Indian-American journalist and author, Fareed Zakaria, makes a number of

propositions that are most useful. His starting point is that democratically elected regimes around

the world increasingly ignore the constitutional limits of their power and deprive their citizens of

basic rights and freedoms. This has not been sufficiently recognized due to a focus on elections

rather than post-election processes. According to Zakaria, this perspective stems from the fact that

in the West democracy has been understood as liberal democracy, i.e. a political system marked by

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free and fair elections, the rule of law, a separation of powers and the protection of basic liberties of

speech, assembly, religion, and property. However, Zakaria finds that the

latter bundle of freedoms - which may be termed constitutional liberalism - is

theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy. As the political scientist

Phillippe Schmitter has pointed out, "liberalism, either as a conception of political

liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of

democracy". Today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western

political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing;

constitutional liberalism is not.10

Even if Zakaria's distinction between liberal constitutionalism and democracy is not identical with

the distinction between human rights and democracy in this chapter, it does serve to illustrate how

the two inter-connected concepts may be separated. In this chapter I will also keep an analytical

distinction between human rights and democracy.

The third classification issue concerns the approach applied by Denmark as a donor to the

integration of human rights in development aid. Development aid literature distinguishes between

three basic ways in which a donor can influence a recipient country's policy and behaviour: 1)

pressure, 2) support and 3) persuasion. Conditionality is one instrument of pressure. Conditionality

means that aid is made conditional on the potential recipient accepting a number of requirements.11

Since political conditionality was not formally introduced until the late 1980s I will use a crude but

useful definition of the approach to human rights in development aid in the analysis of Danish Cold

War policies. The literature distinguishes between two basic approaches. The first is a so-called

‘negative’ approach where respect for human rights is made a prerequisite for aid. The second is a

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so-called ‘positive’ approach in which aid is continued, or even initiated, despite breaches of human

rights because aid is seen as a way to improve standards of human rights through dialogue,

cooperation and improved economic and social conditions.12 The United States on the one hand and

Western Europe and Canada on the other have by and large been seen as representatives of

respectively the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ approach.13 Still, as the chapter will show, there were clear

differences within the West European camp.

The International and National Contexts

After 1945, international human rights law expanded to encompass new areas. Major steps included

the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, the European Convention on Human

Rights in 1950 and the two UN covenants on political-civil rights and economic-social rights, which

were finalized and opened for ratification by 1966. The two covenants finally became legally

binding in 1976 when ratified by a sufficient number of states. At that time the ongoing Helsinki

process placed human rights even more firmly on the international political agenda. These processes

served to undermine the constraints against foreign interventions in cases of human rights

violations. The sovereignty of the state was no longer to be considered a shield for those states

engaged in the violation of individual rights.14

The promotion and codification of human rights was profoundly affected by the Cold War.

East and West argued in favour of the primacy of socio-economic rights and political-civil rights

respectively. At the same time, human rights came to involve a North-South dimension: first, during

the decolonization process from the 1950s human rights rhetoric formed part of the struggle for

independence by Afro-Asian countries against the colonial countries.15 Second and most

controversial, the Third World promoted the right to development as a collective human right

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hereby giving priority to states over individuals. Thus, the issue of human rights caused tensions not

merely between East and West but also between North and South.

Development aid was launched by the United States and the United Nations in 1949. Aid was

seen as both a foreign policy instrument for the West in its efforts to prevent Soviet expansion, and

as a means to promote economic growth and development as a goal in itself. Aid was above all

transferred bilaterally from donor to recipient, but also multilaterally as international organizations,

the UN and its affiliates in particular, expanded their activities. The organizations at the final count

also depended on individual states to fund their operations. Thus the multilateral organizations were

also subject to the vagaries of East-West and North-South conflicts.16

Human rights were introduced as a basic principle already in the American Foreign

Assistance Act of 1963. In 1977 a law was passed that made American support for loans in

international financial institutions conditional on the projects meeting certain basic human rights

standards and catering to basic human needs. The principle of basic human needs referred to the

International Labour Organization (ILO)’s adoption of the Basic Human Needs strategy in 1976,

setting the minimum standards with regard to food, housing, clothes, drinking water, sanitary

conditions, public transportation and healthcare, education and cultural facilities.17

The integration of human rights into the development agenda occurred in response to large-

scale human rights violations in developing countries. At the same time, much integration served as

a means to kill two birds with one stone, making progress on human rights on the one hand, and

strengthening the position of the West more generally on the other. The demand of the developing

countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) had put the West on the defensive,

particularly within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The

West, the US in particular, eagerly grasped the opportunity to regain the initiative. It allowed the

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West to place counter-demands on the Third World, in an attempt to regain the initiative on the

playing field of international development.18

After the Cold War and with the ongoing transition towards democracy in the former Soviet

Union and the Eastern European countries, human rights, democracy and good governance became

central elements in international relations and the foreign policies of states. International military

interventions in the 1990s took place with reference to human rights and developing countries were

assisted in establishing democratic and legal systems. After 2003, the war against Saddam Hussein

was arguably fought with the aim to promote democracy and human rights.

The Danish domestic context concerning human rights in development aid is characterized by

at least two main features. Firstly, the development aid consensus among the majority of the Danish

political parties which implied that Denmark should give aid to developing countries broke down

with a change of government in 2001 from a Social Democratic to a Liberal-Conservative one. 19

The new government was supported by the Danish People’s Party which may be characterized as a

center party with regards to socio-economic issues and a right-wing party with regards to

development aid, asylum and refugee policy. Secondly, when discussing the domestic context we

need to include the rather odd political constellation in Denmark from 1982-8 when an alternative

majority of Centre and Left Wing opposition parties shaped Danish foreign and security policies.

The bourgeois government found itself unable to counter this majority, which, in particular, forced

the Danish government to make reservations from major NATO decisions.20 As we shall see,

however, the issue of human rights in development aid was also affected by this rather special

parliamentary situation.

Denmark, Human Rights and International Institutions during the Cold War

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The basic Danish approach to aid in international institutions was based on the view that the

institutions and their programmes should deal with development issues exclusively from a

professional and technical point of view. Denmark’s development policy was to be distinguished

from other political issues and not used to promote any other goals than those aimed at the

programme in question.21 From the outset, Denmark appeared reluctant to adapt the ‘negative’

approach to human rights in development aid. The following sections will look at the degree to

which non-politicization as the point of departure for Denmark’s development policy in the

international institutions policy was pursued in practice.

Denmark in the UN

Denmark’s policy in the UN was very much in line with the stance mentioned above. As

emphasized in documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was Denmark’s policy in the UN to

avoid politicization of development aid. Rather than relying on political arguments in development

negotiations, Denmark would emphasize criteria of efficiency, i.e. whether aid actually reached the

intended recipients, namely the neediest people in the poorest countries.22 One should not, however,

necessarily accept the official distinction between political and non-political issues. It may be

argued that the attempt to avoid politicization is also political. However, the point is that Denmark

was very concerned with keeping development debates focused on development rather than the

political nature of the recipient regimes.

Denmark’s resistance to the politicization of development aid in the UN is illustrated by its

opposition to an Italian proposal for a joint EC statement on the human rights situation in Chile.

