Metaphors in the History of Psychology

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CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN HE STORY OF PSYCHOLOY



Camb Sud n the Hisory of PycolgGENERAL £ITS: lUM R WOODWARD AND

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Metaphors in the history of psychology

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Contents

Abu he auhr age vPreface x

1 Pche mue he rle f meaphr n he hr

1Dad E. Leay

2 Frm meaphr mdel he ue f analg nneurpchlg 79Kal H. Pibam

3 nner feelng, wrk f he eh he bea whn,deae f he mnd, drvng frce and pung n a hw:x meaphr f emn and her herecal exenn 104

ames . Aeill

4 Mve and meaphr a ud n cenc creav 133Paul Mceynolds

5 Cgnve meaphr n expermenal pchlg 173obet Hoffman Edwad L Cochan andames M. Nead

6 Meaphr f cncune and cgnn n he hrf pchlg 230eome Bune and Caol ehe Feldman

v



V

7 Meaphr f knwledge nd ehavr n he behavrradn 39Lauence D Smith

8 Meaphr meaher, an cal wrld 267

Kenneth . Gegen9 Meaphr f unwaned cd: a hrcal kech 300

Theodoe Sabin

0 Generave meaphr and h hr f pchlgcaldcure 331

Kut Danzige

Meaphr her and prac n he hr f pchlg 357Daid E. Leay

N ae ndex 369Subec ndex 381



About the authors

James R. Aver Prfer f Pchlg a he Unver f Maachue Amher A Fellw f he Amercan Pchlgcal Acan and pa member f he Bard f Drecr f he nernanalSce fr Reearch n Emn, Averll he auhr f Ange andAggession An Essay on Emotion New rk Sprnger, 98 and edrf Pattes of Psychological Thought: eadings in Classical and Contempoa Texts Wahngn, DC Hemphere, 976. He ha al publhed numeru reearch arcle and chaper n re and emn

Jerome Bruner Reearch Prfer f Pchlg a New Yrk Unver and a Vng Schlar f he Ruell Sage Fundan A frmerpreden f he Amercan Pchlgcal Acan, he ha al heldprferhp a Harvard Unver, Oxfrd Unver and he NewSchl fr Scal Reearch Wdel recgnzed a ne f he pneer nhe eld f cgnve pchlg, Bruner ha been hnred b he Dnguhed Scenc Cnrbun Award f he APA b he Gld Medalf he CBA Fundan, and b he 987 Balzan Prze "fr a lfemecnrbun human pchlg Amng h recen bk are nSeach o Mind New rk Harper & Rw, 983 hids Ta NewYrk Nrn, 983) and Actual Minds Possible Wolds Cambrdge,MA Harvard Unver Pre, 986).

Edwa L. Cochran uperve a grup f cgnve cen and humanfacr pecal n he Arcal nellgence Deparmen a HnewellCrprae Sem Develpmen dvn n Mnneapl The depar

II



Vlll o te ah

men develp advanced uer nface, exper em, uer nerfacedevelpmen envrnmen, and knwledgebaed fware A frmerfacul member f he Deparmen f Pchlg a Adelph Unver,Cchran ha publhed arcle n ru apec f cgnve cence andarcal nellgence

Ku Danziger Prfer f Pclg a Yrk Unver n TrnThe auhr f man arcle n xpermenal and cal pchlg,Danzger al well knwn r reearch and publcan n hehr and phlph f pchg, n uch pc a he hr fnrpecn, he rle f pv n he develpmen f pchlg,and he cal cnex f earl cc pchlg ncludng epecall nvegave pracce H m recen bk Constuctng the Subject Hstoca Ogns of Psycolcal eseach (Cambrdge Unver

Pre, 1990)

Carol Flesher Feldman began ung phlph bu ended up akngher PhD n pchlg a he er f Mchgan Her reearch hafcued prmarl n he rela language and hugh a ubec whch he ha wren exenvel eldman ha augh a he Unverf Chcag, Harvard Unver, ad Yale Unver, and he preenlSenr Reearch Acae a e Yrk Unver and an ccanalAdunc Prfer a he Gradua Cener f he C Unver f New

rk

Kenneth J Gergen Prfer chlg a Swarhmre Cllege He a Fellw f he Amercan Pclgcal Acan and ha erved apreden f Pchlg and h Ar dvn and Therecal andPhlphcal Pchlg dvn Wdel knwn fr h reearch n heelf, n hrcal pchlg, and n cal cnrucnm, Gergen habeen a leader n he explran new apprache underandng henaure and develpmen f plgcal phenmena a well a henaure and develpmen f he uec maer and mhd f he dcplne f pchlg Amng man her publcan Gergen ha wrenTowad Tansfomaton n Soc Knowledge (New Yrk Sprnger1982) and he ha ceded Htoal Socal Psychology (Hlldale, NJErlbaum, 1984) wh Mar M Gren

Robe R. Hoffman Acae Pfer f Pchlg a Adelph Unver Currenl ervng a acae edr f he urnal Metapho andSymbolc Act Hffman a ldng reearcher n he pchlg fgurave language Recenl h reearch ha fcued n he prblem fknwledge acqun n general and n he develpmen f experknwledge n parcular largel rm he vewpn f arcal nell



he ah X

gence he auhr man paper n he hr and phlph fpchlg, Hffman ha al ceded Cognition and Figuate Language (Hlldale, NJ Erlbaum 1980 wh Rchard P Hneck and Memoy and Leaing The Ebbinghaus Centennial Confeence (Hlldale, NJErlbaum 1987 wh Davd S Grfen

David E. Lea Prfer f Pchlg and Dean f he Facul f Arand Scence a he Unver f Rchmnd Prevul he wa Prferf Pchlg, Hr, and he Humane, charpern f Pchlgand cdrecr f he Hr and Ther f Pchlg Prgram a heUnver New Hamphre He a Fellw f he Amercan Pchlgcal Acan pa preden f Hr f Pchlg dvn, anda frmer Fellw a he Cener fr Advanced Sud n he BehavralScence n Sanfrd, Calfrna Lear he cedr (wh SgmundKch f A entuy of Psychology a Science (New Yrk McGrawHll,1985) and he ha publhed varu arcle and chaper n he hrphlph, and her pchlg

Paul Ms Emeru Prfer f Pchlg a he Unver fNevadaRen where n 1987 he wa he recpen f he unverOuandng Reearcher Award He a Fellw f he Amercan Pchlgcal Acan and f he Sce fr Pernal Aemen and heha erved n he edral bard f Motiation and Emotion. An edrf a number f bk ncludng Fou Ealy Wos on Motiation(Ganevlle FL Schlar Facmle and Reprn 1969), McRenld al he auhr f man arcle and chaper n mvan, pernal,and he hrcal backgrund f pchlg

s M Nead a cmpuer cen a UNSYS Crpran n Mnneapl where he wrk n he aumac nhe f dgal cmpuerhardware and n he aumac vercan f dgal hardware degnTraned n pchlg a well a cmpuer cence Nead ha been udng he brad area f meanng n arcal and naural language n anaemp prduce a emanc mdel ha capure he ngh fmeaphr ude and cnexualm

Karl H Prbram Jame P and Anna Kng Unver Prfer andEmnen Schlar fr he Sae f Vrgna a Radfrd Unver Hepen man ear a Sanfrd Unver, where he nw PrferEmeru, and he ha receved man fellwhp and hnr ncludnga Lfeme Career Reearch Award n Neurcence frm he Nanalnue f Healh He wa he r preden f he nernanalNeurpchlgcal Sce and ha erved a prden f he Dvnf Phlgcal and Cmparave Pchlg and f he Dvn f



X he h

Therecal and Phlphcal Pchlg f he Amercan PchlgcalAcan Prbram he cur (wh Gerge Mller and EugeneGalaner f Pans and the Stuct of Behaio (New rk Hl, 1960,and he he auhr f Langugs of the Bain rev ed (New YrkBrandn Hue, 1988, f Bain ad Peception Holonomy and Stuctue

in Figual Pocessing - The MacEachan Lectues (Hlldale, NJErlbaum, 1988 and f man hr arcle chaper, and bk

Theore R Sarbin Prfer Eru f Pchlg and Crmnlga he Unver f Calfrna S Cruz He a Fellw f he Amercan Pchlgcal Acan nd pa preden f PchlgcalHpn dvn He ha been a lbrgh Fellw a Oxfrd Unverand a Fellw f he Scal Scence Reearch Cuncl he Jhn SmnGuggenhem Memral Fundan, and he Cener fr he Humane a

Welean Unver Sarbn h edr f Naatie Psychology TheStoied Natue of Human Conduct New Yrk Praeger, 1986 cedr(wh Karl E Schebe f Studie i Social dentity (New rk Praeger1983 cauhr (wh Jame ancu f Schizophenia MedicalDiagnosis o Moal Vedict (New rk Pergamn, 1980 and auhr rcauhr f her bk, ea and reearch arcle

Laurence D Smith Acae fr f Pchlg a he Unverf Mane He hld a maer degee n he hr and phlph f

cence frm ndana Unver a a PhD n he hr and herf pchlg frm he Unver f New Hamphre, where he wa aNanal Scence Fundan raae Fellw Smh he auhr fBehaioism and Logical Posii A eassssment of the Alliance(Sanfrd CA Sanfrd Unver re, 1986, a well a arcle n hehr and phlph f phlg, and he currenl ervng aaan edr f he oual of ind and Behaio.



Preface

Th vlume reec a lea hree rend ha have becme ncreanglapparen ver he pa everal decade he develpmen f nere n hehr f pchlg he develpmen f nere n he naure f cgnve prcee, parcularl he underlng creave acv and hedevelpmen f nere n he naure f language, epecall he ncdence and funcn f meaphr Alhugh hee rend verlap n varuregard, he chaper n h vlume ghen her acan b eplcang he rle f meaphr n he hnkng and behavr f pchlgA a whle, h vlume huld rae he cncune f pchlg,hran f cence, uden and nereed lapern regardng heue - and abue - f meaphr n he hr f pchlg

A he bk prgenr and edr am parcularl graeful frhe cperan dlgence and chlarhp f m cllabrar fr henere and uppr f he drecr aff and m fellw fellw n 1982-3 a he Cener fr Advanced Sud n he Behavral Scence, Sanfrd, Calfrna fr he encuragemen and feedback f man pernwh aended a ere f mpa enled Meaphr n he Hr fPchlg ha were held a he annual meeng f he AmercanPchlgcal Acan beween 1983 and 1986 fr he nellecual andnancal aance f he Deparmen f Pchlg, Dean Suar Palmerf he Cllege f Lberal Ar, and he Reearch Admnran Offce fhe Unver f New Hamphre fr he reference checkng and prfreadng dne b Tre Buchanan and Lnda Perch fr he paence andecrearal help f Shrle Nrn Dnna Hard and epecall AnnaMe fr he exper and mel edral wrk f Helen Wheeler and

x



II eace

Mar Nevader f Cambrdge Unv Pre and fr he frbearance fall he frm cllabrar anger, wh kep akng "When habk n meaphr gng cme ? Fnall wuld lke acknwledge a ver pernal deb m wf, Marge, and m chldren, Eml,Elzabeh, and Mahew wuld have had he afacn f beng

acaed wh h wrk f he h n cnnuall uppred m chlarl effr

Perhap a few wrd abu he cher n h vlume are n rder Mnrducr chaper "Pche Me mean mpl draw u hereader, n he ubec and cncern f h vlume b preenng a brefprelmnar dcun n meaphr and b pnng llurave nance f hrcal rle n l her han pchlg a well a npchlg elf The becve h nrducr chaper mpl

e he cene fr he ubequen chaer n uch a wa ha n reader wllpu dwn h vlume wh he dea ha pchlg mehw alne n relance n meaphr Hweer nque parcular ue f meaphrpchlg ha had n mnp meaphrcal hnkng A a reul,even hugh h vlume fcu marl n he rle f meaphr npchlg anale are relv an underandng f nellecuallfe n general bh nde and de he dman f cence

Wherea m nrducr chpe eek elc ur nere and e wder bundare fr ur hgh m cncludng chaper bre

ummarze he mar meaph nd urce f meaphr cvered neach chaper harpen an mpr pn ha n emphazed n hefregng chaper and ndca he chlarl wrk ha reman bedne Snce he chaper f h vume prvde n each cae mehngakn nal recnnaance ave reed he mpule - and hewegh f cum - e all her Such cnderable un a hvlume en nhere n cmn ubec and n he cmmn becve ward whch he chaper There n need haen clurea h me

A fr he chaper beweenm

nrducn and cnclun u wlldcver ha he are he hear an ul f h bk The decrbe ncnderable deal he ue f mahr n dfferen area f pchlgOher area mgh have been reprened eher nead f r n addn he acuall chen Bu he urveed heren cnue a verreanable elecn frm amng h man ubpecale encmpaed bhe cnemprar dcplne f plg n an cae b fferng uch arch and vared de he cnrbur h vlume have prvded plenf fd fr u de wh pr fr a gd lng me

Th bk nended prmarl f he whe nere nerec ne rmre f he rend led a he ennng f h preface Bu even f u



eace Xll

are n amng hee man ndvdual m fellw cllabrarn hpng ha u wll be nfrmed mulaed and challenged b hvlume

A fr urelve he auhr f h vlume we have ened prduc

ng h bk and f anhng we are nw mre cncu han befreha ur pc mpran - and ha ur cnrbun are all prelmnar A Phlp Wheelwrgh nce ned n a mlar cnex wecan nl murmur wh he Hndu age f he Upanhad "Neti neti,whch a "N que ha! N que ha!

We hank he wh have been paen a we raveled ward hmlene n ur effr cmprehend he rle f meaphr n hehr f pchlg and we are graeful n advance he wh wllread h vlume wh lerance a well a vglance Hwever fallble uranale and argumen ma be, we are cnvnced ha he deal whpc and cncern ha deerve - and wll repa - he effr f uanedaenn



1

Psyche's muse: the role of metaphor

in the history of psychoogy

D A VI D E L E A R Y

Ever nce Arle aered ha he greae hng b far be amaer f meaphr numeru chlar have uded and wren abuhe naure and funcn f meaphr The va mar f hee chlar have fcued n meaphr a a dncve ue f language ha ha

varu rhercal funcn 2 Recenl hwever me chlar havebegun dg deeper n he pc nvegang he pbl hameaphr n nl a frm f speech bu mre fundamenall a frm fthought havng bac epemlgcal funcn Wh regard cencefr nance uch chlar a Arbb and Hee (1986 Barbur (1974Black (1962, 1979 Bhm and Pea (1987 Bd (1979, Farber (1950,Gerchenkrn (1974 Guld (1977ab 1983) Hee (1955 1966 1980)Hffman (1980, 1984b, R S Jne (1982 Kuhn (1979 Leaherdale(1974 MacCrmac (1976, 1985 Martn and Harr (1982 Nbe

(1976 Nrh (1980 Oppenhemer (1956 and Temkn (1977 havebegun ud he wa n whch meaphrcal hnkng bradl cnceved ha helped cnue and n merel reec, cenc herand pracce4 Fllwng upn uch wrk h vlume ha been rganzedwh he nenn f rang and anwerng quen abu he rle fmeaphr n he hr f pchlg whle al prvdng anale fme f he mar meaphr ha have guded - and meme preempted nvegatn n eleced area f pchlg

M wn renan a rganzer and edr f h vlume huld

bear me prelmnar crun hugh m vew abu meaphr and rle n he hr f pchlg d n necearl reec he f hercnrbur h vlume (N cnrbur had gn an ah f

1



2 a eay

allegance n rder parcpae n nellecual venure The purpef h nrducr chaper here decrbe he renanunderlng m nvlvemen n h cllabrave prec prvde abref penng dcun n meaph (a generall underd n hvlume and gve a hrcal ve f eleced ue f meaphr nvau dcplne f hugh ncdng bu n lmed pchlgTh urve wll ccup m chaper and wll prvde a runnngar n he chaper ha fllw [ hpe wll al bvae a cnclunha mgh be reached n he ba f he le and cverage f hvlume namel ha meaphr l a rle n pchlg bu n necearl n her dcplne wud be ndefenble f h vlume nvedr lef rm fr he mpren a chlg and alne n relancen meaphrcal hnkng

Preliminary distintions and discussions

M on thesis

T a hng ff hall a my wn he a baldl a can Allknwledge ulmael red n eaphrcal (r analgcal mde fpercepn and hugh Thu, meahr necearl pla a fundamenalrle n pchlg a n an he dman n her wrd he npran f pchlgcal hugh wch have mblzed a "Pche

Mue n he le f h chaper derve frm he cmparave relanal mde f underandng ha preume be fundamenal human cgnn

The mple and m apprprae wa elucdae h he bmean f an analg f am cnfrned wh a wrd ha d n underand, wll eher ak mene w mean r lk up n a dcnar n eher cae wll keep ang and earchng unl he wrd dened n erm f her wrd h are beer knwn me Th mpleexample can erve a a paradgm fr he man wa n whch we cnfrn

and cme underand real When an apec f ur experencerke u a wrh underandng eher fr he r me r n a newwa, we begn earch fr "ml nance, a Wllam ame (1890called hem (chap 13, 19, and 2 Onl when we have fund an appeg r pgenhle fr h ac f ur experence d we feel heubecve afacn ha brng r earch an end m cnenn ha he mlar nance ha erve a ur peg and pgenhle -a ur caegre f underandng - are eher explcl r mplclmeaphrcal n naure and func

T expre h cnenn n ll dfferen erm, wuld a hau a we urn a dcnar fr he denn f unknwn wrd nerm f mre famlar wrd, e lk phenmena f her r,



syche's se 3

wheher naural r arcal, fr analg f hng quale, and even ncludng apec f u wn experence and acv - ha we wh cmprehend And cnverel we fen lk ur wn experenceand acv f analg f he naual and arcal phenmena F

nance Arle (ca 330 BC/193 explaned menal funcnnghrugh he ue f blgcal meaphr whle recen cbernec(eg Wener, 1961 have reved ur nn f blgcal rganmhrugh he ue f mechancal and cgnve meaphr Thu, Arle he mnd a liing thing wherea cbernec lvng hng arenfrmanprceng machines. Cnequence f bh a mral and anaehec naure reul frm uch cncepual dfference

Th general cnenn regardng he fundamenall meaphrcalnaure f human hugh eem bvu me, bu neverhele

wrh ang and cnderng, nce frgeng he meaphrcal nauref ur cncep nve hardenng f he caegre and he varur f mh and cul - uch a he mh f becv and acaed cul f emprcm - ha have characerzed much f wenehcenur hugh, n he cal and behavral cence a elewhere (eeTulmn & Lear, 1985)

Of cure, am far frm he r prpe ha human language andhugh are ulmael meaphrcal ndeed have me ver gdcmpan f Arle n furquare amng h cmpan (ee Levn,

1982 Lld, 1987), he a lea ared he ball rllng b pnng uha frm meaphr ha we can be ge hld f mehng freh(Arle, ca 330 BC/1924a, I 1410) Sll nl n mdern mebegnnng wh he emlgcal rhercal, and hrcal anale fGambaa Vc (1744/1948) ha man chlar have cme harehe vew ha meaphr characerze human hugh and language n arul fundamenal wa Th vew whch uuall preuppe ha analg ncluded n he brader caegr f meaphr, ha been held bman her f varu peruan - b emprc and pragma a

well a b deal and nellecual anarch: b Davd Hume JeremBenham Alexander Ban, and Charle Perce (fr nance a well a bmmanuel Kan Fredrch Nezche, Han Vahnger, and ErnCarer n pn f fac, h vew ha becme wdepread and habeen expreed b her f man renan ha he wenehcenur pchlg Kenneh Crak eem have uered a mere cmmnplace when he uggeed ha he bran a machne fr maknganalgcal mdel 7 Th vew ha been renfrced n recen ear b ah f ude cnduced b nvegar frm man dcplne (e g

Hlland Hlak, Nbe & Thagard 1986) n um he pulae hameaphrcal r analgcal hnkng pla a fundamenal rle n he acqun and exenn f knwledge ha been bradca far and wde

Nnehele h vew n unanmul held The cnenn ha all



4 av E a

language and hugh ulmal meaphrcal r analgcal cnrveral, even hugh cmmn T gve he crc her due, wmar dncn mu be acknledged and addreed: (1) he dncn beween meaphr and her gure f peech and hugh and (2)he dncn beween meaphrcl a pped leral language and

hugh Thee dncn can an, n me cnex, ceranl huldbe made, bu n relan m e, I beleve ha b and large he canbe gnred n he fllwng ecn I hall r uf h belef bargung (1 ha meaphr n mpl ne amng man gure fpeech and hugh, bu raher h can be reanabl cndered behe prmar gure f peech and hugh and (2 ha here n abluecham beween meaphrcal and leral language and hugh

The denition of metao nd its elation to othe guesof seec and thought

Cnen wh m he, meaph ha been dened hrugh he ue fcmparn - ndeed many cmarn Meaphr ha been lkened a ler a fun a len a preen a creen a enn, a dplacemen aerecpc mage a frm f lnuc pla a fale den a emanccn a cnexual hf a ranln f meanng a wnned vn andan ncngruu perpecve menn nl a few f cmmnmeaphr Th range f mage nd her crrelave denn

grea ha ne uden f mephr Jane Marn Skce (1985 hacmmened ha "anne wh a grappled wh he prblem fmeaphr wll apprecae he pragam f he wh prceed dcu whu gvng an denn a ll One chlar clam hae fund125 dfferen denn urel nl a mall fracn f he whch havebeen pu frward (p 15 Sll evn allwng fr alernave, wll beueful fr me prvde a genera enn f nl mve ur dcun alng

Skce wn wrkng den ha "meaphr ha gure f

peech whereb we peak abu ne hng n erm whch are een beuggeve f anher (p 15 alc deleed Th denn mlar ha f Rchard Brwn (1977 aer mpl ha meaphr eeng mehng frm he vewpn f mehng ele (p 77 Lkem denn f meaphr, ee reec Arle (ca 330 BC/1924b denn accrdng whch meaphr cnued b gvng mehng "a name ha belng mehng ele I 1457 FllwngSkce and man her, hall a whn Arle amb bfferng he fllwng lghl med denn Meaphr cn n

gvng ne hng a name r decpn ha belng b cnvenn mehng ele n he grund f me mlar beween he w ncnderng h denn ne hld realze ha he hng meaphrzedneed n be a maeral bec Qale even, and an her apec f



yhe e

experence are ncluded amng he nnumerable hng ha can berendered hrugh meaphr Th denn al ugge ha Arledenmnan her nadequae, f underd n a rerced eneMeaphr fen nvlve mre han he mere ranfer f a frm ne

bec anher A Paul Rceur ( 1977 1979) ha ned meaphr canal nvlve he ranfer f predcae r decrpn ndeed, anhngacaed wh he meaphrcal erm n rgnal cnex, can bempled f ew refrn Thu, wh Arle eaed h md a alvng hng, he nved he nference ha can develp and change verme ad when cbernec make nfrma ceral blgcalfuncnng he e he age fr quen abu he relanhp beween he ne and "meage nvlved he regulan f lvngbde

Th denn f meaphr al hghlgh he fac ha cnvenn ne' underandng f he "nrmal uage f language - pla a rle nhe crean f mephr wll a mre bu h n he nex ecnFnall h denn ugge ha mlar - r analg - he bndbeween he w hng cmpared n a meaphr A Arle (ca 330BC/1924b) ad "A gd meaphr mple an nuve percepn fhe mlar n dmlar I 1459) Thu he nn f mlar ranalg ncluded n he cncep f meaphr T a ha he mnd a lvng hng r ha a lvng hng a machne - a al a ha

emn are frce r ha he ene are gnal deecn devce rha behavral prblem are llnee - ugge a e f reemblancebeween he member f each f hee par f erm

The nclun f analg n he cncep meaphr undercre hefac ha am prpng a brad denn f "meaphr ha encmpae a vare f her gure f peech ndeed accrdng heabve denn, meaphr can hardl be dnguhed frm rpe (guref peech) n general Furhermre, a cnequence f h denn ha uch hng a fable , parable, allegre mh, and mdel nclud

ng cenc mdel can be een, b mplcan, a exended and uaned meaphr (Turbane 1970, pp 11-20 ee al Barbur 1974pp 42-5 Black, 1962, p 237 Shble, 1974, p 27)

Oher befre me have argued fr gvng h r f generu wa he cncep f meaphr Tradnal rhercan, fr nance haveallwed meaphr an fr gure f peech n geeral a well a frne parcular gure f peech amng her (ee eg Fgeln 1988p 28 Hawke 1972, p 2 Lanham, 1968, pp 123-4 Perelman &Olbrecheca 199/1969 pp 398-9 Th de n mean cre

ha nhng culd be ganed b ung he erm n a ud lke he preenne, wh a narrw raher han brad gncan Fuure ude mghwell nvegae he rle ha meaphr a distinct frm analg mlemenm necdche, and n, ha plaed n he hr f pchlg Hwever beleve ha here gd rean prceed here wh a



6 y

brader vew, nt nl becaue f chlarl precedent but becaue theevdence (a I ee t) upprt vd Cper' (1986) cnclun thatuuall ne gan rather than l� b emplng metaphr' n a generu wa (p 196) I beleve that th urel the cae n an admttedlprelmnar tud lke the prent ne At the tart t crtcal t makecertan that there a general phenmenn f me nteret and mprt,hwever blunt ur mean f dentcatn and explratn A a reult, Iam qute cntent that the cntrbutr t th vlume fr the mt parthave aumed a brad rather than narrw dentn f metaphr and thatme have felt free t ue analg vrtuall equvalent t metaphr Inm udgment that a t huld e

Metahorical ersus ltral language and thought

The ke t the relatnhp betwn the metaphrcal and the lteral prvded b the cncept f cnvtnalt Metaphr cnttuted, Iclamed n m dentn b the attrbutn t ne thng f a name rdecrptn that belng by conntion t methng ele Althuht prblem reerc a t t vrtel claumed that decrptn a well name are assigned t thng b calpractce rather than discoered thrugh me rt f raw experence, a fthe were mehw embedded f all tme n ther bect What cunta lteral language, n the nw ndard accunt, language uage t

whch a partcular lngutc cmmunt ha grwn accutme Thuwhen Englh peaker refer t th leg f a char the need nt wrrthat ther klled Englh peaker ll thnk ther expren rather ddlmetaphrcal Hwever a n man ntance t nnethele truethat the term f reference - n th ae leg - wa rgnall an magnatvemetaphr It nl wth repeatd uage ver tme that uch term aretranfrmed b cutm nt "lteral term wth vrtuall unanmulundertd referent The mplctn, a Ralph Wald Emern (1836/1983a 1837/1983b 1844/1983c) ntd mre than nce that metaphr

the fertle l frm whch all languge brn, and lteral language thegraveard nt whch all "dead metaphr are put t ret

What th mean that there n harp dvn between metaphrcaland lteral language At the ppte end f a ngle cntnuum relatvel clear ntance f metaphrcal and lteral language are farl ea trecgnze, but - except n trul dead language - there cntnualcmmerce between thee tw pl, a metaphrcal cncept becmemre cmmn (e lteral) thrugh ue and a lteral ccept are uedn unexpected ( e metaphrcal) wa In th manner the metaphrcal

cncept f cgntve nput ha lt mt f t nvelt and awkwardnever the pat decade and the ce lteral phlgcal) cncept fneural cnnectn ha taken n an entrel new (cgntve) meanngat leat fr man member f th chlgcal cmmunt



shes us 7

Th cntentn abut the permeable bundare between the metaphrcal and the lteral hardl new In 1927, fr ntance, MrtmerAdler nted that the dtnctn between lteral and metaphrcal tatement cannt be defended when the mblm f all language re

vealed (p 94) H clam cnnant wth a great deal f recentchlarhp Carl Kate (1980) eptmzed th chlarhp when he adthat narrwl emantc there f metaphr are unable t dtnguhmetaphrcal tructure frm rdnar lteral (emprcal) tatement andthat the dtnctn between the metaphrcal and lteral "can nl becaptured b a pragmatc mdel f the metaphrcal functn (p 232)"Captured ma be t trng a metaphr The mt Kate feel able tclam that "ne ntutely aware f a dfference between a metaphrcal utterance and a lteral emprcal tatement, r between a lvng and a

dead metaphr (p 233 talc added) T a that the dtnctn between the metaphrcal and lteral depend n "ntutn t a that tdepend n a ver ubtle acqured ene r tate - that ne "knwwhat metaphrcal and what lteral becaue ne ha becme aentve cnneur f the language Th upprt m argument thught mght nt repreent the entre tr behnd the ablt t ntut thedtnctn between metaphrcal and lteral tatement Sentvt t apeaker' ntenton ma be a mprtant a entvt t lngutc usage nth regard (ee Gbb 1984) In an cae, a gd deal f recent reearch

ugget that the dtnctn between the metaphrcal and lteral relatve rather than ablute and that the dtnctn ha "lttle pchlgcalrealt (Gbb, 1984, p 275)

Be that a t ma the dtnctn de have the rt f ractcal realtthat brn f repettn and rtualzatn A Cntha Ozck (1986) haput t metaphr "tranfrm the trange nt the famlar (p 67) - andmetme nt the all too famlar The prblem that ma reult frmuch famlarzatn r lteralzatn wll be dcued later n th chapter and at varu place thrughut th vlume Fr nw, I hpe we can

mpl agree that the dtnctn between the metaphrcal and lteralneed nt tand n the wa f m central the that human language andthught are fundamentall metaphrcal In an cae t tme t mven t the electve htrcal urve that I prmed t prvde

A selective and illustrative historical surveymetaphor in the history of Western thought and science

Thoughts about metahor n early Greek hlosohy

T get a runnng tart I hall g back t the ancent Greek and begnwth Plat wh mprtant n the htr f metaphr partcularl frntallng a deep ambvalence abut t at te ver cre f the Weternntellectual tradtn It wa Plat (ca 375 BC/1961a ca 360 BC/



8

1961b), ou will call who sai tt th tu ssncs of thins a puidas that w can and should sti to attain (o ath, to mmb),but that in pactic will man (o most of us) fov bond oucomplt asp (o call) All ht w can now mpiicall said Platoa th ctions of ths ultmt ssncs - ctions that a m

bddd in th matial obcts cssibl to ou snss Sinc thsctions a onl copis o linss of tu alit what w ta to bou nowld of thins is actuall onl opinion At bst ou thois and h fd in th Timaeus c 355 BC/96lc) spcicall to ouscintic thois - a lil ts In oth wods, th a mthso xtndd mtaphos

Thus, Plato dadd th onl id of nowld w a lil to havin this nit wold of ous Setin th famwo fo th viws ofnowld and scinc that we o com h stablishd th huistic

oal of ctain tuth and placd sid it th inluctabl actualit oftntativ stois In so doin h smichd th putation of th vsot of nowld h so astutl analzd and so bautifull xmplidin his own wo (, s Bambuh, 1956)

Aistotl, Platos studnt, sv his ow wa to dla th considation of mtaphoical thinin as fundamntal to all nowld Fo all hisimpotanc as th st sious stnt and most nduin u in thhisto of sach on mtapho istotl focusd pimail on th olof mtapho in pot and htoi and thus hlpd stablish th sval

millnnium mphasis on mtapho as a m htoical dvic (s Knnd, 1980) Tpicall ovloo has bn th fact that mtapho canalso sv as a mans of discov Althouh Aistotl himslf pointdtowad this fact it was not untl th wo of Giambattista Vico 1744/1948) that it civd an sinica attntion - and not until th wo ofSamul T Colid 1817/1975) I A Richads 1936) and oths thatit was mo full xplod Thus, onl in lativl cnt tims has thstud of mtapho bun to mov ac into th cntal plac it occupidat last implicitl in Platos paatic philosoph of scinc

Metahor and e ise of mode science

Of cous whn w thin about philosoph of scinc, w natuallthin of modn scinc not of Plto Aistotl Vico Colid o I ARichads As is commonl now th mnc of modn scinc inth svntnth cntu coincid with a ood dal of antimtaphoicalhtoic (s R F Jons, 1963) omas Spat captud th ton of thishtoic in his Htory of the oyl Society of ondon (1667/1702) whn

h wot that th mmbs of ths nw scintic socit had ndavodto spaat th nowld of ature fom th colous of hetorick thdvics o Fancy, and] th dltul dcit of Fables (p 62) In thi



plac h said th had substitutd a clos nakd natual wa ofspaking (p

Thomas Hobbs (6968 xpssd th sam attitud whn hcompad mtaphos, and snslss and ambiguous wods to ignes

fatui Rasoning with mtaphos, h said "is lik] wanding amongstinnumabl absuditis and th nd of mtaphoical thinking is contntion and sdition, o contmpt (pp 6-7

It is instuctiv that all this antimtaphoical talk was htoical in thxtm its goal bing to appotion th stictus on thought anddiscous Indd, it is a dlicious ion that th nw languag of bothSpat and Hobbs was thooughl infusd with mtaphos - about thcolous of htoic th dvics of fanc th dcit of ablsabout mtaphos bing "foolish s ignes fatui) ; and about mtapho

ical thinking bing a path to stif, tason, and all sots of wo

Evn mo to th point Hobbss own phsiological and social thoisw basd on mtaphos, th cntal ons bing mchanical in natuthus cting his fascination with aticial automata and in paticula hislov affai with clocks (s McRnolds 980 On th v st pag ofhis mastpic fo instanc Hobbs (6/968 laid out th mtaphoicassumptions undling his wa of thought - and that of so man othadhnts of th mchanical philosoph that accompanid th ScinticRvolution

Sing lif is but a motion of Limbs th bgining whof is in sompincipall pat within wh ma w not sa that all AutomataEngins that mov thmslvs b spings and whls as doth awach) hav an atciall li Fo what is th Heart but a Sringand th eres, but so man Strings and th oynts, but so manWheeles giving motion to th whol Bod such as was intndd bth Atic So too] b At is catd that gat EVATHANcalld a COMMON-WEATH o STATE (in latin CVTAS which is butan Aticiall Man in which, th Soeraign is an Aticiall Soul,

as giving lif and motion to th whol bod Th Magistrates andoth Ocers of Judicatu and Excution, aticiall oynts ewardand Punishment a th eres and so on] (p 8

Of cous whn w think of th "clockwok univs, w thinkalmost immdiatl of Si Isaac Nwton vn though Nwtons pspctiv was thooughl mathmatical ath than mchanical Indd thcntal concpt in his sstm of thought - univsal gavitation - is fafom mchanistic Nwton 687/974 s Cohn 980 In fact, th

histo of this concpt, which is on of th most fundamntal in modnscinc illustats natl how natual philosophs and scintists oftnutiliz mtaphos fom th social wold Whn Nwton st ponddth fact that no dtctabl mchanical foc accountd fo th tndnc



0 E r

of masss of matt to mov towd on anoth, h concptualizd thismstious movmnt as analos to th attaction of human psonstowad one anothe In his a notbooks he even used th temsociabilit in addition to ataion (Manul 968, p 68 at, hepefed to speak of "gavit spit its mchanistic connotation, on

the assumption that this mtah could b usd nutall, which is tosa in a puel desciptiv mann But though gavt was cetainlless anthopomophic than sciilit o attaction, its subsqunthisto shows that it was al akn nutall Indeed, as I havealad suggestd, no tem, no si, no mtapho is so tanslucnt that itcan conve a pu ida without so sot of clothing Numbs ma comeclosst to being tanslucnt, bu vn th as we now know, bing alonga wadob of assumptions tha soud thi obects, howv spal, inone fashion o anothe

In sum, w ned not selct a platonic mstic lik Johanns Keplin od to illustate the impac o taphoical thinking in the histo ofthe phsical scincs (s Kosle 99 Quit th conta It woud bas to povide examples ad aam of the constitutive and gulativmtaphos of modn phsical snc, accompanied b extended analss of and quotations fom the oks of such spctabl scntists asJames Clek Maxwell, Willia homson (od Klvi), and AlbetEinstin Fo th sak of psein th ncssail slctive chaact ofm histoical suv, howve, I hall simpl fe to th woks of Hss

(966, Hoffman (980, eathal (974 MacComac (976, andNoth (980, which povid man lucid and complling xamples of thecontibutions of metaphoical thiing to th dvlopment of the natualscncs

Metahor n ologcal scence

If th was a Nwton of biolo at pson was Chals Dawin, whospublishd woks (dspit his tims positvist htoic) ae eplete

with mtaphos oftn - indd gall - social in oigin mtaphos ofstuggle, competition oganizati and division of labo mtaphosgading th conom and polt of natu and so on But mosignicant than th m abunda of mtaphos in Dawins witing isth essntial ole that mtaphos ld in th concptual dvlopmnt ofhis thinking, as clal shown n J notbooks (s, g, Batt 974D B 960-, 967 He 980 Vozimm 977 Fa fombing mel illustativ Daw mtaphos constitut th v foundation of his tho (s Evans, ; Gub, 974 980 Mani, 978

Most fundamntal of cous Dawins mtapho of natual slction Dos ature - with a captal as h tpicall had it - all selct?



u

Not all, but Dawins aticulation of volutiona tho was dpndent on his sustaind analogical - and htoical - compaison betwnth socalld aticial slction (o bding) of animals as contolld bhumans on th on hand and th putativl natual slction of vaiants

caid out b Natue, on th othe Thus the human mtapho (as niclanalzd b Robt Young, 97) was cntal and citical to Dawinsthought, in this as in oth was And it is woth noting that Dawin wasno mo abl to fostall unintndd, somtims ven tlological adings of his mtapho than Nwton was abl to kp th mchanists at ba(s Glick 974 D Hull, 97 Vozimm, 970) If I ma us a cuntDawinian mtapho, I would sa that th histo of Dawinian thoughtsuggsts that idas (lik offsping of a diffnt sot) dvlop accoding tothi own gntic ndowmnts nvionmnts, and lif histois, tnding

to mov in dictions unanticipatd (and somtims vn vigoouslopposd) b thi pants 2

Also impotant in Dawins cativ thinking was th ol of imag,which oftn initiall took th fom of visual mtapho and was soonaticulatd into vbal mtapho I am thinking pimail of th imag ofan igulal banching t, although oth xampls could b citd aswll As Gub (978) has shown, th mtapho of a t hlpd Dawinat a cucial point to mak sns of a good dal of untid and poblmaticdata gaing th volutiona histo and lationships of vaious

spcis Th t mtapho did not, and dos not wok pfctl Dawin859/964) himslf claimd onl that it largely spaks th tuth(p 29, italics addd) 22 And t, whatv its impfctions th tmtapho continus to this v da lik impfct mtaphos in othdisciplins - to povid a cognitiv famwok fo both scintists andlapsons alik

Bfo tuning fom th biological to th social scincs, I want to saa fw wods about on aspct of th phsiological tho of HbtSpnc whos lif and wok ovlappd signicantl with Dawins I

wish to do so in od to focus attntion bi on th lationshipbtwn mtaphos and mpiical sach To account fo th multiplicit of nual functions which clal outnumb th nit numb ofth nvous sstms oganic pats, Spnc (870) suggstd that thbain (with its nuological xtnsions) smbls a piano Though thpiano has fw than on hundd ks its potntial combinations ofnots a so numous that it can poduc a vitual innitud of soundsSo it is (Spnc said) with th bain whos xtnsions and pats can bla n nnumal was 56-) o b su this is an

innocntsming mtaphoical compaison but it inspid som of thimpotant nuological wok of John Hughlings Jackson and thoughJackson its impact was flt b Sigmund Fud and man oths (s



i E r

Fost 980 chap Fullni 98 C U M Smith 982abYoung 970, chaps 5 and 6)

Th point I would lik to hasiz h is that th a mandiffnt was to look at th a o at anthing ls Spnc suggstdon of thm, on th basis of an anaog with a piano H usd man oth

analogis as wll - his aiload mtapho is phaps th bst knownOth thoists and sach in his tim usd batt and dammtaphos, which soon gav wa t tlphon mtaphos and vntuallto oth tlcomunications and inomation masumnt mtaphos avait of thmostat and fdc mtaphos comput hadwa andsoftwa mtaphos and now hogam pattn analsis and paallldistibutd pocssing mtaphos (s Pibam, Chapt this volum)It is impotant to aliz that all hs mtaphos hav had histoicallsignicant directie functions h hav dictd th gaz - not to

mntion th thotical and patcal activitis - of sachs towaddiffnt aspcts of th nvou stm Indd it sms saf to sa thatas a gnal ul, phnomna sch as th bain and ts xnsions) looksomwhat diffnt to - and td to b concptualizd and tatd somwhat dffntl b - possssos dft mtaphocal famwoks

A gaphic dmonstation of hi point could b povidd b a histoicalsuv of nuological illustaio which would show how sachsof diffnt thotical psuasio poduc diffnt obctiv psntations of th bain It ma not b so supising that handdawn

illustations (vn b wlltaind aftsmn) a suscptibl to stlizationalong th lins dictatd b thoical gavit and tchnical facilit butfw popl stop to consid that vn photogaphic illustations a basdon ppad bains cut in scins and cafull displad along linsdictatd b cunt tho Althouh w cannot pusu this topic futhit is lvant to obsv that dfnt and vn opposing thoticalviws, goundd on v diffen ts of analogis can b illustatd andcooboatd at on and th sa tim fo what counts as lvantvidnc vais in lation to ons thotical vision A good xampl is

povidd b th simultanous cnmation of both John HughlingsJacksons dcntalizd (Bitish modl of ain functioning and EduadHitzig and Gustav Fitschs cntalizd Pussian) modl oth of whichw aboatd on th basis of plicitl sociopolitical analogis (Paul98 C U M Smith 98b) (Outsid th biological scincs thcontmpoanous conmation f both Wilhlm Wbs paticlointd tho and Jams Clk axwlls ld tho of lctomagntism povids anoth good xamp s Hibt 980 p 88) Obviouslth givnnss of facts is not ch that it uls out th possiilit of

slctiv pcption and altnti intptation guidd (I would maintain) diffing mtaphoic assptions about alit



h' u

etaphor i oia sciec

About th mtaphos of socal scnc - mchanstc oganc ngustcludc damatugcal and so on - much could b sad Howv f

to focus on a sngl hstocal cas and an ssu that t ass - an ssuthat wll ba futh attnton whn w tun to pscholog and tsmtaphos As hav alad notd Nwton dvd hs ognal notonof gavt fom th aaog f huma attact I wat ow t pt outth oncal lgac of ths concpt whch was soon utlzd as an analogn thos of socal dnamcs As an xampl, I shall f to th socaltho of Bshop Gog Bkl, bcaus t llustats th pont soclal It should b undstood, howv, that Bkl was onl onof man postNwtonan thnks and socal scntsts fo whom th

mtapho of Nwtonan gavt, o som latd concpt, svd as atmplat fo constung human acton n th agggatTh ssnc of Bkls socal tho s xpssd n hs posthumous

l ttld ssa Th Bond of Soct (7/955) As st foth n tpcall succnct Bklan fashon, ths tho s basd on th smplstaghtfowad contnton that th s a ctan cospondnc osmltud of opaton btwn th natual and human wolds Just asnatual phlosophs (followng Nwton) agd that natual bods xta mutual attacton upon ach oth, so too Bkl asstd, can wobsv a lk pncpl of attacton n th moal wold n fact, thsocal apptt n human souls - that gatst spng and souc ofmoal actons - s th v bond of soct, ust as gavt s th bond ofnatu (pp 2258)

So n Bkls tho of socal ntacton th socal apptt thatbnds humans togth s lknd to th phscal gavt that daws btsof matt towad on oth Nd I xplcat th on? Nwton had usdth analog of human attacton pcsl bcaus h could thnk of nomchancal o phscal foc capabl of accountng fo th natualphnomna h was studng But vn bfo hs dath n 727, hs

supposdl ssubggng mtapho, backd b th authot h hmslfhad confd on t, was tund full ccl and usd as an analog b whchhuman attacton could b undstood And gong a stp futh, th usof ths mtapho would soon contbut to th qustonng of th vconcpton of human natu as nonmchancal and nonmatalstc, thatNwton had found ptnnt to hs fomulaton of th concpt of gavtn th st plac Although Bkl hmslf as an dast sdstppdth phscalst, ductonst connotatons of hs "Nwtonan wa ofthnkng about socal bhavo th sam could not b sad fo man of hs

contmpoas and succssos Bfo long, socal dnamcs (and mntaldnamcs, fo that matt) w bng dscussd as f humans (o das)



4 E ery

w so man billiad balls bumping into on anoth As w shallmak again lat on this so o onical boomang ffct, b which ahuman mtapho is ctd bc on th human condition in a nonhumanist, ductionist fom, is not a as on might wish in th histoof th social and pschological cincs

Metahor ad the orii of sychoogica cocets

W com now at last to pschog, but onl aft having dvotd thst potions of ou bif histoial suv to pointing out xampls ofth wa th oth phsical, biologial, and social scincs hav dvlopdon th basis of ctain oot, o founding mtaphos It is impotant tommb ths xampls lst uwaantd conclusions b dawn aboutpschologs lianc on mtaphcal thought and xpssion

W should bgin ou considton of mtaphos in th pschologicaldomain b focusing on th concs of th soul o mind and its vaiousintllctual and motional pocses - in oth wods b focusing on thconcptual foundations of taditinal mntalistic pscholog Wh doths concpts and tms com m M answ is quit simpl: Thcom, histoicall, fom th labation o mtaphoica mods of comphnding human xpinc

Lik oth claims in this chapt, this on is not nw John Lock(690/959), who was himslf a pponnt of man inuntial mtaphos

of th mind,

mad th same lim - and psagd th conclusion ofnumous linguistic histoian philosophs, and pschologists (gMll 867, and Whitn, 89, pp 88-90 Nitzsch, 87/979 andRid, 785/969, p 5 Asch, 9 958 and Skinn 989 spctivl) - whn h notd how snsibl idas a tansfd to mo abstussignications and mad to st fo idas that com not und thcognizanc of ou snss (vol p 5) Locks point was simpl thattms fing oiginall to snsib obcts and actions hav oftn comto stand fo pocsss hat a ot accssibl to snso xpinc To

illustat his point Lock citd ch pschological concpts as imagination apphnsion comphnsi, concption, disgust distubanc, andtanquilit, ach of which had iginall signid phsical stats andpocsss Futhmo, Lock wnt on to sa (with considabl fosight) that h was condnt that f w could tac thm to thi soucsw should nd in all languags th nams fo things that fall not undou snss to hav had thi st is fom snsibl idas (v 2 p 5)

In oth wods Lock cognzd that ou basic mntalistic concptsa mtaphoical - tansfd om th phsical to th pschologicalalm in an attmpt to xp hat ou inn xpinc i ke Butths mtaphoical concpts ae nt simpl descritie th hav also bntrasformatie Thi us has ld to changs in human slffnc and



Pyche mue 5

hnc to human slfconsciousnss This is a mao claim, but on thathas th substantial backing of such spctd classical scholas as R BOnians (95) and Buno Snll (953) Th nu of th agumnt is that itwas onl ov tim that such phsicalist tms as euma and sychecam to hav xplicitl pschological manings and that it was duingth sam tim that humans bgan to think of thmslvs as having adistinctiv soul o idntit - somthing solid and tangibl at thiv co29 Thus, as Bwst Smith (98) has agud, xplicit slfconsciousnss sms to th resut not simpl th pognito of mtaphoca thnking This s appan u no on on h phgnticll - a lvl on which gnic slfconsciousnss oiginatd whn humans bgan to hink abou hmsvs wih nc to oth hngsactivitis, and psons - ut also on th ontogntic ll As GogHb ad (94-) Ha Stack Suvan (9), v Vgosk

934/98) and oths ha poposd th oigin of indiidual slvssms to occu in h cnx o atonshps wth ohs and wth hout wold

I would lik to mak two oth points of mo gnal applicabilit ()Mtaphos can hav an impact on pactical as wll as thotical dvlopmnts, and () maphoca cncps can undgo pgssiv, hstocadvlopmnt changing thi analogical clothing as it w) fom tim totm Boh points can b illustatd wh pschological concps ootd inancint tims Fo instanc, gin th association of spiit o ath)

and li which was common in a vait of ancin cultus (sBmm, 983 Rohd, 894/925) it was natual fo ou foas tothink that if th qualit of thi livs took a tun fo th wos it wassomhow latd to a chang in th qualit of thi spiit On pacticalsult of such thinking was th institution of tphining th dilling of ahol in th skull - as a tchniqu fo lasing "vil spiits fom patintssuffng pschic distubanc It s vant to mphasz that ths pactic was asonabl within th concptual (i mtaphoical) contxt inwhich it was omulatd But th mao point I wish to mak with th

assistanc of this xampl is that mtaphos can hav a signicant impactin th alm of pactical activit As w shall s lat in this chapt andbook this is as tu in th twntith cntu as it was in ancint tims

To illustat th histoical tansfomation of mtaphoical concpts Iwill f again to th notion of "spiit o bath with its oiginallphsical fnt Ov tim this fnt bcam lss and lss phsical at last in th Wstn tadition until it was thooughl "immatializd into th Chistian concpt of th soul (s Bak 947 Knowls962, chap 7 Tillich 972) "Spiit now mant somthing diffnt

fom bfo t intstingl man of th pschological pactics associatd with th ali concpt of th spiit w tansfomd and maintaind in a stikingl paalll mann Fo xampl th sugical las of



Dv E ey

vil spiits was placd b the "asting out of dvils which involvdspiitual puications and incantaions ath than sugical intvntion

Not supisingl th histoical tnsfomation of mtaphoical concptsand pactics is not an allaton o alonon pocss Dspit thimmatialization of th concpt of th soul fo instanc minutl

phsical "animal spiits w stll pat of th basic xplanato famwok of pscholog in th svtnth cntu, whn Rn Dscatsassignd thm a cntal ol in th tipping of his infamous pinal gland(s th illustations as wll s th txt of Dscats 2972 pp9-2) Soon aftwad howve th maining animal spiits w tansmogid into lctical cunts which in tun w tansfomd intobiochmical solutions and so o Thus th thotical lgac movsfowad - with clinical pactic flowing suit - fom ancint tims ightdown to th psnt

Descartes ad the mehtic metahor i sychoogy

Dscats, to whom I hav ust d, is paticulal impotant in thhisto of pscholog fo havng oldid - fo tt o wos - thadical distinction twn mid nd od (s Dscats, 644/9c,sp pp 22 -2 Kling, 96, ap 6 ) As is wll known, Dscatsxplaind all odil functionig, including motion and havio, inmchanistic tms It is not as wl known that Dscatss postulation of

a mchanistic pscholog was nspid, lik Hoss, aticial automata, though mo th wtdivn gus in th gottos of thRoal Gadns at SaintGmaina than b clocks (s Jans,970 Pic, 965 and th illustain opposit th titl pag of Dscats,662/972) Having sn ths makal automatd status, Dscats(662/972) asond that if m mn could mak mchanical dvicsthat actd in such liflik fashion, thn sul it was - and had n - asimpl thing fo God to mak liing odis that actd accoding to thpincipls of asic mchanics (pp 5)

Dscatss mtaphoical asong povids anoth xampl of somon taking a humanl constut analog - this tim an animatd statumad in th imag and likns of human ings - and thn using thisanalog as a mans of cting o human natu, that is, on th vsam aspct of natu that had bn th modl fo th analog in th stplac Of cous, Dscats hilf (67/9b) flt that no mlmchanical catu would hav - no could hav - catd an xtnalimag of itslf, and h continue to bli in th autonom of thhuman mind (s sp pp 5- But onc th possibilit of a mcha

nistic xplanation of mind was poposd, as it was b man in thightnth cntu (s Rosd, 968), th paadoxical impot of



Pyche mue

Dscatss us of th mchancal mtapho had a dp and lastng ffcton th stmaton of human natu achd b man scntc and nonscntc thnks, ght up to ou own da Thus, not fo th last tm nth hsto of pscholog, a cacatu of th human mnd sd as amodl fo ts thotcal potat As a sult, th mnd was not otadas bng ke a machn bult to mmc human bhao t was pctud aa machn (g, La Mtt, 748/92)

It was a ml logcal consqunc whn Dad atl, amongoths, bgan to spculat about th possbl phsologcal bass of Lockan assocatonsm, whch bcam th most popula pschologcal thoof mntal dnamcs n th ghtnth cntu and bond (s Ga 969Ong 95 Randall, 962 Wan 92) Aft st concptualzngassocatonsm on an xplctl socal modl, Hatl (749/966) followda suggston of Nwtons and conctud that "vbatons a st off nth ban b th mpact of snsatons and that ths phscal movmnts lav "tacs psntng th "pathwas that consttut thassocatv lnks btwn das (s Walls, 982) Such mtaphocalthnkng - about vbatons, mpacts, tacs, and pathwas - stmulatdnumous dvlopmnts n pschonuologcal tho and motvatd agat dal of mpcal sach (s g, Fnch 969, chaps 0 and Rath 965) Although such sach vald th lmtatons ofths mtaphos th s no dnng th mpotant ol n th hsto ofphsologcal pscholog No fo that matt should on ovlook

th ol n th hsto of bhavoal pscholog fo ths mtaphosand th assocatonst tho b whch th w lnkd to pschologvntuall fd nto th dvlopmnt of bhavosm whch was st basdon th concpt of th phsologcal x (s Watson 96) and thndvlopd futh on th bass of ts ctqu (g b Sknn 9)

Of cous not all postCatsan mchansts td to phsologzpscholog o to tanslat assocatonsm nto a bhavostc pscholog(s Rachln 970 chap ) Som mand stadfast mntalsts vnthough th w commttd to th noton that mntal phnomna a

poducts of mchancal pocsss On such pson was Johann FdchHbat (8689) who fd to ths pschomchancal pocsss asth "statcs and dnamcs of th mnd I nd ot mnd most adsthat "mntal mchancs s now a mansta of twntthcntu cogntvpscholog Indd f th w an utlt n attachng such mtaphoclabls, I would suggst that Hbat was th "gatgandath ocontmpoa nfomatonpocssng appoachs to th mnd Bsdsths somwhat dstant pogn hs "mntal mchancs wth ts postulatd "thshold twn conscousnss and unconscousnss, s also

latd (along uncula not patnal lns) to Sgmund Fuds appoachto th "statcs and dnamcs of th mnd



8 Dv E ey

Freud ad the mthors of sychoaays

Not too long ago, whn posiivs stictus w mo stongl hld,Fud was oftn chagd with sous violations of scintic mthod (s,g, Popp, 96 Skinn, ) Toda, howv, a somwhat diff

nt assssmnt is coming to te f and th is vn occasional talkabout how advancd hs phlosoph of scnc was In an cas, whatv citicsms ma still b lvl aganst hs wok, Fud was unusuallastut in his awanss that pschnaltic tho, lk an tho, constituts what h calld a "mthlog in th sns that it invitabl involvs spculaton H also aliz that th is no wa fo pschologiststo opat without th mtaphcal xpssions that a as h said,pculia to pscholog (90/55, p 60) In pscholog Fud(926/959c) wot w can onl dscib things b th hlp of analogis

Th is nothing pculia in th i is th cas lswh as wll But whav constantl to kp changn hs analogis fo non of thm lastsus long nough (p 95)

This is a makabl and o mans isolatd statmnt Moxplicitl phaps than an oth pschologist Fud gav analogicalthinking cnt stag in his theotical uminations Bond that, h tanalogis guid his pactical w in thap, wh h countd sistanc with fdom and ovcm "pssion with disclosu (sFud, 95/957c 926/959b sp pp 57-64 Laplanch & Pontalis,

97 pp 90-7)It is notwoth in this context that Fud was a dvot of Plato Inffct, h accpd Platos patic ath than his idalistic, philosoph of scinc If human knowlg at bst is a "likl sto Fudstov to mak pschoanals t most likl sto possibl In hiscontinuous stuggl to impove ti sto h tid out an mtapho thatpomisd to mov his thinkin fad

Indd a taxonomist would v to wok long and had to classifFuds man mtaphos which dawn fom social and political liffom the elds of phscal dns and hdaulcs phsiolog and natual histo anthopolog and mtolog acheolog and ancient histomilita life and technolog te lassics and popula liteatue and fomothe ealms as well As Feud tized these metapho - of eneg andfoc ow and sistanc pesin and convsion dfns and aggssion and all th st - h was clal following his own advic to changanalogis and compaisons as ofn as ncssa

Fuds us of multipl mps was occasiond b his awanss ofth insufcinc of an singl metapho H did not sk multiplicit oits own sak Instad as ala otd h constantl stov to nd th

most appopiat and usful mtphos fo his paticula concns andsubct matt Fo xampl n his mao tatis he terretato of



Pyche mue

Dream (900/953a), Fud wokd though a sis of mtaphos inod to av at a much mo stctd co of basc compasons (ssp chap 7) H did so lagl though his xplication of th analogbtwn pcpton, thought, and wtng, whch solvd som of th

concptual and mpiical poblms with which h had bn stuggling (foan insightful analsis s Dida 978) Matthw Edli (985) hasagud that ou contmpoa comput modl solvs ths poblmsvn mo conomicall This ma b so but w can xpct computational tho in its tun to b found wanting, fo lik all oth thois,including Fuds, it is ultimatl mtaphoical and fallibl (s not 5)What is distinctiv aout Fud is his xplicit undstanding and accptanc of this mtaphoicit and fallibilit, and his psistnt ffots -howv succssful - to impov th compaisons that ontd his thoand pactic

Phaps vn mo impotant Fud fquntl attmptd to spcifth limitatons of his analogs, oftn within th v contxt in which husd thm As much as an oth pschiatist o pschologist, h wantdto b psuasiv, but h al psntd his mtaphos and analogisas anthing oth than impfct Fo instanc, in his terretatio ofDreams (900/95a), Fud opnl admittd that his mtaphos nddimpovmnt ut h said that h saw "no ncssit to apologiz fo thatfact sinc th w onl povisional aids, intndd to assist his initialdsciptions and thoughts about pviousl unmakd pschic pocsss

(p 56) Evn ganting that this sot of slfdisclosu svs a htoical pupos of its own it also invitd oths to xamin to impov andsomtims to ct his wok in favo of oth mtaphoical schms ofpschological undstanding and pactic That is not a bad wa toconduct th businss of scinc

ames ad the metphorica ature of scietic thought

Evn so until ust a dcad o two ago man psons would hav bn

othd th suggstion that human thought, including scinticthought is ncssail pspctival appoximal and incomplt But notWilliam Jams, th most fquntl and most ustiabl citd fath ofmodn Amican pscholog Th xpctation that somon might psnt a tho that would nd all thotical agumnt was foign toJamss tmpamnt and as h pointd out, unfaithful to th histoicalcod of scinc itslf Following in th footstps of his blovd RalphWaldo Emson Jams blivd that "scnc is nothing but th ndingof an analog and that th analogis of scinc - indd th analogis

undling all foms of knowldg - a uxional ath than "fozn(Emson 87/98b p 55 844/98c p 46) In oth wods, although h was a staunch mpiicist o ath as h saw it because h



20 D E ey

was a staunch mpiicist - Jams isistd that th is alwas a nw wato xpinc an alt and a w wa to catgo an xpinc Acativ gnius in an ld in cnc as in th ats, is simpl somonwho has an unusual nativ talent o pciving analogis that hav nott occud to ohs but tha , on psntation a sn b thm to

val somthing salint about xpinc (Jams 890 vol , pp 42-4, 5290 vol 2, pp 090 6-5)

Salinc, as Jams knw, is ot somthing that is absolut It cannot budgd onc and fo all Evn Jass wllknown pagmatic cition oftuth is suscptil to vaiabl tptation What woks fo onpson ma not wok fo smon ls, givn diffnt fundamntalconcns In th nd, Jams fe humans - scintists includd musthumbl accpt th fact that th salinc of thi cativ das willultimatl b udgd b th "consus of thi social o pofssional

goup (Jams, 880 890 vol p 92 907/975)Th achivmnt of scintic nsnsus fom this point of viw, d

pnds to a signicant dg on h htoical pow of paticula analogis o ath of th paticula tois basd on ths analogis Thispow daws on th xpintia nsitivitis of th paticula scinticcommunit, but t is not ducib in an simpl o dict fashion to thbut facts of th matt No alog - which is to sa, no lkeness ofalit - is idntical with alit s anoth of Jamss admid mn putit, "No liknss gos on all fou (Colidg, ca 82/98 p 2)

Thfo no sto dvlopd analogical pmiss can b dnitivo nal This is th sam viw ssd b Plato long ago W shouldxpct no mo than a likl o fom thos who constuct thoisabout th natual wold (s nt and th txt associatd with it)Consquntl, Jams (890) conludd, th bst mak of halth that ascinc can show is this unnihdsming font vn though it isusful fo ach scinc to hav as its huistic goal th attainmnt of"concptions so adquat and xct that w shall nv nd to changthm (vol , p vii vol 2 p 9) In oth wods in Jamss viw as

wll as m own w should tinu to sach fo pfctl adquatmtaphos o maps of alit ths continuall impoving ou stock ofmtaphos, but w should not pct to discov an analog that willpovid th "nal wod abo u xpinc of alit

Jamss blif in th analogicl o mtaphoical foundation of knowldg is ichl illustatd in hi on pschological witings His tatmntof thought o consciousnss as stam ath than a chain otain is wll known (s Jams 890 chap 9) and his discussion ofoth pschological topics is iilal infomd b undling analogisand mtaphos Th ultimat mtaphos that foundd and famd hispschological thinking and that m to undgid his pagmatism plualism and adical mpiicism th Dawinian mtaphos of vaia



Pyhe mue

tion, slction, and function4 All pschological stats and actions,accoding to Jams a poducts of spontanous vaiation and/o slction in tms of thi cosquntial utilit This "functionalist ointation has bn shad b man oth Amican pschologsts and has

stuctud much of th thotical agumntation in modn pschologlading histoicall fom mntalistic functionalism to functionalistic bhavioism and back again Its htoical pow is clal dpndnt on thauthoit that Dawinian mods of analsis bcaus of thi succss inmaking sns of a vast aa of biological phnomna, hav com tono (s g E Ma 982) Oftn takn dspit Jamss intntionas a dnitivl tu sto ath than as a usfull likl sto, thfunctionalist account of mind and action has ld to som of th cntalpschological thois - and mths - of ou tim49

Conclusion Psyche's muse in the twentieth centuryand beyond

Now that w hav viwd Fud and Jams on th ol of mtaphoicalthinking in scinc and pscholog (as wll as in cognition in gnal) whav achd a point at which w can halt ou v slctiv histoicalsuv with th alization that, aoud th tun of th cntu sompschologsts at last w knl awa of th mtaphoical natu ofpschological knowldg Although oth twntithcntu pschologistshav shad this awanss pschoogists fo th most pat hav tnddto ow with th positivist tid As a sult, until cntl, data gathing gnall psumd to b an activit that can and should b pusudwithout an thotical pconcptons - was fquntl considd to th souc of pschological tho and pactic (s Toulmin & a,985) In this gad th naiv mpiicist viw of Jams McKn Cattll,anoth found of modn Amican pscholog is much mo mblmatic of twntithcntu pscholog than th mo sophisticatdmpicism of Jams Fo Cattll, scintic activit was work, pu and

simpl Rath than th spontanous ashs of mtaphoic insight thatJams toutd, Cattll (896) saw mn of scinc ngaging n thvda uphill wok of th laboato This wok in his opinionwas scacl mo stimulating than th outin of th facto o thfam (p 9) With such a stoic, antimtaphoical viw of scinc(stuctud th mtapho of pcwok lao), it is not supsing thatth "wok of Cattll and fa too man of hs contmpoais andsuccssos has povdd littl mo than wlloganizd catalogs offacts lagl dvoid of longang thotical signicanc

Givn th positivist mntalit of so man twntithcntu pschologists it was natual nough that awanss of th mtaphoicit ofpschological concpts and tms cdd ov th middl potion of this



22 E ey

cntu laving th impssion that both scintic and applid pscholog unlik ali philosophical pscholog std on an unamiguouslootd concptual foundation Paps th bst xampl of th solidication of this concptual foundati is th litalization of "stimulus and"spons sul th most usd nd ausd tms in twntithcntu

pscholog Whn John B Wton (99) st commndd thstms h admittd that in intodung thm fom phsiolog into pscholog "w hav to xtnd somwh thi usag (p 0) which is to sa(quit popl) that syhooga stimuli and "sponss - as wll asth yhoogia xs (o olations btwn stimuli and sponss) about which th allow s to spak - a somhow ke thiphsiological countpats but als uke thm But Watson nv dnd th xact was in which pschological stimuli and sponss aunlik thi oiginating analogs hus stting th scn fo a simpl

mindd litalization of ths ts, and laving oom fo susquntvaiations o "xtnsions Indd as Koch (959) has psuasivlshown w hav not lackd suh •xtnsions In fact ths two putdl"obctiv and "nutal tms so basic to bhavioal scinc in thiscntu hav bn usd v h ast halcntu in myrad was, andal in pcisl th sam wa an two thoists T vait is notncssail bad - lt th mutant ontnd and th ttst vaiant(s) suviv But whn th vaiation go ncognizd a psumption of monolithic unanimit is (and has n atd - a psumption that dos not

ct disciplina alit hov much w might wish that it didFotunatl in mo ct as th vaiation o plualism oftwntithcntu pscholog wih is vidnt at so man lvls of thdisciplin has com to b coizd (g s Koch, 976) and notunlatdl awanss of th taphoical natu of pschologicaltho and of th mtaphoical aming of pschological pactic hasincasd signicantl Wh ths will lad whth to th dismmbmnt of pscholog (long sinc pdictd b Dunlap 98 and oths) oto a vivication of pscholo cannot t sa (A nuoscinc

cognitiv scinc and th nw hlth scincs at th "gowing dgs oon th "faing nds of pschlog) In ith cas in th laboation ofths and oth dvlopmnts w can condnt that Pschs Mus -mutd and hmmd in but fa fo inactiv duing much of this cntu- will hav h sa O ath we will hav ou sa at last a hae tohav ou sa fo, as I hav ti to show Pschs Mus th fount ofpschological tho and pactic is non oth than we ourees usingwhat th mpiicist David Hum calld "Analog that gat pincipl ofRasoning and what th atioait Immanul Kant though in an unfo

tunatl tanscndntalist mood clld th "Analogis of Expinc

hav said a numb o tims that m thsis is hadl nw Manscholas and scintists hav cogizd that ou thoughts flings and



c u 2

bhavo a nfomd b mtaphos Stll gvn th staks n th domanof pscholog t sms mo than asonabl that w should paus andct on th natu and consquncs of ths mtaphos That s whatths book s all about Insofa as th qualt of lf of man ndvduals

and goups as wll as th futu of th dscpln tslf wll b affctd bth chocs of mtapho that pschologsts mak, ths book has a vsous pupos focusng on th ol of tapho n th hsto opscholog th followng chapts suggst that t s though th udcouschoc and us of mtapho that pschologsts wll dal mo o lssffctvl wth th stmabl challngs and oppotunts that l ahad

Acknowledgments

An al vson of ths chapt was shad wth man of m fllowmmbs of th Cnt fo Advancd Stud n th Bhavoal Scncs nStanfod Calfona n Fbua 98 I am spcall gatful to Mtthw H Edl, Jams W Fnandz, and Howad M Spo o thsuppotv and thoughtful fdback at that tm Intmdat vsionsw psntd bfo th Wstn Pschologcal Assocaton n Ap98 and bfo th Amcan Pschologcal Assocaton n August 984Th latt occason was m psdntal addss bfo th APAs Dvson of th Hsto of Pscholog I thank all of thos who lstnd

patntl and spondd ctcall am also gatful to th oth contutos to ths vou who hav povdd suppot fdack, and stmulatn and to th oual of he Hsor of he ehaoral cences opmsson to us potons of an atcl of mn 987

Notes

1 Most of these scholas have taken thei lead fom Aistotle especially fom histeatses on hetoic and poetics (Astotle, ca. 330 B.C./194a ca. 330 B.C/194b).

The quotation in the text s fom the fome wok.

1410).2 Astotle (ca. 330 B.C./194a) fo nstance sad that metapho confes cleaness cham and distincton [to dscouse] as nothing else can . 1405) . Fo aeview of the histoy of scholaship of metapho see ohnson (1981a). Fo asuvey of the liteatue up to 1970 see Shibles (1971) fo that fom 1970 intothe mid1980s see van Noppen De Knop, and ongen (1985). ohnson(1981b) Mall (198) Otony (1979) and Sacks (1979) povde convenientaccess into and examples o the ecent lteatue on metapho. Billow (1977Hofman (1984a) and Otony Reynolds and Ate (1978) povide oveviewsof the psychological lteatue. Vosnadou and Otony (1988) epesent someo the latest developments and Winne (1988 dscusses some o the onto

genetc factos that undepn the use of metapho n adult life by scentsts aswell as othes. I. A. Rchadss chaptes on metapho n The Phlosophy of Rheoric (1936)

ae at the oot of much of ths ecent wok whch stems moe poximately



24 E ey

fom Max Blacks Moels an Meahors (196). Richads (1936) agued that"metapho is the omnipesent picple of language (p. 9) and subsequently that t is also the fundamenal inciple of thinkng "Thinking is adicallymetaphoc. Linkage by analogy i ts consttuent law o pincple its causalnexus since meanng only aise hough the causal conexs by which a sgnstands fo (takes the place of) an ntance of a sot To thnk of anything is totake t as of a sot (as a such an uch) and that as bings in (openly o ndisguise) the analogy the paael he metaphoic gappe o gound o gaspo daw by whch alone the mnd takes hold. It takes no hold f thee snothing fo t to haul fom fo is thinking is the haul the attaction of likes(I A Richads 1938 pp. 489.

4 Despte the citicsms diected at is (196) position Black (1979) has continued to ague that "a metaphcal statement can sometimes geneate newknowledge and insght by changn elatonships between the thngs designated and, futhemoe that sme metaphos enable us to see aspecs ofealty that the metaphos poducton helps to constitute (pp. 37 39) Some

one adoptng a less adical postin would agee with Blacks contention thatmetaphos can diect ou attentin to fomely nnoce aspects of ealityand ae thus impotant in the devlpment of new insights into o visions of- eality but would eschew the d that metaphos actually help to constituteealty. Even someone holding ths moe modeate vew howeve wouldcedit metpho with an essenti epistemologca function

Of the many books and atcs stmulated by Blacks wok May B.Hesse's Moels an naloges n cence (1966) deseves mention not leastfo its highlighting of elevant sss by means of an insghtful endton of ahypothetical debate between Piee Duhem and N. R. Campbell egading theole of models n the constuction f theoies n physics. Duhems (1906/196)

and N. R Campbell's (190) ws povde addtonal context fo the delibeatons in ths volume. Se D Smith's comments (Chapte 7 thisvolume) on Duhem's metaphoial statements against the use of metaphoicalstatements n scence. Also see Hse (1955) whch shows that Hesse was onthe ght tack long befoe Blac (196) wok appeaed

Fnally Black's wok togehe wth seveal essays by Saul Kpke andHlay Putnam has insped Thmas Kuhns ecent assignment of peeminence to metapho in the pos of "evolutionay change in science. AsKuhn sad in 1979 eacting to <. mlaly elevant essay by Richad Boyd(1979) "The vew towad whih I gope would also be Kantan but wthoutthings n themselves and with tgoies of the mind which could change in

tme as the accommodation of langage and expeence poceeded. A view ofthat sot need not I think make the wold less eal (pp. 41819). By 1987Kuhn would say that of the thee chaacteistics shaed by hs illustativeevolutons the one that has bn the most dfcult . fo me to see butnow seems the most obvious an pobably the most consequential is thecommon occuence of a "centl change of model metapho o analogy achange in one's sense of what sila to what, and of what is dffeent (p.0). The cux of Kuhns analyss is that the goupings o categoizations ofphenomena change adically an holistically n the couse of a scienticevoluton so that what once we "natual categoes of peception andundestandng no longe ae suh. Aistotle fo nstance found it quitenatual to assume that "the falin stone was lke the gowing oak o lke thepeson ecoveng om illnes and thus that all thee wee nstances ofmoton (p. 0). Newton's aliment of like and unlke howeve, wascompletely diffeent. Afte his evew of othe instances of scientc change



Psyche's use 25

Kuhn (1987) noted that all these cases dsplay nteelated featues famlato students o metapho. In each case two objects o stuatons ae uxtaposedand sad to be the same o smla . The juxtaposed tems ae exhbted to apevously unntated audence by someone who can aeady ecognze thesmlaty and who uges that audence to lean to do the same . . Thus the

educaton of an Astotelan assocates the ght of an aow wth a fallngstone and both wth the gowth of an oak and the etun to health . . thestudent leans what categoes of thngs populate the wold what the salentfeatues ae and somethng about the behavo that s and s not pemtted tothem. In much of language leanng these two sots of knowledge knowledgeof wods and knowledge of natue - ae acqued togethe not eally two sotsof knowledge at all but two faces of the sngle conage that a languagepovdes (pp. 01).

Kuhn's elevant concluson s smply that "the metapholke juxtapostonsthat change at tmes of scentc evoluton ae thus cental to the pocess bywhch scentc and othe language s acqued (p. 1). As these statements

and hs examples show Kuhn's poston s now vtually dentcal to Black'sadcal poston descbed at the begnnng of ths note Though I stand nclose poxmty to them I want to epeat that shang ths poston s not apeequste o accodng metapho an mpotant ole n the hstoy ofthought and scence.

5 The necessty of allowng ou seach fo meanng to est on the achevement ofsubjectve satsfacton ntuton o belef was suggested long ago by Montagne (15878/1958) I ask what s natue' peasue ccle' substtuton.'The queston s one of wods and s answeed n the same way. A stone s abody. But f you pessed on And what s a bod' Substance. ' - And

what s substance' and so on you would nally dve the espondent to theend of hs lexcon (pp. 818-19). To say that ou knowledge ests ultmatelyon a bass secued by satsfacton ntuton o belef s not to admt that ouknowledge s nsecue n any devastatng sense. I thnk t was Kal Poppe opehaps one of hs students who suggested seveal mages ht at east n myendton expess my own vew of the matte: Ou knowledge s lke a housebult on plngs dven nto qucksand. No ndvdual plng s absolutely secued and any gven plng may and pobably wll fal and have to beeplaced yet the plngs ae sunk nto ealty and manage as a grop anwh or ongong vglance an repar to keep us n touch wth ealtywthout allowng us to snk so fa nto t that we lose ou oveachng pespec

tve. An altenatve mage s qute smla: It s as f we ae n a boat whosevaous planks must be eplaced fom tme to tme though n need of constantepa ou boat manages to keep us aoat. The pont n each case s that ouknowledge s not suppoted by any sngle satsfacton, ntuton o belef noby any ocksold foundaton but by a coodnated system of satsfactonsntutons, and belefs each of whch has stood the test of expeence at leastup to the pesent moment. As Wllam ames (1897/1979) put t the "naltuth wll not be known "untl the last man has had hs expeence and hadhs say (p. 141). In the meantme the ccle of knowledge s epeatedlyboken and econnected as we contnue to bootstap ou undestandng ofthe wold and ouselves. Metaphos I am suggestng povde one of themajo means of ths eveongong pocess.

6 The commonalty of ths vew s aely appecated patly because of thedfeence n vocabulay favoed by theosts of dffeent pesuasons. AsNewell and Smon (197) have noted wth efeence to an eale atcle



26 E ey

(Simon & Newell 1956) thee no set teminology no metatheoy ofscence to explicate the oles of etaphos analogs models theoes anddescptions o the pasage fom e categoy to anothe (p. 5) hence thecacophony of voces each tyng o expess a simla insight. Fo nstance ajustication of the efeences a in the text would poceed though theexplcaton of the following co satements He (1748/197) All aguments fom expeience ae founde n the smilaity whh we discove amongnatual objects (p. 36). enh (841/196) In the use made of languagection . . becomes a necessay euce (p. 331). an (1855): Some discovees tun upon ths [use of th aw of smilaity] exclusively; and no successon of dscovees can poceed ihout it (p. 508). Perce (193): "Uponnding hmself confonted wth a henomenon unlke what he would haveexpected . he [the easone] ooks ove ts featues and notices someemakable chaacte o elaton aong them whch he at once ecognizes asbeing chaacteistic of some cocepton with which hs mind is aleadystoed . . . Pesumption [o the auctng' of similaities] s the only knd ofeasoning whch supplies new deas (pp 7767). Kan (17811965) "We aejustied in combining appeaanes [n ode to aive at concepts] only accodng to what is no moe than an nlgy (p. 1). Nesche (1873/1979): Thedive towad the fomaton of taphos is the fundamental human dive(p. 88). Vahnger (1911/194) All cogniton is the appeception of one thingthough anothe. In undestann we ae always dealng wth an analogyand we annot agine how theise extene an be undetood . . allconception and cogniton ae ase upon analogical appeception (p. 9).assrer (195/1946): Myth and language [the oots of human cognition]may dffe yet the same fom ntal concepton s opeatve n both. It sthe fom whch one may denote s eaphorcal hnkng" (p. 84)

Regading the thoughts of Peic Netzsche, and Casse on metapho andelated topics which have pove tculaly stmulating to many ndvidualssee Buks (1946) Fann (1970) ad Fsch (1986); Blonde! (1977), Beazeale(1975) Canto (198) Schft (18) and Sten (1978) and Lange (194) espectively. Ogden (193) offe inteestng oveview of Benthams theoyof ctons, including a section title Fctons and Metaphos (pp. 704) andMcReynolds (1970) discusses the pplication of this theoy to psychologicalconcepts

Of couse to say that language and thought ae ultmately metaphocalleaves unesolved the pecise ate of ths metaphocty (see Leathedale,1974 pp. 173). In ths egad I would smply ague consevatively, thatthe acquston of new knowledge always based on the fowad "each of

metaphocal o analogcal peeton and thought. Ths leaves oom fo theaddtonal clam, whch I would alo endose that such "metaphocal knowledge can become "lteal knowldge once t s conmed by contnued useand geneal acceptance Indeed t sometmes becomes all oo leral n thesense discussed late n the text an n note 49

Agan I would lke to pont u hat my thess s hadly novel. Moe than acentuy ago the geat compaatve lngust Max Mlle (1867) noted that"no advance was possble n the tellectual lfe of man without metapho(p. 370), and Ftz Mauthne, the wte and phlosophe agued that "wthout excepton evey wod n ts ddual usage s metaphocal and that "wehave leant to undestand the etapho as the tem fo the phenomenon

whch othes call the gowth o te development of language (quoted nGeshenkon 1974 p. 43). Aong psychologsts, as we shall see Wllam



Psyche's use 27

ames (1890) was among the st to asset that "a natve talent fo pecevnganaloges s . . . the leadng fact n genus [ceatve thnkng] of evey ode(vol. 1 p. 530 talcs deleted).

7 I have been unable to elocate the souce of ths quotaton but t s attibutedto Cak somewhee n McCulloch (1965) (see Pbam 1971 p. 97). In any

ase t ts Caks (1943 geneal pont o vew not to menton hs ownanalogcal extapolatons about the ban and ts functons (see Cak 1966chaps. 6).

8 A "gue of speech s any of the vaous foms of lngustc expesson thatdevate fom the usual aangement o use of wods. The tem "tope sgeneally teated as a synonym fo "gue of speech and t can be soundestood hee. Rcoeu (1977) has noted the ccula ntetwnng of"metapho and "gue. As he says "Metapho s a gue and the wodgre s metaphocal (p. 53). The gues of speech that ae geneallyconsdeed closest to yet dstngushable fom metapho naowly denedae analogy metonymy smle and synecdoche. These and othe "metaphocal substtutons and puns ae dened n Lanham (1968).

9 As obseved yeas ago by Stanfod (1936) the moe toleant use of the tem"metapho has been favoed by most of those who have nvestgatedmetapho om the vewpont o phlology and etymology wheeas the opponents of the equaton of metapho and tope have tended to come (lkeStanfod hmself) fom the anks of lteay ctcs whose job t s to makene dstnctons about the use of language (p. 100). Ths s not to say that alllteay ctcs oppose a boad concepton of metapho and ts elaton todscouse. M. H. Abams (1953) suely a leadng lteay ctc has wttenthat metapho "whethe alve o mobund s an nsepaable element of all

dscouse ncludng dscouse whose pupose s nethe pesuasve no aesthetc, but descptve and nfomatve. Metaphyscal systems n patcula aentnscay metaphocal systems . . . . Even the tadtonal language of thenatual senes annot clam to be totally lteal although ts key tems otenae no ecognzed to be metaphos untl n the couse of tme the genealadopton of a new analogy yields pespectve nto the natue o the old . . . .[Some analogs ae] consve [not smply llustatve]: they yeld the goundplan and essental stuctual element of a . . . theoy . . . tey select and moldthose acts' whch a theoy compehends. Fo facts ae aca thngs made asmuch as thngs found and made n pat by the analoges though whch welook at the wold as though a lens (p. 31).

Ths statement especally the latte pat s emakably pescent of subseuent "postpostvst phlosophy o sence (see H. I. Bown 977 oa succnct summay Suppe, 1977 fo moe detals). Even eale KennethBuke (1935/1965) anothe leadng lteay ctc expessed a smla convcton: "As the documents of scence ple up ae we not comng to see thatwhole woks of scentc eseach even ente schools ae hadly moe thanthe patent epetton n all ts amcatons of a fetle metapho? Thus wehave at dffeent eas n hstoy consdeed man as the son of God as ananmal as a poltcal o economc bk as a machne each such metaphoan a hune othes seving as the cue o an unendng lne of data andgenealzatons (p. 95).

Smlaly lteay wtes as opposed to lteay ctcs have shown lttlehestaton n acceptng the wde noton of metapho. Fo nstance RobetFost (19311956) found that "n late yeas he wanted "to go futhe and



28 E ey

futhe in making metapho the whle of thinking (p 37), and Walke Pecy(1958) has agued that metapho "is the tue make of language and that themind's "favoite poect is a "asing about fo analogies and connections(pp. 967).

10 I should eiteate, howeve th he boad use of metapho and its feuent

equation with analogy thoughou his volume do not mean that any of thevolumes othe contibutos necessaily accept my contention that all languageand thought ae fundamentally mtphoical.

It is not only metapho and anaogy that can be consideed intechangeablefo puposes like those pusued n this volume. Howad Gube on the basisof his longtem study of ceatie tnking in science (eg, Gube, 1974), hasconcluded, in hamony with the thust of my own thought, that "metaphos,analogies, and models ae pat of a goup of compaison pocesses by whichwe use some pats of ou knowlge to illuminate othes. Thee ae manynames fo such compaison pocess but thee is no adequate taxonomy ofthem Indeed, since they have lost always been teated singly we hav no

adequate oveview of the way n ich goups of such compaison pocessesfunction in intellectual wok. Lig any such systematic teatment it is idleto fuss ove denitions. We nee a lge and geneous tem to cove the wholefamily of compaison pocesss . I will use eaphor age gre ofhoh and the abbevated re intechangeably fo such compaisonpocesses (Gube 1980, p. 1).

Gubes use of "compaison pesses is simila to my own incination touse "compaative thinking a a eneic tem that encompasses and thusavoids the distinction between mpho, analogy, simile, and so on. In thisegad it is inteesting that Kan 1797/1974) used "compaison as opposedto "distinction. in much the sam ay (pp. 899). Howeve, I only suggestthis tem hee athe than insist o it since thee is aleady a long tadition ofusing "metapho to epesent the same oveaching concept. Fo a similablending of "analogies "modes' "hypotheses, and "theoies unde thegeneic concept of "epesentai see Watofsky (1979 esp pp 111439) See also Fogelin (1988 chaps 36) and . May (1986 p. 04note 1).

11 As MacComac (1985) has said "etaphos that wee false seem to becometue, and metaphos that wee ugammatical seem to become gammaticalboth though usage (p 7). A elated point egading supposedly litealhogh has been made by Bloo (971) "Afte something has been said by

means of a metapho it is easy o hnk that it could have been said without itbecause ones undestanding of th liteal concepts undegoes a change undethe impact of the metapho (p 41). In othe wods since the idea expessedby a metapho can soon come to seem "natual and "liteal and can thenbe expessed (howeve patiall) y diffeent metaphos it is easy to ovelookthe ceatve ole of the oiginal mtpho. A ecent effective agument fo thethesis that "all language is metapoical has been offeed by Abib andHesse (1986) who admit that thi esis "will appea shocking to those witeswho have laboed to povide cful distinctions between the liteal andmetaphoic in taditional gamma and semantics (p. 150). Thei agumenthinges on thei caefully consideed ejection of the liteal view of language aeection based (among othe fodations) on a eview of the eseach onlanguage acquisition. See also Bad (1960) Benjamin Canto and Chistie(1987) and Rumelhat (1979).



Psyche's use 2

1 I cannot esst a few patng shots befoe movng on to the pomsed hstocalsuvey. These shots take the fom of cooboatve statements by fou scholasof athe dffeent oentatons Isaah Beln Nelson Goodman, Robetsbet and Stephen Peppe

The noton that . . . t s possble to thnk wthout such analoges n some

dect fashon "facetoface wth the facts wll ot bea ctcsm. Tothnk s to genealse to genealse s to compae. To thnk of onephenomenon o cluste of phenomena s to thnk n tems of ts esemblances and dffeences wth othes. Ths s by now a hoay plattude. Itfollows that wthout paallels and analoges between one sphee andanothe of thought and acto whethe conscous o not the unty ofou expeence ou expeence tself would not be possble. Alllanguage and thought ae n ths sense necessaly metaphocal.(Be 1981 p. 158)

Metapho pemetes all dscouse odnay and specal . . . . Ths nce

ant use of metapho spngs not meely fom love of lteay colo butalso fom ugent need of economy. If we could not eadly tansfeschemata to make new sotngs and odengs we should have to budenouselves wth unmanageably many dffeent schemata ethe by adopton of a vast vocabulay of elementay tems o by podgous elaboaton of composte ones. (Goodman, 1976 p. 80)

Human thought n the lage s almost nconcevable apat fom the usen some degee of metapho. Wheneve we dentfy one thng wthanothe one commonly bette known n natue than the othe we aeengagng n metapho. "The mnd s a machne. Socetes ae ogansms. "A mghty fotess s ou God. All of these ae nstances of

metaphoc constucton. Metapho s no smple gammatcal devce, amee gue of speech not that s n ts fullness. Metapho s a way ofknowng one of the oldest most deeply embedded even ndspensableways known n the hstoy of human conscousness . . . . It s easy fo thepostvst to dsmss metapho as unscentc. . . . . But fom metaphopoceed some of the domnatng themes of Westen scence and phlosophy as well as at. (sbet 1976 pp. 3-3)

A man desng o undestand he wold ooks about fo a cue o tscompehenson. He ptches upon some aea of commonsense fact andtes f he cannot undestand othe aeas n tems of ths one Thsognal dea becomes then hs basc analogy o oot metapho Hedescbes as best he can the chaactestcs of ths aea o f you wlldscmnates ts stuctue. A lst of ts stctual chaactestcs becomeshs basc concepts of explanaton and descpton. We call them a set ofcategoes. In tems of these categoes he poceeds to study all otheaeas of fact whethe unctczed o pevously ctczed. He undetakesto ntepet all facts n tems of these categoes. (Peppe 194 p. 91)

I ealze that the mee quotaton of these souces wthout futhe explcatonconsttutes a fom of argen a hone (o a acora) but Itust that the gentle use of such agumentaton s not too offensve when tdaws on souces of such poven woth.

1 I lke Plato's denton of scentc theoes as lkely stoes though I wouldnsst that lkely stoes ae not myths n the deogatoy sense. Fo a use oflkely stoes as an oentng conceptual devce see Leay (1987). Wth



0 ey

egad to Plato's ambvalence abt metapho and hetoc see Havelock(1963) and Lloyd (1987). The pyclogcal and socal context of ths ambvalence s descbed by Dodds (1951 and B. Smon (1978).

14 Astotle's (ca. 330 B.C./194a) pt n sayng that t s fom metapho thatwe can best get hold of somethn esh . 1410) was that stange wods

ae unntellgble wheeas cut wods ae commonplace. It s mdway between these two extemes of the bzae and the ote use of wods thatmetapho seves both to please an to nstuct. Wallace Stevens (193055/198) expessed a smla thought en he wote that "ealty s a clch fomwhch we escape by metapho p. 179).

The seconday lteatue on c "metaphoc tun s so vast and eadlyavalable that I shall menton onl the ecent excellent book by Mooney(1985). Coledge's nsghts and conctons egadng the ole of metapho nthe development of human thougt and sensblty wee futhe developed nhs Logc (ca. 183/1981) and hs o Reecon (185/188) about whchackson (1983) has wtten Colees deas nuenced I. A. Rchads as well

as many othes ncludng Owen eld (1977).15 Nakedness was and emans a cmon metapho fo plan unclothed

and hence supposedly "objectve dscouse. A late scentst Chales Dawn(1876/1887) used a elated mtaho when he clamed to have wtten hsautbgaphy "as I wee a dad an (p. 7). "Lelessness "passvtyts the assumptions o postvt hetoc whch was futhe exempled byDawn's statement that the Org f Speces (1859/1964) began to take shapewhen he was srck wth cetan ats n the dstbuton of the nhabtants ofSouth Ameca (p. 1 talcs adde). The ntended mage s clea: He wassmply standng thee on He Mjstys shp the eagle when natue of ts

own accod cae o h By mplaon he dd no lookng o searchng aofo nfomaton. Cetan facts smply spoke fo themselves.Regadng Dawn's hetoc s . A. Campbell (1987) Cannon (1966)

and H. Whte (1978). The fact tht ths htoc ll tted the hstocal ecodof Dawns own ceatve actvty (as dscussed by Leay 1988b) s anothesmlaty between Dawnan dsouse and that of hs seventeenthcentuyfoebeas. As fo the hetoc hese foebeas Dea (1985) has suggestedthat on the bass of the actual pactce the Royal Socety's motto shouldhave been To n vera athe han Nl n vera

16 Ths oncally metaphocal opposton to the use of metapho and elatedmodes of thought and language w typcal of Refomaton gues as well as

the "new phlosophes who ushed n the age of moden scence. In thesxteenth centuy fo nstance Mtn Luthe (ca. 154/1968) condemnedallegoy as a beautful halo ho fondles men n such a way that t smpossble fo he not to be lod (p 347). A smla opposton wasmounted by pesons who mght hae been expected to use metapho somewhat moe eely by the Paalsannuenced . B . van Helmont onstance (see ckes 1984 pp 439). Gven the wdespead concen aboutpotental abuses of gues of spe and thought t s not supsng that theseventeenth centuy wtnessed th atonalzaton of myth as well as the"end of allegoy as a wdely accetd fom of extended metapho (see Allen1970 chap. 10).

Othe mpotant pesons wh ee ambvalent about the use o metaphoand analogy ncluded Fancs Baco Galleo and Ren Descates (see adne 1974 Pak Daston & an 1984). Bacon fo nstance ganted



Psyche's use

that "thee s no poceeding n invention of knowledge but by similitude buthe woed that "all peceptons as well of the sense as of the mnd aeaccodng to the measue of the ndvdual and not accodng to the measue ofthe univese [ex analogia hoinis e non ex analogia niversi] (quoted byPak in Pak et a!. 1984 pp. 94 95). It was his skepticism about anthopo

mophcally based concepts that stimulated hs fea of the "dols of theTbe not any doubt that the human mnd opeates though analogy. Thswas a typical sixteenth and seventeenthcentuy fea (see Popkin 1964).Thus skeptcsm should be added to the ncipient vesons of scentc ealsmthe positvst theoy of knowledge and the ltealist view of language thatAbb and Hesse (1986) have lsted as signicant coelates of the ScienticRevoluton (pp. 1489).

