NJTPAIssueReport History of

MetropolitanPlanningOrganizations

The NJTPAThe North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority Inc. is the federally sanctioned MetropolitanOrganization (MPO) for the 13-county northern New Jersey region. As required under the federalIntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, the NJTPA approves nearly $1 billion in transportationprojects each year and provides a forum for interagency cooperation and public participation. It alsosponsors studies, assists member agencies and monitors compliance with air quality goals. Serving 5.8million people, the NJTPA is fourth largest MPO in the nation.The NJTPA Board consists of one electedofficial from each of the region’s 13 counties and two major cities, Newark and Jersey City.The Boardalso includes a Governor’s Representative, the Commissioner of the NJ Department of Transportation,the Executive Directors of NJ Transit and the Port Authority of NY & NJ and a Citizen’s Representativeappointed by the Governor.The NJTPA Board meetings are held monthly and are open to the public.

This publication was produced with funding from the FederalTransit Administration and the Federal HighwayAdministration. The NJTPA is solely responsible for its con-tent. The host agency for the NJTPA is the New JerseyInstitute of Technology.

Board of Trustees 1997J. William Van DykeChairman NJTPA Freeholder, Bergen CountyRichard MrozGovernor’s RepresentativeJohn J. HaleyCommissioner, NJDOTShirley DeLiberoExecutive Director, NJ Transit Corp.Robert E. BoyleExecutive Director, PA NY & NJBrian P. MurphyCitizens’ Representative Linda Lordi-CavanaughFreeholder, Essex CountySharpe JamesMayor, City of Newark Robert C. JaniszewskiCounty Executive, Hudson CountyPaul SauerlandFreeholder, Hunterdon CountyRobert CavanaughCouncilman, Jersey CityDavid B. CrabielFreeholder, Middlesex CountyTheodore J. NarozanickFreeholder, Monmouth CountyJohn C. O’KeeffeFreeholder, Morris CountyJames J. ManciniFreeholder, Ocean CountyScott RumanaFreeholder, Passaic CountyFred J. HowlettFreeholder, Somerset CountyRichard DurinaFreeholder, Sussex CountyDonald GoncalvesFreeholder, Union CountySusan DickeyFreeholder, Warren County

Joel S. WeinerExecutive Director, NJTPA

Cover Legend:

North Jersey TransportationPlanning Authority, Inc.

One Newark Center, 17th FloorNewark, NJ 07102

973.639.8400

by Mark SolofJanuary 1998

History ofMetropolitan

PlanningOrganizations

Contents1 Origins of Regional Planning:1900-1940

2 Regional Responses to the Suburban Land Rush:1940-1969

3 Toward More Balanced Transportation Through MPOs:1969-1983

4 New MPOs for a New Era:1983-1997

Conclusion

Source Notes

Bibliography

6

10

18

28

32

33

34

he United States may be one nation under God but, politically, it is fractured into a multitudeof jurisdictions—states, counties, municipalities, school districts, election wards and more.Whilenecessary for governance, taxation and administration of public services, these jurisdictions, for

the most part, bear little relation to the distribution of population and economic activity across thelandscape.

Over the last century, the settlement of land in ever-widening rings around the nation’s major citieshas created regional economies that spanlocal government boundaries and often statelines. In effect, the invisible hand of the markethas shaped the man-made landscape with lit-

tle regard to the formal divisions decreed by government.

The federal government has recognized this organic, market-driven growth process by identifyingover 300 “metropolitan areas” across the country. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, each consistsof “a core area containing a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a highdegree of economic and social integration with that core.”

The federal government has also recognized that the integrity and vitality of these areas are depen-dent on the large-scale circulation of goods and people over regionwide transportation networks.Yetthe fragmented political authority in most metropolitan areas makes it difficult to address regionaltransportation impacts and needs.

For over two decades, the federal government has sought to address this failing by requiring statesto establish Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), composed of local elected officials and stateagency representatives, to review and approve transportation investments in metropolitan areas.TheNorth Jersey Transportation Planning Authority is the MPO for northern New Jersey.

But because they bridge traditional boundaries and lines of authority, from the start, MPOs havebeen controversial. Critics have argued that they usurp legitimate functions of state governments andconstitute an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. Supporters say they are important mechanisms forinsuring local control over federal funding and that they deserve wider authority to implement theplans they create.

Congress, while consistently upholding the need for MPOs, periodically has refined their functionsand authority. During the fall of 1997, it was in the midst of doing so again as it considered reauthoriz-ing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act—the enabling legislation for MPOs .

To provide historical perspective on this Congressional debate, the NJTPA published a series ofthree articles on the history of MPOs which appeared in the NJTPA Quarterly during 1996 and 1997.The articles made use of secondary sources to sketch the origins and administrative history of MPOsin the context of the broader developments in the nation, government and the field of regional plan-ning.This publication provides the full text of the history series with added source notes and a bibliog-raphy.

Introduction

T

Origins of Regional Planning: 1900-1940

Chapter I

GGrowth of the nation's metropolitan areas was made possible and sustained byimprovements in the transportation system. In the 19th century, canals and then railroadshelped knit together local and regional markets into a single national economy. Cities withlong-established marine ports such as New York and those situated at the hub of major railroutes such as Chicago became the command centers for the emerging national economy. Theirindustries took in raw materials and fed back finished goods to the rest of the nation. Theyalso served as the headquarters of new business organizations, nationwide in scope, whichgenerated growing numbers of well paying jobs, swelling the ranks of the middle class.

As the cities prospered, they drew in waves of immigrants from around the globe.Soon, new innovations in transportation—horse-drawn railways, electric streetcars and finally,the automobile—provided the circulation systems needed for further growth, spreading popu-lation and productive capacities into wide regions around the urban core. Each city came tosit "like a spider in the midst of its transportation web," according to Lewis Mumford.

Imposing order on the rapid and often chaotic growth of metropolitan areas initiallybecame the cause of Progressive Era reformers, academics and specialists in the new field ofcity planning. While their most visionary plans were never realized, they conducted importantstudies of regional needs and laid the groundwork for eventual federal programs to supportcomprehensive regional planning. This chapter traces the origins of regional planning in thefirst decades of the century.

Congestionwas a problemlong before theautomobile.

FHWA

Progressive Rootsecognition of the need forplanning on a regionalscale has its roots in the“Progressive Era,” roughly

the first two decades of the century.This was a time of great optimismfor the growing middle class, whenscience was seen as offering thepath to a more prosperous, efficientand orderly future. Applying scien-tific principles, industry helped sat-isfy material wants through massproduction of goods and helpedease domestic burdens with a suc-cession of new electric appliances.

Meanwhile, a new intel-lectual elite of “social” scien-tists promoted the reorganiza-tion of public and privateinstitutions along more ratio-nal lines. In consort with busi-ness leaders and reform-mind-ed politicians, this elite initiat-ed a variety of crusades toimprove the lot of the mass ofpeople, economically andsocially. They advocated gov-ernment run by civil servants,breakup of monopoly compa-nies, “home economics,” com-pulsory education beyondgrade school and prohibitionof alcohol.

One of the great chal-lenges faced in the ProgressiveEra was massive urbanization.Cities were growing rapidly as aresult of both unprecedented immi-gration as well as the influx of pop-ulation from rural areas. Socialreformers, taking aim at overcrowd-ed and unhealthful living condi-tions, pressured city governmentsto institute sanitation and buildingcodes. Later they fought haphazarddevelopment patterns, includingthe siting of commercial and indus-

trial facilities in residential neigh-borhoods. In response, cities drewup plans for segregating land usesand instituted the first zoning ordi-nances to enforce them.

Cities were also expandingoutwardly. Many families fledinner-city crowding to homes insuburbs that had access to city jobsvia streetcar or commuter rail lines.By the 1920s, as automobile owner-ship grew, wider areas were openedup to settlement, with many ruralvillages transformed by a wave ofhousing development for urbancommuters. Most of this growth

occurred with little forethought orgovernment intervention. Indeed,existing government structurescould only address the trends on apiecemeal basis and, as a result,many problems were left unad-dressed including mounting high-way congestion, polluted rivers, dis-appearing open spaces and inade-quate water and sewer systems. Itwas only natural that the

Progressive Era emphasis on pro-moting rational organization wouldbe brought to bear on the growingdispersion of population and eco-nomic activity in broad regionsaround major cities.

Practical NeedsThe first efforts at regionwide

planning began in the 1920s.While academics provided the the-ory and social science tools forregional planning (see sidebar p.8), practical considerations moti-vated their use. For instance, bythe end of World War I, a long-

running dispute between New Yorkand New Jersey over rail freightbusiness reached a point whereonly a solution at a regional scalewas possible. The dispute centeredon rates charged by rail companiesthat encouraged goods to be movedfrom rail terminals in New Jersey toships berthed in New York. NewJersey claimed the rates limited thedevelopment of maritime businesson its side of the port. At one

7

Issue Report

R

Trolleys and later autosopened up the suburbs todevelopment: BloomfieldAve. in Glen Ridge, 1921.

Newark Public

Origins: 1900-1940

point, a lawsuit threatened, Solomon-like, to split the port into twozones, reducing its ability to efficiently serve shippers and leading tothe loss of business to other East Coast ports.

New York business leaders recognized the threat and proposed anew bi-state agency to provide unified planning and policies for theport. Backed by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission, thebusiness leaders finally succeeded in 1921 in getting the two states tocreate the Port of New York Authority (later to become the PortAuthority of New York and New Jersey). The authority was the firstinterstate governmental body in the nation and the first special-pur-pose “authority” with power to issue bonds and make investmentswhile insulated from political control. In its first year, the Port of NewYork Authority set about developing a comprehensive plan for improv-ing the entire port with new terminals and connections among raillines

As this ambitious port plan took shape, other planning effortswere initiated to address a host of emerging regional-level problems.Again, New York area business leaders, together with a growing num-ber of professional city planners, broke important ground. In the early

Mixing Science &Utopia

At the turn of the century, the sys-

tematic collection and analysis of data to help

understand and solve urban problems was a

new concept. Early practitioners sought to put

city planning on the same footing as the “sci-

entific management” then being widely imple-

mented in industry to maximize worker pro-

ductivity and profits. However, the problems

faced in cities were infinitely more complex

than those on the shop floor. Standard meth-

ods for studying urban problems took many

years to develop. Notable advances came in

the 1920s, with the advent of new survey

research and statistical techniques.

During that decade, a number of

the academics offered grand visions for

restructuring urban regions. Many drew upon

the utopian vision of Ebenezer Howard who

in the 1890s urged that excess urban popula-

tion be shifted to planned “garden” cities, sur-

rounded by “greenbelts” of parks, farms and

open land. The cities would contain enough

business and industry to achieve a degree of

economic self-sufficiency. A number of

planned communities, including Radburn in

Fairlawn Borough, New Jersey, were inspired

by the Garden City vision. In the 1920s and

1930s, Lewis Mumford was among the most

prominent advocates for garden cities.