Whereas Italy, several other EC members and the US were in favour of putting pressure on

violating regimes, including suspending development aid, Denmark’s approach was of the

‘positive’ kind. The Italian proposal contained a passage saying that ‘we of course agree that

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foreign assistance can and should be used as an instrument to bear pressure for re-orientation of

repressive policies’. Denmark did not agree with this.23

When discussing United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Denmark only raised

questions of efficiency. In 1984 the Conservative-Liberal government attempted to avoid an East-

West confrontation in the UNDP Steering Committee over the country programme to Afghanistan.24

Considering Denmark’s NATO membership, we might have expected Denmark to join in Western

criticism of the human rights violations of an Afghan regime that was a puppet of the Soviet Union.

But Denmark did not.

However, the scepticism towards politicization of aid did not mean that Denmark in the UN

did not criticize states for violating human rights. Such criticism was, however, only brought out in

other UN bodies relevant to issues of human rights and not in debates on development issues.

One reason why Denmark opposed the ‘negative’ approach to human rights in aid is that the

Social Democratic governments in the 1970s and the Conservative-Liberal government after 1982

believed that the main goal of Danish development policy was to reduce poverty. Further, they

believed that poverty reduction was truly a way to support human rights, namely economic and

social rights. As expressed by Henning Kjeldgaard in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

ambassador to Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Kenya from 1983-96, the ‘shaping of Denmark’s

development policy aims first of all at improving conditions for the poorest people in the poorest

developing countries. At the same time, Denmark recognizes that the concept of human rights in its

expanded meaning includes political-civil as well as economic, social and cultural rights.’25

Denmark adhered to a broad concept of human rights. Since it included economic and social rights

it may be argued that Denmark believed that aid distribution in itself would strengthen human

rights. Seemingly, Denmark equated economic and social development with economic and social

rights.

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Even so, the broader Danish understanding of human rights did not include the Declaration on

the Right to Development promoted by Third World countries and adopted by the UN General

Assembly in 1986. Denmark and the other Nordic countries did agree on the existence of a close

relationship between social, economic and cultural rights and development, but opposed the

declaration for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the emphasis of the declaration on collective

rights instead of individual rights; secondly, because the declaration assumed a certain degree of

economic development and the existence of the NIEO as preconditions for respecting and

promoting human rights in the developing countries; and thirdly, because it emphasized economic

and social rights at the expense of political-civil rights.26 However, apart from taking a stand on the

Declaration of the Rights to Development, Denmark managed to avoid politicization of

development aid in the UN.

Denmark's Policy with Respect to the World Bank

The World Bank did not officially adopt the ILO's Basic Human Needs Strategy. However, due to

the American law of 1977 mentioned earlier, it was clearly affected by it.27 In the World Bank

Denmark did not promote a development policy based on professional and technical considerations

as strongly as it did in the UN. The main Nordic priorities in the World Bank were poverty

reduction and gradually during the 1980s also structural adjustment lending, environmental

protection and women in development.28 In a number of instances, in cases of gross violations,

Denmark, together with the other Nordic countries, voted against loans.29 In 1974 Denmark and the

other Nordic countries agreed with the US in opposing loans to Chile. It did the same in 1978-80

with regard to another loan to Chile and loans to Argentina, Paraguay and Equatorial Guinea. 30 In

1982, Denmark proposed that the Nordic countries oppose all loans to Guatemala. Sweden agreed,

but Norway and Finland preferred to take a stand on a case to case basis.31

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Even if human rights considerations contributed to shaping Denmark’s development policy in

the international financial institutions in the cases of gross violations, Denmark remained generally

sceptical of the ‘negative’ approach to human rights in aid. According to a ministerial note,

Denmark, before 1978, had taken human rights into account ‘only indirectly and only concerning

loans to Chile in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank’ (IDB). By

‘indirectly’ the ministerial note referred to the fact that Denmark's proposed rejection of loans to

Chile was not officially motivated by a concern about human rights; it mentioned instead the poor

economic performance of the Chilean government. The reasons were, firstly, that the World Bank

statute only allowed for economic evaluation of projects. Secondly, the Foreign Ministry feared that

an introduction of human rights into World Bank decision-making might lead to a damaging

politicization of the international financial institutions. The Nordic countries agreed to refer

political issues to the UN, not to the World Bank, and in the UN, importantly, to institutions dealing

with political matters, not development issues. The UK and Belgium, in comparison, officially

opposed loans to Chile because of the human rights violations committed by the Pinochet regime.

However, due to the Bank’s statute they would not vote against loans, only abstain.32 The UK and

Belgium were not among the states that directly opposed loans, but did criticize the Chilean regime.

Denmark was among the countries seeking to keep Chile from getting loans, but not among the

states criticizing the human rights performance of the Chilean regime.

In January 1978, the Nordic Committee of Development Officials33 discussed the issue of

human rights in the international financial institutions. The discussion was initiated by the Danish

delegation for three reasons: firstly, due to the new American law of 1977 that introduced basic

human rights as a conditional for loans in international institutions; secondly, because of the shock

generated among the Nordic citizens by human-rights violations in developing countries; and

thirdly, as a consequence of the fear that Scandinavian aid to these countries might lead to a

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negative public perception of development aid. Denmark, with explicit reference to public opinion,

argued for a careful rapprochement to the US position and preferably a common Nordic position.34

Clearly, a consideration of public opinion was at play here.

The Swedish public also took a growing interest in human rights. Sweden was positive

towards the new American policy as it had led to the release of political prisoners in Haiti. At the

same time, Sweden would prefer to oppose projects only if these met neither demands of human

rights nor basic human needs. The US, in comparison, would oppose projects if these failed to meet

just one of these demands. Furthermore, Sweden argued for taking human rights into account only

in special cases, such as in Chile where the regime clearly had no intention of improving either

human rights or the conditions of the poorest part of the Chilean population. The difficult balance to

strike, according to the Swedish government, was to ensure American interest in development aid

on the one hand, and constructive work in the financial institutions on the other. In its bilateral aid

arrangements, Sweden would continue aid despite violations of human rights, but at the same time

criticize recipient countries in donor-recipient negotiations.35

According to the Norwegian representative,

Norway was not convinced that it was fortunate to use economic arguments against loans. The

public would probably feel doubtful if the real reason was not expressed, and it would also be

difficult to influence the countries in question in the preferred direction if we did not refer to

the issue of human rights.36

Seemingly, Norway took both domestic public opinion and the improvement of human rights

standards in recipient countries into account in deciding which arguments to use in the international

financial institutions.