It is unfotunate that skeptical concens have not kept pace with the histocal elaboaton of these othe thee commtments. If they had been kept nmind and tuned against late vesons of ealism postvsm and litealism modenday poponents o lingustc puity (such as B. F. Sknne 1987) might

have established a moe popitous balance of commtments and concens notto mention a geate awaeness of the hetoical devices in thei own lingustcbehavio. As t s they tend to see the mote n othe people's eyes but not themetapho on thei own tongues (see Leay 1988a) .

17 Newton's thought does not povide the only example of the tansfe of aconcept fom a socal to a natual scentc context. Indeed as a numbe ofscholas have pointed out (Adkins 197 esp. chap. 5 Collingwood 1945pp. 34 Confod 191 Fank 1945 pp. 11617 Huizinga 1944/1955 p.117 aege 1934/1945 pp. 15861 Snell 1953 chap. 10 Zilsel 194) thevey notions of "natue "cause and law whch ae so cental to ouconception of natual science, wee dawn oiginally fom the socal ealm. In

moe ecent times one of the most citcal tansfeences has involved the useof statstcs and the attendant notion of pobability ognally developed n thestudy and conceptualization of human thought and social behavo (see Daston 1988 Hacking 1975 Pote 1986 Stgle 1986). Although the mpotaton of the socialstatistical metapho initially met consideable esistancewthn the natual scentc communty ts eventual acceptance has sgncantly changed the chaacte of the physcal scences. (Fo geneal backgound andsuveys of the mpact on ndividual scences see Kge Daston & Heidelbeg 1987 Kge Gigeenze & Mogan 1987 fo an oveview seeGigeenze et a!. 1989 fo a specic analysis of "social law and natualscence see Pote 1986 chap. 5 fo a specc example of the use o a socal

metapho in the study of physical phenomena see Gentne & Gentne 1983.)Othe socal metaphos ae fequently encounteed in the physcal scences.

See e.g. Pigogne and Stenges's (1984) discusson of how ode emegesfom chaos n the physcal wold. Ths Nobel laueate and hs colleaguepopose that the odeed unvese is built on the existence of "hypnons(fundamental sleepwalkng o "dancng units).

Human atfacts ae also common metaphocal fodde fo the physcal aswell as biologcal and socal scences. Clocks and vaous othe devces andmachnes ae too obvous to enumeate but fo the hstocal context seeBenige (1986) Dijkstehuis (1969) . May (1986) and Pice (1965) Koy(1950/1968) has shown that fom the vey stat the elatvely unstctued

quality of social life ceated poblems fo the assumption that such mechansticmetaphos (and the metaphysical pncples based on them) ae unvesal napplcation (see esp. pp. 4).



2 E ey

Fnally socal metaphos also pl a fndamental ole n ou undestandngo natual scentc actvty whc should not be supsng snce scentcactvty s of couse socal n natue Thnk fo example of all the ecent talkof "evolutons n scence (Con 1985 Hacking 1981 Kuhn, 1970).Whethe fotunately o not the ofe muted mplcatons of socal conct andaggesson that ae assocated wth s poltcal metapho est on a much moesubstantal bass than many mgh uppose o wsh to admt (see D. Hull1988). And as Cohen (1985) nots ths poltcal metapho ncopoates aneven moe fundamental elgou etapho nsofa as scentc evolutonshave been seen (even by scentss themselves) to depend on the pesonal"convesons of ndvdual scentts (pp. 4677). Beman (1983) dscussesthe hstocal elaton between olutons and elgous efomaton (pp.183).

18 As Guelac (1965) and Schoeld (90) hae shown Btsh phlosophes andscentsts tended to develop the mhanstc and matealstc mplcatons ofNewton's wok.

As s often the case n the hsto of scence Newton's deas wee "ovedetemned by a vaety of oelapng metaphos and modes of thought.Alchemcal bologcal and theolcal metaphos blended wth the socalmetapho of "attacton n the deopment of hs undestandng of the lawsof natue (see Dobbs 1975 Gul 1983 Westfall 1987). In all these aeasof thought anthopomophsm ws cealy evdent. "Socablty, fo nstancewas a constct used n alchemy and n Newton's own coespondenceegadng alchemy (see Dobbs 15 pp. 079). Although Cohen (1987)epots that "untl hs death Newt was deeply toubled by the concept [ofunvesal gavty], and n patul by hs nablty to gve t a (pesumablymechanstc o matealstc) explnaton (p. 587) Newton's deep and sus

taned nteest n alchemy seem t ave been assocated wth hs reecon ofmatealsm and hs coespondg reference fo a "pctue of ealty n whchspt domnates (Westfall 1987 565). Ths acods wth the stance takenn Newton's stead by Samuel Cl n the faous LebnzClake debateswhch showed the extent to whch teologcal voluntasm the belef n thesustanng potency of God's wll uked behnd and suppoted Newton'smatue vson of the unvese (se lexande 1956). It s appopate to addas Guelac (1983) has shown tht God's actve wll was undestood byNewton though an analogy wth uman wll and anmal moton (p. 8).

Ths nteweavng of alchemcal bologcal theologcal socal and psychologcal metaphos wth natual cntc concepts suggests the eteatve na

tue of what soon became the domnnt wold vew n the Westen ntellectualtadton. tually by dento hs wold vew qa wold vew (o "ootmetapho) became the souce of devatve metaphos (see Peppe 194). Toselect but one famly of devatve metaphos the Newtonan concepts ofneta and "momentum hav been used n a geat deal of subsequentpsychologcal and socal theozg. ee e.g. Atknson and Catwght (1964)Fjda (1988) Nevn (1988) and Psons Bales and Shls (1953) Of cousewth Ensten's amendments the Newtonan wold vew altenatvemetaphos such as those used n Ln's (1936 1951) eldtheoetc appoachto psychology became avalabl f behavoal and socal scentsts.

19 The decson to use hs numbe sstem nstead of anothe h statstcalpocedue nstead of anothe h eans of measuement nstead of anothecan make a consdeable dffeenc n he esults of one's analyss. Mathematcs whethe pue o appled s sngula onceandfoall language that



Psyches use

maps all aspects of the wold in a pefect onetoone elationship. Rathe asecognized since the intoduction of noncommutative algebas and nonEuclidean geometies in the nineteenth centuy mathematics is (in Poinca'swods) a "fee invention of the human mind whose "tuth is not and cannotbe absolute (Wilde 981 pp. 789). "Gadually as Mois Kline (1980) has

put it mathematicians ganted that the axioms and theoems of mathematicswee not necessay tuths about the physical wold. Rathe mathematics"ofes nothing but theoies o models that can be eplaced as demanded bythe equiements of given ituations (p. 97). The same view is accepted bymathematical physcists. Einstein fo instance said that insofa as the popositions of mathematics give an account of eality they ae not cetain andinsofa as they ae cetain they do not descibe eality (quoted by Kline1980, p 97). In summay the attempt to establish a univesally acceptablelogically sound body of mathematics has failed. Mathematics is a humanactivity and is subject to all the foibles and failties of humans. Any fomallogical account is a pseudomathematics a ction even a legend despite the

element of eason (Kline 1980 p. 331). As with any metaphoical systemmathematics becomes a myth (in the deogatoy sense) if its metaphoicity isfogotten (see Tubayne 190 and note 49). The attempt to counte the mytho mathematics by the way stated bee the nineteenth centuy with icowho ecognized that mathematics is an expeimental science ceated byhumans athe than the gods (see Cosano 1969)

The natue of mathematics' metaphoicity is suggested by a statement attibuted to Betand Russell to the efect that mathematics began "when it wasdiscoveed that a bace of pheasants and a couple of days have something incommon: the numbe two (Koestle 1964 p. 00). The point is simply thatnumbes ae sgns of similaity beween things whethe between two objecs

between two sets of objects o between an object and a paticula code ofefeence (one of the many altenate numeical systems). Two ideas two casand two histoians of science have at least this in common: Thei existence canbe "gued in the same way. (The ovelap among ou concepts and tems fonumbe "gue and metapho is no mee coincidence.) This nueicalgue is the most abstact chaacteistic that they shae (othe than existencepe se) Such abstaction allows the ultimate degee of pecision and thelowest amount of substantive specicity. "Two tells you nothing about thenatue of the objects compaed othe than thei quantity nhing that canappea in duplicate fom whethe eal o "ideal can be epesented bythis gue. Although histoy testies to the theoetical and pactical benets

that can be gained by utilizng this kind of abstaction that does not makenumbe any less metaphoical.Even those who might balk at consideing numbe itself to be metaphoical

would pobably agee that the pocess of appling numbes is metaphoical(see McCloskey 1985 pp 7983). Beyond that the application of numbes isinheently rheorical - i.e . meant to be pesuasive - even though it cannotlead o oaly deniive accounts of eality (see Davis & Hesh 1986 1987).Relatedly the development of new foms of mathematics e.g . the mathematics of pobability can be shown to have changed the ways in which we thinkabut ouselves the wld aound us and eveyday life (see Daston 988Gigeenze et a!. 1989). Fo discussions o the ole o analogical thinking in

mathematics see Mach (1905/1976) and Polya (1954) fo a discusson ofmathematics as a cognitive activity see Lakoff (1987 chap. 0) fo a dscussion of the locus of mathematical eality by a nonmathematician, see L. A.White (1949) fo an offbeat but inteesting discussion of numbe as



4 ey

metapho see R. S ones (198 fo a elevant dscusson of the aesthetcsas opposed to the logc of mathmcs see Papet (1978) and fo dscussonsof the quantaton o psycholog see Danzge (1987) Ggeenze (1987)Honsten (1988) and Leay (180a. Regadng the uneasonable effectveness of mathematcs n the natul scences see Wgne (1960) fo a somewhat convese agument see Sham (198) and fo a cultual explanaton ofthe symboss of mathematcs ad pyscs see Wlde (1981 pp. 456). Theman thust of Wldes analys f mathematcs as a cultual system sseconded by the wok of MacKe (1981). Pehaps snce "poof s consdered such a hamark o absolut uth, I should end ths note by quotngWlders (1981) comment that t sms to be a commonly held belef, cheyoutsde the mathematcal communt that n the realm of mathematcs can befound absolute truth . [But s w' have seen] proof' n mathematcs s aculturally determned relatve mater. What consttutes proof for one generaton fals to meet the standards f the next or some later generaton (pp3940). For more on ths topc ee Davs and Hersh (1986) and the nalparagraph of note

0 Regardng Dawn's sometmes povst rhetorc see note 15. But also notethat, despte ths rhetorc Dawn beleved that "wthout the makng oftheores I am convnced there woud be no observaton (letter to C. Lyell 1June 1860, n F. Dawn 1887b vl p 15) Indeed hs son recaled thatDawn often sad that no one ld be a good observer uness he was anactve theorser t was as thou he were charged wth theorsng powerready to ow nto any channel on te slghtest dsturbance so that no fact,however small could avod releasng a stream of theory and thus the factbecame magned nto mportane (F. Dawn 1887a p. 149) That t wasnot smply theory but theoretcll regnant metaphors that were so readly

set loose n Dawn by the process of observaton can be seen from Dawn'sown comments and notebook annaons "There s an extraordnary pleasuren pure observaton not but what uspect the pleasure n ths case s ratherdeved from comparsons formng one's mnd wth alled structures (letterto J D. Hooker ca . 1847 n F. Dawn 1887b vol 1 p 349) But despte hssons recollecton of the faclty f rwn's theozng power Dawn hmselfreported that makng ogna conetures was by no means easy: Perhapsone cause of the ntense labour of orgnal nvenve thought s that none ofthe deas are habtual nor recalled by obvous assocatons (notebook entry16 August 1838 n Barrett 1974 p 8) that s Dawn had to make hsnovel compasons n the face of hbtual assocatons whch work by ther

nature toward nonognal ends. Stll the effort dd not squelch hs pleasure"I remember my pleasure n Kesngton Gardens has often been greatlyexcted by lookng at trees at e as] great compound anmals unted bywondeul & mysteous manner notebook entry 15 July 188 n Barrett,1974 p 73). Al n all, Dawn ould probably have agreed wth T. HHuxley who wrote that the grea danger whch besets al men of largespeculatve faculty s the temptan to deal wth the accepted statements offacts n natural scence as f the we not ony correct, but exhaustve . Inrealty evey such statement hower tue t may be s true only relatvely tothe means of observaton and th pnt of vew of those who have enuncatedt (quoted by F. Dawn 1887, l. 1 p. 347)

Darns senstvty to rhetocal tyle s revealed n hs reply to a youngnaturalst who had sent hm a manscpt for revew: Shall you thnk mempetnent . . f I hazard a remrk n the style whch s of more mportancethan some thnk In my opnon {whether or no worth much) your paper



Psyche's use

woud have been much better wrtten more smply and ess eaborated(letter to J. Scott 11 December 1862 n F. Darwn & A. C. Seward 1903vol. 1 p. 219-20). Later he wrote I never study style all that I do s to tryto get the subject as clear as I can n my own head and express t n thecommonest language whch occurs to me. But I generally have to thnk a good

deal before the smplest arrangement and words occur to me wrtng sslow work t s a great evl but there s no help for t I would suggest toyou the advantage at present of beng very sparng n ntroducng theory nyour papers . . le heo gde or oservaons but tl your reputaton well establshed be sparng n publshng theory. It makes persons doubt yourobservatons (letter to J Scott 6 June 1863 n F Darwn & A C Seward,1903 vol. 2 pp. 322-3).

21 Regardng the evolutonary epstemology on whch ths comment draws anepstemology developed on an explctly Darwnan model see D. Campbell(1960 1974), Popper (1979), R. J. Rchards (1977) and Toulmn (1972). Also

see Smontn (1988) for a psychology of scence based on ths epstemologyand Cohen (985) or a dscusson of the earler "Darwnan phlosophes oscence of Ludwg Boltzmann and rnst Mach (pp. 534-40). For other mpacts of Darwnsm on dverse elds of thought, often medated by themetaphorca extenson of Darwnan concepts see Appleman (1970) Beer(1983) G. M. delman (1987), Leatherdale (1983) Oldroyd (1980), R JRchards (1987), Seward (1909) and Wener (1949). Twentethcentury Amercan psychology n partcular s based on Darwnan premses. Two of the mostselfconscous of these extensons are those of Wllam James dscussed belown the text, and B. F. Sknner, dscussed n note 49.

22 Darwn had prevously tred to "t or map hs data on a more or less lneartme-lne. Wth the mage of the tree, he was able to agne a much morecomplex set of relatonshps among hs data. Although he realzed early onthat coral wth whch he was qute famlar provded a better mage than dda tree (snce the branches at the base of coral de off obscurng the earlerconnectons between subsequent branches, as occurs analogously n evolutonary hstory) and although he realzed later that seaweed provdes an evenbetter mage than coral (n that seaweed s "endessly branchng n everypossble drecton), Darwn seems to have lked and used the "tree of lfemage because of ts bblcal connotatons (see Beer 1983, p. 37 Gruber,1978). Ths suggests a more general rule that the choce o any gven

metaphor can depend on more than smply ts structural characterstcs. Aesthetc and other characterstcs can - and probably often do play a role, asthey dd n ths case. For urther dscusson of the role o vsualzaton nscence (often n the form of vsual metaphors), see Arnhem (1969), Koestler(1964, bk. 1, chap 21) Langley Smon Bradshaw and Zytkow (1987, chap.10) A. I. Mller (1984), Randhawa and Cofman (1978) Roe (1951), RootBernsten (1985) and Shepard (1978). Regardng the role of vsual representaton n the hstory of psychology and psychatry, see Glman's (1976 19821988) pathbreakng works.

3 Ths s not to say that phenomena can look any way we want them to lookxcept for those who are psychotc or smarly mpared, there are lmts tothe extent to whch "realty can be assmlated to subjectve suppostons,fears and desres. At the same tme however, the "resstance of phenomenato beng "taken n a varety of ways whether perceptually or cogntvely sfar from absolute. See Barnes and Shapn (1979 pt. 1), Cooter (1984) andShapn (1979).



6 i E ey

The lterature on socal scenti meaphors (other than those used n psychology) includes Barrows (1981) R H Brown (1976 1977 1987) Deutsch(1951) Felstner (1983) Gerschekron (1974), Goldstein (1984) Harr andSecord (1972) H Jones (1906) hn (1965) Martn Landau (1961) MsaLandau (1984) Lasky (1976) Ler (1978) McCloskey (1985), . F Mller(1979) Nsbet (1976) Olson (71), SaccaroBattsti (1983) and Stepan(1986). Buck (1956) Chapman n ones (1980) and Gergen (Chapter 8 thisvolume) are also very relevant lieraure on premode and amodesocial metaphors ncludes Agnw (986), Alford (1982), Bambrough (1956)Curtius (1953 esp pp 13844), uglas (1982), Jaynes (1976) Kantorowcz(1957) and Tillyard (1944). Medcl metaphors that verge on and overlap withsocial metaphors are dscussed n glo (1976) Harrington (1987) Rather(1982) Sontag (1978 1988) and emkn (1977) The role of metaphors nsocial polcy makng s the specl rvnce of Schn (1963 1979) , but Guseld(1976) has also made a signicant cntrbution The metaphors of daytodaypoltcal dscourse - so redolen f battles, "races "tradng and otherforms of contest and compromse awat someone's sustained attenton Todate Burke (1945) has ponted tord and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) haveprovded examples of the sort of etaphors that would result from such ananalyss

25 For further discussion of Berkel ocal theory and its historical context seeLeary (1977) and Macklem (1958. n Berkeleys use of other metaphors, seeBrykman (1982) and Turbayn (170) and on the metaphors underlyngvarious mode phlosophes of he socal scences see Shapro (19856).

6 David Hume s the best known rresentatve of the many ndvduals whowshed to be the Newton of the ocal (or moral) scences Not only does the

subtitle of Humes major treat (1739-40/1978) identfy the work as an"attempt to ntroduce the experimetal method of reasonng nto moral subjects, but Hume explcitly ndct that hs hypotheszed "princple of associaton s meant to be the prile of gravty of the mental world Thesequence of Hume's meaphorl oughs s que revealing He begns bytalkng about the principle of asston as a "gentle force that untes deasin the mind (p 10) ; suggests tha asciation represents "a kind of which in the mental world will e ound to have as extraordnary effects as[does gravity] n the natural and to shew tself n as many and as varousforms (pp 12-13) then says tt e "cannot compare the soul more properly to any thng than to a republ or commonwealth in which the several

members are united by the reciprcal ties of government and subordination(p 261) and ends by claimng tha he prncples of assocaton are the onlylnks that bnd the parts of the iverse together, or connect us wth anyperson or object exteror to ourls, whch is to say that these princples ofassociation "are really o u the cent of the universe (Abstract, p 662).In a very real sense Hume brng he attracton metaphor full circle backfrom the natural phlosophy of Neton to the socal and mental realms nwhch Newtons universe inhers long the way, he characterzes deas andperceptons and distinguishes blf and fantasies by their varous degrees of"force "vtality, "soldty and "rmness We shall have occason toreect on such physcalist metapos for mental phenomena n the net secton

of this chapterI should also note that an etrely social metaphor guides Humes under

standing of reason and ts relat o other human facultes "Reason s, and



Psyches use 7

ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any otherofce than to serve and obey them (p. 415). Although many others, fromPlato to Freud have expressed the relation of reason to other dynamic factorsthrough the use of similar social metaphors, Hume was distinctive in regardingthe enslavement of reason to be appropriate and acceptable.

Finally another reaction to the clockwork universe wittily expressed byThomas Reid (1785/1969), points toward the inverse social metaphor at thefoundation of the mechanistic world view:

Shall we beliv with Leibnitz that th mind was originally formed likea watch wound up and that all its thoughts, purposes passions andactions, are effected by the gradual evolution of the original spring ofthe machine and succeed each other in order as necessarily as themotions and pulsations of a watch?

If a child of three or four years were put to account for the phenomena o a watch, he woud conceive that there s a little man withinthe watch, or some other little animal that beats continually and produces the motion Whether the hypothesis of this young philosopher inturning the watch spring into a man or that of the German philosopherin turning a man into a watch spring, be the most rational seems hard todetermine. (p. 444)

Reid granted that it is natural to men to judge of things less known by somesimilitude they observe or think they observe, between them and things morefamiliar or better known, and he acknowedged that wher the thingscompared have really a great similitude in their nature, when there is reasonto think that they are subject to the same laws there may be a considerabledegree of probability in conclusions drawn from analogy (p. 48); but he also

noted that men are naturally disposed to concive a greater similitude inthings than there really is (p. 49), and he insisted that all arguments drawnfrom analogy, are still the weaker the greater the disparity there is betweenthe things compared (p. 50). Amen.

27 Locke is perhaps best known for his metaphor of the mind as a tabula rasa, orblank tablet (or more precisely, white paper, void of all characters seeLocke 1690/1959, vol. 1 p. 121), but he used many other metaphors as well,including a metaphorical comparison of the mind, or understanding, to adark roo or closet wholly shut from light with only some little openningsi.e. sensory channels] left to let in visible resemblances, or ideas of thingswithout (p. 212). Reid (1785/1969) recognized that this metaphor was no

mere rhetoric device but embodied a central assumption underlying Locke'stheory of perception (p. 124). By popularizing this and other assumptions,Locke helped to establish the representationalist tradition of perceptualtheory, with its metaphorical treatment of ideas as resemblances pictures, copies, and likenesses of reality (see Hamlyn, 1961, chaps. 6 and8). The larger question of psychology's borrowing of such metaphors from therealm of the arts, especially in the pivotal eighteenth century, when theboundaries between aesthetics and psychology were so uid deserves studyThe full story promises to be quite fascinating, reaching back to the originalGreek concept of do/a and forward to the latest picture theory of semantics.

Besides our notions of copies, likenesses and such, w have derivedour sense of perspective - so fundamental to modern consciousness fromthe history of drawing and painting (see Guilln 1968). Drawing and painting,



8 David E. Leary

of course are not the onl urces of these artrelated metaphors.Archtecture has also long been a fvorte source of psychologcal (as well asepstemologcal) metaphors accorg to whch we "construct our mental lfefrom the "ground up or top dn followng "plans, "blueprnts, andso on (see e.g., Anderson, 198). Less well known, but hstorcally mportantmetaphors have been drawn from usc coverng the range from harmonyto "rhythm. When bran researhes recently "scored branwave harmones(see, e.g. the cerebral symphon n Prbram, 1971, p. 75) t s lkely thatfew people realzed the rch tradt they had oned (see e .g. Heelan 1979Kassler, 1984 Levare, 1980).

Beyond the tabula rasa dar room and representatonal metaphorsof the mnd Locke helped t sablsh the "atomstc or corpuscularapproach to the mnd accordn to whch the mnd s analyzed nto tspresumably elemental deas (Lcke 1690/1959 vol. 1 pp. 1219 see Buchdahl 1969 chap. 4). He was alo sponsble for the nuental vew that themnd s characterzed and motat by ts fundamental uneasness (Locke,

1690/1959, vol. 1 pp. 332-9; ee azard 1935/1963, chap. 5). These bascmetaphorcal assumptons nfore many of the psychologes that came afterLockes

28 Locke could have added moral oncpts such as dependablty relablty andforthrghtness to ths lst of psychlgcal concepts . As Whtney (1896) wrote,A conspcuous branch of the dertment of guratve transfer and one ofndspensable mportance n the htry of language s the applcaton of termshavng a physcal sensble meanng to the desgnaton o ntellectual andmoral conceptons and ther relatns . . . In fact our whole mental and moralvocabulary has been ganed prey n ths way . . . there s a movement nthe whole vocabulary of languag from the desgnaton of what s coarser

grosser more materal to the desgnaton of what s ner more abstract andconceptonal, more formal . . he s no grander phenomenon than ths n alllanguagehstory (pp. 88-90) htney provded examples to support hscontenton.

On the use of "botanomorp' etaphors n the descrpton of trats andtypes, see Sommer (1988).

29 For some nterestng conjectures on the development of the ancent Greekmnd, coupled wth a very sese awareness of the role of metaphor nselfunderstandng see Jaynes 97).

0 See Fletcher (1882) and Majno 195), both of whom nclude llustratons n

ther dscussons of trephnng r ·repanaton (as Majno calls t).1 Should trephnng seem unreaonale or even nconcevably prmtve seealensten (1986) on twentethcntury psychosurgery. (The llustratons onp. 210, regardng the use of electonvulsve shock as an anaesthetc and theuse of transorbtal lobotomy s a cure for schzophrena are partcularlyemblematc.) It s also humblng t ompare other twentethcentury practceswth earler ones that seem prma fce rather "backward. It s not clear fornstance that the ratonale bend the nneteenthcentury practces ofdouchng and rotatng (see Holl & Osborn 1984 vol. 1 pp. 260-1 ; vo . 2 pp. 799801 for bref descrptons d llustratons) s sgncantly dfferent nknd or qualty from the ratonal behnd many of the therapeutc practcesthat are common n the late twteth century. Although Gross (1978) sadmttedly crtcal n orentaton, hs descrpton of our "psychologcal socety wth ts "new therapes n new messahs, can hardly be gnored as



Psyche's muse

competely off the mark. At the same time however t s unlkey that all ofthe parallels between current and past practices should be seen as an indictment of twentiethcentury practice. Almost certainly some of them should beregarded as a complement to earlier therapeutic interventions that had a moresod bass than we generaly recognze.

2 On the various forms of possession and exorcism in other cultures as well asin the histoy o the Western world see llenberger (1970 pp. 13-22).

Descartes's reliance on metaphorical thinking may seem to clash with hisselfproclaimed image a a thoroughly skeptical, cautiou and hece conervative thnker. But lke Francis Bacon who has also been misunderstood in thisregard (see note 1) Descartes (1628/19a) was quite aware that "all knowledge whatsoever, other than that which consists in the simple and nakedintuition of single independent objects is a matter of the comparison of twothings or more with each other In fact practically the whole of the task setthe human reason consists in preparng for this operation (p. 55). For adiscussion of Descartes's use of other metaphors, see N. delman (1950). Onthe use of human artfacts, especially machines as analogs of physcal biological, social bahavioral and mental phenomena see Boring (1946), Chapanis(961) and note 17. One of the strong advocates of the metaphorical use ofsuch artifacts in psychology Clark Hull (1943) sought to combine both"objectvty and "modellng by consdering "the behaving organism as acompletely selfmaintaining robot. This, he thought would serve as an effective "prophylaxis against anthropomorphic subjectivism (p 27). The nextqueston I suppose regards who and what wll provde a safeguard aganst theexcesses of mechanomorphc objectivsm. (For a simlar comment on theuncrtcal physicomorphism of psychologcal language see Asch 1958, p. 87.)

The discovery of the limitations of these and other correlates of the mechanistic metaphor n eighteenthcentury physiology and psychology contributed tothe emergence of a very different root metaphor that of "sensibility orsensitivity (see Moravia 1978 1979 Rousseau 1976). Of course no matterhow delmted the mechanstc metaphor was far from dead: It was transmogried in the nneteenth century to t the new demands and possibiltessuggested by the laws of thermodynamics. In unwitting anticipaton of themetaphors further transformation nto Feudan dynamics Helmholtz(1861/1971) even argued that the human body is . . a eer machne than thesteam engne (p. 119 italics added). Note that it was now the steam enginenot the clock or the hydraulic statue that was the preferred analog. As this

updated comparson imples the mechanstc metaphor has proved to bemmensely protean changng shape whenever there is an advance n physicalscience or engneerng technology (see Wiener 1961 chap 1).

5 For an overview of the recent cognitive revolution and some of the variantforms of contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitve science see Baars(1986) and Gardner (1987). For a general dscussion and more detas regarding cognitive metaphors see Bruner and Feldman (Chapter 6 this volume)and Hoffman Cochran, and Nead (Chapter 5 this volume), respectively.Cognitive metaphors are also usefully and interestingly tabulated and dscussed by stes (1978) Gentner and Grudin (1985) Lakoff and Johnson(1981) and Roedger (1980) . The current domnance of cognitivism in psycho

logy s reected n the fact that cogntive metaphors are frequently assumed tobe literal descriptors of mental entities and processes (see e.g. Newell &Simon 1972 Pylyshyn 1984). Although the literalization (n the sense



40 Dai E ear

described earlier in this chaptr of the new cognitive metaphors of inpustorage retrieval output and ll te other argot of computation and instrumentation is perhaps to be epted, given the frequent usage of thesemetaphors I cannot help but oi H. Jones (1906) and Berggren (1962) inworrying about the potential e and ae of metaphors. Nor can I resistoining Turbayne (1970) in ferin the danger of creating a h out of

metaphors when such literalizatin urs. A myth in this instance would be theresult of assuming that a set of "lenesses between (say) computation andmentation provide adequate grund for an inference of complete or at leastessential den. For a urther disssion of "myth used in a negative ratherthan positive sense, see note 49

Once again as in the discussion f Berkeley's gravitational theory o humanattraction I feel compelled to point out the paradox that a machine made tomimic soe of the human mind tivities has come to serve as the standardagans whch the human mind ativities - and poenal - are measured.Despite all the marvelous advance in informationprocessing theory and technoogy - no ecae of them - i ould seem wise to avoid the temptation to

think that we have nally reache he end of the road in understanding ourmental life. To anyone with histrial awareness and sensitivity it should seempremaure as William James wou put i o assume ha he nal word hasbeen spoken on this matter (se no 5).

I do not wish to be misundertod. Even granting that its ruitulness coudbe recognized only in a technologialy advanced and obsessed - culture theinformationprocessing metaphor (i its computationist and other guises) hasbeen extraordinarily fruitful. It a even found its way into the study ofpersonality (Powell Royce & oohees 1982) the psychoogy of inductionand creativity (Holland et a 198; Langley et a! . 1987), an the philosophyof science (Thagard 1988). My coern is focused not on what this metaphor

and its derivatives offer but on wt alternative metaphors may be ct o ifthey are taken to be denitive. Ti is a basic motivating concern behind myown research on the use and abse - of metaphor in science. The e ofmetaphor is necessary and wondrl to behold but the ae of metaphor -its use as a tool of presumpou pscription rather than tentative description- concerns me a great deal. At ors the metaphors bandied about today withsuch condence by psychologists and cognitive scientists may inltrate publicconsciousness (and personal selfnsciousness) and remain lodged there longafter these same psychologists and cognitive scientists have adopted a new setof metaphors. Do we really want r children and fellow citizens to think ofthemselves as more or less adqately networked information systems and

computational devices There ar urely worse metaphors to live by but anprescriptive metaphor is I belive one too many.

It should be obvious that I am ey sympathetic when Lakoff and Johnson(1981) state that they

are not suggesting that there is anything wrong with using such [cognitive] metaphors . . . . [But] the etaphors of a science, like any othermetaphors, typically hide indeitely many aspects of reality.

The way ordinary people del implicitly with the limitations of anyone metaphor is by having man etaphors for comprehending differentaspects of the same concept . . . These clusters of metaphors serve thepurpose of understanding better than any sngle metaphor could . . . . theinsistence on maintaining a onsistent extention of one metaphor mayblind us to aspects of reality that are ignored or hidden by that



Psyches muse

metaphor . . . . The mora ogntve cence needs to be aware o tsmetaphors to be concerned wth what they hde, and to be open toaternatve metaphors - even f they are nconsstent wth the currentfavortes. (p. 206)

4

Thers s not the only such cautonary comment (see, e.g. Crosson 1985Wezenbam, 1976 on the "hgh cost o normaton see Haaway, 1981-2and fo a ctque of the mndamachne paradgm ee Lakoff, 1987, chap.19). It should be added that hstory suggests that no metaphor, howevermythg lkely t te all ent and creatve thnkng. Thu, we canalways expect that new metaphors wll be found. Just how far a hearng newmetaphors wll receve, however wll vary accordng to the degree of truebelevng that stands n ther way.

Fnally, havng asserted ths caveat, I must gve credt where credt s due:Much of the recent revval of nterest n analogy and metaphor has beenspurred by those commtted to the nformatonprocessng, computatonalcalculus artcalntellgence approaches to mental dynamcs (see, e.g.,Arbb, 1972 Boden 1977, chap. 11; 1988 chap. 6; Russell, 1986 ternberg &Rkn 1979).

36 Certanly, n comparson wth he nave emprcsm of some of hs wellknownscentc contemporares, Freud fares well n ths regard. lse FrenkelBunwk 1954), taned n the phloophy of cence a well a n pychologyat the Unversty o Venna n the late 1920s was one o the rst to note that"Feud, n contat to ome of h followe, wa keenly awae of logcal andepstemologcal problems, ncludng those pertanng to the conventonaltyof scentc dentons (p 294) Relatedly, n a crtque of knners (1954)crtcsm of Freuds scentc method, crven (1956) argued that "the language of psychoanalyss s very opentextured t s a rst approach. Bengso, t uns the rsk of becomng emprcally meanngless, a rtual form ofmental alchemy. But the apprach s fully ustable and t s as wrong tosuggest that Freud should have pnned hs terms down to nfant neurology or,by the smple expedent of an operatonal denton, to physcal and bologcal scence, as t would be to nsst that the founders of rado astronomy shouldhave early sad whether a rado star was a sold body or a regon of space(p. 128). More recently Macntyre (1967) among others has ponted out theblndness of commentators who seem not to have notced that after all"Freud brought to lght and descrbed a huge varety of htherto unrecognzedtypes of behavor ths gvng psychology a new subect matter to explan(p. 252). He also noted that the rtualstc crtcsm regardng the untestabltyof Freuds theory s smply false - much of Freuds theory ha been reectedand/or moded as a result o such testng. Other phlosophers who haveshown an ncreased nterest n Freuds work nclude Wollhem (1971) and thecontrbutors to Wollhem (1974). Among the latter Gymour (1974) expctlydefends Freud's bootstrappng vercaton procedure, f not all of hs logcalarguments.

Meanwhle, Rcoeur (1970) and pence (1982 1987) represent a school ofphlosophers and psychologsts who are takng a new hermeneutc approach topsychoanalyss tryng to elucdate the ways n whch psychoanalyss representsan nerpreve enteprse par excellence. Although some are crtcal of thsnew approach (see esp. Grnbaum 1984 who presents an updated verson ofthe old emprct crtque) and athough others preent a very dfferent vewof Freud's work (see esp. ulloway 1979, who places Freud squarely and onl



42 Davi E eary

in the biological tradition) the hemeneutic understanding of Freud's work asesseniay inerpretive in oientaton is more in ine wih Freuds inenionsand background than these citics rcognize or allow. As early as 1895 Freudrealized that he was groping towar an approach hat resulted in case hisoriesthat were more novelisic han sientistic in format (Freud 1895/1955app. 160-1) and by 1896 he had aready claied that psychological processes

involve "rearrangement and retransciption of memory traces - that is, a"revision of sensations image deas, and words (see his letter to WilhelmFliess, 6 December 1896 in Masn 1985 p. 207). When Freud subsequentlyremarked that psychoanalysis was oncerned with reconsrcing these samedisplaced traces into coherent toies in which the missing elements hadbeen reinsered ino heir proper plces (as he did in the famous case of Dora1905/1953b, e.g. pp. 16, 116, in hich he used the concepts of censorsnew editions and "facsimiles s well as "revised editions) he was simplyclosing the circle of a longstandig position. That Freud himself studied thescience of language and drew on eevant aspects of the philological traditionis clear (see Forrester 1980), and hat he was conversant with the philosophi

cal literature - and was condent in his own epistemological position - isshown by his comment that he did not have to refer to aihinger (1911/1924)work in order to legitimate hs n ue of ctions. All scienes Freudargued (1926/1959c, p. 194) depd on such "ctions. Most recent philosophers of siene would agree, en if they would use different erms.

To review briey three salient ins in Freuds philosophy of science: (1)He did not feel that precise denitins should be the sine qua non of scienticwork. In fact he felt just the osite - that premature denition serves onlyto retard open and unfettered serch (see e.g. Freud 1914/1957a p. 771915/1957b p 117 1917/1963 p. 4 1925/1959a, pp. 57-8). (2) He did notfeel that certanty is a necessar cracteistic of science. In fac he doubed

tha it could be reached. Instad he proposed that science should aim forhighly probable knowledge - for beter and better analogies that provide evercloser resemblances and appximations of realiy (see e.g. Freud1895/1955b p. 291; 1917/1963, pp. 51 296). (3) He ook a completely pragmatic approach to science. He freely admitted ha his meaphorical conceptswere "nothing but construction ut he insisted hat psychoanalytic praciceshowed them o be necessary n seful construcions, at least for the timebeing (1917/1963, p. 326). He presmed that one must make many assumptionsin order to get on with scienti rk and that he way to jusify any givenassumption (or meaphorical cocpion) was simply "to see what comes of i.The outcome of our work will deie wheher we are to hold to his assump

tion and whether we may then go to reat it in tu as a proved nding. Butwha is it acually hat we wan to arrive a Wha is ou work aiming a Wewant something that is sought fo n all scientic work - to understand thephenomena to establish a corrlaion between them and in the latter end ifit is possible, to enlarge our powr over them (p. 100). Freud's criterion ofpsychological health was similarly pagmatic: It is a practical question and isdecided by the outcome by wther the subject is left with a sufcientamount of capacity for enjoyment nd of efciency (p. 457). Of course, herelated this outcome to a metaphoial premise regarding the "relative sizes ofthe quota of energy that remain ree (p. 457).

7 Bettelheims (1983) translation of tis passage is less awkward and more apt:"In psychology we can describe ly with the help of comparisons. This isnothing special it is the same lshere. But we are forced to change these



Psyches muse 4

compaisons over and over again for none of them can serve us for any lengthof time (p. 37.

That there was nothing unusual, so far as Freud was concerned, aboutpsychologys reliance on metaphoical compaisons is made clear by these twopassages:

I know you wll say that these ideas about "resistance and "repression] are both crude and fantasic . . . . more than that I know that theyare incorrect and if I am not very much mistaken, I already havesomething better to take their place. Whether it will seem to you equallyfantastic I canno ell. They are preiminary working hypoheses ikeAmpres manikin swimming in the electric current in one of theondng sudies n he sciene o eecomagneism and hey are no obe despised in so far as they are of service in making our observationsintelligible. (Freud, 1917/1963, p. 296)

We need not feel greatly disturbed . . . by the fact that so many bewilder

ing and obscure processes occur in our scientic speculations] . . . Thisis merely due to our being obliged to operate with the scientic ermsthat is to say with the gurative language peculiar to psychology (or,mre precisely to depth psychology). We could not othewise describethe processes in question at all and indeed we could not have becomeaware of them. The deciencies in our descpion would probablyvanish if we were already in a position to replace the psychological termsby physiological or chemical ones. It is true that they too are only partof a gurative language but it is one with which we have long beenfamiliar and which is perhaps a simpler one as well. (Freud 1920/955e,p. 60)

The critical "mechanism of scientic creativity for Freud was as he wrote toSndor Ferenczi on 8 April 1915 the succession of daingly playful fantasyand relentlessly realistic citicism (quoted by GrubrichSimitis 1987, p. 83).

As he sad esewhee Wha s psyha is somehng so unqe and earto itself that no one compaison can reect its nature (Freud 1919/1955dp. 161) . Freud was keenly sensitive to the need for multiple comparisons andto the insufciency of the ones he had so far located from very early inhis career. As he said, I am making use here of a number of similes all ofwhich have only a very limited resemblance to my subect and which moreover are incompatible with one another. I am aware that this is so and I amin no danger of overestimating their value. But my purpose in using them isto throw light from different directions on a highly complicated topic whichhas never yet been represented. I shall therefore venture to continue in thefollowing pages to introduce similes in the same manner though I know this isnot free from obection (1895/1955b p. 291). He made such statementsthroughout his career as he struggled for more and more adequate analogs ofthe psychological processes he studied and dealt wth. This was a neverendingstuggle for him not conned to his early works. In ust three of the nalpages of The Ego and he d (1923/1961a), for instance Freud compared theeg a nna mnah a servant of hree masers, a psychoanalyst apolitician, and protozoans (pp. 557)

9 Freuds love of antiquity and of Greek history and literature is well conveyedby Gays (1976) tex and the accompanying pictures of the ancien saues andother antiquities in Freuds Viennese home and ofces. Indeed, it is for good



44 Da E eary

reason that Freud's thought ha n studied in relation to Greek mythologyphilosophy, and rhetoric (see, e.. Mahoney, 1974 Tourney, 1965). Freud'srelation to the classical humanst tadtion - a tradition that is overlooked inSulloways (1979) attempt to reduce Freudian thought to its biological roots is discussed by Bettelheim (198) d by the contributors to Gedo and Pollock(1976). It s also elucidated in effs (1979) masterful analysis. Among the

various passages in which Freud iicated his debt to Plato, and specically toPlatonic myths the following is articularly telling "What psychoanalysiscalled sexuality was by no mean dentical with the impulsion towards a unionof he two sexes or towards prodcng a pleasurable sensation in the genitalsit had far more resemblance to e allinclusive and allpreserving ros ofPlatos pos (Freud, 15961, p. 218).

40 To get a quick sense of the role f metaphors and analogies in Freuds worksee A. Richardss (1974) compilatn of "some of the more striking of Freudsanalogies and extended simle' . 179). On Freud's metaphors, see, e.g.Badalament (1979) Bloom (1982 Browning (987), Derrida (978) delson(1983), rdelyi (1985), Mahon (1982, chap. 5), Nash (1962 1963),PedersonKrag (1956), Shengold (979), Spence (1987) and Wilden (1980).On the psychoanalytic approach o metaphor see Rogers (1978).

One of Freuds fundamental maphors - translation or "transcriptionused n reference to the revison f one's life story that takes place in thecourse of psychoanalysis - wa entioned in note 36. Another fundamentalmetaphor, or rather family of mtaphors, comes from archeology (see note41). Another has to do with the nalogies between the ontogenetc development of the individual and h hlogenetic history of he human race (seee.g. the subtitle and analysis f reud, 1913/1955c, and the title and analysisof Freud, 1915/1987). And of re, Freud's metaphorical transformation ofthermodynamics into psychodynacs is signaled throughout his work in suchpassages as The prime factor i nquestionably the process of getting rid ofone's own emotions by blowng f seam' (Freud 1905/1953c, p. 305) .

41 Despite (or perhaps because f) Feud's frequent changes n what might becalled his "surface meaphors w can see a smaller set of "deep meaphorshat persis, wh amendmens toughou the developmen of his hought.This suggests a dfference betwee etaphors that are relatively more exposiory or elaboraive and those that are more basic, though I would not wan toreduce exposiory metaphors to onconsequential saus. One example isFreud's reliance on the archaeolgcal metaphor - or family of metaphors -accordng to which the mind i le an archaeological dig, with various layers

or historical sedimens beng ud a differen levels (though because ofoccasional upheavals hey are omes displaced in relaion o the originalline of sediment) and being "unathed and "reconstructed in the courseof psychoanalysis. This basic tphorical scheme whch clearly orientedFreuds aptly designated "depth pychology, was obvious as early as 1897(see Freud's comments and drawing in Masson 1985, pp. 246-8) and it wasstill ctical at the end of his career (see e.g., Freud 1930/1961c pp. 69-71).Regarding Freud's abiding intrst in archaeology, includng HeinrichSchliemann's highly suggestive dsvery of the manylayered city of Troy seeBernfeld (1951) and Gay (197).

The fact that Freud readily hanged his own metaphors does not mean of

course, that he always welcoed changes made or suggested by others.Although he certainly had the r to argue for his own preferred concepts



Psyches muse 45

and theores hs tendency to be dogmatc toward others n ths regard s noteasly justed. However, though Freud sometmes fell below the mark thatmany of us would endorse at our pont n tme the personal nterpersonaland hstorcal contexts of Freuds dogmatsm - not to menton the character ofths dogmatsm tself - have not yet been adequately assessed. Meanwhle

Gays (1988) rent work compensates for earler treatments of ths matter.42 Ths s not to deny that many of hs followers and many commentators onpsychoanalyss - have been less careful nor that Freud hmself was occasonally less careful nor that Freuds rhetorc at mes nved msundersandng. rexample Freuds frequent and graphc use of synecdoche (e.g. labelng developmental stages, whch he had already shown to be much more complcated, as smply "oral "anal phallc and gental) both aded thepopularzaton and encouraged the trvalzaton of hs deas (see Reff, 1979,pp. 44-5). But a dstnctve aspect of Freuds rhetorc s hs almost obsessvecrtcsm and qualcaon of hs own metaphors (see e.g. , Freud 19001953ap 536 1913/1955c pp. 1601 ; 1917/963, pp. 295-6 1919/1955d, p. 59

1926/1959c pp. 1945, 254 930/1961c, pp. 701 144 and Freuds apprecatve footnote quotaton from Sr James G. Frazer n 1913/955c p. 08) . Freudcontnually ponted out the analogous dmensons of hs metaphors - whereand to what extent they fell short of the mark Unfortunately as Mahoney(1982) has noted All too often commentators paraphrasng Freud leave outthe gure of speech the wha the possle or proale by whch hs ownstatements are qualed thus obscurng the suppostonal character of theorgnal (p. 117).

4 Perhaps I should clarfy that I am nether for nor aganst psychoanalyss perse but I am apprecatve of Freuds broadenng and deepenng of psychologcal understandng and of hs nsght and courage regardng metaphorcal andanalogcal thnkng. I hardly presume that Freuds metaphors are dentvebut I have no doubt that he pursued and shed lght on topcs of great sgncance and relevance.

Jmes (1878/983a) reached the convcton that analogcal thnkng s fundamental to human knowledge, ncludng scence very early n hs career"very phenomenon or socalled fact has an nnty of aspects . . . . Whadoes the sentc man do who searches for the reason or law embedded n aphenomenon? He delberately accumulates all the nstances he can nd whchhave any analogy to that phenomenon, and by smultaneously llng hs mndwth them all he frequently succeeds n detachng from the colecon the

pecularty whch he was unable to formulate n one alone . . . . our only nstrument for dssectng out the specal characters of phenomena, whch . . . arethen] used as reasons s ths assocaton by smlarty . . . . the mnd n whchths mode of assocaton most prevals wll . . . be one most prone to reasonedthnkng (pp. 12 21-2, talcs deleted).

A mnd less prone to analogcal thnkng s more prone, accordng to Jamesto "assocaton by contguty whch s to say to a mental lfe consttuted bysequences of thought that are automatcally, or rratonally determned by thepast order of experence. James (1880) descrbed ths latter, "nonthnkngtype of mnd as dry prosa and matter of fat - n a word "very lteral .Human ntellgence of such a "smple order are he sad "slaves of habt

who "take the world for granted (p. 456). But turn to the hghes order ofmnd and what a change (p. 456). Here nstead of thought of concretethngs patently followng one another n a beaten track of habtual sugges



46 Di E. eary

tion there are the most abrup rosscuts and transitions from one idea toanother the most rareed abstrtions and discrminations the most unheardof combinations of elements he subtlest associations of analogy in a wordwe seem suddenly introduced it a seething caldron of ideas where . . .partnerships can be joined or losened in an instant treadmill routine isunknown and the unexpected sees the only law (p. 456).

nterestngly James (1883-18) notced that although "the world maybe a place in which the same thi never did & never will come twice thehuman mind nonetheless constanly tries to nd similarties among theseevernovel phenomena. Inded istead of the psychological principle ofsameness James suggested tha t would be more precise to speak of the"law of constancy in our meaning which he took to be one of the mostremarkable features, indeed ne ight well say the very backbone of oursubective life (p. 285). It is nl hrough the operation of this "law Jamesargued that generalization abstrtion reasoning and other forms o highercognition can take place.

This emphasis on the centralit of association by similarty - or analogical

thinking - continued throughout amess works including his philosophicalworks. Regardng metaphysial nowledge for example, he agreed withHarald Hffdng (1905ab) - an oreshadowed Stephen Pepper (1928 1942) when he argued that "all our atepted denitions of the Whole of things aremade by onceiving it as analogs in onstitution to some one o its partswhich we treat as a typephenoeon (James 1905 p xi).

In corroboration of points mae elsewhere in this chapter it is relevant tonote that James agreed that (1) mhematics as well as classication and logicis fundamentally metaphorical hat is based on comparison or analogicalthinking (see James 1890 vol p 641-69) (2) our terms and concepts ormental phenomena are derived rom physical analogs (see James 1883-4/

1988 p. 256 for a possibly inuetal precedent besides Locke see merson,1836/1983a p 20); (3) alternaie theoretical frameworks can be simultaneously veried (see James, 180 vol 2 p 312 1907/1975 p 104) (4)human understanding or knwlege can be usefully considered to be a"ransaion of "sensible expeees ino oher forms (see James, 1890 vol.2 pp 640 669) and (5) the disalogous dimensions of metaphorical comparsons must be claried alog ith the analogous dimensions (see eg James 1890 vol 1 pp 6-7 an note 49)

45 arly on James (ca 1879/197) reognized that "universal acceptance is the"only mark of truth which we posess (p 360) Pointing toward a sociologyof knowledge he came to realize hw complex and interdependent the matterof acceptance is "You accept y verication of one thing. I yours of anotherWe trade on each other's truth . All human thinking gets discursied weexchange ideas we lend and borro vercations, get them from one anotherby means of social intercourse ll truth thus gets verbally built out, storedup, and made available for everyoe (1907/1975 pp 100 102)

Simplistic interpretations of wht James meant when he spoke about an ideaworking or "paying o' hav led to some grotesque disortions of hethought of one of the greatest intllects in American history - in philosophy aswell as psychology (Alfred North Whitehead 1938 pp 3 4 even argued thatJames was one of the four great itellects of the Western tradition, along withPlato Aristotle, and Leibniz social dimension of James's thought asexemplied above by the notion of verication by social intercourse has oftenbeen underestimated ven thuh James emphasized the individual over the



Psyches muse 47

group this does not excuse some of the simpleminded claims that have beenmade about James's dsregard of the soal nature of psychological phenomena includng knowledge He was a leader for nstance in argung forthe social dimension of the self (1890 vol 1, pp 293-6)

Although the deal of every scence s that of a closed and completed system

of truth (James 1890/1983c p 247) expeience is ever openended, everpromising and yieldng new phenomena and new aspects of phenomena (seeJames 1890 vol 1 p 233 1897/1979, p 141) Thus the quest for "absolutely' true concepts is an "deal vanishingpont towards whch we imagnethat all ou temporay truths wll some day onverge (ames, 1907/1975pp 106-7) We must remember that absolute truth s a goal, not an achevement so that when we "lay hold o realty from a partcular "angle, we willnot unduly persst in treatng realty "as if t were nothng but that aspect(ames 1890 vo 2 p 8 1907/1975, p 103) How far can and will naturebe "remodelled by human understandng That s a queston which only thewhole future hstory of Scence and Phlosophy can answer (ames 1890 vol

2 p 671)47 See eg ames (1878/1983a pp 35-6 1884/1983b pp 152-3 1890 vol 1

pp 26-7 234-5, 288-9 vol 2 pp 450, 481 1902/1985, pp 380-1 1907/1982 1909/1986, pp 374-5) and the metaphors hghlghted n E Taylor(1982 e g , on p 18) On the evoluton of vaous "ensembles and familes ofmetaphors n amess work see Osowski (1986) On the nuence of amess"ud symbols (e g his famous analysis of and emphass on the "stream ofconscousness) see Ruddick (1981)

On the Dawnan background of amess thought see Hofstadter (1955)Pery (1935 vol 1, chap 27) R Richards (1987 chap 9) Russett (196),

Wener (949 and Wdward (1983 The class exposton of amessthought s provided by Perry (1935) , but for a more recent, lengthy explcatonand analyss see Myers (1986) and for a much brefer summary of amessphilosophcal pncples, see Suckiel (1982) Bjorks (1988) treatment is relevant insofar as it focuses on the centralty of ames's cogntve theory to hsoverall ntellectual poston In all of these works it s rarely, f ever notedthat ames was one of the rst to see and to accept the larger signicance ofDawnan natual seectonsm Darwin (1859/1964) convinced many, ratherquckly of evolutonism but natural selection - Dawins own theory ofevoluton - was not so quckly accepted (see D Hull, 1973) Long beforeselectionsm was accepted by the maoty of bologcal scentsts as one of the

pmay mechansms of biologcal evoluton, ames (1880) had accepted t andwas drawing out its mplcatons for the theoy of socal evoluton One wouldhope that R Rchardss (1987, chap 9) recent work will inaugurate arevval of nterest n ths aspect of amess work

49 I mean "myth here not simply in the more positve sense ntended earler nths chapter but also n a more derogatory sense accordng to whch myth sthe takng o an analogy or metaphor as an dentity - and by extension thetakng of ts elaboraton as a completely true story Another way of sayng thiss that myths (in he negatve sense) arse when people forget to say "lke or"as when proposng a meaphorcal ompason an whn hey ngle dene the ways n whch analogous things or processes are also analogous or

smilar, as they are by denton as well as expeience or related dscussons, see Burke (1935/1965 p 97) and Turbayne (1970 esp pt 1) Royces(1964) discussion o "encapsulaton - the taking o " approach to realty



48 Di E. eary

as f t were he approach (p 14) - s also relevant You mght also recallThomas Carlyles (189/1971) coment on all the earlynneteenthcenturytal about the "Machne of Soct Consdered merely as a metaphor allths s well enough but here, as so many other cases, the foam hardenstself nto a shell, and the shado we have wantonly evoed stands terrblebefore us and wll not depart at our bddng Government ncludes much also

that s not mechancal and canno be treated mechancally of whch lattertruth as appears to us, the polta speculatons and exertons of our tme aretang less and less cognsance 70) The modern preference for representng realty n terms of dffernc and denttes rather than comparsonsand smlartes (a preference alyzed by Foucault 1970 chap 3) accounts,somewhat tautologcally, for the ontemporary tendency toward lteralzatonwhch s the modern verson o thcal thnng Ths preference for whatKant (1797/1974) called "dstncts (the notng of dfferences and denttesrather than comparsons and smlates) does not elmnate the actual processof comparson that underles ogton but t does tend to obscure t Wthregard to the dangers of not dcmnatng between smlartes and denttes

t s nterestng that Descartes (/1911a) began hs rst phlosophcal worwth a warnng aganst tang lartes as denttes (p 1)ames frequently ponted ot he dangers of lteralzaton - of tang

metaphors as dentve lteral saements of truth For example regardngwo of he maor pyhologcal eores of he nneeenh cenury, he wrote"I do not mean to say that the Aocatonst manner of representng the lfeof the mnd as an agglutnaton n varous shapes of separate enttes calleddeas, and the Herbartan way of �presentng t as resultng from the mutualrepugnances of separate entte called orsellngen are not convenentformulas for roughly symbolzng he facts So are the udtheores of electrcty the emssontheory of lght t archetypetheory of the seleton and the

theory that curves are composd f small straght lnes But f taen as lteraltruth I say that any one of th theores s just as false as any other andleads to as perncous results Assocatonsm and Herbartansm [leother scentc theores] re onl chemtms whch the moment they etaen lterally, become mythologs and had much better be dropped thanretaned (1884/1983b pp 147 15)

amess caveat dd not foreclos he tendency toward lteralzaton To gvebut one example B F Snners (938 1981 radcal behavorsm s founded- as s amess psychology thoug wth very dfferent results - on the centralDarwnan metaphors of varaon electon and utlty Snner supposes thatthere are spontaneous blnd vratons n behavor some of whch are

selected ( e renforced) becau f ther utlty But despte the fact that hetransfers Darwns concepts from he context of phylogenec hstory to that ofontogenetc developmen and dete the fac that he apples these conceptsto the arena of behavoral lean rather than that of bologcal specatonSnner maes no qualcaton n hs lteralst appeal to Darwnan authortyHe s he clams, smply drawng ut the neluctable consequences of Darwnsevolutonary theory I would say that he s mang an nterestng and potentally nformatve extrapolaton rm Darwns theory but that he s mstaenly equatng the evoluton of specs over mllenna wth the evoluton of anndvduals behavor over a sn lfetme and I would suppose that theconceptual framewor adequate o the one wll not be dentcally adequate

for the other It s precsely the scaton of some of the major derences that s, the speccaton of the exet to whch varaton, selecton and utlty



Psyhes muse 4

are no preempve conceps for the undersandng of organc behavor - hawould help ll n and round out Snners psychology

What adds a bt of pathos to all ths s the fact hat Snner uses Dawnantheory n support of a completely determnst vew of human nature a vewthat allows for no eedom o selfcontrol as tadtonally understood Once

agan we see an roncal conceptual boomerang Darwn you wll rememberreached hs theory by loong speccally at how human breeders controlnaure by nenonall selecng he characterstcs hey wan to enhance nfuture generatons Now Dawns metaphor of natual selecon whch sbased on the noton o human control over natue n the breedng o domestanmals, s used to support the argument hat nature controls humans andthus to dscredt the vey concepton o conscous ntentonalty that groundedDawns theory

ames (1890 by the way, was moe fathful than Snner - or Dawn - toDawns orgnatng nsght He explctly used selecon eans of conscos aenon (or ntenon) o explan wha he regarded o be he relavely

small vr sgncan amount o human eedom (hap 6Regardng Snners atude oward metaphor and Snnes ownmetaphorc language see Leay (1988a) and L D Smth (Chapter 7 note 4ths volume) Staddon and Smmelhag (1971) n ther attempt to account forbehavoral varaon as well as behavoral seecon provde one of manyexamples o the amplcato o the Dawnan metaphor that les at the heatof Snnean psychology

5 For nstance, G Stanley Hall one of the founders of scentc psychology nAmeca felt as strongly as Freud and ames about the analogcal ormetaphorcal bass of all nowledge In a manner remnscent o both ames

and Emerson Hall (1904) clamed that metaphors are among the mnds "rstspontaneous creatons and that they provde the bass for the development oflanguage, whch s therefore essentally "fossl poetry Wth reference topsychologca nowledge n patcular Hal noted that through the wdenngcrcle of objects and events lned by metaphocal thnng "scores ofobects are no longer mere thngs of sense but are wods n the dctonary ofpsychc states and moral qualtes (vol , p 145) In sayng ths n hstypcally obscure manner Hall had n mnd the same fact noted by Loceames and others (see note 8 and the last paragraph of note thatpsychologcal concepts such as "magnaton "apprehenson and emoton and moral concepts such as "dependablty "relablty and "forth

ghtness, were drawn orgnally from physcal analogsWhatever ther smlarty Hall's approach was also maredly dfferent fromthose of Freud and ames Rather than assume that there s always more thanone salent metaphorca vew of reaty, Hal supposed that one partcularmetaphorcal approach could be the dentvely correct one A monst ratherthan a amesan pluralst n ths regard he proposed hs own recaptulatontheory of psychoogcal deveopment as the ultmate scentc heoy of humanpersonalty and character (1897, 1904, 19) Transformng a metaphor nto aprncple he extrapolated theoes of chldhood, adolescence and agng fromhe premse ha the phylogenec hstory of he speces provdes a lteralcompletely accurate analog of the developmental stages n the lfe of the

ndvdual Smlar recaptulatonst theoies have been proposed by thers nthe hstory of psychology and have been much more nuental than usuallyrecognzed See Gould (1977a) for general bacground on recaptulatonst



50 Dav E. eary

theory see Sulloway (1979) o Feuds recaptulatonsm and see ung (1917/1966) and Paget (1967/1971 chp 4 esp pp 158-64 1969) or othertheores wth recaptulatonst eeents that contnue to attract attenton Asfor Halls developmental theory oth ts largely speculatve nature and tsspare emprcal bacng help accnt for ts downfall

51 Elsewhere, Cattell (1898) noted hat the expermental psychologsts "regard

for the body of nature becoms hat of the anatomst rather than that of thelover (p 15) Tough perfetly understandable Cattells choce ofmetaphors s emblematc of the pofessonalzaton of psychology (more hopedfor than actual when Cattell wte these words) No longer an "amatuer (orlover) o human nature Cattell nted to move beyond even T H Huxley(1898), "Darwns bulldog who fr all hs erce commtment to scence stllfelt that "lvng nature s not a chansm but a poem not merely a roughengnehouse for the due eepng f pleasure and pan machnes, but a palacewhose foundatons, ndeed, ar ld on the strctest and safest mechancalprncples, but whose superstucte s a manfestaton of the hghest andsubtlest art (p 311)

The loss of aesthetc feelng or ones subject matter - the dullng of the eye,as Wllam Wordsworth (1814977 put t wth specal reference to materalstc scence (p 155) - s a loss scant mport, as both Darwn and Jameswould have agreed (Leary, 1988c Such aesthetc loss s frequently ted to the"over rejecon of metaphorc lnguage - and he "cover or unrecognzeduse of emprcs meaphors, su as those assocated wh tang naureapart and "reconstructng t wh the "bare essenals, generally "from thebottom up It s worth consdeg the nature of the supposed "nonessentals that are omed by and frm classc scentc sudy and the actual andpotental damage done to psology - not to menton our scentc andtechnologcal culture - by ther msson, especally snce many of these"nonessentals (e g , emotonal , esthetc, and moral reactons and nterests)are related to the socalled sendary qualtes of experence that werebanshed from the realm of ctc theory and research at the tme ofGalleo, Descartes and Newto (e Burtt, 195/1954, esp pp 180-4, 31-9,303-5 Koyr, 1950/1968, 1957 Although strdes are beng made towardreturnng these "qualtes to h rghtful place n the realm, and sudy ofrealty, we seem not to hav tpped the full dmensons of the humanmeaphor (Sewell, 1964) Wh Wllam ames and others, doubt we everwll, but we ought not close the oor to the attempt We ought nstead tostrve, through the metaphor e create and use, to enrch and empowerrather than to restrc and descct human poental, experence, and acon

Such enrchment and empowerg would pay double dvdends nsofar asrchness of experence and emotn are among he mos mportant facors hatenable and motvae metaphorc or creatve, expresson (see MacCormac,1986)

52 In fact Cattells near decade f "mental testng left lttle more than awarehouse of meanngless data (se Soal 1987) In contrast the wors ofFreud and ames contnue to be surces of theoretcal deas fty and eghtyyears after the respectve deat these two thners It s also relevant thateven an antmetaphorst leaves mtaphorcal traces and n Cattells case thesetraces have dug deeply nto psychlocal practce The emprcst rhetorc of

scentc nqury - le the methologcal practces t corroborates - s ageold but the rhetorc of mode pychologcal dagnoss and treatment s muchmore recent Though ths s a hge topc what s mos pertnent - and wl



Psyhes muse 5

serve as an llustraton - s the rhetorc (and myths) that grew up aroundCattells concept of "mental testng From ts orgnal metaphorcal bassn the "anthropometrc wor of Francs Galton the "psychometry of the"mental testng movement begun n Amerca by Cattell was soon envelopedn a rhetorc of socal doctorng and human engneerng Drawng attenton

and power from ts numerous lngustc and conceptual references to the twomost conspcuous elds n whch mode scence has proved ts worth (medcne and engneerng), an entre rhetorc of abnormal and clncal psychologywas elaborated As doctors tested for dsease and engneers for stress sopsychologsts came to thn of themselves and presented themselves as bengcapable of testng for ntellgence or nsanty or any number of psychologcalpropertes They were not smply lke doctors and engneers they were doctorsand engneers, testng "patents for "mental dsease and desgnng "solutons for ther "mental stress More sgncantly a whole set of practcalroutnes has been ed to ths conceptual framewor - routnes that stll drectthe professonal actvtes of many psychologsts even though the conceptual

framewor tself (at least the porton drawng on medcal analogs) has receved some wellpublczed crtcsm (partcularly after Szasz 1961) On therhetorc of mental testng and of professonalzaton n general, see Brown(1985 1986) on appled psychology earler n ths century, see ODonnell(1985), Napol (1981) and Samelson (1979) and on the development ofpsychologys (or more partcularly psychatrys) professonal jursdcton over"personal problems, see Abbott (1988 chap 10)

53 Such subtle movement from metaphorcal to supposedly lteral conceptualzaton of psychologcal phenomena s typcal of the hstorcal development oftwentethcentury psychologcal rhetorc The apparently pure neutral psychologcal language mandated earler n the century by the domnant postvstphlosophy of scence was always deeper down nformed by comparatvethnng (see note 10) and many of the theoretcal arguments and developments over the past century have been the result of what mght be caledanaoca redecrpon of psychologcal phenomena For example much ofthe tuofthecentury weness of, nd amewor fo undestndng, thephenomena of nonnormal psychology (e g regardng dfferent levels of conscousness and dual personalty) was "translated nto the new scentc language of psychology wth lttle acnowledgment, from psychc research(Leary 1980b) Another example s provded by a truncated argument madeby ohn B Watson (1916) n hs presdental address to the Amercan Psychologcal Assocaon "It seems to me he sad "that hystercal motor man

festatons may be looed upon as condtoned reexes (p 99) Ths s not anunreasonable analogy and pursung t mght have enlghtened our understandng of hystera but Watson sld wthout further justcaton from ths suggestve analogy to a matteroffact declaraton that "the condtoned reex can beused as an explanatory prncple n the psychopathology of hystera (p 99)

Ths sort of lngustc sleght of hand, by whch an analogcal redescrpon staen to be a new theoretcal explanaton, was noted n 1934 by a perceptveobserver who complaned that "psychology, for all ts theores, has performedno mracles It has renamed our emotons complexes and our habts condtoned reexes, bu t has neher changed our habts nor rd us of ouremotons We are the same blunderng fol that we were twelve years agoand far less sure of ourselves (Adams, 1934, p 9) Even those who wouldbe more generous n ther assessment of mode psychology and ts effects wllprobably sympathze wth ths crtque Stll, t s a measure of the success of



52 Dav E eary

modern psychologys rhetorc ha so many people now turn to psychologyboh n health and n dsres Indeed, many Amercans now approachpsychology as ther predecessor aproached relgon Not concdentally, areat deal of relgous rhetorc - fr example about the means of personalenlghtenment and salvaton - h ound ts way nto psychologcal treatses

The persuasveness of twentethentury psychology le that of any other

dscplne s clearly related to s cce of metaphors By drawng on culturally salent and popular metaphor psycologsts have created a salent andpopular dscplne I shall gve tee examples based on the fact that ourculture places a hgh value on eenc that our socety s capalsc andthat we are obsessed wth echnol (facts that are admttedly nterrelated)(1) In our efcencyconscous cultue psychologsts have used metaphors ofefcency at the very core of th thnng and rhetorc Nurtured by thePurtan ethc as well as by the aptlst maretplace the cult of efcency hasnuenced both appled psycholy (eg, ndustral and educatonal psychology) and more theoretcal psycholy (e g abnormal and personalty psychology) As correlates of the metah of efcency, wth ts crtera of economy

of effort and drectedness of purose "mental decency became the effectve synonym for subnormal mentl functonng, whle the leadng of an "ntegrated and productve lfe bcme the major crteron of pychologcalnormalty () In ths captalt soty psychologsts have gven metaphors ofproductvty and exchange a pronent place n ther analyses of socal behavor Although theores of scal exchange (n socal psychology) andtheores of optmzaton (n behoral psychology) have been gven thermature form only n recent dees the mplct assumptons of cost-benetanalyss have guded theoretcl r n psychology for much longer (3) Inths technologcal socety psyoogsts have turned to cybernetc computatonal, and other such analos neurologcal, cogntve, emotonal, and

behavoral fnctonng (The coputer s but one of many techncal devcesthat have provded crtcal anlogs for the theoretcal rumnatons oftwentethcentury psychologsts early, no one would or could have thoughtof our senses, for example a sgnal detecton devces wthout the prornventon of radar nor would the methodologcal and quanttatve technquesnecessary to study the senses s gnal detectors have been avalable wthoutthe prevous development of rdr and smlar technology

On psychologcal efcency an decency see Goddard (190) Hollngworth (191 1914) udd (1918 caps 4 and 5) Wtmer (1915 1919) andWoodworth (1901) Deweys ( 86197a) descrpton of "good character ashavng as ts rst attrbute 1 fcency force To be good for somethng not

smply to mean well (p 36) a hs subsequent (1897/197b) remar that"force, efcency n executon r overt acton s the necessary consttuent ofcharacter (p 78), provde a ontXt for hs later (1900) concern about suchthngs as waste n educaton (cp 3) The "progressvst cultural contextof ths "cult of efcency (a alahan 196 has called t) s reected nwors such as that of H chards (1910) n Frederc W Taylor'sScentc Management Movement (see May 1959 pp 13-6 Schwartz1986 chap 8 F W Taylor 1911 and n varous educatonal concerns andreforms (see Callahan 196 Tya & Hansot 198) The longterm legacy ofths cult was stll vsble n the 150s (see Walln 1956) Indeed t s vsbletoday transmogred nto ergomcs cost-benet analyses optmzaton

theores and so on whch contne to nuence theores of ndvdual andsocal behavor both nsde and outsde psychology proper (see eg Haraway 1981- Wlson 1968 1971 1975 1978)



Psyhes muse 5

As I have indcated optimization theories are related to earlier concernsabout efciency and come primarily from economc theory The exchangemetaphor s also rooted in economic (capitalist) theory and was ntroducedformally nto psychology n wors such as that of Thbaut and Kelley (1959)Regardng later developments see Gergen Greenberg and Wills (1980)

With regard to technological metaphors see Pribram (Chapter ths volume)and N Wener (1961) The complete and fascnating story of the dalectcbetween ideas and devices n psychology - how deas lead to the invention ofdevices and how devices lead to the modcaton and extenson of ideas - hasnot yet been adequately told though the nteracton of thoughts and things(including in some cases politcal theory daily patterns of behavor andeveryday technal deve i begnning to be the focus of hitorial scholarship n other realms (eg Beniger 1986 Gimbel 1976 Landes 1983 Mayr 1986) The overlap between the American cult of efcency and theAmerican obsession with machines was well expressed in Santayana's classcanalysis "The Intellectual Temper of Our Times (1913/1940) n which

Santayana noted that n America (as opposed to Europe) "the mind s recommended rather as an unpatented devce for oiling the engine of the body andmaing t do double wor (p 17)

There is no necessa problem involved in drawng on culturally popularmetaphors but the dangers associated with t especially the danger of lteralization are quite real When metaphors seem "obvous they can easily be"taen for granted and can be very persuasive to a great many peopleFurthermore when a culturally promnent metaphor is literalized this tendsto legitimate as well as draw on cultural values and arrangements To thisextent culturally based metaphors have deologcal dimensons and politicalramcations no less than do metaphors that purposely cut against the grain of

standard cultural assumptions In this situation it seems all the more importantthat theoretical metaphors be clearly seen and dentied for what they arenamely historically contngent modes of perception cognition and (so far asthey are implemented) action That wellsocialzed Americans tend to engagein socal nteractions in "capitalistic ways expecting a protable - andperhaps a more than equitable - exchange of goods and services should notbe surprising But to "prove the valdity of exchange theory by observationof ercan socialbehavior patterns and then to propose exchange theory onhs ass as a nversal explanation of human behavior s to prescribe uncritically one particular cultural pattern as the "normal mode of human behavorThs not only canonizes one particular cultural arrangement it shields it fromcritcsm and by implcaton damns alternatve socal arrangements as "unnatural devant or less than optimal The case is similar regarding other sorts ofmetaphors For example our culture favors novelty ("sgnals or "messages)over constancy (bacground noise) and we learn to focus to thn aboutand to study our senses accordingly But "signal detection hardly exhauststhe range and possblity of sensory experience

Stll have signal detecton theory and socal exchange theory helped usunderstand control and even extend certain dmensons of our experience?Absolutely And provided that they are not seen as dentive they evenpovie he grouns for a cre of our sensory and social experence But

nsofar as they become prescrptive they narrow rather than expand ouroptions and there I beleve is the rub metaphor yes prescrpton no horographcal posscrp The intmate connection between culture and

psychology that s so obvous n metaphor - and instrumentally accomplishedn part hrogh metaphor (see MacCormac 1985 p ) - maes metaphor an



54 Da E. eary

extremely useful tool for the hsorian who wishes to study the impact ofculture upon psychological theory nd practice and the converse impact ofpsychology upon culture The lattr inuence results from the energizing andpopularizing that can begin within te domain of psychology as for instancewhen Freud helped mae awarenes - or the supposition - of sexual motives,dream symbols and various sorts of symptoms and defenses part of our

cultural heritage Although more srictly academic and scientic psychologyhas had less obvious inuence on lture at large, it has contributed to ourcultures sensitivity to the way i which our lives are "shaped by theenvironmental reinforcements hat we receive Indeed the entire HeadStart Program and much of the Pce Corps movement have been energizedby hopes and techniques derivd least in part from academic psychologyThe historical charting of this mtual inuence of psychology and culture,which is surely dialectic constituts one of the major challenges for historiansof psychology As this history is arted the old distinctions between intellectual, social, and cultural history wil become less and less useful, and metaphorwill be seen as one of the sinews that bind this history together

The degree of intimacy betwen cgnition and culture is reected in the titleof a recent boo that focuses on cultral models i rather than language andthought (Holland & Quinn 198) and it is clearly implicated in Geertzs(1983) call for an "ethnography o modern thought

4 Or what we can all more ml, the human imagination The modernambvalence toward the "imagnatin as a presumptive human faculty hasbeen well documented (see eg staLma 1988 Engell 1981 Gay, 1969pp 0815 ohnson 1987 Keaey 1988 SchulteSasse 1986- 1988)Even though science contributed i ome ways to a rediscovery of the imaginaton (see Rousseau 1969) it i nnetheless true that the imagination has

generally been considered to lac the methodological rigor and reliabilitydemanded by science and conqntially that the imagination is a facultyseldom encountered in modern traments of analogy in scence (Par et a!1984 p 87) However the imagiations fortunes seem to be changing (Inthis regard see all the wors prevosly cited in this note as well as Boulding,1956 chap 11 Hesse 1955 Holtn 1978 Koestler 1964 Ricoeur 1979) Ihope this trend continues An unebarrassed admission of the reality and roleof the human imagination seem to me to be perfectly in tune with thediscussions of "fact ction and ocast (Goodman 1954) "personal nowledge (Polanyi 1958) "plans· (Miller Galanter & Pribram, 1960) "foresight and understanding (Toulmin 1961) the logic of scientic discovery(Hanson 1961) conjectures and refutations (Popper 1963) "posits andreality (Quine, 1966) "paradigm (Kuhn 1970) "the thematic imaginationin science (Holton 1973) "ay of worldmaing (Goodman 1978) "theconstructon of reality (Arbb & Hesse 1986) "scence as creativeperceptioncommunication (Bohm & Peat 1987 chap ) "constructive realism (Giere 1988) and "imasti and analogical reasoning (Nersessian inpress) that from my perspectiv xpress the central thrusts and trajectories ofrcent and current musings abut the nature of nowledge and science It isnot only the poets pen that ies "shapes to "things unnown Thescientist too has an imagnation hat "bodies forth the forms of thngs un

nown and gives to them a locl habitaton and a name (Shaespeare,1598/1936 p 406) The scientis too s a "maer Indeed the modernscientist has demonstrated the wsome truth of Wallace Stevens's (1930-55/198) contention that "the imagintion is mans power over nature (p 179)



Psyhes muse 55

That I turn to poetry to express the heart of the matter is no accident AsSewell (1985) has argued the sooner the uneven dane between psychologyand poetry is rechoreographed the better and as Asch (1958 noted yearsago the study of metaphor could contrbute not only to "our nowledge ofcogntive functions but also to a lessenng of a gap that has too longcontinued between psychology and the humanities (p 94 Indeed psychology lie science more generally is one of the humanities - one of the majorproducts of the human magnation We should remember ponder, and actaccording to this fact ohn Dewey (1891/1969 in arguing that we mustbrdge ths gap of poetry from scence and thus "heal this unnatural woundsaid much the same thing "This division of life into prose and poetry orscience and the humanities is an unnatural divorce of the spirit (p 13)

In ths context t is symbolcally apt that Marx Wartofsy concludes hs tooneglected (1979 collection of papers on representation and the scienticunderstanding with an essay ttled Art as Humanzng Process (pp 357-69)If we can understand more fully how art humanizes us we can begn to fathomsome of the less commonly recognized ways in which science can contribute tothe expansion of human awareness understanding discrimination choice andaction

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2

From metaphors to modes:the use of anaogy n neuropsychoogy

K A R L H . P R B R A M

Man scintists fl uncomfortabl with th xplicit us of analog inthir work Brain scintists ar no xcption Th want to undrstandth rsults of thir xprimnts soll in trms of thos rsults This mab possibl whn data oncrn on lvl of inquir but it bcoms

infasibl whnvr an attmpt is mad to rlat svral lvls of nquiras in nuropscholog In such instancs som mtaphor analog ormodl oftn srvs as a usful tool for organizing th rlationships amongdata so that th rct th organization of data at adacnt lvls ofinquir

Brain scintists hav in fact rpatdl and fruitfull usd mtaphorsanalogis and modls in thir attmpts to undrstand thir data Ththm of this ssa is that oy b th propr us of analogical rasoningcan currnt limits of undrstanding b transcndd Furthrmor th

maor mtaphors usd in th brain scincs during this cntur hav bnprovdd b invntions that in turn wr producd b brains husth propr us of analogical rasoning sts in motion a lfrctivprocss b which mtaphoricall spaking brains com to undrstandthmslvs

Analogical rasoning in scinc tpicall bgins with mtaphors thatar onl loosl coupld to th data to b organizd and nds idall bfurnishing prcs modls of th t of thos data to th tp of organization suggstd b th original mtaphor This ssa provids xampls of

how ths procss has workd and s workng n th ld of nuropscholog Spcicall it rviws th inunc of mtaphors takn from

79



80 Karl Prbra

tlcommunications control sstms nginring computr scinc andholograph

First howvr a qualicatin i in ordr h kind of undrstandingoftn achivd b mtaphor - wt w might call xistntial undrstanding - is not th kind that is th goal of scinc Whn I listn to a

smphon or fl th intimacis f a rlationship or no a good mal Ixprinc a sns of tacit undstanding of th smphon th intrprsonal xprinc th food bfr m This sort of xistntial undrstanding can b nhancd b mtphor and complmntd b th studof musical form and of th ar a auditor nrvous sstm th analsisof th constraints and frdoms in intrprsonal rlationships and of thmotional and motivational maup of th prsons involvd or thcaloric contnt and constitunt cmposition of foods and thir mtabolism Such knowldg dos not dact from and ma vn nhanc ach

of th xistntial procsss dsrid It is clar howvr that xistntialundrstanding is ssntiall priv whras scintic undrstanding isssntall and minntl shaal

Onc w distinguish btwn istntial and scintic undrstandingw can s that skptics ar ind corrct in doubting our abilit toachiv an xistntial undrstaning of our own brains Brain tissu ispculiar bcaus in contrast to hr tissus it is largl insnsitiv toprobing vn b nurosurgons W cannot thrfor sns our brainsas such Onl th brains procsss ar accssibl to xprinc As an

xampl whn th somatosnor ara of th cortx is lctricall stimulatd a snsation of tingling in tos is producd whn th classicalmotor rgion is xcitd th os actuall mov In pilptic patintswhol trains of rmmbrd pincs can b licitd whn th cortxof th tmporal lobs of th bin is probd lctricall h patintnvr xclaims that h fls hi brin H simpl fls and that fling isrfrrd to thos parts of "him at mak nuronal connctions with thbrain tissu undr th prob (s Libt 966)

Yt although th brain appeas inaccssibl to xistntial undrstand

ing thr sm to b no barrirs o a scintic undrstanding As in othrscintic ndavors such undrstading coms from a propitious blnd ofth thr mods of rasoning at guid rsarch and provid somundrstanding of its rsults t duction of principls from data thdduction of logical rlationsis among principls and rasoning banalog which attmpts to pla th rlationships in a widr contxtThis ssa is concrnd chi ith rasoning b analog not onlbcaus it is most closl rlat to th thm of this volum but alsobcaus - as pointd out abov nd b C S Pirc (92) - innovation

stms almost xclusivl from th propr us of analog Induction sstmatizs th familiar dducti casts it into formal rlationships



Fro etaphors to oels 8

Rasoning b analog b contrast brings to bar on th familiar a nwprspctiv drivd from anothr ralm of inquir

Th us of analog has bn fruitful in nuropscholog from itsbginning Oftn th analogical thinking is implicit Somtims it is xplicit as whn th brain is compard to a tlphon switchboard or to thcntral procssing unit of a computr In ithr cas th analog providsa stp in th undrstanding of how th human brain functions

The impact of telecommunications

h contribution of tlcommunications to nuropscholog cam in thform of tchniqus for masuring th ow of signals Th contribution ofBll Laborators Claud Shannon and his collaborator Warrn Wavr isa landmark in th dvlopmnt of modrn thinking Shannon and Wavr

949) dvlopd a masur of signal pattrns in impulss of nrgtransmittd ovr a givn tim in a limitd communication channl using abinar Boolan algbra as a bas for tat masur Thus a bit (nardigi) of information was rst concivd as a unit indicating th matchbtwn th signal pattrns producd b a sndr and thos rcivd atth othr nd of th communication channl h masur of informationrlatd th numbr of possibl undrstandings (altrnativs) containd inth mssag to thos undrstood b th rcivr Whn th numbr ofaltrnativs or possibilitis (uncrtaintis) had bn rducd b half on

bit of information was said to hav bn transmittd Shannon andWavr notd that such a masur was rlatd to th ida of ntropEntrop masurs th disordr of a sstm h ida is takn from thrmodnamics whr it is usd to dscrib th fcinc (or infcinc) withwhich nrg is usd b a machin Masurs of ordr in th us ofnrg and in th ow of information promisd to ild intrsting rsultswhn applid to othr lds of inquir

But this lin of thinking ran into difcultis Shannon notd that thmasur of information dpnds on th uncrtaint (th numbr of

altrnativs) in a sstm For him th masurs of information andntrop wr positivl corrlatd - mor information implis gratrntrop Howvr othrs lik Brillouin 962) pointd out that anincras in th masur of information involvs uncrtaint rdcio andis thrfor mor appropriatl rlatd to th opposit of ntrop Thisviw has bcom prvalnt Information is now concivd as th masurof ordr and ntrop as th masur of disordr of a sstm

n th brain scincs th information masurmnt concpts bcamspciall powrful in th hands of Warrn McCulloch and his collabor

ators (s McCulloch 94). h dscribd th brain as an organ whrcommunication functiond both intrnall in th ntwork of nurons and



82 Karl H Pribra

as a means of providing the orde f external psychological) communications among individuals

The impact of these formulatons has been paradoxical On the onehand the idea has taken root ht a level of organization beyond that ofelectrical nerve impulses exists and can be dealt with in quantitative terms

as "information On the othe specic contributions of informationmeasures to the understanding f brain function or to psychology havebeen meager Ross Ashby 963 one of the foremost exponents ofinformation measurement thery has remarked that the strength of thetheory lies not in providing answes but in allowing the reformulation ofquestions in more precise terms

The concept of channel caiy is an example of the failure of information measurement theor t rovide specic answers while sharpening the framing of questions hs concept was devised to handle the

organization of energy pattern i xed channels of limited capacity. Butthis is an oversimplication in rin science because xed channels oflimited capacity do not exist n the brain Pribram 976) nor do theyoperate in personal communicatin in which the context of transactionsis continually inuenced by infration received Miller 953). Neurological and psychological systems perate within exible constraints thatshift expand and contract as they do for instance when attentionbecomes focused t is a commn mistake at present to attribute aprocessing limitations to restricte channel capacity see eg. Kahne

man 973) Although centralrainprocessing limitations are realBroadbent 974 Pribram 97 the idea of competency based oncontextual structuring Chosky 963 Pribram 977b Pribram &McGuinness 975) or chunin Garner 970 Miller 956 Simon974) is more productive.

The move from a concept of a restricted channel capacity to theconcept o a exible competenc capable o beng reprogrammed tomeet changing conditions heral a shift from viewing the brain as �telephonelike system to regardi it as computerlike. Before discussing

this shit we must clarify anothe ated problem plaguing the applicationof information measurement they.

The impact of cotol systems egieeig

Cybernetics "the science of inormation and control raises the newproblem. Intuitively we may ee hat the greater the amount f information available to a system the ore precisely that system can be controlled. owever since inorman can be dened as a measure o the

amount o uncertainty in a syste as suggested earlier) it would appearthat the more information there i in a system the harder that system isto control




The dfculty s resolvable Shannon n hs orgnal paper Shannon &Weaver 949) dstngushed between two types o nformaton The rstreduces uncertanty the second s concerned wth repettons In a telephone communcaton dsturbed by excessve nose the recever oftenshouts What dd you say? I cant hear you. Please repeat When thesender hears ths he or she repeats the message. The effect of repettonss to reduce nose and error whch s not the same as reducng theuncertanty contaned n the orgnal commucaton. Error reducton saccomplshed by repetton or redundancy rather than by changng thestructure of the communcaton Snce errorreducng sgnals were notan ntrnsc part o uncertantyreducng communcatons they were ofsecondary concern to Shannon and Weaver owever errorreducngsgnals are as we shall see the crtcal operators n control systems

The orgnal dea behnd cybernetc control systems s twofold ) The

current state of a system can be compared wth a desred state and 2)the current state can be brought closer to the desred state throughadjustments repettons) based on the magntude of an error sgnalthat denotes the dscrepancy between the current state and the desredstate The process of adjustment that reduces the error sgnal s callednegatve feedback

Norbert Wener n Cee 948) notes the relatonshp betweencybernetcs and the concept of homeostass omeostass descrbes themantenance of a constant nternal envronment n the body by com

pensatory mechansms brought nto play when shfts occur n chemcal orphyscal condtons Ths s an old concept developed orgnally by thephysologst Claude Bernard 858) and gven precson by Walter BCannon 932) Wener extended the concept of physologcal homeostass nto control systems engneerng The thermostat whch mantansa temperature wthn assgned lmts s an example of such a controlsystem.

The dea of physologcal homeostass played a role n the developmentof the more comprehensve deas of cybernetcs. The concept of negatve

feedback that developed out of control systems s n turn applcable toneurophysology. In a sense an engneerng dea that was n part basedon physologcal observatons returns to physology on a hgher levelNegatve feedback s currently nvoked to explan regulaton by the branof sensory nput from the external envronment Prbram 967) andthe ne tunng f muscle atvty Mller Galanter & Prbram 960Prbram 977b)

The rst evdence of negatve feedback n the operatons of the nervoussystem came from work on muscle spndles receptors n the muscles that

sgnal the degree of muscle stretch Kuer 953 Matthews 964).These muscle spndles are drectly controlled from the spnal cord andbran formng a loop that ensures smooth and coordnated movements



84 Karl Pribra

Feedback from the bran also egulates receptors of other sensorysystems. Sgnals orgnatng n the ban can alter the nput of sgnals fromtactle (agbarth & Kerr 954 udtory (Galambos 956) olfactory(Kerr & agbarth 955) and vual (Spnell & Prbram 966 Spnell& Wengarten 966) receptors assocaton areas of the bran whch

le adjacent to the somatosensr ortex are potental sources of thesesgnals that nuence sensory np (Lassonde Ptto & Prbram 98Retz & Prbram 969 Spnell Prbram 967).

Ths evdence of cenral conol over recepors revoluonzed he concept of the reex n neurophysoly and thus affected the pcture of thestmulus-response relatonshp tha had domnated psychology for decades (see Mller et al. 960) . No lnger could the organsm and ts branbe thought of as a passve swthboard on whch envronmental contngences mght play at wll A new actve mage of a selfsettng oeo

statcally controlled organsm ta searched for and selectvely acceptedenvronmental events replaced th old passve stmulus-response mage.Now nsead of responses elc by dscrete smul as n the oldphysology and psychology the esponse was seen as ntatng furthernervous system actvty that alte d future responses In bology thschange n thnkng ourshed t studes of anmal behavor known asethology. In psychology the cang was reected n an abandonment ofstmulus-response learnng thers n favor of the deas of operant condtonng and cogntve conceptualaton (Prbram 977b).

The thermostat embodes thee pncples The set pont of the thermostat deermnes the level a whch hanges n temperature wll be sensedby the system and regulates (stat and turns off) the operaton of thefurnace. The operaton of the uace depends on temperature changeswthn chosen lmts rather than a smple onff swtch omeostatcally controlled systems lke the thermostatcally controlled furnaceprovde a tremendous savng n ory load Von Foerster (96) calledths mechansm a "memory wtht ecord. There s no need to keeptrack of the vagares and varabls of the temperatures external to thesystem: The homeostatc system orates on the hottest summer days andn the coldest wnter months. Ol the devatons of temperature fromthe set pont need be sensed.

Cybernetcs attempted to coe the nsghts derved from telecommuncatons wth those derved fr servocontrol. As noted earler thscreated problems. Some of thee ere antcpated by Shannon (Shannon& Weaver 949) when he use t term "nformaton n two techncalsenses nether of whch corresponds to the popular sense. As we haveseen n one techncal sense nfoaton s a measure of the reducton ofthe number of alternatve chocs hat s of uncertanty. In the second

nformaton s a measure of th flure to reduce a dscrepancy betweentwo ongong processes. But the stncton goes even deeper. he rstmeasure speces chefly the comlexty of a process. It can be precsely




and quanttatvely stated n bts. The second measure s an error sgnalthat speces lttle or nothng about complexty but deals only wthdscrepancy and changes n dscrepancy Usually t s measured n contnuous analog terms snce t s nge that s of central concern. As

noted earler when dgtal measures are appled to ths second knd ofnformaton t s seen to be more akn to the concept of redundancy thanto the concept of nformaton It s ths redundant error sgnal that s thecrtcal component of homeostatc mechansms and s nvolved n thenegatve feedback process of cybernetc control systems

Error sgnals whch specfy changes n redundancy rather than nuncertanty provde the lnk between cybernetc concepts and nformaton measurement theory. Cybernetc systems use redundant error sgnalsto mantan stablty. They have lttle to do wth uncertanty or complexty. Bran systems that operate solely on homeostatc prncples aretechncally not nformatonprocessng systems n the sense of reducng orenhancng uncertanty. Informaton measurement theory s therefore notapplcable to nternal homeostass and external sensory processng unlessthe homeostatc prncple s supplemented n some way.

hse deas characterzed the bran and behavoral scences almosthree decades ago and are detaled n n n e Srre of Beor(Mller et al . 960) . Roger Brown (962) rghtly crtczed ths book forthe homeostatc cast t shares wth psychoanalytc theory (see Freud895/966) The noton of drves and habts n ullan stmulusresponse psychology (ull 943) and Sknners concept o the "condtonable operant (Sknner 938) share ths slant Even ethologcalformulatons of "elctng stmul and actonspecc energes areessentally modeled on the homeostatc prncple (nde, 954a, 960Lorenz 969 Tnbergen 95). But the capacty of homeostatc systemsto alter ther set ponts s mplct n all of these theores (Prbram & Gll976) Ths capacty was emphaszed by Waddngton (957) n hs conceptof homeorhess a ow toward an everchangng set pont rather than areturn to a statc stable one. omeorhetc systems are open, helcal,futureorented feedforward systems (as opposed to homeo systems, whch are closed loops), because the changes n set pont can beprogrammed In bologcal systems, prme eamples of helcal organzatons are the NAs that program development Engneers have developed nonbologcal programmable systems, the currently ubqutouscomputers.