Together with strong land use planning, he

saw them as a means to achieve a rational dis-

tribution of population and economic growth

in each region (“balanced urban communities

within balanced regions”).

Vision for Auto-Oriented Suburbs Circa 1928: the com-munity of Radburn in Fair Lawn, NJ was designed with“superblocks” of 30-50 acres with cul-de-sacs, interior

parks and extensive walkways.

New

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Issue Report

1920s, the Russell Sage Foundationappointed a committee to developa “Regional Plan of New York andIts Environs.” The work grew into amassive undertaking, includingextensive surveys, data collectionand economic projections, focusingupon New York City and 500 com-munities in three states withincommuting distance of Manhattan.The pioneering work would contin-ue for most of the decade duringwhich most other major cities inthe U.S. initiated similar “compre-hensive” regional plans.

The first volume of the NewYork plan was issued in 1929 andpresented recommendations onnearly every aspect of regionaldevelopment, including calls forthe development of satellite citiesin outlying areas, the control ofland-use to preserve open spacesand the construction of new railand highway networks.

Implementation of such a far-reaching plan was problematic. Theauthors hoped that the logic oftheir recommendations would domuch to promote voluntary com-pliance by affected governments inthe tri-state region. A private plan-ning organization, the RegionalPlan Association, was created topromote this compliance and con-duct follow-up research.

However, the experience ofthe Port of New York Authority didnot bode well for achieving volun-tary compliance. Lacking power toforce cooperation among the highlycompetitive freight rail companiesin the region, the Port Authoritywas blocked in implementing manyelements of its plan for creating anintegrated freight rail network.Critics argued that the recommen-dations of the Regional Plan of

New York, and of comprehensiveplans elsewhere in the country,would be similarly blocked by thecompeting interests of local gov-ernments. One planning professor,Thomas Reed, in 1925 contendedthat the only way to insure effec-tive regional planning was the cre-ation of “areawide” governmentswith power over municipalities insetting policies for regional infra-structure.

The Great DepressionQuestions about the imple-

mentation of comprehensive plansin New York and other citiesbecame all but moot in the face ofthe economic collapse of the GreatDepression. Where toll or otherdedicated funding sources wereavailable or where the federal gov-ernment would foot the bill, select-ed infrastructure projects recom-mended by regional plans werebuilt. The New York region faredparticularly well, with the GeorgeWashington Bridge, LincolnTunnel and other major transporta-tion facilities built in the 1930s.But, by-and-large, visions of pro-moting orderly urban regions withplanned communities and efficientinfrastructure systems, were aban-doned as cities struggled with des-perate social and economic condi-tions.

Still, the regional planningexperience of the 1920s exerted animportant continuing influence.Through the empirical techniquesof the social sciences, planningefforts in major cities had docu-mented the regional nature ofmany social and economic prob-lems. In doing so, they also createda strong case for new institutionsand decision-making mecha-

nisms— such as authorities andregional planning commissions—tosupplement fragmented politicalstructures.

The federal government, for itspart, carried the torch of regionalplanning forward as it intervenedto revive the economy in the1930s. President Roosevelt, withgreat interest in natural conserva-tion, encouraged and supportedcooperative planning by govern-ments in river valleys to addressflood control, soil erosion andother shared needs. He also initiat-ed a massive federal experiment inregional planning by creating theTennessee Valley Authority whichaddressed not only water resourcesissues but electrification, agricultur-al improvement, housing and eco-nomic development.

Many New Deal programswere administered regionally andencouraged cooperation amonglocal officials. The Public WorksAdministration, in particular,helped state and local governmentsdevelop the planning capabilitiesneeded for large-scale infrastructureprojects. But there was a catch.Planning was to be in accordancewith national standards as a condi-tion for the receipt of federal infra-structure aid. This requirement setthe pattern for future intergover-mental relations: the federal gov-ernment used aid as a lever for pro-moting achievement of nationalgoals and for persuading state andlocal governments to look beyondtheir narrow self-interests in mak-ing infrastructure and social invest-ments.

RegionalResponses tothe SuburbanLand Rush:1940-1969

10

Chapter II

At the end of World War II, America wastransformed by rapid suburbanization which broughthousing, retail and other development sprawling outin every direction around major urban centers. Asthe transformation proceeded, public and privateleaders recognized that existing government struc-tures were inadequate to deal with the problemsthat arose—not the least of them, inadequate trans-portation, water and other infrastructure systems,the loss of open spaces and the decline of urbanneighborhoods.

This recognition prompted the creation ofnumerous regional planning bodies. With regulatoryand financial backing by the federal government,these bodies by the 1960s took on a variety of offi-cial planning functions for their regions. Still, theywere seldom able to exert influence over the landuse decisions of local governments or the trans-portation decisions of state agencies which helpeddrive the continuing suburban land rush.

This chapter traces the post-war develop-ments in regional planning that set the stage for theformal establishment of MPOs in the early 1970s.

“Garden State Parkway Booms JerseyCoast”-Newark Star Ledger featurearticle, 1957.

Newark PublicLibrary

Preparing a NewFuture

During World War II, govern-ment and industry leaders werekeenly aware of the need to planfor the post-war period. After adecade or more of pent-up demandfor housing and consumer goods,the nation was poised for anunprecedented peacetime econom-ic boom. However, the leadersknew that if this demand was not

capitalized upon effectively, thenation could easily slip back intothe unemployment and stagnationof the pre-war years.

Thus, alongside the patrioticfervor for the war effort, planningfor a new post-war Americabecame a national preoccupation.In a number of major cities region-al alliances were launched in whichpublic officials joined forces withprivate industry and surrounding

local governments tochart strategies fortheir post-war future.Their efforts were sup-ported at the federallevel by the NationalResources PlanningBoard (NRPB), until itwas disbanded byCongress in 1943. Theagency urged a “com-prehensive” approachto post-war planningthat would make use of

surveys and community forums andrecognize “the interrelatedness ofproblems of population, economicactivities, social patterns [and]physical arrangements.”

But by and large the alliancespaid little heed to urgings of NRPBfor comprehensive planning—oreven to the lessons learned in the1920s about the problems of unfet-tered regional growth. The domi-nant view was that, if regions wereto seize the coming economicopportunities, bold initiativeswould be required. Rather thanengage in the cautious planningadvocated by the NRPB, mostregional alliances focused uponpreparing housing, business devel-opment and infrastructure projectsthat could be quickly implementedwith the war’s end.

Planning new freeways becamea favored activity. Many of theregional transportation systemsenvisioned were straight out of the

Issue Report

11

The GM Futurama exhibit atthe 1939 World’s Fair inspiredpostwar highway systems.

13

Issue Report

General Motors’ “Futurama” exhib-it at the 1939 World’s Fair—citieslinked and served by networks ofcongestion-free, limited-accesshighways that presumably wouldmake the nation’s crowded andrun-down mass transit systems a

thing of the past. In 1944,Congress gave its endorsement tothis “motor age” vision with initialauthorization for construction of anationwide interstate highway sys-tem. If the nation was to moveboldly into the future, apparently itwould do so solely by automobile.

Suburban Land RushBy the end of 1946, 10 million

men and women were discharged

from the armedservices and newfamily formationrose to a record 1.4million per year.The need for newhousing to accom-modate themreached near-crisisproportions. Thenational housingagency estimatedthat five millionnew housing unitswere neededimmediately and12.5 million wouldbe needed over thenext decade.

Private devel-opers jumped atthe opportunity.Using pre-fabricat-ed materials,

“cookie-cutter” plans and standard-ized construction techniques to cre-ate “tract” housing developments,the developers sought to attractveterans—with their generous GImortgage benefits—and middleclass urban dwellers eager to enjoythe privacy and amenities of new,detached suburban homes.

The most aggressive and suc-cessful of the private developerswas Levitt and Sons, who trans-formed potato farms on Long Islandinto the 17,000-home Levittown,creating the model for similar com-munities in Pennsylvania and NewJersey. By 1950, according to oneestimate, Levitt was producing onefour-room house every 16 minutes.

In all, three-fifths of all newhousing in the late 1940’s was builtin the suburbs. On the heels of thesuburban housing boom, retailers,manufacturers and other businesses

sought out suburban locations,resulting in an increasing disper-sion of economic activity that hadlong been compacted in andaround major cities.

The dispersion, in addition tomeeting the material and employ-ment needs of the new suburban-ites, was viewed by military officialsas having strategic benefits, mak-ing the nation’s population andproductive capacities less vulnera-ble to nuclear attacks against majorcities. Architect Frank LloydWright put it bluntly: “The urban-ite must either be willing to get outof the city or be resigned to blow-ing up with it.” This cold-war cal-culus provided further impetus tonational-level support for a contin-uing suburban land rush.

Federal Planning AidInevitably, many rural commu-

nities faced growing pains inaccommodating waves of new resi-dents. In some areas, the painsbecame outright sickness.Symptoms included poorly laid-outhousing developments and inade-quate schools, roads and water andsewer systems. Many homeownersalso faced their share of woes fromslapdash building methods, includ-ing leaky roofs and faulty sewerhook-ups. Planner and historianLewis Mumford, surveying thegrowing chaos in many areas,termed it “the suburban falloutfrom the metropolitan explosion.”

The nation’s cities, too, wereshaken. The loss of middle classresidents and business further exac-erbated the social and economicproblems that had received scantattention through the long years ofeconomic depression and then war.

Congress responded with

By the end of 1946, 10million men and womenwere discharged fromthe armed services andnew family formationrose to a record 1.4million per year.

Highways laid the path for the suburban housingboom: Land cleared for the Route 4 (later, GardenState) Parkway in Cranford, circa 1948.Inset: Parkway construction in Woodbridge, 1949

New

Jer

sey

Sta

te A

rch

ives

, D

ept.

of S

tate

General Motors’ “Futurama” exhibitat the 1939 World’s Fair—citieslinked and served by networks ofcongestion-free, limited-accesshighways that presumably wouldmake the nation’s crowded andrun-down mass transit systems athing of the past. In 1944,Congress gave its endorsement tothis “motor age” vision with initialauthorization for construction of anationwide interstate highway

system. If the nation was to moveboldly into the future, apparently it would do so solely by automobile.

Suburban Land RushBy the end of 1946, 10 million

men and women were discharged from the armed services and new family formation rose to a record 1.4 million per year. The need for new housing to accommodate them reached near-crisis propor-

tions. The national housing agency estimated that five million new housing units were needed immediately and 12.5 million would be needed over the next decade.

Private devel-opers jumped at the opportunity. Using pre-fabricated mate-rials, cookie-cutter plans and standard-ized construction techniques to create “tract” housing developments, the developers sought to

attract veterans—with their gen-erous GI mortgage benefits—and middle class urban dwellers eager to enjoy the privacy and amenities of new, detached suburban homes.