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Domestic public opinion played a central role in the formation of Denmark’s policy. When

Norway at a Nordic World Bank meeting in November 1982 suggested that the Nordic countries

should remove certain countries from a blacklist, Denmark’s representative referred to the domestic

political context for the human rights reservations and mentioned that ‘a precondition for a positive

Danish public opinion of the World Bank and the IDB was that the government took a critical stand

on certain recipient countries’.37 At the meeting, Denmark also commented on the apparent fact that

the US applied a project-by-project approach rather than a country-by-country approach.38 This

approach allowed loans to states even if they violated human rights. Denmark found the approach

inappropriate.39

In 1986 Denmark and Sweden still voted against loans to Chile. Norway made its decision on

a case by case basis according to whether the project in question would support the regime. Finland

only took economic considerations into account.40 In 1986, however, Denmark softened its position

on loans to Guatemala and applied, together with Norway and Finland, the more pragmatic

approach of deciding on a case by case basis. A further softening had been discussed, but was

opposed by Denmark.41 Denmark continued to maintain a blacklist of human rights offenders,

which happened to include only states that the Danish public opinion took an active political

interest in.42 A ministerial note emphasized that the Nordic reactions in the international financial

institutions against violations of human rights had a symbolic rather than an actual effect. They

never managed to prevent the adoption of a loan. However, Denmark’s reactions in the World Bank

had a certain domestic effect in terms of ensuring public support for Danish development aid.43

Both the careful and pragmatic change of policy in the case of Guatemala, the maintenance of the

blacklist and the ministerial note clearly suggest that Denmark's policy on human rights in

development aid in the mid-1980s was shaped by reference to public opinion in particular.

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Denmark in the DAC

In 1977 the DAC officially adopted the ILO’s Basic Human Needs Strategy. The Statement on

Development Cooperation for Economic Growth and Meeting Basic Human Needs emphasized that

the ambition to meet basic human needs was not intended to replace economic growth, but should

rather be seen as an important component in generating economic growth. The Basic Human Needs

strategy was not to be understood as charity, but as a productivity-oriented and self-generating

growth strategy.44

The Basic Human Needs strategy was in line with the key principle of poverty reduction in

Danish development policy. However, Denmark’s perception of the Basic Human Needs strategy

was also marked by skepticism. The reason had more to do with words than with content. Danida

noticed that while DAC used the term ‘basic human needs’, the ILO conference had ‘probably more

correctly’ termed the strategy ‘basic needs’, which would ‘reduce the risk of conflating it with the

human rights agenda’. Danida preferred the term ‘basic needs’, and would in its own writings on the

matter deliberately use the term ‘basic needs’ instead of ‘basic human needs’. In this way, a

conflation between ‘basic human needs’ and ‘basic human rights’ could be avoided and Denmark

could maintain pure social and economic criteria for the allocation of development aid.45 The Head

of Danida explained in the DAC how too strong a focus on human rights ‘easily might lead to an

unfortunate public debate’.46 Seemingly, public opinion played a central role in Danish policy.

Firstly, the Danish decision makers were eager to avoid a public debate on human rights and aid.

Secondly, to the degree that a critical public opinion existed, Denmark took a critical stand on

different regimes.

In June 1988, after the parliamentary decision to include human rights considerations in

development policy, Denmark initiated the adoption on the DAC agenda of human rights as a

principle in development aid. The Danish representative also emphasized that Denmark in the future

14

would place increased emphasis on human rights in its development programmes.47 In December

1988 at a DAC High Level meeting, Denmark was the only DAC member mentioning the question

of human rights in aid.48 However, Denmark focused its concern in particular on one aspect of

human rights, namely that of democratization. At the DAC meeting in June 1988, Denmark stressed

the need for democracy, human rights and public participation as the basis for sustainable economic

and social growth – and for ‘peace’ which was also emphasized at times. Later in the same Danish

intervention, only democracy and political participation were mentioned.49

Denmark seemed to emphasize, to a greater extent than earlier, civil and political rights – with

democracy as an aspect of political rights. Judging from the meeting of the Nordic Chiefs of

Development Aid in May 1988 the democratic focus was a deliberate choice inspired by Sweden to

frame the development discourse in a way that allowed Denmark to take human rights into account

in its development policy without risking having to suspend aid. At the meeting, the Danish

representative explained how human rights were sometimes part of an ideological struggle in the

domestic development debate. The Swedish representative agreed. He stressed the difficulty in

defining human rights and preferred for that reason ‘to concentrate the debate on the process of

democratization’. The Nordic chiefs acknowledged the difficulty in defining strict criteria for

human rights in development aid and a need for Nordic coordination. It would cause problems for

the planning as well as for the implementation of aid efforts if human rights were used as an

argument to end development cooperation with certain countries. Aid should be suspended only in

the case of very serious violations. Human rights should be promoted through a ‘positive’ rather

than a ‘negative’ approach, by means of dialogue rather than pressure.50

Denmark in the EC

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In the EC, human rights and development aid were on the agenda in a number of institutions and

bodies: the European Development Fund (EDF) (in the negotiations to revise the Lomé convention),

in the Committee of Non-Associated Developing Countries and in the Council of Ministers’

negotiations of the EC special development aid programmes.51 The Lomé Convention was adopted

in Lomé, the capital of Togo, in 1975 between the EC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific

countries (ACP). It coincided with the fourth EDF programme, and aimed to include some of the

Commonwealth countries after the accession of the UK to the EC. The ACP countries gained

privileged access (with important exceptions) to the common market and the EC countries were also

to contribute to the industrialization of the ACP countries by investments in existing industries and

by the introduction of new ones. As an additional protocol, the EC established the so-called Stabex

programme (the acronym for a European Commission compensatory finance scheme to stabilize

export earnings of the ACP countries) in order to counteract future falling export prices.

Furthermore, programmes for technical and financial aid were established. The convention

recognized a number of principles for EC cooperation with the ACP countries establishing a formal

equality between the EU and the recipients.52

The Lomé convention was a trade and aid agreement. It posed no demands on the ACP

countries. Lomé in fact applied a number of NIEO proposals within a limited geographic area. The

convention was re-negotiated every five years until 1990, when Lomé IV was concluded for a

duration of ten years with a midterm evaluation in 1995. In 1990, an elaborate article on human

rights were for the first time introduced in the Convention's text as an area of cooperation between

the EC and the ACP countries although, as we will see below, the issue had been on the agenda

during the previous negotiations and within EC internal discussions.53

Denmark’s preference for non-political aid was easily accommodated in the EDF and the

Committee of Non-Associated Developing Countries where decisions required unanimity.54 Already

16

during the first revision negotiations in 1978-9, the UK proposed including demands of human

rights in Lomé II. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) opposed the proposal.55 Nevertheless,

during the negotiations between the EC and the ACP countries in July 1978, the EC emphasized the

importance of human rights. However, the ACP countries refused to include stipulations of human

rights in a trade and aid agreement. Until November 1978, the issue was off the agenda for

discussion with the ACP due to internal EC disagreements. The UK, the Netherlands and the

European Commission supported a text mentioning the UN Declaration of Human Rights in its

preamble and including an operative text on the relationship between human rights and the

reduction of development aid. France and Denmark were willing to agree to the reference to the UN

declaration, but not to the operative text on potential reductions of aid in the case of human rights

violations. Denmark, supported by France, suggested instead a text including a passage on the

relationship between aid and the effort of the recipient state to mobilize its own resources. The

suggestion should, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked, be seen in the context where violating

regimes seldom accommodated basic human needs.56 Denmark's focus was on the social conditions

rather than on the human rights standard in the developing countries – and seemingly Denmark had

accepted the usage of the term basic human needs even if it was not, as we have seen, the preferred

term.