The impact of compute science

Computers are nformatonprocessng devces that have been heraldedas harbngers of the second ndustral revoluton the revoluton n thecommuncaton o nformaton. Ths revoluton can be compared tothe communcatons revoluton that occurred at the dawn of hstory wth



86 Karl Prbr

the invention of writing or, earle, when linguistic communication amonghumans began The revolution dended lagely on stepwise seral processing espite prodigious spee, serial processing is considerably lessnimble than the brain's facility whch, as we shall see in the net sectionof this essay is based to a larg eent on parallel procedures carried out

simultaneously Nevertheless as model for brain activity, computerprogramming has produced thre decades of intense research (Anderson & Bower 973; Miller et a 960; Neisser, 967 Newell Shaw,& Simon, 958). More recenly, the eld of articial intelligence hasattempted to enhance computer capabilities by patterning computersafter natural intelligence (Schnk & Abelson, 977) or possible brainorganizations (Winograd, 977 What has generated such sweepingchanges in the way we view comunication and computation

Von Neumann (95/96) cnrbuted a major innovation by devising

a computational conguration tht could be programmed by a system oflists in which each item in a list ws preed by an address and sufed byan instruction to proceed to anter address. List programming was thendeveloped by Newell and Simo (56) to allow any item in any list to beaddressed by (follow) any othe it and in turn to address (precede) anyother item Items and lists of ms were thereby edowed with thecapacity to address themselves (on aer running through several otherlists) In the jargon of programmng this was called "recursiveness Asuring (97) pointed out selective programs endowed with recur

siveness can locate any item str in them and can associate any groupof items Such a netwok of lists i a far cry from the stimulus-responsetype of communication based o e model of the early simple telephoneconnection

Structures embodying lists o t sort necessary for program construction have been shown to eist e brain corte he cellular organization of the cerebral corte o t brain shows both a vertical and ahorizontal patterning here are rtical columns of cells perpendicularto the surface of the corte, i ich each cell responds to a differentaspect of sensory input from a smll group of receptor cells on the surfaceof the body - from a small area f the retina for eample he columnscan be thought of as lists contai items namely the cells (Edelman &Mountcastle 978 ubel & Wiesl 968) he horizontal organizationof the corte reects the arrangeent of receptors on the surface of thebody The somatosensory area he cerebral corte, which lies directlybehind the central ssure, recevs sensory signals from the body surfaceprojected in a pattern that mims tiny human gure, or "homunculusThe items (cells), therefore, also orm horizontal lists Interconnectionsbetween the cells in columns or aranged within a single horizontal layer

enable the brain to interpret movig sensory signals hus, some cells inthe vertical lists show sensitivi movement of the stimulus from one



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surface touch receptor to another. Movement in one directio cantrigger the brain cells, while movement in another has no effect, a ndinghat can be interpreed as suggesting a se of prexes and sufxes as invon Neumanns analysis (Pribram, 977b Werner, 970). n the visual

part of the cortex, each cell (item) in the cortical column (list) appearsto be endowed wth such prexes and sufxes. Most of these cells respond selectively to movement, direction, and even velocity changes(Pribram, Lassonde & Ptito 98) which suggests a richer, more nelygrained network of connection than is present in the somatosensorysystem.

Characterization of cortical cells of the brain as similar to items in aprogram list is often described as featue aalys since each item represents one feature of a sensory input. n fact, the prevailing school ofneurophysiological thinking currently favors the view that these cells arefeature detectors (Barlow, 972), that is, that each brain cell is uniquelyresponsive to one - and only one - feature. A competing view is that eachcell has multiple selectivities and that its output is not unique to any onetpe of stmulus, as would be required of a feature detector. n the visualcortex, for example, a cell may select on the basis of the orientation oflines, their width and spacings, luminance, color, the direction of movement, the velocity of movement, and even the frequency of auditorytones.

t appears, therefore, that each cortical cell is a member of an associative network of cells (perhaps a set of list structures, as the evidencenoted above would suggest) rather than a singlefeature detector. Featureanalysis must therefore be a function of the entire network of cells that isaddressed by the total pattern of sensory input The brain thus differsfrom current computers in that the initial stages of processing occursimultaneously, that is, in parallel rather than serially Feature analysis,therefore, results from pattern matching rather than from singlefeaturedetection To return to an earlier analogy, the thermostat is a primitivepatternmatching device that selects deviations from a set point t thus

reduces the memory load that would otherwise be required to detectthe occasion of every new temperature that required a response Anassociation of homeostatic devices, hat is, columns of brain cells, thuscan serve as a patternmatching device that selects features from thesensory input

Even the concept of list structures of homeostatic devices does notsolve al the problems raised by viewing the brain as an associativenetwork of cells Ashby (960) noted that such associative networks tendto e hyperstble ad thus intolerably slow to modify they seem to be

unable to learn To paraphrase Lashley (950), even though one may bedriven at times to consider such a model in the classroom, it should notbe forgotten that one of the brais distinguishing features is its capacity



88 Karl Prbram

to learn Two choces are open t the model bulder The evdence forhomeostatc organzaton o the ban can be gnored, as Edelman andMountcastle (978) have done ter proposal for a "degeneratve (amanytoone mappng) model n hch feedback becomes a secondaryrather than a prmary consttuet r, as Ashby (960) and Mller et al

(960) have done, one can start wt an assocatve net made up prmarlyof homeostatc elements and dd constrants (Prbram, 977b) Theseconstrants are based on nvarn ropertes o the stmulus The structures wthn the bran that recognze nvarant stmul or test-operatetest-ext unts (TOTES, as Mlle, Galanter, & Prbram call them) cutthe assocatve net nto peces (to raphrase Ashby) and can be shown tobe organzed herarchcally (Gelfnd, Gurnkel, Tsetln, & Shk, 97Mller et al , 960 Prbram, 7 Turvey, 97) A denton o thenvarant propertes, or feature, of stmul now becomes crtcal. Tur

vey (97) and Gbson (979) desbe such propertes as localzed n theenvronment of the organsm, whle natvsts (eg , Chomsky, 972) descrbe them as selected by the nsm n the face of an envronmentalcornucopa.

mu m suu u suss termedate stance n a compute the selecton of a workable programdepends on a good ft, a matc between nput and central processor.The brans central processor may be consdered to have becomeadapted durng evoluton to an eclogcal nche and t should be possble

to determne the nvarant proetes (features) of that nche that haveeffected the adaptaton. But wth s general purpose a computer as thehuman bran the responsble evronmental features may be as dfcultto delmt as the speccatons of the adaptng mechansms of the branthat are concerned wth dentfg these nvarances

The impact of holography {(,arallel distributed processing)

Mechansms of extractng nvarnces (features) from sensory nput

have been of consderable nteet to neuroscentsts and psychologstsAs we have seen, a bran cell ornzaton based on an assocatve netwth herarchc constrants can sre as a useful model Certan problemsexst wth ths model There s, r example, the need to postulate ananalytc mechansm that s relatv sparng n ts use of neurons so thatnvarance can be detected wtho nvokng a "one neuroone fetureequvalency A successful model must also explan the speed and mmedacy wth whch percepton crs and ts hgh resolvng power (seeGbson, 979).

storcally, three sorts of asrs have been gven to the questonrased At one extreme s the feture detector, or one neuron-onefeature answer, whch (as ust od) s ntenabe n the lht of current



Frm metaphrs t mels 8

neurological evidence. This model can also be faulted on the basis ofbehavioral evidence (Rock, 970) At the other extreme is the modelproposed by Wolfgang Khler (Khler & eld 949) to account for thedistortions of physically measured stimulation found in illusions Khler

emphasized the congurational aspects of perception and suggested thatdirect current (C) elds result when sensory input arrives in corticaltissue. The low resolving power of the C elds casts doubt on theefcacy of such machinery and its capacity to account for texture perception. A series of experiments was therefore set up to test the issuesinvolved. The results of these experiments were as follows () C shiftsdid accompany the desynchronization of the cortical electrical record(EEG) nduced by sensory (visual and auditory) stimulation (2) disruption of C electrical activity by epileptogenic agents placed on, or injected into, the cortex failed to impair pattern perception and (3) suchdisruption did impair learning. Subsequently, it was shown that imposinga cathodal (negative) C polarization across the cortex would slow learning, whereas imposing anodal (positive) C polarization would speedlearning (Stamm & Rosen 973). In short, C shifts in the cortex biaslearning, not perception, and are thus unlikely candidates for the criticalmachinery of pattern perception.

Between the extremes of the one neuron-one feature (usually referred to as the "pontical or grandfather cell dogma) and the Celd theory, a pair of more moderate views has been proposed Each of

these stems from one of the extreme positions Neurophysiologist oraceBarlow (972) has suggested that the idea of one neuron-one featurebe dropped in favor of a set of cells that together can recognize a feature.This proposal is little different from that made by psychologist onaldebb (949), who suggested that a cel assemby becomes constituted inresponse to sensory input. In these proposals one neuron-one featureis replaced by "one cell assembly-one feature. Barlow's and ebb'sproposals differ in that Barlows cell assembly has a relatively xed rangeof sensitivities - propensities to respond whereas ebbs phase

sequenced cell assemblies vary with respect to their constituent neuronsand change with experience.

A quite different point of view was offered by Karl Lashley (942) inhis proposal that waves of activity are generated in the cortex by sensoryinput and that these waves interact to produce interference pattesLashley, however, did not develop his suggestion at either the neuronalor the perceptual level. e was attracted by the possibility suggested byGoldscheider (906) at the turn of the centu that the brain's organization of the perceptual eld might display some of the same characteristics

as the organization of embryonic developments. (Lashley was a zoologistby training.)In several essays I have developed in detail the "interference pattern



0 Kar rbram

model for bran functon (Prbr, 966, 977b Prbram, Nuwer, &Baron, 974). At the neurona lvel the model nterprets electrcalchanges n the cell membrane of neurons on the far sde of synapses(or nterneuronal unctons) as ontutng wave fronts. These electrcalchanges known as "hyperpolarzons and depolarzatons, are not

themselves nerve mpulses. epolzatons ncrease the lkelhood that aneuron wll ncrease ts generato of nerve mpulses hyperpolarzatonsdecrease ths lkelhood My proposal s somewhat smlar to that made nquantum physcs, where the wv equaton s treated as a vector basedon the probablty of occurrenc o quantal events. The neural "quantalevents are those hyperpolarzatns and depolarzatons that, taken as apattern occurrng n an area of te cortex, can be descrbed n terms ofnodes created by renforcement and extncton among nterferng mcrowave forms These patterns f polarzaton form a mcroprocess of

uctuatng polarzatons. Molecuar storage, perhaps n the form of aconformatonal change n the prons of the cell membranes at neurontoneuron synapses, s assumed to result from repettons of partcularpatterns n the neuroprocess (Pram, 977b Prbram et al , 974).

At the perceptual level, the odel mples that sensory nput becomesencoded n synaptc membranes b hese mcroprocesses n such a fashonthat mage reconstructon can be eadly accomplshed hs can be doneby storng the Fourer or smlar tnsform (see later n ths secton) of asensory sgnal, whch nvolves orng the coefcents that represent the

nterference nodes of the mcropocess (Prbram, 988 Prbram et al.,974), raher han represenn t by smple ponopon nensvedmensons In order to read out an mage from such a store, all that snecessary s to nvoke the nverse ransform to restore an mage.

Over the past century evden as been accumulatng that such harmonc analyss of the neural prcess entaled n sensory processng svald Ohm (of Ohm's law) sugted n 843 that the audtory systemoperates as a frequency analyzer prhaps accordng to Fourer prncples.Fourer theory states that ny patern, no matter how complex, can beseparaed nto a set of componnt egular waves of dfferent frequences,ampltudes, and relatons to another elmholtz (857/97) developed Ohm's suggeston by a sees of experments that provded evdence that such separaton takes place n the cochlea, the part of thenner ear where the sound reetrs are located. elmholtz proposedthat the cochlea operates much lke a pano keyboard, a proposal thatwas subsequently moded by Grg von Bekesy (960), who demonstrated that the cochlea resembl more closely a strnged nstrumentbrought o vbrate a specc freqnces. Nodes of ectaon developngn the vbratng surface (the stn) accounted for the panokeyboardlke qualtes descrbed by elmhotz.

Bekesy further developed hs del by actually constructng a surface



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bearng ve vbrators, whch he placed on the forearm of a subject. Theperods of vbraton of the ve vbrators could be adjusted so that the veshowed a varety of phase relatonshps to one another. The phase relatonshp could be adjusted so that a sngle pont of tactle exctaton was

perceved (Bekesy, 967). It was then shown that the cortcal responseevoked by such vbratons was also located n a sngle area: The patternevoked resembled the perceptual response n ts sngleness rather thanthe multplcty of the physcal stmul (ewson, 964). Somewhere between skn and cortex, nhbtory (hyperpolarzng) nteractons amongneurons had produced a transformaton.

Bekesy went on to show that by applyng two such vbratorbearngsurfaces, one to each forearm and once agan makng the approprateadjustments of phase, the subject could be made to experence the pont

source alternately on one arm then on the other, untl, after somecontnued exposure, the source of stmulaton was projected outward ntospace between the two arms. Bekesy noted that we ordnarly projectour somatosensory experence to the end of wrtng and surgcal nstruments. The novelty n hs experments was the lack of sold physcalcontnuty between the perceved source and the actual physcal source.Stereophonc hghdelty musc systems are based on a smlar prncpleBy approprate phase adjustment, the sound s projected to a locatonbetween and forward of the acoustcal speakers, away from the physcal

source of orgn.Over the past two decades, t has been shown that the vsual systemoperates along smlar prncples n ts processng of spatal patterns. In anelegant seres of experments, Fergus Campbell (974) and ohn Robson(975) found anomalous responses to sets of gratngs (sets of lnes orbars) of varous wdths and spacngs. The anomales were reconcledwhen t was realzed that the wdths and spacngs of the bars could betreated as havng a frequency of alternaton over space - that s, the wdthof bars and the dstance between them formed a pattern that, when

scanned, showed a frequency n the change from bar to spacng Theanomalous results were obtaned when these spatal frequencesformed harmoncs.

Then t was shown that certan cells n the vsual cortex encode suchspatal frequences' (e Valos, Albrecht, & Thorell, 977 Movshon,Thompson, & Tolhurst, 978 Pollen & Taylor, 974 Schller, Fnlay, &Volman 976). Mos tellng are he resuts of experments ptng thestandard neurophysologcal hypothess that these cortcal cells are lne(bar or edge) detectors aganst e hypothess that they are selectve ofone or another bandwdth of spatal frequency. e Valos and hs colleagues showed that cortcal cells were nsenstve to bar wdth and thatwhen the bars were crossed wth others n a patten such as a plad theresponse of the cortcal cells changed to reect the total pattern. Spec



2 Karl Prbram

cally, each cortcal cell was shown to be selectvely senstve to lnes(gratngs) orented n a partcula drecton, a ndng that had beennstrumental n generatng th eature detector proposal (ubel &Wesel, 959). If the cells were opeatng as feature detectors, addtonsto the ntal dsplay pattern of les should not alter the orentaton n

whch the dsplay has to be shown order to match the selectvty of thecell Addtonal lnes n the patt would be processed by addtonalunts whose orentaton matched tt of the addtonal lnes If, however,the total pattern of the plad w beng processed by the bran cell, theorentaton of the whole patter uld have to be altered to match theorentaton of the major componets of the Fourer (e., spatal frequency) transform of the patter. e Valos performed a Fourer transform by computer on each plad dsplayed. Such transforms showed radat varous angles from the orgnal perpendcular pattern of the plad. e

Valos found that all plad dspla patterns had to be rotated to brngthese rad nto lne wth the specal electvty for orentaton of the brancells. Furthermore, the rotaton wa eactly that (to the degree and themnute of vsual arc) predcted by he proposal that the Fourer ransformof the total plad (and not ts sprae lne) s encoded

There thus remans lttle doubt hat descrptons n terms of harmoncanalyss are vald models of the pressng of sensory stmul n audton,touch, and vson Such descrptons can also be compared to mageformaton n the processng devce alled holograms. olograms were so

named by ther nventor, enn bor (948), because each part of thehologram s representatve of the ole In a hologram each quantum oflght acts much lke a pebble thrown nto a pond The rpples from onepebble spread over the entre ce of the pond. (The mathematcalexpresson for ths s, n fact, calle a spread functon, and the Fourertransform s a prme example f sch a functon.) If there are severalseparate pebbles, the rpples proded by one pebble wll orgnate n adfferent locaton than those producd by another pebble. The rpples wllntersect and form nterference pterns, wth nodes where the rpples

add, and snks where they cancl. If "rpples are produced by lghtfallng on lm (nstead of pebbles allng nto water), the nodes can becaptured as reductons of slver grns on the lm Note that the nformaton from the mpact of each pble or lght ray s spread over therecordng surface thus, eac otio of that surface can be seen asencodng the whole And as noted earler, performng the nverse Fourertransform reconstructs the mage f the orgn of that nformaton. Thus,the whole becomes enfolded n ech porton of the hologram snce eachporton contans the spread f nformaton over the entre mage

The prncple of the hologram s fferent from the earler Gestalt vewthat wholes develop propertes dton to the sum of ther parts. Thepropertes of holograms are expresed by the prncple that the whole s



Frm metaphrs t mels

contaned or enfolded n ts parts, and the very noton of "parts saltered, because parts of a hologram do not have what we thnk of asboundares.

The followng propertes of holograms are mportant for bran functon:

() the dstrbuton and parallel contentaddressable processng of nformaton - a characterstc that can account for the falure of branlesons to eradcate any specc memory trace (or engram); (2) thetremendous storage capacty of the holographc doman and the ease wthwhch nformaton can be retreved (the entre contents of the Lbrary ofCongress can currently be stored on holosche, or mcrolm recorded nholographc form, takng up no more space than s contaned n anattach case); (3) the capacty for assocatve recall that s nherent n theparallel srbuted processng o holograms because o he couplng oseparate nputs and ( 4) the provson by ths couplng of a powerfultechnque for correlatng (crosscorrelatons and autocorrelatons areaccomplshed almost nstantaneously).

It s mportant to realze that holography s a mathematcal nventonand that ts realzaton n optcal systems through the use of laser beams sonly one product of ths branch of mathematcs. Fourer transforms alsoplay a role n modern computer technology as n the parallel dstrbutedprocessng algorthms of neural network smulatons of cogntve processng (Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PP Research Group, 986), nXray tomography, and (as demonstrated by the evdence descrbedearler n understandng he resuls obtaned n experments on branfuncton

Let us return for a moment to the classes of neural models that havebeen proposed for percepton. Recall that the holographc model (.e., ofnterference pattern processng of Fourer coefcents) was derved fromdssatsfacton wth both the "feature detector and cell assemblytheores. John (967 and Uttal (978 have also developed sophstcatedstatstcal correlaton models, whch dffer from the holographc model,however, n that they do not rely prmarly on harmonc analyss of

bran functon. The most efcent manner of achevng statstcal correlatons s to transform the data (the sensory nput, n the case of thenervous system) nto the Fourer doman. There s thus a convergence ofthe statstcal and harmonc models when they are followed to therlogcal and neurologcal concluson Nerve mpulses arrvng at synaptcjunctons are converted to postsynaptc depolarzatons and hyperpolarzatons, whch can best be descrbed as Fourer transforms of thosempulses Repettons of mpulse patterns result n nformaton storage ofas yet undetermned nature, possbly alteratons n the cell membranes of

neurons Subsequent sensory stmul are crosscorrelated wth the storedresdual from former nputs, and the nverse transform of the results ofthe correlaton form our perceptons. The perceptons are then projected





Frm metphrs t mels

the lttle man or woman n the head? Who s the I, the "self, thatexperences the results of the holographc process?

To try to answer ths queston one must rst ask what t s that s bengobserved. The assumpton has been that an somorphsm (dentcal form)

exsts between a sensory percepton and some physcal "realty (Khler& eld, 949). But as the Bekesy experment wth multple vbratorsmakes clear, physcal realty and perceptual realty may dffer substantally. The sensory apparatus appears to be lenslke as t focuses an nput,but the focusng produces an mage that s decomposed by subsequentneural actvty nto the Fourer transform doman - that s, nto a dstrbuted holographc form. In vew of the nvertblty o ige in �g n, one may ask n what form the nput to the sensesarrves Is ths nput holographc, and does t become organzed nto

mages (thereby revealng the objects of whch the mages are formed)only by the lenslke capabltes of our senses?Ths vew s probably too extreme. The only way we can answer these

questons s through the evdence of the senses and the nstrumentsdevsed to augment them. Ths evdence suggests an ordnary level ofrealty to whch the senses have become adapted through evoluton.Ordnary realty s the realty of Newton's mechancs and Eucld'sgeometry. t s grsped through consenual valdaton - by brnng tbear the several senses and nerrng a realt that partakes of them all.We see a moon n the sky and send a man to palpate t. We bump ntounseen obstacles and nvent radar and sonar to dscover them. As nfants,we hear our mother, and ee and touch them. At another level, smelland taste are based on our perceptons of dssolved molecules - a chemcal level of an unseen, unheard, and untouched realty.

More recently, physcsts have probed ever smaller components andhave taken a new look at the evdence about a spatally dstant realtypresumably palpable but beyond our reach. The evdence about thsmacrounverse comes to us by way of the very same electromagnetccomponents that make up the mcrounverse. It should come as no great

surprse, therefore, that the laws that relate to us the naure of themacrounverse, such as the specal and general laws of relatvty, andthose that relate the nature of the mcrounverse, that s, quantum andnuclear mechancs, provde a somewhat smlar concepton of realty. Thsrealty, hghly mathematcal n nature, departs consderably from ordnary sensory experence.

avd Bohm (97, 973) has noted that, although the mathematcs ofrelatvty and of quantum theor are thoroughl worked out, the conceptual representaton of what that mathematcs mght mean has lagged

serously. e has suggested that ths lag s caused by our propensty touse lens systems to construct our conceptual realty. e proposed that thehologram mght provde a better conceptual model for nderstandng



6 K Pb

both the macrounverse and mrverse s proposal stres a responsve chord n the neuroscentst o has also found a level of organzaton n the nevous system that s more approprately modeled by hehologram than by the senses ( .. , lnses) After all, the bran s a part ofphyscal realty.

What are the characterstcs o ths holographle order of realtyFrst, t does not correspond to ee percepton and s ths counterntutve Second, ths order, whch Bm calls mplcate to dstngush tfrom the ordnary explcate senry order, s nonobjectve. he objectve explcate order s made up of te mages by whch we know objects.These mages are constructed b lses: the lenses and lensle characterstcs of ou senses as well as the lses, often called objectves, of ourmcroscopes and telescopes. B ntrast, the holographle mplcatenonobjectve realty s not compsd of thngs but of quantally const

tuted mcrowaves and ther ntrcve consttuents such as constructve(nodal) and destructve nterfernes. Lebnz (74/973) descrbed sucha realty n hs Moadology n whc the whole unverse was representedn each monad, a wndowless porto of the whole. Substtute lensless forwndowless, and the monad bes hologrphc.

Fnally, n the realty descrbed n ths doman, the ordnary dmensonaltes of space and tme beme enfolded (mplcated). Thus adfferent set of dmensons mus be nvoed n order to specfy ts characterstcs. Tme and space can b ead out, but the readout may show

peculartes such as the compleeary nature of measures of locaton nspace and of moment (momentu) so that n specfyng one, the otherbecomes elusve Partcles, r ather events, n ths mcrounverseappear to nuence one another stuatons where a causal connectonbetween them cannot be traced see d'Espagnat, 97). An mplcateorder composed of the probabltes of uctuatons n nterference nodes,related by ther wave equatons s proposed to account for the peculartes resultng from observatons of the mcrounverse. The mplcateorder s therefore not statc, and lographc s a somewhat nappropr

ate term. A hologram s only a frozn record of an everchangng scene.The term holonomc, used n physcs to descrbe lnear dynamcalprocesses, would be preferable Pram, 977a).

The fact that the holonomc mplate order s wthou boundares, thatevery part enfolds or contans the hole , and that therefore the dstncton between observer and oberv s blurred so that observatons nolonger result n objects (.e., obserbles) has led some physcsts to notethe ntrnsc nteweavng of percepton and conscousness on the onehand and macrophyscal and mcrohyscal realty on the other. Thus,Bohm ncludes an appendx ttled ercepton n hs boo The SecialTheo of elatii (965), and gner (967) exclams that modernphyscs deals wth "relatons aog observatons, not among observables. An observable s chaacterd by nvarance across observatons



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n hs famous prncple esenberg ( 930/984) ponted out that, n mcrophyscs, the observed vares wth the nstrumentaton of the observer.Bohr (928/985) enuncated hs prncple of complementarty on thesame gronds. And, of course, Ensten (97/96) made the same pont

wth regard to the macrounverse n hs general theory of relatvty.Ths enfoldment of observaton nto the observable has led some physcsts and some phlosophers (e.g, Whtehead, 938) nto a panpsychsmn whch conscousness s a unversal attrbute rather than an emergentproperty of bran organzaton. Such vews have nterestng consequencesfor the analyss of the mnd-bran ssue (Prbram, 979, 986), brngngthe concept of conscousness closer to that enuncated n the Easternmystcal tradton and the sprtual relgous vews of the West hus,Capra (975) can proclam a Tao of Physcs n whch the detals ofmodern macrophyscs and mcrophyscs are matched to those of themystcal tradton Scence of ths sort appears far removed from theobjectve operatonsm of the postvst and crtcal phlosophers ofthe Venna crcle (eg. Carnap, 939 Fegl, 954) and of lkemndedpsychologsts (e g , ull, 943 Sknner, 938).

Summing up: how human beings go aboutundestanding hemseves

It s ncredble to thnk that the major mpacts on neuropsychology and

the bran scences that we have revewed have occurred n less than half acentury. Of course, the modes of thought that made these advancespossble could be traced much further back n tme, but enough hstoryhas been covered to allow a return to the ssue rased at the begnnngof ths essay If you wll recall, I sad that I would revew the mpact ofcertan modes of thought, whch had been stmulated by several newnventons, n an attempt to trace the manner n whch human brans goabout understandng themselves. I also foreshadowed my thess, statngthat reasonng by analogy s one of the most powerful tools for nnovatve

thought and scentc progress The subsequent hstorcal revew of majordevelopments n neuropsychology should have provded ample llustraton of ths clam, even for the most ntractable skeptc. Now I want torevew ths thess.

I nd t useful to dstngush between er (the larger concern ofths volume), ng (a way of reasonng about metaphor), and e(a precse couplng of an organzaton of data to another mode of organzaton such as a mathematcal formulaton) It seems to me that thehstorcal epsodes I have just recounted show () how a group of n

vestgators can begn wth a general metaphor a broad and somewhatundened sense of the smlartes beween wo thngs (n our casesbetween some newly nvented technologcal devce or concept and someaspec of bran funcon), (2) how the can rm hs metaphor no



more and more precse shape, prmarly through reasonng by analogyback and forth between the two ngs beng compared and (3) how,once they have gone far enoug, te orgnal metaphor s transformednto a precse scentc model, a thretcal framework that can be sharedwth and tested by the larger scetc communty. I submt that my hsto

rcal account of developments n e bran scences over the past halfcentury shows that ths smple hee s a straghtforward and accurateway of tracng the maner n whh uman brans have gone abot nderstandng themselves

So, n sum, metaphorcal nsht, reasoned analogy, and emprcalmodelng are woven together n he fabrc of scentc nnovaton, n the"hard areas of psychology as n t "soft areas. I have emphaszed theprocess of proper analogcal esonng - the process leadng frommetaphor to model - because, lough metaphorcal nsght s funda

mental, t wll not get us far n acevng scentc understandng unlesswe subject t to the sort of susta reasonng by analogy that has beenlustrated throughout ths essay

Lookng to the future, there s o reason to expect that the sort ofreasonng by analogy that has wroht current scentc understandng nneuropsychology wl cease. New evelopments, techncal and theoretcal, n engneerng, chemstry, ntrpersonal psychology, and other yetunspeced domans, wll contnu o crossfertlze the bran scences -leadng from vague but pregnat metaphors to more precse and test

able models - provded that scentsts contnue to reason, carefully, byanalogy.

Acknowedgment

hs chapter s based largely o (980) artcle n aedal, journalof the Amercan Academy of Ars nd Scences. I am grateful to aedal for permsson to reproduce extnsve portons of ths artcle.

Nte1 once oed he oblem of ecfng he elaonh beween nfomao

meauement and the contol of tm to Nobet Wene Waen Mculloch Don Mackay and oth cytcan. Aft mny hou of dcuoneveyone ageed that t wa ndeed a ot elexng ue that had at that tmeno dect anwe.

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3

Inner feeins, ·works of he esh,he beas ihin, iseases of he min,rivin force, a puin on a sho

six meaphors of emoion anheir heoreca exensions

A M S R A E RI L L

Probably no area of psycholoy marked by more poetc and vvdmetaphors than s the area of eoton. A person who s fearful s ayellowbelled "llylvered anthearted spneless "chcken -wth "cold feet no less. A perso s "blue when sad "whte when

fearul and red when angry. Le may blnd you hope wll cloudyour vson and anger can prevt you from seeng straght f gref"weghs you down hope wll "boy you up You may be "full ofgrattude burstng wth oy plodng wth anger "swelled wthprde but dsappontment can let the ar out of your sals and desparmay "crush you Prde "strus ke a peacock you are happy "as alark and when humbled you eat crow. Love can "consume youand ealousy can eat your heart ot. When sad you are "down at themouth when happy you ar oatng on ar. Ths s only a small

sample of the lterally hundred of metaphors of emoton found n colloqual Englsh. Why are such metahors so common And what nuencef any do they have on the w we conceptualze and nvestgate theemotons n a scentc context

Before we can start to answer hese questons a few dstnctons mustbe made n the above examples the emotons (fear anger love etc)ae the tgts of metaphor wheras some other aspects of experence(anatomcal structure spatal drton color etc.) provde the sucThe source presumably helps o larfy the meanng and sgncance of

the target.Accordng to Lakoff and Johs (980) aspects of experence that are

poorly delneated are especally lly to become the targets of metaphor.

04



ix p 05

Examples nclude physcal obects that lack clear boundares or orentaton abstract concepts such as tme many socal practces and mentalactvtes - especally the emotns.

Lakoff and ohnson are undoubtedly correct but ther comments do

not explan why the emotons are so frequently the target of metaphorFor one thng many emotonal syndromes are relatvely well delneated(eg. an angry person s seldom confused by a lack of structure; seeAverll 982). For another thng emotons often serve as the source aswell as the target of metaphor. Consder the followng examples The skythreatened the storm unleashed ts "fury the "erce wnd swrledthe young tree stood "deantly aganst the onslaught eventually thestorm exhausted tself the sky "blushed n "shame as the sun sankbelow the horzon the next day dawned brght and cheerul; themrthful brook babbled merrly on ts way; the branches of the treesntertwned n "fond embrace the hlls stood humble aganst the skyall the world seemed calm and "peaceful only the lttle ower bent tshead forlorny ts stem broken by the "cruel storm

The ascrpton of human emotons to nanmate obects s so commonthat t has even been gven a formal name n logc the "pathetcfallacy. Even more common s the ascrpton of human emotons toanmals. Eagles are "proud lons "courageous deer tmd cowscontented doves peaceful and so forth.

The eghteenthcentury theorst Gambattsta Vco (744/948) saw nthe pathetc fallacy (although he dd not call t such) the orgns of cvlsocety. Vco used fear of thunder as a paradgm of hs thess. As earlyhumans ed to caves to escape the thunder they understod ntutvelythrough look and gesture that they all feared the same thng. Ther fearprovded common ground a sensory topc (to use Vco's term) whchgave meanng to events. But what exactly was t that they feared Thethunder posed no mmedate danger nor was there anythng specc tobe done These early people's fear ponted beyond the thunder to someunknown cause and accordng to Vco when people are gnorant of

natural causes they tend to mbue nature wth human attrbutes. Forexample thunder may be attrbuted to the anger of some god. n thsway through the metaphorcal extenson of shared feelngs to nanmateobects mythologes supposedly were brn as ultmately were morehghly developed forms of socal organzaton.

am not concerned here wth the accuracy of Vco's account as a bt ofpsychoarchaeology. For our purposes t sufces to note that feelngs andemotons often serve as the souce as wel as the target metaphoaanalyses. n fact the same terms can serve both functons dependng on

the context as n the followng examples "The storm unleashed ts furyand s fury was lke a storm. n the rst nstance fury helps clarfythe nature of storm n the second nstance the reverse s true. Ths



J v

double duty helps explan th quency o emotonal metaphors. Butt s stll not the entre story.

Metaphors serve two man untons beyond mere descrpton or elaboraton. Those unctons are exanaton and evaluaton. Elntometaphors are concerned prmy wth the transer o knowledge rom

the target to the source doma lut metaphors by contrast arentended to convey an atttude o mood. Phenomena that call or bothexplanaton and evaluaton are specally lkely to become a source and/or target o metaphor.

At the core o any emoton s n evaluatve udgment. For someoneto be angry rghtened sad n lve dsgusted proud and so orthrequres that the stuaton be ealted n a certan way - as good or badas benecal or harmul as u unust as beautul or ugly and soorth. Because o ths emotos re a rch source o evaluatve meta

phors. owever the emotons a also the obect o value udgmentsand hence the target o evaluate etaphors. Consder or example thecharacterzaton o emotons a dseases o the mnd. As we shall seeshortly ths s one o the maor meaphors o emoton hstorcally speakng. t h an explntory unct (e.g. eotons can dturb orderlythought processes ust as dsees can dsturb orderly physologcal processes) . owever the metaphr s also clearly evaluatve. Emotons areunhealthy.

Unortunately t s not alway easy to dstngush explanatory rom

evaluatve uses o a metaphor d when the two are conused valueudgments may masquerade as ctve explanatons. wll argue belowthat ths has been - and contnus to be - a partcularly vexng problemor theory and research n the psyhology o emoton.

n the dscusson thus ar he reader may have noted two ratherdstnct uses o the concept o eon. These uses must be made explctor they plague nearly every dsusson o ths topc n one senseemoton s used as a generc t or such specc states as anger eargre love and so orth. n t scond sense t s used to reer to the

broad and duse matrx o epeence out o whch more delneatedthoughts and eelngs arse. Th scond usage s llustrated by Prbram's(980) contenton that "only logc s lmted the world o emoton andpractce s lmtless (p. 9). Pbam goes on to dstngush emotonal("tact exstental) undestdng rom scentc understandngWhen lsten to a symphony eel the ntmaces o a relatonshp orenoy a good meal experenc a sense o tact understandng . . . t sclear however that exstental uerstandng s essentally prvate whlescentc understandng s essetay and emnently shareable (p 0).

Prbram's use o "emoton n s context s qute common and understandable ndeed our langua s replete wth useul concepts that seemqute "lmtless n reerence T ncludes not only psychologcal concepts such as "emoton and "actce (n Prbram's sense), but also



x p n

such physcal concepts as thng and happenng. Such concepts do notlend themselves well to logc or scentc understandng. owever thss not because they are too prvate or unshareable as Prbram mples;rather t s because ther referents can vary wdely dependng on the

context.n any case am concerned n ths chapter prmarly wth the rstsense of emoton descrbed above; that s wth "emoton as a genercem e ass psyga sates at ncudes anger ear andso on wll proceed as follows Frst wll examne the hstorcal orgnsof some of the maor metaphors of emoton Next wll explore thenuence of these metaphors on ve contemporary approaches to thestudy of emoton namely phenomenologcal psychophysologcal ethologcal psychodynamc and drve theores Fnally wll ntroduce yetanother metaphor - emotons as socal roles - and explore some of tsmplcatons

Metaphors of emotion historica perspective

Not all metaphors are ntroduced conscously nor are ther meanngstransparent To take a rather mundane example the French word forhead tt derves from the (late) Latn tst meanng earthen pot orurn Smlarly the German word for head Ko derves from the

Latn cu (a tub or cask) whch n Englsh has become cup. Themetaphorcal relatonshp between head and vessel s obvous n theseetymologes athough t need never have been ntroduced conscousy orexplctly nto the language When metaphors evolve wthn the vernacular ther orgns are frequently dfcult to recognze and when theyembody serously held belefs (not supercal resemblances as n theexample of the head as a vessel) they may exert consderable nuenceon the drecton of thought

Many metaphors of emoton have become so deeply embedded n our

ordnary language that ther metaphorcal connotatons often go unrecognzed Yet as wll argue later those connotatons have exerted andcontnue to exert consderable nuence on the way we thnk about theemotons Therefore wll begn ths analyss wth a bt of hstory andetymology

The term emoton s tself based on metaphor t stems from theLatn mo whch orgnally meant to move out "to mgrate ap an bec Meaphorcally t was sometmes used odescrbe physcal condtons such as turbulent weather or psychologcal

states nvolvng turmol t dd not however become a common term forreferrng to human emotons untl about the mddle of the eghteenthcentury For most of Western hstory the emotons have been referredto as passons



J R. v

"Passion comes from the Gre th by way of the Latin t (whichmeans "to suffer the perfect patcple of is ssus from whch thenoun sso s formed) From th we also get such emotional terms aspathetic "empathy and "iathy

n ts orgnal Greek and Lat forms "passion had a very broadconnotation t could refer to a bect animate or inanimate that wasundergong ("sufferng) some cnge through the action of an externalagent A rock for example coul uffer the blow of a hammer Emotonsn the contemporary sense were thus only one kind of passion namelypassons of the soul (sych us self). n other words emotonswere understood to be nner changes impressed on the soul by someexternal agent

Two other categories of pass sensory experience and disease states- are worthy of special note bse of their (metaphorical) inuence onsubsequent theories of emotion nsory experiences are also passons ofthe soul broadly speaking For example when look upon an obectunder normal lghting condition cannot help but see the obect. t is asthough the mage has been imprsed upon my mind ndependent of (oreven against) my wi. A persn n demand of me on't ook butonce have looked the demad "on't see is unintelligible.

Of the senses touch has often been considered the most basic. Totouch something is to feel t. nce by metaphorical extension we getthe concepton of emotions as ier feelngs as when we are touched

to the quick. will have mu more to say about this conceptionlater when discuss the phnmenologcal tradition in contemporarypsychology.

Another subcategory of th tat has had a maor impact on subsequent theores of emotion is that f disease. seases are passons of thebody. Ths meanng of th s vdent n such contemporary medcalterms as pathology pathogn "idopathy and (via the Latin)"patient. n vew of the fac tt the same generic term was used tocover both emoton and diseae 3 it is not surprising that an association

was often made between the to conditons. The Stocs n particularconsidered emotons to be dieass of the mind. will also have muchmore to say about this associat shortly.

To summarze these prelinay remarks the emotons share wthcertain other conditions (sensatons feelngs diseases) a common meaning namely the connotation of assivity. This shared meaning has beenthe source of many metaphor troughout the ages and it continues toshape our theores of emotion. lies at the heart of what Solomon (976)has aptly called the myth of e passions that is the notion that

emotons are irratonal response ver which we have little control.storcally Plat (47-34 C) provides the best ntroduction t

this myth. Plato divided the sou (sych) into two maor parts. e



p

localzed the ratonammortal part n the head and the rratonamortalpart n the body below the neck. The ratonale behnd ths localzatonwas explctly metaphorcal. Ratonal thought s the hghest knd ofthought; hence ts localzaton n the body should also be hghest ( .e .

nearest the heavens). More mportant Plato conceved of thought as aknd moton. Ratonal thought s selntated and selsustanng thats t s an acton and not a passon. Wthn Greek cosmology crcularmoton was beleved to have smlar characterstcs. Ratonal thoughttherefore should be ocated n the part of the body that s most sphercalnamely the head.

Snce the emotons nterfere wth delberate ratonal behavor theyshould be located away from the head where they can do as lttle harm aspossble. Plato therefore located anger and related "sprted emotons nthe chest separated from the head by an sthmus (the neck) but closeenough to be called upon by reason when needed for the defense of thendvdual. The baser motons were stuated stll arther away belowthe mdrff.

Plato also postulated a knd of reverse evoluton. A man who faled tolve a lfe of reason could be punshed by rencarnaton as a woman oras an anma - a brd land mammal quadruped or pypod) reptle orsh n descendng order dependng on the passon that domnated hsle and the severty hs transgressons. "These are the laws by whchall anmals pass nto one another now as n the begnnng changng asthey lse or gan wsdom and olly (Tm 9c amlton & arns96 p . 2 ) . Or stated metaphorcally emotons are "bestal as wellas "gut reactons.

t mght be obected that Plato's analyss of emoton although hghlymetaphorcal was not wthout emprcal warrant. After all physologcalarousal often accompanes ntense emotonal arousa and anmals doshow fear rage sexual desre and so on but not ratonalty (at least notn the same sense as humans). Moreover Plato dd not dsparage theemotons and the body hs concern was rather that they be kept n

balance or harmony lest they usurp the power of reason. But mostmetaphors have some groundng n emprcal relatons; otherwse theywould not be effectve. The mportant pont s that Plato's analyss sprmarly evaluatve although t s presented as explanatory (a lkelystory).

As a counterpont to Plato's physologzng let us consder brey thevews of the Stocs whose analyses of the emotons were far moresystematc than were those of Plato. Accordng to the Stocs the emtons are forms of false udgments. As such they can be experenced only

by a ratonal beng for only a beng capable of makng true udgments salso capable of makng false udgments t follows that emotons are notclosely related to physologcal actvty n the manner postulated by Plato



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nor are they anmallke n anthg but an evaluatve sense. oweverthe Stocs dd adhere to the my of the passons n one fundamentalrespect The emotons are somethg we suffer pathologes of the mnd

Ccero (0643 B.C.) was n of the persons most responsble fortransmttng Greek thought to th oman world (see e.g. Lang 972).

Although hs prmary leanngs we wth the followers of Plato Ccerobeleved the Stoc analyss of eton to be the more penetratng. econsdered the more turbulent otons to be dsorders of the soul(tubtons nm) but no dseases n the strct sense:

These terrors lusts ts of aer and the lke belong speaknggenerally to the class of emotns whch the Greeks term th mght have called them dess [mobos] and ths would be awordforword renderng b t would not t n wth Latn usage

For pty envy exultaton oy all these the Greeks term dseasesmovements that s of the soul whch are not obedent to reasonwe on the other hand should thnk rghtly say that these samemovements of an agtated soul are dsorders [tubtons] butnot "dseases n the ordnary ay of speakng unless you are ofanother opnon (Ccero 4 .C./966 bk. 3 chap. 4 p. 33)

Evdently some were of anoer opnon for as prevously notedssons nm (passons of soul came to be the more commonly usedterm for the emotons n spte o or perhaps because of - ts connota

ton of morbdty.One other hstorcal lne of thoht deserves menton before we turn toan analyss of metaphors of eoton n contemporary psychologcaltheory. An assocaton of emoto wth a motvatng or drvng force hasbeen common throughout West hstory although the source of themetaphor has vared wth the tellectual and technologcal condtonsof the tme. For example n the hdus Plato compared the passonsto twownged steeds over whc the charoteer - reason must try toexercse control (amlton & Cans 96 p. 493).

An assocaton of emoton wh motvaton became especally pomnent among Chrstan Neoplatont the most promnent of whom was St.Augustne. By way of backgroun t should be noted that the Greeksand ther Roman followers generlly consdered reason to be the regnantfaculty of the human mnd. t vew underwent fundamental changewth the advent of Chrstanty he dea that human reason s capable ofcomprehendng an omnscent G was consdered by early Chrstans toe akn to lasphemy yet a persn of good wi could eeve or havefath n that whch he or she l not fully comprehend. n ths sense

the wll was regarded as equa f ot superor to reason. Ths dethronement of reason also had mplcans for conceptons of emoton.Turnng now to Augustne (3-430 A..) we should note that he



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recognzed a road class of emotonal phenomena - the affectons acton of whch the passons are a subcategory. Many of the affectonsare necessary for human lfe and some (e.g. love) even partake of thedvne. Lke the Stocs Augustne (ca. 40/9) consdered the passons

proper to be contrary to nature but unlke the Stocs he beeved thatthey (and other affectons) arse from the wll not reason

The character of a mans wll [oluntas] makes a dfference . For f ts wrong these emotons wll be wrong but f t s rght they wll benot only not blameworthy but even praseworthy. The wll s ndeednvolved n them all or rather they are all no more than acts ofwll. For what s desre or oy but an act of wll n sympathy wththose thngs that we wsh and what s fear or gref but an act of wlln dsagreement wth the thngs that we do not wsh . . . And gener

ally even as a man's wll s attracted or repelled n accordance wththe dverse character of the obects that are pursued or avoded sot shfts and turns nto emotons of one sort or the other. bk. 4chap. 6 pp. 2857)

Augustne went on to postulate love as the fundamental character of thewll:

A rght wll therefore s good love [bonus amo] and a wrong wll sbad love. ence the love that s bent on obtanng the obect of ts

love s desre whle the love that possesses and enoys ts obect soy the love that avods what confronts t s fear and the love thatfeels t when t stkes s gref. (bk. 4 chap. 7 p. 29)

The assocaton of emoton wth the wll or volton remaned a domnant theme throughout the Mddle Ages owever wth the advance oftechnology and the rse of modern scence the nature of the metaphortook another turn ung the sxteenth century sprng mechansms camento wdespread use as the motve power or clocks by anaogy humanmotves came to be vewed as sprngs of acton (McReynolds 980).

T the extent that emtons ad beme dented wth motvaton theytoo could be conceptualzed as a knd of nner force.

There s not space to carry ths hstorcal survey further nor s thereneed for we can already see the roots of some of the maor metaphorsof emoton that have nuenced contemporary thought. To recaptulatebrey the emotons have tradtonaly been conceptuazed as passonsthngs that happen to us as opposed to thngs we do n a ratonaldelberate way (actons). Wthn the Western ntelltual tradtnratonalty and free wll have been consdered the hallmarks of human

knd. They are what dstngush humans from anmals. t s not surprsngtherefore that the emotons shoud be metaphorcaly lnked to thoseaspects of human nature that are nonratonal (noncogntve) nvoluntary



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yet "drven (motvatonal) comon to both anmals and humans(nstntual) and n ther more extreme or dsruptve manfestatonspsychopathologcal These are th core features of what may be calledborrowng Solomon's (976) felctus phrase the myth of the passons.By callng these features a myt do not mean to downgrade ther

mportance. Myths ae what peop lve by and sometmes de for. But aswe shall see n subsequent sects there s another realty behnd themyth of the passons.

Needless to say the myth of e passons s not pecular to Westernsocetes. No socety could long dure f t emphaszed the nonratonalover the ratonal the nvoluntary over the voluntary (delberate) and theprvate over the publc. oweve the myth does take dfferent forms ndfferent socetes For exampe utz (982) reports that the faluk apeope of Mconesa vew the motons pmaly n tems of nte

personal elatons and they pae lttle emphass on ther physologcalconcomtants. Moreover even wtn the Western cultural tradton themyth of the passons has by no mns remaned untary. We have areadymentoned the Stocs who mantned that the emotons are a pecularlyhuman afcton And durng perods of romantcsm (e.g. through muchof the nneteenth century) th lgc of the emotons has often beenvalued more hghly than the lc of reason. owever even amongromantcs or perhaps especay ong romantcs emotons are dvorcedfrom socety - not because the later s vewed as a cvlzng nuence

but rather because t dstorts a nhbts the authentc expresson ofemoton.

Meaphors of emoion in cemporary psychoogica heory

On the bass of the precedng strcal analyss ve maor metaphors ofemoton may be dstngused otons are consdered to be () nnerfeelngs (2) bodly responses especally of the vscera () the anmal nhuman nature ( 4) dseases of the mnd; and (5) drvng forces. For ease

o reerence these ve abstact etaphors are lsted n Table 3. together wth some llustratve baslvl metaphors taken rom colloqualEnglsh.

The dstncton between abtct and baclvl metaphors deservesbre comment. Abstract metaphors represent superordnate categoresand for the most part are nt und n everyday speech. They provdethe (often mplct) ratonale for hatever explanatory functon the basclevel metaphors presumably hav. t wll be recalled however that manymetaphos have an evaluatv s wel as an expanatory functon. Theevaluatve functon s usually mst evdent n basclevel metaphors. Forexample no one really beleve that callng a fearful person chckensht explans hs behavor. t des however express a strong opnon.



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Table 3.. mo mthos of moton

Emotons are nner feelngsexperences

He "felt hs anger rsngHer kndness touched hm deeplyHe lstened to hs heart not hs head.She s a real "pan.He "ached for her.

Emotions are physiological responsesespecially of the viscera.He had a gut reacton.Anger made hs "blood bol.She got cold feet.He had butteres n hs stomach.Her heart brke rom gre.Emotions are the animal in humannature.Dont be a brute.She acted lke an anmal.He "subdued hs fear.She was proud as a peacock.He responded sheepshly.Don't rufe her feathers.

Emotions are deases of the mndHe was nsane with rage

She fell madly n loveHe was paralyzed wth fearShe was sckened by despar.He was blnd wth eny.She was cray wth jealousy.He was foamng at the mouth.

Emotions are a driving force or vitalenergy.He was "dren by fear.Loe makes the world go 'roundHe could not ren n hs anger.She was burstng wth oy.He blew hs stack.Hope "sustaned hm.Dsappontment "took the wnd out of

hs sals.ealousy only added fuel to hs

desre.

Ths evaluatve unton s usuay ess evdent at hgher eves o abstraon. Thus o say ha emoons are closely assocaed wh bodly srtures and physologcal changes seems more explanatory than evaluatve. would suggest however that the evaluatve functon s not absent fromthe abstract level only masked (and n some cases t s not even masked;see the emotonasdsease category).

Other abstract metaphors of emoton could of course be mentoned.

For example emotons are often treated as though they were physcalobects that can be lost found offered relnqushed abandoned and thelke. Such hypostatzng of the emotons helps to dvorce them from theself and from ratonal delberate actvty (what a person dos). Spatalmetaphors are also common (n addton to the nsdeoutsde dstncton). We have already noted that the emotons are generally consderedlower than ratonal delberate responses (.e. the hgher thoughtprocesses). But wthn ths lower doman further dstnctons can bemade. n general postve emotons (eg. happness) are up whereas

negatve emotons (eg gref) are down. And needless to say eachemoton has metaphors that are specc to t. Many of these are metonymc expressons n whch some aspect of behavor s made to stand for



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the whole (e .g . cold feet n the se of fear a swelled chest n the case ofprde aggresson n the case o anger tears n the case of sadness).

Gven these qualcatons the e categores lsted seem to encompassthe most mportant abstract metahors of emoton. Ths s true hstorcally as already dscussed. t s al true n the sense that each abstract

metaphor s assocated wth a ar tradton n the psychology of emoton namely the phenomenlocal psychophysologcal ethologcalpsychodynamc and drve tradts respectvely. n what follows wllsay a few words about each of thse tradtons. n a subsequent secton wll consder a sxth tradton aely the dramaturgcal n whch emotons are consdered as socal .

h hnologcl tdton

Spatal metaphors are among h ost common n psychology (Gentner& Grudn 985). On an nnerter dmenson emotons are nner(see Table 3.). As descrbed erler sensory experence as well asemotons are passons of the ul as tradtonally conceved. We havelso noted tht the sense of to feelng) hs often been consdered themost basc of the senses. By metahorcal extenson we get the concepton of emotons as nner feelns r experences Not only s ths concepton common n everyday speh; t s also central to many theores ofemoton. For example Clore Ortony (984) ask us to magine an

ntellgent robot that from a ontve pont of vew s ndstngushablefrom a human beng. Ths rt s a perfect Turng machne. t canevaluate emotonal stmul u a you and ; t can plan emotonallyrelevant courses of acton ad t can carry out those actons n anapproprate manner. Yet for ll ths dsplay of approprate behavorand expresson t does not fllw that the robot ever actually flsanythng (p. 53). Moreover le and Ortony (984) suggest f theres no feelng there s no emot regardless of anythng else that mghtbe gong on (p. 54).

Ths suggeston seems qute reonable untl we ask What s a feelng?The term feelng s one of t ost elastc n the Englsh language. Asalready noted ts root mean s to touch but through multpleextensons t has come to nclude a wde varety of psychologcal states. Aperson can feel a pnprck feel dull pan feel cold feel ll or healthyfeel rebellous and so forth. nsderng ths wde applcablty theasseron ha emoons are feelngs is no parcularly nformave. Thenaure of he feelng mus be sped.

Two broad approaches o h analyss of emoonal feelngs can bedsngushed he aomsc and he holsc. Wh regard o he aomscapproach a furher subdvson us be made namely ( 1) feelngs are(nohng bu) sensaons for eaple of bodly changes and () feelngs



x aps

are modes of experence su geners for exaple of pleasure and dspleasure The rs poson was ha adoped by Wllam Jame (1890) n hsfamous psychophysologcal heory of emoon he second poson wasadvocaed by Wlhelm Wund (1896/1897) n hs equally famous rdmensonal heory Afer nearly hree decades of careful nrospecveresearch many psychologss came o beleve ha Wunds dmensonswere reducble o sensaons n a Jamesan sense (Nafe, 194) Be ha as may neher poson has proved o be parcularly convncng on eherlogcal or emprcal grounds (For general revews and analyses seeAlson 1969 Nasoulas, 1973 Solomon 1976)

Aomsc approaches such as hose of James and Wund presumeha s possble o analyze emoonal feelngs no more elemenaryuns her phenomenologcal approaches would reec hs presupposon preferrng nsead o rea emoonal feelngs as experenal Gstal

tn Indeed n he srces sense a phenomenologcal analyss wouldreec all presupposons and aemp o descrbe emoonal conscousness simplicit Tha goal however has proved o be somehng of achmera Phenomenologcal analyses ha adop he holsc approachypcally yeld resuls remarably smlar o he lngusc analyss ofemoonal conceps Ths s an mporan pon ha bears cenrally on herelaonshp beween meaphor and emoon Therefore le me expandon brey

I s common among phenomenologss o dsngush beween pre

reecve and reecve experence The former s a nd of awarenesspresumably le ha of a dog or brd Reecve experence by conrass a hgherorder awareness an awareness of beng aware Ths does nonecessarly mean a selfconscous reecon on ones own experenceRaher means he subsumpon of experence under a concep (seeKan 1781/1966 Mll 1869/1967) Saed somewha dffereny conscousness n he human sense, ncludng feelngs of emoon s dependen onhe same cognve srucures and capaces ha underle language nhs pon here s wdespread agreemen even among heorss of oher

wse dverse persuasonanguage s as old as conscousness language s praccal conscousness as exss for oher men and for ha reason s reallybegnnng o exs for me personally as well for language leconscousness only arses from he need he necessy of nercourse wh oher men (Marx & Engels 1845-6/1939 p 19)

The subley and srengh of conscousness are always n proporono he capacy for communcaon In shor he developmen of

speech and he developmen of conscousness (no of reason bu ofreason becomng selfconscous) go hand n hand (Nesche 188/1960 p 96)



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The process of somehng becng conscous s above all lnedwh he percepons whch our sense organs receve from he exernal world Bu n men here s an added complcaon hroughwhch nernal processes n he ego may also acqure he qualy ofconscousness Ths s he wor of he funcon of speech whch

brngs maeral n he ego n a rm connecon wh mnemcresdues of vsual bu more pcularly of audory percepons(Freud 1940/1964 pp 161-2

Whou he help of a verbal ommuny all behavor would beunconscous Conscousness a socal produc I s no only not hespecal eld of auonomous m s no whn he range of asolary man (Snner 1971 p 192)

Freud clamed ha dreams are he royal road o he unconscous Tha

clam may be dspued Wha seems beyond dspue however s halanguage s he royal road o cncous experence ncluding flngs ofmoton I follows ha he exprce of emoon s no smply subecve(nner) s nersubecve · a shared experence ha s nformed bymany of he same convenons h govern he use of language

If these observaons are correc a complee analyss of he emoonsmus proceed n wo seps The s sep s o lay bare he meaphorcalnaure of emoonal conscousnes (e .g as exempled by he myh ofhe passons) The second sep s explore wha les behnd he meaphors Why do we experence emons he way we do Ths second sepnvolves a careful analyss of he way parcular emoons relae o hebroader socalhsorcal conex o whch hey are a par

I wll reurn o a dscusson of he socal bases of emoonal behavor na subsequen secon For now I ll smply conclude hs bref dscussonof he phenomenologcal radon h a few addonal observaons onwhy emoons are so frequenly dned wh nner feelngs when n facfeelngs are neher necessary nor sufcen condons for he arbuonof emoon (For example he on of unconscous emoons sperfecly nellgble whereas h of unconscous feelngs - e unfel

feelngs - nvolves a conradcon f erms )Needless o say, feelngs (wher nerpreed as bodly sensaons or

experenal Gstltn) are ofen promnen feaures of emoonal epsodes I s herefore no surprn ha by meonymy of par for hewhole feelngs have come o san for emoons Bu I beleve emoonshave become closely dened wh feelngs for anoher reason as well

Boh feelngs and emoon are ofen conrased wh hnng (reason)For example f I ouch a rough sce I do no have o hn n order ofeel he roughness Thnng or reson eners when we mus nfer wha s

no evden o he senses Smla consderaons apply when eelngs used o refer o nonsensory eens Thus f you as me why I dd



p

somehing and I can hin of no special reason I may reply I us fellie it Such a reply has two effecs irst it imples ha my behaviorwas no based on raional deliberae processes (ie i was a passionraher han an acion) and second i ends o hal furher inquiry Iwould mainain ha he appeal o feelings in he explanaion of emoionalbehavior has ofen had similar effecs on scienic inquiry

Th sychohysiologicl tdition

This radiion also loos o he inside bu o inner responses raher haninner feelings Specically physiological change is considered a necessarycondiion for emoion - and someimes even a sufcien condiion (seeWenger 1950) This radiion is ofen combined wih he phenomenolo

gical as when William James (890) explained he ul of emoion ashe awareness of bodily change added o he cold percepion of heexciing even

Needless o say al psychological phenomena ulimaely depend onphysiological processes owever in he case of he emoions his dependency has been given special saus Why should his be so

The funcioning of he human body is of umos imporance no onlyfor he individual bu for sociey as a whole Moreover unil relaivelyrecenly presumed nowledge of he human body was ofen based oninformal observaions of slain animals I is no surprising herefore hacommonsense inerpreaive schemes (fol anaomies and physiologies)are heavily imbued wih meaning ha has less o do wih he physiologicalfuncions of an organ or body par han wih is use as food is involvemen in riual sacrice is role in sexual aciviy and he lie From apsychological poin of view our body is as much symbol as subsance(ouglas 1970 nians 1951 ThassThienemann 1968)

Body symbolism can affec scienic aciviy in a variey of suble waysFor example udson (197) has found ha medical specialiss fromEnglish privae (as opposed o saesuppored or public) schools are

more liely o achieve eminence by woring on he head a opposed ohe lower body on he surface as opposed o he inside of he body andon he male as opposed o he female body These and oher relaionshipsobserved by udson defy analysis in erms of medical sill bu hey dohave obvious social implicaions As udson noes

Pars of he body evidenly possess symbolic signicance - a signicance ha inuences medical sudens when hey are deciding ospecialize And i would seem sudens from an uppermiddleclass

bacground are more liely han hose from a lowermiddle orworingclass bacground o nd heir way ino specialiies ha areseen for symbolic reasons as desirable (p 71)



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Body symbolism can inuence only he choice of scienic specialiies bu also he naure of heorcal speculaions ur concern here iswih he way psychological proceses such as emoions become associaed wih physiological processes sch as visceral responses on he basisof shared symbolic meaning rahe han on any empirically demonsraed

funcional relaionship nce suh an associaion is made i can beexremely enacious e me illusrae

The erm hyseria is derived fom he Gree word for he womb oruerus hysta . References o h omb as a cause of physical sympomscan be found in Egypian wriing as early as 1900 BC. From Egypiansources his noion wored is wa ino Gree medicine Veih 1965).ippocraes was he rs o call ceain sympoms hyserical in meonymic reference o heir presumed cse These early heoriss did no seemespecially concerned abou how e womb could wander so widely pro

ducing sympoms hroughou he body The localizaion of funcion wasapparenly based on he vague regniion ha some ypes of sympomssem from sexual difculies and ha he uerus is an imporan organ offemale sexualiy I is more difl o deermine why such sympomsbecame associaed almos exluily wih emale dsorders Perhaps had somehing o do wih he sas of women and heir sex role i mighalso have been regarded as uneemly for a man o be so aficed.Moreover downward moveme he uerus has some empirical foundaion in uerine prolapse wherea he male organ is obviously no free o

wander Whaever he case on he wandering womb came o symbolizehyserical reacions he noion a hese sympoms are genderlinedproved exremely enacious eve afer he uerus was made immobilehrough advacing physiological nowledge Freud (95/959) describedan old surgeon who exclaimed t him regarding he possibiliy of malehyserics Bu my dear sir hw an you al such nonsense Hystonsic means he uerus So how n a man be hyserical p. 15)

Elsewhere Averill 1974) I ha referred o he meaphorcal associaion of psychological wih physilical processes as psychophysiologicalsymbolm and I have raced h inuence of such symbolism on heoriesof emoion from he ime of he cien Grees o presen neurophysiological speculaion. Suce i here o noe ha he common assumpion haphysiological change, especially ha mediaed by he auonomic nervoussysem and is cenral neural reprenaions in he visceral brain isbased more on he myh of he pasons han on hard empirical evidence

Needless o say physiologial esponses are prominen feaures ofmany emoional episodes There ae condiions such as sudden frighnausea on smelling a purid odr lashing ou agains a painful simulusdepression following loss of a love one and so forh ha are accompanied by proounced physiologicl changes In such saes a person maybe sruc by he auonomy of dily responses The body seems o



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now somehng ha he person does no and acs on s ownsomemes agans he persons wll and desres Such seemngly auonomous responses may appropraely be regarded as happenngs - aspassons raher han as acons. I should be emphaszed however ha

noceable physologcal change s no a promnen feaure of all emoonal epsodes (e g of fear) bu only of hose ha are relavely nenseand moreover physologcal change s no even characersc of someemoonal syndromes (e.g hope) no maer how nense he epsode.

Sll hrough he use of meonymy n common speech we ofen allowpresumed physologcal responses sand for he whole (e g. sweaypalms for fear a broen hear for gref beng red n he face foranger) The nuve appeal of psychophysologcal heores of emoons based n par on such everyday meonymes Bu n he process ofabsracon and generalzaon we end o forge ha we are dealngwh only a par and we assume ha wha s rue of ceran physologcalresponses (eg vsceral change) s also rue of whole emoonalsyndromes

There s anoher aspec of physologcal meaphors of emoon hadeserves bref menon Such meaphors are no simply meonymes heyare also veled nsrucons abou how a person should loo and reacwhen emoonally nvolved I s no uncommon for people o soe heres of her pason n order o conform to such nsrucons Theprecse means by whch people conrol her physologcal responses areno well uderstood and are undoubtedly multple. But hat such conrolcan and does occur s beyond dspue. Perhaps he mos dramac example of hs s voodoo deah The person who s hexed adops he role of adyng person - and des (ofen wh he unwng and suble asssance ofhose presen) As a more mundane example consder he Vcoran ladywho would fan on demand as for nsance upon hearng a sexuallysuggesve remar Such behavor has gone ou of fashon bu llusraes well he ne conrol ha can be exered over physologcal responseeven by ordnary persons

Th thological tadition

The ehologcal radon derves n recen mes from arwns ThEpssion of th Emotions in Man and Animals (187/1965) In fac hemos domnan vew n psychology oday s probably ha emoons areproducs of bologcal evoluon - nsncve reacons ha may beobserved n lower amals as well as humas Ths too s part ofour myh of he passons (Recall Plaos posulaon of a nd of reverse

evoluon he psych beng rencarnaed n an anmal accordng o hedomnan passon by whch he person had lved)

I s somemes sad ha human bengs are unnshed a brh n he



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sense ha many human characercs are a produc of socalzaon nobologcal nherance I would prbably be more accurae o say hahumans are parly nshed a b wh bologcal mauraon compleng one par and socalzaon he oher

A problem wh many radonl heores of emoon especally hose

whn he ehologcal radon s ha hey end o denfy he emoonswh he bologcally nshed par whereas reason (cognon wll andhe hgher menal processes n enera) s assgned o he unnshedporon For example he clam ha nellecual processes are n pardeermned by heredy s ofen wh sepcsm and even hosly.By conras he clam ha h oons are bologcally prmve responses s ofen acceped uncrcay Boh clams do an nusce - oreason as well as o he emoos

Consder rs he case of reson. As Mdgley (1978) has argued

reason s no some deus ex mah graned o us by a benevolen deyso ha we may be more n hs ma nor (as some romancs would have) s reason an alen force mpoe n us by socey n order o brdle ourpassons Raher reason s par of our naure a reecon of and a meansby whch our needs are ordered n a coheren whole among hemsevesand n relaon o our envronn A porpose does no manfesraonaly n he human sense n because lacs he cranal capacybu because has a dfferen nae a dfferen se of needs o mee

Jus as s a msae o consder reason an eny apar from our

bologcal naure so oo s a e o consder emoon a hng aparfrom our socal naure and our hgher hough processes Boh reasonand emoon parae of he hgh and he low of human naure Thsfac s obscured by he many anml meaphors ha we use when hnngand speang of he emoons meaphors whose funcon s more evaluave han explanaory

In a frequenly ced observao ebb and Thompson (1954) ponedou ha human bengs are he os emoonal of anmals as well as hemos nellgen Why should su an obvous fac requre menon and

deserve frequen caon were ha our way of hnng abou heemoons as anmalle and bsh has condoned us o overloohe obvous? I should go whu sayng (bu seldom has) ha heemoonal and cognve capaces of humans have coevolved he dsncon beween he wo spheres ben more one of socal nerpreaon hanof underlyng mechansms (Averl n press)

Th psychoyamic tadition

Ths radon draws much of s nuve appeal from he meaphor ofemoons as dseases of he md In popular concepon menalllness s praccally synonymou h emoonal dsorder By conrasmenal decency (abnormally low nellgence) s no usually consdered



x ps

an llness alhough t may requre lfelong nsttutoalzaton (usuallyin a school no a hospial) A perusal of selfhelp boos alsosuggess ha such emoional saes as anger ealousy envy fear anxeyguil embarrassmen loneliness and grief are on one sc ls oranoher Even such hghly valued emoons as love have become heobec of suggesed cures And hs is no us a peculiary of poppsychology As Thois (985) has observed emoional varables enerno he dagnostc crtera for most forms of psychopahology as lstedin he Dignostic nd Sttisticl Mnul of Mntl Dds DSMIpublshed by he Amercan Psychiarc Assocaion (980)

To call hs radion psychodynmic s perhaps a b msleading fordynamic psychologies are by no means preoccupied wih he noion ofemoions as diseases of he mind Ye mos psychodynamc heores haveher base n clnical phenomena hey are also among he mos consisen

and nsghful approaches o he sudy of emoonSince psychoanalysis is a prime example of a psychodynamic heory le

us consder briey urng hs long career Freud devloped a numberof differen and no always compable views on emion (Rapapor953) I will consder only one srand n hs complex web In Studis onHysti (895955) Breuer and Freud presened he hypohess hahysercal sympoms resul when emoons are aroused bu no allowed anormal oule for example because of psychological defenses Freudfrequenly reurned o hs heme n laer wrings For insance hs is

how he summarized hese earler sudies n hs Clar lecuresne was driven o assume ha he llness occurred because heaffecs generated n he pahogenc siuaions had her normal oule bloced and ha he essence of he llness lay n he fac hahese srangulaed affecs were hen pu o an abnormal use A ceran porion of our menal exciaon s normally dreced alonghe pahs of somac innervaion and produces wha we now as anexpresson of he emoons ysercal converson exaggeraeshis porion of he discharge of an emoionally caheced menalprocess represens a far more inense expresson of he emoonswhich has enered upon a new pah (Freud 90957 p 8)

A a sill laer dae Freu • seemed o expand hs views of hyseria onclude normal no us srangulaed affec rawng on he vewcommon in his ime ha experiences of repeaed could ulimaely become erted Freud (99 descrbed emotos as hystercala a had beome par of our biological nheriance Converselyhe descrbed hysercal reacions as a freshly consruced ndivdual

affec (p 396)

I emphasze these observaons by Freud for wo reasons Frs heyillusrae well he close relaionship beween he psychodynamic radiionand he concepion of emoions as dseases of he mnd Second and



J ve

more imporan emoions a le hyserical conversion reacions incerain fundamenal respecs n oh cases for example he personseems o be suffering from sm behavior ha is on a deeper level ofanalysis an acion ha he or sh is performing In he case of hysericalconversion reacions he behavio (neuroic sympom) is highly idiosyn

craic and resuls from inrapsychc conic In he case of normal emoional reacions by conras he havior has become sandardized ando a cerain exen legiimaed wiin sociey I will reurn o his issue ina laer secion when we discu oions as social roles I believe helaer meaphor (emoions as socl roles) beer conveys Freuds basicinsigh han does his own variaon of he emoionasdisease meaphor

The e taition

The concepion of emoions as rving forces could also be illusraedby reference o Freud who in hi more meaheoreical wriings posulaed a ind of psychic energ derived from insincual sources Thisenergy could vary quaniaively (i in inensiy) bu i had few qualiave feaures of s own Affec s experienced when energy was dscharged he qualiy of he affec ( g fear as opposed o anger) beingdeermined by he ideas o which he energy had become caheced

An inerpreaion of emoions s drives has also been common obehavioriss (of he ullian no he Sinneran variey) Fear is hedrive ha moivaes avoidan behavior anger is he drive hamoivaes aggression and so foh In some versions he drive is concepualized as an inervening varabl (heoreical consruc) wihou anysubsanive properies of is ow In oher versions he drive is given aphysiological locus (eg arousl o he auonomic nervous sysem) andif i is considered a primary dve i is given a biological (herediary)origin

I do no wish o commen in a deail on he emoionasdrive concep in eiher is psychoanalyic o is behavioris versions Sufce i onoe ha of all he radiions we ve been considering (he phenomenological psychophysiological ehological and psychodynamic) he driveradiion probably has been he le illuminaing and possibly he mosobsrucive as far as our undesding of he emoions is concerned Imenion i here primarily becae f is hisorical imporance

If his assessmen seems a bi hsh his is due in par o he fac hahe emoionasdrive concep derivs considerable inuiive appeal fromwo meaphorical sources rs our ordinary language (see Table 31)and second he language of hysical heory where energy andforce have been cenral consrus Neiher source has ransferred well

ino psychological heory Particully damaging has been he endency orea emoional drives in quaniive erms only hus deecing aenion from deailed observaions of e qualiaive differences among emo



x eps e

ons (wheher hose dfferences be phenomenologcal physologcal orbehvoral) Whn he drve radon movaon was he prmary concern he emoons were reduced o moves and were largely gnoredno beng consdered worhy of sudy n her own rgh

Some futhe obseations on the eationship betweentheoy and metapho

Te ve heorecal radons ha we have dscussed hus far are nondependen The phenomenologca adon leas n s moe aomsc verson has somemes aepted o reduce he experene of emoono he percepon of physoogca responses hose responses n urnhave been relaed o he bologcally more prmve pars of he nervous sysem (e g mbc and auonomc srucures) rve heores havealso relaed emoons o physologcal arousal and anmal nsncs has when hey have no reaed emoons as pure nervenng varables(heorecal consrucs) And we saw n he case of Freud how heseradons can become nerwned n a psychodynamc approach o emoonal dsorders (dseases of he mnd) Wha les behnd and helpsprovde some uny o hese radons s he myh of he passons and smany meaphorcal exensons

Smpy by ponng ou a parale beween he maor (absrac)meaphors of emoon and some of he maor radons n emoonalheorng we do no demonsrae ha he heoreca radons are basedon meaphor owever scenc explanaon le any oher nd ofexplanaon necessarly nvolves he use of meaphor Indeed some haveargued ha scenc heores are le more han exended meaphorsTha s gong oo far for here s ceranly a useful dsncon o be madebeween a scenc expanaon and a my meaphorcal accoun ofhe same phenomenon Bu a he very leas our meaphors help maeceran nds of heorng seem more naural and nuvely obvous fcourse emoons are noncognve (feelngs) of course hey are cosely

assocaed wh vsceral acvy of course hey are remnans of ourevoluonary pas of course hey may ead o psychopahoogy (eg foo exreme or no allowed proper expresson and of course hey movae behavor Everybody nows ha I s embedded n our commonlanguage

Anothe metapho emotions as socia oes

In hs secon I wsh o nroduce sll anoher meaphor of emoon

namely emoons as soca roles (Averll 1980a 198 n press) Thsmeaphor s no more rue n an absolue sense han any of e vemeaphors dscussed earler owever does revea ceran feaures ofemoon ha he ohers have ended o conceal Perhaps mos mporan



4 Je R ve

i aes he emoions ou of he privae realm and places hem in hepublic (ouer) domain and i rs he individual as he agen of his orher own emoional responses rahe han as a paien

The concept of a social role is tself based on metaphor he sourceof which is he heaer (All h worlds a sage ) owever he

noion of emoions as social rles is no simply a meaphor on ameaphor Some of he mos inigful analyses of emoion can be foundin boos on acing especially o he echnique of mehod or deepacing pioneered by he Russian drecor Sanislavsi (936). Thus whenspeaing of emoions as social res I am drawing on he hearicalradiion direcly as well as o e exension of ha radiion wihinsocial psychology (Biddle 979 Sarbin & Allen 98).

If he role meaphor is o be ueul in explicaing he emoions i musbe made more precise In his rsec Sarbin (986) has made useful

disincions among four ypes o rs The rs is hearical namely hepar or characer in a play The econd involves aing on anohersideniy in a social conex for ince as a con aris In he hird sensehe concep of role is used o decibe he expeced conduc of a persongiven his or her saus in socie This is he usual socialpsychologicalmeaning of a role Finally hre re sereoypic paerns of behaviorsuch as characerize he radiioa lover or rogue he ealous husbandand so forh Behaviors of his yp help preserve and enhance an acorsideniy and moral values Sarbin refore calls such sereoypes ideniy

roles e suggess ha emoon elong in his caegory since emoionsinvolve an assessmen of he effe of an acion on a persons sense ofideniy

Sarbins disincions are useful i reminding us ha no all social rolesare alie A more deailed discusion of emoions as social roles wouldhave o ae hese and relaed disicions ino accoun For he sae ofsimpliciy however I will refer iply o social roles in a generic senseand o emoions as one variey of social role (meaphorically speaingSome of he ways ha emoions are similar o social roles are oulined in

Table 3.2.Needless o say here are also iaions o he role meaphor Emoions are presumably auhenic sponaneous and selfinvolvingBy conras role behavior is regred as feigned deliberae andselfdisanced (divorced from e self) These conrass are all legiimae a he level of everyday experince bu heir heoreical signicancerequires criical analysis

The anhropologis su (983) hs wrien a shor bu revealing essayon he relaion beween social rles and emoions (or wha he callsaffecs) su cies excerps from Mlinowsis diaries indicaing ha helaer had difculy empahizing w he naives he was sudying (Trobriand Islanders) As for ehnograhy alinowsi records in his diary



x tp t

Table .. Paralels eteen damatstc and eotonal roles

les

Role A rle s cnsttute by a set fnstructns, .e. , the lnes an stagesettngs

Ply A le nt ext n latnbut s nterwven wth ther les tfrm a whle.

Plot A rle s part f a larger strythat gves t meanng.

ctor Persns can chse when anhw t enact a rle.

raining Actng s a skll that requrespractce as well as nnate ablty.Involvement The actr entes

wth the character f the leexperecng events as the charactermght.

Interpreting the role In rer tbecme nvlve n a rle the atrmus unerstn the pl f the pay.

Emtns

An emtn s cnsttute by scalrules an stuatns an nt smplyby nnate factrs).

A emtn es nt exst as anslate event t s an nterpersnalan ntersubectve phenmenn

An emtn s part f a larger culturalmatrx that gves t meanng.

Persns are actve partcpants n theremtns nt passve recpentspatents.

Emtns ar e sklle perfrmances annt unlearne, reeke respnses.Invlvement n the emtnal rle

etemnes the nature an ntenstyf the emtnal experence.

Emtnal nvlvement requres anntutve unerstanng f thecuural mar hat heps gve heemtn ts meanng.

I see he life of he naives as uerly devoid of ineres or imporancesomehing as remoe from me as he life of a dog su suggess haMalinowsi laced ruly human relaions wi he naives su henass rheorically "Wha do we mean by ruly human relaions And heanswers Truly human relaions are characerized by affec (or feeling)in conras o he nosohuman relaions characerized by role (or usefulness) (p 7)

A his poin i migh be ased Wha is more peculiarly human hanhe social role Bu leaving ha quesion aside le us coninue wih susaccoun Malinowsi we are led o presume could undersand (raionally) he roles ha he Trobriand Islanders adoped and ha separaedheir culure from his bu he could no undersand wha he supposedlyshared wih hem namely heir emoional experiences

Culures borrow much from each oher n role maers such asfoods ariacs eiquee heories o naure and ools for conrolof human beings and hings Bu here is lie evidence ha people

change in any fundamenal way and as a whole heir paerns offeeling abou hemselves abou each oher and abou he res ofhe world (su 983 p 74)



Je R. ve

su concludes hs essay wh a paan o our shf from a Melng Poconcep of Amerca o ha of ura Plurasm

I ae hs las saemen o ean ha by recognzng our commonhumany (epresened by feelng nd emoons) we wll be beer ableo accep culural dfferences (reresened by socal roles) Bu f socal

roles are so supercal characered prmary by her usefulness whyshould we be concerned abou er amalgamaon n a meng poAnd why should Malnows hae ad such dfculy undersandng whahe shared wh he Trobrand Ilaers whle beng so asue n comprehendng he dfferences

The answer o boh hese quens les I beleve n he fac ha heemoons are hemselves culurl caons Indeed hey ae more cenralo a culure han hey are o an nvdual Ths s no o deny a commonhuman naure Bu s o dey ha he emoons are a more drec

reecon of ha naure han hey re producs of he culure n whch aperson s rased The emoons re n fac one of he chef ways n whchone culure dffers from anoher

Ironcally n hs crcsm of lnows su s drawng on a concepon of emoon ha s o a lage en cuually specc one ooed nhe Wesern myh of he passon sudy by Myes (979) llusraes analenave concepon When gvn accouns of emoonal reacons fornsance o he deah of a pae he Pnup (a goup of Ausalanaborgnes) do no emphasze nnr feelngs To quoe Myers

The Aborgnal auobographs have seen as well as hose I redo elc emphasze he culura xpecaons much more han heydo he specc experences an nerpreaons of he ndvdualhey seem llusraons raher n selfconscous nrospecons was frequenly dfcul o el wheher a person was genunelyangr (feelng anger) or wher he dsplay was a culuralperformance or nally what sense it made to distinguish thesePnup al of emoon hen no necessarly he al of rawexperence (p 348 alcs add)

I would go furher and sugge ha emoons are culural performances and no us among he Pnup The young man who says o hssweehear "I love you s no sy descrbng some nner condon (apecular feelng or sae of phslogcal arousal) nor are hs wordssmply a subsue for more prmve expressons of sexual excemenle he caerwaulng of a cvlzed mca Raher by an avowal of lovehe ndvdual s expressng a wllnness o ener no a ceran nd ofsocal relaonshp wh he oher a relaonshp ha vares from one

culure o anoher and from one hsorcal epoch o anoher (Averll985Smlar consderaons apply o oher emoons Gref s no smpy an



x ps

inner wound aused by he loss of a loved one i is also a duy imposedon he bereaved by he group wih accompanying righs duies andobligaions (Averill 99 Averill & Wisoi 98) Anger oo involvesa ransacion among individuals a ransacion ha is consiued as well

as reguaed by socia norms and rues (Averil 982) Even such aprimiive emoion as fear is in is mos common manifesaions asocia consrucion (Averi 987) Every socia group has is appropriaefears (eg of God polluion communiss capialiss cerai nauralphenomena) he experience of which ceries membership in and allegiance o he group

There is no space here o pursue he way emoions are lie and heway hey are unlie social roles The references cied in he precedingparagraphs provide deailed analyses of specic emoions from a socialconsrucionis poin of view There is however a nal poin worhmaing before I conclude his chaper

No only does he role meaphor help place emoional phenomena in anew ligh i also suggess new sources of daa relevan o he undersanding of emoion ne of hose new sources of daa is meaphor iself Thegeneral model of emoion held wihin a culure is encoded in he colloquialisms maxims and fol sayings common in everyday speech Manyof hese expressions are meaphorical Thus an examinaion of commonmeaphors can help uncover he norms rules expecaions and valuesha dene emoional roles (Some analyses of his ind have alreadybeen menioned in noe 8)

Concuding obseations

ur mos common meaphors depic he emoions as inherenly privae(inner) evens a par of our human naure ha is - in is pures form unsullied by social inuence and higher hough processes (reasonlogic) To he exen ha ou meaphors help consiue he way we hinand feel hey creae he experience of emoion in heir own image And

o he exen ha we forge or fail o recognize he meaphorcal naure ofemoional experience we are liable o develop heories ha mysify morehan hey explain

Bu people live a muliple levels of realiy To undersand he emoions we mus ae ino accoun a leas wo levels The absrac level isha depiced in meaphor myh and many of our scienic heories I isimporan o undersand his absrac level for i guides our behavior andlends meaning o our experience Ye we mus also loo a he moreconcree level a he role ha emoions play wihin he social sysem as

well as any biological and psychological funcions hey migh haveThe meaphor of emoions as social roles has been inroduced o

faciliae his as I is mean no o replace he oher maor meaphors



J R v

of emoion bu o complemen em In he nal analysis emoions areemoions and our goal sould be o undersand hem on heir own ermsBu ha goal is perhaps oo idealic In psychology probably more hanin mos sciences undersanding prceeds by way of meaphor Tha aleas has been he hisory of eories o emoion as he preceding

analysis indicaes Sill as an ide we should always be searching forways o mae our meaphors mo precise and for scienic purposesmore explanaory and less evaluaie

Acknoedgment

Preparaion of his chaper wa sppored in par by Gran M40131from he Naional Insiue of enal ealh

Ntes

1 Ths bref summary f Vc s bas n a recent analyss by Shtter 1986).2 These remarks refer t the use f he term emtn n Englsh. In mern

French sentiment an emotion ar the terms mst wely use t refer temtnal phenmena. (Sentimnt has a cnntatn smlar t the Englshfeelng.) In German Gefhl an Gemtsbewegung are the vernacular termscrrespnng rughly feelng an emtn espectely ekt hasas been cmmnly use n the pchlgcl lterture e.g by Freu) as

has mre recently Emotion. Fr late terms n ther InEurpean languages see Buck 1949).3 The term sease rnally ha an emtnal cnntat. It stems frm the

Mle French des s) + ae ese) meanng scmfrt r uneasness.

4 The rratnamrtal part f the su was subve nt a sprte aspectlcale n the regn f the cht n an appette aspect lcale belwthe mr. The sgncane f h ubsn s explane belw.

5 The mst cncse presentatn f Pats lcalatn f functn can be funn hs algue imaeus Hamltn Carns, 1961 pp. 11511211).

6 Fr scussns f emtn by early reek Stcs e.g. , Zen an Chrysppus)see Garner Metcalf an Beebeenter 197) an st 1969). The assertn that nly a ratnal beng wul be capable f makng emtnal ugments s well llustrate by Seneca ca. 50/196) cntentn that reasn anpassn are nt stnct, but are ly the transfrmatn f the mn twarthe better r wrse p. 127). Thu, anger althugh t s the fe f reasn. . . s neertheless brn nly wher reasn wells p. 1 15).

7 T the extent that emtns are pasns . e. are thngs that happen t us anare beyn ur cntrl) hey ae ivolunta an nt luntary. Hweeremtns are nt nluntary n t sense that behar nuce say byexternal cercn s nluntary. The angry persn wants t gan reenge the

fearful persn wants t ee an s frh In ther ws whle expeencngn emn a pers s ece f at ll by hs r her n esres. Inschlasc phlsphy OBren 198) hs fac le t a sncn beween



x pr

fully luntary acts t whch the nual ges full assent as when he r hes exerencng an emtn) an perfectly luntary acts whch are perfrmeafer elberatn an frethught) . The legacy f ths stnctn can be funtay n the legal treatment f crme f passn. A hmce cmmtteuner sucent emtn s aucate as luntary manslaughter as ppse

t mure premetate) an nlunty manslaughter ue t neggence rculpable accent). In subsequent scussn I wll use man anmte as generc terms t refer t bth fully emtnal) an perfectlyelberate) luntary acts an n accrance wth eeryay speech I wllfe ee t the emtns a nluntary. The cntex shul make hemeanng clear.

8 Fr eale analyses f the metaphrs f specc emtns see Kecses1986 1988) n anger pre an le an see Aerl Catln an Cn npreparatn) n hpe.

9 The sense f reasn r ratnalty ust escrbe s nt the nly r een themst cmmn ne tay. Usually when we speak f ratnalty we mply

sme meansen relatnshp fllwng certan stanars f ecacy.atnalty as harmny amng nes basc nees an esres ges back t thergnal Greek meanng f logos, whch meant t assemble r gather tgetherthe best f smethng r alternately the prncple by whch such an assemblage s mae Karathers 1979). Ths meanng s eent n such currenterms as anthlogy . In ne f ts senses the Latn rt rato als mpleharmny an prprtnate relatns.

10 I am nebte t Bram Frhanler 1985) fr hese cmments by Freu.

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Harar Unersty Press. Orgnal wrk wrtten ca. 42.)Ae J. . 194) A ayss psyhphysgca symbsm an ts

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1979). The functns f gref. In C. Iar E.) Emotons n personal andpsychopathology pp. 968). New Yrk Plenum.

1980a). A cnstructst ew f emtn. In . Plutch & H. KellermanEs.) heores of emoton pp. 54). ew Yk Acaemc Press.1980b). On the paucty f pste emtns. In K. . Blnksten P. Plner

& . Plvy Es.) ssessment and modcaton of emotonal behavorpp. 745). New Yrk: Plenum.

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Gentner D. & Gruin, . 1985). Th lutin f mental metaphrs in psychlgy: A 90yea retrspectie eican Psychologt, , 18192.

Hamiltn E., & Cairns, H. Es.). 191). he collected works of Plato. Princen, NJ Princen Uniersity Ps.

Hebb D. . & Thmpsn W. R 1954). The scial signicance f animalstuies In G. Linzey E.) Hdbook of social psychology l. 1 pp.5261). Cambrge, MA AsWesley.

Hsu, F. L. K. 198 le affect a anthrplgy. In Rugged individualismreconsidered pp 1714). Knil: Uniersity f Tennessee Press.

Husn L. 197). he cult of the at. Ne Yrk: Harper & .James W. 1890). he principles of pchology. Ne Yrk Hlt.

Kant, I. 1966). Critique of pure reason F. M. Muller Trans. . Garen City NY:Dubleay. Origial rk publish 181.



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Karather S. 1979). Logos An analyss f the scal acheemen fratnalty. In A. Blum & P. Mcugh Es.) Friends enemies and strangers heorizng n art, scienc, and everyday life pp. 17514). Nr,J: Ablex.

Kecses, Z. 1986). Metaphors of anger, pride, and love: lexical approach to

the structure of concepts. Amsteram Benamns.1988. he language of love he semantics of passon in conversatonal Englh. Leburg PA Bucknell Unersty Pres.

Lakff, G & Jhnsn, M 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chcag Unersty fChcag Press.

Lang, F . 1972). Psychlgcal termnlgy n the Tusculans Joual of theHistory of the Behavioral Sciences, 8, 4196.

Lutz C. 198. The man f emtn rs n faluk. merican Ethnologt, 118.

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Mceynls P 1980). The clck metaphr n the hstry f psychlgy InT. Nckles E.), Scientc dcovery Case studies pp. 9711. Drrecht:eel.

Mgley, M. 1978). Beast and man: he roots of human nature. Ithaca NY:Crnell Unersty Press.

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Myers, F. 1979 Emtns an the self A thery f persnh an pltcalrer amng Pntup abrgnes. Ethos, 7 470.

Nafe J. 194. An expermental stuy f the affecte ualtes mericanoual of Psychology, 5044.

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4

Motives an metaphorsa stuy in scientic creativity

UL cRYLD

My purpose n ths chapter s to examne the role that metaphorcalthought has played n the hstorcal development of motvatonal psychology The relaton between motves and metaphors consttutes a partcularly apt topc, snce recently there has been growng nterest n thesgncance of metaphors and analoges n scentc thought (e.g, Boyd,99 Gruber, 98 esse, 966 Kuhn, 99 Leatherdae, 94 MacCormac, 985 McReynolds, 980 Turbayne, 962 and snce the eld ofmotvaton s one of the most basc and venerable areas of psychology.

Rather than begnnng wth a predetermned concepton of the utltyof metaphors n motvatonal theorzng and then lookng for hstorcalnstances that t that concepton, I wll present a hstorcal survey ofdfferent approaches to motvaton, payng specal attenton to the use ofmetaphors and analoges, and I shall then draw such conclusons from the

data as seem warranted. Though my survey s necessarly lmted andselectve, t covers a representatve sample of motvatonal perspectves.Before begnnng ths survey, t wll be useful to dscuss brey theconcepts of motve and metaphor.

The concept of motie

Though a rgorous and completely defensble denton of motvaton snot easly artculated, the general area demarcated by the term s clear

enough, and theorsts throughout hstory have found the noton of motve, or somethng lke t, necessary for an explanaton of behavor If wethnk of behavor as beng determned by factors of two knds, those n

33



4 Pul MReyols

the orgasm and those n th taton, then motvaton falls theformer category. Thus, motvatonl nuences are those behavoral determnants that an organsm carrs around wthn tself nto dfferentenvronment

A key term here s the word bavor Generally speakng, ths term

taken to refer to actons that are n some sense optonal for theorgansm. Thus, an anmal may may not eat n a gven stuation, aperson may or may not go to a gvn socal functon, and o on To saythat a behavor s optonal s not t assert that t s necessarly, or evenprobably, conscously ntended rher, t s smply to mply that wthnthe range of realstc possblt, cludng relevant specesspecc tendences, the occurrence of the behaor s problematc and s sgncantlydetermned by varable factors hn the organsm. In contrast, suchautomatc fnctons as dgeso respraton, and cardovascular pro

cesses are not ordnary thought as behavor, though they may be,at least under certan crcumsaces and to a certan extent Broadlyconceved, behavor conssts o atons, movements, motons, whateverthe anmal as a whole anmal (a ctrasted wth a partclar organ of theamal) oes whether overtly or vertly

Essental, then, to the noton motvaton s the dea of organsmsoing thngs, and dong them n lre part under ther own steam, to putt metaphorcally. Thus, we can tnk of organsms as beng consttutedso as to have the capacty to peform certan behavors yet wthout

some nternal mpetus, some nnr psh or pull, some tendency towardactualzng ts potental actons, organsm would merey exst, nertand nactve. To be sure, t could tll respond, n reex fashon, to theworld about t, but t would lack the characterstc capacty of anmatebengs to adust ther behavor nternal needs and dects What wethnk of as motvatonal tendences do not exst n the abstract, ndependent of ther context Rather, th come nto play only under certancondtons. For example, the mot to drnk arses n response to a waterdect, te motve to ee n repse to a percepton of danger, and so

on.Tese nner mpetuses to beaor - ndvdually, n toto, and n tecontext of the overall state of an ransm - consttute the essence of theconcept of motvaton. The bas aradgm or metaphor for the noton ofmotve, then, s that of a force wtn an organsm that leads to certanmovements - hence the term "moe, somethng that produces moton,or movement

The durablty and tenacty otvatonal concepts derve from thefact that motvaonal nterpretans, n one form or another, have

proved to be essental to the exlcaton of behavor. Yet the precsenature and source of most motve are hghly obscure and, of course,were even more so n earler tme Ths obscurty should not be surprs



v p 5

ng gven that motves are nternal factors largely hdden from drectnspecton. As a result the varety of motvatoal formulatons that havebeen proposed through the ages s enormous and many of these conceptons have nvolved complex metaphors. Ths suggests tat metaphors are

most lkely to occur n areas of scence n whch mportant questons arecombned wt lmted knowledge.Another reason for the promnence of metaporcal patterns of thought

motvatonal pyology les n te kd of poblems tat ae dealt wtn the study of motvaton. The area encompasses (but s not lmted tote topcs of ntentonal (purposve) beavo coce beavo perceptons of personal control and ntrapsychc concts and such topcsnevtably rase dfcult conceptual ssues ncludng the problems of freewll and determnsm. In copng wth these and related problems motvaton theorsts have sometmes turned to anthropomorphsm (e.g. referrng to the ego as f t were anmate and recaton (e .g treatng theunconscou as f t were a tng) . Suc pattes of tougt are frequentlyexpressed n guratve language.