The most aggressive and successful of the private devel-opers was Levitt and Sons, who transformed potato farms on Long Island into the 17,000-home Levittown, creating the model for similar communities in Pennsyl-vania and New Jersey. By 1950, according to one estimate, Levitt was producing one four-room house every 16 minutes.

But blacks and other minori-ties were generally not welcomed. Even after 1948 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that clauses in sales agreements discriminating against minorities were unen-forceable, many contracts still contained them and realtors and developers used “steering” and other methods to keep non-whites out of prime suburban locations.

Still, in all, three-fifths of all new housing in the late 1940’s was built in the suburbs. On the heels

of the suburban housing boom, retailers, manufacturers and other businesses sought out suburban locations, resulting in an increas-ing dispersion of economic activity that had long been compacted in and around major cities.

The dispersion, in addition to meeting the material and employ-ment needs of the new suburban-ites, was viewed by military officials as having strategic benefits, making the nation’s population and productive capacities less vulner-able to nuclear attacks against major cities. Architect Frank Lloyd Wright put it bluntly: “The urbanite must either be willing to get out of the city or be resigned to blowing up with it.” This cold-war calculus provided further impetus to national-level support for a con-tinuing suburban land rush.

Federal Planning AidInevitably, many rural com-

munities faced growing pains in accommodating waves of new resi-dents. In some areas, the pains be-came outright sickness. Symptoms included poorly laid-out housing developments and inadequate schools, roads and water and sewer systems. Many homeowners also faced their share of woes from slap-dash building methods, including leaky roofs and faulty sewer hook-ups. Planner and historian Lewis Mumford, surveying the growing chaos in many areas, termed it “the suburban fallout from the metro-politan explosion.”

The nation’s cities, too, were shaken. The loss of middle class residents and business further ex-acerbated the social and economic problems that had received scant attention through the long years of economic depression and then war.

Congress responded with

By the end of 1946, 10 million men and women were discharged from the armed services and new family formation rose to a record 1.4 million per year.

13

Issue Report

General Motors’ “Futurama” exhib-it at the 1939 World’s Fair—citieslinked and served by networks ofcongestion-free, limited-accesshighways that presumably wouldmake the nation’s crowded andrun-down mass transit systems a

thing of the past. In 1944,Congress gave its endorsement tothis “motor age” vision with initialauthorization for construction of anationwide interstate highway sys-tem. If the nation was to moveboldly into the future, apparently itwould do so solely by automobile.

Suburban Land RushBy the end of 1946, 10 million

men and women were discharged

from the armedservices and newfamily formationrose to a record 1.4million per year.The need for newhousing to accom-modate themreached near-crisisproportions. Thenational housingagency estimatedthat five millionnew housing unitswere neededimmediately and12.5 million wouldbe needed over thenext decade.

Private devel-opers jumped atthe opportunity.Using pre-fabricat-ed materials,

“cookie-cutter” plans and standard-ized construction techniques to cre-ate “tract” housing developments,the developers sought to attractveterans—with their generous GImortgage benefits—and middleclass urban dwellers eager to enjoythe privacy and amenities of new,detached suburban homes.

The most aggressive and suc-cessful of the private developerswas Levitt and Sons, who trans-formed potato farms on Long Islandinto the 17,000-home Levittown,creating the model for similar com-munities in Pennsylvania and NewJersey. By 1950, according to oneestimate, Levitt was producing onefour-room house every 16 minutes.

In all, three-fifths of all newhousing in the late 1940’s was builtin the suburbs. On the heels of thesuburban housing boom, retailers,manufacturers and other businesses

sought out suburban locations,resulting in an increasing disper-sion of economic activity that hadlong been compacted in andaround major cities.

The dispersion, in addition tomeeting the material and employ-ment needs of the new suburban-ites, was viewed by military officialsas having strategic benefits, mak-ing the nation’s population andproductive capacities less vulnera-ble to nuclear attacks against majorcities. Architect Frank LloydWright put it bluntly: “The urban-ite must either be willing to get outof the city or be resigned to blow-ing up with it.” This cold-war cal-culus provided further impetus tonational-level support for a contin-uing suburban land rush.

Federal Planning AidInevitably, many rural commu-

nities faced growing pains inaccommodating waves of new resi-dents. In some areas, the painsbecame outright sickness.Symptoms included poorly laid-outhousing developments and inade-quate schools, roads and water andsewer systems. Many homeownersalso faced their share of woes fromslapdash building methods, includ-ing leaky roofs and faulty sewerhook-ups. Planner and historianLewis Mumford, surveying thegrowing chaos in many areas,termed it “the suburban falloutfrom the metropolitan explosion.”

The nation’s cities, too, wereshaken. The loss of middle classresidents and business further exac-erbated the social and economicproblems that had received scantattention through the long years ofeconomic depression and then war.

Congress responded with

By the end of 1946, 10million men and womenwere discharged fromthe armed services andnew family formationrose to a record 1.4million per year.

Highways laid the path for the suburban housingboom: Land cleared for the Route 4 (later, GardenState) Parkway in Cranford, circa 1948.Inset: Parkway construction in Woodbridge, 1949

New

Jer

sey

Sta

te A

rch

ives

, D

ept.

of S

tate

14

Land Rush: 1940-1969

major housing legislation, first in1949 and again in 1954. The actsprimarily supported continued sub-urban development, with financingand insurance programs benefitingboth homebuyers and builders. Butthe acts also authorized federal aidto cities for urban renewal and pub-lic housing and supported newregional planning efforts. Section701 of the 1954 Act for the firsttime gave federal grants for coun-cils of governments and other met-ropolitan planning agencies to pro-mote cooperation in analyzing andaddressing regional problems.

Testifying beforeCongress, urbanplanning profes-

sor Robert Mitchell argued thatsuch planning aid was needed tobuild “awareness that central citiesand suburbs are interdependent andcannot survive in the present gov-ernmental and physical chaos.”

The federal aid proved popu-lar, prompting the formation ofnearly 100 metropolitan planningbodies. Yet, while the new agenciesimproved intergovernmental coop-eration, they generally were ham-strung by their inability to directlyshape local government land usepolicies. Indeed, many local offi-cials supported regional planningonly to the extent that it wouldsustain their capacity to ac-commo-date the windfall of developmentprojects coming their way.

Some communities chose to goit alone, hiring consultants todevelop master plans that wouldrein in the more disorderly aspects

of growth. The extreme case wasthe community of Mountain Lakes,New Jersey, which purchased allthe town’s vacant, developable landto be parceled out only for thoseprojects that fit the sensibilities ofits wealthy residents.

Interstate HighwaysThe ambivalence on the part

of local officials towards regionalplanning changed dramaticallywith the 1956 Federal AidHighway Act. The legislationauthorized construction of themulti-billion dollar, 41,000 mileinterstate highway system as well asproviding aid for primary, sec-ondary and lesser roads. The systemconstituted the largest constructionprogram in the nation’s history —-on the scale of 60 Panama Canals.With the choice of routes left up tostate highway departments, manylocal officials found new cause toembrace cooperation through met-ropolitan planning agencies toavoid having routes imposed onthem and to gain bargaining cloutin negotiations with their states.

Still, the resulting cooperationhad few of the features of the com-prehensive regional planning advo-cated years earlier by the NRPBwhen the interstate system wasconceived. Rather much of the“planning” was of a narrow, techni-cal nature focusing on routingalignments. Despite the urging ofthe planning community, the Actdid not require routes to conformto metropolitan plans already inplace or to give consideration tocrucial land use issues, such as howparticular routes could open upwide areas to new waves of subur-ban development and sprawl. Alsothe Act all but neglected the fur-

ther damage that could be done tourban transit systems, whichalready were pitched into a steepdecline due to competition withthe automobile.

The decision to forge aheadwith the massive interstate high-way system with only dim recogni-tion of its potential consequencespartly stemmed from the influenceon Congress of those with some-thing to gain from the system—thedefense establishment, developers,auto manufactures, oil companies,state and local engineers and oth-ers.

But it also reflected a peculiar-ly-1950s outlook about the future.It was a decade of national self-assurance when American industri-al and military might dominatedmuch of the world. Any challengeswhich might appear on the hori-zon, the view went, would yield totechnology and American ingenu-ity.

Faith in the future was alsostrong among transportation offi-cials in the 1950s. Even the demiseof mass transit systems was seen asamenable to technical fixes. Forinstance, a 1956 BrookingsInstitution report stated that “Inthe coming decade the develop-ment of regional mass transporta-tion by helicopter or convertiplanemay provide the longer distancecommuting services now providedby interurban buses and commuterrail lines.”

All this added up to a confi-dence in building large-scale pro-jects in the name of progress, leav-ing the consequences to be sortedout later. It was an outlook personi-fied in “master builder” RobertMoses who, from the 1930s on,

15

Issue Report

oversaw the construction of majorhighways, bridges and parkways inand around New York City—as helashed out at “ivory tower plan-ners” for being preoccupied withpotential complications.

Three-C PlanningBy the late 1950s, the effects

of a decade or more of rapid subur-ban growth began to dampen thewidespread “build it now” enthusi-asm. Many planners and publicofficials were alarmed at thenation’s changing landscape. In1958, planner William Whyte

noted that a traveler flyingfrom Los Angeles to SanBernardino “can see a legionof bulldozers gnawing intothe last remaining tract ofgreen between the twocities.” On a flight overnorthern New Jersey, hesaid, the traveler “has afleeting illusion of greenspace, but most of it hasalready been bought up andoutlying supermarkets anddrive-in theaters are omensof what is to come.”

These concerns led tostudies during theEisenhower Administrationof new government struc-tures and policies that couldhelp improve local planningand coordination. Manystudy recommendationswere enacted under theKennedy Administration aspart of the Housing Act of1961 which provided grantsfor mass transit and openspace preservation andexpanded funding andincentives for metropolitantransportation planning.

Afurther,andhis-

toric, step in addressing the prob-lems of rapid suburbanization camewith the enactment of theHighway Act of 1962. It made fed-eral highway aid to areas with pop-ulations over 50,000 contingent onthe “establishment of a continuingand comprehensive transportationplanning process carried out coop-

eratively by state and local commu-nities.” This required planningprocess—known as “three-C” plan-ning for its continuing, comprehen-sive and cooperative features—established the basis for metropoli-tan transportation planning used tothe present day.

While regional cooperationand comprehensiveness had beenlong-sought goals of the planningcommunity, the Act’s requirementfor continuous planning recognizedthat in a rapidly changing andincreasingly complicated environ-ment—which included dramaticpopulation growth resulting fromthe post-war baby boom—regionalplans had to be dynamic docu-ments, subject to revision based oncontinuing data collection andfeedback. Advancements in com-puter technology and social scienceresearch techniques became impor-tant tools for conducting this con-tinuous planning.