In February 1979 the Danish minister responsible for development aid in a speech to the

Council and the Commission warned against letting the question of human rights come between the

Community and the ACP countries. Denmark agreed with the ACP that human rights demands did

not belong in a voluntary treaty on trade and aid and that it would be better to pay attention to the

level of social and economic development in the different ACP countries when deciding the

magnitude and aim of aid. The EC ought to follow the same economic and social criteria as the

World Bank and questions of human rights should be referred to negotiations in the UN – i.e. to

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political institutions, not development bodies.57 The speech may be seen as an attempt to separate

the politically controversial issue of human rights from that of development aid.

The document agreed upon in the Lomé negotiations in 1978-79 included a general reference

to the UN declaration in the preamble. However, during the signing ceremony the EC presidency

emphasized the importance of respecting human rights. Subsequently, on 20 November 1979 a

decision was adopted in the Council that in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights

in an ACP country that had signed the Lomé II, the EC could ‘take suitable measures’.58 The

decision gave the EC the option of suspending aid to ACP countries if agreement on such a measure

could be reached in the Council. Still, conditionality was far from an established principle in EC

development aid.

During the re-negotiation of the Lomé in 1984, human rights were again a controversial topic.

In particular the Netherlands and the UK, this time joined by Belgium, France and Ireland, argued

in favour of including a concern about human rights. The Netherlands was most determined arguing

for a provision allowing for the suspension of aid in case of gross and systematic violations. The

FRG and Denmark remained reluctant. The ACP countries at this point argued that respect for

human rights had to be seen in tandem with the rights to development. Additionally, they would

only accept a reference to human rights in the convention if the EC agreed to discuss economic

sanctions against South Africa.59

Although the human rights camp had gained more members, the EC remained internally

divided. The result of the revision negotiations was a compromise between the EC and the ACP.

The Lomé III referred in its preamble to the UN Declaration on Human Rights and to the

contracting parties’ mutual respect for human rights. It included a reference to ‘human dignity’ in

art. 4., and a common EC-ACP statement concerning art. 4. on economic, social and cultural rights.

Finally, it included a condemnation of apartheid.60 Human rights were mentioned. However, the

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Lomé III represented only modest changes from its predecessors and was characterized by dialogue,

negotiation and mutuality. This is evident in particular when comparing Lomé III to Lomé IV from

1990 when human rights became included as an essential area of cooperation (Lomé IV, art. 5).61

During the 1980s, Denmark and the FRG would not use EC development aid for political ends in

developing countries. The principle of unanimity in the EC Council of Ministers guaranteed that

this Danish position was upheld.

Denmark’s policy concerning the EC’s special aid programmes to South America differed

from its Lomé policy. In 1982, the EC adopted the Central America Initiative, including

extraordinary financial aid to Costa Rica, Honduras, The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

During aid negotiations, the Danish Social Democratic foreign minister opposed aid to El Salvador,

Guatemala and Haiti, referring directly to breeches of human rights.62

Following the military coup in Bolivia in July 1980, the EC decided to suspend its relations

with Bolivia and put negotiations with the South American free trade area, the Andean Community,

on hold until the situation in Bolivia was improved and the other Andean countries had normalized

their relations with Bolivia. The US also suspended its relations with Bolivia. Denmark adhered to

the joint EC decision, and instructed its embassy in La Paz not to assume official contacts with the

new regime. However, Denmark did accept necessary technical contacts with regard to

development aid.63

In 1981, a counter coup in Bolivia took place. The new president promised to return to

democratic conditions within a period of three years. A report from the UN Human Rights

Commission bore evidence of ‘significant improvements’ of human rights.64 In the fall of 1981, the

US decided to reestablish normal relations with Bolivia. The Andean countries followed suit during

fall and winter 1981/2. In the spring of 1982, Denmark and the Netherlands agreed as the last EC

countries to resume EC-Andean relations. In May 1982, the Social Democratic government of

19

Denmark approved a DKK 46m financial guarantee to Bolivia. In September 1982, the remaining

EC countries had all normalized their relations with Bolivia and the newly elected Conservative-

Liberal government in Denmark soon did so too.65

In 1985 Denmark did not raise the issue of human rights when the EC negotiated its

development aid to Central America, possibly because human rights had already been taken into

account. The Liberal foreign minister explained to the Danish Parliament’s Market Committee that

the limited aid to Central America was shaped by political motives rather than by pure poverty

criteria. The opposition apparently did not question this arrangement, which was in line with the

former Social Democratic foreign minister’s opposition to aid certain Latin American countries a

few years before.66 Besides certain South American states, Turkey was rejected as recipient of EC

development aid with reference to the lack of democracy and human rights in Turkey.67

To sum up, development aid ought not to be politicized by raising demands of human rights.

This policy was maintained in UN development bodies, in the DAC and in the EC with regard to

the revision of the Lomé Convention until 1990, whereas in the World Bank human rights

considerations led to Danish rejections of loans in cases of ‘gross violations’, e.g. in the case of

Chile. Denmark sought to separate development policy from human rights policy by way of

referring human rights issues to the political bodies of the UN rather than to development bodies.

Latin American countries stand out, in particular when compared to the ACP countries, both in the

World Bank and the EC, as countries to which Denmark most often rejected loans or suspended aid.

Taking this into account, the explanation for the nuances in the policy in the different institutions

may be explained less by the differences in scope, power and membership of the various

institutions, but more by the recipient countries in question.

The Parliamentary Decision in 1987 and the Development Aid Strategy of 1988

20

Before turning to the analysis of human rights in Danish development aid after the Cold War, it is

necessary to provide some background to the parliamentary decision in 1987 to integrate human

rights in Danish development aid. It is a part of the domestic context which shaped Danish

development aid and the inclusion of human rights.

The main principle in Danish development aid in the 1970s was poverty reduction. In addition

a number of so-called cross-cutting principles were added to Danish aid in the 1970s and 1980s.

Concern for women was introduced in the mid-1970s. Protection of the environment was adopted as

a central principle in the parliamentary decision following the discussion of the Brundtland report of

1987 on sustainable development. At the same time, human rights were included as Parliament

adopted a proposition by the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals on broadening the scope of

Danish development aid policy.68

The debate took place during the years in which the Danish Centre-Right government was

forced to take formal exceptions to NATO decisions by an alternative Centre-Left foreign policy

majority. The Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SPP) had first presented a proposal

calling for the government to increase aid to Nicaragua and give direct economic support to the

ANC and Swapo in South Africa and South West Africa. Compared to the SPP proposal, the

proposal by the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals was more moderate and supported by

the government.

Following the parliamentary decision, Danida included human rights in the renewed

development strategy Strategic Planning from 1988. However, the publication Strategic Planning

leaves the impression that human rights enjoyed a less central position than women and

environmental protection. Human rights are mentioned as the last principle to be taken into account,

and in the presentation of the role of development aid in foreign policy they are mentioned only in

brackets: the aim of Danish development aid is to ‘promote social, humanitarian (including human

21

rights) and political ideals, which have been and ought to continue to be the basis for this part of

Denmark’s foreign policy’.69 In the presentation of the more specific role of development aid,

human rights are not mentioned, whereas women and environment are: development aid should

‘promote Danish views on development including lasting improvement of the economic and social

conditions in the developing countries, including poverty reduction, a sustainable development

including environmental sustainability and integration of women in the development process’.70

Furthermore, in strategies for countries as well as sectors, human rights are mentioned last, if at

all.71

In short, during the Cold War, Denmark remained reluctant to include demands of human

rights into its foreign aid policy. A ‘positive’ approach to human rights in aid was preferred and an

emphasis on social improvement – rather than political rights - was first maintained. From the mid

and late 1980s Denmark also embarked on the road of political conditionality, though only

reluctantly and with a deliberate and limited focus on one aspect of political rights, namely that of

democratization. Human rights did not formally become a principle in Danish aid policy until

1987/8. However, in the official aid strategy (Strategic Planning), human rights still appeared as a

principle of lesser importance.