Te relaton betwee motves and emotos deserves a bef ntroductory comment. The dstncton - and overlap - between these two conept ve lw poed omethn f a pule ad ome utr aetreated them as essentally nterchangeable. In the seventeenth centuryte noto of a "passon ncluded both conatve and affectve aspectsand n the contemporary perod motvaton and emoton are sometmes

brought together n the same text and n the same ournal. 1 The problems ot so muc tat motvato ad emoton are n prcple dstngushable but rather that they frequently occur conontly. ertan strngemotons (e.g . love or anger) ave obvous mpellent functons andconversely certan motvatonal processes (e .g . success and falure mayhave conspcuous emotoal concomtants. The answer to ths apparentproblem s to recognze that the same phenomenon may from one perspectve be motvatonal and from anoter be affectve. Thus to theextent tat a gven emotonal state has motvatonal qualtes t s also a

motve and vce versa.

The concept of metapho

A metapor s a partcular type of cogntve constructon. Ordnarlymanfested verbally t relates two tems not typcally conceptualzedas smlar n a relatvely surprsng and sometmes dramatc fashon.

Metaporcal tnkng s promnent n ordnary human dscourse n lterature and n the arts as well as n the scences For example such

guratve expressons as My ob s a rat race and "es a chp off theold block are part of the standard repertore of contemporary Amercanspeech In lterature the use of metaphor - as when arl Sandburg (96



Pul MReyols

refers to Chcago as og Butche r the World (p. 3) and tells us thatThe fog comes/on lttle cat fee (p 3) - s partcularly strkng andperhaps essental. Metaphor also lays a role n the arts. In pantng, fornstance, cubsts saw the world composed of cylnders, cones, andspheres, and n musc a wellknon composton s commonly referred toas the Pastoral Symphony.

Though the utlzaton of mtphors was once consdered relatvelyrare and somewhat napproprat n the scences, recent scholarshp -as already noted - has strongly •mphaszed the promnent role thatmetaphors and analoges have plad n scentc creatvty. Instances arenot hard to nd. In the physca scences one thnks, for nstance, ofAugust Kekul's dscovery of the structure of benzene on the bass of adreamlke mage of a snake grppng ts own tal or of Lord Rutherfordshypothetcal constructon of the atom as composed of electrons whrlngaround a nucleus - n terms of th tructure of the solar system. An earlyand wellknown metaphor n pyholgy, datng back to Plato and Arstotle, represents memory n ter of the mpresson of a seal on a waxtablet. A favorte contemporary ychlgcal metaphor n some quarters at least, s that of the bran r mnd as a "black box.

The techncal lterature on metaphors, most of t concerned wth logcaland lngustc analyses and nvolvng a number of conctng nterpretatons and emphases, s enormous Fortunately, t s unnecessary for usto revew ths lterature n detal here. Indeed, t s probably best to

approach our hstorcal survey wthout too many preconceved notons asto the nature of metaphors, ls those deas napproprately bas oursearch. There are, however, severl mportant ntroductory ponts to bemade.

Frst, some cmmets the age f several words - partcularsimile metpho nlogy and moel (as ths term s used n scence) -wll be helpful. Each of these wors refers to the comparson of two termson the bass of smlarty. In a sle the smlarty s speccally stated,as n the expresson "The bran s like a computer. If we change ths

slghtly to suggest an dentty, as "The bran is a computer, we have ametaphor. And f we propose tht the computer s n certan respects arepresentaton of how the bran fctons, we have made the computer amodel of the bran. The term alogy s often employed when onewshes to draw attenton to a rlevant smlarty between two thngs,whle at the same tme recognz ther dfferences. Note that all theseuses are guratve. The bran s t elly a computer; t does not havetransstors, dsk drves, and so o.

In practce the dstnctons ang smles, metaphors, models, and

analoges are not always clearcut. here s a growng tendency to employthe word "metaphor as a genrc term for all of the above dyadcexpressons. I wll generally follow ths conventon n ths chapter,



tv tp 3

though my man emphass wll be on the dentcaton of what aretechncally analoges, smles, and metaphors. The term "model, tseems to me, should be (and typcally s) restrcted to the more compex,delberatve attempts to construct predctve replcas (physcal, concep

tual, or mathematcal of gven natural domansow do metaphors exercse ther nuence on thought In what manner can metaphors be productve, as contrasted wth merely clever Somensght hee ueton affded by he w f Buke (9969)that a metaphor s a devce for seeng somethng in tems o somethngelse (p 503). Thus, to say that the bran s a computer s to lead oneto thnk of the bran om he pespecive o what computers are lke:It causes one to conceptualze the bran n a new way Smlarly, themetaphorcal expresson Sue has a warm personalty yelds a qute

dfferent pcture of Sue than the expresson Sue has a cold personalty. The essence of a metaphorcal constructon, n acton, s that a persons nterested, for one reason or another, n a gven dea or topc, X andelaborates ths dea or topc by combnng t wth or relatng t to anotherdea or topc, Y, thus extendng or modfyng the meanng of For thscombnaton to qualfy as a metaphor, t s further requred that X and Ybe from content areas that are not normally lnked, so that at rst therconuncton may seem paradoxcal, or even absurd. The reason they cnbe lnked, n spte of ths dsparty, s that they can be conceved as havngsomething n common, and t s when one perceves what ths commonalty could be that he or she gets the metaphor. It s through thscommonalty that the meanng of X s moded by seeng t from theperspectve of Y Thus, n the utterance "John s a dormant volcano, ts clear that the person John X s not actually a dormant volcano Y ;ut f t s perceed that the functon f the expresson s to mply thatwhle normally John s placd he has the capacty to react volently, thenths metaphorcal characterzaton has successfully led to an elaboratedand enhanced understandng of John Wrters on metaphor have employed a varety of terms to desgnate what I hae referred to smply as X

and Y I nd the labels proposed by Leatherdale (974 p. 6) topcanalogue and mported analogue, to be partcularly helpful, and I wllemploy these terms from tme to tme

Metaphors sometmes undergo stages of development. In some nstances ths means that over tme a metaphor comes to be taken lterally

For example, the expresson "Man s a mache was orgnally ntendedmetaphorcally, but ow beleved by ome pero to be a lteral truthAther r t ty dfferet type f che ccr whe a "vemetaphor become a dead oe, a exempled by the hort htory of

the term skyscraper whch once had a certan hock value but whchsoon came to be used n reference to any tall buldng All languages arewell stocked wth such dead metaphors Ideed, Jeremy Betham ssted



Pul Reyols

early n the nneteenth century tht all strctly psychologcal terms n thecommon language were once gurtve expressons based on corporealanaloges (McReynolds, 970 Ogn, 99).

It s useful to classfy metaphors accordng to the extent of thercoverage or applcaton. In ths rard two types have been dstngushed.Pepper, n hs Wol Hypothes ( 42) , delneated the concept of bascanalogy or root metaphor (p. 9 , whch can be contrasted wth other,more specc metaphors. A r metaphor s a concepton of broadtheoretcal generalty that suggst, by analogy, other smlarly broadconceptons Although Pepper d ot gve a name to the more frequent,less encompassng metaphors, Maormac (98), followng epper, hasproposed that the boader clas termed basc metaphors and thatthe other, less encompassng las be called conveyance metaphors(p. 9) . A basc metaphor, n cormac's dchotomy, serves a a bacpresuppostonal nsght or ntuton that undergrds an entre theory. Aconveyance metaphor, n contr, s "employed to express a partcularfeelng or to suggest an ndvdual ssblty (p . 9) . As an example of aroot or basc metaphor MacCrc ctes the computatonal metaphor,whch has recently led to a varet of formulatons regardng cogntveprocessng. 8

What are the functons of mtahors n scence Park, aston, andGalson (984), n ther stmulang dscusson of the employment ofanaloges b Bacon, Galleo, and escates, dstngush between the useof analoges as vehcles for scen explanaton and ther use as vehclesfor scentc exposton. Thus, alleo, though a master of expostoryanaloges, tred to avod the us n explanaton, whereas escartesemphaszed ther explanatory r. Of the two types, explanatory analoges are the more exctng to t hstoran because of ther role nscentc dscovery. What frequenl appears to happen s somethng lkeths: A scentst tryng to make ene of an nadequately charted domannds that the conventonal w o conceptualng t leaves mportantssues unresolved, and then cos up wth a way of seeng a partcularproblem as analogous to somethng from an entrely dfferent doman,thus puttng the whole matter t a new perspectve. Sometmes ths shelpful; sometmes t s not.

Metaphos n mtatonal psychology

avng examned the concepts o motves and metaphors, we are nowready to brng the two together a prmarly hstorcal perspectve. Myapproach wll be to focus o ertan key nstances of metaphorcalthought n the hstory of movtonal psychology, snce t would bempossble to trace ths hstory rehensvely n a chapterlength study- and snce, n any case, ths wod not necessarly be the best way to



es eps 139

proceed, even f space permtted In other words, I shall dentfy anddescrbe what I conceve to be the maor root or basc metaphors thathave hstorcally been nvolved n human motvaton theory, and I shallorganze my subsequent dscusson n terms of these.

I dscern ve such underlyng metaphors, though I do not nsst that mylst s absolutely comprehensve. Motvaton s a very ntrcate affar, andefforts to fathom ts mysteres have resulted n nnumerable currents andcrosscurrents of thought. As a result no reasonably nte set of categores can guarantee a dentve taxonomy of ths hghly complex andofused area. Certanl there s o sngle theme, except perhaps omethng that wuld be so broad as to be neffectual, under whch allmotvatoal conceptos can be ordered. Even wth my vefold conceptualzaton there wll be nstances n whch t s unclear whether a gvenconcepton ts nto one category or another, as well as caes n whch apartcular motvatonal concepton has some of the characterstcs of twoor more metaphorc themes.

The ve basc metaphors of motvaton that I propose are the followng

Controllng powers persons as pawns

2. Personal control persons as agents3 Inherent tendences persons as natural enttes4 Bodly processes: persons as organsms5 Inner fores persons as machnes

These ve basc metaphors can be thought of as the gudng themes nterms of whch motvaton theorsts have tended to develop therconceptualzatons In the followng secton of ths chapter, I wllexamne each of these themes, focusng on the use of metaphors nvarous motvaton theores rather than on the theores themselves. Wthn each secton, I wll also nclude, as approprate, nstances of lessencompassng (conveyance) metaphors.

Contolling powes: pesons s pwnsIt seems probable that human nterest n the determnants of behavorreaches far back nto prehstory, vrtually to the dawn of the speces. Ourknowledge of the earlest conceptons of what we now term motvaton s,of course, extremely sparse, but we can draw certan plausble nferencesIt seems certan, on the bass of anthropologcal and lngustc analyses,that the present naturalstc era, whch began n the rst mllennum BC ,was preceded by a long perod durng whch the occurrence of mportantevents, ncludng sgncant human actons, tended to be attrbuted to the

nuences of hgher, supernatural powers Though t s not clear howwdespread ths pattern of thought was, t s evdent, as I wll documentpresently, that t was once very promnent. When appled to human



140 R

behavors, t amounts to a ther f motvaton n whch the basc paradgm s that the decsons an ndvual makes, when faced wth mportantchoces, are determned by the nuences on hs or her mental processesof certan controllng detes.

Ths concepton of acton, though present n a wde varety of early

peoples, ncludng the Norse, Slas, AngloSaxons, Celts, ancent Persans, and Aryan nvaders o ealy Inda, has been most dentvelyrevealed n the works of or As the clascal scholar R B Onans(95) pu t

In omer, one s struck b t fact that hs heroes wth all thermagncent vtalty and actv feel themselves at every turn notfree agents but passve nstrunts or vctms of other powers . . . .A man felt that he could o help hs own actons. An dea, an

emoton, an mpulse came to hm; he acted and presently reocedor lamented Some god had spred or blnded hm. (p. 303)

The same theme has been aculated by other authortes on thehstory of deas, ncludng E R odds (95), who employed the termpych nterventon to refer the cocepton of hgher powers nterferng wth the course of behor, and by Bruno Snell (953), whoconcluded

In omer a man s unaware of te fact that he may act spontaneous

ly, of hs own volton and st. Whatever strkes hm, whateverthought comes to hm, en from wthout, and f no vsbleexternal stmulus has affecte m he thnks that a god has stood byhs sde and gven hm counel. (p 23)

There are many examples o t folk motvaton noton n omer , butI wll ndcate only one here. Ea n the Ili the hero Achlles, angryat Agamemnon for havng taken from hm the farcheeked Brses, sto whether to draw from bee hs thgh the sharp swor, drvng/away all those who stood betwe and kll the son of Atreus [Agamem

non] , /or else to check the spleen wthn and keep down hs anger (bk. ,90-2; Lattmore, 962, p 64 I n ths stuaton of uncertanty, thegoddess Athene appears to Achlles and drects hm to stay hs re.

The extent to whch the actos of the characters n the Ili areconceved to be determned or t least nuenced by dvntes was rstsystematcally explored by Nlsson (925/967) and was developed furtherby odds (95), Onans (95) nd Snell (953) Barbu (960) as wellas Smon and Wener (966) have related the concepton more drectly topsychology. Barbu, for nstance, berved that the people descrbed by

omer dd not feel that the motes' of ther behavor lay n themselveson the contrary, they beleved tt ther behavor was determned frmoutsde, by the gods (p. 5) More recently, I have utlzed ths



p 4

metaphor n tracng the hstory of the concept of anxety (McReynolds,975) It was Julan Jaynes (976) however, who carred the psychologcal mplcatons of the Ili to ther extreme In hs stmulatng butspeculatve theory of the hstorcal orgns of conscousness, he has pro

posed that people of the omerc age lacked conscousness and that thervoluntary behavors were exclusvely a functon of felt drectves from agod.

Ths nterpretaton, however, eems ue mpluble. Certlomers characters manfest an abundance of very human motves anddrves. Indeed, f ths were ot the case, readers today would hardly ndhe poems so compelng. The epsode referred to above n whchAgamemnon has clamed Brses smply because he desres her and spowerful enough to take her and n whch Achlles reacts ambvalently,revealng conctng motves - provdes two cases n pont. In my vew,the evdence, nterpreted conservatvely, strongly supports the vew thatan early concepton of what we now call motvaton presupposed thatmany human nclnatons to act arse from the nterventon of dvntes,but t does not support the further nterpretaton, proposed by Jaynes andmpled to some degree by the other scholars quoted above, that llhuman actons were conceved n ths manner

In summary, there seems lttle doubt that n the early perod mnyhuman motves for acton were conceptualzed n terms of what havelabeled the controllngpowers metaphor. Answers to questons concernng when, where, and how ths mode of understandng motvaton orgnated are lost n the msts of prehstory, but the paradgm appears to havebeen utlzed n a consderable varety of early cultures As a bascmetaphor for motvaton, the theme s, of course, fundamentally awedn that t does not lead to precse and accountable theores Wth theadvent of the materalstc era n ancent Iona and Greece, the approachtended to dsappear, and t never attaned the status of a systematcallydelneated concepton of human behavor.

Peonl contol pesons s gents

The motvatonal concepton of people beng n charge, so to speak, ofther own behavor has a long past. owever, the personasagent paradgm was not systematzed untl the classcal Greek perod. Snce then, nts varous representatons and rencarnatons, t has contnued to bea vable approach. Though dfferent aspects of ths theme have beenemphaszed by dfferent authors, the essental core concepton s that anndvdual's behavor s a functon of hs or her havng and exercsng the

capacty to make voluntary choces and decsons and to act purposvelyon them.

The early development of the personasagent motvatonal paradgm



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occurred n what has been reerd to by Jaspers (953) as the axalperod of human hstory, spally n the era between 800 and 200B.C. (see Parkes, 959 p. 76) was n ths perod that the earlerprendvdualstc world vew w succeeded, notably n the ntellectualculture of the Greek world, by a oncepton of the ndvdualty of human

bengs (Barbu, 960 p. 7) Th hstorcal stage s thus to be stronglycontrasted wth the stage descrbed earler as underlyng the hgherpowers theme Wth regard to human motvaton, what we see n thstranston s a shft from the assupton that mportant human decsonsare made by the gods to the ve that they are made by human bengsthemselves. Thus, the agency fo mportant acton was conscously andexplctly transferred from wtht to wthn

Accordng to the best classc thortes, the rse of ndvdualsm wasstmulated and manfested by uch lyrc poets as Sappho and Pndar and

by the great tragedes of Aeschyus, Sophocles, and Eurpdes. Snell, nhs Discoey of the Min (9) and Barbu, n hs chapter ttled TheEmergence of Personalty n t Greek World (960 chap. 4) havebrllantly descrbed the dawnng mphass on nternal human drectvesn classcal Greek thought. Ths wa the era of Sorate' cocer whselfknowledge and of the adoon Know thyself over the entranceto the temple at elph It ws also the era of the rst systematcpsychologcal theores. Platos ws among the rst.

Plato dvded the soul nto hr parts or aspects reason, hgh sprts

(passons), and appettes. All o hese have motvatonal sgncance, butt s the rst - reason, or the raal mnd - that correspods ancestrallyto the concept of personal agenc . Plato was partcularly nterested n therelaton of reason to the other aspcts of mental lfe and motvaton, andhe portrayed ths relatonshp wth several strkng metaphors. Perhapsthe best known of these s the le of the charoteer and two steeds(Pheus 253-5 amlton & Carns 96 pp. 499-500) In ths smleone of the horses s portrayed s hghly sprted but manageable (passon), and the other as dfcult d unruly (appettes). The charoteer,

of course, represents reason. he pont of the metaphor s that thecharoteer (human agency), perhas wth some support from one of thehorses (passon), controls the ovement of the charot. In otheranaloges, Plato compared the tee motvatonal aspects to counselors(reason), helpers (passons), and money makers (appettes) n a cty(epublc 44 amlton & Cas, 96 p. 683) and to lovers of wsdom, lovers of honor, and loe of gan (epublc 58; amlton &Carns , 96 p. 808) One anot know, of course, whether thesemetaphors were nstrumental the development of Plato's trparttetheory or whether ther role wa solely that of communcatng hs concepton through vvd mager. t mnmum they performed the latterfuncton



v p

Whereas the concept of human agency was only loosely delneated byPlato, t was spelled out explctly and n consderable detal by Arstotle.In Arstotles analyses the noton of agency entals the deas of choce,endoreted behavors, and purpose. The followng statements of Arto

tle (ca. 335 ../975) are llustratve: "It appears therefore . . . that aman s the orgn of hs actons . . and all our actons am at ends (p.39) and "The orgn of the movemet of the parts of the body nstrumental to the act les n the agent; and when the orgn of an acton sn oneself, t s n ones own power to do t or not (p 9).

Arstotle was more techncal and less poetc n hs wrtngs tha Plato.These facts, as well as he fac tha Arstote, comng after Plao, foundknowledge more well ordered, ma accout for hs less dramatc adapparently less frequent utlzaton of gurate language. Arstotle dd,

of course, employ metaphors.

Wth respect to the concept of agent, forexample, Arstotle (ca. 335 ../975) suggested that the process ofdelberatng about end s analogous to the aalyss of a gure n geometry (pp. 37-9). e also compared the process of an ndvdual makng achoce by and for hmelf to the procedure by whch omerc kgsproclamed decsons to the people (p. 4).

Snce the tme of St . Augutne, the noton of elfagecy, the senseof ountary choosng and ntendng, has often been dscussed n ermsof the wll. Though ths term s dfcult to dene n a rgorous

manner and though t has been employed n a varety of ways by dfferentauthors, t typcally carres the connotaton of a dstnct voltonal poweror faculty, as mpled by "the wll. In addton to Augustne, otherpromnent analysts of the wll have been St. Thomas Aqunas, Renescartes, avd ume Immanuel Kant, and Wllam James. Perhaps npart because of ts somewhat ambguous and abstract nature, the htoryof the dea of the wll s replete wth metaphors, of whch two may benoted here.

Perre Charron, n hs nuental treatse Of Wsom (60707) con

trasted the wll wth the nature of understadng and wrote wth respectto the former, ere the Soul goes as t were out of t self, t stretchesand moves forward toward the Object t seek and runs after t wth openArms, and s eager to take up ts Resdence, and dwell wth the Thngdesrd and belov'd (p. 65). Edward Reynolds 640/97) wrtng alle laer, conveyed hs dea of wll n he followng way

he Wll hah boh a Oeconomc Governmen n respec of heBody, and the Movng Organs thereof, as over ents and t hath

a Politique or Cvll Governmen owards he Unestning Affections and ensitie Appetite as ubjects wth whch by reason ofther often Rebellons t hapneth to have sundry concts and troubles as Prnces from ther sedtous and rebellous subjecs. (pp. 541-2)



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Thugh cuently ut f vgu s a tpc f psychlgcal nquy, thetem wll emans a stable pat f u language, as n such metaphcalexpessns as wllpwe, weak lled, and gdwll, and t cntnues tbe a fcal pnt n the ngn dsussn f fee wll Futhe, wheeascncen wth the faculty f wll has faded n cntempay psychlgy,

emphass n the pesnalcntol etaph, n ts bade sense, emansstng and ndeed appeas t be nceasng.

Rchad de Chams (1968), akng an ndvdualdffeences appacht pesnal causatn, has empld the metaphs f Ogns and Pawnst desgnate, espectvely, ndvduals wh feel that the behavs aedetemned by the wn chces and thse wh feel that the actnstend t be cntlled by the psns the envnment ulan Rtte(1966) utlzed a spatal metaph - lcus f cntl - t dffeentatesmlaly between feelngs enal (pesnasagent) and extenal

(pesnaspawn) cntl. Anothe maj cntempay metaphcaltem that apppeas t have at last sme f the chaactestcs f selfagency s the cncept f a Pln as ntduced by Mlle, Galante, andPbam (1960).

The ma ue ees n e pesasaget paadgm, hweve,has been n the fm f phlsphcal examnatns f the cncept fagency (e.g, a, 1984 a & Secd, 1972 Tayl, 1977) a(1984) cnceves f pesnal agecy as a knd f elease f ptentalactn, and he has emplyed e fllwng cnveyance metaph t

elabate hs meanng In ppang t set ff a ace the state ceates astate f eadness n the unns th hs Get Set. The subsequent Gcan be thught f as a elease p. 189)

Ineent tendences esons s ntul entities

One f the ldest and stll pvalent mtvatnal cnceptns s thatpeple behave the way they do because t s ntul f them t d sSystems based n ths t met have dfculty explcatng ndvdual

dffeences n behav but they s t sme extent by pstng dffeent natual behav epetes fo men, wmen, and chlden Cnceptns f human natue - and hce f natual behav - date back atleast t ancent Sume (Kame 963), and thee ae numeus mplctallusns t the natue f man n Hme, n ealy bblcal wtngs, and nthe lteatue f ealy Chna an nda.

It s mptant t emphasze that the tem natual s nt bengemplyed hee n the lmted snse f nstnctve, nheted, genetc. These cncepts, eetve f me mden appaches t the

cntnuty f human natue, e nt nvlved n the fmatve stages fthe nheenttendences metaph, n ae they pat f ts essence. Theefeence f natual, as appled t human bengs, s smply t the way



v p 145

peple ntnscally ae, as epesented n Asttles (ca. 330 B.C./947)statement that all men natually dese knwledge (p. 3). hat s,peple seek t lean new thngs because t s natual f them t d s. Indscussng human natue, whch has always been taken t efe pmaly

t the mtvatnal makeup f human bengs, sme auths, lke Asttle, have descbed cetan psted natual mtves, wheeas thes havesmply asseed that cean deses tendences wee mplanted by Gd by an anthpmphzed Natue.

Systematc dscussns f natual mtves wee nauguated n the classcal Geek ped. The Geek wd that we tanslate as natue spusis The etymlgy f ths tem suggests that ts gnal meanng,late metaphcally exended, was manne f gwth (Adkns, 970,p. 79). Asttle develped a lage catalg f natual deses and be

haval tendences (Gfn 1931), ncludng deses f fd wamthsexual elatns, cae f the yung, and many thes. The ealy Stcphlsphes wee pmaly espnsble f develpng a speculatvetaxnmy f the human passns The geneal mdel cncened wthsuppsedly natual mtvatnal affecs, lased - wth numeus addtnsand vaatns - f tw mllenna. sty then, has wtnessed thepstulatn f a wde asstment f mtves held t be nheent n humannatue. I wll sptlght seveal f these t llustate the le f metaphsn the hstcal develpment f the nheentendences theme.

Fst cnsde the passn f lve, a badly cnstued human nclnatn f temendus nteest t Renassance phlsphepsychlgstshe fllwng selectn, whch I gve at sme length n de t cnvey tsveall cntext, s fm A Tble of Humne Pssions (16201621) by theFench phlsphe Nclas Ceffeteau

As t s the custme f men t efe the nblest effects t the mstexcellent causes many cnsdeng the dgnty f loe, have magned that ths Pssion came fm a patcula mpessn, whchGd makes n u Soules, nspng nt them wth the ntue theaffectns whch tanspt them, and whch makes them seeke thebjects whch ae pleasng unt them. The whch they stve tpve by the example f the natuall nclnatns whch he hathgven t the Ceatues. Wee see, say they, that Gd as the Authf ntue hath ngafted nt lght thngs an nclnatn t seupwad t seeke the place f the est by easn wheef the edth always send hs ame twads een. And n lke manne heehath mpnted n heavy thngs a natuall nclnatn whch makes

them tend t thecente

s as stnes, mables, and such lke dalways bend dwnewad, & d nt hang n the ae, but wthvlence and cntay t the nclnatn. In the same manne, saythey, Gd hath ngafted n man a cetan nclnatn t thse thngs



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which have sme beames <auy buny, s as when hesebjects cme t incunte i yes minde, he is avished andthen pesently thee is famed in his heat an adent desie t seekand pusue hem. (pp. 83-

What is Ceffeteau's pups i using this meaph f ingafting Itis nt t intduce a new exlaty cncept simply t claify hisexpsitin. I suggest that it is pimaily pesusie that is, t cnvincethe eade f he plausibiliy f te view that the inclinatin t lve isimplanted by Gd. Ceffeteau tes d s by shwing tha his ppsitin is analgus t smething th eade (in that peid) aleady tk fganted, namely, the Aisttelean cnceptin f upwad and dwnwadmtin.

As a secnd example f meaphs used in the sevice f the inheenttendencies theme I efe t Ceteaus teatment f pleasue and pain.

The passage in the same b <ads as fllws

As this geat Fbicke f th avens 9 makes his mtin upn thetw Ples f the wld, whih ae as it wee the tw pints whee itbeginnes and ends S i seees ha ll he Passins f u sulesdepend upn Plesue and Pne which gw fm he cntentment distaste which w ceiv fm the divese bjects which pesentthemselves t us in the cu f this life. (pp. 244-5)

The cntentin that pleasue and pain ae the natual abites f

behavi is an ld ne. Pehp its bestknwn fmulatin is eemyBenthams (789948) metaphial expessin that Natue has placedmankind unde the gvenanc f tw sveeign mastes, pain and pleasue It is f them alne t pnt ut what we ught t d as well as tdetemine what we shall d p . L .20

F my next illustatin I a iebted t avid Leay (977), wh hascalled attentin t an inteestig plyment f analgy in Gege Bekeleys scial thy. (The ve act that Bekeley, famus f his idelism had a scial they will phaps supise many) The essence f

Bekeleys (73955) psitin s an emphasis n the inheent natuef human sciability. T pt is cnceptin Bekeley dew a paallelbtween scial tendencies and avitatinal cncepts as then ecentlycdied in Newtnian they. T fllwing, smewhat tuncated selectin expesses th analgy

Philsphes ae nw agee tat thee is a mutual attactin between the mst distant pat a east f this sla system . . . . Nw ifwe cay u thughts f t cpeal t the mal wld, wemay bseve in the Spiit Minds f me a like pinciple fattactin, wheeby they a wn tgethe in cmmunities, clubs,families, fiendships, and all the vaius species f sciety. As inbdies, whee the quantity s the same, the attactin is stngest



vs tps 4

between thse whch ae placed neaest t each the, s s tlkewse n the mnds f men , tes pbus between thse whchae mst nealy elated. (pp. 225-6)

An mptant cntempay f Bekeley was Fancs utchesn.

utchesn n cmpany wth a numbe f the phlsphes f hsped, n patcula Shaftesbuy, espused a natual human tendencytwad benevlence, what tday s temed altusm. Lke Bekeley andpaccally al e saas he ely eheeh euy, uesnwas nuenced by Newtn. It s theefe nt supsng t nd utchesn ( 725) famg the fllwng cmpasn:

Ths unesl Beneolence twad all Men w e may cmpae t thatPncple f Gtton whch pehaps extends t all Bdys n the

Unese; but lke the Loe f Beneolence nceses as the stance s dmnshed and s stongest when Bdys cme t touc eachthe . . . . hs ncee f Loe twads the Beneolent accdng tthe nee Appoces to ou seles by the Benets s bsevablen the hgh degee f Loe whch Heoes and Lwges unvesallybtan n the wn Cuntys abve what they nd abad. (pp.198-9)

It s nstuctve that bth Bekeley and utchesn emplyed gavtatnal metaphs t state the cases. Althugh t wuld be dfcult tpve t seems that t was thugh the ceatve use f analges fmNewtns cnceptn gavtatn (ts pstulated unvesalty and tsnvese squae law) that utchesn lke Bekeley, came up wth thedeas he ppsed cncenng scablty and benevlence. In any case ts nteestng t nte hw Bekeley and utchesn utlzed the then veyecent Newtnan they f gavtatn and hw at an eale tmeCeffeteau used the then pevalng Asttelean cnceptn f fces.Clealy the specc cmpasns made by these thests eected thehstcal cntexts n whch they lved.

My nal llustatn f a pductve analgy n the natualstc mde sless cleacut but vey nteestng. In the yea 692, Chstan Thmasusa leadng gue n the Geman Enlghtenment ppsed a mdel fpesnalty that pstulated fu nheent human nclnatns: sensuusness acqustveness, scal ambtn and atnal lve. The stknglynnvatve aspect f Thmasuss cnceptualzatn s that t was ppsedalng wth a methd f systematcally applyng numecal atng scales nthe assessment f these fu mtvatnal vaables (McReynlds & Ludwg 1984). In addtn, Thmasus epted quanttatve nfmatn

deved fm ve pesns, ncludng what amunts t elablty datacncenng ne case. hs wk appeas t cnsttute the st dcumented systematc cllectn and analyss f quanttatve data n actualsubjects n the ente hsty f psychlgy.



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Thmasuss appach t ealty - havng the same pesn atedndependently by tw judges s suggested t hm by the fllwnganalgy as expessed n hs ds (tanslated and quted n McReynlds & Ludwg 1984)

ust as n mathematcs whee hee s n bette way t check t seef ne has calculated cetl than t epeat the pcess tw thee tmes n de t nd t f the sum s the same, I havethught that n the dscve f the tuths, egadless f whatdscplne t may be, ths meh mght be the best way f checkg[the accuacy f ths scence. . 551)

A tgug quest s, Wh dd Thmasus get the dea f atngpsychlgcal dmensns In dn why dd he utlze a sxtypntscale athe than a scale f ten tenty sme the numbe f pnts

Althugh we can nly cnjectue hee s n ham n explg pssbleclues. Mst lkely hmasus g hs basc dea fm an analgy based ntempeatue scales. Thugh acue and standadzed themmetes hadnt been develped by 1692 the dea f lnea tempeatue scales waswell establshed ad pesumabl ll kw t Thmasus. The subsequent chce f a sxtypnt sl may have been based n an analgywth tme measuement as caed ut by mechacal clcks. The numbe60 has, f cuse bee sgncant Westen cultue snce t seved as thebase f the numbe system f te ancent Sumeans but t was n the

latte pat f the seventeenth ety that clcks began t have mnutehands that maked ff hus n sxty equal unts.In the mde ea the nheenendency appach t mtvatn was

affded stng suppt by the wtngs f Chales awn (1859, 1871)and Wllam ames (1890), bth f whm emphaszed nstnctve factsn behav. Thugh nstnct ths ae nw ut f style, they have beensucceeded by analgus ethgal cnceptns (see EblEbesfeldt,1970 Klpfe & alman, 196). hugh ethlgsts have cncentatedn anmal behav, the wk as dente mplcatns f human

mtvatn. Othe nheenttendey appaches (e.g. , Cattell&

Chld,1975 Eysenck, 1967) have been lagely assmlated nt genetc cnceptualzatns, thugh nly n a ve pelmnay way. At the level f flkthees f mtvatn, ntepeatns f behav n tems f cnceptns f basc human natue ae mmnplace.

Bodily pocesse: esons s ognms

The essence f the bdlypeses metaph f mtvatn - thathumans ae anmate, rganc bgs - des nt peclude the smultaneus applcatn f the pesnsagent, pesnasnatualentty, andpesnasmachne gudng meths. Cnceptns f the natue f



v p

animate beings have changed ve the centuies, but this fact need nttuble us here, since u gal is nt an ultimate specicatin f what lifeis, but a claicain f the le that cnceptns f the livin ganismhave played histically in mtivatinal they.

In this cntext it is imptant t nte that an animate wld view, inwhich all eality is intepeted as being alive and as pssessing feeling andwishes, has been pevalent thughut much f human histy. Thisview was nt limited t pimitive peples t ealy civilizatins. On thecntary, as we will see shrtly, it pesisted in sme degree until theeighteeth entuy. Such a pespecive bviusy filitated tempts tintepet behavis in tems f ganic pcesses, as these wee undestd at diffeent times and in diffeent places.

An ealy, thugh limited ganismic cnceptin f mtives was ffeedby Plat in his Pilebus (31d-32d amiltn & Cains, 1961 pp. 1109-10). In this dialgue Scaes ppses that a state f distess in a livingceatue fllws a distubance f hamny and that the distess causedby such a state (e.g. hunge thist) leads t estative effts. Thisfmulatin is clealy an adumbatin f mden physilgicaldecitmdels f mtivatin.

Aisttle, pimaily a bilgical theist, was stngly iented twadan ganismic mtivatial pespective. I his Moment of Animals (ca.340 ./1968) he emplys a numbe f metaphs t elabate thenatue f mtivated behavi:

The mvement f animals esembles that f mainettes whichmve as he esul f a small mveme, when he stings aeeleased and stike ne anthe a tycaiage which the childthat is iding up i himself sets in mtin in a staight diectinand which aftewads mves in a cicle because its wheels aeunequal . . . . Animals have simila pats in thei gans namely thegwth f thei sinews and bnes, the latte cespnding t thepegs in the mainettes and in [pesumably a efeence t a patf the caiage], while the sinews cespnd t the stings, thesetting fee and lsening f which causes the mvement. (pp.463-4)

A cntempay eade cming upn these wds f the st timeis likely t see in them an ealy instance f the pesnasmachinemetaph This hweve wuld be incect. The machine paadigm wasstill sme tw millennia in the futue (abut tw thusand yeas sepaateAisttle fm bbes and escates), and Aisttle's pupse in emplying a mechanical metaph was nt t insist that animals ae actually

machines, but ahe, as a bilgist, t ptay the natue f animalmvement by elating it t smething familia t his audience. The factthat passages simila t the ne just quted wee put fwad in the



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seventeenth and eghteenth centues t ague f a machne mdel llusates hw smla metaphs an be emplyed f qute dffeentpupses and hw the message tended by a metaph s vey much afunctn f ts cntext.

The maj gansmc cnceptulzatn develped n the ancent wld

was the they f the hums. Ognally systematzed by ppcates asan explanatn f dseases t wa ate elabated and extended by Galeand thes t cmpse a they f tempeament. The geneal ntnf the latte they, as s well kwn, was that cetan tempeamentalentatns, such as cheefulnes and tablty, ae detemned bybdly cnsttuents f the knd tha e nwadays wuld label bchemcal.Thugh pmaly an affectve they, humlgy als had bvus mtvatnal mplcatns F nstac humal thests suppsed that theamunt f phlegm affected the g f actns. S fa as humlgy

pvded a mtvatnal psychly, t s apppate t nte that Galen'sgnal develpment f the ffldtempeament cnceptn n thesecnd centuy A.. appeas t ve been stmulated, at least n lagepat, by an analgy wth ppcates' dsease mdel - and that the lattewas tself deved fm the Geek nceptn f fu pmay ansmcqualtes (ht, cld, dy, and wet . These fu qualtes wee tansfeedby Galen t the psychlgcal eal when, f example, he attbuted aquckly changng mnd t an xces f bdly heat, emtnal stabltyt clness, and s n (Segel, 0, p. 210) These metaphs ae stll

embedded n u cmmn langua, as when we say that a pesn s httempeed s cl n the pesene f dange.As nted eale, the cncept mtvatn ecmpasses the phen

menn f mvement , and ealy wes wh tk the rgansmc pespectve wee especally nteested hw anmal mtn culd be explaned.It was ecgnzed vey ealy the ellenstc ped and pssblybefe - that anmal mtn n se manne nvlves dectves sent utfm the ban by means f the nves t the musculatue whch n tunactually effect mvement. A etal pblem n ths analyss was themeans by whch the messages ta alng the neves. he questn wasnt eslved, f cuse, untl the den ea, wth the undestandng fbelectc pcesses, but the nterenng centues bught fth a vaetyf speculatns.

alen cnceved that sme upeced alteatn n qualty mvesalng the neve and he lkened ths t the manne n whch lght and heatae tansmtted fm the sun (Segel 1970 p. 194). he mst genealappach untl the mden ped weve, was t pctue the neves astubes thugh whch anmal sp s pass fm the ventcles f the bant the muscles. As the muscles suppsedly ll wth anmal spts theyexpand, thus bngng abut mveent thugh an essentally hydaulcpcess (Espe 1964 p. 100 ayn, 1970). As an example f ths ntn



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f neual tansmssn, I qute bey fm an anatmy lectue gven n1620 Neves have n peceptble cavty ntenally . . . but the ntenalsubstance s cntnuus and pus wheeby t gves a passage t theanmal spt, whch s exceedngly apd n mtn and s caed thugh

ths substance wth an adant apdty, just as we see lght mvngthugh a (quted by Fench, 1975, p. 15).Befe clsng ths sectn, I wsh t cmment bey n the gn

f hydaulc analges whch have played s geat a le n mtvatnthey. Empedcles (fth centuy B.C.), s fa as wtten evdencendcates was the st phlsphe t apply the hydaulc ntn tgansms. In hs On Ntue (Espe, 1964 p. 96; Lenad, 1908 p. 47fagment 100 Wthen 970) he cmpaed the functns f pasages(tubes) wthn the bdy t the phenmenn f a gl hldng a cntane(a wateclck f gleamng bnze) unde wate wth he hand ve anpenng s that the ar wthn pevents wate frm enterng. Empedcles'smewhat ambguus smle and the fact that he s tadtnally asscated wth the develpment f the pneumatc schl f medcne, suggestthat hs thughts may have been nstumental n the eventual develpment f systematc hydaulc thees. We may me safely pesume thatthe actual hydaulc and pneumatc appaatuses, as descbed by e fAlexanda (ca. A.. 62/1971) wee f suggestve value t ealy mtvatn thests

ydaulc analges, t wuld seem, have pved almst essental t

mtvatnal psychlgsts, and the day n the sun has hadly ended.Wthut elabatn and wthut specfyng whethe they suppt thepesnasgansm the pesnasmachne t metaph, I shallsmply lst a numbe f quashydaulc analges ecently cuentlyempyed n mtvatna they Feud's (19401964) cnceptn fcathexes, n whch lbdnal eneges, n de t be nvested n nebject, must be wthdawn fm anthe bject ung's (1928/1960) pncple f equvalence, accdng t whch psychc enegy can be attachedt ne nteest nly f eleased fm anthe attachment; ulls (1943)

mtvatn thery, whch assumes that the fces frm several mtvessum up t yeld an veall dve () Lenzs actnspecc energymdel, n whch dffeent energy surces, cnceptualzed as guatvelyllng a esev, buld up pessue t bng abut elease (see Klpe &alman, 1967 pp. 42-3) and my wn they f anxety , whch attbutes the ntensty f that affect t the level f unassmlated expeences(McReynlds, 1976). he mst cmmn example f a hydaulc mtvatnal metaph les n the ppula ntn that peple need t let ffsteam fm tme t tme as the pessue fm accumulated tatns

nceases.Clealy, the gansmc appach t human mtvatn s hghly pmnent n cntempay psychlgy. Ths blgcal emphass undeles



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wk n such tpcs as the le hmnal acts, ban unctns, andthe physlgcal acts n beh ( a evew, see Mk, 1987). Ishuld nte t that thee has be a cnceted tendency t ncpatethe gansmc paadgm wthn th mechanstc paadgm.

Inne foces sons s mines

The pedmnant cntempay tvatnal paadgm s based n themachne metaph. Peple ae eved as machnes, and the expessnand nteactn mtves ae ntpeted n tems the peatns andeects that chaacteze mechaniss. It s, t be sue, nt easy t knwpecsely what cnsttutes a mehsm. hee was a tme when the wdmachne cnjued up mage gea tacks, pulleys, leves, and thelke, and pehaps t stll des. Su pctue, hweve, s hadly adequate

n a ped n whch the mst sstcated appaatuses nclude tanssts Xays, and lase beams tunately t s nt necessay upesent pupses that we have a us dentn machnes snce ucncen s n pmaly wth manes pe se bu athe wh peple'sncepns machnes

In ths cntext let us bey xamne the hsty the machnemetaph as appled t mtvat nd cnsde n patcula hw t camet be deentated m the anmebeng metaph. F seveal mllenna, pbably sce he begnns sysemac human hugh, hee

was a tendency (as we nted ele) peple t attbute le, at leastn sme lwe sense, t bjecs at we nw cnsde nanmate Thspespectve had emakable stayn pwe F example, t was cmmnly assumed - and nt just by the alchemsts - that metals wee n smesense alve As late as the latte at the seveteenth cetuy, hLcke (ca. 17201877) wte Al stnes metals and mneals ae ealvegetables that s, gw ganl m ppe seeds, as well as plants(p. 486). The anmate paadgm ban t be systematcally suppanted bythe mechancal paadgm n the ee teenth centuy and by the nneteenth

centuy the dmnant wld viw t least n the West evlved aundthe machne analg. hs transt thugh smwhat abrupt n hstrcaltems dd nt ccu vernght and s ascnatng t study.

Tday wth the dmnance t machne metaph we ae lkely tsay that the human ban s lk a cmpute, but n the tanstnalped when the anmate pespectve was stll pweul, ne was ust aslkely t undestand a physcalstc henmenn by cmpang t t smethng anmate. F example, Aaban alchemsts cmpaed the transmutatn dseased metals nt ld t the medcal cue sckness.They thught the unace r th metal as t were a hsptal ct rthe nvald (. Gegy, 1, p. 301) Fancs Bacn, thugh astng habnge the develpn echanstc pespectve, stll thught,



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as Gegoy puts it in tems o an "nnimte equlent o animatebehavio (p 304) Thus Bacon conceived that inanimate bodies had akind o appetite' to choose the pleasing o avoid the unacceptable Wate would hang in doplets to avoid discontinuance gold leaves

peeed the point o a nge to the neighbouhood o the atmosphee(p 304) and so onPehaps the most intiguing instance o a physicalismtoanimism anal

ogy is that believed to have been utilized by Newton (16871974) in theomative stages o his theoy o gavitation Though explicit documentay evidence is lacking thee is eason to believe that Newton's evolutionay insight gew out o analogies om the animate ealm (see Dobbs 1975 Guelac 1983; Manuel 1968 pp 73-4 84-5 Westall 1980see also Leay Chapte 1 this volume) Beoe the Pncp the deve

loping mechanistic philosophy o natue was amed in tems o paticlesin motion acting diectly on one anothe Newtons epochal move wasto posit that bodies attact each othe at a distance without necessayintemediay bidges Though his notion was consideed occult by manyand had implications bothesome to Newton himsel its aeachinginuence cannt be doubted How did ewtn ome upon such an idea?What was its geminal oigin in his mind? Appaently Newton eachedthis conception though analogical easoning based on his intensivestudies o alchemy a eld populated by such concepts such as active

pinciples attaction epulsion and the sociability

o substances (Dobbs 975 Westall 1980). Ultimately once his theoy wasuthe developed ewtn attibuted the physcal es in the univeseto Gods will (Guelac 1983).

What actos led to the ise o the mechanistic wold view and thus to amechanistic conception o motivation in the seventeenth and eighteenthcentuies? A patial answe seems to lie in the populaity duing thatpeiod o lielike mechanically animated gues o automata whichwee sometimes ound in public places Such moving eplicas o humansand animals with thei complex contivances o wheels cams and levescould well have suggested that humans and animals actually aemachines though somewhat moe complex than the existent automataIndeed we know om Descates's own testimony that analogies based onthe automata ound in the gottoes o Pais wee instumental in hisconceptualization o animals as machines (Descates 16621972 aynes1970). This is paticulaly elevant testimony since Descates's theoiesae usually accepted as seminal in the eventual development o themachine model

Nevetheless and without depeciating the inuence o automata I amnot inclined to assign them a singula ole in the eventual tiumph o themechanistic wold view Fo one thing seventeenthcentuy automatathough possibly moe complex than those o pevious eas wee hadly



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novel It is now well documente that complex machines includinginticate automata (Bedini 964 umbaugh 966 Chauis & Doz95 Heo ca AD 6297 Reynolds 97 Pice 964) and evenan ealy computelike device (Pce 959) existed in ancient GecoRoman cultue Thus it is clea tha actos othe than the mee existence

o automata ae necessay to eplain the emegence o the machinepaadigm

It is aily obvious what these cucial actos wee Specically theywee () the development o a w conception o motion and (2) thespead o mechanical clocks mn which involved automata includinghuman gues constucted to stike the hous Since both o these actoswee intimately involved in the devlopment o the mechanical metaphoo motivation I will discuss eac them sepaately

Fist the concept o motion Aistotle had poposed a theoy o motion

that dominated thought up to a in some espects beyond the timeo Galileo This conceptualizatio emphasized the inheent capacity oanimals to engage in selinitiate movement n contast to nanimateobects which move only when ushed o pulled o when seeking theinatual position This last point i potant It was assumed that heavyobects such as stones natually me downwad towad the cente o theunivese (conceived as the cente the eath) and that light obects suchas smoke natually move upwa An impotant exception to thesegenealities was the movemen o the heavenly bodes which wee

thought to be animate Fo them e natual movement was supposed tobe cicula Futhe the natual sate o all teestial bodies was consideed to be est so that o an obect to be kept in motion it waspesumed that continuous oce d to be applied (Fo a psychological analogy based on Aistotl'� conception see the quotation omCoeeteau that is given ealie)

This complex but highly inutial model an into cetain poblemseven in Aistotles day and it cae unde inceasing attack in the latemedieval and Renaissance peiod The new paadigm o motion epesented most denitively in the wok o Galileo and Newton emphasizedectilinea motion and the tendcy o bodies to stay at est o tocontine in motion as the cae ight be and eased any undelyingdieence between the movemet o teestial and heavenly bodiesThe longtem eects o this evoluion in the conception o motion weeextemely a eaching Buttee 957) even concluded that o all theintellectual hudles which the huan mind has cononted and ovecomein the last teen hunded yeas t one most stupendous in the scope oits consequences is the one elati to the poblem o motion (p 5)

This paadigm shit in the concepion o motion had impotant implica

tions o sychology and especilly o motivation theoy his s notsupising given that the tem mtive in its psychological sense oigi



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nally eeed to the natue and souces o animal and human movementThe inuence o the new conception o motion was paticulaly appaentin the seventeenthcentuy witings o Thomas Hobbes who was stonglyinuenced by Galileo Hobbes woking om an analogy with the ole o

motion in physics developed a mateialistic theoy in which mentalactivity was equated with innitely small motions o endeavos in theneves and the bain The concept o endeavo as we noted ealiewas subsequently used by Newton (see nte 27). As mplyd yHobbes it had a distinctly motivational cast being used o instance toexplain appetitive and avesive tendencies As Petes (1967) hasobseved The postulation o these minute movements in the bodies oanimals and men made the suggestion plausible that human action as wellas the movement o poectiles can be explained mechanically Ate allmen move owads and away om obects and each othe (p 87) 9

he second imotant acto in the ise o the mechanistic wold viewand moe paticulaly o the mechanistic conception o motives was thespead o mechanical clocks Though hoological devices o vaious sotssome o them quite complex can be taced well back into the medievaland ancient peiods it was in the outeenth centuy and theeate thatlage mechanical weightdiven clocks began to appea thoughoutEuope Fo some time the moe pominent o the clocks included complex automata thus eectng the pesstence of the anmstic wold viewDuing the sixteenth centuy o pehaps even beoe a new om omotive oce the use o metal spings that could be tightened - wasdeveloped This made it possible to constuct much smalle as well aspotable clocks

As clocks impoved in accuacy and potability and became moewidely disseminated they came to be viewed as amazing miaculouseven lielike devices This attitude was vividly expessed in a hetoicalquestion asked by the philosophe ohn Amos Comenius (16571910) Isit not a tuly mavelous thing that a machine a soulless thing can movein such a lielike continuous and egula manne? (p 96). It is not

clea this long ate the event who st had the ceative insiation thatthe human mind o at least the animal mind might be thought o asanalogous to a clock but eventually the clock metapho became veypominent in psychological thought Among the many seventeenth andeighteenthcentuy authos who utilized the clock metapho in explicatinghuman behavio wee Hobbes Descates and La Mettie

It is impotant to emphasize the special elevance o the clock analogyto motivation theoy This elationship deives pimaily om the signicance o metaphos that focused on the analogy between the souces o

powe in clocks and the motive oces in animals and pesons Thus wend Comenius stating with espect to ealy clocks that the weights aethe desies and affections which incline the will this way o that (p 48).



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Late as clocks became moe sopiticated it was the sping (specicallythe mainsping) that constituted t impoted analog o conceptualizingmotivation in mechanical tems us ulien de La Mettie in his inuential Mn Mcine (1748/912, eeed to the human bain as themainsping o the whole machin (p 135), and William Paley (1825)noted that when we see the watc oing we see poo that thee is apowe somewhee that thee is a secet sping in a wod that theeis oce and enegy as well as mhanism (p 525).

As I have poposed elsewhee (McReynolds 1980), the clock metapho including the povision o a intenal powe souce that keeps themechanism unctioning was insuental in delineating the conception oinne oces o motives in human and animals Though the genealnotion o motivation is an old one and medieval and Renaissance philosophes posited a motivational acuty (motiva) to cay out the diec

tives o the soul the idea o mi as inne oces o impetuses had toawait not only the elucidation o te concept o oce by Galileo ewtonand othes but also the specic aalog o the spingdiven clock By theend o the eighteenth centuy th em motive in its moden psychological sense had come into genea use (eg Bentham 789948, 85/1969 Hutcheson 1725 Locke 161959). It is inteesting that the temmotive powe also came to b employed in physics (eg Canot18241960)

As the dominant wold view shed om that o an animate pespec

tive to that o mechanism (Diksthuis 1969), it began to seem natualto conceptualize dieent aspes eality in mechanical tems Thuseven ate the use o the clock mtapho declined in the eighteenth andnineteenth centuies othe machielike analogs wee used to sustain andadvance the mechanistic model o motivation The essence o this paadigm as it developed was the assption o intenal conditions o statesthat automatically dive o impel a animal o peson into given behavioal channels These inne motive oes wee conceived as aising mechanically and necessaily within the niidual The gand success o ewton's

(16871974) gavitational theo uggested to vaious philosophes thatconcepts and appoaches analogos to those employed by Newton mightbe poductive in the human sciens Ealie quotations in this chapteom the woks o Bekeley n Hutcheson eect this view Moesystematic attempts to boow ceatively om Newton wee made byLocke Hume Hatley Kant nd Hebet (see Lowy 1971)

The nineteenth centuy saw he apid development o themodynamictheoy in physics which osteed he uthe delineation o the conceptso enegy and entopy These ccepts wee adapted analogically bycetain theoists Both Feud (s Holt 968) and ung (1981960)utilized the notion o psychic eney and McDougall (1933) posited theexistence o mental enegy The piciple o entopy and the consevation



tv tp 157

o enegy contibuted by suggestive example to a numbe o hydaulicmotivational models as discussed ealie in this chapte

Coming to the pesent peiod we nd that motivation theoy in thetwentieth centuy has been dominated by two boad conceptualizations

psychoanalytic theoy and dive theoy Both o these appoaches haveinvolved the signicant use o conveyance metaphos Psychoanalyticmotivation theoy developed by Feud (19171963, 1933/1964, 19401964)om the end o the last centuy into the 193 can be seen as an inconguous but poductive maiage o the pesonasagent and pesonasmachine metaphos The concept o the ego is eective o pesonal contol but the geate pat o psychoanalytic motivation theoy with its emphasison the inteplay o inne oces is clealy mechanistic Feud himsel was apolic invento and use o metaphos (Nash 1962 Thom & Kchele

1987 see also Leay Chapte 1 this volume) In this connection onethinks not only o Feud's extensive hydaulic analogies to which Ialluded ealie but also o his postulation o a censo guading againstthe enty o epessed mateial into consciousness his poposal odamatic inteelations among the anthopomophic ego id and supeego and so oth As Leay has obseved Feud's use o metaphos wasdelibeate and nonapologetic Futhe as Nash has pointed out Feudnot only illustated by metapho he also conceived in metapho (p 25)

Pobably the most widely employed technical tem in motivational

psychology in this centuy has been dive This tem was intoduced byWoodwoth in 1918, along with the companion tem mechanism (Thetem mechanism ailed to catch on in motivation theoy) It is inteesting that Woodwoth employed metaphos in ode to delineate themeaning o these concepts Using the example o a baseball pitche hedescibed mechanism as the poblem o aiming gauging the distance andcoodinating movements and dive as the answe to the questions whythe man is pitching at all why he pitches bette on one day than anotheand so on (pp 36-7). The distinction between dive and mechanism

may become cleae Woodwoth (1918) wote i we conside it n thecase o a machine The dive hee is the powe applied to make themechanism go the mechanism is made to go and is elatively passive(p 37). Following Woodwoth othe psychologists developed divetheoy Most impotant among them was Clak Hull (1943, 1952), whoevealed his ealy commitment to a mechanistic appoach in the ollowingdiay enty o 1 Mach 1926 It has stuck me many times o late thatthe human oganism is one o the most extaodinay machines - and yeta machine (Hull 1962, p 820)

Though both psychoanalytic theoy and dive theoy ae now lesscental to motivational psychology than beoe they ae still inuentialand a numbe o newe mechanistic motivational conceptions have gainedecognition These include optimallevel theoy and opponentpocess



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theoy Optimallevel theoy (ummaized in Akes & Gaske 1977,pp 144-65) holds that individual eek to maintain optimal levels (nottoo much and not too little) o cetn psychological vaiables such as theamount o novelty that one s eeencing o the extent that one isaoused Though this theoy has many oots it was stimulated in pat by

an analogy with Cannons (1932 cception o homeostasis (Mook 1987Stagne 1977), which held that onisms ae so constituted as to maintain a pope balance within phsiologcal systems Opponentpocesstheoy developed by Solomon an Cobit (1974), is concened with theact that cetain expeiences that e eithe pleasant o unpleasant tendwhen teminated to be ollowed b an opposite aect (see Mook 1987)Fo example cetain dugs yield ositive aects but the withdawaleelings ae distinctly unpleasant e essential theme o ths theoy wasboowed by analogy om sen psychology (Huvich & ameson

957In concluson the pesonasmne metapho has tended to dominate

motivationa theoizing in ecent ecades and it has tended to incooate both the esonasnatulentity and the pesonasogansmhemes Futhe boh contempoy behavioism and cuent cogniivepsychology ae essentially mechanstic in style The only seious ival tothe machine analogy on the cuent scene is the pesonasagentmetapho which (as noted eale has shown a stiking esugence inecent yeas

Theoretical implications

Having completed ou histoica suvey we ae now in a position to seewhat lessons and suggestions may gleaned om the ecod o the pastPehaps the most cleacut and nt unexpected conclusion is that analogical thinking has been widely eployed thoughout the two and a halmillennia o omal thought about otivation The specic examples thatI have gve costtute oly a smal acto though I thnk a epeseta

tive action o the metaphos tt motivation theosts have devisedThe geneal patten has been tht a paticula way o conceptualizingmotivation has been developed o modied by impoting analogs omothe content domans

My pimay pupose in taking a longitudinal appoach in this suveyhas been to enable us to get an oveall pictue o the topic unde eviewto see - to put it guatively - th oest athe than the tees In thiscontext we may ask whee th ipoted analogs o motivation metaphos have come om Ou evie clealy indicates that they have come

om all ove - om wheeve thnkes ad scentists have ound whatseemed to be elevant instances example motivation theoists haveboowed analogs om music (eg dissonance motivation) om politics



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e g censoing motives) and even om othe elds o psychology (e g the opponentpocess motivational model) Moe geneally it appeasthat analogs have most equently been dawn eithe om the und ogeneal wisdom and expeience amilia to eveyone o om nonpsycho

logical aeas that enoy high pestige Instances o the st sot includeo example dieent vesios o the clock analogy as well as most o themotivational metaphos employed by Plato Descates and Feud Incontast metaphos o the second class include those adapted om thephysical sciences such as those elying on concepts om Newtoniantheoy This eeence to physical science analogs as examples o thesecond sot pesumes o couse that the pevailing wold view accodshighe pestige to the physical sciences than to psychology ad the othelie sciences It is woth notng n this egad that in an ealie age whe

the animistc pespective was dominant physcal scientists commonlyimpoted analogies om the anmate wold in ode to aod theiconcepts an aua o geate eality The physical notion o oce oinstance was oten explicated by analogy to human physical stength

Thus the typical diection o a scientic metapho o analogy is om amoe pestigious and cedible domain to a less pestigious and cedibledomain Conside o instance the expession human benevolence islike gavity One o the implications o this statement is that benevolence s univesal and one o the aims o its eliance on a scienticmetapho is to make this theoetical position seem moe plausible moeconvincing by associating it with a popostion o phenomenon that theaudience aleady takes o ganted O couse what is taken o ganteddies om one ea and om one audience to anothe so it should notbe supising that thee has been a continual change ove time in thechoice o specic (conveyance) motivational analogies Thus wheeasNewtonian mechanics once spawned a numbe o inetia analogies moeecently it has been physical eld theoies in the tadition o Einsteinselativity theoy that have suggested newe motivational conceptionslike those o Kut Lewin (1939) Cuently as noted ealie a mao

development in motivational psychology is optimallevel theoy. Thisappoach utilizes analogs om both technology (e.g the themostat) andbiology (Cannons concept o homeostasis)

Taken togethe these obsevations suggest that the metaphos employed in motivational psychology tend to be oicl, to daw on elevantew souces as these become available But though this is so it is alsotue that cetain metaphoical themes in the aea o motivation aeam tt I am thki o examle o the umeableestatements and eincanations o the hydaulic analogy Anothe endu

ing theme is the concept o vaious bodily o psychological decits oneeds Futhe the same theme may appea in simila metaphos atwidely sepaated times Fo example in a damatic descption eminis



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cent o Plato's image o the two teds Feud (933/964) compaed theego's elation to the id to that o a de on his hose Similaly the clockmetapho is stll used at least in cmmon speech (I wonde what makeshim tick?) Howeve undametally dieent undelying metaphosmay be suppoted by essentially sila topical analogs Fo example theautomata that Descates and oes used to suppot the machinepaadigm wee not adically dient om the maionettes with whichAistotle illustated the oganismi aadigm

Fequently scientic metapho� appea to ow athe diectly ompevailing wold views oten I supect without the theoist being awaeo this act That the univese and all its pats including pesons aebasically mechanisms is the implct assumption undelying most cuentmotivational theoizing but the moity o contempoay theoists pobably do not ealize that the mecanistic paadgm is itsel a metapho

on the gand scale This obsevatn leads me to popose that metaphoscan in pinciple be conceptualiz hieachically om the most allencompassing instances such as he animistic paadigm and the machinepaadgm to the most paticulaisti and tivial ones as when one mightosu a meaho hat has meanin only o a vey lmied audienceIt is I suggest the highe boae nalogies which I have eeed to asbasic o oot metaphos that sev as guides oten implicitly to theoyconstuction The loweevel mo paticulaistic metaphos ae moelikely to seve an expositoy ole

An inteesting question is Whe do metaphos come into play? Whatoccasions thei constuction? Metaphos ae devised o couse by pesons acting unde individual need ad whims Consequently thei adventcannot be pedicted in any igos way Yet cetain genealities aesuggested by ou suvey One is tat metaphos appea to aise in timesand aeas o ignoance and uncetanty and to pesist as live metaphoso as long as the questons at ssu emain clouded o undecided andas long as the impoted analog etins its cedibility In othe wodstheoists ae likely to each o a metapho when they ae aced by a

poblem Exampes o this ae pied y the geat vaiety o metaphoical desciptions o neual tansisn that wee devised ove the yeasuntil the poblematic natue o bilectical tansmission was nally esolved A second kind o situat in which metaphos ae likely to begeneated is bought about by the ioduction and development o a newhighode (o basic) metapho Ts the pesonasmachine conceptionstimulated o was associated with geat vaiety o mechanistic analogs clocks automata mills telep switchboads and othe devices

Futhe on the basis o ou oeing suvey I believe that metaphos

ae less likely to appea in aea o immediate pesonal signicanceand/o expeience than in domai at ae moe pesonally emote Thatis etaphos appea not to be a ecessay o the elaboation o phe



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nomena that ae aleady pesonally meaningul In suppot o this intepetation I ee to the act that concepts o the soul and human agencyboth o which ee to pesonal inne expeiencing and both o whichhave motivational sgnicance have geneated elatvey ew metaphosSimilaly diectly expeienced motivational tendencies such as hungethist pain and pleasue have not equently been descibed metaphoicaly n contast extensive use o guative language has been employed o the pesonasmachine paadigm which seems a less natualand less immediately undestadable way o constuing huma behavio

What ae the uses o unctions o metaphos in scence? The oeginghistoical suvey suggests that analogical thinking seves thee distinctunctions desciptive pesuasive and ceative The st and last o thesecoespond to what Pak et al (9) ee to as the expositoy andexplanatoy oles o analogy

Desciptive uses o analogy ae impotant didactically in delineaing andcommunicaing motivational concetions Desciptive metaphos tend toinvolve geneally amilia analogs analogs amilia that is to thetheoists intended udience Fo example conside Platos metapho othe chaiot and Feuds compaison o the tieup o psychic enegy (inxation) to the analog o a potion o an amy staying behind the geneladvance in ode to maintain contol ove a conqueed teitoy Thesemetaphos wee suely amilia to Plato's and Feuds divese audiencesand would have helped thei audiences undestand the phenomena they

wee tying to descibePesuasive analogies ae intended to conince an audience In the case

o science the audience is typically the elevant scientic communitythough it may (especially initially) be esticted to the theoist Pesuasivemetaphos ae agumentative and equently syllogistic They tend to takethe ollowing om is obviously tue B is like theeoe B ispobably tue Theoies cannot be validated in analogistic aguments butthey can be made to seem plausible aesthetically appealing and wothyo uthe consideation An example pesented ealie would be Coe

eteaus analogical compaison between human love and the then highlycedible Aistotelian conception o natual ocesO special nteest is the thid explanatoy unction o metapho

which suggests a tuly ceaie use o analogy The pimay audience heeis the scientist and the aim is to ole a theoetical poblem by coming tosee the elevant phenomenon in a new way Sometimes o couse thetheoist may have no specic aim no explicit question to answe Onsuch occasions the new analog may appea adventitiously as did the clockanalog and moe ecently the compute analog but in any case it opens

up new and unexpected vistas o theoetical exploation The vitue othe ceative metapho is that it pemits the theoist to conceptualize datain a dieent way to eexamine peviously accepted veities Some o the



Paul McReynolds

new diectons opened up may lead to pemanent advances othes maylead into blind alleys Thus i we tink o ceativity as being composed otwo basic stages st the poduton o new ideas and second thecitical examnation ad developmt o these ideas then it is obviousthat analogical thnking makes it ao contibution in the st phase

Have analogies led to any mao eative advances o beakthoughsin motivaton theoy? I think so and as examples I cte the development of the concep of motivationl oce o stength and the distinctonbetween oce and diection in mivation the st engendeed by theclock metapho and the second by \oodwoths dive vesus mechanismanalogy Fo a ecent example I fe to the development o optimallevel motivation theoy a substata theoetical advance Though adumbaons o optmalevel concepio can be found as a back as casscalGeece the geneal notion did nt become signicant until the elevant

bological and physical analog had een ceated

Final omments

hs chapt has xamed h o of metaphos motvato theoyom a histoical pespective The teial was oganized in tems o vebasc metaphos of motivation tat have been inuntial duing thecouse o histoy On the basis o this suvey I have concluded thatmetaphos have seved and psably will continue to seve � theedieent unctions in motivation teoy desciptve pesuasive and

ceativeThough I have ocused on methos in motivational psychology I

believe that most o the tentative genealizations I have put owad aeelevant to othe elds o psycholoy and obably to the entie scienticentepse

otes

1 For eample they are treated tother n P. . Youngs Motivation andEmotion 1961 and n the journal otivation and Emotion.

2 Many witers on metaphor e.g. aCormac 1985 Sarbn 1982 have commented on the fact that the pard referents n a metaphor partcularly whent s new have a strkng unusul ualty that contrbutes to an attentongettng tenson or stran n the hear. As a metaphor becomes older andmore famlar ths novel qualty akens

3 Among he general sources hat I ave found parculary nformatve andstmulatng are Black 1962 Burke 945/1969 Leatherdale 1974 MacCormac 1985 Mar 1977 Orton 979 Paprotte and Drven 1985 Sarbn982 and urbayne 1962 Imprtan specalarea sources n additon othose already cted, nclude st 1967 ogers 1978 and Sapr and

Crocker 1977. Among those presntng psychologcal theoies of metaphorsare MacCormac 1985 Mller 979 and Sarbn 1982.



otive nd metphor 63

4 hough eceptons est eg. Gentner & Gdn 1985; Park Daston &Galson 1984 most analyses of metaphors and analoges have been based onnstances selected to llustrate certan preconceved theoretcal deas ratherthan on surveys of metaphors as they actually occur. Gentner and Gdnsrecent study presents an nterestng analyss of changng trends n the use of

metaphors n scentc psychology over the past nnety years.5 Of the four concepts smle metaphor model and analogy analogy s

usually consdeed the most bac A eathedale 1974 states Both theconcept of metaphor and the concept of model nclude wthn ther sense thecocept o analogy. As far back as Arsole one form of metaphor s descbed as gvng the thng a name that belongs to somethng else on thegrounds of analogy' p 1. he dependence of metaphor on analogy s alsonoted by MacCormac 1985 pp. 21-2 who suggests that the derencebetween the two terms of a metaphor s more marked than between the termsof smple analoges whch accounts for the more dscernble shock provdedby metaphor he tendency of wrters to consder smle metaphor modelandor analogy as aspects of the same doman s reected n several recentttles ncludng Models and Metaphors Black 1962, Models and Analoges nScence esse 1966 and The Role of Analogy Model and Metaphor nScence Leatherdale 1974.

Sarbn 1968 1977 1982 refers to the process whereby metaphors are transformed nto lteral equatons as the recaton of metaphos he frequentrecaton of psychoanalytc metaphors s dscussed by hom and Kchele1987. hs problem was hardly unknown to Freud. As hom and Kcheleobserve p. Breuer n hs porton of the semnal work on psychoanalyssBreuer & Freud 1895/1955 cautoned aganst the danger of treatng

metaphorcal concepts as f they were real p. 169.7 ransformaton of a lteral statement nto a guratve one may also occur. Foreample n preCoperncan days the sentence he sun s settng was ntended as a lteral statement whereas now t s generally understood to bemetaphorcal.

8 In further dstngushng basc and conveyance metaphors MacCormac 1985wrtes: Conveyance metaphors usually propose a metaphorc nsght lmtedn scope whereas basc metaphors underle an entre theory or dscplnedevoted to descrpton of wdespread phenomena. For eample the scentst may adopt conscously or unconscously the basc metaphor he world s

mathematcal' p. 48. For a further dscusson of Peppers rootmetaphorapproach see Sarbn 1977. Basc or root metaphors are of course notlmted to scence. hey est n all broad areas of human thought.

9 I employng the term pawn n essentally the same metaphorcal sense asde Charms 1968 ecept that my usage s set n a hstorcal contet.

10 My lstng s dfferent from the classcaton of root metaphors proposed byPepper formsm mechansm contetualsm and organcsm though thereare certan smlartes especally wth respect to the mechanstc orentaton.It should be noted that whereas Pepper's am was to conceptualze and delneate all root metaphos that have logcal and scentc mert and whch can bedefended n a fundamental sense my am here s to dentfy and descrbepartcular root metaphors that motvaton theorsts have actually employedregardless of ther adequacy durng the course of hstory. My purpose s thussgncantly dferent from that whch guded Pepper.



164 Pau eynolds

11 Supernatural s of course our t�rm. he dstncton between natural andsupernatural was not made n he renaturalstc perod.

12 here s no way of knowng wth tanty how pomnent was the tendency toattrbute the orgn of human mots to hgher powers Most scholars belevethat the tendency ested to a sncant degree and ths s my concluson.Smth 1974 dsagrees to some eet concludng that omerc an was nota puppet of the gods as has ben arged. But there are a number of ways nwhch the gods dd eert nuenc p. 15. Dodds 1951 has convncnglyargued that the nstances of superatural control recounted n the Iad are notmere lterary devces but nstead eect the cultural vews of that perod. Onemay ask What was the psycholcal bass of the attrbuton of personaldecsons to the gods he most plasble answer s that they were proectonsn the psychoanalytc sense. Aorng to . B. Parkes 1959 Man's rstanswer to the socal and poltcal oblems nvolved n the rse of cvlzatonwas to strp hmself of all responsty for hs destny and project all authortyupon the gods p. 5 And B Son and . Wener 1966) state: One canthen vew the gods as projecton> not merely of unacceptable mpulses orwshes but more as projecton o elfrepresentatons p. 08. he projecton hypothess s supported by fact that the values attrbuted to the godsparalleled those of mortals

13 hough all or most vestges of th arly controllngpowers conceptons haedsappeared nstances of the underlyng theme are by no means are nmodern socety hus t s not unuual fo odnary ndvduals to feel that adecson of thers has been gud by a hgher power Further paranoddelusons often take the form of a convcton that ones mnd s beng controlled by alen forces In addo moden emprcal research has hghlghted the etent to whch ndvdul n contemporary socety attrbue control

over themselves to such metaphoal enttes as fate and destny14 Indeed Arstotle as s often pnd out was the rst prson to dentfy anddscuss metaphors formally n hs oetics and Rhetoric) and hs conceptonsare stl of substantve vaue

15 St Augustne s generally credte th beng the rst to develop a systematcconcept of wll hs concept was ncessary n order to clarfy whch part ofthe human personalty s coned wth freedom, sn, and dvne graceDhle 1982 pp. 194-5. Whetlr Arstotle had prevously formulated atheory of wll s debatable and pears to depend on how one denes the wll.Certanly Arstotles dscusson f gency lad the groundwork for an understandng of voluntary behavor, bu t dd not post a separate faculty or part ofthe mnd to serve ths functon general hstorcal source on the conceptof wll see Bourke 1964 and Dhle 1982.

1 Netzsche n hs Wi to Power 9/1968 refers to weakness of the wll asa metaphor that can prove mldng. For there s no wll and consequentlynether a strong nor a weak wll p 28 But elsewhere p. 52 he appears toaccept weakness of wll as a meagful attrbuton

17 John Locke 1690/1959 emplong a metaphorcal approach to emphasze hsvew that the queston of freedo f wll s meanngless wrote that t s asnsgncant to ask whether mans i be free as to ask whether hs sleep wllbe swft or hs vrtue square vl 1 p 9.

18 It s nterestng that some author when they wsh to make a metaphocalterm appear more substantal begn t wth a captal letter Note for eample,



otives nd metpors 65

Ogn Pawn Plan. It may be observed that the term "orgn was also usedto refer to human agency n the quotaton from Arstotle gven earler n thete.

19 hs phrase fabrc of the heavens later appeared n John Mltons ParadeLost 1667/1968 bk 7 71 n later eds. bk. 8 76 and s the ttle of awork by oulmn and Goodeld 1961.

20 A later work by Bentham, A Table of the Sprngs of Acton 1815/1969 wasI beleve the rst volume devoted eclusvely to the subect of motvaton. hebeautful metaphor n ts ttle derved rom the mansprngs o clocks s tllwdely used as a dramatc synonym for motvaton. As noted earler Benthamcontrbuted sgncantly to the understandng of guratve language, and notsurpsngly we nd a number of descrptve metaphors n hs Sprngs ofAcon hese nclude eeences to motve as pefomng the oce ofa spur and alternatvely the "ofce of a brdle p. 7. In anothernstance, Bentham posted that on some occasons certan motves may be

substtuted for others as coverng motves p 0 employed as g leavesp 2.

Berkeley 171/1955 attbute the socal mpulse to dvne mplantaton It a pncple orgnally engrafted n the very rt formaton of the soul by theAuthor of our nature p 227. Further he supposes that the mpulse ha avaety of manfestatons As the attractve power n bodes s the mostunversal prncple whch produceth nnumerable effects and s a key toeplan the varous phenomena of nature so the correspondng socal appetten human souls s the great sprng and source of moral actons p. 227.

22 hough homasus employed the word Grad degree to ndcate the unts n

hs ratng scales ths fact cannot be nterpreted as strong evdence for athermometer analog snce Grad was used genercally to epress dfferences nntensty. It s nterestng that homasuss younger colleague Chrstan Wolffwas nvolved n the development of the thermometer Bolton 1900 thoughapparently only well after homasus completed hs work on ratng scales.

23 he translator E. S. Forster notes that the maronettes seem to have beenworked by means of cylnders round whch weghted strngs were wound thecylnders beng set n moton by the removal of pegs p. 46.

he fact that the word neuron derves from the Greek word for strng asn the strngs that operated the maronettes Gregory 1981 p 69 neatlyllustrates the role that metaphors play n the development of techncal terms.It s nterestng that Vesalus the famous enassance anatomst used themetaphor of cords n referrng to nerves Damper 1958 p. 122.

25 For a further dscusson of hydraulc analoges n motvaton ncludng addtonal eamples see Esper 1964 pp. 99-102. Some knowledge of hydraulcsprobably dates back to the ancent Mesopotamans snce agcultural rrgatonwas central to ther culture. It can also be conjectured that pneumatc prncples may have become obvous through the observaton of chldren playngwth the bladders of butchered anmals.

2 For stmulatng dscussons of the concepts of machnes and mechansms, see. L. Gregory 1981 and arr 1970. For general sources on the nuence

of the mechanstc world vew on psychology see Leahey 1980 especallyhe Mechanzaton of the World Pcture 1600- 1700 chap. and Lowry1971



Paul ceynold

27 Leary Chapter 1, ths volume has called our attenton to the nterestng factthat whereas Newton evdently deloped the concept of gravtaton at least npart through analogy wth the conpt of socablty Berkeley later argued fornherent human socablty by analoy wth Newtons gravtaton hs certanly llustrates both the ubquty d adaptablty of metaphors n scentc

thought. Newton, t should be t lved n a transtonal perod and can besad to have had one foot n the echanstc camp and the other stll n theanmstc camp through alchm hough he attempted to elmnate allanmstc notons from the Prncip the transtonal nature of hs perod sreected n hs use of the pycholocal term endeavor Latn conat) nthe scholum followng the denons Newton 1687/1974 vol. 1 pp. 6-12see Cohen 198 p. 82. It seems ear that the concept of socablty wasmeanngful to Newton through h studes of alchemy whch was heavlyanthropomorphc. I am nclned o doubt Manuel's cautous suggeston thatNewtons own personal solaton lyed a sgncant role n the developmentof his thought. For ndepth treatents of Newtons work n alchemy seeDobbs 1975 an Westfall 190 sp. chaps. 8 and 9.

28 he possble nuence of the Paan automata on Descartess creatve development s dramatcally desrbe by Jaynes 1970. For a 1615 pctoralsketch of these automata see the rntspece n Descartes 1662/1972. uchman 1978 provdes a vvd pctu of a fourteenthcentury spectacle nvolvngautomata p. 11.

29 obbess theoretcal emphass n oton led Brandt 1928 p. 79 to suggestthat he mght better be termed a otonalst than a materalst. For furthercomments on the role of moon n obbess concepton of conat seeBernsten 1980.

For other sources on the role o he mechancal clock n the development ofscence see the recent ecellen trtments n part I of Mayr 1986 part II ofMacey 1980 the rst three chaters of Maurce and Mayr 1980 and themore popular but hghly nforatve treatment by Landes 198.

31 For eample the analog of the mll as n a mll for grndng gran. ecall fornstance these lnes of Pope 15 1/ 1942 hs subtle hef of Lfe thspaltry me/What wll t leav me, f t snatch my hme? / If evry Wheelof that unwearyd Mll/hat tu' ten thousand Verses now stands stllp. 171

Woodworth was not the rst peson to dstngush between the force andmechansm aspects of motvaton ee the quotaton from Paley n the tet

above.33 See also Lundn 1972 pp. 20. he essental dea of Lewnan eldtheory was to relate behavor sytatcally to the overall envronmenta eldn whch the behavor occurs.

I have organzed ths chapter n trs of two levels of coverage of metaphorsMacCormac 1985 and I consdr ths dchotomy vald and useful. In prncple however one can conceptulze a contnuum along whch any metaphorcould be assgned a place as a futon of ts range of applcaton.

35 As a scence progresses metaphr that were formerly meanngful may become obsolete. For eample the tlephone swtchboard metaphor s no longer

consdered an adequate representon of bran functonng. Benthams reference to pan and leasure as soveregn masters noted early nths chapter s an ecepton to ths generalzaton.



otves nd metphors 67

37 he same metaphor may serve more than one of these functons.38 he queston can be rased as to whether all creatve advances depend n the

nal analyss on analogcal thought. An afrmatve answer would presupposethat all new deas are combnatons of estent elements. Such a hypothess sattractve but t begs the ssue of the origin of the elements. Further t should

be remembered that not all scentc advances are the result of new deas.Many advances n contrast reect new emprcal dscoveres. For eampleour knowledge of the functons of the hypothalamus s based prmarly oncareful emprcal eamnaton not on analoge.

39 I have n mnd here the emphass n ancent Greek culture on moderaton andavodance of eces.

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eynolds, E. 1971. treate of the passions and falties of the sole of an.London Bosock. Orgnal work publshed 1640.

ogers . 1978 . Metaphor psyhoanalytic view Berkeley and Los AngelesUnversty of Calforna Press.

otter J. B. 1966. Generalzed epectances for ternal ersu eternl controof renforcement Psychological Monographs 1 Whole No. 609.

Sandurg C. 1916 hicago poes. New York olt.Sapr J. D. & Crocker J. C. Eds.. 1977. The socal se of etaphor.Phladelpha Unversty of Pennsylvana Press.



72 Paul ceynlds

Sarbn . . 1968 Onology eculates phlology he myhc nature ofanety ercan Psychologt 3 41118.

1977. Contextualsm: A world v for modern psychology. I A W Landeld Ed. Neraska Sypos on Motvaton pp 141. Lncoln Unversty of Nebraska Press.

1982. A preace to a psychologcl theory of metaphor. In V. L. Allen & K.E. Schebe Eds. The soca ctext of condct pp. 2249. New York:Praeger.

Segel . E. 1970. alen's syste o physology and edcne. Basel Karger.Smon B. & Wener . 1966. Moels of mnd and mental llness n ancent

Greece I. he omerc mdl of mnd. oal of the Htory of theehavoral Scences 014.

Smth N. W. 1974 he ancetackground to Greek psychology and some

mplcatons for today. Psychoocal Record 0924.Snell B. 195. The dcovery of he nd . G. osenmeyer rans.. Cam

brdge, MA arvard Unvert ress.Solomon . L & Corbt, J. D. 9. An opponentprocess theory of motva

ton I. emporal dynamcs of affect Psychologcal Revew I 11945.Stagner . 1977 omeostass dcepancy, dssonance. Motvaton and Eo

ton 108.aylor, C. 1977. What s human agcy? In . Mschel Ed. The self Psycho

logcal and phlosophcal ss p. 105. Oxfod Blackwell Publshe.hom, . & Kchele . 1987. schoanalytc practce New York Sprnger.oulmn S. & Goodeld, J. 96. The farc of the heavens. New York:

arper & ow.uchman B. 978. dsant rrr. New ork Ballantne Books.urbayne C. M. 1962. The yh etaphor. New aven C: Yale Unver

sty Press.

Westfall S. 1980. Never at rs ography of Isaac Newton. CambrdgeUnversty Pess.

Woodworth . S 1918. Dyna ychology. New York Columba UnverstyPress.

Worthen . D. 970. Pneumt cton n the klepsydra and Empedoclesaccount of breathng. Is 6 20

Young P. . 1961. Motvaton an eoton. New York Wley.