Three-C in PracticeIn the year following the adop-

tion of the 1962 Act, governmentsthroughout the country scrambledto put in place the required three-C process. The response of officialsin the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut metropolitan regionwas typical of major urban regions.Since the late 1950’s, the non-prof-it Regional Plan Association, withinput from many of the area’s offi-cials, had been developing a com-prehensive plan for meeting theregion’s infrastructure needs. As aresult of the 1962 Act, a new offi-cial body, the Tri-State RegionalPlanning Committee (later the Tri-State Regional PlanningCommission), was created to buildupon this planning effort and

On a flight overnorthern New Jersey,he said, the traveler“has a fleeting illusionof green space, butmost of it has alreadybeen bought up andoutlying supermarketsand drive-in theatersare omens of what isto come.”

16

Land Rush: 1940-1969

administer the region’s three-Ctransportation planning process. Anumber of similar metropolitanplanning bodies were created acrossthe country and some existing vol-untary and quasi-official re-gionalbodies gained official status.

Despite the high initial expec-tations created among many plan-ners by the new organizations andthe enlightened nature of thethree-C requirements, the weak-nesses of the Act became clear insubsequent years. Implementationof the Act was the responsibility ofthe federal Bureau of Public Roads(BPR) which was closely alliedwith state highway departmentsand organizations dedicated toroadway construction. Accordingto urban planning professorThomas A. Morehouse, the three-C planning requirement was seen

by these highway interests as “apotentially disruptive innovativeforce, threatening established poli-cies, procedures, commitments andsystems of decision-making.” Ofparticular concern to highwayinterests was the possibility thatlocal officials acting through newregional organizations—with man-dates for comprehensive planningin hand—could block or slow con-struction of segments of the inter-state system which were then werebeing pushed through densely pop-ulated metropolitan areas.

To avert the threat, BPR inter-preted the Act in ways that pre-served the authority of state high-way departments. For instance,states were able to fulfill the “coop-erative planning” requirement bynegotiating agreements directlywith local governments, bypassing

regional planning organizations.These agreements typically allowedlocal officials to participate in tech-nical studies, initiated and domi-nated by state highway depart-ments, for planning the implemen-tation of specific roadway projectsor for establishing long-rangeregionwide capital plans. Land use,mass transit and social issues wereusually given only passing consider-ation.

One result of BPR’s “artful”interpretation of the requiredthree-C process was that regionalplanning agencies were left largelyas adjuncts to state highway depart-ments which relied upon them forcollecting and interpreting dataand perhaps for input on how roadconstruction within their regionsshould proceed. In effect, the 1950s“build it now” approach to projectdevelopment lived on in the 1960s,though it was now tempered bysomewhat greater local participa-tion and informed by increasinglysophisticated technical studies.

1960s ProgressWhile many of the hopes of

the early 1960s were never fullyrealized, the cause of improvedregional planning was by no meansvanquished. With crucial supportby President Johnson and his polit-ical allies, major transportation andhousing legislation during thedecade progressively expanded therole and authority of regional plan-ning agencies (see box, right). Inhis message to Congress shortlyafter his election, Johnson notedthat in confronting housing, trans-portation or other urban problems,metropolitan planning was neededto “teach us to think on a scale aslarge as the problem itself and act

New homes under construction in Toms River, 1966.

Newark Public

to prepare for the future as well asrepair the past.”

In addition to new responsibil-ities in the areas of environmentaland transit planning, regional bod-ies were entrusted with reviewingall applications for federal aid toinsure they were consistent withareawide plans and were coordinat-ed with other federal-aid projects.

Though carefully crafted topreserve the prerogatives of busi-ness and avoid the taint of “biggovernment,” these legislativerequirements were a significant steptowards comprehensive regionalplanning. Their enactment reflect-ed an often grudging recognitionamong politicians that the nationcould simply not afford to buildmajor projects that would trans-form its landscape and communi-ties without attention to the conse-quences that, more often than not,played out on a regional scale. Thisrecognition sprang, on the onehand, from increasing sophistica-tion in social and environmentalsciences that brought to light thedamage done by unthinking poli-cies of the past and that offeredimportant new tools and method-ologies for planning the future. Onthe other hand, mass movementsand urban riots showed that nar-row, technical approaches to prob-lems could neglect critical socialfactors, with potentially devastatingresults.

The greatest impact of the leg-islative mandates was felt in thenation’s largest metropolitan areaswhere regional agencies like theTri-State Regional PlanningCommission in New York and theDelaware Valley Regional PlanningCommission in Philadelphia tookon multiple official functions in

cooperation with states and localgovernments. However, across thecountry, the bulk of staff resources,engineering expertise and politicalinfluence needed to see plansthrough to implementation contin-ued to reside in state bureaucracies.

Particularly in many smaller urbanareas, regional agencies foundthemselves going through themotions in fulfilling federal require-ments while key decisions on trans-portation and other policies weremade in state capitals.

1960s Regional Planning ActsIn 1959 President Eisenhower created the Advisory Commission onIntergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to explore new government structures and poli-cies to address suburban growth problems and improve coordination of theincreasing number of federally-aided projects and programs. A succession of majorlegislation in the 1960’s helped realize many of the ACIR recommendations forreplacing the largely ad hoc regional commissions in place with permanent andstronger metropolitan bodies:

The 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act, was the first major legislation to pro-vide federal aid for development of mass transit systems. In doing so, it providedincentives for preparation of metropolitan transportation plans. A 1966 amendmentcreated transit technical studies grants.

The 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act extended and broadened the“Section701” grants created in the 1950s to support mass transit planning byregional planning bodies, helping to improve the coordination of highway projectswith transit systems.

The 1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, and 1968 fol-low-up legislation, required all applications for federal aid for the planning andconstruction of housing, roads and other facilities to be submitted to an areawideplanning agency for review and comment. The goal was to insure that the applica-tions were consistent with regional plans and were coordinated with other federalaid projects. Many regional planning agencies and Councils of Government wereentrusted with these “A-95” clearinghouse functions for federal-aid.

The 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act provided protections for historic buildings andnatural resources in highway planning and required hearings to be conducted onthe economic, social and environmental effects of proposed routes. Amendments in1969 required citizen participation in all aspects of the three-C transportationplanning process administered by regional bodies.

The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act required Environmental ImpactStatements to be prepared for major projects, inaugurating an environmentaldimension to transportation planning that would take on growing importance indecades to come.

17

Issue Report

For much of the 1950s and 1960s,America built highways on a grand scale.With billions of dollars from federal gaso-line taxes, each year 2,000 miles or moreof elaborately-engineered interstate high-ways were dynamited through mountains,lifted over rivers, snaked across the coun-tryside and bulldozed through densely-populated urban areas. The highway build-ing effort commanded wide public sup-port and was backed by a powerful coali-tion of politicians, business leaders andinterest groups.

Yet by the early 1970s the highwayjuggernaut was in serious trouble. Facingoften fierce opposition in urban neighbor-hoods, concerns about the environment,funding shortfalls and other complica-tions, highway projects were slowed,scaled-back and even blocked in manylocations. Congressional hearing roomsbecame the scene of heated debate overefforts to broaden federal policy toembrace other transportation goals—suchas supporting mass transit systems andridesharing programs—that would reducethe nation's dependence on automobilesfor mobility.

To help the nation cope with thevastly more complex transportation poli-cy environment in the 1970s, Congressrequired each urbanized area to establisha Metropolitan Planning Organization(MPO) composed largely of local officials.Congress hoped MPOs would help buildregional agreement on transportationinvestments that would better balancehighway, mass transit and other needsand lead to more cost-effective solutionsto transportation problems.

As this chapter recounts, MPOs gener-ally failed to live up to expectations dur-ing their first decade. Eventually, theyfaced cutbacks in funding and support fortheir missions, though formal federalrequirements for transportation planningthrough MPOs continued.

18

Chapter III

Toward MoreBalancedTransportationThrough MPOs:1969-1983

Construction on one of the last major inter-state highways, I-78, in 1985.

New Jersey

19

Issue

Highway ResistanceThroughout much the 1960s,

opposition to nation's massiveinterstate highway building pro-gram grew to formidable propor-tions in many cities. In contrast tothe initial stages of the programwhen highways were built throughsparsely populated areas,the efforts to

completeroadway links through and

around major urban centers oftenprompted firestorms of controversy.According to Alan Altshuler, for-mer Massachusetts Secretary ofTransportation, in building majorurban roadways, "There was no waythat highway planners could avoidstepping on an extraordinary num-

ber of toes."

Highway planners traditionallydealt with controversies over pro-posed routes by privately cultivat-ing support among key politicaland business leaders. Publicly, theyused detailed traffic studies to out-flank the technically unsophisticat-

ed opposition.

But these strategiesbecame increasingly ineffec-tive. Business personsbecame anxious about hugeprojects close to home thatcould upset local realestate markets and pat-terns of commerce. Atthe same time, the wide-spread political activismon civil rights andagainst the VietnamWar translated intomore aggressive com-munity organiza-tions. They wereaided by lawsgranting the publicgreater input intothe transporta-tion decision-making processand by a grow-ing number of"advocacyplanners"

who lent theirexpertise to fights against

highway routes through minorityand poor neighborhoods.

Even traffic studies advancedto support projects no longerretained the assumption of legiti-macy. Recognition was dawningthat cities could not easily buildtheir way out of congestion. Inmany cases, as University ofVirginia professor Peter Nortonnoted, "urban freeways could only

relocate [congestion], easing trafficflow in some areas while hinderingit in others." Overtime, some newhighways even compounded con-gestion as they spawned new traf-fic-generating residential and com-mercial development.

In 1970, Helen Leavitt, authorof Superhighway - Superhoax,offered the maxim: "Congestionrises to meet road capacity." Andmany highway officials, grudgingly,were coming to acknowledge itstruth.

As the tide was turning againsturban highways, there were a num-ber of high profile casualties. In1969, Robert Moses' planned"Lower Manhattan Expressway," anelevated highway which wouldhave vaulted across the islandthrough the then run-down com-mercial district of Soho, was turneddown by city officials. Its defeatcame after years of determinedopposition, led by urbanologist JaneJacobs. In the same year, in NewOrleans, a "Riverfront Expressway,"was killed after a bitter ten-yearfight because it would impinge on ahistoric area.

Environmental HurdlesCongress responded to the

growing chorus of discontent byenacting laws that placed new hur-dles in the way of highway projects.In addition to laws requiring gener-ous compensation for residents andbusinesses directly affected by newroadways, Congress passed thesweeping National EnvironmentalPolicy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Itrequired detailed environmentalstudies of major projects and plansfor minimizing not only on air,water and noise pollution but dis-ruptions to historic sites, scenic vis-

20

Balanced Transportation: 1969-1983

tas and neighborhoods.