Human Rights in Development Aid in the 1990s

In 1994 Danida presented a new development strategy emphasizing human rights.72 Human rights

were to be promoted through democratization, electoral supervision and a strengthened judiciary in

recipient countries. Danida’s annual reports confirm that the agency held on to this approach.73

Thus, the identification of human rights with democracy - initiated as we have seen during the Cold

War as a way to avoid discussions on human rights - continued.

22

Danish policies during the 1990s were modified with explicit reference to concern for

democratic principles and human rights.74 Direct aid to human rights and democracy increased from

below DKK 12m in 1988 to 300m in 1994. During the period 1988-93 aid was altered due to

political conditions in recipient countries in seventeen instances.75 These two features bear evidence

of a combination of the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ approach. The previous skepticism towards the

‘negative’ approach seems, however, to have continued. Aid was frequently just scaled down, not

terminated. For instance, the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 led to an immediate stop of

Danish aid to China, but relations were normalized again in 1992. In a couple of sensitive cases,

Danish aid was redirected through NGOs instead of disbursed directly through the Foreign

Ministry. A project in Malawi in 1991 was adopted despite the fact that Malawi had a despotic

regime and one of the worst human rights regimes in Africa. Eventually, the project was suspended

when a disturbing report on the human rights situation reached the Danish press.76

It seems reasonable to conclude that along with the many reductions of aid due to political

circumstances in the recipient countries, there was still a reluctance to place demands on recipient

states and to practice political conditionality, as opposed to the dominant international trend.

Denmark remained true to its predilection for carrots over sticks. Further, public opinion continued

to play a central role in the sense that aid was terminated not necessarily when human rights were

violated, but when evidence for this reached the Danish press.

Human Rights and Development Aid after 2001

In November 2001 the Social Democratic government was replaced by a Liberal-Conservative one.

Nevertheless, the Partnership 2000 development aid strategy adopted by the previous government

was continued. The government supplemented the Partnership programme with a series of annual

priority plans that reiterated human rights, democratization and good governance as central

23

principles of Danish aid and signalled that aid would be conditional upon the recipients meeting

strict demands.77

At a press conference in January 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the aid

reductions that had taken place: ‘systematic and continued violations of human rights and

democratic rules will no longer be tolerated. For this reason development cooperation with Eritrea,

Malawi and Zimbabwe will end.’78 In Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Vietnam reductions

were due to ‘worries’. The UNDP worked too ‘inefficiently at country level and for this reason was

reduced with DKK 50m.’79

In 2003, the government adopted the so-called Arabic Initiative to increase cooperation with

actors in Arab states supporting modernization and democracy. The purpose was to counter

radicalization and religious fundamentalism.80 In 2003, Danida also presented the Action Plan to

Fight against Corruption and the priority plan from 2004 emphasized a need for an ‘increased

effort on human rights, democratization and good governance.’81

According to the priority plan of 2006-10, the amount of aid directed towards human rights

and democracy was increased from DKK 150m in 2005 to 200m in 2006 out of a total aid budget in

2005 of 10.7bn and 10.89bn in 2006. In 2010 the figure would be increased further to DKK 215m

out of a total budget of 10.87bn. In addition 30m were set aside to combat terrorism and extreme

religious fundamentalism.82 These budgets signal a more pronounced as well as a broader emphasis

on political rights, now including anti-terrorism and anti-extremism. The concern for human rights

in Danish development aid became closely linked to Denmark’s international human rights policy

in general, which was elaborated and intensified after 2009 notably with regard to the fight against

torture, the death penalty and the rights of indigenous peoples – in accordance with international

trends.83 The close connection between human rights in aid on the one hand, and Denmark's human

24

rights policy in general on the other hand, represents a novelty compared to the previous deliberate

attempt to separate the two.

In 2007 good governance and human rights became the first of three main focus areas in

Danish development aid – the other two were women and HIV/aids.84 In 2008 an additional nine

programmes on good governance, democracy and human rights were launched.85 Human

development was understood according to the Danish Foreign Ministry 'not only as social and

economic welfare’, but also the ‘respect of the rights of the individual’ and ‘democratic

participation’ were integrate parts of human development.86

In February 2010 the Danish Prime Minister (Liberal) reorganized his government and

appointed a new Minister for Development. The new minister, as the former one, was from the

Liberal Party, but with a very pronounced liberal profile. He proceeded to transform the ministry

into one of Liberty, as he expressed it, which would fight terrorism, promote gender equality,

democracy and civil liberties. Focus would be on the reconstruction of Afghanistan.87 Promotion of

liberty, human rights and democracy became the first among five goals of Danish aid according to

the aid strategy of 2010.88 This signalled a strong focus on civil-political rights and on a connection

between aid, human rights and countering terrorism. Aid was terminated in the case of gross

violations of democratic rule or its complete abolition: the military coup in Niger was condemned

and a water sector programme was postponed.89

At the same time it should be noticed that the Liberal-Conservative government did not

always apply the ‘negative’ approach. Shortly after his appointment, the new minister for

development visited Zimbabwe. He explained that he would meet only with the moderate

government leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and not with president Mugabe. Further, he emphasized

that Danish aid was to people, not to states: ‘Denmark gives aid to the people in Zimbabwe, not to

Mugabe. We have to accept the risk that a small amount of Danish aid may fall in the wrong

25

hands.’90 Even if political rights in recipient countries were reinforced and even if the government

embraced the ‘negative’ approach much more positively than its predecessor, the case of Zimbabwe

indicates that the government had to realize the general dilemma of who receives aid and that

political conditionality or the ‘negative’ approach was not always seen as the proper way to

promote democracy and human rights.

The Status of Aid in Danish Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Danish Development Aid

1975-2010 – an Interdependent Relationship

The chapter has shown that public opinion played an important role in Danish policy on human

rights in development aid. However, the impact of national public opinion needs to be understood in

the context of the status of development aid in Danish foreign policy which, as this section will

show, was decisive for the status of human rights in Danish development aid.

Until 2001 a broad national consensus generally supported development aid as a significant

element in Danish foreign policy. Only the Left Socialists, the Progress Party and later the Danish

People’s Party did not belong to this consensus.