5

Cogntve metaphos nepemental psychology

R O B E R T R H O F F M A N , E D W A R D C O C H R A N ,

d J A M E S M . N E A D

In his classic aticle on eaction time eseach Saul Stenbeg (6)began with the assumption that infomation is stoed etieved andopeated on in a seies of stages o mental opeations between thestimuls and esponse In his expeiments Stenbeg had people leanlists of lettes o digits and then indicate whethe a given test lette odigit was in the leaned list The task is called memoy scanning fo agood eason The metapho elates to the phenomenal expeience ofemembeing the list in the fom of a mental image The basic metaphoa compaison of imaging to a beam scanne Stenbeg 16 p 44) tsmany paticipants postexpeimental epots of thei expeience at thetask

The scanne pesupposes a mechanism that can look though the beamin ode to cay out acs of ecognition Stenbeg postulated a singe

homunculus that could eithe opeate the scanne o examine the contents of memoy but that could not do both at once Futhemoe heassumed that it takes a xed amount of ime fo he homunculus o swichfom one opeation to anothe Each step of encoding and matching takessome amount of time fo each item in the list If the scanning wee to goove the items one at a time then one patten in the eaction time datawould be expected If the scanning wee to go ove all the items at onceanothe patten would be expected Each assumption fom the metaphoyielded futhe testable hypotheses

This intoductoy example illustates what we will do in this chapteWe will show how metaphos fo vaious aspects of cognition elate toened psychological theoizing and to ideas fo expeiments The com

13







76 R. R. ffman, E. chran, and . . Nead

edited volume on metapho ext We also assume that liteal scienticstatements exist Fo example ome obsevation statements can beundestood ltealy even though etapho can ceep nto them nsofaas they ae theoy aden (Mcmac 176) We ae not especiallyenamoed of taditional denitos of "liteal In fact taditional deni

tions of the liteal ae themsls metaphoical They identify litealmeanng as "logical tuth value and as what wods "point to (seeHoffman 188) By ou intepetton the sgnicance of such theoiesof liteal meaning is the obvis fact that social conventions andfequencyofuse factos (i e t pagmatics of efeencing) play aole in judgments of litealnes Cetainly one can nd elativelyclea cases of liteal statement ut thee ae also cases about whichpeople can easonably disag nd cases in whch litealness is onlyappaent

Metapho has been dened n any ways as saying one thing whiemeanng anothe as "violating seantc ules and as "making mplicitcompaisons of unike things discussion of theoies of metaphowould take us too fa aeld F teatments of metapho theoy seeBlack (12) Hoffman MacCoac Lawle and Caoll (18) Levn(177) Otony (17 180) o Ricoeu (178) Fo ecent evews ofpsycholinguistc eseach on mapho compehension see Hoffman(184) and Homan and Kem (187) Though it is impotant toattempt to dene the metaphieal dstinction the pesent investga

tion takes a boad appoach i oe to focus on the natue of scienticpacticeWe ae favoably inclined tow the inteaction theoy of metapho

(Black 162 Richads 136) hich holds that metapho involves theceation of new meanngs an not just logical compaisons o eductionto liteal tut values We ty to voi a ror notions about the natueof metaphos such as the notin ha meaphos ae "only analogieswheeby the liteal logic can be saated fom he onamental metaphoWe egad lnguistic metapho as manifestation of complex pocesses of

peceiving acting and emembing (Vebugge 180) To emphasizeou view that metapho is not jut a linguistic phenomenon we will efeto compehension in tems of th notion of "metaphoic undestanding(Lako & Johnson 180abc}

In ou analysis we adopt stanad teminology to descibe the components of gues of speech pic the pincipal subject) "vehicle(used to talk about the topic) and "gound (the semantic basis ofthe gue) Fo example in th imile My lo s lk rd ros "mylove is the explicit topic (a pticula beloved peson is the implicittopic) "ed ose is the vehicl and the gound is the vaiety of waysn whch love can be elated d oses e g it is beautiul it gowsetc)



prs 77

Metaphor in science

In the context of the phlosophy of science metapho stands out by vitueof its poetic and imagistic qualities This sets it in contast with liteal

logical language which is taditionally egaded as the eal basis ofscientic easoning But metapho abounds in science Fo example wepointed out above that fomal denitions of metapho in linguistics andpsycholinguistics ae themselves based on metaphoical notions about thenatue of meaning (see Hoffman et al 18) This may seem doublyionic to those who beleve that all scientic thought must be liteal

Hanson (158) Ha and Secod (173) Simon (173) and otheshave poposed that the logic of scientic discovey is psychologicalthat is a matte of heuistics and not just logical that is composed of

deductions and pedictions Some philosophes of science who have ealized this (e g Poppe 15 pp 312) ague that the topic of scienticdiscovey is theefoe lagely ielevant to the philosophicallogical analysis of theoies The psychologist who follows Simons lead need not viewscientic discovey and theozing as ieducibly intuitive o iationalRathe the ceative pocess can be descibed, and metapho seems to beone impotant way of descibing it Futhemoe, the desciption couldhave implications fo the philosophy of science

Fo instance theoies in diffeent disciplines have diffeent domains toexplain and if human theoists undestand the domains in diffeent waysthe theoies may have to diffe in fom and may have to be analyzed bydiffeent sots of metatheoetic citeia (eese, 172) Theoies of pesonality ae witten in wods may ely on some obvious metaphos andshould make sense to psychologists Theoies in physics should makeintuitive sense to physicists but will have to be patly if not lagelymathematical and the metaphoical concepts may be left lagely implicitSuch diffeences we feel ae mattes of empiical investigation

We ae inteested hee in the pocess of theoizing, scientic ceativityand poblem solving athe than in static econstucted theoies We ae

inteested as much in the context of discovey as in the context ofjustication these cannot be usefully chaacteized independently

Having descibed ou point of view egading metapho and science,we will now discuss and exemplify cognitive metapho a cental concept in this chapte

Contve metaphor

A cognitive metapho is ceated o used wheneve some phenomenon

of cognition is conceptualized o explained though the use of mtaphoCognitive metaphos can efe to phenomena of language leaningpeception moto skills polem solving indeed to any phenomenon



78 R R ffman hran, and J Nead

of cognition Ou pupose in ths section is to illustate the cognitivemetaphos that occu in natul anguage and then to show biey howsimila cognitive metaphos fo he coe heitage of Westen psychology The discussion will set the sge fo the subsequent case studies inwhich we examine vaious domai of moden expeimental psychology

Cognte metapors n natural language

Natual language is laden with mtphos not just novel metaphos, butalso tens of thousands of common metaphos and idiomatic phases(Becke, 175 Pollio, Balow Fe & Pollio 177) Fo example people often compae wa to insait sugeons to butches, economic ination to a disease and maiage t pisons Such common metaphos tendto fall into thematically elated ustes o categoies called metapho

themes (Black 162 Lakoff & hnson 180c) Fo instance accodingto the metapho theme LOVE IS JOURNEY, one can say such things asLook how far wee come n or relatonshp Its been a long bumpyroad We cant tu back now ere at a crossroads We hae to go oursearate ways ur reationshi 't going anywhere d o on

Many metapho themes a simila in tems of a geneal oientational function (Lakoff & Jhnson 180a Osgood 180 Rhodes &Lawle, 181) Fo example accoing to the theme coNCIOUNE Is uP

THE UNCONCI us I DOWN one c say I fell asleep He sank nto a coma

It was a shallow trance I woe up and My conscousness was rasedSimilaly the theme RATIONA L J UP EMOTIONA L I DOWN elates hutteances as I'e thought th or He fell n loe and The dscussonwas at a hgh leel Accodng t such oientational themes ou bodiesae containes with boundaie nd in-out up-down and fontbackoientations

Anothe set of cognitive mtao themes uses the expeiences of thesenses as the vehicle of expessi (Asch 158 Mille & JohnsonLaid176 Romanyshyn 182) Fo stance EEING I TOUCHING (H eyes

were glued to the task I caug sght of t She kept an eye on hm)UNDERTANDING I EEING (I saw hat they meant I got the whole pctureThe theory was transparent) a IEA ARE LIGHT souRcEs (It was abrght idea The concept was e llumnatng It was a ash of nsghtae all themes that utilize this cpaison

Metaphos ae used to descbe leaning and the acquisition of knowledge (Schefe 160 Schn 1 Skinne 168) One common themeis that KNOWLEDGE Is GROWT he dea grew on me A new dea wasbo today It had a germ of n t) Accoding to this theme the

teache is a gadene and leaing consists of stages o phases thatemege elatively independently o the teache although the teache canhelp by poviding optimal condiions that noursh the student and cult



nv phrs 7

ate fetile minds The elation of leaning to oganic gowth pocesses isa vey salient one (e g Piaget 171)

Many cognitive metaphos ae vaiations on the theme that KNOWL-

EDGE I A TRUCTURE which teats the mind as a containe and ideas as

contents (Jaynes 176 Lakoff & Johnson 180a Reddy 17) eeae thee vaiants of the stuctue theme

WORD AND IDEA A R E OBJECT OR ENTITIE

The words carred great weght That thought has been around forcentures The concets bured hm

WRD CONTAN MEANNG R NFORMA TON

He ut hs deas nto words The words held no meanng for me

IND ARE ONTAINER

I ddn't get anythng out of t Her mnd a songe That thoughtreally sunk n

Ideas in the mental space ae peceived in some sot of inne vision opeception Ideas o memoies can be fuzzy dm obscure o hddenMinds can be said to be broad oen cosed shaow o narrow Accoding to the stuctue themes using language involves taking ideas omone mind and tansfeing them into anothe Language becomes aconduit fo the tansmission of ideas

COMMUNICA TON THE TRANFER OF OBJECT

Hs meanngs got across well The deas oured out The wordscarred much normaton

The cognitive metapho themes ae often coheent with one anothe,in the sense that instances can be combined (Lakoff & Johnson, 180c)Fo example if ideas ae light souces and the mind is a cotaine andundestanding is seeing then the utteance he dea was growng n he

dm recesses of my mnd makes sense As we will show such mixing ofmetaphos occus in cognitive theoies as well as natual language

Contve metaphors n the hstory of psycholoyan overvew of our Western hertae

Not only do cognitive metaphos and thei themes abound in natuallanguage about cognition they also aound in the histoy of psychologyFo example the theme UNDERTANDIN I EEIN a ed by oh

Locke in his explanation of novelty and ceativity in tems of a mentalpocess of reecton on ideas and mental opeations (Locke 160/18,bk 2 chap 1) Most if not all of the key wods that expeimentalpsychologists use ae of metaphoic oigin Hee ae some that came



10 R R Hffma, Chran, ad J Nead

into English fom Latin abstac (to pull away fom) analysis (toloosen) compehend (to gap) induction (to lead) ecollection(to gathe) Such etymological cgnitive metaphos often go unnoticed o as some would say thse oncepts have become liteal in thelanguage In any event thei ogi can be taced to metaphoic unde

standingA pedominant metapho th in mentalistic psychologies of the

1700s and 1800s and Weste thught in geneal is the Vorstellungtheme In Geman the wod rstellung means pesentation Inacademic psychology the wod a also meant image (see Ebbinghaus1880/171) Accoding to the Vrtelung theme, MENTA L PHENOMENA

ARE THEA TRICA L EVENT. Many mon metaphoical expessions aboutsocial action, social cognition, and lifes stages elate etymologically tothe theate He played a slent ol n te affar Tey made a scene I got

upstaged In many cognitive thies, ideas o mental phenomena aeegaded as pesentations (Vorstlungen) that ae set before the innepeception of thoughts ust as k of at is set befoe an ntepeteRemembeing is egaded as th aing of representatons of knowledgeCcios we c b lk t pctt, who is only patiallyawae of the infeences going on ack stage o below awaeness Alsoconscious expeience can be on stge actively peceiving athe than inthe audience thinking about thoughts The stage metapho fo mental lifeis a ich one and was elied un and debated about by many

scholas Goethe Kant Reid Bntano Wad, Feud Titchene andlate phenomenologists (see Gfman 17) Fo example, hee is apassage fom David Hume (170/178):

The mind is a kind of theat, hee seveal peceptions successively make thei appeaance pas epass glide away and mingle inan innite vaiety of postus d situations Thee is popely nosmplc in it at one tie no dentty in dieent whateve natual popension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity

The compaison of the theate ust not mislead us They ae thesuccessive peceptions only, th constitute the mind no have wethe most distant notion of the pace whee these scenes ae epesented o of the mateials of which it is composd (vol 1, pt sec 6 p 253)

Many of the metaphos on whh expeimental psychology is based canbe attibuted to Ren Descate and the Catesians (de Man 178Johnson 181 Keans 187 Mcynolds 180 E S Reed 180) TheCatesians use of metaphos and nalogies was quite delibeate out of

ecognition of thei utility in hypothesis fomation (Descates 1628/111p 36 Kant, 170/151 , pt 2 sec 1) Descatess metaphos have left afomidable legacy of beliefs that e ingained and implicit in much of



gntve etaphr 8

psychology phlosophy of mnd and lngustcs Because the Catesanlegacy has had such a fomatve nuence we wll suvey some of themajo Catesan metaphos to set the stage fo ou case studes of some ofmoden expemental psychologys domans

A cental poblem that Descates tackled has to do wth the foundatons of physcs and psychology Pecepton s the gound fo scentcjudgments and knowledge, but how do people get fom the subjectvepeceptual expeence (seconday qualtes) to a knowledge of theoee ees o thngs pmay uales hs s oh a polem n physcal ontology (What exsts?) and poblem epstemology(ow can we have knowledge?) Accodng to the theoetcal systemDescates ceated, psychology should explan the phenomena and qualtes that ae not assumed to be eal by physcs The speccs of Descatess system ae laden wth metaphos fo mental lfe ncludng themetpho theme IND ARE A HINE Although escates hmself (1662/172 was nsped y hydaulc statues fo many othes of the sxteenthand seventeenth centues, such as Lebnz (165/112, p 21) and LaMette (178/112) the machne of choce was clealy he clock hehuman beng was egaded as a dvne machne to be explaned byanalogy to atcal automata Even Hobbes (1651150 p 3), whoejected the noton that hghe mental pocesses cold be explaned bythe automaton concept, eled on the clockwok metapho n hs explanaton of behavo

One of the thngs Descates (1662/172) wanted to explan s how vsualmages that ae anted o roected onto the etnal screen come to benteeted To do ths he devsed what we today would cal a model ofpecepton He hypotheszed that lght ays mpnge on a ecepto sufacethat s lke a mosac o rubber sheet Indvdual ays rck at ponts on thesheet The geomety of the mage wll thus coespond wth movementsthat ae caused on the ecepto suface These motons ae caed backto the ban hydaulcally as f down a set of tubes o channels. Thus, thesensatons wll lead mechancally to ban events and the coespondng

mnd events Awaeness occus when the movements ave as deas atcetan places n the ban The peceptual machne poduces expeenceand memoy the acts of pecepton and eason ae egaded as metcaleckonng lke the mathematcal judgments of the geomete who smeasung angles and dstances (see Descates 1638/165)

As fa as scentc hypotheses go the Catesan mechanstc appoachhas been vey successful Wth an addtonal boost fom Locke, theBtsh assocatonsts contnued the tadton of mechanstc and physcalstc theozng (see Bett 165, chap 12 Watson, 17 chap 11) Fo

nstance, Hume (178/155 essay 2) descbed the pocess of assocatonas a fom o mental gra wheen deas n the mental sace ae attractedand reelled by one anothe Late John Stuat Mll (183, bk 6, chap



182 R R ffman, . . hran, and J Nead

sec 3) consdeed assocatons to esult fom a om of mental chemst About the same tme n the nneteenth centuy, the paadgms ofpsychophysology and psychophyscs aose when Mlle Webe Lotzeelmholtz and othes eled on uc Catesan concepts as the dstnctonbetween sensaton and pecepton the noton that sensatons ae con

ducted down sensoy bes, and t noton that conscousness o wll s ahghe o moe cental pcs To povde just one moe exampleof the Catesan legacy boadly cceved Wundt (111112 chap 12)agued that thoughts conssted of lemental sensatons put togethe ntopsychcal compounds

Meor metaphors

Thee s a long and veneable hsoy of postulatng hypothetcal entes

and pocesses to account fo memy Memoy has been sad to be lke awa tablet a dctonary an enclpeda a muscle a telephone swtchboard a computer and a holoram Acoss the decades of modenpsychology theosts have popod corecontet unts cognte mapsmemoy tags kels loops an so on (Undewood, 172) In dectcontnuty wth the Westen pscologcal tadton moden nfomatonpocessng theoes descbe mees as contents that ae stored andthen ethe recoered o lost Mey s egaded as an oganzed spacesuch as a structure of networks wt nodes and paths o herarches wth

locatons and classcatons Th nodes o locatons epesent vebal,peceptual popostonal o ote enttes Shfts of attenton ae egaded as passng at a dente e though ntemedate ponts n thesemantc spac (eg , Lockhead 72)

Roedge (180) descbed n detal many of the metaphocal deaspsychologsts have used to dsce memoy ncludng Feuds (117/163) metapho of memoy as a ouse full of rooms Mudocks (17)metapho of memoy as a coney belt and Nesses (167) metapho ofmemoy as an archaeologcal rcnstructon pocess (see also Lasen

187) Roedge concluded tha ost theoes of memoy ae vaatons ofa metapho theme of mental pe, wth ecall geneally egaded as aseach though the contents o t space

In addton to mental spac d stoage metaphos anothe maometapho theme fo memoy t trace metapho whch we efeed toabove as beng a coe concep n Descatess theoy of peceptonAccodng to ths theme memo s lke a rerbed though whch sensoympessons ow The souce of Dscatess hydaulc poesandchannelsmetaphos was Haveys (1628/147 chap 8) descpton of the ccula

tory system as a set of lock d canas In the memory metaphomemoes can be sad to be fom by the weng of mpessons nto the



gnitve etaphr

vebed the layng down of traces that can be strengthened o can decayDscussons of tace stength theoy can be found n Hatleys theoy ofassocatons as mpessons (7/66, hap ) he mena mechanics o James M (182/167 chap 3), the mental chemtry o J S

Mll (183 vol 2 bk 6 chap ) and the theozng about memoy nEbbnghauss class monogaph (1/16)The metaphos of Westen psychology lke those n natual language

conceve cogntve phenomena n tems o uldngs, conduts events,machnes, obet enttes contanes and oentatons The elements ofconscous expeence ae eed as enttes pojected nto an nne mental contane wth oentatons and tansfeed fom one mnd ntoanothe Consde, fo example, the moden levels of pocessnghypothess about memoy (Cak & Lockha 172) It was ntended obe an altenatve to the hypothess of sepaate memoy stoes (Waugh &oman 165) Accodng to the sepaatestoes hypothess, dffeentknds of memoy hold dffeent types of nfomaton have dffeentstoage capactes, and have dffeent ates at whch nfomaton can bepocessed Fo example sensoy shottem memory bey ecods peceptual appeaances, wheeas longtem memoy ecods meanng Cakand Lockha (172 poposed that memoy nvolves a nume olevels Pelmnay levels deal wth sensoy and physcal popetes andpatten ecognton deeper levels deal wth meanng and moe elaboatepocessng Cak and Lockhat held that the appoach was a lteal vew by vtue of ts bass n nfomatonpocessng notons and by vtue ofts contast wth the moe obvously metaphocal sepaate stoes hypothess (p 681) Nevetheless the levelsofpocessng hypothess s clealybased on oentatonal metapho themes

Cogntve metaphos have been used to geneate not only hypothesesbut also fulledged eseach domans and paadgms Fgue 51 pesentsa geneal nfomatonpocessng dagam of the speech pecepton andpoducton pocess (based on Lbeman, 170 Pson 178; Repp, 181and StuddetKennedy 176) Though theosts vews dffe n detals

many speech eseaches have assumed that speech s a condut thatcaes coded nfomaton fom the speake to the lstene In the lstenes cogntve pocessng the nfomaton s caed to the mnd wheeopeatons ae pefomed on t by vtue of the memoy contanes Thecontanes nvolve the vaous levels o speech audtoy atculatoyphonetc lexcal syntactc, posodc pagmatc and semantc Thepocessng leads to nal awaeness and ecognton of the sgnal asmeanngful speech

ow the queston ases How ae such cogntve metaphos elated (f

at all) to actual eseach? To addess ths queston we begn ou casestudes



84 man, hran, and J M ead

HEARERCNTL

1VL OFOCING

jC OUND

SPEAKER

Fgue 51 Genea nmanng dagam eeh een andpductn he dagam eles n te cndut ntane and enta tna!meap themes

Case study pecepton and psychophyscs

The research lterature on sl percepton shows how abundantmetaphor can be n a scentc oman The eld has many speccmetaphorcal labels for expermeal tasks (eg bnocular ralry perceptual glance) for psychologal phenomena (e g perceptual defense) and for mental mechanss or processes (e g feature detectorsperceptual tunng)

Even percepton tself s dned usng metaphors For exampleaccordng to Attneave (15) per·pton predgests nformaton before t

reaches conscousness Percepton erages out any redundancy to yeldan economcal representaton hough the varety of dentons ofpercepton ncludes such uses o t theme IEA ARE FooD the orentatona theme and other metaphor a basc metaphor Cartesan n sprt that appears n the work o rcepton of Attneave and others sa omparson of percepton to a easurng process Accordng to thsmetaphor reports aout percepua experence are references to centramental representatons that are bsd on a lasscaton of physcal attrutes and ther values (Natsouls 167 Tresman 162) Perceptonnvolves measurng the magntues of sensatons or of exctatons nplaces n the nervous system (Stevs 172 Warren 158) Perepton slkened to the use of a set of nstrets the observers n psychophyscal



gnitive metaphrs 85

experiments are likened to physicists who are calibrating and using instruments to measure physical properties (Perkins 153)

Threshold metahors

n order for a given stimulus to be perceivable say a dim light in anotherwise darkened room the stimulus must be of a certain minimumintenity or durtion That dgree of ntensity or durtion at whih thestimulus becomes perceivable is called the threshold The very termthreshold suggests that conscious contents enter the room of the mindby passing some sort of doorway or boundary Freud (117/163) reliedheavily on this type of metaphor

Let us compare the system of the unconscious to a large entrancehall in which the mental impulses jostle one another like separateindividuals Adjoining this entrance hall there is a second narrower room a kind of drawingroom in which consciousness resides The impulses in the entrance hall are out ofsght of the conscious f they have already pushed their wayforward to the threshold and have been turned back by thewatchman we speak o them as reressed (vol 6 pp 256)

Perception researchers have conceived and measured perceptual

thresholds in a number of ways For example Helson (16) regardedthresholds as a balance or weghted nuence of all the past stimuli thataected the organism (Much of Helsons research involved weight judgments!) Historically the concept of a threshold was supposed to referto the inner mechanisms of perception and not just to an externally oroperationally dened independent variable The general psychometricalfunction (or neural quantum) was believed to reect the inner workings ofthe discrimination process (Corso 156) According to Fechner (1860/165)

The dependence quantitatively considered of sensation on stimulus must nally be translated nto one of sensaton on the bodily processes which directly underlie the sensation in short the psychophysical processes and the sensaton instead of being measuredby the movement of the stimulus will be measured by the intensityof these processes (p 6)

According to Herbart (1816/181 pt 1, chaps 2 and 3) the ways ideasinuence one another can be described in terms of the mechanics of

forces Specically he (and many other) relied on a metaphor of iceoating on water deas oat near the surface of consciousness unless theysnk or are suressed by other ideas As in the room metaphor the ice





Cgniive maphr 87

Cas study : pattrn rcognition

Historically the key problem in the area o pattern recognition has beento speciy and quantiy the physical dimensions o patterns that are

critically related to the perception o orm In this case study we willexplore the pandemonium model o Selridge (5/66) Howeverwe should begin by pointing out that metaphors are rampant in thisdomain ust as they are in psychophysics and the psychology o perception in general or example according to neua netk theory (Uttal73) the central nervous system is a decde that recognizes patterns onthe basis o inhibition and excitation processes Points within the cortex that correspond to perceptual eatures spots edges movements orientations and the like have been named featue detects (Hubel &

Wiesel 62) he content o visual impressions consists o perceptualeatures arranged in a hierarchical classication o the perceptual orms inthe world Recognition o orms has also been said to rely on temates(eg Lindsay & Norman 77) A template is basically a stencil oroutline cutout I one shines a light through the cutout the outline canbe proected onto a surace and one can look at the proected imageor correspondences between the stencil and an input pattern (ierecognition)

Cmute metahs

Pattern recogton modeling with computers began about 54 wthattempts none o them especially successul to develop systems orrecognizing printed texts he work was not specically tied to the question o how humans recognize patterns However the concepts that wereused to describe programs terms such as image and idea were clearlyreerences to human perception According to the general articial intelli

gence view pattern recognition is a process that analyzes signals rom thesenses and decides which class or type a given input pattern belongs tohe input is an array o discrete symbols points or brightnesses heprogram must describe the transormations and other analyses that areneeded to get rom the input array to a class name that is stored in a seto representations o possible patterns (Uhr 65) o accomplish thisthere are a number o stages here is a "preprocessing o sensoryinputs in order to normalize them (i e sharpen the contours ll inirregularities align orientations etc) Next comes the problem o

ecient searching through the memories o alternative patterns orinstance the search could be serial or parallel exhaustive or selterminating Once alternatives are retrieved they can be compared to theinput in a matching or decisionmaking process



188 R. R. r J M.

The padeonum model

n a sense the early falures to g computers to see gave rse to thearea of pattern recognton On cnnot smply hook up a camera to acomputer have t learn search through an orderly set of alternatves andthereby recognze patterns Oe aces not ust the tough problem ofstorng and processng complex ta but the tougher problem of repre-sentng knowledge

Selfrdge (1959/1966) proposd a metaphorcal nformatonprocessngmodel for vsual pattern recogntn that stands as a good example ofmany of the basc components of formatonprocessng theores of vs-ual percepton Selfrdges ma gl was to develop a system of percep-ton that could be exble and culd learn n order to represent n abetter way how humans proce vsual nformaton n hs pandemo-num model the mnd s sad t consst of a set of cogntve demonseach of whch represents a posib pattern (type of form) or partcularfeatures (e.g lnes anges etc.) he demons are sad to look for nputsthat match ther patterns wth te otput of the demons dependng onthe degree of computed smlart The demon shreks loudly f thesmlarty s great he decon emon responds to the loudest patterndemon labelng the input patte wth the category of that loudestdemon

Selfrdge wanted the system to evolve through natural selecton of thedemons here were a number o ays that ths could happen1 hrough changes n the weghgs of the features that make up the

patterns Across all possble ntnces of a pattern a common weght-ng would emerge

. y selectng new feature sudons that strongly affect the decsonsand by elmnatng nefcent sdemons hese processes were calledson and conjugaton of dmns

3 y havng decison demons that could change themselves ltmately,

there would be one demon or fcently classfyng each of the nputpatterns

One level of the pandemonum sstem s data driven, that s based onthe analyss of the ncomng senso sgnals Another level s conceptuallydrven, such that hgher mental pcesses add to the lowlevel processes(Lndsay & Norman 1977) n conceptually drven processng generalknowledge gudes the analyss ere are specal demons for conextualnformaton for expectatons an or meanngs

Snce the demons are organzed nto levels and snce they can change

or learn a gven sgnal need n completely analyzed Rather atten-ton s guded accordng to the st pertnent features Nevertheless allthe demons must be able to communcate wth one another o allow forths Lndsay and Norman postultd a mental blackboard. he demons



Cogntv mtapor 189

can take from or add to the blackboard any nformaton they may needAlso there s a supervion demon, who puts together a logcal nterpreta-ton of the sensory nputs based on the nformaton of the blackboard

he pandemonum model s obvously metaphorcal t supposes

homuncul (or rather dabol) that recognze compute decde andshout he model reles on cogntve metaphor themes (e orentatonsconduts memory contents) ut despte the obvous metaphorcalnessthe theorsts who espouse ths model oten seem to beleve that they aredescrbng somethng lterally true about human mnds (eg Lndsay &Norman 977, p 8). heoretcally the demon processes correspondto hypothetcal neural processes supposedly makng the theorzng morelteral and the hypothetcal processes mor real

hs case study was ntended prmarly to show how an ndvdual theo-

retcal model can rely on a concatenaton of metaphors ut must cogn-tve metahors t together as neatly as all the nformatonrocessngmetaphors seem to or can they sometmes be at odds wth one another

Case study Gibson's ecological psychology of perception

he varous "schools of thought n psychology favor partcular meta-phors and metaphor themes (Gentner & Grudn 98 Hoffman & Nead983). he percepton theory of James J Gbson provdes an nterestng

case study of how one pont of vew (and ts metaphors) can be at oddswth another pont o vew (and ts metaphors) n ths nstance thecontrast s between Gbsons "ecologcal psychology and the approachto vsual percepton taken by tradtonal thnkers n Western sychologyand typed by the works of such scholars as Descartes and Helmholtzo those traned n ths tradton whch s the maorty of psychologstsGbsons theory seems dentely curous Analyss of the metaphorsnvolved can clarfy the two dfferent theoretcal postons and show howthey are at odds

he CartesanHelmholtzan trditon

As we ponted out n our llustratons of cogntve metaphors Descartesand many of hs ntellectual ancestors took physcal and geometrcaloptcs to be a lteral descrpton of human vson Accordng to ths vewlght rays are converged by the eye to produce retnal pctures hesemages are then carred along nerve bers to the bran y the earlynneteenth century, the mathematcs was so rened that all manner of

optcal proectons could be descrbed n geometrcal terms hs tradtonreached a clmax wth Helmholtzs Handbook of Physologcal Optcs(86796). Followng Helmholtzs reasonng most psychologsts stllregard percepton as a process of "unconscous nference because (t ssad) the data for vsual sensaton are mpovershed twodmensonal



190 R. R. Hoffman, ocran, and J M. Nad

retnal mages Perceptual expeee s beleved to be not of the worldbut of an analogy to the world te results of the operatons that processsensatons by adumbratng or supplmentng them through nference andmemory (Haber 1968 p ; Helltz 1867/1962 vol 3 pp 213) hebare sensatons have no meanng; e nervous system uses them as clues

cues, codes, or features.

Gbson's ecogcal alternatve

o Gbson (1979) the CartesnHelmholtzan notons are completelymetaphorcal a confuson of an event wth our words for descrbng t(p 672) a confuson that leads to n endless phlosophcal debate aboutontology and "what exsts he may be processes of sensaton n-volved n percepton but thee eed not rely on the processng of

hypothetcal mpovershed sensations or "clues o Gbson lght tself shghly structured; the optc envoent s a sea of optcal energy that hasa specc pattern n three spaal dmensons from any gven pont ofview Changes n the pattern over tme wll specfy the nvarant envron-mental relaton and the changg nes

o Gbson psychology made a ctcal error when t assumed that thephyscs of stmul s basc to senstons and that sensatons are basc topercepton he nformatonprocsng vew a modern manfestaton ofthe CartesanHelmholtzan traditon led psychology to avod ts oblga-

ton to study the natural envroent (Gbson 1979 p 699) Whatpsychology needs s an "ecologcally vald optcs an optcs of surfacesand obects not of solated spot vwed through a tachstoscope (see alsoJohansson 1985)

What s perceved o Gbson 1977) "affordances are percevedAffordaes are thngs lke the grpablty of a stck, the supportabltyof surfaces the lftablty of obes the falloverablty of slopes Anaffordance s a combnaton of proertes taken wth respect to an organ-sm he noton of affordance cus across the tradtonal Cartesan ds-tncton between subectve and obectve Gbson wanted to reect theageold dstncton between prmar and secondary qualites especallynsofar as the dstncton postulats that secondary qualtes are arousedn the bran as a result of sensatos or prmary qualtes o Gbson thss so much mythc bosh he rpess of a banana lke ts color andshape s drectly speced n the tic array

Drect versus ndirect perception

o Gbson perceptons are not bult bottomup out of sensatons

Rather affordances are drectly perceved va the nvarants that arespeced n the otc array he eed not be ndrect percepton that sthe deductve nference of obects r nformaton that s not present n the





192 R. R. Hoffman, ocran, and M. Nad

percepton. o paraphrase Reed d ones (1978) the percepton of apersstence an act that reles on memory n the tradtonal vew doesnot depend on some persstence in he organsm (e memory storage ofcopes of thngs n the world) snc there s enough nformaton avalablethat speces the persstences n changes hat s do not take outloans on ntellgence n order o eplan percepton (urvey & Carello1981 p 31)

y means of the hypothess of ect percepton t s clamed that oneneed not postulate memores or ental representatons n order to ex-plan percepton Furthermore Gsonans clam that perceptual exper-ence tself even when medated not equvalent to the memores ornferences that may provde matel support for the percepts (see Reed& ones 1978; Shaw & ransor 1977) Perceptual experence s notthe awareness of actvated mmy traces or memoral adumbratons

of sensory messages hus a ke ssue that separates the nformaton-processng and Gbsonan vews s whether hypothetcal medators areust causal supports for percepto r are also representatons of percep-tual experence (epstemc mediats)

As wth the other case studs our dscusson has been bref t doesnot do ustce to the orgnal wors and certanly not to ther assocatedresearch programs he Gbsona rogram of ecologcal psychology hasbeen treated esewhere at length (eg. Hagen 1985; Warren & Shaw1985; see also Gbson 1985) W ope that ths dscusson of Gbsons

metaphors has clared the contrt between hs theory and tradtonalvews of percepton One reasn tat Gbsons theory may be hard forsome to grasp s that he twsts arnd our usual orentatonal metaphortheme. We have also shown o an epstemologcal problem that ofdrect versus ndrect percepton s based on an underlyng metaphorcalconcepton of the relaton of te owng agent to the world

On a general level ths case tudy shows how rval theores can utlzecontrastng metaphors However al theores can also share metaphorsas shown n our next case stud

Case study motor skills

Hstorcally motor sklls theorsts have borrowed metaphors that arepopular n other areas of nqur nd appled them to the motor skllsdoman ost theorsts contnue to nvoke models n whch cogntvemetaphors play a central role (or a revew of the motor sklls area seeelso 1982a.) Our dscusson roles around a basc dstncton between

ways of storngmotor command

muscles) n memory hs dstnctons between open and closed-loop heores of the nature of movementfeedback.



gntve etars 3

Feedback

heores of motor sklls that nvolve feedback control can be dvded ntotwo types those that clam that feedback nvolves a comparson of actons

to a stored copy of the commands sent to the muscles and those that clamthat feedback s compared to stored epectatons of the consequences of agven planned act Accordng to the semnal theorzng by von Holst(94) an mage or copy of the mpulses sent to the muscles (the efer-ent copy) s used to modfy or control ncomng vsual mpressons hshypothess was ntended to explan how we can dstngush movement ofobects from selfmovement on the bass of retnal mages alone. here ssome evdence that can be taken to support the efferent copy theory.However efferent copy theores have been crtczed for falng to explan

how we can detect errors that are caused by envronmental factors(Hershberger 976). Speccally a movement that s executed exactly asplanned but was naccurately planned to begn wth could not be deter-mned to be erroneous. Such dfcultes led to the concepton of feedbackas nvolvng a comparson of the results of an act wth stored expectatonsof the consequences of the act

oops

otor theores dffer n the way they conceptualze the feedback hereare two prmary knds of feedback theores open-loop theores n whchfeedback s used after an act s completed and closed-loop theores nwhch feedback s used n contnuous montorng of the systems perform-ance. he most common example of the latter sort s the home thermo-stat Closedloop systems requre that feedback from each segment of amovement be used n the executon of the task Openloop systems donot requre feedback durng performance snce each act s preplannedHowever openloop systems requre explct knowledge of the ntal

condtons n whch an act occurs hey do not deny that feedback ofsome type occurs nowledge of results can play a role n the executonof subsequent acts.

he use of closed and openloop concepts to theorze about motorsklls s not new. Wllam ames (89) proposed that feedback from onepart of a movement led to the ntaton of the next and called ths thereex channg hypothess (vol p 6) artlett (93) proposed that amotor response s not merely set off by receptor functon but s gudedby t (p 3) ernsten (93967) dstngushed between closedloop

control whch he called the chan hypothess and openloop controlwhch he called the comb hypothess he mechansm les outsde theengrams themselves and drects ther order by an herarchc prncple(p 37). Smlar dstnctons have been ponted out by others snce then



R. R. Hoffman, ocran, and J. M. Nad

and closedloop theores have bome numerous (eg Chase 1965;Crak 197 Lazlo 1967)

he dea that the same metaphs can appear n rval theores s bestllustrated by an analyss of two modern theores of motor behavorAdamss trace theory a closedoop theory and Schmdts schema

theory an openloop theory

Adamss rce theory

A detaled cosedloop theory of motor sklls was proposed by Adams(1971 1976) Adams dened a memory trce as an agent responsble forselecting and ntatng a movemet a modest motor program that onychooses and ntates the response 971 p 126) n addton a hypothe-tcal perceptual trce s the refernce for determnng whether a gven

response s accurate he percetal trace s a motor mage (not neces-sarly a conscous one) and the coparson of feedback stimul wth t san act of recognton (1976 p 9) races of both types are lad downon each tral or repetton of an ct e effect of learnng s a dstrbutionof traces across repettons eah race leavng a small change n thememory substratum Learnng th formaton of new traces and move-ments become automatc when strong traces have been lad down

Adams had conduced some exrmens on perormance a a smpleleverpostonng task f each movent n such a task s really a seres of

corrected movements more of he total movement tme should be de-voted to the nal portons of the tsk as more correctons are made Asmple mathematcal nstantaton f the trace model therefore wouldhave two components n the total eacton tme R = t t, wth trepresentng the effect of the correcons his equaton was an importantstep toward explanng the emprl relaton known as Fittss law (Ftts,196; eele 1973) Adamss therzng was also supported by researchthat showed that response tme eases as a functon of the amount ofnormaton processng demanded by a motor task (e choce among

a number of alternatves) and tt response tme ncreases as moremedatonal or processng stage ar requred (eg pressng a button nresponse to a smple lght stmulus v n response to pctures or to words)(Ftts 196; Hck 1952 Hyman 153)

A problem for closedloop thees has to do wth the lmts on therapdty wth whch movement can be executed Lashley (1951) ctedevdence that movements can b extremely rapd such as the panoplayers trllng of notes at a rate sxteen or so per second Such ratespresent a challenge to theores that rely on the closedloop control of

movements snce the theories may not alow enough tme for feedbackand error correcton (eele & Posr 1968) An alternatve s openloopcontrol n whch some acts are plnned before executon and feedback s





196 R. R. Hoffman ocran and J M. Nad

RECALLSCHEMA

RECOGNTON

PASTRESPONSE

SPECIFCATONS

SCHEMAL_

.

PASTSENSORY

CONSENCES

L �GJ -

SCHEMA

EXPECTEDSENSY

ONSEQUENS

(FEEDBK)

_

-

_

_

_

_

�:NWEDGE OF RESLTS

Fe 5 Schema heoy f oo kll (Afe Schmd 1975)

varablty of the ractce exer he learnng of a schema or overallpattern wll be better f a pero acqures experence through dversenstances of the task A numbe of experments usng smple lever-postonng tasks have found ncresed transfer from practce to test tralsf people are able to acqure exprence through more varable tranng(Newell & Shapro 1976; Wrsbeg & Rogsdale 1979)

Schmdts theory s smultaeouly promsng and frusratng t spromsng n that t goes further than other theores n rovdng answersto the queston of spatal representaon and frames of reference n motorcontrol ut t s frustratng n that t depends crtcally on the functonsand capabltes that are assgned t the hypothetcal schemata. Hstor-cally schematas have been regred as holstc abstract representatonsof patterns that underle percepto and acton (Attneave 1957 artlett1932; eele & Posner 1968; Nortay 190 Paul 1967) As dened by

neurologst Henry Head (1920) tey are combned standard[s] aganstwhch all subsequent changes ture are regstered before they enterconscousness We are always buldng up a postural model of our-selves . . . [very change] s reordd on ths plastc schema (vol. 2 p 605) he concept of the schema s an abstract conceptualzaton ofmental representatons a dyna pattern that may only be approx-mated by ndvdual nstances. abstract categores schemata cancontan whatever a theorst wes practce effects spatotemporalqualtes even ntenton ndeed t Schmdt (1975) a schema s a rule

(p. 233) a set of abstrct nforman (p. 235) and an agent that gener-ates responses (p 236) he sce boxes are both memores and nten-tonal agents that coordnate nteate and generte



Cogntv mtapor 197

Schema theory holds that t s not necessary to store programs for allpossble motor acts or perceptual traces from all motor acts or any otherspecc nformaton necessary to ntate or montor performancehrough the relance on abstract schemata consderable savngs n mem-

ory storage requrements are acheved. ut how general can a schema be?Obvously the more general the fewer the storage requrements but t snot clear how general a schema can be before the concept begns to losets theretcal uscaton As he nas mt rgrams schemaahave many of the characterstcs that entre organsms have n the smplerclosedloop formulatons Recognton schemata fo example nvoke allthe metaphors of the pattern recognton models that wee descrbed nour second case study

n essence Schmdt has developed a theory that bulds on the

metaphorcal qualtes of many psychologcal theores and provdes adomanspecc framework for ntegratng them.

Med metaphors

At tmes the metaphors n scence can be confusng. For nstance we nd theorzng n the motor sklls doman to be somewhat confusng (Weare not alone see elso 1982b) For some reason perhaps the nuenceof papers by Pew (1966 1970) and especally Adams (197 the concept

of a motor progrm has been generally dented wth lnea (openloop)sequences of commands and the concept of closedloop (feedbackbased)systems has been dented wth efferentcopy or soredexpectatontheores hese dentcatons make t necessary to nvoke some knd ofopenloop control mechansm n closedloop systems n the ntal stagesof an act Furthermore t s possble to regard loops that nvolve motorprograms as closed because an executve program trggers and montorsthe chan n fact most openloop theores make use of the metaphorsused n closedloop theores. hus there can arse some confuson about

what knd of theory a partcular theory s he metaphors of loopsprograms feedback and copes or traces are not mutually exclusve butcan be mxed and rearranged to develop new theores or to gude furtherresearch as Schmdt has done n hs theorzng and research

Our next case study s ntended to show how metaphors can drveresearch

Cs sud nion sh

odern research on attenon shows clearly how metaphors can generatedeas for experments n addton ths case study llustrates how theexpermental esults can n turn suggest renements of ther rootmetaphorcal theory



198 R. R. Hoffman, ocran, and J. M. Nad

he applcaton of nformato theory and communcaton theory(Shannon, 198; Shannon & Wear, 199; Wener, 198) to problemsn psychology (ller & Frck, 9) had a profound mpact on areassuch as the psychology of attento he orgnal metaphor provded bythe theory (roadbent, 1952, 195, 958) was the lkenng of the compon-ents of the percepton process to te components of a rado commun-catons system An nformaton oce (the transmtter) produces sgnals(stmul) that are detected by a sensr system and passed on to some sortof central processor (the central nous system), where they are lteredand decoded (recognton, catgrzaton) Generalzng on the radoto nclude other types of nformatonprocessng systems (e , compu-ters), humans were regarded a ltedcapacty nformatonprocessngchannels

any perceptual processes were descrbed as nvolvng computatons ofthe nformaton value of stmul ad a great deal of research was gener-ated by pursung ths approach (g, Attneave, 195; Ftts & Posner,1967; Garner 1962 ller 1953 he nformatonprocessng notonswere appled to the problem of elanng the phenomenon of selectveattenton Accordng to roadbet (958), the nputs (the ears, eyes,touch, etc) would correspond to fferent channels wth parallel nputlnes Selectve attenton would b necessary to avod botlncks orovrloa of the system here st be some sort of samplng of thenputs some sort of selecton or choce some sort of swtch roadbent(195) conducted some research tt reled on the swtch metaphor nhs spltspan experment peope lstened over headphones to a taperecordng of spoken numbers he partcpants heard a seres of threenumbers n one ear and at he same tme another seres of threenumbers n the other ear. After lisnng the partcpants were nstructedto recall the numbers People tend to recall the numbers by ear, that s,they would recall the three number heard n one ear and then recall thethree heard n the other ear wh call performance beng better for the rst set recalled Accordng to h wtch theory of attenton, the sgnalfrom one of the ears (e, one of the channels) was passed through theperceptual swtch and processed he message from the unattended chan-nel was lost from shortterm meory sorage before could be pro-cessed, and hence he poorer reca for the second set of three numbers

One of roadbent's manpulaton nvolved nstructng people to recallthe numbers n an order that altated ears (channels), for example,rght ear, left ear, rght ear, and so n n ths case, the lsteners had greatdfculty recallng the numbers escally for bref presentaton rates (ofthe order of a second or so pe nber) y manpulatng presentatonrate, roadbent was able to estte the swtchng tme of selectveattenton.



Cogntv mtapor 199

Cherry (1953) reported the results of experments on attenton n whchpeople lstened over headphones to taperecorded prose passages adfferent passage n each of the two ear channels. he lsteners taskwas to "shadow or repeat out loud whatever was heard n one of the

two channels. A number of studes usng the shadowng task have foundthat people can be so attentve to the content of the target messagethat they may be unable to remember much about the content of theunattended message. Not only that they can fal to notce that thespeech n the unattended sgnal s eng played ackward or has sudden-ly changed language. essages can be repeated n the unattendedchannel many tmes and stll not be recalled ven an nstructon tostop shadowng embedded n the unattended message can be mssed(oray 1959)

Such results supported the swtch model n that t suggests that noaspect of the unattended message s analyzed beyond the pont of theswtch However lsteners n the shadowng task can notce ther ownname f t occurs n the unattended channel (the cocktal party phe-nomenon) and they also sometmes notce when the voce n the un-attended channel changes from male to female or vce versa (Cherry1953; oray, 1959) hus one can notce certan salent aspects of theunattended channel hs result suggests that selectve attenton s basednot on a smple swtch but on a r n some cases the reectednformaton can "leak through nto perceptual analyss Relyng on the

root metaphor of a rado communcaton system roadbent (1958)altered hs earler mechancal swtch model and explaned Cherrys resultsn terms of an electronc r "A practcal analogy may be found n arado recever desgned to elmnate nput nterference [t would makeuse of the fact that the nterference possesses frequency components notpresent n the desred sgnal (p 1)

A next maor development was the demonstraton that the message nthe unattended ear s analyzed for meanng resman (1960) conducted ashadowng experment n whch the two prose messages were occasonally

swtched from ear to ear so that the message that had been shadowedfrom one ear was suddenly comng to the ear that was supposed to begnored She found that lsteners would contnue to shadow the targetmessage when the two channels were swtched only to notce momentslater that they were suddenly lstenng to the "wrong ear n anotherstudy resman (196) showed that t s harder to shadow a prosepassage f the unattended channel carres a prose passage wth smlarcontent. hese results ndcated that the lter may not screen out mean-ng. n a revson of roadbents theory resman proposed a system n

wc lterng occurs on two levels After an ntal lter that selectsaccordng to physcal features there s a second set of lters wth var



200 R. R. Hoffman, ocran, and J. M. Nad

able thresholds that select mesags accordng to meanngfulness andsemantc features. She conceve o hs second set of lters as comprsnga perceptual dctona Such a echansm would explan the fact that theunattended message can be anlyd for meanng and the ndng thatcontextual and nstructonal faco can brng about changes n the sal-

ence of the unattended message (oray 1969).Snce the work by roadbent Crry resman and others attenton

research has been domnated by th renement of the basc metaphors onthe bass of expermental result (e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch 1963 Nor-man 1968). For example ahnen (1973) sought a new type of con-ceptualzaton of attenton whch e called the "effort or "resourcetheory. Accordng to ths theory ttenton s lkened to an economctradeoff of supply and demand rater lke a home electrcal system wthlmted capacty to run applanc lthough relyng on the concept of a

channel the theory does not nol a lmtaton of nformatoncarryngcapacty but a lmt on the capact to do mental work a metaphorcalpersoncaton of attenton f te ental work capacty s lmted someway must be found to allocate strtecally the resources accordng to taskdemands e more work capay evoed o one task he beer s heperformance at that task howev less capacty wll be avalable forother tasks n other words seece attenton was regarded as a post-perceptual phenomenon havng to o wth the selecton of nformaton torespond to and havng nothng to do wth blockng sgnals from

perceptual analyss.Lke the other attenton ther the effort theory has led to deas

about new experments. A great deal of research has been conducted totest the dfferng predctons made by the lter and response selectonmodels (Dember & Warm 1979 cap. 5) Our descrpton of attentontheores and research s not detaled or complete or even up to date t sntended to show how metaphor ply a role n the cycle whereby theoresand expermental results are relate hs s a cycle of mutual constrant the metaphors and theores sugget partcular expermental desgns and

n turn the results support one or another of the hypotheses. t s also acycle of mutual renement the rults can lead to mprovements n thetheores and metaphors whch n urn can suggest further renementsand advances n research.

Lookng across the case studes we have presented so far we can seea common thread or two n ec f the research domans researchershave the goal of dscoverng the auseeffect relatons among mentalprocesses and representatons. o cnceve of those processes and repre-sentatons they rely on cognte etaphors. Havng llustrated how the

metaphors relate to deas for resear<h n specc domans we turn now tothe broad ssue of mental represeaton.



Contv mtapors 1

ase study : the issue o representation in cognitive science

What s a representaton?

he term represenaton derves from the Latn esse, whch n turn has

ts roots n the Sanskrt es and sat to be real present or exstng. heword represent comes drectly from the Latn praesse and representareto be before the mnd or to be n vew Somethng representssomethng else f t brngs to mnd the orgnal experence n otherwords f t s a representaton of exstence.

n ther tmely monograph on guratve language Lakoff and ohnson(1980c) dened metaphor by sayng that the essence of metaphor s theunderstandng and experencng of one knd of thng n terms of another(p 5). n hs paper on representaon Palmer (1979) sad that a repre-

sentaton s somethng that stands for somethng else (p. 262) n thelterature on metaphor metaphor has been dened as a comparson oranalogy taken across domans or terrtores as n the percepton of thesmlarty of nondental thngs. So too have representatons been dened as analoges between dfferent domans ust as there are semantcfeaturemappng theores of representaton so too are there such theoresof metaphor (e.g. Gentner 1982). n the lterature on representaton thas been clamed that mental representatons are ncomplete n thatthey capture only some aspects of he represented world (Palmer 1979).

Also some of the aspects of the represented world may be rrelevant.Smlar ponts have been made about metaphors (e.g., berle, 970 p.230). oth metaphors and representatons have been sad to focus theusers attenton on elevant or salent aspects or dfferences, at the ex-pense of hdng or losng nformaton

What all these smlartes suggest, of course s that the psychologcaland phlosophcal problems nvolved n the ssue of the nature of mentalrepresentatons are problems wth metaphors Indeed, the taxonomcproblem of denng the meanngs of the term representaton s not one

of lteral scentc meanng, but one of metaphorcal scentc meanng Anumber of metaphor themes have been reled upon n varous dscussonsof the nature of representaton and mental representaton (Goodman976). he followng are some examples

REPRESENTAONS AS ESSENCES

Accordng to ths ancent theme, representatons are regarded as dealzatons essences or essental propertes It s true of much of language thatwords are taken to represent the essence of the thngs denoted. For

example the names of gods were once beleved to be devces for nvokngthe partcular powers and personaltes, and the Greek words for men



202 R R Hoffman ocran and J M Nad

and stones were related reecng the belef that humans orgnallygrew from stones (Cassrer 925/946 pp 40).

REPRESENTAONS AS VISION

Accordng to ths theme, represtatons are regarded as pctures of

the world mrrors of the stuctu of the wold, portrats, depctons,lkenesses or perspectval ways o ewng the world (see Romanyshyn982 chap 3).

REPRESENTATIONS A HEATRICAL PERFORMANCES

Accordng to the Vorstellung thee we referred to earler representa-tons are thngs produced on a ta (see Goffman 974). As a role canrepresent a person so too can a computer smulate people and act as f twere ntellgent

REPRESENNS AS MAPPINGS

hs theme regards epresentato as geometrcal enttes, and t con-cerns tself wth correspondences tween domans or terrtores (Parker982) he mappng can be a onetoone or somorphc map or t cannvolve a manytoone map, as n computer language nterpretaton pro-grams and complers

REPRESENTAONS AS L,UAGE OR SYMBOLIC FORMS

Examples of ths theme are the prcepton of a black cat as a symbol forevl or the percepton of muscal notaton as abstract sgns that representmusc In ths theme representatons are compared to logc whch as aconcept s tself understood metphorcally through a comparson wthlanguage (see Hoffman et al 89) Representatons ae beeved tobe nterpretatons or translatons of the represented world, logcal assess-ments nvolvng popostons and ferences (eg Fodor 984)

Metaphors for mental representaton n

nformaton-processng psychologyn nformatonprocessng psycholgy t has been wdely assumed thatmental representatons are menta states that have a causal structurelogcally composed of names prdcates quanters, concepts or otherelements (eg Dennett 978 For 98 984 Harman, 978 Hauge-land 98 atn 978 Oaty 978 Pylyshyn 984) t s assumedthat nputs (sentences percepts ec.) have mental representatons, thatconscous experence s of ment representatons and that learnnglanguage, and other sklls depend n the acquston and manpulaton ofmental representatons

A maor dstncton regardin mental representatons that appears





204 R R Hoffman Cocran and J M Nad

phrase structu es and transfor tences reect an attempt to deal wthsome of the creatve aspects of lguage as well as some of ts regular-tes ut n phrasng the nnt rblem the way they have, lngusts are,of course speakng metaphorlly they are treatng language as acontaner of sentences and rule. (For revews of the metaphors thatlngusts use n ther theorzn, ee Wlks, 985; Zwcky, 973)

Rule systems such as Chomy's evolved along wth the generalnformatonprocessng vew and te metaphorcal comparson of mndsto computers he generatve lngstc rule systems can easly be taken tobe hypothetcal psychologcal procss models For example although thedeep structure of a sentence nldes no ndcaton of ts lfetme, oncean approprate transformaton rle s appled, the rule brngs about achange A great deal of research the area of psycholngustcs consstsof attempts to explore hypothes about the psychologcal realty oflngustc rule systems and of sc enttes as deep structures For exam-ple transformaton steps mgt reected n comprehenson reactontme (see S . Reed, 988 cha 0)

Accordng to the general fratonprocessng vew some mentalrepresentatons take the form of rules procedures or commnds sometake the form of stored content r knowledge In the operaton of thecogntve engne, the contnuous fow of tme runs forward n steps aseres of transformatons of stored contents each transformaton brngngabout a new cogntve state A ew state mght nvolve a change ncontents t mght also nvolve th "callng up of some other procedure

Generatve systems treat langage as a process but n the statesand-transformatons theorzng tme tself s frozen out n that t becomesaccdental to the process n gral what we call structure s actuallytemporary but s nvarant relatve to processes or events or relatve tothe ways t s measured or charterzed (Newell 972) What we callprocess s of necessty dynamc ut processes themselves are representedstatcally as nvarant rules or procdures In other words our conceptonof the dynamc nvolves a doble metaphor mental contents are

assumed to be statc and menal rocesses are themselves represented asstatc forms

Image presentations

Perhaps nowhere n cogntve psyhology are metaphors for representa-ton more salent than n dscssns of mental magery he concept of"mage s ntmately related te Cartesan metaphor theme EEN Es E , whch uerles most cogntve theores of vsual

percepton A common assumptn of magery theores s that mages arespatial and picture-like Imager s sad to rely on some of the samemechansms as the perceptual stem For example t s thought thatvsual mages are antcpatons o percepts (Nesser, 976)



gitie etahrs 5

Images are described by a number of metaphors in the psychologicalliterature (Paivio 979 Pylyshyn, 973 94, chap ) both spatial ones(e g , images are described as drawigs workig spaces primal sketchesmetal blackboards, and scratch pads) and abstract ones (e g , images are

described as possible words and abstract data structures) It is said, bothin psychology and in natural language that images can be dim focusedivid sharp fragmeta costructed and scaed In their classic ex- eiments Sheard and Mezler 9) measued he ime i ook eoleto compare mentally two drawings of threedimensional shapes thatwould appear in different orientations he results implied that imagesundergo a smooth continuous rotation as if mental objects are beingturned Some reaction time data even suggest that images could bedescribed as having inertia and showing deceleration (see Cooper &

Shepard, 973)Critics of the picture metaphor have pointed out that images are notcopies he picture metaphor for visual images implies that images needanalysis or interpretation when in fact images already are interpretationswhich is to say, they are not "raw osslyn & Pomerantz 977;Pylyshyn 973) he ways in which images are vague are not like theways in which pictures are vague Images are not reperceptions of pictures they can show a loss of details qualities, and relations Images arenot pictures in that they can be inuenced by expectations and can

contain nonpictorial aspects (eg perceived causation)Anderson (979), osslyn Pinker Smith, and Schwartz (979), andothers are willing to argue that the picture metaphor is a good one aexible one one that can be protably used to generate ideas for experiments However Field (97), intsch (974) osslyn and Pomerantz(977), Palmer (975) and Pylyshyn (94) argue that images are repre-sented in terms of propositions In general a proposition is considered tobe a statement with two terms that are connected by some relation anatomic fact having some truth value Some authors consider associations

(binary relations) and lists to be propositions (see Anderson & Bower973, chap ) he notion of propositions was imported into cognitivepsychology along with the notion that the rules of logic are the laws thatgovern the operation of the cognitive engine According to this metaphorintelligence is regarded as symbol manipulation (Pylyshyn 97) Forming and using a mental image is supposed to be the same as accessig aode and retrievig a perceptual description, or assemblig a structure ora sematic et in some form of workspace (ieras, 97 Pylyshyn, 973)

Since we can give a verbal description of our images and since verbal

inpu can ead o he formaion of images, there must be some commonformat code or iterigua (see Dennett, 97, chap 6) According tothe proposition theory images could be mentally represented in the sameformat as verbal information With propositions, one format can be usedto represent any type of wellspecied information whether it be verbal



206 R R Hoffman, Cocran, and J M Nad

perceptual, or imagina Mental ration could be expressed as a series ofsmall computations or changes n addition to its contributions on atheoretical level, the proposito theory has also been relevant to theinterpretation of research ndns According to the theory, the reasonthat images and concrete word a remembered more accurately in recalland recognition tasks than is le imageable information (ie, abstractwords or sentences) is not that iagery is a privileged format or contentbut that highly imageable merls are represented by richer, moreelaborate propositional encoding (see Anderson & Bower, 973, chap4 intsch, 974 p )

he claim with which we bega this case study was that problems anddebates about representations are largely problems with metaphors Infact, the entire issue of the natur f mental representation is a morass ofmetaphorical relationships heoies of perception provide analyses andrepresentations of aspects of t real world which must be linked toanalyses and representations te perception rocess, which in turnmust be linked with analyses a representations of the phenomenalexperience of percepts hus th model of perceptual mechanisms andphenomenal experience is a rersentation of a representation of theworld his morass of relations rss on fundamental metaphoric assumptions with different researces invoking different representationalmetaphors to get at different asects of psychological phenomena orresearch

o determine that our analyis of cognitive psychologists' metaphorsfor representation is pertinent o gnitive science in general we will nowexamine some literature in the aricial intelligence (AI) branch of cognitive science

Metaphors for repreettion in articial intelligence

A basic problem addressed by rsarchers in AI is that in order to haveintelligence one needs to reprsen knowledge, as we pointed out in the

case study on pattern recognitio Questions concerning representationtherefore comprise a major ae of A and expert systems research(Hoffman, 97) According to e general AI approach to knowledgerepresentation (e g , Palmer, 99 Raphael, 97), words are stored incomputer memories as contents at locations that have addresses andpointers that inform the mahin of the next step (ie, some otherlocation to "go to) Representains are made up of lists or strings thatexpress properties or processes According to Raphael (97) representations are idealizations that ovide solutions that can be translated

back into the original problem anguage he translation is not onetoone, but is a complex mappng that preserves information by settingup correspondences with the rresented world hus, according to



Cogntv mtapors 207

Palmer (979), representations are to be compared in terms of theirinformation content and computational efciency A number of mathematical notions can be used to describe the relation of a representation tothe represented world for example, asymmetry transitivity, isomph-ism, and homomorphism

n the areas of cognitive simulation and A, metaphors for representations are quite abundan When taken ou of their conexs and simplylisted te metaphicalness ms tecncal tems n sands quite clearly here are access skeletons working memories combinatorial eplosions sstems hgiene, and canonical coreferents that come indifferent avors In able 5 we offer a glimpse of our classication ofmore than 350 metaphorical sentences and phrases that we identied inthe "Special Issue on nowledge Representation of the newsletter ofhe Special nterest Research Group on Artical ntelligence (Bracman& Smith 90) Illustrated in able 5 are many of the metaphor themesthat have been used n the history of Western psychology to talk aboutreresentations and many of the metaphors that have been used in thepast few decades of informationprocessing psychology to talk aboutcognition

The metaphorical interace

We close this case study with a conjecture about the relation of cognitive

simulaton work to cogntive psychology People speak about computersas if they do what heads do and they speak about heads as if they dowhat computers do he computer metaphor goes both ways As achallenge we propose that it would be impossible to give a generallyacceptable description of either computers or minds without usingmetaphorical language But this raises an interesting possibility If anintellgent computer were able to communicate efectively about itsrepresentations it would need the language that people use to create,manipulate, and talk about representations the cognitive metaphors

that we mortals use to understand representations language, memoyperception, meaning, and other cognitive phenomena

Some researchers in AI have attempted to program computers tocomprehend metaphors by reducing or transforming the metaphorsinto basic literalmeaning elements (for a review see S W Russell,9) An alternative approach would be to arm a computer with themetaphor themes themselves as a part of the semantic base his mightenable the computer to comprehend novel metaphors by recognizingthem as instances of the themes Carbonell (90) has had some success

with this type of approach Going even further it is conceivable that acomputer interface system could describe its own internal states wit thesame metaphors that we mortals use to refer to the mind One need not



Tble 5.1 Classed eamples of more than metaphorcal phrases and sentences found n Brachmanand Smth

MachinesIfeece machey pattematchg ege metalappaatu mechacal pocedue; mecham mulatebehavo; tak ca be eay o dfcult fo mache

EniiesOtologcal pmtve metal dctoae feece tap adtgge evat ad demo, pote atom; elato adpopoto ca be fomal obect; dea get emboded compute ad md

BuildinsFxed kleo d mc c, eddtuctue bac buldg block compute buld chemata adpototype; epeetato ae tool; thought modeled wthtuctue

PersoncaionCotol tatege ad tuctue compute mapulateymbol pogam actvate ette focu atteto, ad gudefeece; pogam behave lke expet; cocept gudethought

Pahs and locaionsCogtve map, uogate path make aocatve pathematc etwok ad ode, poblem pace lkage,patto aocatve hetace topologcal feedom chaof ymbol; oe ca fetch fomato ad have eachpoblem; fece follow patte; memoe ae acceed

Mirrors and visionSelfefeetal pogam, eexve tepete clea theoelluoy theoe ytem ca expla the ow eaog admod the ow behavo

ProcessesFlow gaph foe pocee xed meag etwok owfutue tate; eaog a poce chage ca be dvocedfom tme compute ca eao backwad tme; belef aeupdated

anuaesPm c k x, ,ytactc ecoomy, gaph gamma laguage ca becomputatoal ymbolc uveal ad equvalet computetalate laguage ad geeate tepetatoepeetato have a gamma ad a ytax

eels and orienaionsSpace of poble toke dtace betwee cocept,lgutcally deep dea uface popete kowledge adtuctue ca be of hghe o lowe level cotol ca be global

o local; pogam ca be cocept ceteedoicEcodg ad decodg of cocept fuy logc checodg coceptual heache epeetato ae logcalepeetato captue eece pedcate logc epeetkowledge pogam ae fomal epeetato feececa be ytematc, hdde, obvou, o expoed



Cogntv mtapor 209

only ask how to make a computer more intelligent one can also ask howo make a computer communicate about its internal sates as if it wereintelligent hat is the use of naturallanguage cognitive metaphors mightlead to more "userfriendly programs, as well as smarter ones

In this chapter we have sampled experimental psychology speechperception visual perception pattern recognition ecological psychologytheory motor skills and attention Looking across the case studies, wea n abundan nie metaphrs are how they lead torened eorng, ow meapors and eories can be a odds w oneanother how contrasting theories can sometimes share metaphors, andhow meaphors can play a role in he generaion of ideas for experimensOur nal case study cut across the various domains and focused on thegeneral issue of the naure of menal representations hroughout ourdiscussion we have tried to keep our illustrations of the uses of metaphordistinct from any criticisms regarding the potenial misuse of metaphor. Iis now time to turn to the latter topic

On he "msuse o meaphor

Representatonal mperalsm

For some reason, cognitive scientists tend to believe that there is one trueexclusive represenaional forma for example, that all knowledge takes

the form of propositions or schemata Psychologists and other cognitivescienists seem o operate wih a somewhat distored noion of parsimony.he point of Occam's razor is that the level of complexity of a heoryshould match the complexity of the phenomena not that all theoriesshould be simplistic. Yet cognitive scientists seem to feel that hey arefree to pick a favorite formalism and assume that it holds for all mannerof mental phenomena and representations

Med metaphors

In contrst to the tendency toward representational imperialism is thetendency to invent more and more clever combinations of metaphorical hypotheses. he various meaphors in cognitive science, from logicalprocesses to memory boxes to levels of processing, are coherent for themost part. It usually makes sense when cognitive scientists mix them ashey do Bu theorss often operate as if hey were compleely free onen any sor of meaphorical theory hey want or completely free topick and choose among possible hypothetical mental representations

hus, one can nd theories that combine propositional reckoning withschemata or combine feature hierarchies with templates, and so onAnderson (979) denes schemata as subsets of propositions. Schmidt




(975) denes schemaa as inteional agens wih abstract structuresSternberg, ourangeau, and Nir (979) dene comprehension as thecomputation of vectors in a seantic hyperspace. his sort of strategymight work in A, where one is eking clever ways of nding computational solutons to toug memoy sarch o inferencemakng problems

without necessarily being terribl concerned with how the human mindsolves similar problems But for te psychologist interested in cognitivesimulation, some means has to b ound to constrain the theorizing and tolink it with research ndings and, ne would hope, the reality of cognition(Bahrick, 97). Otherwise, cogtive psychology might just as well retun to being a branch of the hilosophy of mind. etaphos can beelaborated and combined ad initum and they certainly do tend toproliferate in experimental psyhology (Roediger, 90; Undewood,97). What strong experimntl evidence or phenomenal experience

waants even simple compoundngs of metaphors?

ecaton

Wih proposiions or schemata can do al sors of clever things, but isthat a sufcient reason for bliing that propositions or schemaa areactual mental entities? What ot of justication should be given forexplaining one set of data, sa invoking schemata and another set bynvokng templates? All too oftn in cognitive science, little justication

is given for the metaphorical etties and processes that are postulated(Bahick 97).he notions of proposition sema, template, and the others are all

candidates for eication, but t alidate a candidate for eication, wemust be able to say more th "It is parsimonious. he theoreticalrepresentation of cognition is nt necessarily what minds do when theycognize, although it may nonetess provide a desciption that is ade-quate for particular purposes A similar distinction between descriptionand representation was drawn b Goodman, 97) Given that cognitive

science seems unconstained in its theorizing, we should ask where theconstaints are to come from he issue is one of method and purposeHow should we use hypothetical ental epesentations, and what ono-logical status should we gant th? Converging evidence must be foundthat a given epresentation h smething to do with actual interveningmental states or processes Grner, Hake, & Eriksen, 95 Paivio,975). his evidence must be difrent from the evidence, demonstration,or phenomenon that led to the ostulation of the representation in thest place. Furthemore, th vaious types of representations equiedifferent sorts of justication and evidence In any event, there must besome continued interaction o e theory with the data produced by new



Cogntv mtapor 2

experiments therwise the modeling remains at the level of theorizingalone and at that level it seems that anything goes

ne thing this chapter should make clear is that the informationprocessing view offers no free ticket for going from metaphors to a theoryof what the mind is (see also Bahrick 987 Denne 978 Roediger980

The myth of literalness

here seems o be some onfusion in the images versus proposonsliterature about the relation o propositions to verbal informaton Someresearhers e, Anderson & Bower 973 hap are arefu o pointout that propositions are supposedly nonverbal entities Yet the factremains that words are virtually invariably used to express and explain

propositions and if not words then some logical symbols that to haveany meaning at all must be the objects of the mental acts of theorists"Proposition is no less a metaphor for thought than "picture is ametaphor for imagery Advocates of the proposition metaphor claim thatthe picture metaphor demands a homunculus that can interpret pictureimages But their own computational metaphor demands a homunculusthat can call up subroutines and make inferences he fallacy at workhere is the assumption (in its most extreme form) that any theory sus-pected of being metaphorical is necessarily bad or stupid, inviting replace-

ment by some bette (ie, liteal) theory What is usually substituted ofcourse, is another metaphor

Many examples can be found of theorists who criticize soeone elsestheory for being metaphoical seemingly assuming that this alone isenough to brand the theory as false and unscientic while hey themselves propose an alternative theory that is just as metaphorical Herefor example is part of Chomskys (959) critique of Skinners learningtheory

[Skinner utilizes experimental results as evidence for the scienticcharacter of his system of behavior and analogical guesses (formu-lated in terms of metaphorical extension of the technical vocabularyof the laboratory) as evidence for its scope his creates the illusionof a rigorous scientic theory although n fact the terms used inthe descripton of real life and laboratory behavior may be merehomonyms With a literal reading the book covers almost noaspect of linguitic behavior, and with a meaphorical reading it ino more scntic than traditional approaches to its subect matterpp 301)

In order to critcize Skinner's ratsandreinforcements metaphors Chom




sky adopts the metaphor that hs compute Well f metaphorcalness issufcient to condemn Skinner tn Chomsky is the sinner who cast astone Of course both theories hve their merits and failings both led tosome useful research, and both gerated renements through criticismsof their metaphos At every tu, the metaphors were doing their job

he theorists were making error hen they presented their own theoriesas literal truth

Some mpcaons o he phosophy o scence

Is metar necessary?

Occam's carefully worded advice (ssentia praeter necessitatem non suntmultiplicanda) implies that som phenomena, at least, may be complex

enough that a complete explani of them requires the use of multipleconcepts However, the operationlists and logical positivists latched ontothe "razor as a clarion call for a linguistic hygienics that would purgeall scienic theores of the vags and meaphors of naural language(eg George, 953 antor 93 (Ironcally operationalism andlogical positivism the epiome of lea logical igorous scientic theo-rizing were themselves based on etaphors; see Smith, Chapter 7, thisvolume)

o counterbalance this ware appoach to the nature of science,

Hoffman (979) proposed a speciation of the other edge of the razorssentia praeter dem non sut subtrahenda In other words, do notpretend to do without concept OU honestly cannot do without In thecase of experimental psychology (ad "behavioral science as a whole?)cognition is one such concept In he case of the philosophy of sciencemetaphor is certainly such a conept

he major fallacy we hope tis chapter will help to dispell is theliteralist idea that metaphor play o role in the generation of ideas forexperiments and in the renement of theories and models As it appearsin the philosophy of science th! myth of literalism is the belief thatproper theories are literal logcal constructs (which is itself an abstractmetaphor) However discovery i ften the nvention of new metaphori-cal ways of representing things a choosing between theories is often amatter of choosing between moe and less fruitful metaphors (Hesse9 aplan 95 Simon 97

he grand question implicit n at we have said so far is whether anytheory can be completely devoid f metaphor Can fundamental discoveries occur without some metaphoral extension of an idea or practice orwithout some metaphorical dection of newly found phenomena? As

we stated at the beginng of tis capter we do assume the existence ofliteral statements and literal i!tic statements Without some such



rs 213

assumption the concept of metaphor would lose all its descriptive andexplanatory power Clearly what counts as a literal statement variesaccording to the criteria used in different contexts he means of specify-ing the "similarities implied by a metaphor (or a "literal statement of

identity) are the criical considerations and they vary across researchcommunities he issue of whether metaphor plays a necessary role inscientic theories and scientic discovery has been discussed at length(see Boyd, 979 Hesse 9 Hoffman 90 MacCormac 97) Atone extreme is the view that theories cannot be devoid of metaphor evenif hey also include some literal statements his has been claimed forexample about theories of metaphor that they necessarily rely onmetaphorical notions of what meaning is (Nemetz 95)

At the oher extreme is the view that metaphors are completely un-necessary that any metaphorical components of a theory can be rewritten into a literal form here are theories of metaphor which assume hatguraive meaning can be reduced to literal meaning Both the "substiution and "comparison theories of metaphor assert that the comprehension of metaphor relies on some sort of literal paraphrase (Johnson9) he claim is sometimes made that metaphors can be reducedto underlying logical analogies or literal restatements (eg Davidson97) We should perhaps be careful not to confuse analogy as ametaphorical way of describing metaphor and cognition with whatpeople might actually be doing when they comprehend a metaphor

(Hoffman et al 99) Granted analogistic reasoning does sometimesplay a role in science (see Genner 92) but scienic analogies arealmost always post hoc relative to root metaphors hat is the scientist ishinking in terms of a metaphor or its basic image and only afterconsiderable thought might the relations be spelled out using an explicitanalogy format (Hoffman 90 95)

Metaphor as process

A major reason the substitution comparison and analogy theories ofmetaphor are doomed to fail is not just because they assume that mean-ing at its basic level is literal Rather each of them runs into troublebecause of its resistance to the idea that metaphor is a process ake forexample the literature on mental imagery Some theorists (eg osslyn& Pomerantz 977; Pylyshyn 973) criticized the picture theory ofimagery by saying "Its only a metaphor Other theorists seem some-times to have taken this criticism at face value For example Paivio(97) said "No imagery theorist accepts the metaphorical view as a

workng theory (p ) But when one looks closely at how psychologistsare using he picture metaphor something very revealing appears Sometheorists use the metaphor of images as pictures to specify the ways in





Cognt mtapors 21

Mephor and model

In addition to relating heories to new ideas for experiments metaphorconnects all the major functional components of science In this chapter

we have given examples of meaphor themes specic metaphorical hypotheses metaphorical theories mathematical models based on metaphorsand metaphorical ow diagrams A model is echnically a subsanivething. All oher uses of the term model are metaphorical extensions ofthis basic meaning including the abstract mathematical notions of amathematical model and model theory. Psychologists' cognitivetheories are often regarded as models as in the aenion models.

wo things are common to scientic products that are called models() hey have similar compositions namely physical or symbolic repre

sentations that preserve hypothetical correspondences or relations ofthings in the represented world (Palmer 979) and (2) they behavesimilarly that is they generate symbols or other outputs o the literature on the relations of meaphors and models we would like to adda distnction between physical models and "metaphorical diagramsPhysical models do things they produce outputs (symbols numbersetc) Most informationprocessing ow diagrams do not do this althoughthe programs they may represent can A metaphorical diagram need notprecisely specify the nature of the represented information just as Figures 5. and 5.2 and similar models (metaphorical diagrams) onlypartally specify some of the factors and transformations involved in thehypothetical boxes he more specic and geneative a repesentation ordiagram is the more willing one might be to say that it presents a model.Adamss (97) simple equation for motor skill reaction time is a goodexample It can be represented as a metaphorical diagram (with themathematical operations indicated by concept terms in he boxes) or as aphyscal model (i.e t can be used to compute or generate temporalintervals)

Metaphor and the falsication of theories

Not all scientists are suckers they are often painfully aware of metaphorical and literal aspects of their theorizing aware of metaphoricalness infalsied theores that were retained for the sake of advances on boththeoretical and research levels Here for example is another passagefrom Frud (97/93)

I know you will say that these ideas are both crude and fantastic andquite impermissible in a scientic account hey are preliminaryworking hypotheses like Ampres manikin swimming in the elec



216 R R Hoffman Cocran and J M Nad

tric current I should like assure you that these crude hypotheses of the two rooms th atchman at the threshold betweenthem and consciousness as sectator at the end of the secondroom must nevertheless be ve farreaching approximations to thereal facts (vol p 9)

What Freud was suggesting is tt a fallacy is committed whenever ametaphor in a theory is blamed fr any shortcomings of the theory whenin fact it is the depth or extent he theorizing that may be insufcientAs we have shown metaphor leas to advancement in more ways thanproviding ideas for new expermts Metaphor leads to the renementof theories by pointing out th tlorist's assumptions Metaphor can beused in falsication by pointin o the shortcomings of the theorizing ofwhich the metaphor is one part hese are all positive contributions ofmetaphor not failings

Another fallacy is committed when it is assumed that metaphoricalnessalone is sufcient to falsfy a thor and sufcient to justify the abandonment of a theory. In actuality metphoricalness alone is not sufcient forfalsicaion and falsed theoe shuld not necessarily be abandonedsince hey may have some "tutikeness Even theories that are believed to be literal can need slifying assumptions (eg All otherthings being equal) mathematia shortcuts temporary hypotheses incompletenesses entites that are ot real phenomena or propertiesthat are not directly sensible ad the like. So it is logically incorrect to

abandon a theory on the assumtion that its metaphoricalness detractsfrom its truthlikeness Metaphrs ike literal statements can be regardedas falsied and yet be used cretiy to generate experimental conrmations and disconrmations It i never necessarily a mistake to propse ameaphor in an attemp o explai or clarify somehing or to come upwith new ideas. Any given mtahor might have payoffs if pursued.Scientic metaphors are embroni theories hey can grow into precisehypotheses that can ultimately go beyond their root metaphors in descriptive or explanatory power.

One can certainly establish rules for deciding whether to accept (tentatively) a given theory on the basi of the occurrence of metaphors n thetheory One simple rule often lied on in debates is If the theorycontains metaphor abandon it. nother such rule perhaps a morereasonable one would be If the etaphor suggests more resemblancesthat are demonstrably incorrect tn ones that are demonstrably correctseek another metaphor. However he question of when to know whetherto apply any such rule (i e the ruls decidability) is problematic hatis in practice one can never be se a rr that a decision to reject (or

accept) a theory on the basis of a iterion of metaphoricalness is a soundone (Hoffman 90)



Cogntv mapor 217

his conjecture the undecidability of criteria for the rejection ofscientic metaphors is a variation on a claim made by Maxwell (970)that there can be no strict inductive justication (i.e a rr logicalguidelines) for belief in scientic (here metaphorical) principles Hesse

(9) argued somewhat similarly that the postulation of new entitiesmust involve metaphorical extensions since a strictly deductive (orational) method cannot make such postulations. One may not be ableto determine which charcteristics of a theory or model can be exploitedand which are irreevant Hutten (954) and Lchman (90) argued thamodels can be evaluated a rr that is by rational rather han empiricalmeans according to their scope and precision Yet hey maintainedthere cn be no sufcient rational grounds for determining beforehandhow well a theory or model will work out In terms of the presentanalysis there is no deductive means for deciding which metaphor tointroduce (or throw out) or for deciding which correspondence rules touse to t the metaphor into a theory As Berggren (9) put it this isbecause metaphors "partially create what in fact they reveal (p 42)he moral Do not reject a heory ofand because it is metaphorical

The cognitie-experimental approach tohe hiosohy o siene

In his summary of various philosophical positons with regard to thenature of scientic knowledge Lakatos (970) wrote

ustiioniss wan scienic heorie to be proved before they arepublished Probabilists hope a machine can ash up the degree ofonrmaion of heory given he evidene Falsicationists hopethat the elimination of a theory is the verdict of experiments Allthese theories of instant rationality and instant learning fail. heconstraints in science the tenacity of some theorists the rationalityof a certain amount of dogmatism can only be explained if we

construe science as a battleground of research programs rather thanof isolated theories. (pp 745)

he cognitiveexperimental perspective on science encourages the viewthat psychological factors such as metaphor and the heuristics andbiases that operate in problem solving play just as important a role asogical factors his is essentially the opposite of the view taken by logicalpositivists and empiricists hat view dominated the philosophy of sciencefor many years but has been challenged in the past few decades ophilosophers of science such as the "instrumentalists (e.g Maxwell970) and fallibilists (e.g Weimer 979) knowedge does not comeonly from experience sifted through the rules of logic there are other



218 R R. Hoffman, Cocran, and J. M Nad

important and necessary compones he notion hat science can be fullyunderstood only through a naive iew of observation and steadfast re-liance on logical analyses leads to an impoverished philosophy of scienceone that eschews empirical studie of actual scientists in favor of thepredicatecalculus analysis of statc inhuman contextfree "theories

Philosophers of science generl reify theories A major goal of theirdiscipline is to dene what a "ther is. But strctly speaking there is nosuch thing as a theory with xd meaning and independent of cognizingtheorists Most of the history of t philosophy of science and epistemol-ogy consists of repeated attemps to convince ourselves that theoriesexist that bits of knowledge exist and that they can be literal and true.In practice it would be better o cus on the idea that theorizing existsand not theories

he analysis of scientists cgiion suggests that a collaboration of

philosophers and psychologists in research programs on real domains ofscientic practice could be more roductive for philosophy (addressingquestions such as "What is inducive inference?) and more productivefor psychology (ddressing qustons such as Does a given theory ofcognitin wrk fr sienic poem solving?) han a philsphy ofscience that focuses on postulatnal theories and repeated attempts tosalvage empiricism through reens in logical calculi (Weimer 979)In what cases if any do metapo appear to serve a necessary scienticfunction? How do scientists go fr metaphors and images to mathema-

tical equations? Would a knowlee of the different rhetorical forms ofgurative language be of assistne in actual problemsolving situations?Must certain types of metaphor e used in the comprehension of certaindomains?

Science is a kind of poetry n otion under the multiple constraintsof physical conceptual and mtodological factors he analysis ofmetaphor its many uses in scietc theorizing and research will notilluminate the entire truth. But by lassifying cognitive metaphors seeingtheir thematic coherence and carifying ther role in experimentalpsychology we somewhat nearshted psychologists may be able to seethe ickering shadow on the wall f the cave a bit more sharply

Acknowledgments

his chapter stems from previous works (Hoffman 979 90) concern-ing metaphor in science It actualy began as a larger work that has nowbecome a riad Elsewhere (Hoffn & Nead 93) we explore the useof metaphor in general world vies including those in psychology andarticial intelligence Hoffman 5) goes into more detail on the im-plications of metaphor for the phlsophy of science Looking back overthe triad we see that a few points re repeated (briey) but we feel that



Cogntv mtapor 21

hese poins need repeatng especially in a review chapter such as thishe preparation of a draft of this chapter was supported by a postdoc-

toal assocateship to the st author and a redoctoral associateship tohe second auhor under Gran HD075 from the National Institute of

Child Health and Human Development to the Center for Research nHuman Learning of the Unversity of Minnesota Many of the ideasexpressed here rst arose in a seminar on mental reresentation held atthe center in 979 and 90 he seminar was attended by Joseph lounEdward Cochran Stephen Chew Grant Ciof Peter Eisenberg RobertHoffman James Jenkins Jeffrey reps James Nead Edward ReedMary Ann Records Jan Wald Jerry Wald and Connie Wellen heauthos would like o hank Joseph Blount Ben Bravermen RussellBurrhus Peter Eisenberg erry Gottfried Lenief Heimstedt Leah Lar-key Edward Reed and Jan Wald for heir helpful comments on drafts ofsectons of this chapter David Leary deserves special thnks for hispainstaking attention to hstorical details Our thanks also go to MaryWolf and Jm Becker for preparing he gures.

Note

hroughout th chapter we ollow the coveto o puttg metaphor talc ad metaphor theme captalzed talc I the ollowg dcuowe gve oly a ew example o each metaphor heme, bu we vte the reader

to geerate other example.

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6

Metaphors of consiousness andognition in the sory of psyology

J E R O M E B R U N E R A N D C R O L F L E I S H E R F E L D M A N

It is mind bogglng to review as and resent theories of consciousnessand cognition with an eye eeled or metahor ven on the shallowestinsection it is aarent that ter have been nthing but metahors inthe history of these two toics A these metahors have been so variedand so riotously luxuriant at least here consciousness is concerned thatwe can only stand back and wond Of what or of whom does one seakin such cascading metahors? Cscousness as a sotlight a footlghtbefore which scenes are enacted a owng river a stream of thoughts aseamless web a set of sets a gra a owerless rider a recursive looan internalized running back a forth a readout a andemoniuma stage or dislay there is no nd to this arade Nor can we fail tonote the elusive chimeralike qulty of the metahors of consciousnessSometimes it is viewed as a stat sometimes as an act sometimes it isinut sometimes outut somties it enoys a unity sometimes a diversity and often a unitas mulipx

One may wonder as we ha hy this heaing of metahors? Whyafter all of human history and sculation should one school of deethinkers (e g Dewey 90 Jas 90/93) think of consciousnessas a biological secializaton for aling with conict, contradiction surrise irregularity and difcult chice whereas another (e g Huiznga93/949) conceives of it as the cild of lay?

Cognition in contrast s rathe ore sedate and generates a far morecultivated garden of metahors he rincial divergence is betweenthose metahors that deict cognition as a cycle of reectin and then

30



Maphors of conscousnss and cognon 231

reroducing the world a kind of selective but orderreseving coyingmachine with degrees of freedom at the registering storing and rintoutoints and those that deict it as a creator imosing its categories onwhateer it encounters ending by making a world of its own ach of

these aroaches let us call them the reroductive and roductivetheories of cognition is relatively uncommitted as to the centrality itassigns to consciousness But each is committed to a different view of itsfuncion one emhaiing how the onen of consciousness reectdistort or otherwise mirror the world however much in a glass darklythe other how acs of consciousness imose not only structure but direction on exerience

Basic metaphors of consciousness

Let us consider rst how the contents of consciousness have been rendered into metahor by theorists in the reroductive tradition Nakednesshas to be a crucial concet in this discussion bare consciousness consciousness as mere sensing as freed of the stimulus error and aselementary has been the basic remise of their aroach Nakednesshas a long tradition Aristotle in the e sensu (ca 330 BC/957)contrasts the secial senses with the common sense the sens com

munis he secial senses according to Aristotle yield only the uniquesensibilities of bare touch bare vision bare sound the common senseuts these together into something that has reference and sense Aristotleasks how we know that it is Cleons son descending the stes of theParthenon when all we have is some visual sensation the sound of avoice a articular gait and so on He argues that there must be something beyond the secial senses something that is a common sense thatust artake of nous or soul If Aristotle were translated by atwentiethcentury enthusiast of articial intelligence he would talk about

the sensus communis as accessing semantic memory and being under thecontrol of an executive routine much like the ustream editing demonsin liver Selfridges ( 959/9) andemonium model Similarly theBritish emiricists although they would have resisted being taed Aristotelians wanted to make and maintain the distinction between baresensory stuff John Lockes (90/959) rimary qualities and the morefully interreted and less naked secondary qualities of sensation as wellas the oerations whereby these could be welded together to makeBishop Berkeleys coach

Yet neither Aristotle nor the British emiricists were rimarily interested in where consciousness started whether aked sensing was anactual conscious rocess or whether it was merely an abstract descrition By the midnineteenth century however such issues had come into





Meaphos of conscousness and cognon 233

Stout (9) rferre the issue right back to rstotle denying that thrcan ever be anoetic sentience (awareness free of no or mind) andargung instead that consciousness s contnually "shaed by acts ofmind A halfcentuy later R S Woodworth (947) an American ex

ermental sychologist steeed n the native tradtion of functionalismwrote a ceebrated artice denyin that there can ever be seeing withoutlooking or hearing without listening

So at the outset we shoud recognize that there has been a onghistory of battle between two basic metahors the one having consciousness deveo from the outside in the other rom inside out the rstguided by rules of entry and inciles of resonsiveness the second byacts of creation However we shoud not overoo that these two viewshave had at least one thing in common Both ave been reoccuied with

the need to distinguish between an inside where consciousness is suposed to dwell and an outside where it does not his essentiallymetahoric distinction between the "inside and "outsde dimensions ofconsciousness has given ise to some of the most fulsome imagey everoduced in the sevice of natura hiosohy

Some of this imagey has to do with the underlying uses o functions ofonsiousness ven in is mos ancient ommonsense form onsiousness was undestood through the metahor of "concentrating the mndsometimes aternativey exressed as the "sharenng of awareness or

the "emoving of distaction gain two basic exlanations fo thisrocess of "concentration have been ostulated ne has to do with howsomthing outsid the mind can foce it to concentate his aoach isbest symbolized erhas by Samuel Johnsons famous witticism to theeffect that nothin concentrates the mind like hanin and it is beautifully illustrated by B itcheners (90) discussion of "rimary assiveattention itchener you may recall assined the cause of this sort ofconcentration to comellin states of the world that force us to attend tothem xamles would include sha or reternatural changes of stimula

tion such as bangs snas crackles and os In contrast to this exlanation of focused consciousness itchenerdescribed a second rocess of concentration which he ascribed to "activeattention and which will illustrate the other mode of conscious focusingto which we ust referred Accordng to itchener this kind of attentionrequires some sort of mental effort to bring into the focus of attentionthings that themselves do not have the vividness to get there from outside glitches humdrummery and those ordinary henomena that ontheir own ower would dwell either in the erihery of consciousness or

on the nether side of the thresholdInterestingly itchener alowed for an ovela of these two rocessesin his ostulation of a hybrid form of "secondary assive attentionAccording to this notion once we "actively develo the habit of attend



234 eome Bune an Caol Fleshe Feldman

ing to items that would not norally enter into our consciousness theseerstwhile inconsicuous thing n become assively focal and beeffortlessly arehended

Permeating both the actve d assive aroaches to concentraton is the assumtion that conisness has both a focus and a erihery

and that the two an be maniuled from either outside or insideAnd if from insde then we mg ask by what means and toward whatends the focus of consciousnes is ontrolled his kind of question ointsour discusson toward the wor f Sigmund Freud the author of one ofthe most extraordinary metahoial documents on the function of consciousness We have in mind hi Note uon a Mystic WritingPad (1925/1961) but this relatively sure article simly treats in condensedand lively fashion matters tha h had aready discussed in much richerdetail in the famous seventh ter of his nepeaon of eams

(1900/1953) In these and othe rks (see rdeyi 1985) Freuds argument was the same Consciouss functions as a shield Not only is itshaed by the sort of orderiming categories of mind that ant hadroosed but hidden beneath it are a host of things that an interosingmechanism refuses to allow int the light of consciousness lest teydisturb the uncertain eace we ve managed to force on our warringinstincts

Finally for yet another metaric view of consciousness let us takea quick glance at the informtirocssing models of contemorary

cognitive science hese model r based on the view that consciousnessis the readout at the end of series of ltering rocesses hesecication of the nature of thes lters has deended on what we know and what we think we kno bout ercetual rocesses and on themachine analogs at our disosa hus the lterings before the readoutinto consciousness have been conectured to be linear and serial tooerate in arallel and to inlve recursions in which the oututfrom one lter oerates as inu a loo in which the same rocess thatroduced it then oerates on it ain (see Palmer & imchi 1986) As

time and exerience have show however informationrocessing systems of this kind cannot be mae t aear humanoid unless they oerateto down as well as botto u" (se eg Bransford & McCarrell1974; Shanon 1987) Somethi high u in the hierarchy has got toinform the downstream ltrs bout what is wanted in the readouthis is articularly the case we one i dealing with such comlicatednonnite state henomena as anguage So what gets into consciousnessis in a much more technical ns than was ever dreamed of before amatter not only of higherorder structural rinciles but also of intentions conventions and stylizaio As a good many of our ancestors from Leibniz and ant onward have said being aware always meansbeing aware with something ueior in mind being aware relative to aurose or intention




Basic metaphors of cognition

We have already noted that both the theories and the metahors ofcognition divide themselves into those that emhasize how mind (rero

ductively) reects the world and those that focus on how it (roductively)constructs exerience and knowledge Now on the rst score mind hasbeen ictured as a mirror of nature as a wax tablet on which theworld writes and even as a set of "unit recetors that send staccatomessages about this or that feature of the environment to a utativeassembly oint Some of the reroductive theories of consciousness arelocus theories hey secify where the ghost in the machine (Ryle1949) is suosed to reside locating consciousness in the cortex in thefrontal lobes in the temoralarietal area or in some other art of thebrain Whatever its address this locus is resumably the sot at whichthe outut of the unit recetors is eventually dumed

In contrast to such outsidetoinside metahors of cognition are themetahors of roduction which are even richer For instance there aremetahors of illumination (exressed in the language of searchlightssotlights and footlights) creative synthesis (exressed in the languageo masonry mental chemistry and construction) asignment of meaning(exressed in the language of semantic networks encoding and decoding) and ograhy (exressed in te language of cognitive mas chemata and toological reresentations) to name only a few of the maorcategories

erhas the big bang that roduced the ssion of reroductive androductive heories of cognition occurred back in the eighteenth centurywith the invention of association theory No metahor in the history ofsychology has had greater ower or done longer sevice and greaterdamage than the troe of association Its metonymic rendering is thatthe exerienced world here and now is as it is because the world thereand then was as it was his roosition has engendered a language ofcoies mirrors and faithful renderings and in the fancy dress of rein

forcement theory it has led to the allegation that the likelihood of aresonse increases as a function of the frequency with which it has beenmade in the resence of a articular environmental state In this andother forms the metahor of association continues to carry the assumtion of a onetoone maing between a living being and its nonlivingenvironment often exressed metahorically as the intersecting axes of agrah

he assoiationist is in for some hard knocks if he or she adheresardently to such a assive metahor A sulementary metahor of

cognition had to be added one that recognized the astonishing caacityof even simians and rodents to go beyond the information given andto turn the received world of satiotemoral contiguities into ossibleworlds having other rinciles of organization E G Boring (1950)




whose volumes on the histor sychology managed to obscure ourintellectual history described ti ognitive aendage of the associationists as "act sychology he "ts of the Bavarian and Austrian actsychologists did some higherordr fancy work on the contents of consciousness without changing ts bic nature What they added comari

sons abstractions and so on s never as real as the basic sensorystuff on which these acts were rformed (see Humhrey 1951) Boringsummed it all u with an ecoomists metahor he "raw material ofsensation and association had to worked into the "nished roduct ofeveryday henomenology Fro this tradition of thought we have inherited a metahoric view of mental rocesses according to which thesubstrate of sensory organizato and association (what today we wouldcall the machine language) consites the hard scientic core and all elseis virtually eihenomenal to it The articular scientic metahor that

catured Bongs theoreical imagination was Mendeleevs table of theelements Chairs tables and brcks were all well and good but thebusiness of science was the derition of the raw sensory materials ofwhich these compound objects re composed

ven te oonens of associtionism beame enmh n h ramcations of the associationist meahor which conveniently t the needsand assumtions of the hyicl monism that dominated nineteenthcentury scientic thought and s continued to sway twentiethcenturyconcetions of sychology and t obects ake Gestalt sychology as

an examle For all of their oosition to associationism as a generalaoach and all thei insistenc on naive henomenology as a startingoint for the analysis of exeiee the Gestaltists nevertheless claimedthat their doctrine rested on rncile of isomorhism that is on theroosition that for every henomenal conguration there is a corresonding isomorhic hysical getalt in the brain (see hler Held &Connell 1952) his rooiton is homologous to the associationistsclaim that for every mental stae or condition there is a corresondinghysical state "out there

But there was another metaor of cognition that grew from issuesquite outside the realm of hicalism sense data theories an theassociationism of British and man sychology It was the metahorof symolism of humans as sybolmaking symbolusing creatures whoread signs and create meanig the metahor of sense and referencerather than mere associations Mastering the world according to thisview does not involve mirrorn t but reading it through a system ofsigns and symbols that ermit t construction of hyotheses theoriesand interretations It is now lai that the great innovator of the symbolmetaho was Charles Sanders eirce (193158) His views ovided thefoundation metahors icons indexes and symbols hese were what heroosed in lace of the hysicalitic sensations that dominated the think




ing of his time In essence he identied language rather than hysics asthe most aroriate source for metahors of cognition

he metaphors of today and tomorro

In this new disensation consciousness is neither a state reecting thesensory order nor a reroduction of ast associations yielding Berkeleyanoa Rahr i i a ro of ymbolic actt Now we are egnnnto ask what consciousness s instead of what it s to ask about theossible ss to which it may be ut in constructing meaning and inassigning interretations and to ask such questions as whether theconsciousunconscious distinction corresonds in our symbolic activity tothe distinction between marked and unmarked new and given exlicit

and imlicit toic and commenthis oints us toward some future questions A new set of concernsregarding consciousness and cognition have begun to beckon us and wehave begun to resond We are going "meta No longer are we satisedwith the study of mere cognition we are now studying metacognitionWhat haens when we think about thought and when we talk abouttalk From such questions it will be but a small ste to asking whatmetahors we use to understand metahors in the history of sychologyas elsewhere As we look forward to such investigations investigations

that should shed further light on the nature and rocesses of consciousness and cognition we can already see that at least where sychologistsare concerned it is indeed by their metahors that we shall know them

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J. Lochhead, & J. Bishop (Ed., Thnkng: The second nteatonal confer-ence (pp. 3349). Hillsdale, NJ lbaum.

Sou, G. F. (1896). nalytc psyhlgy London: Sonnenshen.Thene, E. B. (1908). ectures on te psychology of feelng and attenton New

Yok Mamllan.Woodwoh, R. S. (1947). Renfoeen of peepon. mercan Joual of

Psychology, 6 11924.