Additional landmark environ-mental legislation was passed inthe wake of the first Earth Day,April 22, 1970. For over a decade,the environmental movement hadbeen building in strength andinfluence. With Earth Day, themovement reached a critical massof popular support and burst onto

the national stage. Twenty millionpeople across the country partici-pated in peaceful demonstrationsand teach-ins. Earth Day organizerU.S. Senator Gaylord Nelsoncalled it a "truly astonishing grass-roots explosion."

Politicians from across thepolitical spectrum quickly becameoutspoken champions of the envi-ronment. Congress, for its part,passed the Clean Air Act of 1970which set emissions standards fornew cars and banned lead in gaso-line ("Get the Lead Out" readbumper stickers during theCongressional debate). The lawalso required states to developplans for controlling rising levels

of automobile use -- enforced by anew Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA). A Federal WaterPollution Control Act followedtwo years later.

Search for SolutionsThe upshot of the wave of

environmental legislation as wellas the backlash against urban

highway projects was a seriousrethinking of the long-held gospelthat national progress was tied tothe automobile. Steadily risinginflation also entered the picturein the early 1970's. The result wastighter transportation budgets atall levels of government and theimposition of federal wage andprice controls.

Federal highway and masstransit legislation began to encour-age more cost-effective approachesto transportation problems. Ratherthan massive new highway pro-jects to combat congestion, federalofficials urged smaller, more strate-gic roadway improvements. Theseincluded completing missing links

between roadways, redesigningintersections to improve trafficflow and widening selected high-way segments to remove bottle-necks.

Facilitating mass transit andother modes of travel was alsoimportant. Additional federalfunds were made available forupgrading long-neglected bus and

rail systems, creating park-and-ridelots, reserving bus-only lanes onhighways and promoting car-pool-ing.

Such “multimodal” and“transportation management” pro-jects could squeeze greater capaci-ty from the existing transportationnetwork without encouraging autouse, incurring huge costs or inflict-ing major environmental damage.

Despite the new federal focus,state decisions about how to allo-cate federal funds remained biasedtowards highway projects. Whilemany state highway departmentshad been renamed transporta-tion departments to reflect a moremultimodal philosophy, in fact

One futuristic vision,circa 1968, forsqueezing morecapacity from high-ways involved hoistingcars onto fastmovingelevated conveyers.From Robert Wolf.Metrotran-2000.Cornell University,1968.

21

Issue Report

most of the staff working in themwere still highway engineers andplanners. The new environmentaland fiscal constraints had forcedthem to scale-back many of theirplans and search for innovativesolutions to congestion. But com-pleting favored highway projects --in particular, the remaining 10,000miles of the planned 41,000-mileinterstate highway system -- wasstill at the top of their agenda.

Balance ShiftA year-long battle in

Congress in 1972 over a highwayfunding bill dealt a further set-back to the cause of continuedhighway expansion. Urban inter-ests and environmentalists lobbiedCongress to allow a portion of gastaxes deposited into the federalHighway Trust Fund to be used fora wide range of mass transit pro-jects. Big city mayors, many ofwhom were forced to take overmoney-loosing private bus and railcompanies, were particularly eagerfor expanded federal transit aid.

But the highway lobby wouldhave none of it. According toIndiana University professorGeorge Smerk, "Highway inter-ests... guarded the Highway TrustFund against diversion to otherthan highway purposes with thesame fierceness as a mother bearguards her cubs."

During the Congressionaldebate, the previously localizedopposition to highway buildingreceived a wide national hearing.New York Times columnist TomWicker argued against urban high-way projects “that gobble up land,ruin neighborhoods with air andnoise pollution, scatter our citiesinto patternless chaos and force

more and more people into moreand more automobiles for whichthere will never be enough park-ing until the country is pavedover."

The urban-environmentalinterests were able to block pas-sage of the highway bill until 1973when Congress authorized the useof highway monies for mass tran-sit, phased-in over a number ofyears. While roadway projects toaddress rising levels of congestion,especially in suburban areas, wouldstill command the lion's share offunding, the bill was a major polit-ical defeat for the highway lobby.It signaled the waning of lobby’sonce mighty influence.

MPOs FundedThe mandate for more bal-

anced and multimodal transporta-tion systems, focused new atten-tion on regional organizationssuch as Councils of Governmentand Regional PlanningCommissions, composed of localofficials and representatives ofmajor interests in each metropoli-tan area.

In the early 1960’s, the federalgovernment had required regionalagencies to conduct "continuing,comprehensive and coordinated"(3-C) transportation planning. Yetten years later most were servingonly an advisory role. They wereeffective at providing technicalassistance to local agencies andpromoting coordination amongthem. But their actual planningwork, focusing years into thefuture, often was viewed by electedofficials "merely as an exercise inmeeting federal requirements, notthe means of providing meaningfulsolutions to their problems." This

left the crucial day-to-day deci-sions about allocating funding andchoosing projects largely to high-way-oriented state officials.

States, and even many localofficials, were comfortable withthis arrangement, in part becauseit allowed deals to be cut over pro-jects. Federal officials, however,pushed to strengthen regionalplanning. They wanted regionalagencies to become forums fordeveloping consensus on the mostcost-effective approaches for solv-ing transportation problems. Thisincluded balancing road, masstransit or other needs and address-ing environmental, economic andcommunity concerns.

Congress took important stepsin this direction in crafting the1973 Highway Act. At the urgingof federal officials and the urban-environmental coalition, they ded-icated a small portion of eachstate's funding from the HighwayTrust Fund for new "MetropolitanPlanning Organizations" (MPOs)to be established or designated ineach urbanized area over 50,000 inpopulation. In doing so, Congressgave federal officials the legalmandate and financing theysought to transform the hodge-podge of regional bodies across thecountry into effective, multimodalplanning agencies. Many saw thenew MPOs as a means to counter,or at least keep in check, the dom-ineering influence of state trans-portation departments in pushinghighway projects.

Oil ShockAs federal regulators began

working out standards and proce-dures for the new MPOs, interna-tional events intervened to drasti-

22

Balanced Transportation: 1969-1983

‘Holistic’ Regional Planning

In 1973, Oregon Governor Tom McCall warned the state legis-

lature of the serious threat posed by “sagebrush subdivision,

coastal condomania and the ravenous rampage of suburbia.”

The speech bolstered efforts to create more effective planning

to preserve Oregon’s prized environment and livable cities.

The efforts in the Portland metropolitan area have since

become a widely-cited model for the nation. Metro, the only

popularly-elected regional government in the nation, was created

in 1979 and provides planning and direction for Portland and

23 surrounding towns in three counties. Metro, which is the

designated MPO for the region, uses controls over growth to

minimize sprawl, encourage transit, walking and biking and

increase the cost-effectiveness of public infrastructure invest-

ments.

All housing and other development over the next 20 years

must occur within the region’s Urban Growth Boundary (UGB).

This development must support the region’s close-knit neighbor-

hoods and mixed-use “main street” districts. Outside of the

UGB, Metro has designated Urban Reserve areas for potential

future development and Rural Reserves in which farms and

forests are protected. Metro has adopted a goal of reducing the

miles of vehicle travel by 20 percent over the next 30 years.

Another national model of comprehensive regional planning is

the Metropolitan Council covering the Twin Cities of Minneapolis-

St. Paul and 189 towns in seven counties. Established in 1967,

the Council, like its Portland counterpart, serves as the region’s

MPO and has established an urban growth boundary for limit-

ing sprawl and protecting rural and natural areas. It also has

established the nation’s only unified metropolitan tax base in

which the tax revenues from richer communities are shared to

help defray the costs of schools, transportation and other infra-

structure in poorer districts.

Both Portland and the Twin Cities are struggling with pres-

sures for additional growth. Portland is considering expanding

development into its “urban reserves.” The Twin Cities, without

the support of strong statewide growth management, is facing

competition from sprawl development that has “leap frogged” to

areas outside its seven-county jurisdiction.Many Park & Ridelots were estab-lished in the 1970’s.

23

Issue

cally alter the context for trans-portation planning.

Middle East oil producers,angered over U.S. support for Israelin its war with Arab states, imposedan oil embargo in October 1973.The five-month embargo shatteredAmerican's long-assumed birthrightto cheap and plentiful fuel.Looking back from the 1990s, jour-nalist James Howard Kunstlerrecounted the embargo's immediateimpact: "Erratic deliveries of gaso-line caused localized supply short-ages. Lines formed at pumps every-where, people panicked, fistfightsbroke out, work schedules were dis-rupted, vacations were canceledand nobody knew if the countrywould be able to carry on asbefore."

Energy conservation becamean urgent concern. Congressimposed a nationwide 55-mile perhour speed limit, set fuel economystandards for new cars and tookmeasures to spur domestic oil pro-duction.

The 1973-1974 embargo, withthe quadrupling of world oil prices,led to soaring inflation and a long,punishing recession. Congress andfederal agencies moved with evengreater determination to promote amore efficient and less auto-depen-dent transportation system. For thefirst time, federal funds were pro-vided to subsidize the daily opera-tions of transit systems. MPOs werelooked to as the agents of changein urban areas to break business-as-usual attitudes about transportationpriorities.

MPO Planning After a series of interim steps,

the final rules governing MPOswere issued in 1975. Joint develop-

ment of the rules by the highwayand transit administrations of thefederal Department ofTransportation itself constituted asignificant achievement in multi-modal planning. MPOs, then beingorganized, had to include the "prin-cipal elected officials" of local gov-ernments in their regions. Theytook a variety of forms: extensionsof existing regional bodies, newlycreated freestanding agencies or, inthe smallest urban areas, commit-tees staffed by state or county

employees.

The most significant responsi-bility handed to MPOs involvedcompiling and approving a short-range component to the long-rangeplans previously developed in mosturban regions. This three to fiveyear agenda of projects was called aTransportation ImprovementProgram or TIP. For the first time,both highway and transit projectshad to be included in a single plan-ning document and state and local

Raising the Earth Day flag at Columbia High School in Maplewood, NJ, April 22, 1970.

New

Jer

sey

New

sph

otos

24

Balanced Transportation: 1969-1983

agencies were required to gainapproval of regional agencies—MPOs—to obtain federal trans-portation funds. In compiling theTIP, MPOs were required to givespecial consideration to projectsthat reduced or better managed,rather than just facilitated, traffic --for instance, through new trafficsignal systems, park-and-ride lots,intersection improvements and

pedestrian facilities.

Associations of state andcounty officials reacted angrily tothe authority accorded to MPOs.They viewed the new bodies as "afederally-imposed level of regionalgovernment that impinges on thelawful authority of local and stategovernments." Yet federal officialsforged ahead with their rules, giv-ing MPOs a chance to prove theirworth.

From the start, MPOs faceddifficulties in advancing the causeof multimodalism. This was due not

only to wary or even hostile offi-cials but to increasingly severe bud-get limitations. Many states hadlarge backlogs of roadway projectsand many of the roads built in thepast two decades were coming duefor repair or replacement. Theseneeds prompted the creation ofnew federal-aid programs andpushed many innovative, multi-modal projects to the back burner.