Even though development aid played a lesser role in Denmark’s foreign policy than did core

pillars such as NATO and the EC, aid was nevertheless a key feature of Denmark’s foreign policy

profile and a tool for Danish political parties and changing governments in their efforts to

accommodate or balance various domestic and international interests. Thus, it makes sense that

Danish decision-makers within the development aid consensus avoided fundamental debates on

development aid. If respect for human rights were made a requirement for recipients of aid,

Denmark risked having to suspend or discontinue aid to many countries. Three sets of adverse

consequences could potentially occur, and Danish policy-makers surely must have been aware of

them. Firstly, Denmark’s small state foreign policy platform would be eroded as both altruistic and

26

commercial consensus would suffer. So would security interests that were part and parcel of aid

efforts. Secondly, aid projects and programmes would most likely suffer as they under the threat of

closure would be forced to adopt more short term perspectives. Thirdly, the aid agency and its

affiliates would suffer. As aid became subject to the vagaries of human rights concerns,

employment opportunities would both shrink and be less predictable. Both domestic and foreign

policy concerns worked against making human rights enforcement mandatory.

The argument is further based on the assumption that the aid budgets are indicative of the

status of development aid in Danish foreign policy. The 1990s was characterized by an increase in

Danish aid. The ambition was to reach one per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1992.

During the period 1989-1994 Denmark’s development aid increased by 50 per cent, from DKK

6.65bn in 1989 to 9.04bn in 1994.91 This development occurred first under a Conservative-Liberal-

Social Liberal government and was also affected by a wish to direct aid to Eastern Europe.

However, it gained further momentum under the Social Democratic led government from 1993. In

1995, Denmark, with an aid percentage of 0.97, took the lead among donors well in front of Sweden

with 0.89 per cent, Norway with 0.87 per cent and the Netherlands with 0.80 per cent. Denmark

thus gained first place in the premier league of contributors to development aid and was well aware

of its international image as a front runner.

In 1995 Danida apologized for an under-consumption of DKK 405m. The administration was

criticized for having too much money to be able to spend it in a reasonable way. In January 1997,

therefore, the minister of development was pleased to be able to announce that in 1996 the ministry

had been able to spend the whole of the appropriation and the surplus from 1995.92 Spending

became an end in itself. The ‘aid spending impulse’ and the preservation of Denmark’s image as a

front runner therefore contribute to explaining both the ‘positive’ carrot-rather-than-stick approach

to conditionality as well as the reluctance to attach demands of human rights to Danish aid.

27

After 2001, the previous emphasis on democracy was maintained, but expanded with a

broader aim of combating terrorism and religious extremism. Moreover, human rights compliance

or non-compliance as a consideration in aid policy was in line with important new Danish foreign

policy goals such as combating international terrorism and religious extremism.

This increased focus on human rights in the shape of political-civil rights occurred along with

severe aid reductions. The volume of Denmark’s development aid was reduced from DKK 12.8bn

to 11.9bn between 2001 and 2002. The previous policy of donating one per cent of BNP was

modified to 0.8 per cent. Funding to NGOs was reduced by ten per cent.93 Seemingly, the image of

Denmark as a front runner in development aid was less important in the foreign policy after 2001.

Rather, the government from 2001 gave priority to international activism in the shape of alliance

policy and solidarity with the United States, including participation in the US coalition against Iraq

2003-8. This new priority went hand in hand with an increased focus on human rights in

development aid. Hence, it seems fair to argue that a reduced status of development aid in Danish

foreign policy made room for an increased status of human rights in Danish development aid.

Conclusion

The starting point of Denmark’s development policy in international institutions was to focus

predominantly on economic and social progress. Development aid ought not to be politicized by

emphasizing demands for human rights. A ‘positive’ approach to human rights in aid was favoured

over a ‘negative’ one. This policy was pursued in the UN development bodies. In the DAC and in

the EC negotiations of the revision of the Lomé Convention, Denmark also opposed political

conditionality until the 1990s. In the World Bank, however, Denmark rejected loans in cases of

‘gross violation’ of human rights, e.g. in the case of Chile. Except from the cases of gross violation

in the World Bank, Denmark sought to separate development policy from human rights policy by

28

referring human rights issues to political bodies of the UN (importantly not to UN development

bodies).

The skepticism of the ‘negative’ approach should be seen in relation with the fact that Danish

decision-makers perceived social and economic prosperity as a way to promote human rights, i.e.

decision-makers initially emphasized economic and social rights and hence saw development aid as

a lever for human rights. In the late 1980s, Denmark was among the countries discussing human

rights, including political rights, in development aid in the DAC, but deliberately sought to focus

the human rights agenda in aid purely on democratization. With the emphasis on democracy,

political rights became more pronounced than before, but at the same time, the focus on democracy

was a deliberate way to shape the human rights agenda in a rather circumscribed way.

Human rights were formally integrated into Danish development policy in 1987 following a

domestic debate in which human rights were still discussed in the light of the Cold War. Human

rights were therefore given a rather modest status in the new formal development strategy from

1988 in which they were most often mentioned as the last consideration.

The reluctance towards the ‘negative’ approach changed somewhat in the 1990s which saw

several changes in Danish aid due to political developments and human rights violations. Denmark

now came closer to following the international trend of prioritizing political conditionality.

Nevertheless, the fact that aid cooperation was often resumed indicates that the ‘positive’ approach

to human rights in aid was to a large degree maintained and skepticism towards political

conditionality continued to exist. It was not until after 2001 that political rights and liberties came to

play a more pronounced role in Danish development policy and the previous skepticism of the

‘negative’ approach disappeared. Danish aid to Zimbabwe in 2010, however, indicates that the

‘negative’ approach was pragmatically applied and that the government continued to face the

problem that aid to people risked falling into the hands of oppressing regimes.

29

Public opinion and the status of development aid in Danish foreign policy are important

factors in explaining the status of human rights in Danish development aid. During the Cold War

and in the 1990s the development aid budget was indeed significant in the relative term by

international standards, and aid enjoyed an important role in Danish foreign policy as a platform for

Danish international agency. As a major international donor, Denmark could preserve an image as a

front-runner and pursue an active international policy in the field of development. This aspect helps

to explain why decision-makers were reluctant towards the ‘negative’ approach and political

conditionality and to risk a fundamental debate on Danish development aid.

After 2001, the balance in Danish foreign policy activism changed from emphasizing soft

power to hard power. Danish development aid was reduced and appeared to be less important in

Denmark’s foreign policy. This went hand in hand with a more pronounced emphasis on a broader

set of political rights, including an ambition to combat terrorism and religious extremism, and a

much less sceptical perception of the ‘negative’ approach. Thus, the reduced status of development

aid in Danish foreign policy made room – from the political rights and the political conditionality

point of view - for an increased role of human rights in Danish development aid.

30

I would like to thank Christilla Roederer-Rynning, Dept. of Political Science, U. of Southern Denmark, two

anonymous reviewers and the editors of the book for very valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.1 H. Selbervik, Aid as a tool for promotion of human rights and democracy: What can Norway do? (Oslo 1997), pp. 5-6,

p. 15. 2 K. Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention (The Hague

2000).3 K. Cmiel, ‘The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States’, pp. 1231-50 in: Journal of American

History, vol. 86, no. 3, 1999, pp. 1233-6.4 J. Donnelly, International Human Rights. Dilemmas in World Politics, 2 (Boulder CO 1998), pp. 107-10; L. R. Rehof,

Udviklingsbistand og menneskerettigheder. En oversigt over forskellige donorlandes og organisationers synspunkter

(Copenhagen 1987).5 Parliamentary Records (PR) 1986-97, vol. VIII, 21 May, 1987, clm. 12238; L. A. Rehof, Udviklingsbistand og

menneskerettigheder. En oversight over forskellige donorlandes og organisationers synspunkter (Copenhagen 1987).