7

Metaphors o knowedge and behavorn the behavorst tadton

L A U R E N E D . S M I T H

Until very recently metahor has been looked uon with considerabledisfavor in Western scientic and hilosohcal thought From Plato andAristotl to the emiricist hilosohrs of th Scientic Revolution andon down to the ositivists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

metahor has been variously denigrated as an imlement of deceit acrytic and circuitous means of conveying thought and no more thana mere literay or rhetorcal device for evoking an emotonal resonsein others he standard view has been that whatever real content ametahorical assertion may have the content can and should be reformulated in literal language But even a cursory examination of the antimetahor tradition reveas that this inunction has roved far easier toreach than to ractce Not only have the denouncers of metahor madeliberal use of metahors in their own ositive ronouncements about the

nature of the world and our knowledge of it but they have failed to avoidmetahors even in the act of denouncing them o cte but one examleof this recurrent failure Pierre Duhem (1906/1962), the great turnofthecentury chamion of urely descritive science referred to the mechanical metahors and models that have accomanied hysical theories as"arasitic growths that have fastened themselves on a tree alreadyrobust and full of life ( 95)

vn i on w to suppos that such uses of mtaphor are incidentalrather than substantive (which as I shall argue is hardly the case) the

ironic if not downright hyocritical use of metahors in formulatingositons hostile to metahor is a remarkabe henomenon that hascontinued in various forms even to our own time In the twentieth

239



240 L D it

century the maor school rerenting the antimetahor tradition hasbeen logical ositivism As is wid known te logical ositivists dividedall discourse into three mutull exclusive tyes ogical roositionsemirical (or factual) roositos and nonsensical exressions o thecategory of nonsense they assigd the assertions of traditional meta

hysics as well as oetic and mehorical assertions the aim of whichwas said to be urely emotive eaningful discourse was conned to therealms of logical and emirica saements

How did the logical ositiviss characterize these realms and theirinterrelation Certainly not in olly literal language In the formalrealm of logic there was metrical talk of logical atoms moleculapopositions a pictue theoy of eaning, and a logical stuctue Auauof the old In the context o sintic theory the urely formal comonent of a theory was sometie characterized as a postulate set (to use

a geometrical metahor) someimes as a machine fo ginding outtheoems (to use a mechanical mtahor) and even as a nomological net(to use a iscatorial metah) In the fequently used achitecturalmode theories were said to be eected or onstucted on an empiicalfoundation And what about thi eirical foundation Sometimes it wareferred to as the plane of mical facts, soetimes as the soil ofobsevation and sometimes simly as the given And what was therelation between the formal and eirical realms he formal comonentof theory which was said tooat or hove over the lane of facts needed

to be tied to the obsevable rem by means of what were variouslydescribed as links, anchoings ains of eduction sentences, bidge pinciples ootlets descending into te soil, and even pilings diven into thesamp of fallible obsevation tements hese connecting links werethen said to ermit an upad seage of meaning from the obsevationbase to the theoretical concet

Note that these etahors fr e urely emirical realm and its ties tothe formal or theoretical real a intended to exress somethng aboutthe caacity of science for litra descrition In effect these logical

ositivist roonents of literal derition had great difculty characterizing literalness itself in nonmetrical terms Lest the reader think thatthe foregoing inventory of exles was adventitiously assembled tocreate that imression or tha he logical ositivists could have givenliteral translations of their metaors for literalness it should be ointdout that even by the logical osiiists own admission the decadeslongsearch for a recise literal acct of observation statements ended infailure (see Brown 1977, 173 oer 1959, 43)

he difculty of being literal about literalness has also roved to be a

roblm for thinkers other than rofessional hilosohers In sychologyerhas the most ositivistic schl of thought has been the behavioristtradition How then have beavorists fared in characterizing the con



Meaphos of knowledge and behavo

nection between our most literal knowledge of the world and the worlditself? Perhas a few examles will agan be instructive dward Colman (935) soke metahorically of immediate exerience as a - comosed of or alternatively as an out of

which science ls but no sooner did he seak of immediate exerience in tese metaorical erms han he conceded tha immediateexerience is ineffable that is incaable of being described and communicated ( 359 33) Clark Hull (930a) characterized immediateknowledge as a simle Pavlovianconditioned chained resonse that arallels a simle sequence of events in the environment this conditionedresonse was then said to be a p of art of the world (54) B F Skinner (935) tells us that our descritions of behavior havemade good contact with the world when we have discovered the "natural

along which behavior and environment acually "( 40 italics added) In each case we see the familiar attern ofmetahors being used to talk about literal descrition And the behaviorists were not the only ositivistic sychologists who resorted tometahors itchener and his followers arguably the most ositivisticsychologists of any nonbehaviorst tradition soke of sp (aguraive looking inward) of the contents o mind discerning tere thel (later ss) of consciousness Furthermore in their effortsto give the most literal introsective descritions of feelings they found

themselves describing feelings in terms of pss a dimension borrowedmetahorically from the sense of touch (vans 973 )I will not try to claim that the difculties revealed by the examles cited

thus far are sufcient to discredit fully the traditional view of metahorAfter all one cannot rove that literal translations for all this metahorical talk cannot or will not eventually be sulied But the ersistence ofmetahorical talk by those most oosed to it together with the aarentdifculty of giving a literal account of the very notion of literal descrition suggests that something may be seriously amiss with the standard

antimetahor tradition his realization has n recent years timulated arearaisal of the role of metahor in the scientic enterrise he trendof this rearaisal has been toward concluding that metahor may well beunavoidable and ubiquitous in science ven so devout an emiricist asW V Quine (97) has acknowledged that metahor s "vital at thegrowing edges of science ( 59) But we can ask whether this acknowledgment goes far enough Is the livelihood of metahor limited tothe growing edges of science where its value in extendng terminologyto nw domains is adi apparnt? r dos taphor also pla a mor

central role in science eras an indisensable rle in the formulationof the scientic world views from which theories and testable hyothesesare drawn?

hese are of course issues too large to be settled easily But we can





Meaphos of knowledge and behao 243

reexology. The great van Pavlov (897/90) n turn referred to hscondtonal reexes as psychc reexes (see oakes 984) therebycautousl markng hs extenson of the termnology to the psychologcalealm of whch he was geneally leery The aptness of Pavlovs metaphor

seemed guaanteed by the close analogy between the operatons used toproduce psychc reexes and ther nonpsychc analogs but as Karl Zener(937) was later to show so small a change of operatons as leavng thedog unrestraned produced such marked dffernces n the condtonedresponse that alternatve metaphors of sgn or perceptual learnng seemedmo appoprate to the phenomenon.

n Amerca ohn Watson (96) pcked up the reex metaphorrather belatedly but he appled t relentlessly to a wde range of psychologcal phenomena. Followng Sechenovs lead he dented thought wthcovert speech and speech wth reexes a metaphorca extenson thatganed the enthusastc endorsement of no less than ertrand Russellbefore ts approprateness was nally dscredted by experments demonstratng that thnkg s no prevented by the parayss of the speechmuscuature. ut n the cmate of Amercan pramatsm such setbacksdd not prvent the mergenc of the more global metaphorcal clam that"to know s to do. In one form or another a behavorsts subscrbed toths vew athough (as w shall se) the dveopd the metaphor ndfferent ways.

Out of the evolutonary tradton came comparatve psychology wth tsown array of metaphors. n ts earler versons comparatve psychologyreled heavly on anthropomorphsm that s the metaphorcal ascrptonof human characterstcs to lower anmals. Thus G. . Romanes (883)extended the termnology of human psychology to other organsms whenhe attrbuted emotons to spders and powers of reason to the crab. Ofcourse the anthropomorphc metaphors soon lost favor but they werereplaced not wth lteral language but rather wth new preferred metahors. Among these progressve metaphors was the metaphor of renforcement based on the analogy between the strengthenng o a physcal

structure ad the strengtheng of psychologcal assocatons. Ths concepton may be fund n the wrtngs f loyd Mrgan whose famous( 894) "canon eventually brought the metaphor of parsmony to bear onnterpretatons of the anmal mnd. Morgan (894) also helped popularethe metaphor of tral and error wth ts frutful evocaton of the parallelevolutonary notons of vaaton and selecton. As an mmedate foerunner of behavorsm . L. Thorndke (898) cononed the tralanderrormetaphor wth a verson of the metaphorcal framework of assatonsm. Thorndke thus spoke of assocatons between deas ad mpulses

(later to become assocatons between stmul and responses) as bengstamped out and stamped n by the consequences of error and success.Thorndke also used metaphors of compound and element responses as



244 Lauen D mh

well as foces of trial outcomes tht were said to be absobed by responsetndencies Finally it was Thonie (898) who exmplied in a singlesentence the entire trend of relcing anthropomorphic metaphors withequally gurative but more scientcsounding metaphors when he wrotethat his learning curves repreet the wearing smooth of a path in the

brain, not the decisions of a rational consciousness (p. 45). n sum by the time behaviors became establshed as a school it hadalready inherited a lively stock of etaphors from both sides of its familytree u the neobehaviorists did not rest content with the inheritance Aswe shall see they contrived borwed and extended metaphors fromsources boh old and new in order t formulate their even more ambitiousversions of behaviorism.

Tolman zes and maps

As is apparent to anyone who has much as glanced through dward CTolmans classic uposve Behav n Anmals and Men (93) Tolmanwas exceptionally fond of spatia diagrams and images. He once remarked "I el cmortable ony hen hav translated my explanatoyarguments into diagrams m ery unhappy whenever do not havea blackboard in my ofce (95 p 367) . ut Tolmans penchant forexplanation by diagram involvd uch more than a preferred mode ofexpression rather it sprang from s deepseated view of he world as a

spatially extended complex of ltative routes to goal states As Tolman put it in the metaphor that la at the root of all his other metaphorsthe world is a mae

To understand how Tolman arrid at his conception i is necessary oconsider his early training in the orealist epistemology of his Harvardteachers Ralph arton Perry d dwin . Holt (Smith 98) ndeveloping William amess funional theory of consciousness theneorealists argued that the mind i not a private entity encased in an"impenetrable shell; it reaches ut into the environment where it

grasps the obects of is atenion

a ratio of funcioa"obcivreference. What they referred o s the "mind abroad was said to be

out thee operating on and adui to the nvironmnt. Tolman agerlyembraced this view of mind. He wte that a mental characteristic such asan organisms purpose could be inted to that it is out thee in thebehavior of its descripive war a woof (Tolman 96 p. 355), andthat it lies in the exteals of he ituation (Tolman 93 p 7)

Given this conception of pyclogical phenomena as extended inspace it i not surprising that Toan chose the mae as the apparatusideally suited to his studies of anial learning With the mae, animalpsychologists were able to obsrv the spatial relations involved in be



Meaphos of knowledge and behao

havior. The rats purposes could be observed as its gettings away from thestart box and its gettings toward the goal box. ts cognition could beobserved as its pattern and sequence of turns to the goal box. n Tolmansmaeinspired version of the pragmatists toknowistodo metaphor,

known became a mater of confronting choice point in a mae andselecting routes o desird endsn 95, Tolman reported a set of experiments in which rats were

rewarded indifferently for selecting either arm of a simpl shapedmae Under these conditions, rats showed stable strategies of responding, or example, always choosing the let arm or consistently alternatingleft and right. Tolman later came to refer metaphorically to these response patterns as hypotheses (Tolman & Krechevsky 933). Still laterworking with more complex maes Tolman (948) saw that rats could

acquire a more global knowledge of a mae so that when some feature ofa complicated mae was suddenly altered the rats could select an ecientalternative route to the goal. The rats were in effect, tting togethertheir specic hypotheses about the various possible mae routes into anoverall picture of it. For this broader picture Tolman adopted the famousmetaphor of the cognitive map.

n an earlier use o spatial imagery Tolman (93) had asserted thatwhat an animal learns in a mae is "probably never adequately represented by single lines but always rather by some degree of speadingfannng or netoking of the lines (p 7). With his notion of a maphe now had a powerful metaphor to express this point. y its very naturea map epresents a network o spatial elationships coded in such a wayas to serve the needs of a particular organism in a particular extendedenvironment. The metaphor facilitated Tolmans thought in various ways.For one it gave him a way to characterie his view of the central nervoussystem especially in distinguishing it from other metaphorical views.Thus he (948) wrote that the "central ofce of the nervous system isfar more like a map control room than it is like an oldfashioned telephone exchange with incoming signals being worked over and elabo

rated in the central control room rather than being "connected by ustsimple onetoone switches to the outgoing responses (p. 9). Foranother it allowed Tolman to dstinguish between the "broad and comprehensive maps that are formed under conditions of optimal motivationand the narrow and striplike maps ormed under excessively highlevels of motivation or frustration (p 93).

Tolmans use of the mae as a laboratory apparatus was initially sugsd o him hs a oraist epistemological views but in timethe mae took on additional signicance both as a heuristic device and as

a central metaphor for formulating and expressing his deepest viewsabout the word. That it served as a heuristic device in the continual



246 Lc D

developmen of hs research proam s obvous enough. To address aresearch problem Tolman and s tudents would rounely transform heproblem nto one of how to daam desgn and construct a sutablemae n turn the mae would uest new hypotheses and drectons foresearch That the mae served aso as a fundamental metaphor may beless mmedately obvous especa o those who would vew Tolman asa postvst of the typcal antmetaporcal bent. Nonetheless n hs mostserous pronouncements about he world Tolman repeatedly urned tohs famly of mae metaphors addressng a group of phlosophersTolman (96) statd that "the wld for phlosophers as for rats s the last analyss nothng but a ma of dscrmnatonmanpulaton possbltes extended or narrow comlex or smple unversal or partcular(p. 369). Aga n one of hs at classc artcles he concluded wth adramatc refernce to that great odgv mae whch s our huma

world (948 p. 08) learly Tlan took hs mae metaphor serously When he spoke of ssues tha attered most to hm he fell back on hsextended metaphor. For example Tolman who was a lfelong pacstdepcted one of the causes of ar s the narrowness of peoples maps ofthe woldmae (p. 08). All al wuld be grossly underesmatngTolmans use of metaphor to sa tt t served only rhetorcal or heurstcroles for hm rather hs metaphor appear to have played a crucal rolen formulatng the world vew f whch hs tstabl deas arose andwthn whch they found he u sgncance.

To see more clearly the depth f Tolmans use of metaphors let usconsder another of hs spatal phors and ts relaton to hs generalworld vew. n a vvdly metaphoal statement Tolman (96) wrote

We may lken the envronment o a multdmensonal spders webradatng out from the beha organsm n many drectons. Thefar ends of the threads termate n nal tobesoughtfor quescences or nal tobeavoded turbances. nvronmental obectsand suaons are responded to and cogned only n her characerof provdng brdges or routs long these threads. (pp. 3578)

Ths spderweb metaphor dovtld neatly wth Tolmans other metaphors of ap and oof and the eadng fannng and netokng oflnes The behavng organsm was always enmeshed n what Tolman andrunswk (935) would later cal te causal nteeavngs or causal textueof the envronment. n operatng such a complexly textured envronment an organsm would need to ploy maps and hypotheses about thevarous strands of causalty (e about wha leads to wha) smplybecause the ends of the strands we generally too remote to be known

drecly Gven hs vew of the orld cognon became for Tolman aknd of mapguded movement lo varous strands of a texture a formof acton based on expectances



Maphos of knowldg and bhavo 247

As we have seen Tolmans vew of he world as a grand mae appldto the human wold as well as to the ats wold. Sgncantly Tolmanconsdered rats and humans to le on the same epstemologcal as well asontologcal plane. As should be evdent from the anthropomorphc char-

acter of Tolmans metaphors for cognton he vewed human knowledgelke rat knowledge as a knd of operatng on envronments under thegudance of hypotheses and maps. Perhaps more remarkable s the factthat Tolman appled hs etaphors for cognton to the very paragon ofhuman knowledge scence tself Accordng to Tolman the scentstlke the rat forms hypotheses that can undergo conrmaton and dscon-rmaton by the envronment see Tolman 933 pp. 3967). For hmthe rats mapbased expectances do not dffer n prncple from thescentsts predctons. n a related ven Tolman (936/966) drew explctparallels between operatonsm as a method practced by the scentst andthe operatons of the rat n the mae pp 56) And at the core ofTolmans vew of scence was one last grand metaphorcal clam Thetheores of scence are maps. ust as the welltraned knowledgeable ratntegrates ts wellconrmed hypotheses nto a composte map so thesuccessful scentst arrves at relatvely global theorymaps of the worldIn the nal chapter of Pps Tolman (93) defended thsextenson o the map metaphor n the course of explcatng hs doctrneas to the ultmate methodology and status of scence

All scence presents t seems to us but a map and pcture of realtyf t were to present realty n ts whole concreteness scence wouldno be a map but a coplee replca of ralty. And then wouldlose ts usefulness One of the rst requstes of scence s n shortthat t be a map .e . a shorthand for ndng ones way about . . . .Our account of mnd s we hold a mapaccount. And so also s thephyscsts account of matter. pp. 445)

Thus we once agan nd Tolmans basc metaphors beng appled equallyto the human and the rat.

ut surely one mght protest Tolmans map metaphor cannot betaken serously when appled to scence. Map knowledge n the rat mustperforce be lmted by the rats partcuar experences and needs whereasscence provdes unversal knowledge that s ndependent of tmeboundhuman desres and needs. Tolman however dd not accept ths argumentaganst extendng the map metaphor to scentc knowledge

All knowledge o the unverse s always straned through thebehavorneeds and behavorpossbltes of the partcular organ-

sms who are gatherng that knowledge. That map knowledge strue whch works gven the partcular behavorneeds and theparcular behavorcapactes of the type of organsm gatherng such



48 Lauen D Smh

knowledg. Physics and purposie behaviorism are both thereforebut humanly condtioned behoral maps. (93 p. 430)

n othr words Tolman stood by hs map metaphor and all ts mplca-tons he took it serously as ndicative of the "ultimate status of science.And he was n ths respect no pocrte He freely admtted that hsown system of psychology lik a oher was obvously bound to bewrong and was nevtably "twist out of plumb by the specal culturallack of buldng materals nhert n the tme and place of ts orgn(p. 394). Tolmans approach to sience was that of a thoroughgongpragmatst and he urged hs reader to adopt the same atttude Speakngof hs own theory of psychology he wrote "May nether you nor we everseek to hold up these propots save n a somewhat amused asomewhat skeptcal and a wholly adventureseekng and pragmatcbehavoratttude (p. 394).

As a pragmatst Tolman was turally nclned to vew scence as aknd of exploratory actvity, and his atttude carred over into his per-sonal style as a scentst and nt hs vews on methodology. n therfamous sudes on latent learnng n ras Tolman and Honk (90) hadshown that the rat cold lear useul thgs about ts maeworld throghmere exploratory activity. What e rat learns through explorng sadTolman (95) would depend on the "range methodcalness and ex-bility of his exploratory impulses (p. 90) And so it is for the huanscentst One needs to be methodl n scence but not at the expense of

the range and exblty of one eloratons The scenceasexploratonmetaphor was again one that Tolan took serously. ndeed the looseexploratory style of hs own reserch and theorng was wdely recog-ned by the psychologists of hs d and not nfrequently he was reviledfor t ut n defendng hmself Tlan put hs spatal metaphors to gooduse. n reference to what he cald the psychologcal landscape (Tol-man 93 p. 394) he reminded hi detractors tha psychology was stll a"vast contnent of unknowns (Tolan 959 p 98) and proudly referredto his own scientc work as "theotcal meanderngs (Tolman 95 p.

335). These spatal even geogracal metaphors so neatly capturedTolmans atttudes toward scen that t was qute natural or hm toreprse them n hs 937 presdnal address to the Amercan Psycholo-gcal Assocaton (APA). At the lse of that address (p 34) he (938)recited the followng poem

To my ratocnaons hope ou wll be knd

As you follow up the wanderingsOf my amaed mnd.

Wth its reference to "wanderings and its pun on "amaed the versecleverly eptomed his vew of entc actvty as a loosely guded



Meapho of knowedge and behao 4

wandering through he worldmae. Tolmans mind was certainly amaedin the sense that he approached the natural world with a sense of wonderand respect for its complexity but it was also amaed in the deepmetaphorical sense of being thoroughly suffused with maethinking. For

Tolman the extended metaphor of maes and maps was more than amanner of expression it was the very language of his deepest thoughtsand beliefs.

Hu the oganism in the old machine

Although lark Hull is known chiey as a behaviorist his earliest in-terests in psychology grew out of an interest in epistemology. While still agraduate student Hull decided that the greatest need in psychology

was or a scientc knowledge of he higher mental processes (Hull96 p. 84). n fact it was toward this end that Hull devoted hisdissertation research to the problem of concept formation in humans utHull felt that all of the extant theories of knowledge and thought wereawed by their assumption of incorporeal entities or processes on-vinced that the principle of conservation of energy ruled out the possibil-ity of nonmaterial ideas producing physical action Hull believed that anygenuinely scientic account of knowledge and thinking would have to be astrictly materialistic account He was rmly committed to a materialistworld view and had no doubts as to its adequacy for psychology as well asphysics As he wrote in his intellectual diary (the "dea ooks 978) " feel quite sure that all kinds of action including the highest forms ofintelligent and reective action and thought, can be handled from thepurely materialistic and mechanistic standpoints (p 06)

Of considerable signicance in the development of Hulls thought is thefact that he was highly adept at the design and construction o machinesWhile studying engineering as an undergraduate at the University ofMichigan Hull had built a logic machine that at the turn of a crankwould generate the valid implications of syllogistic reasoning (Gardner

958 p 4 Hull 95 p. 46) During the mid90s he devised andassembled a machine (now housed at the Smithsonian nstitution) thatautomatically computed correlation coefcients (Hull 95 p. 5). Thecapacity of these machines to perform what might be called "mentalwork was taken by Hull to be a convincing demonstration that even themost abstract forms of intelligence are manifestations of activity withinmaterial bodies. As Hull himself recognied there was nothing inherentlynovl i his oclsio. ndeed he had read and admired the mechanicalphilosophy of Thomas Hobbes but believed that Hobbess efforts to

extend the mechanical world view to psychology had been impaired by hislack of knowledge of the actual workings of machines Hull now believedthat his own proven competence with complex machinery removed any



50 Lnc D Smh

such limiaton and made him uniely qualied to apply the mechanicalworld view to psychological phenena.

y 96 Hull had arived a hs central metaphor and guiding visionfor psychology. n that year he wrte "t has struck me many times oflate that the human organism i extraordinary machine and yet amachine. n Hull's view Newto ad shown the inanimate world to bean elaborate machine and Darwi had shown humans like other organisms, to be a part of the world mahine. t remained only for an adroitmechanist like Hull himself o cplete the vision by acually devisingintelligent mechansms. Formulati what he would later call the "robotapproach Hull continued his atment of 96 as follows

So far as the thinking processs o a machine could be built whichwould do every essential thin that the body does . . . . to think

through the essentials of such

echanism would probably be thebest way of analying out th ssential requirements of thinkingresponding to abstract relations among things and so on. (Hull,96 p. 80)

n effect Hull was giving a clar nd arly statemen of th rationale formachine simulations of psychologcl processes thereby anticipating thefounding of the modern science o bernetics by more than a decade (seeGunderson 967). Signicantly lls statement went on to speciy asone of the properties of good iulations that they be designed with

hierarchies of control to govrn teir various submechanisms (p 8).The notion of the hierarchy was t ecome an important aspect of Hull'smachine metaphor.

n 97 Pavlovs Conditioned eexes became available in nglishtranslation and Hull avidly seie n it as the basis for his mechanisticpsychology. Pavlovs simple codiined reexes would serve as the rawmaterial or more precisely the mputational units of Hull's simulations and the basic laws of cnitioning would serve as the rules ofcomputation. Hull set out immeately to design and build a simple

conditionedreex machine a macne that would learn and thus exhibitintelligence simply by coming into ntact with the environment The rsof these socalled psychic machines built while Hull was at the Universityof Wisconsin was described in an rticle in Science (Hull & aernstein99). After Hull moved to ale in 99 he and his coworkers devisedand published paprs on sevral ther automata (aernstein & Hull93 lson 935 Hull & Kruer 93). Although the details ofconstrucion varied from case to cse all of these conditioning machineswere designed according to a simir pattern. Some mechanical or elec

trochemical analog of Pavlovian o rialanderror conditioning was constructed such that when the devie as subected to suitable combinations





252 Laue D Smh

psychological phenomena. ust h seriously he took the metaphor isindicatd by the fact that his "dea ooks of the arly period wer fullof drawings of machine parts by he fact that he once drew up plans toestablish a museum of psychi chines at Yale by the fact that heconcluded his 936 APA prsidenil address (Hull 937) with a demon

stration of one of his automata (s hapanis 963 p. 0) and by thefact hat he once considered titli his magnum opus (evenually inciples of Behavio) Psychology om the Standpoint of a Mechanist.

Yet despite the imporance he mechanical metaphor in Hullsthought it gradually receded fro rominence in his published writings.This curious developmen may be tribued to wo sorts of evens thasuppressed his public displays o allegiance to the metaphor First thereare indications tha during he 9s cerain authoriies at Yale took adim view of his robot approach o sychology (Hull 96 p. 85). Hull

had earlier voiced fears that the pproach would be viewed as grotesque and that he would be riiied and called a trie insane forpursuing it (Hull 96 pp. 88 89 . When the threat of suppression didarise he noted to himself that his ork with psychic machines wouldhave to be handled disreetly wt n avoidance of newspaper publctyand that he should not take th odels too seriously at least in the eyesof the public (Hull 978 p 7980 8). Second and moreimportant Hulls mechanical methor was suppressed in his publishedworks as a consequence of the risg popularity of positivist philosophy

among his psychological peers. n e late 930s and 940s an increasingnumber of psychologists were bing won over by the logical positivistphilosophy of science a philosopy that actively discouraged the use ofmtaphor in science. Hull bowd t this trend by publicly downplayingthe mechanical metaphor while clling attention to hose deductiveaspects of his theoriing that id armonie with the logical positivistschema of scence. Hull was peaded by his own dsciple KennehSpence who was closely allied t lical positivism to delete some of hisalk of behavioral mechanisms rom an early draf of inciples of Be

havio When the book nally appred in 943 it contained only a briefpassage on the robo approach . 7 8) whereas earlier drafs haddevoted an entire chapter to it (e och 954 p. 6). Still Hulls robotapproach did not slip from view ithout exerting some inuence onother more seminal articulatios f the metaphor During the 940sKenneth raik one of the found of ritish cybernetics approvinglycited Hulls conception of the ot (see raik 966 pp. 83) andWarren Mculloch one of th paticipants in Hulls seminars of the930s (see Northrop 960 p. 46 uld later become well known for his

treatment of the brain as a kind o logic machine.Hull had originally regarded hi research on conditioning theory as



Meapho of nowedge and ehao

preliminary groundwork for his more imortant work on a scienticepistemology However conditioned habits turned out to be a morecomplex and controversial topic than he had anticipated. onsequentlyas he became mre and mre embroiled in protracted debates about

animal learning he was increasingly sidetracked from his earlier goalof establishing what he called a "purely physical theory of knowledge(19 p. 0). Facd wih advancing age poor halth and unresolvedprobems in his learning theory Hull eventually abandoned his aim ofwriig a ir book o his mchaisic hory of knowldg ad evhis mre mdest plan to write a series of shrt papers on the topi wasscrapped. oneheless it is apparent from his "dea ooks and fromscattered passages n his published works that Hull did formulate amechanical theory of knowledge. Hull believed that the theory though

never worked out in full detail could account for the entire range ofepistemic phenomena including the theories of science and in fact thetheory continued to underlie his own views on science

n Hulls account the basic mechanism of knowledge was a kind ofserially conditioned response chain. onsider an organism that is exposedto some sequence of events in the world. nitially each stimulus eventsimply evokes a corresponding response. However each response in theresponse sequece produces proprioceptive stimuli which by virtue ofbeing paired with the next event in the world sequence come to evokeon their own the succeeding response. As a result the entire responsesequence once triggered by the rst stimulus event can eventually run itscourse independently of the world. As Hull (930a) stated it "Henceforth the organism will carry about cotinuously a kind of replica of thisworld segment. In this very intimate and biologically signcant sense theorganism may be said to know the world (p. 54). Thus for Hull toknow is to do in the sense of acquiring a seria conditioned response thatreplicates a relevant part of the world. The adaptive value of suchknowing is readily apparent Once the response chain achieves independence of the world sequence it can run off more rapidly than the world

sequence allowing the organism to prepare for signicant events Hullreferred to this phenomenon as foresight or foreknowledge. FurthermoreHull pointed out the intervening responses in the chain can undergo areduction in magnitude as long as they remain ust strong enough tomediate the sequence. Hull (930a) referred to responses that are soreduced as to become covert responses as pure stimulus acts or puresymbolic acts (p 55). These became his material equivalent of ideasWhil indubitably physical he (93) wrot with a metaphorical ourish they occupy at the same time the very citadel of the mental

(p. 50).Hull considered all higher knowledge to be in one form or another a



54 Lauen D Smih

complex machinry of pure stils acts. Scientic laws differed frommore basic forms of knowledge onl in tha hey were abstract replcas ofbroad classes of causal sequenc i the world rather than specic replicas of secic sequences. A her in turn was an inricae machinery ofsymbolic habits that paralleled an ven more abstract causal structure of

he world. y encompassing varios laws withn is deductve hierarchy atheory could mirror the structure of the world as well As wehave seen when the deductive they hapens to be a theory of behaviorit runs parallel to the hierarchical tucture of an organism machine. Andany theory according to Hull i pdictive by virtue of the capacity of itssymbolic machinery to operate mor rapidly than the relevant part of theworld machine that it parallels I um Hull viewed organismic adaptation (i.e. knowledge) as a kind f parallel operation of an organismmachine and a world machine. n te case of human science adaptation

meant the closely parallel operaion of the conceptual machinery oftheory and the machinery of the rld (Smith 986 chap. 8)

ust as Tolman applied his methors for science to his own scienticactivities and attitudes toward mthod so too did Hull. For exampleaft ettn sttd int a wr rutne foowin his dsrut mofrom Wisconsin to Yale he wrt "I seem to have gotten my lifesufcienly mechanied in his ne nvironment so tha I can work reallyeffectively (Hull 96 p. 83) Bt efcient scientic practice was notus a mater of workers ecoming mechanied. Hull proeced

his metaphor of the hierarchica achine onto the s structure ofscience as well. Thus in the 930s hen Hull was atemping o integratethe research activities of Yales stitute of Human Relations he informed a research group there tht "the integrative medium is a structureof implicative pure stimulus acts in other words a theoretical machinery (Hul 936 p 50) In the cal hierarchy that was to parallel thistheoretical machinery the highes positions would be occupied by thepostulate makers a select group o theoretical scientists among whosemembers Hull of course counte himself. At the next level were the

deducers or logic grinders a gru of mathematicians and logicians whowould derive from th postulate a variety of theorems that could then bechecked by observation. At the btm of the hierarchy was a large groupof experimentalists (composed mainly of graduate students) who wouldsubect the theorems to experital tests. The postulatededucetestmethod of science was hus tranomed into a social mechanism in whicheach scientist became a gear or cog heel in the great machine of scienceWhereas Tolmans metaphors led i o view science as an adventurousmultipletracked exploration of th world Hulls metaphors led him to

conceive of science as a long an grinding labor required by a "grimand inexible adherence to th rues of scientic method (Hull 937p 3 943 p 24)



Meaphos of knowedge and behaio 55

: s sqs p

. F. Skinner has been called "Americas most brilliantly and consistently

positivstic psycholoist (Feigl 98 p 4). ndeed Skinner has held anunswerving positivistic stance throughout his long and productive career.The mainstays of his descriptive positivism are well known his denial ofthe value f thois hs eshwal unbservable constructs and hisreection of causes in favor of functional relations between independentand dependent variables. On the face of it Skinner would seem to be thepsychologist who comes closest to achieving the traditional positivist aimof eliminating metaphorical discourse from science ut s he manaedto formulate hs descriptive psychology in purely descriptive and literal

terms n this section it will be argued that Skinner has often employedmetaphors in advancing his scientic views and furthermore that Skinners metaphors like those of Tolman and Hull arise out of and reveal adeeply held set of beliefs about the world. n Skinners case the worldview in question is that of Darwinian biology

Skinners psychology is based on operant conditioning a phenomenonthat he metaphorically characteries as a process of "selection by consequences or "selection by contingencies of reinforcement. The behavior of an individual is said to be emitted and then selected upon byenvironmental contigencies in much the same way that variations amongindividuals are selected upon by an environment in the course of evolution. The notion of selection by an environment may not strike us ashighly metaphorical because it is based on the nowfamiliar Darwinianmetaphor of natural selection. ut the anthropomorphic imputation of aselecting action to the environment was recognied by Darwin himself asmetaphorical (oung 97 pp. 4656) and it remains so today. n factin Skinners use it is a twiceextended metaphor in that he has brought itfrom its original context of phylogenetic adaptation into the realm ofontogenetic adaptation.

Along with the Darwinian selection metaphor come several relatedmetaphors. First and perhaps most obvious is the widespread metaphorof "shaping. Skinner speaks of behavior being "shaped sometimes byan experimenter in a laboratory and sometimes by contingencies in theenvironment (see e.g. Skinner 969 p. 76). Deliberate "shaping inthe laboratory is of course an apt metaphorical extension of the literalshaping that one migh perform o a pice of clay; bu the notio ofshapig by an like that of selection involves an additionalmetaphorical dimension in its anthropomorphiing of nature More re

cently Skinner (975) has even spoken of phylogenetic shaping by environmental contingencies in the case of the migratory behavior of marineanimals. n another Darwinianinspired metaphor Skinner (974) has



56 Lauen D Smh

referred to "accdenal varatons n behavor whch are hen selecedupon by the envronment (p. 4) The obvous parallel here s to thesocaed accdental varatons t have played an mporan role nevolutonary thory. n yet anotr related metaphor Sknner (969)refers to behavors that are sleed by adventtous contngences as"supersttous behavors notng hat these behavors nd ther phylogenetc parallel n evolved chacterstcs that do not contrbute tosurvval (p. 77). Another metahor havng evolutonary orgns andextensvely employed by Sknnr (hough not orgnal wth hm) s thatof "extncton the declne and ventual elmnaton of a learned response n the absence of selecton y favorable consequences a phenomenon parallel o the decne and demse of a speces under anaogouscondtons.

Now t s to be admtted tha Sknners metaphors are nether as

conspcuous nor as fully elaboed as those of Tolman and ull. tshould also be ponted out that Skner has warned aganst nappropratenterpretatons of hs varous seltonst metaphors (see e .g. Sknner974 p. 37) and that he has ocasonally placd uotaton marks aroudthm apparently as a warnng t aders. ut he nonetheless contnuesto use metaphorcal expresson d to use them systematcally. Sknners meaphors are no ust assred gures of speech employed forther economy of expresson or fo ther effect on the reader n a gvencontext. Rather hey represent a oheren and conssteny used

famly of metaphors unted by her common orgns n SknnersDarwnan world vew.Sknner acqured hs Darwnan concepton of nature both through hs

early readng of Darwn and mo mportant thrugh the Darwnanepstemologcal wrtngs of rnst ach one phlosopher whom Sknnercredts wth havng exerted a poound nuence on hm (Smth 986chap. 9). t was Mach who rpeaedly nssted that the evoluton ofscence s strctly contnuous wth bologcal evoluton. Accordng toMach scence s an adaptve hum actvty that promotes preservaton

of the human speces. ts hstorca oots le n the adaptaton of anmalsto ther envronments and more oxmally n the practcal commerceof humans hunters farmers ad artsans wth ther envronments(Mach 905976). As Mach put "Knowledge too s a product oforganc nature or more forcefull Th ways evn of scnc stll ladto the mout (Mach 894943, p. 7 886959, p. 3). For Machthese vews mpled that scence subect to the demands of what hecalled "bologcal economy a strkng metaphor n ts own rght. fscence s to serve ts bologcal ucon t must exhbt a correspondng

ntellectual economy. The scents must make efcent drect contactwth the subect mattr economcal descrptve laws must be substtutdfor uneconomcal theores and unoservable constructs and the noton of



Meaphos of knowedge and behaio 7

cause must be replaced with th more economical notion of functionalrelations between observable variables.

As may already be apparent Skinner has followed Mach in all of theserespects. For Skinner as for Mach science contributes to the survival

value of a culture (see Skinner 97 pp. 9 36). ust as animalbehavio is selected by environmental contingencies so human knowl-edge is a form of adaptation to the world. Skinner (969) has writtenThe world whch establishes contingencies of reinforcement of the sortstudied in an operant analysis is presumably what knowledge is about. Aperson comes to know that world and how to behave in it in the sensethat he acquires behavior which satises the contingencies it maintains(p. 56). Scientic knowledge differs from ordinary human knowledge inthat it consists of verbal oprants that ar gnrad and ransmited

under the control of a specialied scientic community (Skinner 957chap. 8). The verbal operants composing scientic knowledge areselected because they lead to favorable outcomes. Scientic laws are saidto be concse economical descriptions o contingencies in the envionmentand can thus serve as "rules for effective action (Skinner 974 p. 35).n Skinners (969) words the laws o science are "not . . . obeyed bynature but by men who effectively deal with nature (p . 141). ike oherneobehaviorists Skinner extends his theory o learned behavior to theactivity of scientists and he clearly adheres to the general pragmatistmetaphor that "to know is to do. 3

Given his Machianevolutionist perspective on science Skinnersmetaphors can be seen to arise quite naturally. elief in the continuity ofscience with more primitive forms of organic adaptation has licensedSkinner to apply the metaphor of selection by consequences to scien-tic knowng as well as to the behavor o rats. The behavioal scientistwho shapes behavior in or out of the laboratory is making a kind ofdirec cotact with he behavioral subect mater much as the artisanshapes somethng useful out of the relevant raw material. When Skinnerasserts metaphorically that no one steps outside the causal stream or

that a person is a locus of a system of variables we can see the basis ofthese mtaphors in his Machian view of cause as functional relationbetween observables (Skinner 974 p. 06 947/96 p. 36) . And theMachian metaphor of intellectual and ultimately biological economy isechoed throughout Skinners writings. The criteria for evaluating a scien-tic system says Skinner (938) are supplied by the "usefulness andeconomy o the system wth respect to the data at had (. 438).Scitic practices and formulations that are unacceptable to Skinner aresad to be wasteful useless unpracical and even "clumsy ad

obese a metaphor hat vividly connotes unness in a biological sense. Inother words Skinners positivism is a biologcoeoomical positivism sm-ming from the demands of expedient adaptation in a Darwinian world.





Meaphors of nowedge and behaor 59

tainly formulated many of the views in question during the ascendancy ofthe vigorously antimetaphysical school of logical positivism Yet theascription of metaphysical views to quasipositivistic behaviorists will surprise no one familiar with the actal development of their thoght or with

the history of positivism in this century. In the rst place, it is by nowfairly widely accepted that not even the logical postivists managed toavoid metaphysical commitments (see, e.g, ergmann, 954 rown,977) Frthermore, despite freqet lams to the otrary he eobehaviorists (with the exception of Kenneth Spence) were closely alliedwith logical positivism (Amndson, 983 Amndson & Smith, 984Smith, 986). And most important, the neobehaviorists did in fact advance blatantly metaphysical assertions, even in the face of the positivistclimate of their time When Tolman asserted that the world is a complex

mae, or Hull that organisms are machines, or Skinner that the knownworld is a set of contingencies, we see in these assertions the expressionof deeply held beliefs about the world, not just colorful expressions ofstraightforward positivistic facts

Though it may be unorthodox to accuse these neobehaviorists of engaging in metaphysics, to do so is far from accusing them of being unscientic The old positivist equation of the metaphysical with the meaninglessor the unscientic has long since been laid to rest (see, eg , Wartofsky,979, chap 4) As historians of science have been aware for some time

(and philosophers of science only more recently), many of the greatscientic issues and achievements through the ages have been metaphysical in character a generaliation that holds just as well for physics as forthe "less mature scences As one phlosopher has put t, the scienistis, most often, s in proposing and examiningconceptual models in his domain (Wartofsky, 979, p. 86).

Far from being irrelevant or antithetical to scientic practice, themetaphysical views of scientists are often closely connected with theirproductivity as scientists. What matters from the standpoint of conducting

science is how the implications of one's metaphysics are drawn out andapplied to the world of observable phenomena how, in the long run,one's underlying vision of the world is put to use in generating empiricalresearch and conceptual insights On this score, the major neobehaviorists have fared reasonably well, a conclusion attested to by their ownrecords of productivity and by the fruitful research traditions they fostered (see Smith, 986, pp. 3345, and the discussion below). ut itwould be a mistake to try to understand their work by focusing on theire eoea saes o e eso o e eapysia ews at

generated them As Howard Gruber (980) has stated, The testing ofhypotheses has been the glory of methodologists, but it remains a sterileglory so log as little or otig is said about te prmtve roots botimaginal and ideological from which testable ideas spring (p 55) t





Metaphor of knowedge and behaor

be gauged only in the long run, through extended efforts at drawing outthei implications

n retrospect, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the neobehaviorists devlopment of metaphysical metaphor systems is that these systems

were formulated during an era in which positivist aims were held in highrepute Though much of the twentieth century, the literature of philosophy and theoretical psychology contained an abundance of endorsementsof logical positivism and numerous poposals for the redction of theoetical sciece to the level of pure description Had the neobehavioristsseiously attempted to act in accodance with positivist prescriptions foscience, it is doubtful whether their systematic approaches to psychologywould have survved for long or even been formulated As it turned out,they sufciently withstood the positivistic currents of their time to be able

to produce fruitful metaphors for knowledge and behavior metaphors,in fact, that are still in use today Tolman's anthropomorphic metaphor of"expectanc has become a cental concept in recent theories of anmallearning (eg, Mackintosh, 974), while his metaphor of the "cognitivemap has poved to be a fertile one both in animal psychology (e g ,Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 978) and in human geography (eg, Downs &Stea, 973) The Hullian metaphor of organism as machine is so wdelcurrent in modern cognitive science as to require no furthe commentAnd Skinner's various evolutionary metaphors, especially those of variation and selection, have been employed and extended in ecent inuentialformulations withi the Skinerian tradition (e g , Staddo & Simmelag,17) f hose who use such metaphos today are largely uncogniant ofthe metaphysical background of their concepts, their lack of awarenessevinces the continuing sway of positivism and constitutes a situation thatmay well be to their detriment as scientists

Noes

I hae focused only on meaphors for heories and her relaons o obsera

on bu s empng o conclude more generally ha all global accouns ofhuman kowledge are meaphoral From Neurah's (19323/1959) shpatseameaphor o Qune and Ullans (1970) noon of a web of belef and fromKuhns (1970) reolutona ew o Toulmn's (1972) eolutonary ew we seehe same paern repeang self

2 Furher parallels beween operan condonng and eoluonary phenomenaare dscussed from a Sknneran sandpon by Saddon (1973 1975)

Sknners neress n deelopng an emprcal psychology of scence werefored while he was in auae school, partly under the nuence of ach's(1905/1976) eors o do he same In fac Sknner's rs book, begun n he

early 1930s was hs Sketch for an Eptemology (see Sknner 1979 pp 115146 159) only one chaper of whch was eer publshed (1935) Among hslaer wrngs on he psychology of scence he mos mporan are TheOperaonal Analyss of Psycholocal Tems (1945) and Verbal Behaor



6 Lauren D Smith

(1957) Dscussons of hs psychology of scence may be found n Buron (1980)Smh (1986, chap 9) and Zurff 180)

Sknner s unque among he behvorss dscussed here n havng gven anepl reamen of he naure of maphorcal language In hs accoun whchexpresses by and large a radoal emprs vew of meaphors Sknner

(1957) makes he followng clams 1) Meaphor s approprae n leraure buo be avoded n sence (pp 98 99) (2) he use of meaphor nvolves heexenson of erms o new ens n a way ha s no ordnarly renforced byhe speaker's verbal communy (p 2) (3) as opposed o meaphorcal exenson he process of generc exen nvolves applyng old ermnology o newdomns n a way ha respeced he verbal commuy largely as a resulof beng consonan wh he comunys consensual modes of caegorzngenes (p 91) (4) generc exenson s acceped n scence because of spraccal consequences whereas eaphorcal exenson s punshed or exngushed by a scenc communy ecause of s dsadvanageous consequences(pp 99 41920) and (5) when maphorcal exenson used n sence he

meaphor s quckly robbed of s meaphorcal naure hrough he adven ofaddonal smulus conrol n c hrough emprcal denon (p 419)Now should be obvous even n Snner's own grounds ha wha mghcoun as generc exenson for one cenc verbal communy mgh well counas meaphorcal exenson for anohr senc verbal communy or even hecommuny of senss as a whol If Sknnerans renforce each oher's descrpve (e. osensbly generc} xesons of evoluonary heory such apracce says more abou her vera habs as a communy han does abouhe naure of he world (Preuly f Sknner had spen an apprecableamoun of me observng commues of Tolmanans or Hullans he wouldhave been forced o he realzaon ha very dfferen ses of exensons were

beng renforced and punshed n hose communes) And o course headven of smulus conrol ca hdly be expeced o provde unvocal reducons of meaphor o leral descron gven ha any such process would becarred ou dereny n deren erbal communes I would asser ha agven scenc communy's mods of caegorzaon and means of dedngwhch ue of language are benel or dsadvanageous wll hemseves ypcally be deermned by s prefrrd fundamenal meaphors Scenss do nopunsh or exngush meaphor as a maer of generl course raher heyselecvely punsh he meaphors fored by compeng senc radons

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(1938) The deermners of behaor a a choce pon Pschologcal Revew45, 141 (1948) Cogne maps n ras and men Pschologcal Revew 55 189208(1952) Edward Chace Tolman In E G Borng, H S angfeld H Werner

& R M Yerkes (Eds), A htor o pscholog n autobograph (ol 4,pp 32339) Worceser MA Clark Unersy Press

(1959) Prncples of purpose behaor In S Koch (Ed ) , Pscholog A studo a scence (ol 2 pp 92 157) New York McGrawHll

(1966) Operaonal behaorsm and curren rends n psychology In Behavorand pschologcal man Essas n motvaton and leang (pp 11529)Beree and s Angee ner f Cafna Pe (Orgna wr

publshed 1936)Tolman, E C, Brunswk E (1935) The organsm and he causal exure ofhe enronmen Pschologcal Revew 42 4377

Tolman E C Honzk C H (1930) Inroducon and remoal of reward



66 Lauren D Smth

and maze performance n ra vers o Caloa Publcatons n Ps-cholog 4 2575

Tolman, E C Krechesky I (19) Meansandreadness and hypohess Aconrbuon o comparae phlogy Pschologcal Revew 40 6070

Toulmn, S E (1972) Human unndng The collectve use and evoluon oconcepts Prnceon, NJ Prn Unersy Press

Warofsky, M (1979) Models Repeentaton and the scentc understandngDordrech Redel

Wason, J B (1916) The place o e condonedreex n psychology Pschologcal Revew 23, 89117

Young, R M (1971) Darwn's maphor Does naure seec Monst 55 442503

Zener, K (1937) The sgncanc o behaor accompanyng condoned salary secreon for heores of e cndoned response Amercan Journal oPscholog 50, 384403

Zurff, G E (1980) Radcal behars epsemology Pschologcal Bulletn8, 33750



8

Meaphor, meaheory, andhe soa word

K E N N E H G E R G E N

Metaphor is the chief vehicle through which we advance our understand

ing of social life ndeed without metaphor scientic thinking as a wholewould remain paralyed To explore these claims shall focus in thischapter on some of the maor theoretical developments in social psychology and more particularly on the dominant metaphors that havegenerated these theoretical developments Within this context shallpropose that the metaphors used to build scientic theories of humanaction should be consonant with ones conceptons of scientic conductitself n other words ones conception of what it is to carry out properbehavioral science should mesh with the theories of human conduct

(including the conduct of scientists) that one constructsThis proposal suggests that a special tension may exist at any giventime between the current philosophy of science and particular conceptualiations of the social world Ones theoretical metaphors may be moreor less compatible with the root metaphor underlying ones account ofscience itself ndeed shall argue that in recent decades the tensionbetween social psychology and the typical understanding of the nature ofscience has become unusually acute and has even reached a breakingpoint The family of metaphors underlying maor theories in contempor

ary social psychology not to mention emerging strands of social inquiry form essential challenges to the traditional concept of science As aresult a new conception of science seems to be demanded

2



68 Kennt J Gergen

The meaphoric an he iera in socia heory

efore we can appreciate the iial functions played by metaphor in theconstruction of scientic theory i is necessary to focus on the nature ofmetaphor itself How are we to nderstand metaphor Traditionally it

has been dened in opposition e discourse Whereas literal language has been viewed as dity representing the obects to which itrefers and thus as being essentiy true to fact metaphoric languagehas been said to be suffused with imagination to be merely gurativeand to be exaggerated Not surpiingly given this opposition it has alsobeen said that proper science shld renounce the metaphoric and striveassiduously toward the achievet of a pure literal language Scientistsin other words have been urge to leave metaphor to poets, novelists,and ideologues and to let thei on language simply "carve nature at the

ointWithin this traditional conxt te thesis that metaphor plays a key

role in the advancement of sieic thinking may seem perverse Howcould metaphor be accorded suh importance To appreciate the argument consider rst the attemt by logical positivists to establish thegrounds for a scientic language As they initially agreed the theoreticallanguage of an empiricial scienc should be tied closely to particulars inthe real world deally as Russ ( 9 1819) reasoned each term withinthe theoretical network should tnd in onetoone correspondence with

realworld particulars f this wr accomplished the meaning of theorywithin an empirical science wol be derived from its relationship withobservables For psychologist tis line of thinking gave rise to the longstanding attempt to furnish opetional denitions for conceptual terms(see eg oring et al 945 et despite the attraction of such aproposal the means by which mirical anchoring was to be achieved wasnever satisfactorily rendered hould realworld particulars be relatedto individual words at the theotical level or to phrases or to entiresentences What was to be ma of the many theoretical terms in the

advanced sciences, terms essentl to understanding but for which therewere no observables f opeatinal denitions were also described inwords didn't these words reqre obective anchoring And if suchanchoring was similarly brough about by means of words that neededtheir own anchoring had we o ntered an innite regress of denition

These and many other questins left the logical empiricist attempt toustify a literal language vulneale to attack Such attack came alongdifferent fronts For instance uine's (960) analysis of radical translation was lethal to any attempt t a simple mimetic theory of reference

As uine demonstrated there re no ultimate means by which a visitorto a primitive tribe could detemine whether their term couldproperly be translated into the glish term rabbit ooking at all the



Metaphor metatheory and the oca word 6

contexts in which gavagai was applied to realworld events would leadonly to perplexity in this respect Even if capable of substituting the termrabbit on each occasion, the visitor could never know whether thenative was using the term to refer, for example, to a set of attached rabbit

parts whereas he himself used it to refer to the rabbit as a whole yextrapolation, when two members of the same language community usethe same term on the same occasion, we cannot ultimately determine thepese hig, eve o popety to which the term refers all te moreso since attempts to sort out possible disagreements must themseles beframed in a language in which the precise particulars remain unknown,and so on

Wittgenstein's (953) work provided another maor antidote to literalism As he demonstrated descriptive terms appear in multiple linguistic

congurations, which he called "language games The limits on how adescriptive term can be employed are thus to be traced primarily to theinguistc contet Wha can be sad, for example, about rabbit dependson whether one is a oologist a hunter a writer of children's books, or acook Descriptive terms gain their meaning not from obects in the realworld but from their use in the various games of language

When extended, such forms of criticism suggest that the traditionaldistinction between a literal and a metaphoric language is specious flanguage cannot provide a mirror or map to the world, then the very

concept of a literal language becomes dubious At the same time, withouta viable concept of literal language the concept of metaphor also perishes for if all theoretical description is metaphoric the latter term is simplyredundant with what we mean by theoretical description, and we are thusleft with the unchallenging conclusion that theoretical description issimply what it is

How, then, is the meaning of metaphor o be rescued The criticalturn, in this case, has been prepared by Wittgensteins attack on theassumption of linguistic mapping Wittgenstein's demonstrations of the

constraining power of linguistic context over descriptive terminology arefully convincing However it would be a mistake to delimit the constraining context to the level of language alone There is little reason tosuppose that a person's linguistic activities (eg speaking and writing)should alone constrain word usage , while other activities (e g pointing,lifting and running) should not et us then expand the concept ofcontext to include the entire range of social practices (linguistic andotherwise) in which words are ensconced et us expand it further toinclude the various obects parapernalia pysical settings and so on in

which these social practices are embedded A fully developed theory ofword meaning might thus include words, movements obects, and so onNow to draw again from the Wittgensteinian perspective it may be saidthat the meaning of each constituent word, action, or obect



70 Kennt J Gergen

depends on ts place wthn the tre array From ths vantage pont themeanng of a word s not derved from the emprcal world that t s sadto represent (as the logcal empsts would have t) nor s t dependenton the speaker's underlyng ntenton (as most hermeneutcsts andspeech act phlosophers would clm) ather, meanng s derved froman array of patterned practces thn varyng contexts To nqure ntothe meanng of a term s to ask ether for ts observable referents norfor the speaker's ntenton t s o request from the nterlocutor a dsplay of the fuller set of practcs n whch the term s embedded on apartcular occason

On ths vew there s no ler language n the tradtonal sense of alanguage that smply ts the world, perfectly and wthout remandernor s there metaphorc langua that we can dene once and for all,

n Arstotelan fashon as lnuage that talks about somethng as ft were somethng else Hove denyng these alternatves does notmply that the dstncton betwen the lteral and metaphorc s tselfvacuous Rather wthn the prsent analyss we may vew lteral language as essentally any consttue of an establshed or reteratve pattern(wordactonobject) n other words lteral words are smply thosethat occupy an establshed postn n a language game that s repeatedwth some knd of regularty ch words feel rght they seem toreect the world or to "call spade a spade n contrast what we

call metaphorc language would merge from ths perspectve n caseswhere the establshed pattern s ltered Metaphorc words are replacements or substtutes for culturly sedmented vocabulary The capacty of these substtutes to nnate the wrter or reader s derved fromthe assocated practces that he mport nto the establshed contextNovel uses of words nvte alrnatve practces both lngustc andoterwse

As we dscern from ths aalys the dstncton between lteral andmetaphorc language s gradued or dmensonal rather than categorcalA new term thrust nto an ln context wll seem metaphorc at theoutset However as t gradually becomes ncorporated nto the communal practces and the new pterns become solded the term wllbecome ncreasngly lteral Fr example as Macormac (976) asponted out n 755 the term "haff was dened by Samuel ohnson asrefuse left after the proces f threshng gran y 966 however,dctonares ncluded another ral entry for the word thn metallcstrps that are dropped from a arcraft to create confusng sgnals onradarscopes (p 77) The chag occurred when the term chaff became commonly used for meal scraps left from the mllng process andwhen these scraps were subeuently found to be useful n confusngradar detecton devces For many ar personnel at least chaff has tusshfted from the metaphorc t the lteral n the same way we usenspraton a lteral ter ay People do n fact seem to us to be



Metaphor metatheory and the oca word

"nspred Yet f we consder the orgns of the term wth ts referenceto the sprt enterng the body we wll reale ts orgnal metaphorcaldmenson

Meaphor n he consrucon of soca undersandn

Thus far have argued aganst the tradtonal mode of denng metaphorn opposton to lteral descrpton However f we vew the dstnctonbetween metaphor and lteral language as reectng degrees of normatveacceptablty the concept of metaphor s revtaled n mportant waysAt the outset we nd that lteral language s the antcpated outcomeof ongong nterchange among persons ncludng scentsts That s aspeople attempt to coordnate ther actons wt one another they nd t

necessary and useful to develop a common language that remans stableacross tme n effect, ths creates a strong tendency toward normalaton or lteralaton of dscourse "Please pass the salt s functonal asan llocutonary devce n Englshspeakng culture precsely becausewords such "pass and "salt when uttered n the mealtme settng have acqured the status of lteral language n the same way, scentcterms such as "gravty and "classcal condtonng have bcome lteral nthe scentc communty They are useful not because they necessarlyreect what s the case, but because they enable certan scentsts to

coordnate ther actvtes across tme and crcumstanceAt the same tme we see that the achevement of a lteral languagewthn a communty carres the threat of socal stass To accept a lterallanguage s to sustan the broad range of practces n whch ths languages embedded Thus wthn the scentc communty the extent to whchpartcpants acquesce to the standard lngustc practces s a relablemeasure of the extent to whch scence wll reman statc, ts outcomeswll be ncreasngly dmnshed and the productvty of the scentcparadgm wll approach asymptote For example bologcal theores of

reproducton have tradtonally charactered the process of fertlatonas one n whch the sperm s the actve agent and the egg a passve receptacle ologcal theory has thus reled on the metaphor of tradtonalheterosexual relatons to comprehend the process of bologcal reproducton Over tme the metaphor has been transformed nto lteral languageYet as varous femnst crtcs (FaustoSterlng 985 Martn 987) haveponted out the use of the metaphor n ths case not only sustans oppressve socal patterns but places lmts on bologcal theory and researchy eployng a dfferent metaphor by grantng for example, that the

egg may have a more actve role n the process of reproducton newpredctons can be made and new "ndngs generated n other words,new metaphors enable nvestgators to see the phenomenon n a dfferentlght, to formulate novel predctons, and to search for new forms ofevdence



7 Kenth J Gergen

n this context, we nd ta scientic advances depend vitally onpressing against the boundaris existing forms of understanding Newtypes of interpretation constitut he necessary foundation of new rangesof exploration

Yet how is the scientist to brak with traditional forms of understanding? One cannot simply introdc a form of private language in effect alanguage composed of "nonsense syllables into the community Sucha language would have no ming, which is to say it would not beembedded within existing pattrs of interchange in such a way thatanyone would know how to resnd The critical question, then is howthe theorist can break with tradiinal sedimented forms of language andat the same time continue to ma sense in the scientic culture n otherwords the question is how ne forms of understanding can ever beachieved if understanding deps on commonly accepted forms of discourse t is at this point that w can begin to appreciate the critical rolethat metaphors play in the scices for as we have seen when we shiftfrom the literal to the metaphorc we are moving from an use oflanguage o a p se of language. Meaphors hover a heedge of inelligibiliy hey rly on cerain convenions while violaingohers hey are sufcienly reasonable ha hey communicae, bu sufcienly novel ha hey hreaen he saus quo.

As an illusaion, suppos seone says ha he adiional familyoperaes like a machine lealy his saemen is meaphoric. y currensandards of lieral language usa, families are no idenical o machines.However, he meaphor makes sense by virue of he fac ha ceraindeniional componens of he mchine are also deniional componensof he radiional family For eaple, boh he machine and he familyare (or should be) smooh runing, dependable, solid, and so on. A hesame ime he machine meapor invies one o consider a new rangeof erms for speaking of he riional family, erms ha are no nowpar of he lieral language. or example, he meaphor invies one ohink of he family as a sruced se of inerdependencies, he func

ioning of which depends on erin inpus ino he sysem. In effec, hemeaphor opens up new depaurs for undersanding and research. Overime, if he new language i lboraed and exended wihin variousresearch pracices, is meaphri characer will recede. ndeed, for manyresearchers, "family srucure as already become a lieral realiy.

n summary, meaphor serves a he crical devie by which heoreicalforms of undersanding are gnaed and ransformed in he sciences and more informally in he clue a large. Meaphor, in oher words,furnishes he essenial foundaio for new avenues of invesigaion. Ye

even his analysis is limiing, f s we explore various meaphors in hehisory of social inquiry, we n ha meaphor serves oher funcions aswell. Four of hese deserve speil menion.



Meaphor, eaheory, and he socia word 73

u si

A he ouse meaphors enable he social heoris o solve heoreicalproblems creaed by exising forms of undersanding. Wih a properly

seleced meaphor one can reorganie concepions of social life andranscend aninomies or conics of long sanding. The concep of heGrea hain of eing illusraes he poin. onsider he problem ofclassifying forms of living beings. Merely o group such beings accordingo physical differences leaves one wih only a series of isolaed labels andfails o furnish a sense of organiaion or relaedness. Thus for Arisoleand many subsequen hinkers i proved useful o hink of all creaures asrelaed on a coninuum from he lesser o he greaer. In he eigheenhcenury he meaphor of he Grea hain of eing formalied his possi

biliy (see Loveoy 1936). For many hinkers of ha ime he concepalso solved new problems Wih he coninuing emergence of a science ofbiology he place of religious undersanding was hreaened From heheological perspecive (and for many biologiss) here was a need for aconcep ha would demonsrae he uniy among differen species. TheGrea hain of eing solved he problem If living creaures could begrouped from he lesser o he greaer and humans (he greaes ofhe creaures) were creaed in he image of God hen God acquired aplace a he head of he chain and a naural coninuiy was esablished

beween he biological and he spiriual. In his as in oher ways hechain meaphor played a valuable concepual role.

s

To he exen ha meaphors are associaed wih new forms of socialpracice hey can serve a powerful funcion in he process of socialchange . Like a banner emblem or anhem hey come o serve assymbols of collecive goals. Ye hey can ofen be used wih greaer

efcacy han such symbols because of heir capaciy o confer meaningraionaliy and a sense of usice upon given forms of sociey. Some ofhe mos dramaic illusraions of his poin may be found in he pascenury. onsider for insance he meaphor of social change as a formof naural growh. us as all living organisms go hrough predeermined sages of developmen as he earh moves in is naural orbi andas species emerge and disappear according o naural condiions so ooi is said socieies possess a naurally deermined raecory (accordingo which hey rise fall ec.). In effec he "naural gowh meapho

recommends invies and usies social change. Darwinian accouns ofsocial change (social Dawinism) made explici use of his meaphor.There is aso an imporan sense in which Marxis heory relies on hesame view. To be sure Marx also employed he Hegelian concep of



74 Kenn J Gegen

dialecic change. However, h Hegelian idealism was maeialied,wih being and negaion reca s anagonisic social classes, Marxisheory acquired all he rheoicl value of he Darwinian accoun. Noonly is bourgeois sociey compiive and divided, according o Marx(1867/1954) i has creaed devaaing weapons and placed hem in he

hands of he prolearia. In eec, he ruling class has become an unspecies and is demise is a naul and predicable oucome. For many,his meaphor has been complli, and he resul has been social changeof enormous magniude

In he same way ha meapho n serve as implemens of social change,hey may also be used o legiiae or raionalie social orders. To illus

rae, he mechanisic meaphr hs played a criical role in sancioning avariey of social endeavors. A poliical scienis Marin Landau (1961)proposes, i was his meaphor he meaphor of he machine hadominaed he houghs of hose ho penned he American onsiuionohn Adams, for insance, wo in his 1787 deene of th onsituionha he hree branches of goemen have an "unalerable foundaionin naure. To inves a single poliical body wih all power, wihou "balance or equilibrium, said Ams, is o violae naure's laws (quoedby Landau, 1961, p. 341). Thoas efferson added ha he saes as

well as heir cenral governm , like he planes revolving around heircommon sun, acing and ace un according o heir respecive weighsand disances, will produce ha beauiful equilibrium on which ouronsiuion is founded (quo by Landau, 1961 , pp. 341 ) . In effec,he mechanisic meaphor len governmenal insiuions a solidiy,permanence, and Godgiven riey.

s ss

In cerain hisorical periods mephors serve o express commonly heldbu imperfecly ariculaed feeigs. People ofen share cerain senimens, fears, or hopes ha h failed o reach expression for lack ofadequae means. A such im wellchosen meaphor may be aken upquie eagerly. Such popular phors serve as a medium of commonundersanding, giving people a ense of commonaliy and possible direcion. onsider early explanaion> of crowd phenomena. specially duringhe nineeenh cenury, many teoriss viewed he crowd essenially as ademon force, capable of unlsing ferocious acions ha individuals

would never dream of commiing on heir own. This meaphor waselaboraed mos effecively by save Le on (1896). As he wroe, heperson in a crowd



Meaphor, eaheory, and he ocia word 7

is no longer conscious of his acs. In his case, as in he case of hehypnoied subjec, a he same ime ha cerain faculies are desroyed, ohers may be brough o a high degree of exalaion. Underhe inuence of suggesion, he will underake he accomplishmen of

cerain acs wih irresisible impeuosiy. (p. 35)There is reason o believe ha Le on's work gave ven o widelyshared bu illexpressed senimens in French culure. Firs, his was buone of a noably large number of aemps o undersand he acion ofmobs. Aready in 1837 George raik had published his s Pu uus Oher reamens, more conemporary o Le onbu similar o raik in perspecive, were offered by Tarde (189/193),Sighele (189), and Sidis (1898), among ohers. The "problem of crowdswas hus widely apparen. Furhermore, since he majoriy of his work

was he produc of French inellecuals, one suspecs ha much of i wasaemping o render inelligible he irascible and ofen bloody incursion of demonsraing crowds on he French poliical scene. No fyyears before Le on's birh, he naion had winessed housands ofcrowdplasing execuions (in one hreemonh period, more han sevenhousand execuions). Since hen he governmen had changed handsnumerous imes, and surging, angry, and ofen armed groups frequenlyroamed he ciy srees. One can only imagine he public anxiey overhe group and is unpredicable violence. In his conex i is more han

credible o suppose, as Moscovici (1985) suggess, ha Le on's workwas moivaed largely by he fear of crowds. shoud also be noed ha his meaphor he crowd as demonic force

has no compleely run is course. I is eviden in Solomon Asch's(1956) work on conformiy, in he "risky shif lieraure (arwrigh,1973), and in Irving anis's (197) hesis of "group hink. All convey abasic misrust of he effecs of social groups on individuals, lendingexpression o a coninuing, widespread, bu sill only indirecly ariculaedfear.

The hsorca eacy

Having inquired ino he naure of meaphor and is uses in socialhough, we are in a posiion o examine he meaphors on which socialpsychological heory has been consruced. This review will rs considera range of meaphors used in prescienic hough and hen urn o heprimary meaphors of he wenieh cenury. As we shall see, a briefdiscussion of he dominan meaphors underlying prescienic heorieswill help us appreciae he concepual legacy of he pas . Such heories

furnish a rich se of culural resources ha are sill being drawn uponin he consrucion of social heory. A he same ime, insofar as hemeaphors in prescienic discourse seem inadequae, hey will provide



76 Kenneh J Gergen

a series of benchmarks again hich subsequen concepual progresscan be chared. ven hough a eview of he full range of hese earlymeaphors is beyond he scope o his chaper, i will be useful o ouchon a number of meaphors ha ave played, and coninue o play, asignican role in social hough

n considering meaphors genaed in earlier imes i is useful odisinguish rs beween meaphor of he animae and meaphors of heinanimae. Whereas some heoiss encouner he social world as ucuaing, ransien, or unsable, ohes are led by he same experiences oconclude, The more hings chn, he more hey say he same. In heformer case, heoriss are likel draw on meaphors from he animaeworld in he laer, meaphors o he inanimae ofen prove more compelling. Le us rs consider svral dominan meaphors from he animae domain.

u u s

I seems probable ha in he hi�ry of humankind he aemp o describe and explan ndividuals reeded aempt o account for groupbehavior. The coordinaion of feoface ineracion among single individuals would appear o be a preequisie o he coordinaion of largesocial unis. In any case, he vs, everexpanding body of erms forindividual acors has served as a eady reserve of descripive erms for

making group life inelligible. Fe descripive reposiories offer such anenormous, differeniaed, exie, and commonly comprehensible se oferms as ha employed in accou of individual acion.

I is difcul o ascerain he rs usage of he person meaphor inundersanding social life. Perhaps i was similar o S. Paul's limied, bueffecive use of i in his early episles, where his inenion was o developa sense of uniy among oherwse isparae bands of hrisian believers.In his leers o boh he orinhins and he Romans, he suggess haheir uniy should be like ha of body. ach of us, he wroe, "hasone body, wih many different ars, and no all hese pars have hesame funcion jus so we, houh many in number, form one body inhris, and each acs as he couerpar of anoher (Rom. 14, 5 1or. 111). For hrisians he cramen of he ucharis, in which hebody and blood of hris are symlically ingesed, serves as a coninuousrealiaion of his meaphor. A smilar meaphor was offered earlier byPlao, who, in u (c. 375 ../1961), compared he relaionship among classes in sociey wh he relaionship among pars of hebody. The ruling class of a sociey, in his esimae, was equivalen o hehead, he warrior class o he bres, and he slave class o he abdomen.

ach class was as essenial o h ie of sociey as each par of he body isessenial o is coninuing vialiy



Meaphor, eaheory, and he oia word 77

A less differeniaed bu compelling reamen of he sae as an individual organism was proposed by Thomas Hobbes in he seveneenhcenury. The colleciviy, as a collecive organism, was o give superordinae srengh and proecion o he single individuals who comprised i.

The wellknown fronispiece of he rs ediion of Hobbes's (1651), in which he social commonwealh is represened as a large kinglygure composed of many smaller individuals, powerfully illusraes hisconenion. The same meaphor surfaces again in Herber Spencer's Ps (1876). Like Plao, Spencer views he ruling body as aform of brain. The communicaions and rafc sysems along wih hesock exchange are said o operae like a circulaory sysem, and heagriculural and indusrial spheres are equaed wih he nuriive processes. Similar views are apparen in Hegel's (187/191) concep of he s (a superordinae social eniy wih he characerisics of asingle person), in spinas's (1877) concep of he "collecive consciousness of social groups, and in Durkheim's (1898) argumen for"collecive represenaion. The meaphor of he social world as personrecurs in he presen cenury. Though roundly criicied, he rs ediionof William McDougall's u (19) posied a superordinaeeniy, he group, which oulived is individual consiuens bu dependedon heir consciousness for is vialiy. More recenly, George omans'su u (195) made use of he same meaphor.

u s

Alhough no as well elaboraed, early aemps o explain human socialconduc have frequenly made use of animal meaphors. Arisole wasamong he rs o do so. When faced wih he quesion of why peopledevelop organied social groups, Arisole answered in his Ps (ca.33 ../1947) ha people are insincively gregarious, ha humans areby naure poliical animals (p. 556). However, wheher for lack of a

welldeveloped oological vocabulary or because o he deeply rooedassumpion ha nonhuman creaures are somehow differen and inferior,he animal meaphor was no employed exensively unil he nineeenhcenury.

In early social psychology, i was William McDougall (198) who madehe mos exensive use of he animal meaphor, based on he Darwinianassumpion ha, in given environmenal condiions, species survival depends on inheren or geneic disposiions. Since humans are a species ofanimal whose acions mus conribue o survival, i seemed sensible o

view basic acion paerns as geneic in origin, and McDougall accordinglyposied he exisence of insincs for procreaion, pugnaciy, curiosiy,selfabasemen, repulsion, and igh. In addiion, he viewed more com



78 Kenne J. Gergen

plex social behaviors as emergn ombinaions of insincual endencies.For example he supposed ha rligious aciviy resuled from he combinaion of curiosiy, selfabaseme, igh (fear), and he ender emoionaccompanying he parenal instin.

Alhough criicied for his as well as oher aspecs of his work,

McDougalls orienaion coninue in one form or anoher o capure hesocial psychological imaginaion. For insance, ernard (194) buil anenire heory of social psychol around he insinc concep, and inmore recen imes he concep ha resurfaced in sociobiological sudiesof human conduc (see unningam, 1981). Alhough he genes of heanimal have replaced animal iincs in sociobiological heory, hemeaphoric form and resul ar milar. We will have more o say abouhe animal meaphor when we disuss he dominan rends of he scienic era.

As we have seen, when fousg on he animaed qualiy of humanacion, heoriss have ofen emploed he characerisics of humans andanmals o undersand human acons. One may also view argumenaionand enlighenmen as forms animaed aciviy. Plao viewed heseprocesses as dialecical as procsses in which hesis and anihesis leado higherorder synhesis. Thi form of accoun was laer deployedmeaphorically by Hegel (1861/196) and Marx (1867/1954) o explainhisorical change in sociey. Mor• recenly he dialecical meaphor hasbeen used by numerous social sychologiss (e.g., Alman, Vinsel, &

rown 1981 Georgoudi 1984 Irael 1979) o accoun for personal andsocial change.As noed, he use of anima maphors is more common when heor

iss are focusing on he insabiiy or changes in social phenomenaHowever, many heoriss have b nclined o search for ha which issable in social life for underlyin characerisics ha persis beneah heransiory. In such insances no meaphors of he animae bumeaphors of he inanimae ha nd o be mos useful Le us consderseveral manifesaions.

s suu

In he same way ha he image he human organism has served as auseful reposiory of erms for acuns of social groups, so oo has helanguage of maerial consrucion, paricularly he consrucion of publcedices. Alhough less elabora han person language, archiecuralmeaphors have obvious poenc owing o he sable and someimescenral place ha physical consrcions occupy in communiy life Theiruse has been widespread. For inance, boh Plao in hs u andArisole in his Ps make exnsive use of he concep of "levels ofgovernance in Mahews Gospel, esus says o Peer, You are a rock,





80 Kenne J. Gergen

sysemac socal scence. I remas he ask ha many professonals sebefore hemselves oday. We hall have more o say shorly abou conemporary manfesaons o he echansc meaphor.

I should nally be noed ha dsncon beween meaphors of heanmae and nanmae has recey surfaced n an mporan dscusson ofmechansc versus organsmc hres of human developmen Overon& Reese, ) In hs case an aack has been made on he machnemeapho of human developmn n grounds ha renders he organsm's acons enrely dependen npu condons. n conras, Overon, Reese, and ohers presume ha personal developmen s under ahgh degree of auonomous pow. People develop n nrnscally programmed ways. The anmae methor n hs case s ypcally he growng plan or ower, whch s sd o possess s own dreconaly Thsdebae has now begun o smua dalogue n socal psychology, parcu

larly wh regard o crossme lraons n socal paerns Gergen &Gergen, ). Forms of relaonp appear o have her own paernsof unfoldng developmen, no dpenden on smulus npus.

We have now glmpsed a numr of meaphors from he prescencera ha helped o make ocal le ellgle. They have been sngled oubecause of her hsorc mporan n he descrpon and explanaon ofsocal change and sably. Of coure, many oher meaphors have playedan mporan ole n socal heog. Fo nsance, ean acques Rousseau (/) and Sr Henr ames Sumner Mane (5) among

ohers, used he concept of he lal conac o descrbe he necessaryform of nerdependence n soey Gambasa Vco (/) usedhe conceps of "ages and cyl o accoun for socal change. ThomasHobbes (5) made use of h oncep of "famly n addon o henoon of he "levahan, n pakng abou he ways n whch enrepeoples, for purposes of muu oecon, agree o serve a soveregnpower. And n hs uu s (/) Freud made use ofmuch he same famly meaphor n descrbng relgous nsuons.ven oday we connue o speak f he "famly of man.

Soca meaphor n he scenc era

As we have seen, prescenc hsory furnshes a rch array of socalmeaphors and nforms conempoay scenss of varous ends hey mayserve. We have also seen how ceran of hese meaphors have hreadedher way no conemporary scnc dscourse. However, may farlybe sad ha he "age of scenc sal psychology has no reled heavlyon he specc meaphors dscusd hus far. To be sure, a vas deb s

owed o prescenc analyses, bu because of new problems and prospecs, he domnang meaphor o he pesen cenury have made use ofoher magery. We shall consder s o hese meaphors along wh someof her seleced uses and lmans.



Maphor, eaheory, and he ocia word 8

Of parcuar concern wll be he relaonshp o hese meaphors o heradonal accoun of scenc behavor for as I suggesed n he nroducon o hs chaper, a heory of scenc conduc s perforce a heoryabou human acvy I conans assumpons abou he naure of human

knowledge, how s acqured, and how may be subvered. In manyrespecs, he heory of scenc conduc s normave nforms henvesgaor and socey of he naure of he good and proper way of lfeand hough. Once a commmen has been made o he heory, henvesgaor s no longer free o pursue any meaphor ha he or shewshes. Accouns of socal acvy mus be conssen wh he premses ofhe scenc meaphor, or else he heory of scenc conduc wll behreaened. Indeed, f a heory of human acvy s grounded on ameaphor ha s uncongenal o acceped assumpons abou scencconduc, and f hs heory comes o be acceped as a leral (rue) oreven quasleral ("ruhful, hs heorecal accoun of human acvywould nvaldae he assumpons bul no he radonal heory ofscence.

The logcal emprcs heory of scenc acvy needs lle nroducon. s conours are wdely known (and frequenly nvoked) by mosconemporary psychologss. In general, s an accoun ha vews hegoal of scence o be he generaon of heores ha correspond o henaure of an ndependent realy. The efcacy of such heores s demonsraed by he degree o whch hey enable successful predcons o bemade abou evens n naure. To be effecve, he scens, accordng ohs heory, s supposed o reman sensve or open o he causal relaonsamong evens n naure, develop proposons abou hese relaons, eshese proposons agans naure, and hen revse hem accordng o heoucomes of such ess. The mos approprae mehod for esng proposons s assumed o be he conrolled expermen. f hs hypohecodeducve procedure s conssenly followed, he scens s supposedo accumulae an effecve reposory of knowledge.

As our revew wll show, he early meaphors of he scenc dscplne

ended o be n harmony wh hs meaheory. However, as decades havepassed, heorss have become ncreasngly nsensve o he demands ofhe meaheory, and her cenral meaphors have become ncreasnglyanhecal o he radonal vew of scenc acvy As a resul, wehave now reached he sage a whch crcal quesons mus be rasedconcernng he vably of hs scenc meaheory.

s

Two exbooks n socal psychology appeared n 198, one by WllamMcDougall and he oher by . A. Ross As we have seen, he formermade abundan use of he meaphor of humans as anmals. The oher wassrongly socologcal n s orenaon. A hs pon here smply was no





Meaphor, eaheoy, and he oca wod 8

meaphor championed a form of wha Sampson (1978) and ohers haveermed selfconained individualism As is ofen noed, American culure has long been commied o he view ha sociey is made up ofselfconained unis, individuals responding o or acing wihin paricular

circumsances I is he individual who makes decisions o ac, who is heldresponsible for acions boh good and ill, and on whom sociey musdepend for is welfare Alhough he ideology of he selfconained individual has come under increasing aack in recen years, i is far fromdead, and he meaphor of animal experimenaion, which is clearlyconsisen wih is major hrus, has served o susain is power as aculural ideology.

More imporan o our presen hesis, he animal experimenaionmeaphor has served o legiimae and exend he empiricis meaheoryon which he psychological sciences were supposed o be esablished. Aswe have seen, he meaheory placed a srong demand on ying heoreica erms o observables and racin phenomena o aneceden condiions I also espoused he framing of heoreical proposiions in an "if . .hen forma Each of hese demands could be reaized in he meaphorof animal experimenaion, where boh simulus and response were heldo be observable, responses were held o be a funcion of anecedensimulus condiions, and he experimenal mehod was used o demonsrae he validiy of "if. . hen proposiions. Thus, by conexualizingheir work in his meaphoic language, social psychologiss esablished

heir discipline as a foundaional science and egiimaed a view o knowledge ha graned hem voice including posiion, maerial suppor, ec.)wihin he sciences and he wider culure alike.

bi

Perhaps he major shorcomin of he animal laboraory as a source ofconsiuive meaphors was ha i prevened psychologiss from realizingwha for many of hem was a deeply cherished goa ha of elaboraing

uniquely psychological accouns of human conduc. No only did hesron emphasis on obseables miliae aains psycholoical speculaion ,bu he meaphor of he laboraory frusraed hose who, following aninellecua radiion from he Grea Chain of Bein hrouh Darwin,believed ha humans were inherenly differen from and superior oanimals, even if coninuous wih hem along a hierarchy of oranisms.Soehow people possessed supeior capaciies for selfreecion andmore complex emoional and moivaional saes han could easily beframed in he language of he animal experimen. Modicaion of he

meaphor hus became essenialYe wha form could his humanizaion ake w wished o abandonhe logical empiricis scaffolding, especially when he saus of psychology



84 Kenne J Gergen

wihin he academic sphere was pspering in is wake. Nor did i seemnecessary o abandon his framework, since empircis phlosophers hemselves had begun o usfy he use f heorecal erms ha had no direccorrespondence wih observable >e Carnap, 1966) Wha was requiredwere meaphors of he psychologc world ha would preserve he saus

of psychology as an empirical scnce and he relaed promise of increasingly precise predicions. Thes ends, i seemed, could be achievedby a reurn o he reposory of maphors formng he Wesern neecual heriage more specically by he use of updaed mechanicalmeaphors. Once again i seemed he mechanical world possessed hekind of sabiliy and reliabiliy of peraion ha suied he heoreicalneeds of social heory while also pmising o make psychological sciencecapable of offering ever more depdable predicions urher, snce heoupu of mechancal processe ehavior) was o be undersood as

sysemaically dependen on environmental inpus simuli), he use ofmechanical meaphors would mak easy for psychologiss o reain heempiricis emphasis on observable linked by if . hen proposions.

n socia psychooy he mechanis of he nner reion have ended o wn fm th phy y n tn pt, th ptvating qualiy of Kur Lewin's (195, 951) theorizin can be aribued ois ype of menal mechanics. Lwins lae arrival in he Unied Saes, in1933, insulaed him agains muc of he R simulusresponse)emphasis on observable npus nd oupus. urher, Lewin was

aware of he generaive signicance of he chemical meaphor e.g,menal chemisry) in earlier Geran menalis heorizing. Thus he wasfree o ake advanage of develomens in posNewonian physics, including elecromagneic heory an inseins heory of relaiviy Conceps o eld oce ension, vaenc, and so on were all incorporaed inhs heories o explain social condu.

Alhough he inserion of mel mechanics beween he simulusworld and organismic responses plaed Lewin wihin he neobehaviorismold here is an imporan conra o be made beween his heories and

he prevailing neobehavioris acuns Lewin occasionally emphasizedhe selfacivaing characer of inner processes in effec disinguishing hisheoreical sance from he simulus dependency views of his conemporaries n his respec, Lewin was a ecursor of he cogniive revoluion insocial psychology abou which we hall be concerned shorly.

rom he sandpoin of he empiiis psychology of he period Lewinsmajor failing was hs lack of conce abou ying his psychological mechanics o observables eiher simul r responses . n oher words his eldheory formulaions were oo elonained. Hs sudens were moresensiive o such problems and gnerally avoided he physcal eldmeaphor n is place hey ende o subsiue a biological meaphor ha of he homeosaic process. he advanages of his meaphor were



Meaphor, meaheory, and he oca word 285

ha (1) i suggesed a close relaionship beween he psychological andbological sraa, hus advancing psychologys saus as a naural scienceand () homeosaic processes could be ranslaed ino inpus which weresupposed o deec he inernal mechanism from is preferred sae) and

oupus social conduc) To illusrae, esingers (1957) heory of cogniive dissonance and a hos of cogniive balance models see Abelson eal, 1968) were all based on a homeosaic principle of preferred saePeople were said o have a naural preerence or a sae o coniveconsonance where menal elemens imply one anoher) or for a sae ofcogniive balance where clearly adjudicaed relaions obain amongcogniive elemens), and any deviaion from he preferred sae wassupposed o se in moion counerforces ha would reurn he organismo he iniial sae Schachers (1959) heory of aliaion Brehm's (1966)

reacance heory, and Duval and Wicklund's (197) objecive selfawareness heory are based on morphologcally simlar meaphors.Ye wih he emergence of he compuer revoluon, hee physical and

biological meaphors have been mued. Over he pas few decades, cogniive psychologiss have aken horough advanage of he compuermeaphor, wih is wellelaboraed descrpve erminoloy and s commonplace associaion wh reason and logic Aided by he widespreadavailabiliy of acual machines o help vivify he meaphor, hey havespread he compuaional gospel far and wide Indeed conemporary

cogniive science may generally be viewed as a discipline buil on heexplcaion and elaboraion o an exisng machine. The impac o suchdevelopmens on social psychology is readily apparen from he fac ha"informaion processing "informaion sorage and rerieval, schemaa and heurisics have become sandard erms in he explanaonof social acon eg, see iske & Taylor, 1984)

Ineresingly as he compuer has become he favored source ofmechanisic meaphors he compuaional meaphor has also begun opose a hrea o he empiricis heory of science which i was designed odefend As we have seen, he meaphor of he anima laboraory gaveway o analyses in which mechanisic meaphors became focal Unilrecenly, hese meaphors have generally been consisen wih he empiricis canons for posivsic science They assumed ha individual acon isa byproduc of aneceden condiions Such a view is compaible wih henoion of science as a sysemaic byproduc of realworld inpus. The rubis ha he compuer has come o be seen as an agen in is own righ asysem capable of generaing is own inpus I can funcion wihou heresence o humans and wih seemnly le relance on human nulm uh a A Oss and have given

expression o he common suspicions of such auonomy.) In psychologyhs knd of auonomy is capured by he concep of "opdown processes processes ha presumably direc he organism o search, caegor



86 Kenne J Gergen

ize, and absorb informaion accordng o inernal or machine demands.Ineres in such processes has coe o eclipse concern wih socalledboomup processes, in which macine saes are dependen on environmenal condiions. This shif of concern o opdown processing is a majorhrea o he empiricis model on hich scienic psychology was originally consruced. To he exen h he organism dicaes is own courseof acion independen of simuli o he exen, in oher words , ha ifails o be realiy driven he simulusresponse model fails o be compelling and he empiricis philoophy of science fails as a jusicaorydevice. f people, including scien, are "realiy makers and do no acsimply as faihful recorders of and responders o he physical world,hen he possibiliy of a completel objecive basis for scienic knowledge is seriously jeopardized.

: s s u s

A furher line of social hough mus be disinguished, one ha wasneiher nurured y he soil of he nima earnin aboraory nor sronywedded o he empiricis heory cience Ahouh his ine of houhbears a cerain resemblance o neehaviorism, i provides a disinc andimporan conras. As we hav sn, neobehavioris heory is generallyidenied by is use of mechani meaphors, which i has applied oboh menal and behavioral funciing. Clearly, i is possible o compre

hend he menal world wih oher ages, hese alernae images being ofsubsanial consequence. Wha is nown as symbolic ineracionis heoryis similar o neobehaviorism in i special concern wih elaboraing ameaphor of he menal world ad wih connecing he menal and physical environmen and acion) doins. However, raher han assumingha he menal world is srucure like a machine, he symbolic ineracioniss undersand i o be compsed of symbols.

The concep of he symbol can b raced o a variey of conexs. Theerm has played a lively par in heological discourse and may be raced

in his conex all he way back preChrisian debaes over he waysin which he gods expressed diie inen hrough worldly symbols.Theories of sagecraf includn reamens of he symbolic value offacial expressions, gesures, and props have also been available oweniehcenury scieniss. And sinicanly, he concep of he symbolhas ured prominenly in aeshei dialoue Indeed, iven he vialiyof symbolis movemens in boh ieraure and he ne ars during henineeenh cenury, symbolic inrionis heory seems scarcely a hisorical accden

These various sreams have insinaed hemselves ino social heoriesin a variey of ways. or insan , Mead's (1934) pivoal use of heconceps of esure, imiaion, and role akin links his work sinicanly



Meaphor, eaheory, and he soca word 87

o he lieraure of he sage The generalized oher, from whom heconcep of self is acquired, funcions primarily according o Mead as anaudience ha evaluaes he acor hrouh applause, laugher, and so onDrawing from he lierary realm, Mead also presumes ha privae experi

ence reecs he characersics o auhorshp As he res, One indvidual has one experience and anoher has anoher experence, and bohare saed in erms o her biographes Mead, 1934 p 33) A simlarheory s ha of Cooley (19/19) which s based largely on heconcep of imaginaion Like he acor or he auhor, he social beingaording o Cooley mus imagine oher worlds, inluding he views ofoher individuals, in order o adap. Cooley's emphasis on disineresedand conemplaive love, and he imporance aached o i in organizedsociey, links hs symbolic realm o he udaeohrisan herage

As we can see, symbolic ineracionsm shares wih neobehaviorsm acenral concern wh he workngs of he mnd In s relance on he mindas he maor vehcle for explainng socal lfe i also shares wh neobehavorism a prmary focus on he indvidual raher han he group per se.However, is replacemen of he machine by he symbol leads o ceranimporan consequences. Wih he excepon of opdown compuersics,he neobehavioriss' use of mechancal meaphors has generally enabledhem o rean a srong neres in environmenal npus and smulaneously vindcaed he vew of scence on whch hey have soodHowever, when he meaphor of he symbol replaces ha of he machne ,he envronmen as gven or as consued by "brue acs ceases o becriical I is no he obecive environmen ha deermines he conoursof social lfe, bu wha his environmen symbolizes I s he meaningof he environmen ha is allimporan I is parly for his reason hamany symbolic neraconiss have demonsraed lle neres in laboraory research. rom heir sandpoin, laboraories do no conrol simulihey only communicae symbolically o he subjec. And, hey argue, i ishe symbolic communicaion wih is implied requess, expecaions, orcommands) ha subly engenders wha appear o be simulusdriven

resuls in he laboraory.urher, alhough he meaphor of symbolism focuses aenion on

individual acors, i lends iself far more han he mechanical meaphor oa concern wih social wholes and exraindividual issues. The environmenalism o which he mechanical meaphor has unil he adven of hecompuer) been largely wedded urned he invesigaor's eyes owardpersonenvironmen relaions oward single individuals acing in animpinging environmen. In conras, he symbolis framework encourageshe invesigaor o hink in erms of he relaion of one person's symbol

sysem o ha of ohers in eec, o hink in erms of social inerdependence. rom his vanage poin, socieies and social groups are nohe simple sum of individual acors, bu include relaionships creaed by



88 Kenne ] ergen

shared sysems of meaning. By ilicaion, social neworks can be expanded o include communiies o enire culures, dened as groups ofpeople whose shared symbol syes unie hem in unique ways.

s s

As we have seen, he animal laboaory has served as a source of compelling meaphors for many socil alyss. However much social heoryhas also employed secondary mehors in accouning for he environmenal condiions said o produce· he individual's responses. One ofhese meaphors, ha of behavra rewards, has had a marked impacof is own, especially among operan condiioning enhusiass . s effecshae been favored by he semanic abiguiy of he erm reward. Oerand above is meanings as a for of reinforcer and as an incenive, he

erm is also a consiuen of econoic discourse. Paymen for work iscommonly ermed an economic reard, and economic heoriss havelong made use of a model of ecooic behavior in which he individual'sraional calculaion of rewards nd coss is cenral. hus became increainly apparen o oia hor ha oeran heory could e hesage for adoping some form of homo economicus as he guidingmeaphor for social life.