Indeed, except in New York City,only a tiny portion of highwayfunds ever found their way to masstransit projects, despite the hard-fought battle in Congress in 1972to allow such transfers.

The public was also less thanenthusiastic about multimodal pro-jects, especially when the projectsrestricted their freedom to drivewhere and when they wanted.California's efforts in 1976 toreserve a highway lane for busesand car pools was met with outrageand soon abandoned. As the energy

crisis receded from the public'smemory, programs to encourage carpooling rarely attracted more thanone percent of urban commuters.

Still, there were some encour-aging developments. A number offaltering mass transit systems wererescued thanks to expanded federalaid and attention. Supplementingthese traditional bus and rail sys-tems were a variety of innovative

transit services. These included"demand-responsive" shuttle buses,company-sponsored van pools andnearly two dozen automated "peo-ple movers" – sometimes describedas "horizontal elevators" -- con-structed at airports, shopping cen-ters and amusement parks.

Meanwhile, several urbanareas, including Portland andMinneapolis-St. Paul, were demon-strating how metropolitan-widegoverning bodies could overcomefragmentation among local jurisdic-tions. They were taking "holistic"approaches to solving transporta-

Federal Transit aid was used topurchase new equipment: (left)rail cars inherited by NJ Transitwhen the agency was createdin 1979; replacement cars pur-chased in 1982.

NJ Transit

New

Jer

sey

New

sph

otos

Lining up for gas onRoute 22 in

Springfield, NJ,June 1979.

26

Balanced Transportation: 1969-1983

tion, housing, land use and otherinter-related problems (see sidebar,p.22).

Crisis of ConfidenceAt the end of 1970's, despite

localized successes in finding inno-vative approaches to transportationproblems, consensus was growingthat transportation planning hadbecome too complex and cumber-some to effectively address manypressing needs in urban regions.Over the previous two decades, asuccession of laws and regulationshad added layer upon layer of plan-ning requirements. They wereintended to address concerns aboutthe environment, the integrity ofneighborhoods, the health of localeconomies, needs of the elderly anddisabled, energy conservation, tran-sit finances and other issues.

Yet in many cases multiplereviews and paperwork required byfederal laws prevented the timelyimplementation of even relativelysimple projects. In other cases, theneed to balance or trade-off com-peting concerns led to acrimonyand gridlock in investing availablefederal aid.

In 1980, disputes over land useand other non-transportation poli-cies, led to the break-up of one ofthe nation's largest regional agen-cies, the Tri-State RegionalPlanning Commission, coveringthe New York-New Jersey-Connecticut metropolitan area(the New Jersey arm of whichbecame the predecessor agency ofthe NJTPA).

But dissatisfaction was notlimited to transportation planningand MPOs. The national economyin the late seventies was in a sadstate, suffering from the bewilder-

ing new malady "stagflation" -- acombination of stagnating econom-ic activity and high inflation,accompanied by high unemploy-ment. The immediate causesincluded higher energy prices, thedecline of manufacturing in favorof service jobs and the shift of pop-ulation and economic activity fromthe "rust belt" up North to the "sunbelt" in the South and West. Butmuch of the public's ire wasfocused not on these structural fac-tors but on federal policies. TheNew Deal strategies of using fiscaland monetary policies as well asexpanding federal programs to safe-guard the national standard of liv-ing appeared to be failing miser-ably.

The second oil embargo inSpring, 1979 (see sidebar, right)deepened the economic woes,pushing inflation to over 13 per-cent and disrupting the lives andlivelihoods of many families.Americans were left with deepuncertainties about the future. TheNew York Times commented that"the American spirit of optimismseems to be suffering a brownout, aloss of power and drive." PresidentCarter chided the American peopleto overcome their "crisis of confi-dence" and growing "malaise."

But majority of the Americanelectorate had had enough. In1980, they elected Ronald Reaganwho promised a radical break withNew Deal policies that had domi-nated the national government forover four decades.

New Deal UndoneReagan took office declaring

his "intention to curb the size andinfluence of the federal establish-ment" which he saw at the root of

"our present troubles." After a yearof deep cuts in the federal bureau-cracy, he took on what he calledthe "jungle of grants-in-aid." As aresult of the growth of federal aidprograms, he said, "a maze of inter-locking jurisdictions and levels ofgovernment confronts average citi-zens in trying to solve even thesimplest problems." His solutionwas a turn-back of federal responsi-bilities to state and local govern-ments.

The changespulled the rug outfrom under many

regional agencies. According to thecount of researcher BruceMcDowell, "38 of 39 federal pro-grams that underwrote or requiredregional planning were terminated,deregulated or suffered major bud-get cuts between 1979 and 1984."This included requirements forregional "A-95" reviews of federalgrants and for the development ofhousing and wastewater treatmentplans.

The one major regional plan-ning requirement left on the booksconcerned MPOs. While they werestill required to plan and approvetransportation projects, new regula-tions left it up to each state todefine their specific roles. ManyMPOs were reduced to rubber-stamping the decisions of stateagencies in compiling their annualTIP capital plans. As a result,according to McDowell, MPO capi-tal planning came to "basicallyconfirm what is going on in thefragmented region, rather than pro-viding any areawide leadership."

27

Issue

After losing much of their for-mal authority and funding, manyregional agencies became moreentrepreneurial, marketing theirplanning services to local govern-ments and other agencies. However,the national priorities they onceactively promoted -- notably, energyconservation and congestion relief --did not completely fall by the way-side. The Reagan Administrationordered government agencies(including MPOs) to facilitate pri-vate sector initiatives to addressthese and other priorities.

Private sector companies indeedwere taking a more active role -- forinstance, banding together inTransportation ManagementAssociations to promote ridesharingand other congestion relief programsin major employment centers. Butmany in Congress saw the need forcontinuing federal leadership and

funding to address transportationneeds. Over Reagan's veto, theyexpanded federal transportation aidthrough a five cent increase in thegasoline tax, one cent of which wasset aside for mass transit. Despitethis show of independence, on mostother issues, Congress dutifullyhanded Reagan the legislation heneeded to sustain his revolution oflower taxes, deregulation of industryand smaller government.

Energy Crisis II

During his first year in office, PresidentCarter vowed to make energy conservation the“moral equivalent of war.” When Middle-Eastnations imposed a second oil embargo in theSpring of 1979, precipitated by U.S. support forthe deposed Shah of Iran, the nation had a 70-day supply of oil on hand, as opposed to a 56-day supply during the first embargo in 1973-74.Still, for average Americans the crisis was noless severe or shocking. Once again, they facedlong gas lines and rationing that limited pur-chases to odd or even dates based on theirlicense plate numbers.

Throughout the nation, gas prices climbedover $1, prompting accusations of oil companyprofiteering and Congressional inquiries. InMaryland, the Deputy Attorney General declaredthe gasoline shortage the “greatest crisis” for hisstate since the Civil War. In Connecticut, 14 newstaffers had to be hired by the AAA to assistdrivers running out of fuel on the state’s high-ways. In the West, truckers staged slow movingconvoys over highways to protest fuel alloca-tions. On Long Island, a youth was arrested forstealing 1.2 gallons from a police station gaspump. In the Bronx, two motorists were shotduring a near-riot at the pumps in which dri-vers “wielded knives, crowbars, two-by-fours andjack handles.”

Today, these events have largely fadedinto history. Rising world oil production andmore fuel efficient cars have made oil suppliesplentiful—at least until well into the next cen-tury. Adjusted for inflation, gasoline is evencheaper than it was in the 1950s. However,global warming and other environmental con-cerns—as well as unforeseen internationalevents—could once again make energy conser-vation a top national priority.

New Jersey Newsphotos

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Chapter IV

New MPOs fora New Era:1983-1997

The enactment of the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act(ISTEA) ushered in something of a renaissance for MPOs. After a decade or more of being con-signed to a minimal role in transportation planning, ISTEA gave MPOs increased funding,expanded authority to select projects and mandates for new planning initiatives in theirregions. State transportation officials, for the first time, were required to seriously consult withlocal representatives on MPO governing boards.

The changes had their roots in new political alignments and the need to address increas-ingly difficult transportation problems – in particular, the more complicated patterns of trafficcongestion that arose with the suburban development boom in the 1980s. Many recognizedthat the problems could only be effectively addressed through a stronger federal commitmentto regional planning.

This chapter traces the events that ushered in the ISTEA era and highlights the progressmade under the legislation. It provides a backdrop for the debate underway in Congress onISTEA reauthorization scheduled for 1998.

Many suburban roadsbecame major commutingroutes in the 1980’s:Middlesex County, NJ.

Peter Taft Middlesex Somerset MercerRegional Council

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Issue

Boom TimesThe Reagan revolution of the

early 1980s was followed by theReagan recovery of the mid-1980s.The economic rebound brought a newwave of housing, commercial andoffice development to the nation'ssuburban and rural areas. While muchof the development was spurred byimproving real estate markets, manyprojects were made possible by newbanking rules which opened the doorfor riskier -- and, in some cases, evenfraudulent -- business ventures.

In New Jersey, headlines during1985 told the story of the economicturnaround: "Development Cominglike a Tidal Wave to SomersetCounty." "Route 206 Leaving ItsRural Past Behind." "Its Boom Timein What Once Was the Boonies.""Real Estate Boom Reflected in RisingValues Along Route 1 Corridor."

The spread of development toareas previously considered economicbackwaters later prompted someobservers to discern a new form ofeconomic organization taking shapein the nation. New "Edge Cities" werearising in the midst of the suburbanand "exurban" landscapes (see sidebar,p.30).

While the location of growthmay have shifted, the problemsaccompanying development were alltoo familiar. As many suburbanroads were pressed into service asmajor commuting routes, trafficcongestion mounted and spreadover wider areas. In 1986 RobertCervero wrote that 20 miles fromthe downtowns of Houston, LosAngeles and Washington DC, "rushhour traffic has gone from free-flowto gridlock conditions in a span offive years along some stretches."

The situation caused growing publicfrustration -- with ominous politicalovertones. One mayor in northernCalifornia observed, "No one's outthere trying to hang politicians yetbut the public is a sleeping giant onthis issue and they're incensed."

Elected officials responded withnew efforts to manage growth anddeal with its impacts. Many localitiestightened-up zoning and assessed"impact fees" on developers to pay fortransportation improvements. A fewpassed ordinances requiring compa-nies to reduce the volume of auto tripsto their facilities.

State-level remedies were alsoexplored. In New Jersey, the state leg-islature in 1986 established an Officeof State Planning to develop a com-prehensive growth management planthat would channel development backinto urban areas and into denser, moretransit-friendly suburban "centers."