Norway's policy on human rights and development has been analyzed by O. Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality:

The Case of Norway', in: O. Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London 1995), pp. 162-200; Selbervik, Aid

as a tool; H. Selbervik, The role of the bilateral donor. A case study of Norwegian-Tanzanian aid relationship (Oslo:

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999); H. Selbervik, ‘Power of the purse? Norway as a donor in the

conditionality epoch 1980-2000’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Bergen 2003). A. E. Ruud with K. A.

Kjerland, Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, vol. 2: 1975-1989: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer (Bergen 2003), pp. 252-9.6 Rehof, Udviklingsbistand og menneskerettigheder; K. Midtgaard, ‘Menneskerettigheder og dansk udviklingsbistand i

1970’erne og 1980’erne’, in: Den Jyske Historiker, 120, 2008, pp. 93-110; K. Midtgaard, 'Menneskerettigheder og

Demokrati i dansk udviklingsbistand i internationale institutioner i 1970erne og 1980erne', in: T. W. Friis and K.

Midtgaard (eds.), Diktatur og demokrati (Odense 2010), pp. 215-36. (These two articles partly represent earlier versions

in Danish of the article at hand). T. B. Olesen, ‘Stabilitet og turbulens: Udviklingspolitikken 1975-1989’, pp. 258-389

in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbæk and N. Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitisk historie 1945-2005

(Copenhagen 2008), pp. 284-5; Chr. F. Bach, ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005’, in: Carsten Due-Nielsen,

O. Feldbæk and N. Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp.

472-81.7 H. L. Madsen and L. Haghfelt, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene og i Dansk U-landspolitik (Copenhagen 1989); O.

Therkildsen, (ed.), Dansk bistand en blandet landhandel, (Copenhagen 1994); K. Tomasevski, Human Rights in

International Development Cooperation: Between Politics and Policy, working paper no. 69 in Development Research

Series (Aalborg: Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR) 1999); H.-O. Sano, ‘Development

and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development’, in: Human Rights

Quarterly 22, 2000, pp. 734-52; E. Neumayer, ‘Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative

Analysis of 21 Donor Countries’, in: Social Science Quaterly, vol. 84, no. 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 650-66; K. D. K Hede,

Menneskerettigheder, demokratisering og good governance i dansk udviklingspolitik, (Copenhagen 2006).8 See eg. Donnelly, International Human Rights, pp. 22-6, L. Haghfelt, ‘Den internationale menneskeret og dansk u-

landsbistand’, In: H. L. Madsen and L. Hagfelt, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene og i Dansk U-landspolitik,

(Copenhagen 1989), p. 163. For a scheme of human rights see Selbervik, Aid as a tool, p. 9.9 Selbervik, Aid as a tool, p. 8.10 F. Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', in: Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1997, pp. 22-23.11 Selbervik, Aid as a tool, pp. 15-28.

12 Haghfelt and Madsen, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene, preface. Because the terms positive and negative are also

more normative expressions, they will be placed in inverted commas (‘positive’ and ‘negative’) when used to describe

the approach to human rights in aid applied by Denmark.13 K. Sikkink, ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe’, pp.

139-72 in: Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (red.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political

Change (Ithaca and London 1993), pp. 139-41; Donnelly, International Human Rights, pp. 108-11.14 For the evolution of international human rights see S.-L. Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century

(New York 2011); S. Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University 2010); S. C. Neff, ‘A Short History of International

Law’, in: M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford 2003), pp. 31-58; A. B. W. Simpson, Human Rights and the

End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford and New York 2001); H. J. Steiner and P.

Alston (ed.), International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2000), part C; P. G. Lauren,

The Evolution of Human Rights. Visions Seen (Philadelphia PA 1998), ch. 6-8 esp. pp. 242-58. For the historiography of

international human rights see, R. Afshari, ‘On Historiography of Human Rights: Reflections on Paul Gordon Lauren’s

The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 29, 2007, pp. 1-67; K.

Cmiel, ‘The Recent History of Human Rights’, in: The American Historical Review, vol. 109, 2004, pp. 117-36. 15 J. Eckel, 'Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions', Humanity, fall 2010, pp. 111-

35.16 For international institutions and international aid programmes see e.g. D. Kapur, J. P. Lewis and R. Webb, The

World Bank. Its first half century (Brookings Institution 1997); C. Caufield, Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the

poverty of nations (London 1997); A. L. S. Staples, The birth of development: how the World Bank, Food and

Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization have changed the world, 1945-65 (Ohio 2005); C. N

Murphy, The United Nations development programme: a better way? (Cambridge 2006). For an interpretation of

development aid during the Cold War arguing for a moral impulse in aid see D. H. Lumsdaine, Moral vision in

international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-89 (Princeton NJ 1993). For an analysis of development policies of

the US, Japan and various European states see C. Lancaster, Foreign Aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics,

Chicago, Ill. (Chicago IL 2007), and Contemporary European History, vol. 12, no. 4, 2003. K. Midtgaard, Småstat,

magt og sikkerhed. Danmark og FN 1949-65 (Odense 2005), pp. 58-63.17 T. B. Olesen, ‘Stabilitet og turbulens: Udviklingspolitikken 1975-89’, in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbæk and N.

Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp. 265-8.18 Olesen, ’Stabilitet og turbulens’, pp. 265-8.19 Ibid, 2008, p. 289. 20 N. Petersen, Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, vol. 6: Europæisk og globalt engagement, 1973-2003 (Copenhagen

2004), pp. 292-359. 21 Archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA), 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s

position on questions of human rights in international development cooperation. (The title of boxes and documents are

translated from Danish to English by author in order for the reader to see what documents the article draws on).22 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.23 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. 17 Nov. 1978. Dan Mission New York. ECOSOC's report. The human rights situation in

Chile.24 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.

25 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note to P.I.-ER. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. 22 March, 1983.

Henning Kjeldgaard.26 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 3. 4 Dec. 1986. Explanation of vote on behalf on Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland by

Ambassador Reijo Korhonen, Permanent Representative of Finland. See also 104 A 31. Box 16. Confidential. Summary

of Nordic Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Oslo, 17-18 Oct., 1985. 27 S. Kaur-Pedersen, ‘Spiren til dansk udviklingspolitik 1945-62’, pp. 24-115, in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbæk og N.

Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitisk historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp. 58-9; Olesen,

‘Stabilitet og turbulens’, pp. 295-302. 28 H. H. Vik, 'Small, not weak? Nordic strategies to influence the World Bank in the 1980s', pp. 333-63 in: H. Pharo and

M.P. Fraser (eds.), The Aid Rush, Aid regimes in Northern Europe during the Cold War, vol. 1 (Oslo 2008), pp. 345-58.

Norway's policy in the World Bank during the 1960s and 1970s has been analyzed in B. T. Rosendahl, ‘Bank og bistand

– prinsipper og realpolitik’, unpublished MA thesis (University of Oslo 1998). I have not been able to consult this MA

thesis.29 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.30 DMFA 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights policy. Minister Lise Østergaard, November/December 1978; Olesen,

‘Stabilitet og turbulens’, p. 285.31 DMFA. 104A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Request by Guatemala for Danish support for World Bank loan. 3. Nov. 1983.

DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation. 32 DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Human Rights in the international financial institutions. 2 Jan. 1978. (The quote

above is translated by author).33 Nordisk Embedsmandskomité.34 DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.

Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.35 DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.

Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.36 DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.

Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.37Translation by author. Quote in original: MR-reservationernas inrikespolitiska bakgrund och nämnde att en

förutsättning för att kunna ha en positiv inställing til Världsbanken och IDB i Danmark var, att regeringen förhöll sig

kritisk til vissa mottagarländer. DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-

10 Nov. 1982.38 DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-10 Nov. 1982.39 DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-10 Nov. 1982.40 DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development

meeting: Multilateral development banks.41 DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development

meeting: Multilateral development banks.42 DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development

meeting: Multilateral development banks.

43 DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.44 DAC in Dates. The History of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, p. 18, available at

<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/38/1896808.pdf> (accessed 13 Jul. 2010).45 Olesen, ‘Stabilitet og turbulens’, pp. 284-5; DMFA. 104 S 6. Box 25. Note. D.2. The consequences of the basic needs

strategy for Denmark’s bilateral development aid. 7 Mar. 1978. (Quotes translated by author).46 DMFA. 104 S 6. Box 9. Summary concerning examination of Denmark in DAC, 15 Dec. 1978.47 DMFA. 106 S 6. Box 46. Statement by Mr. Henrik Wøhlk, Under-Secretaty of State, Danish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. DAC Joint Review Meeting, 20-21 Jun. 1988. Agenda Item 3: Review of Aid in the Nineties.48 DMFA. 106 S 6. Box 46. Contribution to the Danida overview. DAC High Level meeting, 5-6 Dec. 1988. 8 Dec.

1988.49 DMFA. 106 S 6. Box. 46. Statement by Mr. Henrik Wøhlk, Under-Secretaty of State, Danish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. DAC Joint Review Meeting, 20-21 Jun. 1988. Agenda Item 3: Review of Aid in the Nineties.50 DMFA. 104 A 12. Box 9. Summary of Nordic meeting between Heads of Development Agencies. 24-25 Jun., 1988.

(Quote translated by author).51 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box. 2. Note. Denmark’s position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial

institutions. 22 Oct. 1984. 52 Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: the Case of the Lomé Convention (The Hague 2000).53 Olesen, ‘Stabilitet og turbulens’, pp. 277-8; M. Lister, The European Community and the Developing World. The Role

of the Lomé Convention, (Aldershot 1988); Arts, Integrating Human Rights, p. 333.54 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box. 2. Note. Denmark’s position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial

institutions. 22 Oct. 1984.55 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights in the EC development aid policy, in particular the Lomé Convention.

8 Mar. 1978.56 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights in the new Lomé Convention. 17 Nov. 1978.57 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Speech by Minister without Portefolio, Lise Østergaard, at the Council conference with

Commissioner Cheysson. 12 Feb. 1979.58 (’træffe egnede foranstaltninger’, my translation, km). DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s

position on questions of human rights in international development cooperation.59 DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.60 DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.61 Arts, Integrating Human Rights, p. 333.62 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation. Ibid. Note. Denmark’s position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial

institutions. 22 Oct. 1984. For an analysis of Denmark’s development aid to South America, see J. Pedersen, ‘Danmark

og Latinamerika. Udviklingsbistand mellem solidaritetsarbejde og international politik’, in: Den Jyske Historiker, no.

129, 2008, pp. 36-55.63 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmark’s relation with Bolivia. 21 Sept. 1982.64 (‘betydelige forbedringer’, my translation, km). DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmark’s relation with Bolivia. 21

Sep. 1982.

65 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmark’s relation with Bolivia. 21 Sep. 1982.66 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation. The Market Committee (today the European Committee) was a parliamentary committee

with which the Danish government should consult in EC matter and which negotiated the mandate to the Danish

government prior to meetings in the EC Council of Ministers. See T. Knudsen, Fra folkestyre til markedsdemokrati.

Dansk demokratihistorie efter 1973 (Copenhagen 2007), pp. 177-80.67 DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmark’s position on questions of human rights in international

development cooperation.68 PR, 21 May, 1987, clm. 12200-12222.69 Danida, Strategisk planlægning, vol. 10 (Copenhagen 1988), p. 95. (Translation by author).70 Ibid. My translation, km.71 Danida, Strategisk planlægning, vol. 1 (Copenhagen 1988), p. 31, 35, 40, 44 and pp. 48-59.72 Danida, En verden i udvikling – strategi for dansk udviklingsbistand frem mod år 2000 (Copenhagen 1994).73 E.g. Danida, Danidas årsberetning (Copenhagen 1996), pp. 17-9.74 Danida, En verden i udvikling, p. 74.75 Bach, ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005’, pp. 473-4.76 Bach, ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005’, pp. 475-7.77 Ibid., p. 417.78 Ibid., p. 418. (Translation by author).79 Ibid., p. 418. (Translation by author).80 Ibid., p. 481.81 Danida, En verden i udvikling. (Translation by author).82 Danida, Globalisering, 2006-2010 (Copenhagen 2005).83 Det internationale menneskerettighedsarbejde. Strategi for regeringens tilgang. 2009. See

http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Politik-og-diplomati/Fred-sikkerhed-og-retsorden/Dansk

%20Menneskerettighedspolitik/1MRstrategi.ashx (accessed 8 August 2012).84 Danida, Vilje til udvikling (Copenhagen 2006), p. 3.85 Danida, 2007, p. 10.86 (Translation by author). The webpage quoted from does unfortunately no longer exist.

<www.um.dk/da/menu/udviklingspolitik/temaerIBistanden/Godregeringsfoerel,> (accessed 28 April 2009). A similar

understanding of development can be found in Danida, Frihed fra fattigdom – frihed til forandring. Strategi for

Danmarks udviklingssamarbejde. 2010. See http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Politik-og-

diplomati/Fred-sikkerhed-og-retsorden/Dansk%20Menneskerettighedspolitik/

StrategiforDanmarksudviklingssamarbejde.ashx (Accessed 8 August 2012). 87 Hans Davidsen-Nielsen, 'Søren Pind lægger hårdt ud med Mugabes diktaturstat', in: Politiken 24 Feb. 2010.

http://politiken.dk/politik/ECE909369/soeren-pind-laegger-haardt-ud-med-mugabes-diktaturstat/ (accessed 24 Feb.

2010).88 Danida, Freedom from Poverty. Freedom to Change, 2010, p. 15.

http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10529/pdf/freedom_poverty_freedom_change.pdf( accessed 8 August 2012).89 'Kup in Niger bekymrer Danmark', in: Jyllands-Posten 19 Feb. 2010.

http://jyllands-posten.dk/international/article4332185.ece (accessed 8 August 2012).90 Radio Broadcast, P1 Morgen, 3 Mar. 2010. (Translation by author).

91 Bach, ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005’, p. 395. Statistisk Årbog 1994, 1995.92 Bach, ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005’, p. 395, 410.93 Ibid., p. 416-8. Statistisk Årbog 2002.

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