George Homanss (1961) work as seminal in his respec Homansdrew a disinc parallel beween e behavior of pigeons in he operancondiioning paradigm and peopl behavioral responses o heir maeschap ). n effec Homans began is analysis wih he meaphor of heanimal laboraory rmly in pla. e as his work progressed, he expanded he concep of reward,

,lcing i in an economic conex and

conrasing i wih cos. He hen veloped he concep of psychological pro, which he dened a rwards minus coss. Along he sameline, Thibau and Kelley (1959) ee equally inuenial in conrasingreward wih cos and in esablishing exchange heory as a cenral modeof social analysis. Besides he noion of exchange, hey added o heiranalysis he decision marix, famlr o many from conemporary discus

sions of economic bargaining Wih he publicaion of Blau's E (1964 he appropriaion of he concep ofreward from he economic sphere s complee

One maor use o which he rkeplace has been pu is ha oflegiimaion rom he ouse hr as a paricular poliical advanageo be gained by adoping he mehor Operan condiioners had developed a series of wha appeare o be wellsubsaniaed groundingsupposiions Homans (1961) iemize hese in he second chaper of hisvolume Wih he obecive solidiy of heir basic supposiions apparenly

esablished in a separae wellreseced hough exoic) radiion exchange heoriss gained considerabl advanage in he compeiive arena



Mapho meaheoy and he socal wold 89

of social heorizing ew alernaive accouns could claim such a srongempirical foundaion urhermore exchange heoriss acquired he coleagueship and suppor of members of he economic esablshmen, manyof who realized he lack of subsanive grounds for he psychological

supposions on which economic heory largely ress This relaionshipconinues o be employed o muual advanage boh poliically andconcepually Sroebe & rey 198)

Wih epec o i implicaions for scienic meaheory he economicexchange meaphor conains mixed signals s legacy from he animallaboraoy places i on he side o empiricis science n addiion, if heexchange heoris is commied o a belief in fundamenal principles ofexhange eg maximizaion of reward, reciprociy equiy ec) heorienaion ariculaes well wih he empiricis view of science Howevero he exen ha one iews economic raionaliy as a precrpton foradequae or adapie behavior, he meaphor poses problems for hisview of science for if one hold as do economiss decision heoriss,and game heoriss ha raionaliy is manifes in paricular sraegies orheurisic he srong implicaion is ha he individual reains he choiceo ac raionally or no n effec, exchange heory will provide an adequae accoun of human conduc if and only if when and only when people choose o adop is sraegies or heurisics People may choose odo so in any gien siuaion bu hen again hey may no choose o doso hus violaing he prediced, lawful paern To wrie he conclusion inbroader erms, an elaboraion of he premises of exchange heory suggess ha scienic lawfulness is possible only when people choose o aclawfully This sae of affairs is hardly a anguine one for empiricisfoundaionaliss

should nally be noed ha some of he mos effecive criicism ofhe exchange meaphor has been mouned by hose who are concernedabou is implicaions for socal change Afer all wha if people reallycame o hink of he social world as a markeplace where everyone wasou o pro from ohers Wouldn social life be ransformed for he

worse Wouldn' he marke meaphor acing as a normaive concep,lend ielf o a deerioraed form of culural life n paricular doesn' hemeaphor reduce people o marke commodiies denigrae rus andhumane concern promoe capialisic values and reduce inrinsic moivaion as criics Pon 1974 Schwarz acey & Schuldenfrei 1978 Wexler, 1983) claim And going even furher, doesn he meaphor negaeany of he phenomena i is inended o explain f inimae relaionsreally are a form of social exchange, as exchange heoriss have assered,hi conradics he very concep of inimacy as an inerpersonal rela

ionship in which he paricipans do no believe he ohers o be operaing on a "minimax sraegy minimizing cos and maximizing reward)As Davis and Todd 198) have poined ou if people were o believe



90 Kenneh T egen

ha ohers were consisenly and a ll imes aemping o maximize heirown gain, here would be no iniae relaions as we now undersandhem An adequae defense of he meaphor agains such criicism has nobeen forhcoming

The ocial orld a tage

The possibiliies of viewing he socal world as heaer can be raced o aleas he sixeenh cenury when re was a welldeveloped radiion ofheaer ha depiced common life heaer can imiae life he opposiepossibiliy seems inescapable ws lef o Shakespeare o draw he fullimplicaions of his possibiliy As aques announces in A You ike ItAll he world's a sage, and all e men and women merely playersThey have heir exis and heir enrnces and one man in his ime plays

many pars vii 19 Wrigh 16 p 677) Three cenuries laer hismeaphor was o gain sufcien oenum ha he issue of wheher dailylife was bu an imiaion of heae or vice versa was o occupy some ofhe bes inellecs of he era

n the twenieh cenury, Vaihners Philoophy of f 1911192),alhough wrien for quie differen purposes, made an early conribuiono he dramaurgic mode of hough and ungs 19281941956) concep of he peroa provided an eal illusraion of is implemenaion inpsychological heory Sill he draurgical meaphor was slow o de

velop in social psychology A les ne major reason for his was ha hepivoal concep of "role was senically ambiguous had a criicalfuncion in a leas wo cenral lin of discourse: he hearical and hesrucural n he laer insance h concep had become virually lieralOne could speak wih seeming beciviy abou he role of his or haobjec in a given sucue or macine eg he ole of he keysone inhe srucure of an arch, he role of he sparkplug in he funcioning of amoor, ec) As srucural meaprs pevaded social heory from he90s o he 960s, he srucural sage of he concep of role ended o

obscure is dramaurgic poenial he same ime, he srucural usageplayed an imporan susaining funon: The concep of role was reainedin he vernacular of social heory il he conex became congenial foris dramaurgic elaboraion

Morenos 1946) developmen f psychodamaic echniques of personal change along wih Kellys 1955) developmen of roleplayingherapy prepared he way for h• dramaurgic urn However i wasSarbins 1954) conribuion o h rs Handook of Social Pychologyha began o explore he dramarical poenial in a serious way His

coceps of role enacmen, oleig ably, and ole nvolvemen allbegan o realize he poeial e, he works of Goffman 1959) and





9 Kenneh J Gegen

domain The meaphors of he eonomic bargainer and symbol user forexample are more inviing in hs sense han hose derived from heanimal laboraory or machine e even in he dramaturgic case heindividual remains he fundamn uni of concern and social wholes areulimaely seen as derivaive is afe o say ha in erms of is emphasis he preceding review has ben generally reecive of he dominanineress and approaches in weehcenury psychology The work ofmos psychologiss has been an oninues o be cenered on he individual is also he case ha he empiricis heory of knowledge is basedon individualis premise is he individual scienis who observes andreasons i is he individual who erves as he locus of knowledge orhese reasons he use of meaphr in rendering inelligible he social unias he basis of explanaion warans special aenion

Much holisic heory in psychology has sprung from he sudy of organ

izaional life and as Weick 1979) has noed he lieraure in his area isrich in meaphoric variaion Oanizaions have been likened o anarchies seesaws space saions garbage cans savage ribes ocopoidsmarkeplaces daaprocessing sedules ahleic eams ladders andpyramids o name bu a few f he relevan meaphors Wihin recenyears however here has been a eadily increasing ineres in analyzingrelaional processes as "sysems ysems noaion is clearly meaphoricand like many of he meaphors icussed so far he sysems meaphor isalso polysemic Tha is i draws is meaning from a variey of conexs

aher han rely on a speci main of relaed discourse i conoinsmeanings from a variey of mains Sysems heories can be racedmore generally o he mechansic radiion in which one assumed areliable deerminaive relaionshp among elemens More proximallyhowever compuer languge hs layed perhaps he single mos inuenial role in deermining how sytes have come o be characerized Afercompue theoriss furnished ocabulary of nputs oupus bits ofinformaion sorage funcions d so on his language was applied ohuman communicaion and hen social organizaions more generally

Anoher nuence me from h eld of cybernecs which s concernedwih he naure of conrol sys in machines organisms and morerecenly) social sysems A h same ime ha i absorbed compuerechnology cyberneics evolvd is own language of descripion and explanaion an independen dicurse h feaures servomechanismsfeedback loops, and selfregulin Much of his erminology has had animpac on developing heorie of group life inally biological heorissfrom von Beralanffy 1968) o aurana and Varela 1980) also conribed o he emergence of holiic heory in psychology by furnishing

sysems accouns of living organisms Though such accouns have borrowed heavily from he compue and cyberneics spheres, hey have also



Meapho meaheoy and he social wold 293

added a range of new conceps such as sysems boundaries homeosasisopen sysems and selforganizaion And o hese conribuons one musadd hose of economiss Boulding 1967) mahemaicians apapor1956) baceriologiss Ashby 1962) and family herapiss Keeney &

oss 1985) o name bu a fewThis mixing and blending of meaphors has been a poen simulusfor social heoriss Parly because of he holisic emphasis of sysemsaccouns sociologiss were among he rs o nd he sysems metphoruseful oremos in his case was he work of Talco Parsons 1951) n ase of bold heoreical srokes, Parsons aemped o exend he sysemsmoif across differen domains ranging from sociey o he single cellegardless of level of analysis sociey communiy family personaliyand so on sysems conceps were shown o be applicable On he

individual level he work of Miller Galaner and Pribram 1960) inpsychology was also a seminal inuence On he basis of heir largelycyberneic model of how individuals plan and execue acions oherheoriss have rapidly moved on o develop socalled acion heories hahave broad social applicaion Carver & Scheier 1981) qually simulaed by he sysems meaphor have been organizaional heoriss wishingo focus on he large organizaion raher han he individual as he criicaluni of analysis Malik & Probs 1982)

The sysems meaphor shares wih he dramaurgic meaphor revoluionary implicaions wih regard o he characer of science Tradiionalempiricis meaheory is buil on a disincion beween he observingsubec and an independen exernal world Only when he scienis orhis or her surrogae) experiences his world under sysemaically conrolled condiions is knowledge said o be properly and securely generaed However when exended he sysems meaphor undermines hesubecbec dichoomy Krippendorff 1984) rom he sysems perspecive one is invied o view subec and obec as par of he samesysem as a conguraional whole raher han as separae eniiesSimilar implicaions emerge when one applies sysems hinking o he

communiy of scieniss n his case one is invied o see he scieniccommuniy operaing as a single organiional uni hus he auonomyof he single scienis and his o her capaciies o make observaionsunrelaed o organizaional requiremens are called ino quesion As aresul he producs of science books papers echnology ec) come obe seen as producs of he sysem and hus subec o he needs andconsrains of he sysem aher han being daa driven as radiionalempiricis docine would have i scienic heories are undersood o besysem driven The force of his posiion has been mos compellingly

demonsraed by sociologiss of science e g KnorrCen 198 1 aour& Woolgar 1979)



94 Kenneh J Gegen

Concludig houghs

As we have seen he meaphors ervading social psychological heoriesover he pas few decades have beome increasingly a variance wih helogical empiricis meaheory o hich he discipline has been radiionally commied Wha conclusion s o be drawn from his growing aninomy A he ouse one migh argue ha he eld has simply goneasray ha hese more recen dparures are only of local ineres andha hey will evenually be replaced by social heory ha is coheren wihhe radiional view of scienc om his perspecive, rerenchmen isulimaely necessary and ineviabl u such a view seems deeply problemaic or one hing i is clea a he era of foundaionalis pursuis isnearing an end ew philosopher of science coninue o pursue he askof jusicaion and mos of h ajor debaes in his domain have urned

on issues arising from he hisry and sociology of science As i isfrequenly said he inellecual ciae is now posempiricis Wha formof alernaive if any) o logic epiricism will emerge over he nex fewdecades remains unclear Conss wih he demise of logical empiricismare a numbe of argumens raise in he opening secions of his chaperagains he picure heory of lauage n undermining he radiionaldisincion beween lieral and meaphoric language we were also layingsiege o he view ha scienic heries can operae as picures or mirrorsof an independen realiy seem hen ha aemps o realign presen

heory so ha i will be more conien wih logical empiricis meaheoryare ill advised

More promising a his junce are aemps oward devising meaheories ha offer greaer laiud of developmen a he heoreical levelWha seems o be required is view of scienic aciviy ha inviesa mulipliciy of perspecives human acion n previous wriingseg Gergen 982 1985ab 6) have aemped o spell ou heconours of a social consruit meaheory for he human sciencesAlhough he orienaion is fa from complee i argues agains he

view ha science is a produc f individual minds each ben on locaing some singular ruh aher his approach replaces individuals wihcommuniies of scieniss wring ogeher o hammer ou forms ofdiscourse ha will service her calized ends rom his vanage poinhe aim of science becomes no ingle generalizable ruh bu differenforms of inelligibiliy or underanding each wih resriced pracicalvalue n his respec we may welcome he mulipliciy of meaphorsha have come o characei social inquiry for as he range andforms of heoreical undersanig have expanded and muliplied so

have our poenials for acon boh wihn science and wio Andas some of hese forms of undranding are convered from he mea



Meapho meaheoy and he social wold 9

phorc o he leral, some of hese poenals wll become he realesof omorrow

The moral s smple: Meaphors are mporan, no only for he consruon of our heores and meaheores bu for he reconsruon of

our socal world

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9

Meaphors of nwane conc:a histocal sketch

H E O D E R S A R B N

n every age and in every sociy rules of propriey are laid down Whena person engages in conduc h ohers perceive o be rule breaking

hose persons responsible for mainenance of order wihin he groupmake effors o undersand and cnrol he rule breake f he violaedrule is an explici one such a a lw of propery he social group or isdesignaed ofcers) apply he saions ha have been legislaed fo heparicular norm violaion f he ule is no explici as for example henorms governing recipocal al he problem is more complex sinceneiher he law nor the lore proes reliable sancions A convenien wayof referring o such noncodied ule breaking is unwaned conduc nhis essay shall skech a hisoial accoun of he meaphors ha have

guided he search for he undeanding and conrol of unwaned conduc or he pas cenury uch conduc has been he concern of hesubdiscipline of medicine cald psychopahology aer in he essay shall poin o some of he hisoil conexs leading o he coinage of haerm

A complee hisory would csder he meaphors employed in earlierimes when devils and demon ood and evil spiris and oher occuleniies provided he ground heory building as well as he raionalefor managng devian persons M selecive hisocal accoun begns wih

he inroducion of a novel ehor ha displaced demonological conceps and paved he way for classicaion of unwaned conduc asforms of illness

00



Meaphos of unwaned conduc 301

The menal illness meaphor

Clearly meaphrs do no arise ou of he blue hey are forged n hecourse of aemps to communicae evens for which no saisacory voca

bulary is available ke all communicaive acs meaphors occur in socalconexs and hey are inended o solve concurren problems Teresa ofAvila 151581) an imporan gure in church hisory, was one of hers inuenial leaders o shif he burden of he scial conrl of normvolaors from religious auhoriies o praciioners of enaissance medicine The norm violaions under consideraion were perplexing and unpopular imaginings ha were repored by some members of a cloiser ofnuns A a laer ime he repored "visions would have been labeledhallucinaions and he nuns would have been idenied as "hyserics

n a humane ac calculaed o save he nuns from he nquisiors Teresadeclared ha he unwaned conduc he repored visions should bereaed s hey were sympoms of illness Teresa ofesus 1571946 pp 640)

eaning parly on he recenly recovered humoral heory of GalenTeresa argued ha he unwaned conduc of he nuns could be accounedfor by naural causes by melancholy an excess of black bile) a feebleimaginaion lack of skill in assigning causes o imaginings) and drowsiness or sleeplike saes Spiriual causes she conended need no beinvoked

Teresas sraegy for saving he nuns was based on argumens ha weredifcul o refue Before her ime i had been esablished ha sicknessor inrmiy (s) is somehing ha happens a person Since heperson is no he agen of acion in sickness he or she canno be heldresponsible Sickness is a happening and no a doing By invoking heseassumpions, Teresa effecively sideracked he nquisiors from heirusual pracice of locaing he cause of unauhorized visions in he visionarys inenional commerce wih he devil She hus conribued o herend already begun by which religious auhoriy slowly gave way o

science a leas in areas relaing o maerial hings) and came o recog-nze he relaive imporance of science in pracical affairs

The inroducion of he "illness meaphor reeced an imporanchange in he consrucion of realiy rom an earlier concepion ofrealiy ha mainaned a sric parion beween spiriual aemporalhings and earhly maerial hings a new concepion ha allowed amerger of spiriual and maerial evens had begun o ake shape Theadan was appaen, n eesa's e, n he evsed sysem Galenic medicine offered by he praciioners of physik he science of he

body and is aficions n his sysem he sor of as if diseases hawere laer subsumed under he generic label menal illness requireddiagnosis and reamen no less han did somaic illness As a resul hese





Meaho of unwaned conduc 303

erms "disease and "malaise were selfassessmens made wih regard ocompelling simuli arising wihin he body When hese inernal evensoccur simulaneously wih dysfuncion or incapaciy of he body, hey areinerpreed as signs or sympoms of disease Someimes an explici causal

connecion is inferred: The subecive discomfor is supposed o becaused y he somaic dysfuncion A diagnosis of illness or disease meansno only ha a person is suffering discomfor, bu ha he or she isincapale of performing some if no all cusomary roles This generaldescripion of illness is widespread and is found in ancien wriings, in herepors of ehnologiss, and in conemporary parlance

Of special ineres o hisorians of psychology are he following ques-ions Wha were he condiions ha nuenced he nclusion of miscon-duc in he semanc marix of illness or disease Wha evens made ipossle o mx nenional ehavior wh chlls, umors, nausea, fever,pain, nd oher somaic complains Wha oher condiions inuenced heassmilaion of unwaned onduc no he illness concep

When employng meaphors, here s a common human endency odrop he "as if or o elde he onexual feaures ha mark he expres-sion as gurave raher han lieral Chun & Sarbin, 970) Galenicpraciioners shared his common endency Alhough Teresa inroducedhe meaphor wih he "as if marker como o denfy condiions ha ddno mee he creria for somaic illness, he docors could no readilyperform heir diagnoses and reamens on "as if or imaginary illnessesThrough he expedien of dropping he meaphoric marker, he praci-ioners of physik were relieved of he ask of differeniaing "as ifillnesses from somaic illnesses Nonconforming or perplexing behaviors ha is, unwaned conduc could hen be inerpreed as "sympoms ofunderlying humoral imbalances in much he same way ha fever wasinerpreed as a "sympom of disempered humors

A review of sixeenh and seveneenhcenury reases on physikmakes plain ha he prevailing paradigm for he diagnosis and reamenof sickness made liberal and ofen exclusive use of Galens humoral

heories Wriers copied from Galen and oher Grecooman auhoriesHuner and Macalpine 96), hisorians of psychiary, poin ou haposenaissance docors coninued o use Galens classicaions and hahe presence or absence of fever was heir main diagnosic guide

An excerp from a sixeenhcenury wrier on physik illusraes heexensive use of Galenic ideas Barrough 5896) described one of adozen disorders, "madness in erms of humoral pahology

Mania in Greeke is a disease hich he aines do call Insania and

They ha have his disease be wood and unruly like wildbeases differeh from he frenesie, because in ha here is afever is caused of much bloud, owing up o he braine,



304 Theode R Srbin

someme e bloud s empere, and someme only e abound-ance of do ur, someme of sarpe and oe colerckehumours, or of a oe dsempue of e brane Tere goe beforemadnes debly of e ead klng of e eares, & snngs comebefore ere ees, grea wacngs, ouges, and sraunge ngs

approac s mnd, and e av ss w remblng of e ead Bu madnes caused of bloud oy, ere followe connuall laugng, ere comme before e sg as e scke nke) ngs olaug a Bu wen coler xed w bloud, en e prckngand ferven movng n e brne make em refull, movngangry, and bold Bu f e coler do waxe grosse and doh prckeand pull e bran and s oe members, make em wood wldand furous, and erefore y are wors o cure p 27)

Te radonal concep of llns ad depended on a conuncve cre-ron An ll person ad o exb complans and observable somacsympoms Te concep of llne% as reformulaed, owever, as a resulof e nroducon of "as f deaes and e subsequen droppng of emeaporc marker Te concep of llness now resed on dsuncvecreron llness was demonsra by complans and somac sympomsor simply y complains y ohr of unwaned conduc Te uncrcalaccepance of Galens umora pology as e only scenc frameworkwn wc o vew boh somac and conduc dsorders faclaed e

ncorporaon of dsordered beavor no e doman of medcal pracceTo mee e basc requremens f e medcal model, "sympoms ofdsease ad o be observed Te repor of a vson, for example, wasreaed as equvalen o fever ols; bo were sympoms of umoralpaology As a resul of e sf from a meaporcal o a leralnerpreaon of a beavoral ac s "sympom, umoral medcne cameo embrace no only every ap of he body bu also all nenonalacons Ts lngusc ransforaon made possble for every umanacon laugng, cryng, sou, prayng, lyng and belevng o be

perceved as a sympom of undyng umoral malancesAloug Galen's sysem beg o declne n nuence afer e e-nassance, e basc Galenc moel served medcal praconers well noe nneeen cenury Temk 97 cap 4) Ten, under e n-uence of a new se of meaps see Prbram, Caper 2, s volume),neurologss began o revse ad ene e conceps radonally ed oe umors n er observans, ey found a some conduc dsorders could be raced o neurpaology, for example, o cerebralrauma Oer dsorders apperd o ave no somac anecedens Tuswas born e dsncon bewee "organc and "funconal dsordersor early anecedens of s dsncon, see angermann, 797 Pnel,8 Sal, 702) Te use of e meapor "organc for a range of



Mepho of unwaned onduc 305

disease processes followed from he increasing knowledge of anaomy:Affeced organs could cause cerain behavioral effecs The use of "funcional was no so clearcu The erm was supposed o direc aenion ohe dsurbed funcioning of he organc sysem n he absence of demon-

srable organic pahology Wihin he prevailing medical framework, hespecialiss were confroned wih he problem of locaing causal agens forhese "funcional disorders Since he neuropahologiss had preempedhe body and is organs as he causal agens for "organic disorders, hosewho had acceped he mission of nding he causes of "funcional dis-orders hd o look elsewhere As hey looked, hey developed heexplici concep, erm, and myh of "menal illness see Szasz, )

Havng desribed some o he relevan semanic and pragmaic feaureso he concep o llness up o he ime o he emergence o he "menalillness meaphor, can now address he following quesion: Wha inuenced nineeenh and weniehcenury wriers o join ogeher hemaerialis concep "illness and he nonmaerialis concep "menalSurely one signican facor was he presumpion of mindbody dualiyby hose scieniss who underook he diagnosis and reamen of "funcional disorders No prolonged exegesis is necessary o claim ha, formos European and American scieniss, he concep of mind was a given,no unlike he concep of soul for generaions of Wesern heologians

"Mind as a erm parallel o "body has a long hisory Mind issupposed o be immaerial and invisible, like is predecessor "soul Yei is locaed wihin he body like more visible and palpable organs such ashe hear, he somach and he lungs Early heoriss asked he obviousquesion f he body was subjec o sickness, why no he mind, evenhough sicknesses of he mind had o be of a differen order han bodilydisease As a resul of such quesioning, he previously crypic "funcional disorders were evenually renamed "menal disease or "menalillness

n one sense, combining he maerialis word "illness wih he spiri-ualis "mind is illci The effec o he complex meaphor is o assign

qualiies o he mnd ha are associaed wih he body The meanings ofmind are all oo absrac and he experiences of he mind oo ephemeral o be serviceable o he praciioners of he healing ars n he sameway ha bodily organs had ideniable properies, he mind was said ohave specic properies The difereniaing characerisics of he ephe-meral mind were reied and expressed s "saes of mind Saes of love,anxiey, joy, fear, anger, apahy, luidy, and so on were posulaed oaccoun for observed conduc, normal and abnormal The praciionernow had he ask of deerminng hrough chains of inference someimes

orured which menal saes were he causes of observed conducBaillarger, ; alre, 0)One of he resons ha mind has been given an onological saus by



306 Theode R Sarbn

wriers in he menal illness radin is is grammaical form Mind is anoun Many nouns refer o nes ha have subsance Hence, mindhas been associaed wih, and asumed o be, a subsanive eniy isreaed as if i were a hing Oriially, however, mind sood for acs,raher han saes or eniies Mnding ha is, remembering, hinking,

imagining, and perceiving conned acions performed in social con-exs We sill have some residue of he earlier usage of he ver Mindhe sep Mind your manners emind me

ike mos words mind a e ime was a meaphor was coinedo idenify acions ofen carried u privaely, silenly and coverly, inconradisincion o acs ha wee more over, pulic, and noisy Ashappens wih oher meaphos, e coninued use of "mind as a sub-sanive in he absence of remiers of is meaphoric saus led o aradical shif in meaning Such a henomenon has been idenied as he

meaphoromyh ransformaio Sarin, 964 968) Wha was once agure of speech was ransforme ino a believedin eniy, a hing wihproperies and powers4

The impliaions of he meaphromyh ransformaion are manifoldMos signican is he problem f uncoveing he causes of unwanedconduc How and whee were eseachers o pobe fo he myhicalorgan esponsible for behavior judged o be unaccepable by ohersDuring he pas cenury, he seah has been direced oward uncoveringcomplexes, neuropsychic disposiins, menal saes, rais, psychic aws,

and oher eniies and characeiics ha presumably reside wihin hemind A momen's reecion n hese saes of mind leads o heconclusion ha he idenicao f inernal "menal causal eniies canbe caied ou only hough cains of inference, premised on selfreporsor he repors of complainan e developmen of such chains of infer-ence, following he canons of conemporary science, helped creae ascience of abnormal conduc neeenhcenury scieniss were com-mied o he mechanisic world iew They were also expeced o avoidhe vernacular and o make use f Greek roos and afxes in naming heir

discoveries and invenions Th, in heir aemp o make he sudy ofmenal illness more scienc, nineeenhcenury scieniss creaed anew meaphor psychopaholg

Psycopahology

The new meaphor and sciene o psychopahology depended on a com-binaion of wo roo meaphors The rs was a paricular concep ofmind as an auonomous hi ha operaed according o is ownnorms and regulaions This meaphorical concep, according o Pepper's



Mer f nwned nd

942) analysis is associaed wih "formism, a world view ha assigns oeach phenomenon in he universe is own formal characerisics andessence When medically oriened scieniss urned o Greek for a scien-ic label o represen his hing called mind, hey seleced "psyche, aerm ha originally referred o one of he forces posied by posHomericGreeks as a source of acion Adkins, 970)

The second roo meaphor underlying he modern concepion ofyhah h ah h nva ana wa derved m he ehansi aher han he s wld vewAccording o his world view, obecs are o be conceived as pars of aubiquious mechanical apparaus ha ransmis forces from one place oanoher As a resul he science of pahology should have as is missionhe uncoveing of causes along mechanisic lines

As a ing consequence of hese concepual underpinnings, "psycho

pahology was an ougrowh of he successful developmen of biology asa sienic discipline, a developmen ha owed is sucess o he applicaion of he roo meaphor of mechanism The mechanizaion of biologyreached is apex in he laer half of he nineeenh cenury Coleman,97; Singer, 959) The mechanisic concepion of life was he saringpoint for reseach and heory in the various biological disciplines, including pahology had an ideological cas and was aken seriously bysignican members of he scienic communiy s imporance isreeced in he oah and careers of Erns von Brcke, Emil du Bois

eymond, Hermann von Helmholz, and Carl udwig n 848 hese soono be famous biologiss swore o accoun for all bodily processes inphysicochemical erms, and hey spen heir lives in he service of hisgoal Craneeld, 957)

The word "psychopahology reveals is medical roos, even o hoseignoran of Greek Pahology came ino use as early as he seveneenhcenury o denoe he sudy of somaic disease was no unil he middleof he nineeenh cenury ha i was used o denoe condiions oher hanhe effecs of umors, oxins, parasies, and microbes n combining

"psyche wih "pahology psychopahology simulaed imagery ha wasaihful o is medcal conex A he same ime users of he em had oincorporae images ha were consisen wih he formis absracionpsyche Taking for graned ha he human body is a complex biological machine, he psychopahologiss underook he sudy of he psycheas anoher complicaed piece of machinery, subec o naure's causallaws

he mechanzaon of bioloy was he famework wihin which hepsychopahologiss conduced heir work A relevan example of he use

of he roo meaphor of mechanism is found in he mechanisic concepion of hyseria



308 Theodo R Sabn

The mehaatio of hysteia

The psychopahologiss aemped o validae heir professional calling bysolving he puzzle of hyseria The meaphorical hisory of hyseria provides ye anoher example of he meaphoromyh ransformaion The

early Greeks raced he source of unwaned, perplexing conduc inwomen o he mos obvious ineral organ ha differeniaed womenfrom men he uerus They explaned conduc ha violaed role expecaions as he behavioral effec o a andering uerus The reamens heyrecommended were reasonable, iven he premises embedded in heirheory To coax he uerus ino i roper posiion, Greek docors wouldapply subsances ha emied fou odors o he genial region and sweefragrances o he nose, or vice ver , depending on he assumed misplacemen of he uerus Veih, 95

Alhough he wanderingueru heory faded ino oblivion, he labelhyseria from he Greek word for uerus) was reained and served ashe focus for a vas amoun of peculaion and clinical work in heeigheenh and nineeenh cenuies The focus of he work was hebehavior of women and some m) ha violaed role expecaions andbore some minimal resemblance o sympoms of esablished somaicdisease conracures, paralyses, reshesias, s, unconrolled weeping or laughing, bizarre posuring ensory anomalies, and even socalleddelusions and hallucinaions

The mos prominen conribuor o he new science of psychopahology were physicians JeanMain Charco 8259), Sigmund reud85699), and Pierre Jane 59947), among ohers, brough heirraining in medicine and he aknorgraned mechanisic ehos o hesudy of abnormal conduc Howevr hey differed in pariculars, hey allembraced he search for causaliy, if no in he brain or cenral nervoussysem, hen in he psyche, menal processes, or various saes of consciousness

Hyseria, once a meaphor fo unwaned conduc among women, became a wasebaske erm and, deding on he paricular auhor, couldinclde any deviaion from he nr rom her hisorical accoun of heuse of he diagnosic erm hyseia, Veih 977) concluded ha, beforehe age of he psychopahologis, physicians were relucan o reawomen whose complains could no be corroboraed by physical andneurological eaminaion Such omen were regarded as nuisances,malingerers, liars, and childish aeion geers Charco was among hers o ake seriously he conduc f paiens whose sympoms did no ino he curren nosological scmes However, he redened hyseriaas illness Szasz, 96)

The hisorical inuence of Chaco's reconcepualizaion of hyseriais a eas parially due o he fac ha he had already esablished his



Meapho of unwaned conduc 30

repuaon as a leader n he rapdly developng eld of neuropahologybefore hs work on hysera Hs observaons on mulple scleross and onlocalzaon of spnal chord lesons, among oher dscoveres had madehm famous These observaons exempled he ransmalofforce noon ha was he roo meaphor of he mechansc world vew Damageor dsease o he nerve bers nerruped he ow of force or energy o orfrom he bran The problem for Charco was o accoun for conduc forwhch he physcal examnaon revealed no known ype of neurologcaldsease or damage no anormal reees or aypal sensormoor sgnsA rs e assmled ysera o neurolgcal dsese Te sympmshe clamed, were produced by nonobvous blockages of he nerve bersaer, he moded hs poson by makng use of menalsc consrucs:He reaed he mnd as f were an organ ha could parcpae n heransmal of physcochemcal energy along nerve runks, and he couched

hs scenc accoun of dsordered or unaccepable conduc n mechansc language The paens sympoms, he proposed, were he nevableconsequence of he excaon and nhon of he ow of mpulseshrough he neworks of nerve bers see Ellenberger 1970)

The magery of he anaomy and physology of he nervous sysem waso a large exen nuenced by he developmen of elephone echnologysee Prbram Chaper 2 hs volume) "Messages were supposed oravel up and down he nerve runks as messages ravel hrough elephone wres The same magery was nsrumenal n fashonng a model of

he mnd The concepual nervous sysem became a foun for meaphorso accoun for all knds of performances, especally hose ha had surfacesmlares o he sympoms of neurologcal dsease

Oher psychopahologss followed he same course They reled on hecenral nervous sysem as he source of meaphors o accoun for heacons of socalled hysercals reuds clncal and heorecal wrngscan be raced o he me n hs career when he shfed from he search forcauseandeffec relaons n he nervous sysem o he search for causalrelaons n he psyche To undersand he acons and he alk of hs

hysercal paens, he had o renven he unconscous n hs connecon s worh rememberng ha he nneeenh cenury wnessed anumber of aemps besdes reud's o fashon meaphors ha wouldconvey he magery of a mnd ha could operae ndependenly of heperson as agen Unconscous cerebraon unconscous nference nsananeous raocnaon, among oher meaphors were coned o help explan wha reud and ohers saw as he dynamcs of hysercal aconsreuds own meaphor of a hreepar mnd composed of d ego, andsuperego was undoubedly nuenced by hs knowledge of he morphol

ogy of he bran s neresng ha hysera s no longer par of he ofcal nomenclaure Amercan Psycharc Assocaon 1987) Some of he abnormal



30 Todo R Sabin

conduc ha previously would hae been labeled "hyserical is nowsubsumed under "conversion reaion This is a carryover of reud'smeaphoric explanaion of hyseri as a conversion of psychic energy inodisablng sympoms "Psychic engy, in urn is sill widely used inpsychoanalyic wriings and is anoher case of meaphor urned myh A

one ime i may have been a convenien gure o help describe acomplex phenomenon, bu for ma wriers "psychic energy has becomereied and is reaed as if i wre of he sme order as solar energy

Anoher meaphor ha has bece popular in recen imes o describehe same kinds of unaccepable conduc is "hisrionic personaliy disorder This meaphor depars frm he imagery of a person being a hemercy of disordered nerves or disrdered menal machinery nsead ievokes an image of a person in he auhor of his or her acions inefors o solve ideniy or exiseial crises Tha he "hisrionics may

creae inerpersonal problems an lead o negaive valuaions by signican ohers poins o he necss for looking a unwaned conduc asnvolving a social jdgmen proces

n view of hese recen concepualizaions, an ineresing quesion canbe posed Did hyseria like smlx us dsappear Or did scenssrecognze ha he reied meaph no longer had referenial uiliy

Schiophrenia: a exercise in meaphor

The mechanizaion of hysera ourred n parallel wih he design ofnosological sysems o aid phsns and medical psychologiss in hesienic jo of classifying disease of he mind The usual paern was omake sysemaic observaions of prsons rough o clinics and hospialsand o disll he observed and epored "signs and sympoms ino asingle word or phrase The connion among medical scieniss andpraciioners, as we have already een, was o use Greek roos and afxeso consruc names for he discvrd or invened) syndrome or diseaserom our presen perspecive, he scieniss engaged in he fashionngof meaphors ha frequenly impid ha he esoeric Greek erms werepacked wih causal implicaion he paien suffers from klepomaniacould be inerpreed as a saem ha he paien suffers from a disease, raher han as an opaqu raemen of he presening sympom,"He sole somehing for no appa reason

n he absence of physical rauma or known pahogens, medical praciioners assigned various Greekipired labels o serious violaions ofpropriey norms Among hese abels were moral insaniy, psychosis,demenia praecox, and schizophrnia A one ime, each of hese ermswas a meaphor Wh coninued d uncriical use, hey were reied and

reaed as if hey had he same s of referens as pneumonia, arerioscleosis, or cancer Alhough ea of he meaphors coined in he pas



Mtapor of unwantd conduct 3

cenury has an ineresing sory will cener my discussion onschizophrenia

The erm schizophrenia was inroduced by he Swiss psychiarisEugen Bleuler 857 99) Bleuler conduced inensive clinical inves

igaions wih paiens who were labeled as suering demenia praecoxsee Bleuler, 19111950) Because many persons who were sen o clinicsand hospials for exhibiing crazy normviolaing) behavior were in heirpospuberal years midnineeenhcenury physicians described he conduc by borrowing demenia absence of mind) from senile demeniaand adding he qualier praecox precocious) The brain was said odeeriorae premaurely and he paien was generally evaluaed as suffering from he eecs of moral degeneraion The meaphor had a lifewell ino he wenieh cenury in spie of Bleulers deailed sudies ha

showed ha he sympoms of socalled demenia praecox could beobserved among people of all agesBleulers work on schizophrenia was coninuous wih ha of Emil

Kraepelin 855926) on demenia praecox Kraepelin is credied wihhaving creaed a nosological sysem for psychiary a sysem ha followed he principles of organic medicine He was he force behind hemovemen o incorporae he new discipline of psychiary ino he pracice of medicine, and his basic ideas coninue o serve as he meaphoricalfoundaon of he dagnosc manuals sponsored by ofcial psychary

Kraepelin's Txtbook of Psychiaty wen hrugh nine ediins Thefh 896) ediion provided a relaively full accoun of his usicaionsfr he diagnsis f demenia praecx T undersand he read accepance of he concep of demenia praecox he concurren climae ofmedical pracice mus be aken ino accoun Medical proessionals o helaer nineeenh cenury properly looked upon neurology as a legiimaebranch o medicine was o neurologiss ha hey direced paienswhose perplexing and/or devian conduc migh be caused by pahology ofhe nervous sysem Presening sympoms were many and varied, some

clearly relaed o neuropahology caused by umors, raumas, and oxinsOher presening sympoms, such as aypical imaginings, nonconformingbeliefs, and bizarre acs, were less clearly relaed o neuropahology nhe medical clinics and hospial wards no ne disincions were drawnDisease was disease, wheher he sympoms were obviously conneced oneurological damage or were assumed o have neurological origins

Paiens diagnosed as suffering from demenia praecox were all regarded as neurologically and somaically defecive Kraepelin advancedthe noton that, like all organic diseases dementia praecox had a typical

onse, course, and oucome No cure was o be expeced, only degenerain ino feeblendedness and deah f a paien recoveed he diagnosis had been incorrec

Mary Boyle in press) has recenly unearhed some sarling facs ha



32 Todo R. Sarbn

help accoun for Kraepelin's nd Bleuler's) pessimisic diagnosis and,more imporan, for he iniial obervaions ha led o he hardeningof demenia praecox ino an irrssible diagnosic eniy Kraepelin discovered clearcu somaic signs o ppor his claim o having idenied aclass of somaically awed human eings or some paiens, Boyle repors, Kraepelin recorded signs an sympoms such as "marked peculiariies of gai excess producion f saliva, and urine dramaic weighucuaions; remor cyanosis of hands and fee consrain of movemen and he inabiliy, in spi of effor, o complee willed acsKraepelin also wroe of severe ucural brain damage which was revealed microscopically a posoem Boyle, in press) The braindamage noed a posmorem was smilar o he brain damage of paienswho had been vicims of encephalii lehargica Such srucural damage isabsen from posmorem examnons of presenday paiens who arediagnosed as schizophrenic

n her reconsrucion of he dmenia praecox concep, Boyle showsha Kraepelin assimilaed he peplexing and devian conduc of apaiens who appeared o be widrawn and noncommunicaive o asubclass o paiens whose behair mached he diagnosis of encephliislehargica Thus, Kraepelin cra a model for demenia praecox: hepublic behavior of paiens suffeig from encephaliis lehargica laened affec, loosening of associons, ambivalence, and auism hepresumed psychological crieria of emenia praecox laer schizophrenia) were acually he behavioral effes of an infecious brain disease

is ineresing ha conempary praciioners do no encounerpaiens who mach Kraepelin's dcripion Encephaliic paiens are nolonger housed wih paiens who employ devian episemic and behavioralsraegies o solve heir life prolems Neverheless, Kraepelin's confounding of demenia praecox wi ncephaliis lehargica has coninuing,and no merely hisorical, impo Bleulers revision of he demeniapraecox concep he basis for curren beliefs abou schizophrenia absorbed Kraepelin's descripin of he psychological concomians ofencephaliis

Bleuler made his revision, sig o esablish a psychological diagnosis of demenia praecox, because he became dissaised wih he noion ofa biologically produced moral deeneraion rom clinical observaions,he had concluded ha he peopl ho were brough ino his clinic andhospial suffered from a paholog of mind in which he various deparmens or faculies of he menal aparaus did no funcion in unison noher words, he faculies were "spli off from each oher see Bleuler,96924) n keeping wih he mdical radiion, he creaed a diagnosiccaegory by using Greek roos, o i, "schizophrenia is insrucive oreconsruc he conex for he faioning of his diagnosic label or a



Mtapors of unwantd conduct 33

long ime, i has been cusomary o divide psychological processes inoa hreefold sysem he inellec, will, and emoion Bleuler noed hamany of his paiens showed a discrepancy beween he inellecual recogniion of a fac eg, he recenly announced deah of ones parens) and

he emoional response o i e g , laugher or apahy) underscore he fac ha Bleuler made deailed observaions of heover conduc of paiens He hen classied he observed behaviorsccdng he dnl pre clsscn Ths clssifying civiy was dependen on ceran meaphyscal assumpions, he rs bengha he mind or psyche is an exisen ealiy The second assumpion washa he mind could be divided ino hree disinc regions When Bleulerdeclared ha a cerin ype o crazy conduc was due o he spliing ohe mind, here was an as if lurking in he episemological shadows was as he pars of he mind were no funcioning in unison The as ifformula was invoked inasmuch as he inellec, he will, and he emoionswere speculaive, no empirically esablished eniies

Anoher popular concep aided he formaion of he schizophreniameaphor The concep of he associaion of ideas had been well receivedin medcal circles Alhough conneced prmarily o he wrings of Brshphilosophers he concep of associaion was congenial wih he knownfacs of neurology A meaphoric leap from connecions observed inanaomical sudies o connecions or associaions in he mind helped oform he premise from which Bleuler creaed he schizophrenia docrinef ideas could be associaed, hey could also be dissociaed

Schizophrenia is a compound meaphor Scho spli, dissociaed)is one feaure The second roo, phrena is an ineresing choice Theancien Greeks believed ha he sea of he soul was he phrenos, hediaphragm The roo coninued o be used o connoe mind or menal,even hough Bleuler and his conemporaries locaed he mind in he brainraher han in he midriff

Unlike an ordinarylanguage descripion of unwaned conduc usingsuch erms as mad, crazy, loco, nuy, weird, odd, bizarre, far ou, aky,

ec ) , he use of a scienicsounding, albei opaque erm of Greek originsuggess ha he erm has causal implicaions Alhough schizophrenahas been he objec of research for hreequarers of a cenury, nounequivocal crierion of is exisence has been discovered or invened is anoher example of a meaphoromyh ransformaion Schizophrenia,originally a meaphor creaed o help communicae abou crazy behavior,is now regarded as a disease eniy by mos medical praciioners Areview of curren researh makes clear ha many scieniss have revivedhe Kraepelinian model and devoe heir lives o searching for he mi

crobe he parasie, he chemical compound, he gene, or he brain anomaly ha causes his disease M Bleuler, 968 Sarbin & Mancuso, 980)



34 Todo R. Sarbn

Hallucinaion he psyhlgy o believedin imaginings

n he preceding pages have presned a hisorical skech of meaphorsinvened as class names o give orm o cerain kinds of disvalueddisurbing nom violaions "Meal illness "psychopahology, and

schizophrenia are class nams ployed by professionals and laypersons o idenify people whose pblic behavior fails o mee normaiveprescripions The iems of conduc ha have been subsumed under heseclass labels are legion Each of he iems ofen called sympoms can bebeer undersood if is meaphori origins are raced n he followingpages will race he hisory of e such "sympom hallucinaion

Wha are he raw observaions for which he erm hallucinaion isemployed A person may publicly rpor hearing he voice of a longdeadparen, seeing an absen hisorical gure such as Napoleon), seeing and

hearing a religious gure perhap he Virgin Mary) or experiencing hisor her head expanding and deforing o he size of a wenyfoo doughnu The es for hallucinaion is onsensus f he audience does noconrm he claimed percepion o he longdead paren Napoleon heVirgin Mary and so on hen "hallucinaion is generally used o describehe person's experience

The word "hallucinaion origied in a world ha was winessing ashif in auhoriy from churchmen scieniss emnans of he views ofmysics and scholasics, however, oninued o inuence he meanings

and valuaions of publicly uered nconsensual claims of seeing personsor objecs and hearing voices o people or gods The rs use of hallucinaion in English occurred in a ranslaion of a rac by udwigavaer 570572) who wroe f ghoses and spiries walkng bynygh and of srange noyses, craes, and sundry forwarnynges, whichecommonly happen before he deah of menne, grea slaughers & aleraions of kyngdomes p 1 . s ear ha avaer was referring in hispassage o appariions and ha h used he word "hallucinaion ananglicized form of he ain word llucinaio which carried he meaning

of idle alk, praing, "a wanring of he mind) as a synonym forillusion, he ain roo of which (iusio) is equivalen o mockingjeering, or banering The Oxrd nglish Dicionary informs us hahallucinaion was synonymous wih illusion and was used o indicaehe "menal condiion of being dceived or misaken, or of enerainingunfounded noions, and furherre ha a hallucinaion was an "ideaor belief o which nohing real cresponds Thus a sixeenhcenuryphysician, whose chief auhoriy ws Galen, would inerpre he publicavowal of imaginingsaspercepis as erroneous images as possiblesympoms of insaniy, or as an ilss caused by an excessive amoun ofblack bile or melancholia, bu no signs of goodness or evil , of possiblesainhood or devil possession



Mtapors of unwand conduc 3

will be insrucive o consider how he meaphor of hallucinaion,originally referring o idle alk was employed by neoGalenic praciiones In he s pace, we should recall he conex of neoGalenicmedical pracice, in which he physician was called upon by paiens or byciizens or ofcials o render a diagnosis and o prescribe reamenThus, he physician examined persons who believed hey were sick orwho were hough o be sick by ineresed, nonprofessional laypersonsThere was an assumpion of sickness , else why consul a physician e ussuppose ha a puaive paien was rough o a physician y relaivesbecause he declared ha he had seen and spoken wih S Peer Thepraciioner of neoGalenic medicine would rs se ou o deermine heinenion of he paien when he said, have seen S Peer Was i heinenion of he paien o seek help from a knowledgeable professionaln curren pracice, his sep would be equivalen o idenifying hechief complains) The docor would hen focus on he following quesion Was he image of S Peer erroneous To answer his quesion acomplex series of inferences would be required, calling for considerablelinguisic sophisicaion and a number of conceps shared by boh hepaien and he physician

Because of he exisence of he newly coined diagnosic label hallucinaion he praciioner could simplify his work and use whaever cueswere available o conrm he hypohesis of error in image making hecrierion for declaring a person o be a hallucinaor f he docor deduced

ha he paien's locuion referred o a memory image of a saue of SPeer ha he paien had seen, he inference of an erroneous imagewould no have been drawn f however, a memory image of he villagebarber served as he basis for he paien's claim ha he saw S Peer, hedocor would have declared ha he image was erroneous, and hallucinaion would have been he preferred label

The neoGalenic paciioner faced anohe poblem a problem hasill confrons conemporary professionals When a paien says, haveseen S Peer or any myhical or nonpresen person), he lisener mus

deermine he inenion behind he use of he verb "o see n heconcree case, is see o be aken lierally acually, corporally, haveseen he disciple known as S Peer) , or is see o be aken guraively is i have seen S Peer) Wheher o assign he label hallucinaion or an alernaive label, poeic expression, depends o anexen on he docor's knowledge of he paien's repuaion f hereferring agen had already declared ha he paien was a lunaic, anoucas, or a public nuisance, he docor's job would be an easy one Hisdiagnosis would be hallucinaion f he docor, afer considering all he

evidence including he repuaion of he paien, inferred ha he personwas merely using poeic speech he would be likely o cas abou for anonpeoraive label fancy, daydream, fanasy, or even meaphor



36 Todo R Sabin

A more complee undersandig of he phenomena for which physi-cians had employed he label hlucinaion was iniiaed in he nineeenh cenury wih he beginnings of he empirical sudy of psychologyAvoiding he clinic, madhous, ad hospial, philosophically orienedpsychologiss adoped a nauralic mode of invesigaing "erroneous

images Their invesigaions led w he conclusion ha such phenomenawere common evens and wer no signs of madness Nowihsanding,mos medical praciioners workng in clinical seings operaed from hebelief ha erroneous images wre sympoms of underlying cerebral orpsychic pahology

The medical model conained wo concepions ha when conoined,formed a circular argumen ) Hallucinaions are imagnings reporedby crazy people and 2) cerai rms of madness are characerized byhallucinaions The confounding f hese concepions was ignored by

medical praciioners nowihaing he observaion ha erroneousimages occurred wih grea freqcy among people who had no beendiagnosed as mad or melancholic

was in he nineeenh cey ha he medical model was consolidaed JeanEienne Domiiq Esquirol 8), he acknowledgedmedical auhoriy, was cerain ha hallucinaions and illusions werepahological phenomena

n hallucinaions everyhing apens in he brain The visionaries,he ecsaics, are people who uffer from hallucinaions, dreamers

while hey are awake The aciy of he brain is so energeic hahe visionary he person allucinaing, ascribes a body and anacualiy o images ha he my recalls wihou he inervenionof he senses n illusions, o oher hand, he sensibiliy of henervous exremiies is excid, he senses are acive, he presenimpressions call ino acion he racions of he brain This reacion,being under he inuence f ieas and passions, dominaes heinsane hese sick people are iaken abou he naure and use ofheir presen sensaions p 7)

Bringing he sudy of erroneou images ino conemporary imes, hepsychological and medical orienions remain wih us William James890) was aware of he sudies epored by psychologiss ha made iabundanly clear ha socalled hallcinaions were par and parcel of hecogniive aciviy of normal peope reud, in conras, regarded hallucinaions as wakeful dreams, o regressive and primiive Hallucinaions were normal during dreamg bu abnormal during wakefulnessreud, 90095a, 940964)

is imporan o remind ourels ha he unexamined meaphor canplay havoc wih logic The erl forms of he word "hallucinaiondenoed idle alk When employe in he medical conex, he erm was



Mapor of unwand conduc 3

ransformed ino a dening cieion for madness and/or an effec ofmadness A review of conemporary exbooks of psychology makes clearha boh uses of hallucinaion he medical and he psychological have been unciically reained or example, in heir chaper on behavioral pahology, Kimble and Garmezy 96) wrie Hallucinaionsare false sensory impressions The schizophrenic may see hings haaren hee or voices ha don' exis, excep for him p 59) nanoher chaper on he deecion and inerpreaion of simulaion, heydene illusions as false percepins ha prduce various srs f disrion in he world p 32) A clinical praciioner using he KimbleGarmezy book as a guide would have he impossible ask of differeniaing beween false sensory impressions and false percepions Thereicaion of hallucinaion has creaed condiions for diagnosic confusion n wha way could a sensory impression be false

n summary, an examinaion of he use of hallucinaion in modernimes reveals ha his oncelively descripive meaphor, in he hands ofmechanisically inclined physicians and menal healh praciioners, be-came reied A careful look a he semanics and pragmaics of heprofessional employmen of he label "hallucinaion leads us o herecogniion of he Alice in Wonderland ransguraion of he idle alkmeaphor: The erroneous images repored by mad or crazy people arehallucinaions if a person has hallucinaions, he or she mus be mad orcrazy

Meaphors of ierveio

A discussion of meaphors of unwaned conduc would be incompleewihou a parallel discussion of he meaphors of inervenion n anyhisorical period and in any culure, inervenion by socieal agens isacily called for and legiimaed when a person is idenied as adevian for displaying conranormaive conduc The inervenion may belegal or quasilegal such as exile, imprisonmen, capial punishmen, or

public ogging) or educaional such as habi raining, religious pracice,or various forms of psychoherapy) When a man or woman violaes henorms fo an ascribed role, heoriss and ordinary folk seek causal explanaions The meaphor chosen o connoe he assumed causal agencyinuences he form of inervenion Exorcism, for example, became heinervenion of choice when he assumed cause was Saanic inuenceeligious docrine provided he underlying causal meaphor, and hechice f inervenin followed logically from he assumed cause Similarly, when socieal agens employ he illness meaphor, i follows logically

ha concurrenly accepable medical reamens will be he inervenionof choiceThe cenral poin is ha specic modes of inervenion ow a any



38 Tod R. Sarbin

given ime from he regnan worl views abou human naure When hedominan world view was a mixur of medieval formism and mysicism,inervenion echniques followed logically from he belief in wichcraf asa causal heory The draconian nrvenons inended o conrol allegedwiches including burning hem a he sake) were consisen wih he

underlying belief ha he devl uld be responsive only o he mosviolen forms of inervenion By e end of he eigheenh cenury, hebelief in wichcraf as a causal hey had been assigned o he dusbin ofpsychological heory supersiion Burning a he sake was no longerpraciced, bu oher draconian mhods were sill in favor oggings,chains, sequesraion, ec) A cenic meaphors displaced religiousmeaphors for undersanding naul phenomena, he claim ha madnessunwaned conduc) had supernral origins was repudiaed Humanbeings were subjec o scienic ls no less han were oher objecs in

he universe Despie heir commien o empirical science, eigheenhcenury physicians for he mos p regarded madness as incurable, andheir prescribed inevenions er no differen from hose of jailers,almshouse keepers and madhous proprieors physical resrain bleeding, nduced vomiing cahar, conrl by fer of punishmen dogging) Some docors advised he keepers o avoid violence, bu inpracice hese draconian meho were coninuous wih eigheenhcenury medical and penological acice Dain 1964)

The beginning of he nineenh cenury winessed he emergence of

a radically differen meaphorf

undersanding human conduc, ameaphor ha dicaed r mangemen as he appropriae inevenion The creaion o asylums n colonies for he care of pesons whowere unable o look afer hemelvs was a reacion agains he crueliesof he earlier period Moral reamen kindness, wholesome food,saniary ving condions, prayr, moderae work, and recreaion aroseconcomianly wih he ineres i formulaing scienic heories abouunwaned conduc Sill largely denden on a paadigm inheried fromGalen, earlynineeenhcenury hysicians consruced physiologicalheories abou he eiology of maness Locaing he cause of insaniy inhe workings of he body made i ssible indeed reasonable o shiffrom a free will o a deerminis posiion The mad person, hen, was nolonge responsible for his or her ligh Thus, moral reamen, raherhan cruel punishmen and vie medical pracices was he logical,humane prescripion see Bockon, 1963)

A paradox emerged A he sa ime ha hey adoped nonphysological inevenions, docors lean more and more on physiologicalmeaphors of causaliy To undesand how hs could be, we need oconsider he ime frame of hese evelopmens he urn of he cenury,shorly afer he American evolon Among he ideological origins ofhe evoluion were resolue snces on freedom of religion and he




prority of civil liberty The rst of these was based on a belief in thedignity of the person Bailyn, 1967) A prevailing optimism perhapsassociated ith etendng nationa frontiers and with general prosperity,inuenced a choice of intervention that most closely resembled the

Christian ideal he civil libertarian premise, metaphorized by Bailyn asthe "contagion of liberty, pushed aside the repressiveness of the eighteenth century The older attitudes faded out with the acceptance of themoral metaphors of democracy

Nineteenthcentury physicians took pride in the more humane methodsof moral management Moral treatment, however, bore an interestingsimilarity to the older treatment methods Both were concerned withsocial control:

n abandoning the methods of the eighteenth century, nineteenthcentury physicians were not abandoning their roles as guardians ofthe moral order and agents of social control Physical restraint,coercion and eile are replaced by the philosophy of the self whichemphasizes the dual nature of man, the power o the will to preventand control insanity and which elaborated the arts of self government Skultans 1975 p 9)

n this regard we should pay particular attention to the choice of theterm "moral in "moral treatment and "moral management Two

hundred years ago the descriptor "psychological had little currencyWriters employed "moral as an adjective in somewhat the same manneras "psychological would be employed today As is clear in the quotationpreceding this paragraph, however the ethical and religious connotationsof "moral remained part of its semantic structure

Meanwhile, Esquirol's inuential treatise on insanity 1838/1845 wasinstrumental in promoting eplanatory metaphors that made sense interms of the increasing interest in anatomy and physiology Madnesscould be accounted for by invoking the notions of awed biologicaldevelopment and regression to childhood f adult norm violators were tobe regarded as partially developed humans or as children, then it followed that societal agents had the duty to guide them toward the goal ofbecoming mature, responsible, selfreliant adults t is more than a coincidence that this was the period o European epansionism and imperialsm These contemporary political and economic policies supported themoral theory that rm, consistent moral treatment would elevate inferiorraces as it did inferior individuals from the darkness of superstition toenlightened selcontrol Sarbin & uhas, 1982)

Esquirol reected the increasingly popular belief in the power of education to overcome differences in people it did not matter whether thedifferences were the consequences of age, culture, heredity, or otherconditions Equally important to the belief in the power of education was






was implicit e g in the theories of Lombroso and reud) n his accountof the origins of the myth White 1972) has shown how Europeansnurtured and reied the metaphor in the preceding centuries. Large areasof the globe had not yet been explored and most Europeans believed

that the inhabitants of unknown worlds were wild and uncontrolled savages The belief wa contingent on naive ethnocentric assumptions regarding how human beings would act if they had no opportunity toreceie he bee urpe cz The ee ig f helinkage between the diagnosed deviant and the "wild man within areobscure, but observation of the conduct of inmates in eighteenthcenturymadhouses undoubtedly conferred credibility on the literalized wildman metaphor Before the intervention of moral management the brutality inicted by the keepers and spectators at La Bictre the Salptrire

and Bedlam shaped the inmates into creatures that could hardly beidentied as human Caged chained harassed, and otherwise treated asif they were wild animals they had no options but to express theirfrutration and hopelene through "wild action. Parenthetically thereied metaphor continues to receive support in the "wild beast theoryof insanity drawn from early English law Platt & Diamond 1965)

The uneasy alliance between physicalistic medical theories and moraltreatment could not be maintained The image of the asylum as advocatedby early nineteenthcentury reformers such as Samuel Tuke 1813/1964)in England and Philippe Pine 1802 in France was a quiet secudedpastoral dwelling that housed a smal numer o persons wo ha aieto meet the demands of everyday life With the increasing growth oindustrial and urban populations, such an ideal could not be realizedThe middle of the nineteenth cetury witnessed the change from smallasylums to vast, overcrowded, and understaffed warehouses for society'sreject At the same time the prestige given to practitioners of cienceand technology reected on the practitioners of medical science Thesuperintendents of asylums, by at, became medical superintendents ofmental hospitals Moral management practices eroded under the authority of the physicians and the illness metaphor was revived and givenntological status The newer causal metaphors were borrowed fromthe fastdeveloping sciences of neuroogy and pathology as described inan earlier section of this chapter By the end of the nineteenth century,physicians were acknowledged as appropriate professionals for diagnosingand treating "mental illness The illness metaphor was so powerful thatfew alternatives to tumors toxins, crazy ancestors, and microbes wereconsere xcep n rare nsances (eg paress hypoheses thalocated the cause of abnormal behvior in pathological orgnic prcesses

remained speculative As argued earlier, Cartesian dualism madepossible the consolidation of organic sickness with mental sickness Theobects of medica treatment included not only the more obvious organs,



322 odor R Sarbn

such as the heart and liver but also that inferred entity the mindAdvances in neurology helped sutain the notion that mind and brainwere intimately connected Pschotherapy had its beginnings asalready noted, in the efforts of ysicians to treat sick or wedminds

Since these early beginnings, the development of the behavioralsciences has broadened the coction of psychotherapy At the sametime however the belief in orgnic causality persists, reected in thewidespread use of psychomimei drugs and in the hypothesis thatmental illness eg, schizophrenia) is caused by biochemical and genetic abnrmaities

Athough still a powerfu foc, organic causal metaphors are not socommonly implicated in psychohrapeutic interventions n addition theobjects of psychotherapy are no longer exclusively the certied social

failures for whom the asylums wee conceived. The clients of psychotherapists are for the most part elreferred. They seek help in solvingexistential, identity, or interpersol problems.

Psychotherapy is not a monolitic proession. Scores of psychotherapyand behavior change systems ha been pomulgated, each originatingfrom the implicit or explicit use f a root metaphor, or world view,concening the human condition. or our present purposes, psychotherapeutic systems can be sort into four classes the behavioral,psychodynamic, existential, and sial systems approaches. Even though

the guiding metaphors are blurred i practice, their constraints are clearlyperceptible.

Behaiit thepy

The prevailing root metaphor o since mechanism is reected in thevarious forms of behavior modicion. The origin o behavior theory islost in antiquity, but the distinghing feature is the recognition that

environmental stimuli have cue poperties and reinforcement properties.Habits may be xed or modid y the effects o extenally instigatedactions, which presumably satify eeds and reduce tension, or by thereinforcing effects of the linguisic acts of relevant others. The imagery ofthe underlying metaphor has taiionally been expressed as man themachine, but the major supporting metaphors of contemporary behaviortheorists have their origins in the ysiological laboratory Complex conduct is reduced to stimuli and "responses. The client or patient isperceived according to the constraints of the mechanistic root metaphor

He or she is assumed to be a netal, passive organism, not a sentient,construing person see, eg., Thorndike, 1913 Watson & ayner, 1920Wolpe 1958



Mtapor o unwantd conduct 2

Pyhodynmi herpy

The originators of psychodynamic theories began from mechanistic postulates eg, reud's hydraulic metaphor), but when the explanatory

powers of mechanism were exhausted, they turned to an essentialistic orin Pepper's 1942 elicitous term a ormistic conception o mind orpsyche The duality of mechanism and formism required no great postulaional leap Cartesian dualism was readily accepted There were bodiesand there were minds The dualistic perspective colorfully epresented asthe ghost in the machine yle 1949) was consonant with widely heldeligious beliefs The reied metaphor mind became the object ofattention Disordered conduct uncontrolled feelings and personal discomfort, on this view, ollow rom imbalances among or accidents to the

hypothesized structures of the mindThe task for the formistic therapist is to adjust or rearrange themetaphorized mental structures Not available to direct observationmental structures are construed from analyses of verbal behavior andother expressions of the mind t is assumed that the therapist canpenetrate the mysteries of the mind by careful attention to clues embedded in talk and gesture n endorsing the position that, in principle, aperson can alter the structure of mind the causal entity) through guidedselanalysis psychodynamic therapists imply that the client is responsible

for his or her own misery n assuming that clients must accept responsibility for their unhappiness and discomfort they have become moralistsieff 1979) Their claimed neutrality and objectivity conceal a normatve moral posture that directs them to communicate that a person isultimately responsible for his or her actions and feelings

xtetil therpy

Sometimes associated with the socalled third force in psychology the

ramework of existential therapy makes use o such concepts asbeing, awareness, experience authenticity, existential crisis and selfactualization The underlying metaphor the self is an abstractionunderstood in relation to other abstractions The relationship of self toGod, to the universe to nature, to humankind these are the foci ofinterest for the existential therapist Phenomenological work helps touncover meanings that have been disguised through metaphor and othergures of speech As the behavioral perspective had its origins in thescience laboratory and the psychodynamic perspective had its origins in

Cartesian doctrine, the existential perspective had its origins in humanistic philosophy and theology The failure to nd an acceptable answer tothe question What am in relation to the rest of reality may lead a



324 r R r

person into conduct judged unccetable by societal agents nterventionby a therapist may be supplemeted or replaced by meditation prayeraesthetic experience, or pain and ffering The aim of existential therapyis to reorganize one's relationship to transcendental objects and eventsthereby effecting change in th s see eg, rankl 1965 May 1969ogers 1961)

Soci sstems thery

The root metaphor underlying th ocial systems approach is the same asthe root metaphor of the contetlist world view the historical act seePepper, 1942) The focus is not n the isolated organism nor on theghost in the machine nor on th lf but on the person in social contextSocial science practitioners percie unwanted conduct from a vantage

point that includes not only the arget person but also the persons whopass judgment on the target prsons conduct The notion of socialsystems contains an assumption hat the actions of any member of thesystem will inuence the conduct o other memers There is no recognition of "man alone or "woma lne. n recent years the adoption ofthe root metaphor o the histor ct has inuenced pactitioners to takeinto account cultural and instutional factors as well as interpersonalfactors. A number of interventin programs among them communitypsychology family therapy and lfhelp and mutual help groups have

come into being as the resut f pychologists adopting the historical actas the root metaphor see e g Denner & Price 1973 airweather1964 Lieberman & Borman 1979 Morrison 1979 Satir 1964)

oda

This essay purports to be a itrical sketch of the development ofmetaphors central to understandig and dealing with unwanted conduct should acknowledge, however tht like all hstorians am not free of

epistemological bias To help trol for the more typical and less warranted sorts of bias have trie to avoid such loaded terms as abnormal aberrant "disordere "pathological, and "insane, and have striven to employ terms tht re more theoretically neutral Amongthe latter is the label that have lected for the phenomena of interest:unwanted conduct But even "nwanted conduct retains the rockbottom implication that is embeed though usually disguised) in theformer, more heavily loaded tes t implies that the labeling of certaintypes of human action as abnomal or aberant or disordered etc.)

involves a value judgment reding what is wanted and what is notwanted. believe that this implcaion is entirely warranted and that itsrecognition is extremely impora

urthermore on evidence like that provided in my historical account,




believe that the udgments involved in designating certain behaviors asunwanted have typically been made and continue to be made by personswho possess more power and authority than the persons whose behavioris beng udged and that these relatively more powerful authoritie make

their declarations against a background of beliefs mores and folkwaysthat contitute a particular culture moral code n the end then believe that the generation of policies and prescriptions for labeling anddeaing with unwanted conduct i ineitaby a mora enterprie

This historical sketch of selected topics has taken the period of theenaissance as its point of departure To be sure early Greek andoman authorities coined metaphors to help communicate about perplexing and unwanted conduct n fact some of these metaphors enteredinto enaissance and later formulations began with the enaissance

however because wanted to discuss the more immediate historicalbackground of Western culture's critical shift from demonism and witchcraft to the belief in sickness as a causal entity t is the literalization ofhe meaphor of illness, am convinced, ha has been he maor sourceof the pychiatric myth of our tme myth that have tood in he way ofthe creation and acceptance of more apt and more humane metaphors ofunwaned conduc

A eview o the hitoy metaph deyg theoie o wtedconduc reveals a ac o grea imporance ha under suble or open

ideoogic preure deciptive metphor become myth nce mythecomes par o he arc o a cvlaons sysem o eles guesthoght and action ad thu t ievitaby miitate gint the itroduction of alternative metaphors n the same way that enaissance gurescreated new descriptive metaphors to attenuate the excesses that followedthe adoption of the mythology of demonism some contemporary scholarsthrough research and semiotic analysis have tried to demonstrate themythic nature of the successor to demonism the mental illnes doctrineSzasz 1961) in particular, has argued persuasvely for an alternatve

metaphor "problems in living This metaphor requires no adherence tomechanistic ideology and it ts well with the requiements of contextualistmode of thought n addition it accord with the central fact that theidentication of an epiode of conduct a "unwanted require not onlyovert conduct by a target peron bu alo a moral udgment by anotheree Sarbin & Mancuo 1980 hope that reader of thi eay will eethe value and promie of thi alternative metaphor

Noes

Since Galen (ca. A.D. 130200) and Galenic edicine ae ofen enioned inhis essay I should noe ha Riese (1963) has published anslaions of soeof Galens lesse known wiings on oal philosophy and psychoheapy andha Siegel (1973) has poided a hoough and auhoae eiew and



26 odr R arbn

analyss of hose aspecs of Gals hough ha ae os elean o heconcens of his essay. Tekin (13) has docuened he hisoy of Galenis" fo he ie of Galen o nineeenh cenuy

2 Of couse hee wee soe pceens fo hs deelopen. Fo exapleRush (1812) had aleady discuse he diseases of he ind," and Bigha

(1844) had consued insaniy as chonic disease of he bain." Bu hefullblown, syseaic consucio and use of he enal illness" eaphooccued only in he lae pa o he nineeenh cenuy.

The issues a sake hee wee a elean o he legal pofession as o heedical and psychiaic coues. Fo a collecion of he seinal legalcases peaining o insaniy and jispudence, see Robinson (197880)

A peusal of he Oord Engl itonar suppos he asseon ha indeneed he language as a eb o enoe acions fo which he conepoayspeake of English would use ebeing" and aending. Mind andeoy" ae deied fo h se oo. The ansfoaion o subsaniesaus ook place when concuen piseology equied speakes o inen alocus fo he acion. The ind hen becae he sea of eebeing andaending. The locaion of ind as no always consideed o be he head.Befoe ou ancesos discoed a he bain was a poweful coodinaingogan, he hea was soeis ssued o be he sea of eebeing.Vesiges of he heaasind ise can be found in colloquial speech: Ileaned he poe by hea is ialen o I eoied he poe. On heheoy ha ocabulay aises fo he liealiaion of gues of speech, seeSabin (1967) and Tubayne (196).

5 On he concep of oo eapho and wold iews (o wold hypoheses),see Peppe's (1942) classic wk in which he species and discusses fou

ajo wold hypoheses" ha a elaed, he agues o fou ajo ooeaphos" (fois, echani, onexualis, and oganicis). Accodingo Peppe, hese diffeen conceual iewpoins ae he ajo elaielyadequae oienaions ha hae ben deeloped in he Wesen adiion ofeaphysical speculaion. Fo disssions and aplicaions of Peppe's conceps and hesis, see Efon (1982

6 Fo fuhe discussion of Kaelin Bleule and he deelopen of odepsychiay see Ellenbege (1970.

Fo fuhe discussion of he hioial backgound of he concep of hallucinaion see Sabin and Juhas (17).

Fo an idiosyncaic bu siulai and suggesie discussion of he bih ofhe asylu" see Foucaul (191/965).

9 The ac wies ebaced he nn of he anifes desiny of he AngloSaxon ace." Ehnocenic aguns wee adanced o suppo he clai haall fos of socieal disode we aceable o he dangeous classes. Seee. g. , Bace (1872) Bown ( 187) nd Song (1885).

On he downfall of he oal eaen oeen and aeps o eie i inhis cenuy (e .g . , in he coun enal healh oeen) see Bockoen(1963).

The agniude of he lieaue on psychodynaic heapies is such ha one

o wo bibliogaphical efeence ould hadly do jusice o he subjec. Theao of his ode of ineeion is eeced in Feud's pape OnPsychoheapy (1905/1953b ).




efereces

Adkins A. W. H. (1970). From the man to the one A stud o personal andvews o human nature n the contet o ancent Greek soce values and

beles Ihaca NY Conell Uniesiy Pess.Aeican Psychiaric Associaion (1987). Dagnostc and statstcal manual omental dsorders DM R (e. 3d ed). Wahingon DC Auho.

Baillage J. G. F. (1853). Recherches sur les malades mentales et sur quelquesponts danatome et de phsologe du sstme nerveu [Sudies o enalillnesses and of he anaoy and physiology of he nerous syse]. PaisMasson.

Bailyn B. (1967). The deologcal orgns o the Amercan Revoluton CabidgeMA: Harad Uniesiy Pess.

Baough P. (1963). Of he frenisie lehagy apoplexy epilepsia adnes andelancholie. In R. Hune I. Macalpine (Eds.) Three hundred ears o

pschatr 155180 (pp. 248). New Yok: Oxfod Unies Pess.(Exceped fo oiginal wok published 1583.)Bleule E. 1924). Tetbook o pschatr (A. A. Bill Tans.). New Yok

Macillan. (Oiginal wok published 1916.)1950). Dementa praeco or the group o schzophrenas (J. Zinkin Tans.).

New Yok: Inenaional Uniesiies Pess. (Oiginal wok published 1911)Bleule M. 1968 . A 23 yea longiudinal sudy of schiophenics and ipes

sions n egad o he naue of schophenia. In D. Rosenhal S. Key(Eds.) The transmsson o schzophrena (pp. 312 . New Yok Pegaon.

Bockoen J. S. 1963 . Moral treatment n Amercan pschatr New Yok:Spinge.

Bace C. L 1872 . The dangerous classes o New York New Yok: Wynkoop Hallenback.Bigha, A. 1844 . Deniion of insaniy. Amercan Joual o nsan 1 97Bown J. E. 1867 . The incease of cime in he Uned Saes. The ndependent

pp. 8323.Boyle M. (in pess). The nondiscoey of schiophenia Kaepein and Beule

econsideed. In R. P. Benall (Ed.) Reconstructng schzophrena. LondonMehuen.

Chun K. Sabin T. R. 1970 . The eaphooyh ansfoaion. Phlosophcal Pscholog 1, 2733.

Colean W. 1971 . Bolog n the nneteenth centu Problems o orm unc

ton and transormaton New Yok: Wiley.Caneeld P. F. 1957 . The oganic physics of 1847 and he biophysics of oday.Joual o the Hstor o Medcne and Alled cences 2 40723.

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Denne B. Pice R. H. (Eds.). 1973 . Commun mental health ocalacton and commun reacton. New Yok: Hol Rineha Winson.

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Eon Ed.). 982 . he Peppe papes. Special issue of he Joual o Mndand Behavor nos. 3 and 4.

Ellenberge H. F 1970 . The dscove o the unconscous The htor andevoluton o dnamc pschatr New Yok: Basic.Esquiol J. E. D. 1833 . Su les illusions des sens che les alins [On he



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Fale J. P. (890). Etudes clnque r les malades mentales et nerveuses [Clnical sudies of enal and neros illnesses]. Pais Baillie.

Foucaul, M. (1965). Madness and zaton A hstor o nsan n the age oreason (R. Howad, Tans.). Yok Rando House. (Orginal wokpublished 1961.)

Fankl V. (1965) The doctor an the soul From pschotherap to logotherap.New Yok: Knopf.

Feud S. (1953a). The inepeaion of deas. In J Sachey (Ed. and Tans)The standard edton o the comlte pschologcal works o gmund Freud(ols. 4 and 5, pp. 1621) . Lond: Hogah Pess. (Oiginal wok published1900.)

(1953b) On psychoheapy. In J achey (Ed. and Tans.) The standardedton o the complete pschocal works o gmund Freud (ol. 7 pp25568) London Hogah Ps. (Oiginal wok pubished 1905.)

(1964) An ouline of psychoanalis. In J Sachey (Ed. and Tans.) Thestanad edton o the complet cologcal works o gmund Freud (ol.3 pp. 4207). London ogh Pess. (Oiginal wok published 1940)

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Kible G. A Gaey N (16) Prncples o general pscholog (2d ed)New Yok: Ronald

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Liebean M. A. , Boan L D {Eds.). (1979) . elhelp groups or copngwth crs Orgns members proesses and mpact. San Fancisco: Jossey

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10

Generative metaphor and the history opsychoogica discorse

U R T D A N Z I G E R

ust how does the topc of metaphor help us to understand the hstoryof psychologcal dscourse What s t that ths topc contrbutes to ouranalyss of past attempts at addressng psychologcal ssues Is the topc ofmetaphor compatble wth a sober account of hstorcal facts I would lketo suggest some prelmnary answers to these questons before movng onto a consderaton of the relevance of the analyss of dscourse to thehstorography of psychology

Frst should carfy what s entaled by the topc of metapho n hscontext The role that we attrbute to metaphor n hstorcal understandng wll obvously depend on our concepton of hat metaphor s and howt unctons I the topc o metaphor s taken to nvolve no more thangures of speech wth purely rhetorcal functons then ts elevance n thepresent context wll clearly be qute lmted However, t needs no elabo-rate analyss to recogne that metaphor s a phenomenon of thought aswell as of speech Metaphorcal turns of speech are nterestng because ofwhat they ndcate about the thoughts they express

Dscourse about psychologcal topcs has long been replete wthmetaphorcal allusons More often than not these allusons do not occurn an solaed fashon but have a epettve recursve quaty A partculartheorst we often nd, s nclned to sustan the same metaphorcalscrpons ovr muc of s or r work. More sgc a numberof ndvduals often share the same metaphorcal forms n ther accounts

of psychologcal processes In such nstances the analyss o metaphorbecomes hstorcally nterestng, for we can use t to mprove our under

1



33 Kt Danzgr

standing of patterns of psycholoial though that were characteristic of aperiod o a cultue or a paca intellectual communiy

More parcularly an analysi of its metaphorcal aspecs allows usto go beyond the literal surfa o psychological discourse to uncover itsunderlying assumptions and prcupations The literature of psychologycertainly contains some metaphors that are little more than rhetoricalourishes But it also contain hers that seem to provide one of theimportant conditions for the ve coherence of psychological discourseSuch metaphors are used pevasvely over relatively long periods andtypically their users do not seem t regard them as "mere metaphors butas expressing some kind of literl truth

So when Alexander Bain (18) for example, describes the learningprocess in terms of "racks n urning off seam, or when WilliamMcDougall 108) tells us tht a organism without instincts would be

like a steam engine whose re had been drawn, they are not simplyindulging in picturesque and inaurate language Those images seem tot their psychological theoris in some quite fundamental ways Bainreally does believe that the id is essentially tracked energy, andMcDouga s convinced that i s n inert apparatus brought to life by theenergy of the instincts These ages are not just literary devices forgetting a point across; they actlly seem to have a theoryconstitutivefunction As a result, they ca give us an insight into some of theunderlying assumptions and concrns that received expression in Bain's

and McDougall's psychological theoriesIf we are sensitive to this leve f psychological discourse, we will also

notice that Bain and McDouall, although they belong to different generations, are employing a similar basic image of the mind as an energysystem At the same time we ill note that they emphasize differentaspects of this image Where ain's main concern is with the harnessingor control of mental energy, Mougall is much more interested in thesources that guarantee its conind supply What is taken for granted bythe one becomes problematic fo he other This illustrates an important

characteristic of fundamental pychological metaphors They provide abasic common framework withn hch communication is possible, whileat the same ime providing scpe or diferences of emphasis Basicmetaphors, like that of psychlical energy, provide a kind of roughschema that, when held in comon, can constitute one of the minimalconditions for effective human mmunication But because metaphorslink two domains such as min nd energy) in rather undened ways,these schemata leave open the isue o precisely which assumptions andquestions are to be transferrd fom the one domain to the other So

metaphorical schemata not onl provide a framework for shared dis-course, but encourage differens of emphasis and therefore provideconditions favorable for theoreil development



nrat mtapor and pcologcal dcour

In going below the surface of psychological discourse to examine someof its underlying metaphors, we are therefore doing more than uncover-ing buried archaeologcal strata That farly static image is not what Iwant to convey here ather, I am suggestng that underlying metaphori-

cal systems have geetive properties that give a certain cast to sufacedscourse while facilitating the appearance of novel features Sharedmetaphorical images make it possible for people to exchange informationabou what they el t b the sam subjc matr Bu as lon as heinterpretation of these mages remains open those who share them are ina position to emphasize different sets of implications, any one of whichcould be suggested by the original metaphorical schema The identica-tion of such schemata is therefore important from the point of view ofunderstanding the cognitive factors that provide some of the conditions of

both coherence and novelty in the historical development of psychologicaldiscourseAppying such an analysis mpies a cerain vew o metapho as wel as

a certain view of psychological discourse It means that we do not treatthe latter as a set of more or less isolated propositions formulated by asuccession of virtually independent individuals As long as that was theprevailing norm in the hstoriography of psychology, questions about theconditions of coherence for shared discourse hardly arose and the appear-ance of novelty within a continung tradition was unproblematic But fwe think of the history of psychological thought as a discourse with manycontributors that is often locally and temporally coherent then the analy-sis of metaphorical schemata becomes illuminating

Of course, it is possible to talk in terms of a metaphorcal schema onlyif one no longer regards metaphors as isolated gures of speech butrecognizes their extended nature On this point there appears to bevirtual unanimty among a variety of modern writers on the topic ofmetaphor and theory Black 162) sees the subjects of metaphor assystems of things rather than things Berggren 196) speaks of thepresidng schema of a scientic theory, which he likens to the presiding

image of a poem not, one might note, to a specic metaphoricalexpression within the poem icoeur 177 smlarly contrasts themetaphoric network of a theoretical model to the isolated metaphor asliterary device Perhaps the best way of conveying the meaning of thisway of looking at what metaphor can do is in terms of Kenneth Burke's166 notion of "enttlement When a major psychologcal domain ischaracterzed metaphorically, as an energy system or perhaps as aninformaionprocessing system, what happens is not a matter o speccwords describing specic features of the world It is much more like

gvng a ttle to a novel The basic metaphor unctions as a title or acomplex set of events, dening something essental about their nature andfocusng on what is felt to be crucial about their structure This does not



334 Kut r

involve an inferential process bt an analogical projection of meaningCua, 1982, p 25)

More than anything else, it is te recognition of this holistic aspect ofmetaphor or more accurately of metaphorical networks) that has characterized the reversal in the evlation of metaphor in recent times Itused to be believed that metaphr had no place in science because sciencewas limited to giving a literl count of elements of the world Butbefore such a literal account a be undertaken it is rst necessary toagree on the terms of discour d on the kind of domain the account isto be about If it becomes osible to attach specic labels to bits ofprepackaged information abot parts of the world, this is only becausethose parts have already been intied in terms of an overall patternThat such pervasive patterns a often based on a "root metaphor wasrst suggested by Pepper 1942)

A further extension of this vw of the role of metaphor leads to arecognition of those geeatve fctions that I wish to emphasize here Ifthe metaphorical assertion doe t simply claim that there is a similaritybetween two specic subject t rathe bings together two sstemsof implications, then it clearl ntails the likely formation of new connections In this "inteaction iw of metaphor Black, 1962) what isinvolved is not simply a compin of two units which could be reducedto a literal statement but an plication to the one subject of a whole setof implications previously linke with the other subject Once such an

application is made, it "ctes e hearer to select some of the secondarysubjects properties and "ve him to construct a parallel implicationcomplex Black 1979, p 29 have italicized "incites and "invitesin order to draw attention to t generative implications of this view)

Thus, when the human mn is metaphorically characterized as anenergy system or an informatorocessing system a whole complex ofknowledge and belief about eergy systems or informationprocessingsystems is potentially brought to bear on mental events and processes Asthis potential is exploited new rspectives and interpretations are very

likely to emerge Schn 196 ncidentally the interaction between thetwo domains is not unidirectional Thus, once the informationprocessingmetaphor is used, it becomes qite natural to raise questions about thementality of computers In the ce of the physical energy metaphor, thebidirectionality is just as strikin In fact, the interaction was historicallyrecursive Such concepts as "for, "power and in part energy hadstrong psychological connotation before they were metaphorically extended to the physical world

The implications of such a geerative view of metaphor run counter to

a long tradition of naturalism i the historiography o psychology Bynaturalism I mean the approach that proceeds from the assumption thatthose objects, processes, or evens to which our theoretical concepts refer



nrat mtapor and pcologcal dcour 335

have a natural existence before the act of discovery that leads to theirlabeling and their symbolic representation in our theories Naturalism is avariant of what is sometimes referred to as objectivism akoff, 1987)In both naturalism and objectivism there is an assumption that psycholo-gical events have xed natural forms, which a few lucky philosophers andan army of systematic investigators have found and labeled Thus to eachlabel there corresponds a xed natural form Almost inevitably, it turnsout that such xed natural forms correspond to the objects posited by thetheories in which the psychologisthistorian believes Where it is notsimply secondhand repetition, naturalistic history tends to be "justica-tionist Agassi 196) it tends to suggest that the terms of currentdiscourse have been determined by nature and not by art

Clearly, the notion of generative metaphor points in a very differentdirection It suggests that we treat the objects of psychological discoursenot as things that were lying around waiting to be discovered but as theproduct of generative schemata applied across various domains Danzi-ger, 198, 1984) From this point of view the surface of past psychologicaldiscourse does not consist of a series of elements, each of which can bejudged in terms of its literal correspondence with elements that appear incurrently accepted discourse Questions of historical continuity and dis-continity cannot be resolved by comparing elements in psychologicaldiscourse out of context In fact any phenotypical similarities and dis-similarities that emerge from such comparisons are apt to be quite misleading ather, what is needed is the uncovering and analysis of thedifferent kinds of generative schemata that have resulted in various sortsof psychological discourse in the past Such historical investigationsfocusing on the underlying schemata that generate the elements thatappear on the surface of discourse are much more likely to contribute toour understanding of psychological discourse including current discourse

Prbles in he hisrigraphy f psychlgy

My plea for the relevance of generative metaphor to the analysis ofpsychological discourse involves a metaphorical) distinction betweenthe surface and deeper layers of discourse I would now like to considerthe more specic signicance of this distinction for the historiography ofpsychology

The question is How is an account of past psychological discourse tobe structured This question must be faced in a very concrete way by theauthors of history texts and their readers There have to be some prin-ciples of organization that determine the way in which the historicalmaterial is arranged and presented Typically authors will use a frame-work whose organization depends on some combination of chronologyindividuals, and topic All these aspects have farreaching implications



336 Ku Danzgr

but it is the last one that is the t problematic, for how does one determine that two or ten) individual, living several centuries or two millennia) apart and writing in differet languages, are talking about the sametopic The specic terms the se are obviously a poor guide, for themeanings of terms can and indeed do change quite radically over short

periods of time et aone ceties In any case, psychological termsseldom have exact equivalens in different languages Yet one wans to beable to identify those cases in wich a difference of language is just thatand nothing more

Those volumes of historica rdings that present brief extrcts fromvarious writers grouped by topi metimes provide a transparent illustration of this problem There we ay nd pages from a variety of textsassembled under section or chaper headings that refer to such categoriesas intelligence, "motivation personality, associative thinking,

and so on The selected excerpts ae meant to illustrate different points ofview or contributions regarding hese topics But the clear implication ofsuch a scheme is that, while varous authors have had different opinionsabou these topics, each topic uch corresponds to some xed objectiveentity that is identied by the ey term in the title of the selectionAlmost invariably those key ers are taken from the accepted vocabu-lary of twentiethcentury Amercn) psychology and not from the voca-bularies of the authors of the sected pretwentiethcentury texts Theuse of contemporary terms stronly suggests that the objects of current

psychological discourse are the ral, natural objects and that past dis-course necessarily referred t t same objects in its own quaint andsubscientic way What this orgnization of historical material overlooksis the possibiliy tha he very objcs of psychological discourse, and notjust opinions about them, have cnged radically in the course of history

Naturalistic histories often proceed by taking elements of past psycho-logical discourse out of their oiinal context and placing them in thecontext of current discourse It is the latter that supplies the titles bywhich the referents of discour ae identied, the implication being that

those referents are what psychoogical discourse has always been about,even when the language was qite different Of course, in many instancesthis may be correct, especialy hen we restrict ourselves to relativelyrecent times My point is not at the assimilation of past to presentdiscourse is necessarily wron but that it is highly problematic Thedisentangling of the genuine continuities and discontinuities of psycholo-gical discourse is a major task f historical analysis When certain cate-gories are effectively removed rom this analysis because they are notthought to be theoretical caegories but simply the names of natural

objects, the result is likely to be an articially imposed continuity thatdistorts historical realities At let one historian Smith, 1988) has beensufciently surprised by the strge continuities assumed by psychologists



nratv mtapor and pcologcal dcour 337

to ask whether the history of psychology can be said to have a subect atall and to give an essentially negative answer or the premodern period

The fundamental distinction to be respected here is that between thesymbolc obects tht pper n psychologcl dscourse nd whtever t s

outside this discourse that these symbols in some way signify Psychologcl concepts le "ntellgence or wll est s such only on the levelof discourse The question of whether they refer to anything outside thisdiscourse is a perectly legitimate one, but it is not one to be prejudgedand not one that should be confused with their analysis as discursiveobecs When we sudy any kind o ex, incuding modern researchreports, the only objects we encounter are symbolic objects, and it is assuch that we have to treat them

Clearly, then, there are two kinds of question that we can raise about

discursive obects One concerns their relationship to some reality outsideof discourse; the other involves their relationship to other discursiveobects In most cases the second question is logically prior to the rst,for in order to make any udgments about the extradiscursive reference ofanything that appears in discourse, we have to compare it with otherinformation we have about that reference But that information isgenerally available to us only in the form given to it by other discur-sive categories So questions of reference cannot generally be decidedrationally without the establishment of some kind of identity relationshipbetween a number of discursive obects In other words we have to besure that A and B are talking about the same thing X before we can useAs statement about X to correct falsify or reinforce Bs statement aboutX In many practical situations, within a short time span this may notraise many problems, but in the context of historical analysis it becomesthe maor problem

Thus, before makin assumptions about what a particular discursiveobect refers to, we ouht to be clear about what exactly it is But we candiscover what it is only by examining its discursive context, its relationship to other symbolic objects For instance, if a particular writeridenties intelligence with mental energy, that immediately provides uswith an important clue about what sort of symbolic obect his concept ofintelligence is Now, the identifying relationships that occur in psycholo-gical discourse are of two kinds: There are explicit literal denitions, andthere are relationships of metaphorical analogy On the whole, the lattertend to be more pervasive than the former Therefore, the historicalstudy of psychological discourse cannot afford to neglect the analysis ofmetaphorical relationships If one is to avoid misidentifying the concep-tual objects with which this discourse presents us, an understanding oany relevant metaphorical relationships seems to be indispensable

Whereas discursive relationships of literal identity are generally quiteexplicit, those of metaphorical analogy are often more deeply hidden



38 Ku Danzgr

There are a variety of reasons wh this should be so In the modern periodthe auhors of discourse are sometimes embarrassed by their reliance onmetaphor Because metaphors ae not supposed to have a place in scien-tic discourse they take care o bury their metaphors where they are lesslikely to arouse critcal attentin But more often the metaphorical nature

of many discursive relationships rmains hdden and without an identify-ing label because they are takn to be selfevident or natural by theauthors of discourse When thoe hdden metaphors are similarly takenfor granted by later students f such discourse, they tend to remainunrecognized and to function as nquestioned natural truths

Metaphors may also remain hdden because they are not explicitlyexpressed in any single element f discourse, though they underlie thediscourse as a whole Thus, in erain instances an author may not informus in so many words that he o he is usng a mechancal metaphor, yet

we are able to conclude with god reason that such a metaphor providesone of the conditions for the coistency and coherence of the dscourseas a whole In hese cases wha appears on he suface are he implicatons and consequences of a bas metaphor that itself is never summedup in so many words

Confusion about identifying e appropriate categores of past dis-course generally arises from two omewhat related sources of distortionThe one nvolves a failure to g beyond the surface of discourse to ananalyss o its underlyng cognite schemata This results n a kind o

conceptual looseness that actull blocks any real analysis of the topicThus a term lke association f ideas may come to refer to the generalcondtions of coherent thought r to any nuence of experience oncogniton In this situation an anyss o the metaphors used by dferentwriters when treatng such topic can help to bring some precison to anotherwise nebulous topc

Another source of dstortion in identifying the categories of hisoricaldiscourse derives from the naturlistc attitude that have already ds-cussed When one starts wth t assumption that the natural facts arenow known and that ones current discourse correctly represents thosefacts, it becomes fatally easy to see all kinds of references to the samenatural facts in past dscours r example, if one accepts a term like"associatve thnkng, not a element in a partcular kind of ds-course, but as a label for a nural phenomenon whose exstence isindubtable, then it is no longer necessary or an author to use the termfor its meaning to be imputed to m On this basis there is no limit to theanticpations of current discoure that hstory can ofer to the undiscri-minating reader Sometimes ths ind of approach serves the function ofdiminishng later developments ut more often t is used to legtimate

current perspectves, which can hen be seen as representng the realruh hat earlier wriers were trining to reach



nraiv mapor and pcological dicour 9

The hisry f asscainis and he eaphrf aggregain

To illustrate these rather general observations I would like to turn to the

history of associationism, a topic that can boast of a more extensiveliterature than most other topics in the historiography of psychology Iwill not provide a comprehensive review of this literature but will merelyouch on crain asps ha a lan n h prsnt cone

n particular, want to point to certin diculties that arise when onetries to decide what propery belongs to the topic of associationism andwhat does not Plainly the doctrines of David Hartley David HumeJames Mill John Stuart Mill and ain must be included ut what ofJohn ocke (100/1959), who only mentions the association of ideas as an

afterthought in the fourth edition of his maor work, and then only as away of accounting for mental connections tha are not natural? Or Tho-mas rown (1820) whose reection of the term "association is not ust amatter of erminology, as is sometimes suggested but the product ofextensive critical analysis of fundamental issues? y what criteria wouldone decide whether the doctrnes of ocke and of rown are really tobe grouped with those of the associationists? Presumably, one wouldneed to identify some fundamental similarity that can be discerned belowthe surface of their writings ut what is the nature of this similarity?