New Federal FocusWith the transition from the

Reagan to the Bush Administration,there was growing interest in astronger federal role to help solve thenation's vexing transportation prob-lems. In addition more complex pat-terns of congestion resulting from thesuburban development boom, longer-term trends, including smaller house-holds and more women working out-side the home, added to traveldemand on the nation's roadways.Overall, between 1983 and 1990, theannual miles of vehicle travel grew 30percent, a rate faster than populationgrowth. Traffic management strate-gies, widely used to cope with thedemand, were increasingly found tohave only localized benefits and theytended to diminish over time.

If the need for federal assistancewas growing, so too were the opportu-nities for creating a new federal role.By the late 1980's, after 20 years oflong and often torturous fights overinterstate highway routes, nearly allthe remaining routes that had a realis-tic chance of being built were eitherfunded or under construction. Thismade it possible to redirect federalgasoline tax revenues to other trans-portation needs.

Creating a new, more active fed-eral role became a top priority of thenew U.S. Secretary of Transportation,Samuel Skinner, the former head ofthe Chicago transit system. He toldan aviation group, "I am totally --with a big "T" -- committed to devel-oping a national transportation poli-cy." Despite criticisms from formerReagan officials who decried this"centralized" approach, Skinner beganto sound-out the transportation com-munity on possible new programs andfunding arrangements for his nationalpolicy.

Environmental issues, mean-while, became the focus ofCongressional attention. The ReaganAdministration had devoted itself togiving industry relief from "onerous"environmental regulations, includingdrastically cutting the EPA's budgetand enforcement powers. In the late1980s, however, headlines about acidrain and other problems motivatedincreased public concerns about theenvironment and the need for action.President Bush and Republicans inCongress sought to regain the envi-ronmental mantle for their party bybreaking the decade-long deadlockover amendments to the Clean AirAct. After a particularly difficult leg-islative wrangle, the amendments

Suburban FuturesOver the last two decades, many subur-

ban areas have moved out of the economic shadowof central cities to become powerhouses of jobs andcommerce in their own right. According to JoelGarreau, the trend has led to the formation of new“Edge Cities” (the title of his 1991 book) which willbecome the “crucible of America’s urban future.” Hesays edge cities are areas with more than five mil-lion square feet of office space and 600,000 squarefeet retail space which become major commutingand shopping destinations. The hundred or moreedge cities across the U.S. “contain all the functionsa city ever has, albeit in a spread-out form” includ-ing trade, employment and entertainment. In theNew Jersey, he identifies 11 edge cities. While edgecities today appear chaotic, he says, they are still intheir infant stages. He predicts that edge cities willmature to become the dominant form of organiza-tion – and driving force -- for the nation’s informa-tion economy.

Critics of Garreau acknowledge the newforms of economic organization in the suburbs andfarther-out “exurbs.” Yet they question whether it canbe, or should be, sustained. The growth of edgecities is based on auto-oriented suburban sprawlwhich consumes open space, degrades the environ-ment and drives up infrastructure bills. Even at theirbest, they charge, edge cities exclude the poor androb older cities and towns of economic vitality.James Howard Kunstler, author of “The Geography ofNowhere,” sees a devastating spiritual and aestheticloss in continuing suburbanization. The roadsidelandscape he said has been littered with bad, mod-ernist architecture and garish commercial messages– “ubiquitous highway crud.” Travelers have “littlesense of having arrived anywhere, because everyplacelooks like no place in particular.” The alternative,promoted by Kunstler and many planners, is NewUrbanism, the effort to recreate or revive small townAmerica, in which residents live in denser, pedestri-an-scale communities with main streets and centralpublic squares.

New Era: 1983-1997

30

New Era: 1983-1997

were approved in 1990, strengtheningrequirements on the nation's cities.

The achievement of bi-partisan com-promise on a complicated issue like airquality and the reassertion of a strong fed-eral role in enforcement were importantprecedents for the coming Congressionalefforts to formulate a new transportationpolicy for the nation.

ISTEAAs the work on the new transporta-

tion policy got under way in Congress, itbecame clear that state officials and theirallies in the highway lobby, despite beingthe richest and best organized of interestgroups, would not call the shots as in pastlegislative efforts. Environmentalists,strengthened by their victory over theClean Air Act Amendments, wielded con-siderable influence with key committees.Allied with mass transit advocates, progres-sive planners and others in the SurfaceTransportation Policy Project, they urgedCongress to emphasize the needs of peoplerather than automobiles and to make theenvironment an integral part of transporta-tion decision-making.

The legislation that emerged, theIntermodal Surface TransportationEfficiency Act (ISTEA), was signed into

law by President Bush in December 1991.It focused on improving transportation notas end in itself but as the means to achieveimportant national goals including eco-nomic progress, cleaner air, energy conser-vation and social equity. ISTEA promoteda transportation system in which all modesand facilities were integrated to allow a“seamless” movement of both goods andpeople. New funding programs providedgreater flexibility in the use of funds, sup-ported improved “intermodal” connectionsand emphasized upgrades to existing facili-ties over building new capacity – particu-larly roadway capacity.

On the slate that Reagan had wipednearly clean of regional planning require-ments, Congress through ISTEA drew upprovisions to require “large metropolitanareas to begin serious, formal transportationplanning.” A Senate Committee reportconfessed, “Had this been specified in thelegislation providing for the InterstateSystem, we possibly would have a more effi-cient transportation network today. Butthat was then, now is now.”

To accomplish more serious metropol-itan planning, ISTEA doubled funding forMPO operations and required the agenciesto evaluate a variety of multimodal solu-tions to roadway congestion and other

New Jersey Edge City: Parsippany-Troy Hills.

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Issue

transportation problems. MPOs werealso required to broaden public partici-pation in the planning process and seethat investment decisions contributedto meeting the air quality standards ofthe Clean Air Act Amendments.

On the crucial issue of projectselection, ISTEA sought to put MPOson a more equal footing with statetransportation departments. LargeMPOs assumed lead authority forselecting projects to be undertakenwith certain categories of federal funds.State-MPO cooperation was requiredon the use of the remaining funding.In deciding among projects -- and intheir long-range planning activities--MPOs were required to consider a widerange of economic, environmental andsocial goals. They also had to “fiscallyconstrain” their long-range plans andshort-range TIPs. This meant that theplan and TIP could no longer contain“wish lists” of projects, from whichstate officials could pick and choose asfunding became available; ratherMPOs had to create realistic, multi-year agendas of projects matched withavailable funds.

New RelationshipsISTEA upset long-standing power

relationships in many states. For thefirst time, many state Departments ofTransportation had to seriously cooper-ate with MPOs on project selectionand other matters. To do so, they hadto reorient their staffs and negotiatenew procedures with MPOs necessaryto fulfill ISTEA requirements. Duringthe early years, many states resistedsharing their power.

Many MPOs, themselves, were ill-prepared for the changes brought aboutby ISTEA. After decade or more ofminimal funding and responsibilities,MPOs were thrust into the position of

being key players in transportationplanning for their regions. Many hadto hire new staff and quickly gear up tomeet the ambitious new requirements.They also faced the task of establishingan effective public presence, includingreaching out to freight operators, busi-nesses and other transportation systemusers.

In recent years, there havebeen considerable signs ofprogress in meeting the goals

of ISTEA. The project selection andfiscal constraint requirements have ledto a planning process that is “morerational than political,” according a1996 Government Accounting Officesurvey of MPO officials. One reason isthat many MPOs have establishedstandardized procedures to compareand evaluate proposed projects. Innorthern New Jersey candidate projectsare awarded points according to mea-sures of how well they fulfill six broadgoals for regional transportation devel-oped with extensive public input.

At federal hearings conductedaround the country in 1996 testimonywas presented that “many states andMPOs, after some awkward first steps,had formed useful and productive rela-tionships.” The hearings also foundthat “ISTEA’s emphasis on multimodaltransportation has been a catalyst forchanging the overall mix of transporta-tion options.” This has included notonly more transit projects but non-tra-ditional projects to improve goodsmovement and pedestrian and bicyclefacilities.

By any measure, the work of ful-filling the goals of ISTEA remains

unfinished. Some states and MPOs lagbehind in establishing genuine cooper-ation. Some federal requirements areoverly prescriptive. And there are largegaps in the knowledge needed toaddress many difficult mobility issues.Yet there is consensus throughoutmuch of the transportation communitythat ISTEA is heading in the right direc-tion.

ISTEA is scheduled for reauthoriza-tion in 1998. Some have proposed a radi-cal “devolution” of federal responsibilitiesand funding to states, much like the“turn-back” approaches tried during theReagan era. But Congress appears likelyto take a more moderate course, buildingupon the comprehensive federal frame-work it established with ISTEA to helpstates and regions cooperatively create amore balanced and efficient nationaltransportation system.

32

History of MPOs

or most of the century, America has struggled with the problems that accompanied theformation and growth of metropolitan areas as the nation’s principle units of economicand social organization.The spread of population and productive capacities over wide areas

around central cities brought with it infrastructure, environmental and other problems on a regionalscale not easily addressed by existing government structures whose jurisdictional lines reflect histor-ical settlement patterns rather than economic realities.

In the 1930s, the federal government began experimenting with using the leverage of federalaid, channeled through regional organizations, to require at least minimal metropolitan-wide planningand cooperation. By 1990, however, most of these efforts had been curtailed due not only to

changing political winds in Washington but theperception that some federal planning require-ments were proving more bureaucratic thaneffective.

The one exception has been regional planning requirements involving economically-crucialtransportation issues. ISTEA is the latest attempt to improve upon the federally-sanctioned metro-politan transportation planning process. By requiring MPOs to help implement the Clean Air ActAmendments, ISTEA has added a significant environmental component to the process.

Even if the goals of ISTEA are substantially achieved in coming years, the search for solutions tometropolitan issues will have to continue.Transportation and air quality, after all, are two parts of abroader complex of interrelated metropolitan issues.These issues include environmental conserva-tion, growth management, urban revitalization, economic development, water resources manage-ment, improvement of educational institutions, welfare reform, health care access and public safety.

In most regions these issues are dealt with on a piecemeal basis by local governments, statewideagencies or special purpose districts. However, in many urban areas, Councils of Government andother regional bodies—many of them the “parent” agencies of MPOs—are attempting to imple-ment more comprehensive and coordinated approaches.Their authority and structure varies widely,from bodies that advise and assist local governments to metropolitan governing boards with pow-ers over taxation and land use. Despite growing success, they receive very little attention or assis-tance at the federal level; rather, most rely on state and local funding, supplemented by private sec-tor support and by program-specific federal grants, especially for transportation, housing, servicesfor the elderly and job training.

In coming years, the experience with ISTEA may provide opportunities for strengthening region-al planning. ISTEA’s approach of empowering MPOs, while providing for flexibility in the use of fund-ing, improved state-regional cooperation and enhanced public participation is proving increasinglyeffective. It could one day serve as the model for broader federal leadership in helping address thecritical issues facing metropolitan areas across the nation.