The problem gets worse when we tun to other writers who do not evenmention the assocation o ideas Hobbes and erkeley are the mostobvious cases but once it is no longer necessary to talk about associa-tions in order to be included under the rubric of associationism, there isvirtually no limit to what the historical imagination can accomplisheibniz and Spinoza have been enrolled in this club (Rapaport 194), ashas Aristotle the biggest catch of all

The eighteenthcentury founders of modern associationism were clearlyaware of the novelty of their intellectual construction and did not referto any predecessors ut as the "association of ideas became a com-

mon element in the discourse of ritish empiricism it was increasinglyaccepted as a natural fact even by those who did not regard it as the soleprinciple of mental organization This eventually led to a new reading ofsome very old texts that could now be interpreted as anticipations ofcurrently accepted beliefs about the nature of the human mind

Typical of this kind of historiography is the awarding of good and badmarks to past authors using current beliefs as crieria of truth In hisaccount of Memory and Reminiscence Aristotle displays an acute andpenetrating intelligence of the great principles of the Association of

deas"2 Unfortunately the key passage on which this praise is basedoccurs in Aristotles treatment of reminiscence or recollection whichhe distingushes quite fundamentally from memory Consequently his



40 Kr Dangr

nineteenthcentury interpreter preeds to ap him over the knuckles forthe "exaggerated promnence ta e has gven to the distinction betweenthe two snce this "tends to prlex hs descrption of the associatveprocess (rote 1880/19 p 4) y the tme this partcular originmyth (Samelson 194) enter t hsorcal canon of wentehcenury

psychology such subtleties ha een lost and Arstotles comments onrecolecton are simply categori with those of such authors as HumeHartley and Mill as dealing i the "assocate nature of memory(see eg Herrnsten & orng 965) Past discourse s no longer per-mtted to speak in its own ters but is forced nto categories of contem-porary psychology that are qute alien to it

Such an approach mplies of urse that nothing essentally new canever emerge from the study of st dscourse What is actually accom-plished here s the reinforcemet f an uncritical and unreective accept-

ance of currently popular conet that are confused wth the order ofnature Approached in this wa t study of past psychological discoursebecomes a ather trival activy ttally subservent to the prejudices ofthe present Once we stop autically identifyng the objects of pastdiscoure wth he objecs of o scourse however t becomes possbefor comparatve historcal stude t throw some light by way of contraston the caegores of our own tiing, which we are too apt to take forgranted There s an obvious aalogy here with crossculturl studieswhich as is well known often e to sharpen ones perspectve on ones

own cultureIt is in the context of suc cmparative historcal studies that ananalysis of metaphor can be particlarly illuminating One way of takingpast discourse seriously and acually alowing t to speak to us on its ownterms s to pay careful attentio its metaphors Its metaphors identifythe kinds of obects it s speaking about and the better we understand tsmetaphors the clearer we will out the essental nature of its objects

For instance following our ample of the assocaton of deas leus juxtapose what are probably te two most famous statements often

grouped under ths topc:These are therefore the priiles of unon or coheson among oursimple deas and n the magation supply he place of tha in-separable connexion by whih they are united n our memory Hereis a kind of Attaction whc n the mental world will be found tohave as extraordinary eect a n the natural and to shew tself inas many and as vared form errnsten & orng, 1965 p 48)

Wheneve therefore we ar rolecting we are experencng cer-tan of the antecedent movemets until nally we experence theone afer whch customarly cos hat whch we seek This explanswhy we hunt up the series aig started n thought either from a



nrativ mtapor and pcologcal dcour 41

present intuition or some other or from something either similar orcontrary to what we seek or else from that which is contiguouswith it (Herrnstein & oring 1965 p 28)

The rst statement is Humes the second Aristotles oth accountsare strikingly metaphorical ut the contrast between their metaphors isprofound Aristotles metaphor is that of the thinker as hunter Humesmetaphor is based on an analogy between mental assoiation and theattraction of physical bodies Aristotles account is completely agentic itis we who "hunt and seek while Humes account deals in impersonalforces of nature Now if we take the socalled laws of association forwhat they are namely discursive rather than natural obects it is clearthat they are a product of Humean but not of Aristotelian discourse

Although the notion of laws of association is even more recent thanHumes own writngs ts meanng depends entirely on the presupposi-ions expressed in Hme s analoy beween he elements of the physicalworld and the elements of the mental world The metapo of associationhad to be constructed before the condtons of association could becomean obect of naturalistic investigation In other words the notion of "awsof association as analogous to "laws of nature is generated by a priormetaphorical identication of mental organization with physical elementsand the forces of (gravitational) attraction they exert on one another

y contrast "laws of association did not and could not become anobect for Aristotelian discourse because the basic metaphorical frame-work that gives meaning to such a notion was absent nstead we get acompletely different metaphorical framework that generates another setof discursive obects altogether Underlying the naturalistic assumptionthat Aristotles mention of similarity or contiguity (in the crucial passageust quoted) ultimately must refer to the same thing as nineteenthcenturylaws of association is a primitive obectivist epistemology according towhich the basis of human discourse consists of neutral labels attached

to preformed natural elements The implication is that such terms ascontiguity or "similarity form part of a theoryneutral "observationlanguage on which vaious theories are subsequently superimposedHowever if we do not accept the aiomatic truth of this vew and alowpast psychological discourse to speak to us on its own terms what we ndare elements that change their meaning and sgnicance as the generativemetaphors in which they are embedded change Thus if the history ofpsychology is to do more than provide a ustication for currently popularbeliefs and categories it will have to concern itself much more seriously

with the analysis of basic cognitive schemata metaphorical and other-wise and with the factors involved in the change of such schemata

or eample further analysis of Humes analogy between mental asso-ciation and physical attraction shows that it entails a highly distinctive



42 Kr anzigr

model of psychological events Tlk about mental association as a quasi-ewtonian force is based on th assumption that the mental world isdivsible ino simple elemens ta are analogous o the ultmae cor-puscular constituents of the Neonian universe Humes analogy be-tween mental and physical forc of attraction is an expression of adeeper, truly metaphorical identcation of the structure of the mentalworld with the structure of a pcc physical model The essential fea-tures of this structure depend c•n the assumption that it functions asthough it were composed of irecible elements that retain their indi-vidual identity when they cohr to form compounds The compoundscan then be regarded as aggregas of such elements and the relationsamong these elements are seen as external in the sense that the identity ofthe elements does not depend o he relations among them

Although Hume does not emy this model with pefect consistency

it is quite pervasive in his traent of psychological phenomena andleads to some very characteristic reults The best known and most radicalof these is of course, his reducio of the self to a collection of specicimprssions n othr words t ssociation o idas in the case of thisauthor is not some limited thry of specic application to the phe-nomena of memory Rather, it i particularly direct expression of a verygeneral structural schema or mdel that he considers applicable to allpsychological phenomena Hum analogy between mental associationand forces of physical attraction no only suggests that mental phenomena

are explicable by laws that are analogous to the laws of Newtoniannatural philosophy it also imples that the mind and the Newtoniancosmos have analogous structure

The relevant feature commo o these structures is the particular typeo partwhole relationship to whic I have already alluded It is charac-trized and constituted by the maphor of aggregation, which operatesas a master model prescribing e ormal characteristics o a vas rangeof phenomena When this metapr predominates, it predetermines thestructure that obects have whn tey appear in psychological discourse

Whether the discourse deals with phenomena of memory perceptionmotivation or the self its obet are presented as though they werecompounded of elements whos i<ntity is independent of the compoundRather than functioning as a thory that could be tested against phe-nomena, the metaphor o aggrgaton serves as a blueprint that predeter-mines the presentation of the pnomena themselves In this sense itgenerates the obects that exelify it Obviously the metaphor ofaggregation involves not a singl metaphorical equation but an extendednetwork of metaphorical relationips among a wide range of domains

As was indicated in the introduory section of this chapter it is theexistence of this kind of netwok at makes the analysis of metaphorical



nrav mapor and pcoogca dcour 343

relatonshps an mportant ad n th understandng of the presuppostonsof psychologcal dscourse

The mportanc of th metaphor of aggregaton s sgncantly n-creased by the fact tat t was not by any mean the pvate property ofa sngle author evn though that author be Davd Hume but was acommon basc feature of the psychologcal dscourse of mature phlo-sophcal emprcsm Hartleys (149/196 assocatonsm was based on tas was the dscourse of nneteenthcentury assocatonsm When thephlosophy of mprcsm swtchd from takng sensatons and deas as tsunts to takng organsmenvronment (e stmulusresponse unts asbasc the mtaphor o aggregaton dd not dsappear On the contrary tbecame rmly embedded n that verson of expermental methodologywhch assumed and stll assumes that the structure of ndvdualenvronment relatonshps s a compound of elements whose dentty and

relaton to one another s unaffected by the structure as a whole and therplace n t

In the present context t s not possble to do more than hnt at themportance of the metaphor of aggregaton for modern psychology Thefocus here s on the uses of metaphor and reference to the metaphorof aggregaton s ntended merely to supply an example o one of theextended metaphors that have helped to shape modern psychologcaldscourse Such extended metaphors nvolve an mplct or submergedmodel of wde generalty and f one prefers one can refer to them as

archetypes rather than metaphors as lack (1962) suggests The pontsto recognze are that metaphorcal relatonshps may not be delberatelymposed but may reman mplct and that the relatonshp may lnk notjust two domans but a whole seres of domans In other words, varousdomans may exhbt a certan dentable homology of structure and thshomoloy would then consttute a maor condton for the coherence ofthe dscourse that contans these domans When ths occurs, t s asthough the dfferent sectors the dscourse reect the same form, eachn ts own way, but the form tself never emerges except through the

medum of these reected mages Insde ths hall of mrrors each magemay be felt to conrm the others (Harrell, 1982, p 229) Ths sense ofconrmaton may be partcularly strong when the reected mages areexperenced as extended backward n tme as n the naturalstc hs-torography I have crtczed above It may be even stronger when thestrctre s embedded n one's research practces whose prodcts are thenexperenced as featres of the world (Danzger 1985 see also adln &Ingle 195)

In any case, t s clear that root metaphors or archetypes are theory-

constttve They predene certan general featres that are replcated nspecc theores developed n varos domans Ths the theory of the



44 Kur anzgr

association of ideas was based n e metaphor of aggregation, thogh itwas not the only form in which ti metaphor fond expression Wherethis metaphor is absent, one cannt legitimately speak of an associationis-tic theory At the same time, o nnot eqate the overt theory with thepresupposed form that it express Classical associationism came close to

being a pure representation of t underlying metaphor of aggregationand yet it was not identical with it or historically, archetypes (in lack'ssense) have a lfe of their own ta sually extends beyond he life of anyof their specic theoretical expressions Thus, the metaphor of aggrega-tion survived the historical demi of classical associationism Specicscientic theories may be put in eopardy by empirical evidence, butunderlying images of the natur o the world owe their life and death tofactors of an altogether differen der

The example of associationis d the metaphor of aggregation illus-

trate how an analysis of underlin metaphorical schemata can provide aguide to genuine historical coninties and discontinuities Without thislevel of analysis one runs the r of ending up either with false con-tinuities that amount to the consuction of origin myths or with falsediscontinuities that break up in iolatd onibions wha is in fa acontinuous discourse extended though time

The uliple referen.� f exended eaphrs

It is time to take the crticism f naturalism in the historiography ofpsychology one step further p t this point I have limited myself toquestioning the approprateness o pplying specc modern psychologicalcategories to discourse that is qte alien to them owever, I havecontinued to use the term psyhlgical discourse itself as though thiswere an unproblematic catego tat could be applied in an abstract,ahistorical way Of course, if I rall believed this I would be guilty of agross form of that very naturali have been criticizing, for the notionof psychology as a separate subt matter, with its own quite distinctiveconcepts and categories, is surly very recent one (Smith, 988) Theclear demarcation between psycogical discourse and equally demar-cated dscourses tha are philosical, physiological, socological, biolo-gical, and so on, is very largel a phenomenon that accompanies theinstitutional separation of these dicplnes in histoically recent times Toimagine that current conventios bout dividing up university depart-ments (and even subdepatment) re a reection of the eternal naturaldivisions of the world virtually rsents a educto ad absudum of thenaturalistic attitude to intellectua istory I must therefore be explicitabout the fact that my refrenc psychological discourse is merely a

shorthand notation resorted to s a matter of expository convenienceSome of the problems of his ntn must now be unpacked



nratv mtapor and pcologcal dcour

n our own day we take or granted the exstence of dscplinarylanguages that dene their own obects in whatever ways are convenientto the various disciplinary language communities Such languags, at leaston the surface are purely technical languages that are part of the con-stantly proliferating division of scientic labor We do not expect theterms of such languages to have any intrinsic reference to obects otherthan those tha are conventionally claimed by the discipline using thelanguage Thus, we expect psychological dscourse to refer to psycholo-gical obects, sociological discourse to eer to ociological obect , and soon However, we also know very well that realworld relationships do notrespect disciplinary boundaries In this situaton relationships that runcounter to the way our disciplines have divided up the world have to beconceived in terms of the action of various kinds of disciplinary obects oneach other Thus we think in terms of the reciprocal o unidirectional

inuence of psychological, sociological and physiological factors Whatis not a regular part of a particular disciplinary or subdisciplinary dis-course enters it in the form of extea obects tha act together with oract on, the disciplinary obects but do not dene their identity

Though this may be the best way to proceed under present circum-stances, we have to be careful about proecting our own discplinarydivisions backward in time The boundaries o twentiethcentury psycho-logial discourse are twentiethcentury boundaries f we impose them onpast discourse, we run the risk of confusing the reference of our own

terms with the reference of analogous terms n a discourse that is not ourown or instance, the mixture of psychological and "physiologicalreferences in the works of Aristotle leads to insoluble problems of inter-pretation unless we keep in mind that Aristotle does not divde up theworld at the same points (see note 5) and that our postCartesiandistinction between psychological and physiological discourse is notoperative in this case

ut the same strictures apply to the interpretation of psychologicaldiscourse that is more direcly linked with our own for instance he

discourse of eighteenthcentury empiricism The reason historians ofpsychology have a legitimate interest in this discourse is that so manyof the fundamental categories of subsequent psychoogica discourseoriginate there Such caegories as sensation, association motivation, andstimulation began o be used in a recognizably modern way in e eigh-een century, and a sudy of heir origins can throw considerable ighon e way in wic modern psycholoical discourse as ome o organizes world u is sould no lea one o assume ha suc caegoriesimmediately take on the restricted technical reference they have for us

That restriction was the result of a fairly lengthy historical processOriinally these categories were not part of the discourse of a segregateddiscipline of sychology, but were embedded in a much more general



46 Kurt angr

discourse on human nature Ths included much of what was later to beidenied as he specic concer f elds like moral and poliical phloso-phy political economy and uliately sociology and economics as wellas psychology per se The proces y which our modern disciplines wereformed was a process of histricl differentiation of older and more

encompassing forms of discoure n this process the specic obects ofpsychology economics and so o emerged though the element of continuity with the parent discour ould not be overlooked7

This early embedding of wht o us are psychological categories indiscourse that is not specically sychological has one very importantconsequence The realworld reatonships which in current specializeddiscourse are represented in em f he inuence or coacion of variousdisciplinedened factors tha e external to one another often appearin oldr less differentiated discuse as metaphorical relationships among

its obects The early history associationism once more provides uswith a signicant illustration of hat is involved here The classicalassocitionists without xcepti eveloped their psychological theoriesin the context f a discourse th as irected primarily by social, moraland politica concerns8 Nowhe s his more apparent han in he maorwork of David Hartley (149/196 the most systematic and most scien-tic of the early associationist ly by the most drastic surgery was itever possble to represent Hare ' work as hat of some sort of precur-sor of a later valuefree phsilogical psychology However modern

scholarship has redressed the baance here and allowed us to see themoral context of his psychologial ideas (Oberg 196 Verhave 19).ut the situation is no differen i the case of David Hume whose veryimportant conceptualization of chologica processes remains complete-ly in the service of concerns th e not intrinsicaly psychological. Thatthe transformation of the coce of the association of deas into ageneral principle of mental funtiing was motivated by the demands ofempiricist moral philosophy emrs equally clearly in the contributionsof less well known wers of hi period (see ay 11/1969 ong14/1969)

As is well known the crucia pschological contibution of this groupof authors was the transformatio of the concept of association from aprinciple that was invoked to exlin unnatural reactions to one thatbecame the foundation for a genal psychology that sought to explain allof mental life What was behind is transformation? Clearly what hadbegun as a model o how ceran ychological resuls might come aboutwas being changed into a modl f the structure o the mind as suchoth Hume (19/1911) and ley (149/196) were aware of thehomology of this model with th structure of he Newtonian physical

universe ut there was another hology involved here that had alreadybecome incorporated into the langge of association In Warren's (1921)



nratv mtapor and pcologcal dcour 4

standard history of associationism there is a remarkable passage in whichhe observes that the social contract theory led to views regardingsociety which were quite favorable to the association psychology Thesocial theory and the psychological theory, he notes have a similar"world view More specically

according o he social contract vew, socey s an artcal nonof human elements And according to the earlier association theory the assoiation of experienes s athe a mechancal econstuc-tion of elements nto omewhat more intricate and complicatedforms Thus the two theories harmonized with each other andtogether constituted a tendency of thought during ths period (p162)

Had Warren pursued the matter he might have discovered that theoriginal psychological application of the term association did not con-sttute an arbitrary choice of a neutral term Rather it represented atransfer of meaning from the social to the psychological level This isdocumented in therst edition of Chambers's (178) Cycopaeda whichnotes the derivation of associate from the atin socus a fellow or"companion and then denes association as the Act of associating orforming a Society or Company Association is a Contract or Treaty ofPartership (p 161) After dening this primary meaning, it goes on to

discuss the assocation of ideas, which was then a rather novel conceptMore detailed documentation of the earlier, purely social meaning ofassociation is provided by modern sources It seems likely that in therst half of the eighteenth century when the purely psychological use ofassociation was not yet something to be taken for granted the socialconnotations of the term were inescapable

Thus, it would appear that the introduction and popularization of theterm association of ideas involved a metaphorical transfer of meaningfrom the social to the psychological level Just as societies were con-sdered to be formed by the combination of separate and independentpersons so individual minds could be thought of as formed by theassociation of separate mental elements At rst the psychological ap-plication of the metaphor of association was limited, but fairly soon therewas a recognition of the potential explanatory value to be derived fromthe extension of a model that had demonstrated its power in the socialsphere to the essential functioning of the mind as a whole What classicalassociationism accomplished was the establishment of a metaphoricalhomology among three levels of discourse dealing respectively with thestructure of society the structure of the physical world and the structureof the human mind It was not just a technical psychological theory butimplied an entire cosmology

The cosmology itself was not the invention of the classical association



348 Kt anzgr

ists nor did they initiate the eaphorical extension of its archetypcalschema to dierent kinds of discose On the level of social theory themodel of society as a combinti of individuals individuals whoseessential attribues are independe of the social system whose elementsthey are was already prominent i the work of Thomas Hobbes (1651/

1958 see Macpherson 1962) bsequently we meet an analogousmodel applied to the physical wrld in Newtonian natural philosophyThis philosophy as reudenthl (1986) has shown is based on thepresupposition that the syste the world is composed of particleswhose essential properties are attrutable to them independently of theirexistence in this system (p 167 . On the basis of his comparison be-tween the Newtonian system an the rival system of eibniz reudenthalconcludes that there was an intmte link between the presuppositions ofnatural and political philosophy he time rom the textual evidence it

appears to me that this link wa rginally based on analogcal extensionrather than on logical inferen. gains this background the classicalassociationists can be regarded s aving systematically exended to hemental level an analogy that alr existed between the system of natureand he social systm. Th lin eween an individualisti soial heoyand an elementaristic model of h ndividual mind prove to be extreme-ly stable (Unger 1975)

The culual eeddedness f eaphs

The historical background of h taphor of aggregaion throws ligh ona more general issue namely the sciocultural embeddedness of psycho-logical theory. Part of that emeedness involves certain fundamentalassumptions about the nature of the objects with which psychology isconcerned Where these objects r construed in terms of metaphoricalhomologies between the social oer and the psychological order, theshape of the latter may come t e governed by the constraints imposedby the former In other words t structure of psychological objects isassumed to be such as to articult with he structure of a cerain kind ofsocial order Thus to revert to t previous example an individualisticimage of society as an aggregate o lements whose separate identities donot depend on the whole may b tructurally duplicaed on the level ofindividual minds

This kind of symbolic dupliton has been documented for culturesthat are remote from our own ut there is no good reason to exemptcultures closer to our own from t process or instance, the anthropo-logist Mary Douglas (1973) has pined out that there are pressures ocreate consonance between th rception of social and physiologicalleves of experience This ma that culturally the human body isgenerally treated as an imag of society (p 98) Socal boundaries,



nrativ mtapor and pcological dicor 349

social hierarchies and processes of social control tend to hve theirphysiological counterpars But if this kind of homology often obtainsbetween social and physiologial symbols i is no really surprising to ndthat it also links social and psychological symbols What happens here is akind of mutual or reciprocal conrmation of the symbolic structure asincorporated in different levels of discourse The structure of the body, orthe mind conrms the consonant structure of the social order and viceversa In this way some of the basic categories of psychology can be seenas being part of a culurally based cosmology The srucure of such acosmology would be dened by a set of metaphorical relationships oper-ating among various levels of discouse It may well be that the sense ofabsolut oniction hat gnerally haracterizes belif in such a cosmologyderives from the fac ha once inside the hall of mirrors the same basicstructure of the world seems to be reconrmed over and over againwherever one looks

At this point it is appropriate to note that the effectiveness of arche-typical metaphorical constructions depends quite crucially on their un-intentional and takenforgranted nature In this way they are verydifferent from novel literary meaphors that are intenionally invented bypecic individua for relatively shortterm uairhetorical purpoes Bycontrast, the origin of root metaphors cannot be traced to any singleauthor they are effectively collective representations Their life typi-cally extends over long periods and rather than being deliberately in-

vented the recognition o their metaphorica nature woud probabydestroy their effectiveness Associationistic psychology, for example,could play a serious role either as psychological theory or as a buttressfor certain sociopolitical doctrines only so long as it was taken literallyThe recognition of its metaphorical kernel would have destroyed itscredibility in boh areas. To use a familiar analogy the case is similar tothat of repression This too is a process that can do its work effectivelyonly so long as there s no awareness that i is occurring

In the history of modern psychology one device in particular has tended

o hide and to obscure the sociocultural basis of theoretical models Thisinvolves the very common preoccupation with mechanical metaphorsrom the hydraulically operated automata of Descartes and the mech-anical clocks of the eighteenth century (McReynolds 1980) to the compu-ters of our own day, a succession of human artifacts has been appealed toas a source of psychologically relevant metaphors It is these artifactsrather han the social order that produced and utilized them that haveseemed to inspire some of the best known psychological metaphors of thepast three centuries But here one has to be careful to avoid the familiar

naturaliic error hat we have already had occaion t criticize Certainlyone needs to understand on their own terms the mechanical metaphorsthat the history of psychology offers in such abundance But one must



3 Krt anzigr

also go beyond this for the macinelike devices involved here are notsimply found in nature they do nt stand on their own but are completelyembedded in human social practi. Not only do mechanical clocks andelectronic computers incorporate crtain abstract design principles; theyare also social artifacts and as suc they incorporate signicant features

of the social practices that prou and utilize themClocks steam engnes railwy hydaulic systems telephone ex-changes computers and so on en they have been used as sources ofpsychological metaphors have no een thought of as inert hardware butas functioning systems As functiong systems they necessarily take heirplace within a certain social oraiation. Many kinds of society had andhave no use for one or more of the devices and if they adopt them theyhave to make the correspondn changes in their social organizationThus as functioning systems the artifacts are also social elements that

reect certain social priorities nd above all, a cerain organization ofsocial activitySo when the unctionng o suc rtacts is taken as prototypcal for the

functioning of aspects of the hun mind or human behavior this sug-gests among other things that a rtain way of organizing social life is inaccordance with human natur Nw in a relative historical sense thismust be true or the organizatio in which the artifacts are embeddedwould not be viable What is milading is the ahistorical nature of theclam that s mplied Perhaps f e remember the essentially metaphor-

ical nature ofa

artifactual nlgies in psychology we will be lessinclined to apply inappropriate stdards of universal literal truth to themakoff 1987 pp 1834) An perhaps if we remember the socialnature of all artifacts we will be ble to detect the limited historical truththey represent without turning tm into fetishes from which we expectthe nal revelation about ourselve.

In order to prepare the way or sch an approach one crucial extensionof our perspective on metaphor i necessary I have been using a mirroranalogy in order to convey cerai aspects of metaphorical networks. Butit is time for those mirrors to be roken or else they will mislead us. Thetrouble with the mirror analog i hat it suggests a merely contemplativerelationship to the world and ht, of course is not how thngs are Theinvolvement of people in the vaios orders of reality that they represento hemselves is no jus conelaive bu pracical and active So heirrepresentations are not simply idl fancies but express particular concernsand goals A metaphorical depicion of a paricular subjec mater isnecessarly a partial depicton d of course ths s true whether t isconscious or unconscious Ou f the innity of possible ways of con-struing the subject matter, one i picked out and given a privileged status

But which one is chosen depes on the preoccupations and specialinterests of those to whom the taphor appeals





352 Kur Danzigr

constellations of activities, whch e called forms of life (p. 23). Thelatter are not intellectual abtrtions but practical ctualities thatdepend on sociocultural forms. tehen Toulmin (1969) has extended thisline of analyss to suggest that t explanation of human actions involvesplacing them in the context f frms of life whose signicance goeswithout saying. One consequenc of ths nsight s that descriptons ofpsychological characteristics shl not be taken to refer o distinct en-tities and processes that inhab t ndivdual . Rather as Toulmn notes,they rect our lerniv s of characterizing n agn, whn wlook at hm from different stnoints and wth different questons inmind (p. 96).

Metaphoricl denitions of syhological subect mattr do not owtheir importance to the fc ht they may on occasion have privatecognitiveheuristic funcions (�s 1980 p. 116). They become histori-

cally signicant as a constitu of a public discourse that facilitatescollective epistemic access (Bod 1979) to aspects of life hat are experi-enced as problemaic. In this uncion they are most effective when theyescbe he oblemac eaus ems o a amewok ha sgrounded in understandings th e accepted without question within thecommunity. But what is accepted without queston changes culturally andalso historically a reection tha eads one to appreciate the dangers ofmisplaced arroganc with rst to currenly fashionable explanatorymetaphors.

Ns

he hisorography of associaioim makes a fascinaing case sudy of hearious ways in whch he bales f he presen ae fough on he soil of hepas Ionically was he oppnens o he mechanica phlosophy ofHarley and Hume who rs ineed an ancen pedigree for assocaionismhe purpose being o discredi he new approach by showing ha Arisole andohes had gien a much beer acn of he key phenomena In Brain his

argumen begins wih Colerdge ( 817) Alhough Coleridge's fancful scholarship was an easy arge (Burn 1846 Hamilon 1846/1967 Mackinosh1830) he idea of a pedgee beg o appeal o hose who egarded he lawsof associaion as obious naurl fcs ha mus hae been noiced by wisemen of old Howeer his mea ha each ersion of nineeenhcenuryassociaionism inerpreed he ancien exs in is own image Compare forinsance Hamilons (1846/196 Arisole wih Groe's (1880/1973)

2 On he signicance of he awardi of marks by hisoians see Agassi (1963)and Young (1966) he exampes uoed here are fom a work by Goe hawas poshumously edied by his se associae Alexande Bain and by G

Coom Roberson Par of Groe' 1880/1973) work on Arisole was originally nended o form an appendx o he hid edion of Bain's The Senses andthe Inteect (1855/1872) In gener Goe waned o show ha wha Arisole



nrativ taphor and pychological dicor 33

anicipaed was no Scoish philosophy as Hamilon had claimed bu somehing closer o he associaionisic psychology of his friend Bain In spie of isdubious aure he hisorical game of anicipaions coninues o aracboh players and fans

he passage from Arisole is he one from which he cional accoun of hisanicipaion of he laws of associaion akes off I occurs in one of heminor works radiionally grouped ogeher as he Parva naturaa no in Deanma As seeral commenaors (eg Ross 190/1973 pp 20 2) haenoed ne ld ell nerre e n Pl' Phad hi w Ie uoed e eae nsan ise's semen a s sed byHerrnein nd Boring (195). he sraighorward hun is he usul nglihrendering hough he He ranslaion used by Diamond (1974) has followhe rail (p 251) which hardly affecs he naure of he meaphor

4 Of course Hume drops ino more agenic language a imes bu his does noaec e conras beween differen discusie obecs a is beng illsraed

here. On Hume's menal mechanism see Lowry (1971 chap 2)5 See Sorabi (1979) on he fuiliy of rying o force Arisole ino he caegories

of posCaresian philosophy: He does no diide up he world a he samepons (p 50)

6 Conemporary criicism of conenional experimenal social psychology ofenakes he form of uesioning he appropriaeness of he meaphor of aggregaion Harr and Secord's (1972) being he already classical saemen of hisriicism Hower he oeraion of he meaphor of aggregaion i nolimed o his area bu is likely o be manifes whenee an essenially addiieiew of psychological relaionships preails

he emergence of specically economic caegories ou of he older discourse,which did no clearly difereniae beween hem and moral poliical andpsychological caegories, has been raced in a paricularly insighful way byDumon (1977)

his was, of course eually rue of heir nonassociaionis conemporaries andimmediae pedecessors On he moral basis of he psychological speculaionof his period see Leary (1980)

9 his inoled physically o cogniiely excising he enie second olme of hswoolume work and a good par of he rs olume as well

For example he Oxford Engsh Dctonary noes such uses as union in

companionship on erms of social eualiy" (10) and a body of personswho hae combined o execue a common purpose or adance a commoncause (159)

I should be noed ha here are a leas wo inuenial heoeical radiionsha sress he primacy of social relaions in he consrucion of such cosmologies One of hese deries fom Max he ohe fom Dukheim For a radialdeelopmen of he laer applied o scienic conceps, see Bloor (197)his issue is much oo complex o be pursued here.

2 o aoid misundersanding I should pehaps sae explicily ha I am nosuggesing ha e operaion of roo meaphos leay depends on e

psychological process of repression Wha is possible and may epay furherinesigaion is ha boh phenomena are insances of a boader as yeunnamed caegory of psychological processes whose dening feaure is haheir effecieness depends on heir emaining inaccessble o meacogniion



34 Kur ger

RfncsAgassi, J (1963) owards an hisoriography of science History and Theory

Beihef 2Bain, A (1872) The senses and th inteect (3rd ed) New York Appleon

(Oiginal work published 185)(1873) Mind and body: The thoe of their reation New York Appleon

Berggren D (1963) he use and abe of meaphor II eview of Metaphysics16 45072

Blak M (1962) Modes and mears Ihaa NY Conell Uniersiy Pess(1979) More abou meaphor In Orony (d.) Metaphor and thought

(pp 1943) Cambridge Unieiy PressBloor, D (1976) Knowedge and oca imagery London Rouledge & Kegan

PaulBoyd, R (1979) Meaphor and hor change Wha is meaphor a meaphor

for In A Orony (d) Mear and thought (pp 356408) CambridgeUniersiy Press

Brown (1820) Lectures on e hiosophy of the human mind (ol 1)dinburgh ai

Burke, K (1966) Language as oic acton Berkeey and os AngeesUniersiy of Califoia Pess

Buron J H (1846) Le and corrodence of David Hume (ol. 1 pp. 2868)Edinburgh ai

Carpener W B (1850) On he muul elaions of he ial and physical forcesPhiosophica Transactions 1 72757

Chambes E (1728) Cycopaedia Or an universa dictionary of arts and sciences(ol 1) London Knapon

Coleridge S (1817) Biographia eraria London FennerCa A S (1982) Basic meaphos and he emegence of roo meaphos

Joua of Mind and Behavio 3 2518Danziger, K (1983) Origins of h chema of simulaed moion owards a

prehisory of modern psycholy History of Science 21 182210(1984) owards a concepual frameork for a criical hisory of psychology In

H Carpinero & J M Pei ds Psychoogy in its historica context:Essays in honour of Prof Jos roek (pp 99 107) Valencia Monografasde a Resa de Hsora de a cologa

(1985) he mehodologial impere in psychology Phosophy of the SociaSciences 15 113

Diamond S (Ed) (1974) The t> f psychoogy: sourcebook in the histoof ideas New York Basic Bs

Douglas M (1973) Natura symb Harmondsworh Penguin BooksDumon L (1977) rom Manve to Marx The genesis and triumph of

economic ideoogy Chcago iersiy of Chicago PressFreudenhal G (1986) tom and iividua in the age of Newton Dordrech

RedelGadlin H & Ingle G (1975) hough he oneway mirror he lmis of

experimenal selfreecion mican Psychoogt 3 10039Gay J ( 1969) Concernng he fudmenal princple of irue or moraly In D

D Raphael (Ed) British morai 16518 (ol 1 pp 41 121) OxfordClarendon Press (Orgnal wor ublshed 1731)

Groe G (1973) ristote (2d ed A Bain & G C Roberson Eds) NewYork Arno Press (Orgna o pubshed 1880)



eneatve etaph and pyhlal de 355

Hamlon W (967) Conrbuon owards a hsory of menal suggeson orassocaon In W Hamlon (Ed) homas Red Phosophca wors (ol2 pp 889910) Hldeshem Olms (Orgnal work publshed 1846)

Ha R & Seod P 972 he expanaton o soca behavour OxfodBlackwell Publsher

Harrell B (1982) he socal bass of roo meaphor An applcaon opocaypse Now and he Heart of Darkness Joua of Mnd and Behavor3 22140

Harley D (1967) Observatons on man Hldeshem Olms (Orgnal workpublsed 149)

Hersen R & Borng E G (Eds) (1965) source book n the hstory ofpsychoogy Cambrdge MA Harard Unersy Press

Hesse M (1980) he explanaory funcon of meaphor In Revoutons andreconstructons n the phosophy of scence (pp 11124) Bloomngon Indana Unersy Press

Hobbes (1958) Levathan Indanapols IN obbsMerrll (Orgnal workpublshed 1651)

Hume D (191 treate o human nature (ol 1. London Den (Oginalwork publshed 1739)

Lakoff, G (1987) Women re and dangerous thngs What categores reveaabout the mnd Chcago Unersy of Chcago Press

Leary, D E (1980) he nenons and herage of Descaes and Locke owarda recognon of he moral bass of modern psychology Joua of GeneraPsychoogy 102 283310

Locke (1959) Of he assocaon of deas n n essay conceng humanunderstandng (ol 1 , pp 52735 A C Fraser Ed ) New York Doer(Frs publshed n 4h ed 1700)

Long J (1969) An nury no he orgn of he human appees and affeconsIn P McReynolds (Ed) our eary works on motvaton (pp 281476)Ganeslle FL Scholars' Facsmles and Reprns (Orgnal work publshed1747 Long's auhorshp unceran)

Lowry R (1971) The evoutn of psyhoogca theory Chcago AldneMacknosh (1830) Dssertaton on the progress of ethca phosophy Edn

burgh Praely publshedMacpherson C B (1962) The potca theo of possessve ndvuam New

York Oxford Unersy PressMcDougall, W (1908) n ntroducton to soca psychoogy London MehuenMcReynolds, P (1980) he clock meaphor n he hsory of psychology In

Nckles (Ed) Scentc dscove Case studes (pp 97112) DordrechRedel

Oberg, B B (1976) Dad Harley and he assocaon of deas Joua of theHstory of de 3 4454

Pepper, S C (1942) Wod hypotheses Berkeey and Los Angeles Unersy ofCalforna Press

Rapapor D (1974) The htory of the concept of assocaton of deas NewYork Inernaonal Unerses Press

Rcoeur, P (1977) The rue of metaphor (R Czerny, rans ) orono Unersyof orono Press

Ross G R (1973) rstote: "De sensu and De memora New YokArno Press (Orgnal work publshed 1906)

Samelson F (1974) Hsory orgn myh and deology Comes dscoery" ofsocal psychology Joua for the Theo of Soca Behavor 4 2731



356 Krt anzigr

Schn D A (1963) Dspacement o oncepts New York Humanes Pess(1979) Generaie meaphor A erspecie on problem seng in social polcy

In A Orony (Ed), Metapho a thought (pp 25483) Cambridge Unesy Press

Smh R (1988) Does he hisory o psychology hae a subec Hsto of theHuman Scences 1 14777

Sorab R (1979) Body and sou i risole In J Barnes M Schoeld &R Soab (Eds) rtces on rstote (pp 4264) London Duckworhoulmn S (1969) Conceps and explanaion of human behaior In

Mischel (Ed), Human acton: Cceptua and emprca sues (pp 2560)New York Academic Pess

Unger R M (1975 Knowedge an potcs New York Free PressVerhae, 1973 Dad Harley he minds road o God In Verhae

(Ed) Harteys theo of human mnd New Yok Johnson ReprnWaren H C 1921 hstory o the socaton psychoogy New Yok

Scribner'sWarofsky M 1968 elos and ecque Models as modes of acon In S

Anderson (Ed) Pannng for dves and choce: Possbe futures and therreaton to mancontroed envroent (pp 1408 Cambidge MA MIPress

Wigensen L (1967) Phosophc nvestgatons (G Anscombe, Ed) Oxfod Blackwell Publsher (Oigl work publshed 1953

Young R M (1966) Scholaship d he hsoy of he behaoual scencesHsto of Scence 5 151



1 1

Meaphor, heory, and praie inhe hiory of pyhoogy

D A V I D E L E A Y

The chapters of this volume provide more than ample illustration of theclam that "metaphor permeates all discourse ordnary and specal(Goodman 1976, p. 80) and they also demonstrate that metaphor isparticularly vital at the growing edges of science (Quine 1979 p 159)

In these chapters we have seen that neuropsychological discourse hasbeen advanced by the use of metaphors from telecommunications controlsystems engineering computer science holography and other develop-ments in parallel distributed processing (Pribram Chapter 2); thattheoretical discussions of the emotions have revolved around metaphorsof inner feelings physiological responses vestiges of animal nature dis-eases of the mind driving forces and social roles (Averill Chapter 3)that treatments of motivation have portrayed the human person as apawn an agent a natural entity an organism or a machine (Mcey-

nolds Chapter 4) that a vast array of cognitive metaphors have beeninsinuated into a variety of domains in psychology and related sciencesranging from the metaphors of vigilance and "defense in the eld ofperception through the access skeletons and avors of articial in-telligence (Homan Cochran & Nead Chapter 5) that separate tradi-tions proposing reproductive versus "productive theorie of cognitionhave evolved from diverse views of consciousness as either a passiverror of reality or an active oder of experience (Bruner & eldmanhapter 6) that there is a rich history o behaviorist metaphors exten-

ing from Descartess reected spirits and Pavlovs psychic reexesthrough Tolmans maes Huls machines and Skinners selection byconsequences (Smith Chapter 7) that whereas traditional discussios of

357



358 avi Lary

social groups have typically utliz organsmic anmalistc and phyica-listic metaphors recent social sintic discourse has tende to viewsocial life from the metaphoric rspectives of the animal laboratorymechanistic regulation meaninul relations and systems theory(Gergen Chapter 8) that there i a long history of categorizing and

reifying unwanted conduct through the use of mental illness hyster-ia schizophrenia hallucinati and other such loosely warrantedmetaphors (Sarbin Chapter 9) and that an analysis of the historical rootsof modern associationism besie revealing the importance of culturalcontext in the articulaton of baic sychological metaphors suggests thata fuller understanding of the rol of metaphor will involve a broaderconsideration of metaphor's plac within psychological discourse as awhole (Danziger Chapter 10)

What may not have been so aly highlighted in the foregoing chap-

ters simply by virtue of their eordinate emphasis on the role ofmetaphor in the construction of sychological t is the extent towhich metaphors are associate h the raa rs of daytodaybehavior with the "dramas "rials and "performances that ll thelives of pschologists and their plic As psychologsts learn throughmetaphorical comparisons to se ertain "commonalities in obects osituations they rather naturaly ome to behave in a similar fashiontoward these objects or situations see Gardner 1982 p 166) Thus ifsome psychologists cncepualze he mind as a compuatioal device

whose instrumentalities and procere can be specied once and for allwhereas others think of the mnd as an organc entity that changes bothstructurally and functionally over he course of a lietime they will adoptvery different methodological pracices in their psychological investiga-tions Similarly if clinical or cusling psychologists consider membersof the public to be their "cliens ather than their "patients they aelikely to orient ther professonal ieractions n distinctve ways In otherwords the metaphors psychologiss use to constue the objects and sub-jects of their concern are relatd -· often in fundamental ways to themethodological and social pracics in which they engage

The commerce between methor and practice like that betweentheoy and practice can be condued in both directions Metaphors canbe drawn from the realm of the pratical ust as practical routines can bederived from the metaphorical cceptions underlying theoretical dis-course urthermore just as prcce can be shaed by metaphor so toocan the creative extension or andment of metaphors be facilitatedor constrained by various practcal factors and considerations or thisreason metaphorical thinking in cience as elsewhere can hardly betreated in its fullness, as some srt of disembodied or radically free playof the mind limted (f at all) oly by the past experences cognitivehabits and biases of individuals at such treatments are sometimes



r r rcc 39

proposed is sufcient cause for KnorrCetinas (1981 chap 3) repeatedinsistence that metaphorical or analogical theories o scientic innovationare incomplete It is certainly true as she argues, that scientists mustwork out or realize metaphorical concepts in the tangible nitty-

gritty process of knowledge production that takes place in the labora-tory or clinic before any truly consequential innovations can be broughtabout It is also true that the theoretical articulation of a metaphor oftenoccurs closer to the end than to the beginning of the research processlearly, as norreina 9 says he process o research proucionand reproduction is more complex than the equation of metaphor andinnovation suggests (p. 66).

urthermore in addition to the social norms institutional structuresand practical routines that may seem more immediately indigenous toscientic workplaces the contet of the production nd seecve consupion of research is composed of cultural values an constructs AsDurkheim (1912/1965) said long ago

It is not at all true that concepts even when constructed accordingto the rules of science get their authority uniquely from theirobjective value It is not enough that they be true to be believe Ifthe are not in harmony with the other beliefs and opinions o in aword with the mass of the other collective representations theconcepts taken for granted by most people in a given time and

place they will be denied mnds wil be closed to them; conse-quently it will be as though they did not exist (p 486)

nvestigating the social historical context as well as the social historicalinuence of any given metaphor will prove essential if we are to now otust that metaphors play an important role in the history of science butwhy or particular metaphor plays or role at is or time and in or tt place In this regard Kurt Danzigers call (in thisvolume) for careful attention to the sociocognitive o cultural setting ofpsychological theory and practice is very well justied It is critical that

we hee such calls i we are o carry the program of research initiate inthis volume to its completion or if we are at the very least to startdown the path that future research must tae would chaacterize thispath by saying that it leads through the newly emerging eld of thereoric o science toward an even wider concern with what might becalled the prgics o science

To situate these new and prospective elds with special reference tothe history of psychology I would begin by noting that the pactice ofpsychology is clearly framed and supported by the kind of social and

institutional structures studied by sociologists of science. Beyond that itis held together by the ner webs of cultural historical linguistic andpersonal relations that anthropologists historians psychologists nd



360 avi E. Lay

rhtras like to investigate e subject matters of these variousdisciplines may be said o revolve round the poblems and processes ofcommunity and communication Sience as one of these subject mattersmay seem to begin wih the atm to specify and clariy the products operception but as David Bohm 77) has put it

the very act of perception is hed and formed by the intention tocommunicate as well as by a neral awareness of what has beencommunicated in the past by neself and others Even now it isgenerally only in comunicaio that we deeply understand that isperceive he whole meaning hat has been observed So here isno point in consiering any kin of separation of perception andcommuncation (p 374)

A similar awareness of the socia ontext of perception and of all that

follows atr perception in the sandard conceptualization of scienticknowledge production has be at the root of the recent "rhetoricalturn in histoical and pilosophicl studies of science 5 The investigationof the role of metaphor in the history of science is both a cause and aneet this turn and it invites h next sep into a ullblown rhetoric ofscience

To speak o he rhetoric of scie is not to imply that science is somekind of mere word play any more han speaking of metaphorical thinkingin science commits one to suc view To attend to the rhetoric of

science is simply to acknowledge th potential signicance of the act thatscience lke all knowledge i achieved thrh and as symbolic activity especially linguic activity This linguistic activity in-cludes the use of alternative sign ystems (such as those composed ofnumbers) as well as the use of varis distinctive means of argumentationand persuasion (such as sandadzed publcation formats) that are in-tended both to capture and to comunicate a particular sort of graspon reality6

An understanding of the pragmatcs of science the allinclusive set o

tangible practices tha constitut hw science actually r lies on theother side of and will encompas an understanding of the rhetoric ofscience Since we are presetly far fom enjoying a complete understand-ing of the latter the pragmatics o iece can be seen for now only as aheuristic goal toward which curren n future research should aim Stillit should prove useful to keep ths oal in mind and to strive to reach itall the more so because a complet nderstanding of the actual workingsof scence would e exraodnarl valuale

Why is this so Why would a understanding of the pragmatics of

sciece be so important? Because ' tt a s science includingpsychology and its many professial ofshoots has been woven intothe very er of our culture h ecome an essential source of our



Mtapor, tory, and prati 361

cultures materal goods socal practces emotonal comforts and sprtual values as t has also become assocated wth many of our culturessgncant tensons materal dangers socal nequtes emotonal dstresses and sprtual crses

If the metaphors of scence can mae one feel at home as Freud(1933/1964 p 77) once put t they can also serve and have served todslocate humans from ther once taenforgranted poston n the worldIf we are to gure out not only the ature and hstory of see dpsychology but also the contours and relatons of a future world thatwould be more worthy and supportve of hataton our metaphors andther encompassng rhetorc must be carefully selected thoughtfullycrafted and judcously used

Ths volume mars only a begnnng Its ndvdual chapters provde

ntal foays nto lagely uncharted terrores and they ase a number ofssues that deserve further consderaton s rs steps go ths volumeseems to be a good sold one onetheless t begs for a sequel foraddtonal steps toward an understandng of the role of metaphor n thetheoy and pactce of psychology and toward a futue that we can onlymagne at the present tme

Noes

These term dramas rtuals ," and performances are drawn from the

wok o Vcto Tune (1974) and ames Fenandez (1986) Fo other dscussons of the socal use of metaphors or the nstantaton of metaphos neveryday lfe see Sapr and Crocker (1977 For related dscussons see dge(94, Gouln (974, an Schn (979 So ecognton was gven to thepractcal mport of psychologcal metaphors n Chapter 1 (e.g. n notes 52 and53) as well as n other chapters (e.g . Chapter 8 by Gergen Chapter 9, bySarbn and Chapter 10, by Danzger) but much more eans to be sad.

2 Sarbn (Chapter 9) has ponted out the relaton between the conceptualmetaphors and therapeutc practces of behavoral therapsts psychodynamctherapsts exstental therapsts and socal systems therapsts. Besdes mplctly stuctung the therapeutc stuaton metaphors can also be used explctlywthn the psychotherapeutc nterchange as the means by whch both nnerstates and external problems can be dented communcated and resolved.See Barker (1985), Cox and Thelgaard (1987), Haley (1976), and Mlls andCrowley (1986) or examples of such uses. For related dscussons ofmetaphors we lve by and metaphors of lvng" see ako and Johnson(980 and Mar (1977, respectvely. Also see Whte (1987 for an analyss ofthe olk wsom emboe n poebs whch appea to be a specal case ofthe moe general process of metaphocal understandng" (p. 153). At the otherend of the spectum see Sontag (1978, 1988) for dcussons of metaphors ofdsease and dyng. Although she admts that thee can be no thnkng wthoutmetaphos Sontag has castgated the use of the metaphos that have come tobe assocated wth cance an AIDS pcsly because of the deastatngeects they have on the vctms o these dseases on the hopes and easthe selfmages and the ways they ae consdeed and teated by others.



362 av E. Lary

nsofar as she s correct about tes ffects of metaphorcal thnkng (and t sonly the degree and not the nunc tself that seems to me to be t ssue) herexamples provde a pognan deosraton of the mpact of meaphors on thepractcal conduct of daytoday vs. An awareness of such practcal mpactshould ncrease the perceved nee for the management of metaphor"(Smos, 1981)

For nstance, Danzgers treatment assocatonsm (Chapter 10, ths volume)llustrates the reshapng of an old metaphor that can take place n a newcultural context. Smlarly Hoffmn Cochran ad Neads essay (Chapter 5) sfll of examples of conceptual and eoretcal developments that had to awatthe creaton of approprate technolcal analogs. Indeed each chapter n thsvolume ofers examples that smal reect the nuence o practcal realy ontheoretcal fomulaton.

4 On the socal practces assocated h the producton of research see atourand Woolgar (1979) and Star (1983 s well as KnorrCetna (1981) Morawsk(1988) has dscussed the socal bs of psychologsts wok. Wth regad to

the broader socal context of sec wok Branngan (1981, Cskszentmhaly (1988), Gruber and Dav (88), and Rosenberg (1976), among manyothers, have begun to clarfy th sal orgns and envronment of scentcnnovaton and ODonnell (1985) s mapped out some of the socal dmensons o he s o Amcan psychogy ound he tun o th cenuy. Thlatte treatments of the encompssn socal contet e elevant to but noequvalent to, the closer analyses f the socal processes at work wthn theresearch envronment to whch I reerred n the rst sentence of ths note.

5 Rhetoc, of course, s the art or scce of spoken or wrtten dscourse of theuse of gures of speech and gratcal forms n the composton and com

muncaton of thought and feelng, the efectve use of speech and wrtng,wth the partcular am to nuence d persuade. The rhetorcal turn" n thestudy of scence can be traced aln ne lne to Toulmns (1958) work on theuses of argument" whch helped t �et the scene for the subsequent shft fromthe study of the ratonal logc of scee to the study of the reasonable modes ofargumentaton n scence, and alon another lne to Perelman and OlbrechsTyteca (1959/1969), who are freqently credted wth revvng nterest n rhetorc and ts applcatons. Kuhns (197) work must also be cted as an mportantpredecessor. Earle predecessors, not drectly nuental on ths shft, ncludeGambattsta Vco (1744/1948 see Berln, 1977 Mooney, 1985) and JohnDewey. Dewey (1929/1960), followng a lne establshed by Wllam James

argued for a dstncton between odfashoned reason" and nowpreferablentellgence. Accordng to ths dstcton the strctly logcal mplementatonof reason (n deducng necessary consquences of ndubtable facts nd assumptons) s assocated wth the old a unattanable deal of achevng cetanknowledge that exactly mrrors a resumably statc world whereas the nstrumental us of ntellgence (n akng and contnually revsng contngentjudgments) s assocated (n Dewy cheme) wth an acceptance of the uncertanty nherent n a world n whc the practcal ctvty of comngtoknowhelps to shape the realtythatskown (For the essays of a contemporaryDeweyan, see Rorty, 982 ) ke Tolmn Dewey (929/960) used the practcn physcan as the model of knowlgenacton The physcan draws upon

a store of general prncples of physology, etc. alrady at command Wthoutths store of conceptual materal h s helpless. But he does not attempt toreduce the case to an exact specmen f certan laws of physology and patholo



Mtapor, tory, and prti 363

gy or do away wth ts unue ndvdualty. Rather he uses general statementsas ads to drect hs observaton of the partcular case, so as to dscover what ts e They functon as ntellectual tools or nstrumentaltes (p. 207).

Ths shft of focus from ratonalty to reasonableness from logc to argumentaton from the suppresson to the recognton of the role and mportance

of rhetorc and practce reects a revoluton from theoretcal ways of knowng to practcal ways of undestandn epte the fact that hs o orkpreceded the recent shft by more than two centures Vcos emphass onpractcal wsdom on sapenta or pudenta rather tha scenta s a usefulemblem of ths turn, especaly sofar s ths reet sht td psttal easonableness (as Pepper, 1942 hrstened t from afar) has rase longoverlooked ssues regardng the value dmensons and practcal mport of knowlege an scence. (or relte scusson o the recovey o pctclcocers phlosophy see Toulm 988.)

Recent works on the rhetorc of scence nclude Benjamn Cantor andChrse (987) KnorrCetna (981 chaps 5 and 6) eary (1987) McCloskey

(1985) Nelson and Megll (1986) Nelson, Megll and McCloskey (1987)Overngton (1977) Schuster and Yeo (1986) Smons (1989), Wemer (1977,1979), and Yearley (181) For some reason anhropologsts have been parcularly senstve to the hetoral dmenson of he dscplne Clfford andMarcus (1986), Geerz (1988) andau (1984), and Payne (1981) are but a fewof many examples n the relaonshp beween rheorc and moral acon seeJonsen and Toulmn (1988) Of the many works and developmens n conemporary psychology tha are consonant wth he new nterest n rhetorc seeBllg (1987), Bronfenbrenner Kessel, Kessen and Whe (1986) Bruner(1986) Gergen (1985) Gergen and Gergen (1983) Harr (1980), Kesen(1979) olknghorne (1988) Sarbn (1986), Scarr (1985), Schank and Abelson

(1977) and Spence (1982) Brnton (982) has addressed the relatonshp between Wllam Jamess thought an the epstemc vew of hetorc. have dscussed he responsveness of pschologss o her audence else

where (eary, 987) An addtonal llustraton s provded by Wllam Jamessstatement I have found by experence that what my heaers seem least toresh s anaycal echncalty and what hey care for s concrete praccalapplcaton So I have gradually weeded out the former and left the latterunreduced . . . . In takng my cue from what has seemed to me to be the feelngof the audences, I beleve that I am shapng my books so as to satsfy the moregenune publc need (quoted n Vdch & yman 1985 p 68) Compare thsstatement wth the denton of rheorc at the begnnng of hs noe

6 Contrary to freuent denals, such as Clark Hulls (1943) strenuous (and ronc)argument agans argumentaton n scence (pp 79), scence obvously doesam to persuade Despte hs own mechanomorphc metaphors (eg pp27 8) Hull lke so many oher scentss suffered from tropophoba as wellas rhetorophoba (The poet Donald Hall, 1985 dened tropophoba asthe fear and loathng of metaphors) However acute and msplaced, Hullsconcern about rhetorc n scence was no completely wthou cause There aen fact a varety of ways of argung and tryng to persuade nd surely manyypes of dscouse have less precse and ess exactg standards and proceduresthan oes scence. Stll, argument or persuason s nonetheless what the scenc process ams toward Even Rudolf Carnap he premer logcal emprcst

phlosopher of scence, had no problem acceptng ths He began hs classcwork on The ocal Structure of the World (1928/1967) wth an unapologetcacknowledgment that the purpose of a scentc work s to persuade the eader



364 aid Lary

of the valdity of the thoughts whc t presents (p xv) To clarfy the formsand means of scentc persuasion what the rhetoric of science s all about

As mentioned in my earler chpter ne of the ssues worthy of frther study sthe followng What mght be gane by makng ner dscrminatons betweenmetaphor and oher gures of speech and thought n the analyss of he ways nwhch such gures have consttuted supported and nuenced psychologcaltheory and practice? It would also b sefl to pursue more detailed analyses ofthe dfferent fnctions that metaphos can and have performed n the hstory ofpsychology To name only a few of tese fnctions, some of whch have beennotd n the preceding chapters metphors can be descriptve or explnatory,illustrative or consttutive, informae or evaluatve revealng or maskngenrchng or deformng This lst f functons should not be taken as evenapproxmaely dentve nor shou the or n these parngs be taken asindicatve of categorical or absout dstnctons Seemngly descrptve orllustratve" metaphors, for instan need not be smply ( e , neutrally orpassively) communicative" hey y actualy hep to consttute the obect"or event to whch they refer and/r mply (e, tlt the balance toward) acertan type of explanaton or a rtcular form of practcal nterventonNneteenthcentury analyses of the rrational mob and twentethcenturydiscussons of hyperactvty" may seve as examples

Other mportant ssues for future tdy revolve around the classc KantanPecean" and amesn" questo How s metaphor possible at all Whtmakes a prtcular etaphor ore t nd more probble to occur in anygiven context? And how are the mtple dmensons of ratonlty includngthe aesthetc moral and practcal s well as intellectual dmensons, broughtto bear on the assessment of th tthflness of metaphors? ow metaphorworks, the nature of the constrats dlmting ts operation, and the entre setof ssues related to the nature and attributon of truth are all relevant tofture nqury aong the nes establsed n hs volume Forunately contemporary researchers from many dsclnes from lingustics, psychology, andphlosophy, among others are advcing our understandng of these mattersand hus preparng the way for a fllr understandng of the role of metaphor inthe hstory of psychology.

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Barrows S. 36 n24Brle, F., 193 196Bechterev V. M. 242Becker J. D. 178 219BeebeCente, J. G. 128 n6Beer G. 35 nn2122

Bekesy, G. von 90-1 94Beniger J. R. 31 n17 53 n53Benjamin A. E . 28 n11 363 n5Bentham, J. 3, 26 n6 137, 146 156 16

n20, 166 n36Berggren D. 40 n35, 174 217, 333Bergmann, G. 259Berkeley G. , 13, 36 n25 40 n35 146, 1

156 165 n21, 166 n27 231 339Berlin 1 29 n1 362 n5Berman, H J. 32 n17Bernard C. 83

Bernrd L. L. 278Berne E . 291Bernfeld S. C. 44 n41Bernstein N 193Bertalanffy L. F. von 292Bttlhm B. 4 37, 44 n39Biddle B. J. 124Billig, M. 363 n5Billow R. M. 23 n2Bjork D. W. 47 n48Black M. 1 5 24 nn34 162 nn35 17

176 178, 333 334 343 344, 351Blau P. 288

Bleuler E. 311 -13 326 n6Bleuler, M. 313Blonde E. 26 n6Bloom H 44 n40Bloor D. 28 n11 353 n1 1Blount J. 219Boakes R. 243Bockoven J. S. 318 326 nBoden M. A. 41 n35Bohm D . 1 54 n54 95-6 360Bohr N 97Bolton H C. 165 n22

Boltzmann L 35 n21Boring E. G. 39 n33 235 236 268 34

341 353 n3Borman L. D . , 324Boulding E. 54 n54 293Bourke V. J . 164 n15Bower G. H, 86 205 206 211Boyd R. 1 24 n4 133 174 213 352Boyle M. 31112Brce C. L. 326 n9Bracewell R . 94Brachman R. J . 207 08

Bradshaw G. L. 35 n22Brandt F 166 n29Brannigan A. 362 n4

Bransford J. D. , 191, 192, 234Bravermen B . , 219Breazeale D . , 26 n6Brehm J. W. 285Bremmer J. 1Brentano F. 180 203

Brett G. S. 181Breuer J. 163 n6, 121Brewer W. F. 203Brigham A. 326 n2Brillouin L. 81Brnton A. 363 n5Broadbent D. E. 82 198-2Bronfenbrenner U , 363 n5Brown B. B. 278Brown H 1 27 n9 240, 259Brown J . 51 n52Brown J. E. 326 n9Brown R . 85Brown R. H , 4 36 n24, 174Brown T. 339Brown T. G. 195Browning D. S . 44 n40Bumaugh R. S. 54Bruner J. 39 n35 174 357 363 n5Brunswk E. 246Brykman G . 36 n25Buchdahl G . 38 n27Buck C . D . 128 n2Buck R. C. , 36 n24Burke 27 n9 36 n24 47 n49 137 162

n3, 333Burks A. W , 26 n6Burrhus R. 219Burton J. H 352 nBurton M. 262 n3Burtt E. A. 50 n51Buttereld H , 154

Cairns H 109 110 128 n5 142 149Callahan R. E. , 52 n53Campbell D . 35 n21Campbell, F. W. , 91

Campbell J. A. 30 n1Campbell N R. 24 n4Cannon W. B. 83 158 159Cannon W. F. 30 n15Cantor G. N, 28 n11 , 363 n5Cantor P. 26 n6Capra F. 97Carbonell J . 207Carello C . 192Carlyle T. 48 n49Carnap R. 97 284 363 n6Canot S . 156

Carpenter W. B . 351Carroll J. M. 176Cartwright D . 32 n8 275



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Carver C. S . 293Cassirer E . , 3, 26 n6, 202Catlin, G., 29 n8Cattell J. M., 21, 50 nn5152Cattell R. B. 148

Chambers E. 347Chapanis A. 39 n33 252Chapman, A. J . 36 n4Chapuis A. 154Charcot, J. M. 308-9Charron P. , 143Chase, R., 194Cherry, E C. 199 2Chew S. 219Chld D. 148Chipman S. 203Chomsky N 82, 88 203 204 211

Chon K. K. 129 n8Christie J. R . R . 28 n1 1 363 n5Chrysippus 128 n6Chun K. 303Cicero, 110Ciof, G., 219Clarke S. 32 n18Clifford J. 363 n5Clore, G. L. 114Cochran E. L. 39 n35, 219 , 357 362 n3Coeffeteau, N 145-7, 154 161Coffman, W. E. 35 n22

Cohen I. B, 9 32 n17 35 n21 166 n27Coleman W. , 307Coleridge S. T. 8 20, 30 n14, 352 n1Collingwood R. G. 31 n17Comenius, J. A., 155Cooley C. H 287Cooper, D . , 6Cooper, L. A. 205Cooter R . 35 n23Corbit J. D. 158Cornford F. M. 31 n17Corsano, A. 33 n19

Corso J. F. 185CostaLima L. , 54 n54Cox, M. 361 n2Craik, F. 183Craik, G. L 275Craik, K. J. W. 3 27 n7 194 203 252Craneeld, P. F. 307Crocker, J. C., 162 n3 361 n1Crosson F. J. 41 n35Crowley R. J . 361 n2Csikszentmihalyi, M. 362 n4Cua A. S. 334

Cunningham M R. , 278Curtius E. R. 36 n24

Dain, N 318Dampier W. C. 165 n24

Dante 279Danziger K., 335, 343 358 359 361 n1,

36 n3Darwin C., 10-11 30 n15 34 n20 35 n22

47 n48 48 n49, 50 n51 1 19, 148, 242 250,

255, 256 283Darwin F. 34 n20Daston L. J. 30 n16 31 n17 33 n19, 138

163 n4Davidson D. 213Davs K. E. 289Davis P. J. 33 n19Davis S. N 362 n4Dear P. 30 n15De Beer G. 10de Charms R 144 163 n9Deese J. 177

De Knop S. 23 n2de Man P. 174 180Dember, W. N , 186, 2Denne B . 324Dennett, D. C., 202 205 211Derrida J . 19 44 n40Dershowitz A. M. 320Descartes, R. 16-17 30 n16 39 n33 48

n49 50 n51 138 143 149 153 155 159166 n28 180 181 182 189 203, 242, 349,357

dEspagnat, B. 96

Deutsch D . 2Deutsch J . A . 2Deutsch K. W. 36 n24De Valois R. L . 9 1 92Dewey J. 52 n53 55 n54 230 362 n5Dewson J. H III 91Diamond B. L. 321Diamond S. 353 n3Dile A., 164 n15Dijksterhuis E . J. 31 n17 156Dirven, R., 162 n3Dobbs B. J . T , 32 n18, 153, 1 n27

Dodds E. R. 30 n13 140 164 n12Dollard, J., 282Doob L. W. 282Douglas M. 36 n24 117 348Downs, R. M. 261Droz E. 154du BoisReymond E. 307Duhem P. 24 n4, 239Dumont, L. 353 n7Dunlap K. 22Durkheim E., 277 353 n11 359Duva, S. 85

Ebbinghaus, H 180 183Eberle R. 201Edelman G. M., 35 n21, 39 n33, 86 88Edelso, J. T. , 44 n40



372 a indx

Efron, A. , 326 n5EibEibesfeld, 1 148Einstein A. 10 32 n8, 97 159Eisenberg P., 219Ellenberger, H F. 39 n32, 309Elson, D. G. 250

Emerson , R. W. 6, 19 46 n44, 49 n50Empedocles, 151Engel J. E., 54 n54Engels, F., 115Erdelyi, M. H 19 23, 4 4 n40 234Eriksen C. W. 210Esper, E. A., 150, 151, 165 n25Espinas A. V. , 277Esquirol, J. E. D . , 316 319Estes W. K . 39 n35, 175Euclid 95Euripides, 142

Evans, L. T., 10Evans, R. B . 241Eysenck H , 148

Fairweather G. W. , 324Falre, J P 35Fann K T. 26 n6Farber E. 1FaustoSterling, A . 271Fechner, G. T., 185Feigl H , 97Feldman C. F, 39 n35 357

Felstiner M. L 36 n24Ferenczi S. 43 n37Fernandez J. W., 23, 361 nFestinger L 285Feynman, R. , 214Field, H 205Figlio K. M. 36 n24ne H J 178Finlay B. L. 91Fisch M. H 26 n6Fiske S. T., 285Fitts P M. 194, 198

Fletcher, R. 38 n30Fliess W 42 n36Fodor J A. 202Fogelin R. J. 5 28 nForrester J. 12 42 n36Forster E. S. 165 n23Foucault, M 48 n49, 326 n8Fowler, H 261Frank J 31 n17Frankl V. 324Frazer J. G. 45 n42French R. K. 17 151

FrenkeBrunswik, E. 41 n36Freud, S. , 11 18-19, 37 n26 41 n36

43 nn3743 49 n50, 50 n52 85, 116 8121 12 3 128 n2 129 n 151 156 17

159 160 161 163 n6 180 182, 185 215234 280 308 310 316 321, 323, 326 n11 ,361

Freudenhal, G., 348Frey B. S. 289Frick, F. C . , 198

Frdhandler, B. M. 129 nFrida N H , 32 n18Frisch G. 12Frost, R, 27 n9Fullinwider S. P., 12

Gabor, D. 92Gadlin H, 343Galambos R. , Galanter E., 54 n54, 83, 88, 144 293Galen 150 303-4, 314 325 nGalileo 30 n16 50 n51 138 154 155 156

Galison, P. L., 30 n16, 138, 163 n4Galton F. 51 n52Gardiner H M., 128 n6Gardner H 39 n35, 358Gardner M., 249armezy N 317Garner W. R. 82 198 210Garske J. P. 158Gay J. 346Gay P. 17 43 n39 44 n41, 54 n54edo J. E . 44 n39Geertz C. 54 n53 363 n5

Gelfand I M. 88Gentner, D. 31 n17, 39 n35, 114, 163 n4,

174, 189 201 213Gentner D. R. 174George F. H, 212Georgoudi M. 278Gergen K. J 36 n24 53 n53 280 296

358 361 n 363 n5Gergen M M. 280 363 n5Gerschenkron A., 1, 26 n6 36 n24Gibbs R. W. Jr. 7Gibson J J., 88 175 189-92

Giere, R. 54 n54Gigerenzer G 31 n17 33 n9Gill M. M. , 85Gilman S. L. 35 n22Gimbel, J., 53 n53Glick T., 11Glymour C. 41 n36Goddard H H 52 n53Gethe 180Goffman E 180 202 290 291Goldscheider A 89Goldstein J . , 36 n24

Goodeld J. 165 n9Goodman N 29 n2 54 n54 201 203

210 260 357Gottfried T. 219



Na indx 373

Gould S. J. 1, 49 n50Gouldner A. W. 361 n1Greenberg, M. J., 53 n53Gregory J. C. 52-3Gregory, R. L. , 165 n24 n26

Grifn, A. K., 145Gross M. L. 38 n31Gote G. 340, 352 n1 n2Gruber, H. E. 10, 11, 28 n10, 36 n22, 133,

259 362 n4GrubrichSimitis I . , 43 n37Grudin J. 39 n35 114 163 n4 174, 189Grnbaum, A. 41 n36Guerlac, H., 32 n18, 153Guilln, C . , 37 n27Gunderson K, 250Gurnkel V S. 88

Guseld J. 36 n24

Haber, R. N. 190Hacking, 1 31 n17Hagbarth, K. E., 84Hagen, M. A. , 192Hailman, J. P., 18, 151Hake, H. W., 210Haley, J. 361 n2Hall, D 363 n6Hall, G. S. 49 n50Hamilton E. 109, 110, 128 n5, 142, 149

Hamilton, W. , 352 n1 353 n2Hamlyn, D. W. , 37 n27Hanson, N. R., 54 n54 177Hansot, E. 52 n53Haraway D . J . 41 n35 52 n53Harman, G, 202Harr, R. 1, 36 n24, 144, 166 n26 177 291,

353 n6 363 n5Harrell, B. J., 343Harringon, A., 36 n24Harley D. 17 156 183 339 340 343

34, 352 n1

Harvey, W. 182Haugeland, J . 202Havelock, E. A., 30 n13Hawkes, T., 5Hazard P . 38 n27Head H . 196Hebb, D. 0 89, 120Heelan, P. A., 38 n27Hegel G W. F. , 277 278Heidelberger, M. 31 n17Heimsed L., 219Heisenberg W. 7

Held R. 89 95, 236Helmholz H. L. F. von. 3 n34 90 182189-90, 307

Helson, H. 185Henry, G. W. , 302

Herbart, J. F. 17 185 232Herbert, X 156Herbert S. 10Hero of Alexandria, 1 51 , 154Henstein, R. J., 340, 341 , 353 n3

Hersh, R. 33 n19Hershberger W. A., 193Hesse, M. B. 1, 10 24 n4 28 n1 1, 31 n16,

54 n54, 133, 163 n5, 174, 212 213, 217,352

Hester M. B . , 162 n3Hick, W. E 194Hiebert, E. N., 12Hinde R. A. 85Hippocrates, 150Hitzig, E., 12Hobbes, T., 9, 16, 149, 155 166 n29, 181,

249, 277 280 339 348Hffding H . 46 n44Hoffman, R. R. 1 10 23 n2, 39 n35, 174,

176, 177, 189 202 203 206, 212, 213 ,216 218, 219, 357, 362 n3

Hofstadter, R, 47 n48Holland, D . , 54 n53Holland J H 3, 40 n35Hollingworth H. L . 52 n53Holt, E. B. 244Holt, R. R., 156Holton, G . 54 n54

Holyoak K. J., 3Homans G. W., 277 288Homer, 140-1Honeck, R. P., 203Honig, W. K 261Honzik C H . 248Hooker J . D. 34 n20Hornstein, G . 34 n19Hovland C., 282Howells, J. G. 38 n31Hsu, F. L. K. 124-6Hubel, D. H., 86, 92 187

Hudson L 117Huizinga J. 3 1 n17 230Hull, C L. 39 n33 85 97 151 157 241

242 249-54 255 256 257 260, 282, 357363 n6

Hull, D. 1 1 , 32 n17, 47 n48Hulse S. H. 261Hume D., 3, 22 26 n6 36 n26 143 156

180, 181 232 279 339, 340 341-3, 346,352 n1 353 n4

Humphrey R. 236Huter R.

Hurvich L. M. 158Hucheson F. 147 156Huen E. H. 217Huxley T. H. 34 n20, 50 n51Hyman R. 194



374 Na indx

Ingebritzen 0 C. , 195Ingle, G . 343Israel J . 278

Jackson J. H. 1 1-12 30 n14Jaeger W., 31 n17

James W. 2 19-21, 25 n5 26 n6 35 n2 40 n35 45 n44 46 n45 47 nn46,47 48n49, 49 n50, 50 nn51 ,52, 1 15 , 1 17, 143148 193 230, 244 316, 362 n5 363 n5

Jameson, D . , 158Janet, P., 308Janis, I. L. 275 282Jardine, L., 30 n16Jaspers, K., 142Jaynes, J. , 16 36 n24 38 n29, 141, 150, 3 .

166 n28, 179, 242Jefferson T . 274

Jenkins, J. , 219Johansson G., 190John, E. R. 93Jonson M 23 n2, 36 n24 39 n35, 54 n,

104-5, 174, 176, 178, 179, 180, 201, 2133

Johnson, S . , 233, 270JohnsonLaird P N., 178Jones, D. M 36 n24Jones, H., 36 n24, 40 n35Jones R. , 192Jones, R. F. , 8

Jones, R. S. 1, 34 n19 174, 214Jongen, R. , 23 n2Jonsen, A. R. , 363 n5Jorden, E . 302Judd, C. H . , 52 n53Juhasz, 319, 326 n7Jung, C. G., 151, 156, 290

Kchele, H . , 157 163 n6Kahn, H . , 36 n24Kahneman, D . , 82, 2Kamback, M. C. 94

Kant, 1 3, 22, 26 n6, 28 n10, 48 n49, 1143 156 180 232 234

Kantor, J. R. , 212Katorowicz E. H . , 36 n24Kaplan A. 212Karatheodoris, S., 129 n9Kassler, J. C., 38 n27Kaes C. 7Katz, J. J . , 203Kearney, R. 54 n54Kearns, M. S. , 174, 180Keele, S. W., 194, 196

Keeling, S. V., 16Keeney B. P. 293Kekul A. 136Kelley H. H., 53 n53 282, 288

Kelly G . , 290Kelso J. A. S., 192 197Kemper S., 176Kennedy G. A . , 8Kepler, J . , 10Kerr D. I. B . 84

Kessel, F. 363 n5Kessen, W. 363 n5Kieras, D. 205Kimble G. A. 317Kimchi, R., 234Kintsch, W. 205, 206Kline, M. 33 n19Klopfer, P . .H., 148, 151KnorrCetina, K. D., 293, 359, 362 n4, 363

n5Knowles, D., 15Koch, S . , 22, 252

Koestler, A . , 10, 33 n19, 35 n22, 54 n54Khler, W., 89, 95 236Kosslyn, S. M. , 205, 213Kovecses Z., 129 n8Koyr, A. 3 1 n17, 50 n51repen E 3, 3 nKramer, S. N., 144Krechevsky I., 245Kreps J. 219Kripke S., 24 n4Krippendorff, K., 293Krueger R. G. 250

Krger L. , 31 n17Kufer, S. W., 83Kuhn, T. S . , 1 , 24 n4, 32 n17, 54 n54 133 ,

261 n1 , 362 n5

Lacey, H . , 289Lachman, R . , 217Lakatos, I . , 217Lakoff, G., 33 n19, 36 n24 39 n35, 40 n35

104-5, 174 176, 178, 179, 201, 214, 335,350, 361 n2

La Mettrie , J . 0 17 155 156, 181

andau, Martin, 36 n24, 174Landau Msia, 36 n24, 363 n5Landes, D. S., 53 n53, 166 n30Lag, F. R., 110Langer, S . K. , 26 n6Langermann, J. G., 304Langley P., 35 n22, 40 n35Lanham, R. A., 5, 27 n8Laplanche, J . 18Larkey, L . , 219Larsen, S. F., 174 182Lashley, K. S., 87 89 194, 195

Lasky, M. J . , 36 n24Lassonde, M. C., 84, 87Latour, B . , 293, 362 n4Lamore, R., 140



Nam nd 75

Lavater, L 314Lawler E R, 176Lawler J M , 178Lazlo, J , 194Le Bon, G. , 274 275Leahy, T H 165 n26Leary, D. E 3 21 , 29 n13 30 n15 31 n16

33 n9, 36 n25, 49 n49, 50 n51, 51 n53,146, 153, 157 166 n27, 219, 353 n8,363 n5

Leatherdale W H , 1 10 26 n6, 35 n21 ,133, 137, 162 nn35

Leiber J , 36 n24Leibniz, G W F von 32 n18, 37 n26, 46

n45 96, 181, 232, 234, 339Leith, E N 94Leonard W E 151Levarie S , 38 n27Levin S R 3, 176Lewin K 32 n8 159, 284Liberman A 183Libet, B 80Lieberman, M A 324Lindsay P H, 187, 188-9Lloyd G E R 3 30 n13Locke, J , 14 37 n27 38 n28 46 n44, 49

n50 152 156 164 n17, 179 181 231 339Lockhart, R S 183Lockhead, G R, 182Lombroso, 321Long, J, 346Lorenz K 85, 151Lotze R H 182Lovejoy, A 0 273 279Lowry, R, 156, 165 n26, 353 n4Ludwg, C , 307Ludwi, K 147 148Lundin, R W 166 n33Luther, M 30 n16Lutz C, 112Lyell, C , 34 n20Lyman S M , 363 n5

Macalpine, 1 303MacCormac, E R , 1 10 , 28 n11 , 50 n51 ,

53 n53, 133, 138, 162 nn2,3 163 nn56,166 n34, 176, 213, 270

Mace W 191Macey S L , 166 n30Mach E 33 n9 35 n21 256 257Macntyre A , 41 n36Mackay D 98 nMacKenzie D A 34 n19Mackintosh, J 352 nMackintosh, N J 261Macklem, M 36 n25Macpherson C B 348Mahoney P 44 nn39, 40 45 n42

Maine, H J S 280Mair, M, 162 n3 361 n2Majno, G 38 n30Malk J 293Malinowski, B., 124-6Malthus T R , 279Mancuso, J. C 313 , 325Maner, E, 10Manstead, A S R 291Manuel F E 10 153 166 n27Marcus, G E 363 n5Martin E 271Martin, E J 202Martin, J 1Marx, K 11 5, 2734 278, 353 n1 1Masson J M, 42 nn3641Matthews, P B C 83Maturana, H R 292Maurice K 166 n30Mauthner F 26 n6Maxwell, G , 217Maxwell J C 10 12May H F 52 n53May R 324Mayr E 21Mayr 0 28 n 31 n17, 53 n53 166 n30McCarrell N S, 234McClelland, J L 93McClosky, D N , 33 n9, 36 n24 363 n5McCulloch W S, 27 n7, 81, 98 n, 252McDougall W 156, 277, 278 281, 332McGuinness D 82McReynolds P , 9 26 n6 11 1, 133, 138

141 147, 148 151 , 154 , 156 180 349 357Mead G H 15 286-7Megill, A , 363 n5Mendeleev, D 236Metcalf, R C, 128 n6Metzler, J 205Miall, D S, 23 n2Midgley, M, 120Mill, J , 1 15 , 183, 339, 340Mill, J S 181 183, 339Miller, A 1 35 n22Miller, E F, 36 n24Miller, G A, 54 n54 82, 83 84, 85, 86, 88

144, 162 n3, 178, 198, 293Miller, N E, 282Mills J C 361 n2Milton J 165 n19Montaigne, M de 25 n5Mook D G, 152 158Mooney M , 30 n14 362 n5Moravia, S 39 n34Morawski, J G 362 n4Moray, N 199, 2Moreno, J L 290Morgan C L, 243







378 Na ndx

Sears, R R, 282Sechenov, I. M , 242Secord, P F, 36 n24, 144, 177, 291, 35 n6Selfridge, 0 187, 188, 231Semin, G R , 291Seneca, 128 n6

Seward, A C, 35 nn20, 21Sewell, E, 50 n51, 55 n54Shaftesbury Third Ea of (A A Coopr)

147Shakespeare, W 54 n54, 290Shannon, C E 8 1, 83, 84, 198Shanon, B , 234Shapin, S , 35 n23Shapiro, M J, 36 n25Shapiro, P, 196Sharma C S, 34 n19Shaw J C, 86Shaw, R E , 191 , 192Shengold, L , 44 n40Shepard R N , 35 n22, 203, 205Shibles, W A, 5, 23 n2Shik, M L 88Shils E A 32 n18Shotter, J, 128 n, 291Sidis, B , 275Siegel R E , 150, 325 nSighele, S, 275Simmelhag V L, 49 n49, 261Sion, B , 30 n13, 140, 164 n12Simon, H A, 25 n6, 35 n22 39 n35, 82 8•,

177, 212Simons, H W, 362 n2 363 n5Simontin, D K 35 n21Singer C 307Skinner, B F 14 17, 18 31 n16, 35 n2

41 n36, 48 n49, 85 97, 116, 178, 211, 1,242, 2558, 260, 261, 261 nn3,4 357

Skultans V 319Smith, A, 279Smith B C , 207, 208Smith, C U M, 12Smith G E, 205

Smith, L D , 24 n4, 49 n49, 174 244 2 254, 259, 262 n3, 357Smith M B , 15Smith, N W, 164 n12Smith, R , 336, 344Snell, B 15, 31 n17, 140 142Socrates, 142Sokal M M , 50 n52Solomon, R C, 108, 112, 115Solomon, R L, 158Sommer, R 38 n28Sontag S, 36 n24, 361 n2

Sophocles 142Sorabi, R 353 n5Soskice, J M , 4

Spence D P, 41 n36, 44 n40 363 n5Spence, K 252 259Spencer, H , 1 1-12 277 279Sperling, G, 186Spinelli, D N , 84, 94Spinoza, 339

Spiro, H M 23Sprat, T, 89Staddon, J E R , 49 n49 261 , 261 n2Stagner R , 158Stahl, G E, 304Stamm, J S, 89Stanford W B, 27 n9Stanislavsk, K S 124Star S L, 362 n4Stea D 261Stengers, 1 31 n17Stepan, N L , 36 n24Stern, J P 26 n6Sternberg R J 41 n35, 210Sternberg, S , 173Stevens, S S, 184Stevens, W 30 n14 54 n54Stigler S M, 31 n17Stout G F, 33Stroebe, W , 289Strong 326 n9StuddertKennedy, M 183Suckiel E K 47 n48Sullivan, H S, 15Sulloway, F J , 41 n36 44 n39 50 n50

Suppe, F, 27 n9Szasz, T, 51 n52, 305, 308, 325

Tarde G , 275aylor, C 144Taylor E, 47 n47Taylor F W 52 n53Taylor, J H , 91 , 94Taylo, S E , 25Temkin, 0 1 36 n24, 304 326 nThagard, P R , 3 40 n35ThassThienemann, T , 117

Theilgaard 361 n2Thibaut, J W , 53 n53, 288Thoits P A, 121Thom, H, 157, 163 n6Thomasius, C, 147, 165 n22Thompson, I D, 91Thompson, W R 120Thomson, W Lord Kelvin), 10Thorell, L G 91horndike E L, 243-4 322Tillich, P 15Tillyard, E M W , 36 n24

Tinbergen, N , 85Titchener, E B, 180, 233, 241Todd, M J , 289



Nam indx 379

Tolhurst, D J 91Tolman, E C , 241 , 242, 2449, 251 , 254,

255, 256, 257, 260, 261, 357Toulmn S, 3, 21 , 35 n1 , 54 n54, 165 n19,

261 n , 352, 362 n5

Tourangeau R 210Tourney, G, 44 n39Tresman, A F 184, 199 200Tsetln M L 88Tuchman B 166 n28Tuke S, 321Turbayne C M 5 33 n19 , 36 n25, 40 n35

47 n49 133, 162 n3 36 n4Turng, A M 86Turner, V, 361 nTurvey M T, 88, 191 , 192Tyack, D , 52 n53

Uhr L 187Ullan, J S, 261 nUnderwood, B J, 182, 210Unger, R M 348Uttal W R , 93, 187

Vahnger H, 3, 26 n6, 42 n36 290Valensten E S, 38 n31van Helmont, J B 30 n6van Noppen, J P , 23 n2Varela, F J 292Veth, 1 118 308Verbrugge, R , 176Verhave T 346Vesalus 165 n24Vckers, B 30 n16Vco, G 3 8 , 30 n14, 33 n19, 105, 128 n,

280, 362 n5Vdch, A J , 363 n5Vnsel A 278Volman, S F 91von Brcke E , 307von Foerster, H, 84

von Holst E, 193von Neumann, J , 86, 87Voorhees B, 40 n35Vorzmmer, P 10, 11Vosnadou, S, 23 n2Vygotsky L 15

Waddngton C H 85Wald Jan, 219Wald Jerry 219Waln, J E W 52 53

Walls J, 17Ward 180Warm, J S 186, 200Warren, H C 17, 3467Warren, R M 184

Warren, W H, 192Wartofsky, M W 28 n 55 n54 259 351Watson, J B, 17 22, 51 n53 243 322Watson, R 1 181Waugh, N C , 183

Weaver, W, 81, 83, 84, 198Weber, E H, 182Weer, W , 12Weck, K E 292Wemer W B 175 217 218, 363 n5Wener H 140, 164 n12Wengaten M 84Wessten N 186Wezenbaum, J , 41 n35Wellen, C 219Wenger, M A 1 17Werner, G , 87

Westfall, R S , 32 n8, 153 , 166 n27Wexler, P, 289Weyer, J , 302Whte, G M 361 n2Whte, H , 30 n15, 321Whte, L A 33 n19Whte S , 363 n5Whtehead A N, 46 n45, 97Whtney, W D 14, 38 n28Wcklund R A 285Wener, N , 3, 39 n34, 53 n53, 83, 98 n ,

198

Wener, P P, 35 n21, 47 n48Wesel, T N , 86, 92 187Wgner, E P , 34 n19, 96Wlden A 44 n40Wlder, R L 33 n19Wlks Y , 204Wlls, R H , 53 n53Wlson, E 0 52 n53Wnner, E, 23 n2Wnograd, T 86Wsock, P A 127Wtmer, L 52 n53

Wttgensten, L 269, 351Wolf M 219Wolff C, 165 n22Wollhem, R, 41 n36Wolpe, J , 322Woodward W R, 47 n48Woodworth, R S, 52 n53, 157, 162, 166

n32 233Woolgar, S, 293, 362 n4Wordsworth W, 50 n51Worthen T D, 151Wrht W A 90

Wrsberg C, 196Wundt, W, 115 182

Yearley, S, 363 n5Yeo, R R, 363 n5



380

Young, P T , 162 n1Young, R M , 1 1 , 12 255 352 n2

Zaonc R B 282Zener, K, 43Zeno, 128 n6

am indx

Zilboorg, G , 302Zilsel E 31 n17, n18Zur, G E, 262 n3Zwicky, A M , 204Zytkow, J M , 35 n22



Subjet nde

aggegation, metaphor of 342-4, 353 n6analoy as metaphor, 56, 28 n10antimetaphorical view in Western thought

239-40, 2589architectural metaphors 38 n27association of ideas, metaphor of 313 ,

33944 3468, 352 nn1-3association by similarity vs contiguity, 45

n44attention metaphors of and experiments

on 197200 primary and secondary2334

backward masking, metaphor of 186Berkeley's metaphors (George Berkeley),

1314body symbolism, 11719

Cattell's metaphors (James McKeenCattell) 21

cognition reproductive vs productivetheories of, 230-1 2357

cognitive metaphor, 1779; in naturallanguage, 178-9

cognitive revoluton, 39 n35computer metaphors in neuropsychology,

8-8concio experence, 11516conciounes: Freud on, 234 and language,

115-16 threshold of, 232cultural context of psychological metaphors,

52 n53

cybernetic metaphors in neuropsychology,825

Darwinian metaphors 35 n21 255-7; inWilliam James's thought, 201 ; in B FSkinner's thought 48 n49

Darwins metaphors (Charles Darwin),101 1, 30 n15

Darwins rhetoric (Charles Darwin) , 30 n15 ,34 n20

Descartes's metaphors (Ren Descartes)1617, 39 n33, 153 , 1801

emotion Augustine on, 1 10-1 1 Cicero on,110; drve tradition of, 1223 ethologicaltradition of 11920 as passion, 108phenomenological tradition of, 11417

Plato on 108-10 psychodynamictraditon of, 1202 psychophysiologicaltradition of, 11719; as socal role 1237Stoics on, 128 n6 see als metonymy andemotion

exorcism in relation to metaphoricalthinking, 15-16 39 n32

feeling: atomistic vs holistic approach to,11415 ; nature of, 1 14-15

gure of speeh, 27 n8Freud's metaphors (Sigmund Freud) 18-19,

44 n40, 44 n41, 156-7, 185Freud's philosophy of science (Sigmund

Freud), 41 n36

8



382Sub ect

indx-

�

Galensm, 3034, 325 n1

hallucnaton as metaphorcal , 314-17hstorography of psychology problem n

335-8 tradton of naturalsm n 336 338 340 344 348-50

Hobbes's metaphors (Thomas Hobbes), 9holographc metaphors n neuropsychoo8897

Hull's metaphors (Clark Hull) 24954humans as symbol makers and users 27Hume's metaphors (Davd Hume), 36 6hystera 118 mechanzaton of, 3081

magnaton, modern ambvalence towrd54 n54

nformatonprocessng metaphors nneuropsychology, 858

James's metaphors (Wllam James) 12147 n47

Jamess thought (Wllam James) Darwnan background of, 47 n48 4 n9

langage lteral vs metaphorc, 26871; smetaphorcal 28 n11

lteralty metaphors of , 2401lteralzaton dangers of, 48 n49; of

metaphors 211-12 n psychologcaldscorse, 67, 212 51 n53

Locke's metaphors John Locke), 37 n27

mathematcs as metaporcal 32 n19mechanstc metaphors n psychology

1617, 24954, 2836 308-10medcal metaphors, 36 n24memory metaphors 1825mental llness as metaphorcal 51 n52

30113, 3245 326 n2mental representaton ee representton

cogntve scencemental testng as metaphorcal 51 n52metaphor: abstract vs basc level 1121,

1278 as agency of socal change, 274 295 317-25, 3502 35861, 364 n7 adaaogcal reasonng n scence 79 978 basc vs conveyance 138 16 n n the behavorst tradton, 24258; nbologcal scence 1012 as collectexpresson 2745 and conceptualpoblem solvng, 273; culturalembeddedness of 34852 35961 asdstnct from smle, analogy and mod,1367 n early Greek phlosophy 78explanatory vs evaluatve, 106 and th�

falscaton of theores 21517 mpacon practcal routnes, 1516, 38 n30,38561 361 nn12 as nnovaton, 3 n4

nteracton theory of 176 as key to thehstorcal relatons between psychologyand culture, 53 n53; lmts of, 35 n23;lngustc vs heurstc vs consttutveroles of 260 and legtmaton 274logcal postvsts on 2401 ; as a means

of organzng the relatonshps amongdata 79; and metaphyscs, 25961 andmodel 215 multple reference of, 3448;nature and functons of 1-7 , 138-81612 1757, 21217, 25861, 2725,3315 occasons for, 160 1 ; andpersuason n psychology, 52 n53recaton of 163 n6, 210 11 n relatonto other gures of speech and thought,56 and the rse of modern scence810 and scentc models, 97-8 andscentc revolutons, 24 n4; B F Sknner

on 262 n4 of socal lfe, 27593 n socalscence, 13-14 and socal understandng2715 tages of development, 1378;targets vs sources of 1045 and theory123 as transformatve 14-15, 24 n4; vslteral agage and tgt 67 vlteralsm ee langage lteral vsmetaphorc

metonymy and emoton, 119mnd, metaphorcal orgns of the concept

of, 306, 326 n4msuse of metaphor 209-12mxed metaphors, 197 20910, 293moral concepts as metaphorcal, 38 n28motvaton clock metaphor of 1556 drve

theory of 1578 humoral theory of 150Newtonan metaphors of, 1467

motves: Arstotle on 143 144-5 149 asbodly processes, 14852 concept of,1335 as controllng powers 13941 asnherent tendences, 1448 as mechancalforces 1528 as personal control, 141-4Plato on 1423, 149

motor sklls Adamss trace theory of,194-5; metaphors regardng, 192-7;

Schmdt's schema theory of, 1957multple comparsons need for, 43 n38muscal metaphors, 38 n27myth meanng of, 47 n49

natural scentc concepts, socal orgns of,31 n17

neurologcal functonng, socopoltcalanaloges of 12

Newton's metaphors (Isaac Newton), 910,32 n18, 36 n26 153

pathetc fallacy 105pattern recognton computer models of187 pandemonum model of, 1889



Subjct ndx 383

Pavlov's metaphor (Ivan Pavlov) , 243percepton Cartesan-Helmholtzan

approach to, 189-90 Gbsonanecologcal approach to, 1902 Gbsonanvs nformatonprocessng approach to,191-2 metaphors of, 184-6

phlosophy of scence cogntveexpermental approach to, 217-8Sgmund Freud and, 18 , 41 n36; ClarkHull's metaphors for, 25354mplcatons of metaphor for, 21217Wllam James and, 19-20, 45 n44, 46n45, 47 n46 n relaton to metaphors ofthe socal world, 267, 2945; role ofmetaphor n 261 n1; B F Sknnersmetaphors for 2568, 261 n3; socalconstructonst approach to, 2915E C Tolman's metaphors for 2479

poetry and psychology, 55 n54poltcal metaphors, 32 n24pragmatcs of scence, 35961presentaton as metaphor, 180psychologcal concepts metaphorcal org

of 1416psychology, cultural relatos of, 3601psychopathology as metaphor ee mental

llness as metaphorcalpsychotherapy as based on metaphor,

31725

ratng scales, early use of 1478relgous rhetorc n psychology 52 n53representaton n cogntve scence

metaphors of 201-9

representatons based on socopoltcalanaloges 12

rhetorc, denton and applcatons of, 362n5

rhetorc of scence 50 n52, 359-61 , 363 nn5,6

root metaphors, classcaton of, 163 n10

schzophrena as metaphorcal, 31013scentc metaphor orgn and drecton of,

159-60scentc revolutons and metaphor, 24 n4scentc theores as "lkely stores 29 n13self, metaphorcal orgn and transformaton

of, 1415selfunderstandng, role of metaphor n 38

n29sensaton Arstotle on 231Sknner's metaphors (B F Sknner), 2558socal behavor Newtonan vew of 1314socal scentc metaphors 36 n24synecdoche, Sgmund Freud's use of, 45 n42

telecommuncatons metaphors nneuropsychology 812

threshold metaphors, 185-6Tolmans metaphors (E C Tolman) , 2449truth: socal dmensons of, 46 n45;

temporal dmensons of 47 n46

understandng exstental vs scentc 80

Watsons metaphors John B Watson) 22,243

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Metaphors in the History of Psychology