F

Conclusion

33

Issue

Source Notes1. Origins of Regional Planning: 1900-1940- Each city came to sit "like a spider in the midst of its trans-portation web," according to Lewis Mumford. Quoted inOwen, p. 10.Progressive Roots- Applying scientific principles, industry helped satisfy materialwants: Boardman, P. 90.- elite of “social” scientists promoted the reorganization ofpublic and private institutions: Lubove, p.14. Boardman, p.99.- cities drew up plans for segregating land uses and institutedthe first zoning: Scott, p. 193.- Suburban growth in 1920s left many problems unaddressedincluding mounting highway congestion: Scott. p.209. Practical Needs- a long-running dispute between New York and New Jerseyover rail freight business: Doig, p.36.- the Port of New York Authority set about developing a com-prehensive plan: Lesser, P.31.- major cities in the U.S. initiated similar “comprehensive”regional plans: Scott, p. 213.- the Port Authority was blocked in implementing many ele-ments of its plan: Lesser, P. 33.- Thomas Reed, in 1925 contended that the only way toinsure effective regional planning was …: Scott, p. 225.The Great Depression- Where toll or other dedicated funding sources were avail-able… selected infrastructure projects … were built: Lesser, p.36-37.- The federal government, for its part, carried the torch ofregional planning forward … in the 1930s: Scott pp. 300-305- Tennessee Valley Authority: Hall, p.161.Sidebar: Mixing Science and Utopia- Early practitioners sought to put city planning on the samefooting as the “scientific management”: Scott, p. 117. Lubove,p. 14.- “garden” cities, surrounded by “greenbelts”: Hall, p.93.- “balanced urban communities within balanced regions”:Mumford, p. 401.2. Regional Responses to the Suburban Land Rush:1940-1969Preparing a New Future- planning for a new post-war America became a national pre-occupation: Scott, pp. 397, 404- NRPB… urged a “comprehensive” approach to post-warplanning that would make use of surveys and communityforums and recognize “the interrelatedness of problems….”:Krueckeberg, p. 164.- the alliances paid little heed to urgings of NRPB for compre-hensive planning: Scott, pp.413, 435.- General Motors’ “Futurama” exhibit and highway plans :Scott, pp.361, 440.Suburban Land Rush- The national housing agency estimated that five million newhousing units were needed immediately…: Wright, p. 242.- the developers sought to attract veterans…and middle classurban dwellers: Wright, p.248. [many developers also imple-mented racially discriminatory covenants which were not out-lawed until 1968: Wright, p. 248]- Levitt was producing one four-room house every 16 minutes:Wright, p. 252.- three-fifths of all new housing in the late 1940’s was built inthe suburbs. Scott, p. 452.- Frank Lloyd Wright put it bluntly: “The urbanite musteither be willing to get out of the city…”: Owen, p. 22.Federal Planning Aid- Lewis Mumford, surveying the growing chaos in many areas,termed it “the suburban fallout …”: Scott, p. 504- urban planning professor Robert Mitchell argued that suchplanning aid was needed to build “awareness that central citiesand suburbs are interdependent…: Scott, p. 499.- new agencies… were hamstrung by their inability to directlyshape local government land use policies: Scott, p. 513.- Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, which purchased all the town’svacant, developable land: Scott, p. 508.Interstate Highways- on the scale of 60 Panama Canals: Scott, p. 537- many local officials found new cause to embrace cooperationthrough metropolitan planning agencies: Scott, p.536.- Interstate the Act did not require routes to conform to met-ropolitan plans: Scott, p. 539.- “the development of regional mass transportation by heli-copter or convertiplane may provide the longer distance com-muting services…”: Owen, p. 159.- Robert Moses …lashed out at “ivory tower planners”: Scott,p. 403.Three-C Planning

- “a legion of bulldozers gnawing into the last remaining tractof green between the two cities”: Editors of Fortune, p. 115.- “three-C” planning: Weiner, p. 41.Three-C in Practice- following the adoption of the 1962 Act… metropolitan plan-ning bodies were created across the country: Scott, pp. 585-86- the three-C planning requirement was seen by these highwayinterests as “a potentially disruptive innovative force…”:Morehouse, p. 167.1960s Progress- Johnson noted that … metropolitan planning was needed to“teach us to think on a scale as large as the problem itself…”:Scott, p.611.- urban riots -- showed that narrow, technical approaches toproblems could neglect critical social factors: Scott, p.619.- the bulk of staff resources, engineering expertise and politi-cal influence needed to see plans through to implementationcontinued to reside in state bureaucracies. AdvisoryCommission on Intergovernmental Relations, pp.72-73.- key decisions on transportation and other policies were madein state capitols: Morehouse, p.164. Harrigan, p. 332. Scott,606.Sidebar: 1960s Regional Planning Acts -1960s Regional Planning Acts: Weiner, pp. 39-84.3. Toward More Balanced Transportation ThroughMPOs: 1969-1983Highway Resistance- “no way that highway planners could avoid stepping on anextraordinary number of toes.": Altshuler, p.40.- better organized and more aggressive community organiza-tions: Altschuler, p. 41.- "advocacy planners" lent their expertise:Harrigan, p.327.- “urban freeways could only relocate congestion…”: Norton.,P.5.- Overtime, some new highways even compounded conges-tion: Lewis & Sprague, P. 11.- "Congestion rises to meet road capacity.": Leavitt, p.38.- Lower Manhattan Expressway…was disapproved by the cityofficials in 1969. Leavitt, p.64.- a "Riverfront Expressway,"in New Orleans was killed:Leavitt, p. 90 and U.S. Senate, 1972, p..489.Environmental Hurdles- NEPA requirements: Weiner, p. 83- Earth Day was a"truly astonishing grassroots explosion.":Envirolink web site.Search for Solutions- legislation began to encourage more cost-effective and "mul-timodal" approaches: see Weiner, pp. 87, 89 &119; andAltschuler, pp.7 & 342.- completing favored highway projects was still at the top oftheir agenda: Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations. p. 77; and Lewis and Sprague, p. 11.Balance Shift- "Highway interests... guarded the Highway Trust Fundagainst diversion…”:Smerk, p. 75.- Tom Wicker argued against urban highway projects: Wicker.- the bill was a major political defeat for the highway lobby:Altschuler, p. 38.MPOs Funded- ten years later most regional agencies were serving only anadvisory role: Harrigan, P. 332-3- MPO planning "merely as an exercise in meeting federalrequirements…”: U.S. Department of Transportation. 1977,p.51.- federal officials pushed to strengthen regional planning: U.S.Department of Transportation, 1972, p. 322.- Many saw the new MPOs as a means to counter the…influ-ence of state transportation departments: U.S. Senate PublicWorks Committee Hearing.1972. Testimonies by: BarbaraReid, Environmental Policy Center. P. 867 and Donald Spaid,Amer. Inst. of Planners, P.566.Oil Shock- "Erratic deliveries of gasoline caused localized supply short-ages…”: Kunstler, p.109.MPO Planning - final rules governing MPOs were issued in 1975: Weiner,p.126.- Associations of state and county officials reacted angrily tothe authority accorded to MPOs: U.S. Department ofTransportation. 1977, p.9.- only a tiny portion of highway funds ever found their way tomass transit projects: USDOT, 1977, p.73.- California's efforts to reserve a highway lane for buses andcar pools was met with outrage: Jackson, P.251- programs to encourage car pooling rarely attracted morethan one percent: Altshuler p.150.Crisis of Confidence- transportation planning had become too complex and cum-bersome to effectively address many pressing needs: Weiner,

p.171-2; and USDOT (Transportation Taskforce…), p. 18.- "the American spirit of optimism seems to be suffering abrownout..”: Roberts. p.1New Deal Undone- “a maze interlocking jurisdictions … confronts average citi-

zens…”: Reagan, p.1.38 of 39 federal programs …were terminated… Quoted inGage, p.208- MPO capital planning came to "basically confirm what isgoing on in the fragmented region…”: McDowell, p. 132;Lewis & Sprague, p.17.- Companies were…banding together in TransportationManagement Associations: Weiner, p. 190.Sidebar: ‘Holistic’ Regional Planning- “sagebrush subdivision, coastal condomania …”: quoted in

Bianco, p. 9.- Metro… uses controls over growth to minimize sprawl:Portland Metro web site- Another national model… is the Metropolitan Council cov-ering the Twin Cities: Twin Cities Metropolitan Council website- The Twin Cities… facing competition from sprawl develop-ment that has “leap frogged”: McDonnellSidebar: Energy Crisis II- Carter vowed to make energy conservation the “moralequivalent of war.”: Quoted in Altschuler. p.124.- Throughout the nation, gas prices climbed over $1: variousNew York Times articles, 1979- adjusted for inflation, gasoline is even cheaper than it was inthe 1950s: Salpukas.

4 New MPOs for a New Era: 1983-1997Boom Times- In New Jersey, headlines during 1985 told the story of thedevelopment boom: Sternlieb & Schwartz, bibliography- "rush hour traffic has gone from free-flow to gridlock condi-tions…”: Cervero xxi- "No one's out there trying to hang politicians yet…”:Cervero 12New Federal Focus- the annual miles of vehicle travel grew 30 percent: Lewis &Sprague. p.6.- Traffic management strategies… tended to diminish overtime. Lewis & Sprague. p.40f.- "I am totally…committed to developing a national trans-portation policy.": Cushman.- Republicans sought to break the deadlock over amendmentsto the Clean Air Act: Bryner, Chapter 3.ISTEA- Surface Transportation Policy Project…urged Congress toemphasize the needs of people: Lewis & Sprague, P. 11-12- ISTEA’s new funding programs provided greater flexibility:Weiner. p.240-51- A Senate Committee report confessed…: U.S Senate. 1991,P. 1.- TIP could no longer contain “wish lists”…Lewis andSprague, p.27,29.New Relationships- planning process that is “more rational than political,” GAO,p.5- Testimony was presented at Federal hearings…USDOT,1997. p 16- there is consensus … that ISTEA is heading in the rightdirection: USDOT,1997Sidebar: Suburban Futures- Critics of Garreau …question whether it can be, or shouldbe, sustained: see for instance McGovern, p.18.

34

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Home Pages:Brookings Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy -http://www.brook.edu/ES/URBANCEN/URBAN_hp.htm

Directory of Regional Councils/MPOs -http://www.abag.ca.gov/abag/other_gov/rcg.html

EnviroLink Network - http://www.envirolink.org/orgs/edn/

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Portland Metro - http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/metro

Surface Transportation Policy Project - http://www.transact.org/

The Citistates Group - http://www.Citistates.com/

Twin Cities Metropolitan Council - http://www.metrocouncil.org/

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North Jersey TransportationPlanning Authority, Inc.One Newark Center, 17th FloorNewark, NJ 07102973.639.8400/FAX: 639.1953http://njtpa.njit.edu