MESSAGE, SECDEF/ATSD-10, 1817002 NOV 98,

SUBJ: POLICY GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE

PROTECTION uuuuu

P 1817002 NOV 98

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ATSD-10//

TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//OJCS-LA/DJS/IG/J2/J3//

RUEADWD/SECARMY WASHINGTON DC//SAIG-10/GC//

RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/NAVINSGEN/GC//

RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHINGTON DC//SAF-IGl/GC//

RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC//DACS/DAMl/DAJA/DAMO/DAAR//

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//NOO/N09/N095/N2/N3/N5/NLSC//

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//CC/CV/XO/XOl/JAG/AF-RE//

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON

DC//CMC/ACMC/IG/SJA/CL/C41/PP&O/MCRC//

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RULYSCC/USACOM NORFOLK VA//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RUCJAAA/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//IG/J2/J3/SJA/CORB//

RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU Hl//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//IG/J2/J3/SJA//

RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IG/GC/NSOC//

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS8619 UNCLAS

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//IG/J2/GC/DO/DHS/DAC/DAJ/DIO/MC//

RUEBMJB/NRO WASHINGTON DC//IG/GC//

RUEAIJU/NIMA WASHINGTON DC//IG/GC//

RUEAADN/DTRA WASHINGTON DC//IG/GC/CI//

RUEAUSA/CNGB WASHINGTON DC//NGC-ZA/NCG-ARZ/NGB-IG//

RUEAUSA/NGB WASHINGTON DC//CF//

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//GC/IG/USDP/C31/ATSD-IO//

RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//CDR/CS-10/IG/DCSOPS/SJA//

RUCXNLG/ONI SUITLAND MD//IG/GC//

RUDHNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//IG/GC//

RUQVAIA/AIA KELLY AFB TX//CC/CV/IG/IN/SJA//

RUEDADl/AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC//CC/CV/IG/SJA//

RUWMFBA//AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/IG-10//

RULSMCA/MCIA QUANTICO VA

BT

UNCLAS SUBJECT: POLICY GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO

FORCE PROTECTION

REFERENCES:

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 B. DODD 5240.1

001183

C. DODD 5200.27 D. DOD REG 5240.1-R E. MGM 75-91 F. AR 381-10 G. SECNAVINST 3820.3D H. AFI 14-104 J. MCO 3800.2A J. DIRECTOR OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEMO, "AUTHORITY TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON DOMESTIC TERRORIST AND OTHER GROUPS COMMITTING ILLEGAL ACTS THAT POSE A THREAT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (U),'' DATED 27 JAN 98. 1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE POLICY GUIDANCE TO COMMANDERS AND SUPPORTING DODO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING PERMISSIBLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FORCE PROTECTION ACTIVITIES. 2. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE JOINT STAFFF; THE DOD GENERAL COUNSEL; THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD; THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; AND THE SENIOR CIVILIAN OFFICIAL IN THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE. 3. FORCE PROTECTION IS A FUNDAMENTAL COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL COMMANDERS WHEREVER LOCATED. DOD INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (INTEL/CI) COMPONENTS HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDERS' FORCE PROTECTION MISSION. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AND DOD 5240.1-R REGULATE THE CONDUCT OF INTEL/CI ACTIVITIES; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS APPROVED THE PROCEDURES IN DOD 5240.1-R. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO ENABLE DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS TO CARRY OUT EFFECTIVELY THEIR AUTHORIZED FUNCTIONS WHILE ENSURING THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS ARE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER THAT PROTECTS THE CONSITITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY OF SUCH PERSONS. 4. INTEL/CI COMPONENTS DO NOT HAVE A LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE AGENCIES SPECIFICALLY CHARTERED TO HANDLE LAW ENFORCEMENT MATTERS, E.G., PROVOST MARSHAL;. CID; OSI; AND NCIS. (NOTE: AFOSI AND NCIS HAVE BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS, WHICH ARE MANAGED SEPARATELY WITHIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS.) OFF THE INSTALLATION IN CONUS, LAW ENFORCEMENT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LOCAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND THE FBI AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, NOT DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS. 5. WHEN FOREIGN GROUPS OR PERSONS THREATEN DOD PERSONNEL, RESOURCES, OR ACTIVITIES - WHETHER CONUS OR OCONUS - DOD

001184

THROUGH J.

INTEL/CI COMPONENTS MAY INTENTIONALLY TARGET, COLLECT, RETAIN, AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION ON THEM (UNLESS THE GROUPS OR PERSONS IN QUESTION MEET THE DEFINITION OF UNITED STATES PERSONS IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333/DOD 5240.1-R-SEE PARA 11A BELOW). BOTH CONUS AND OCONUS, INTEL/CI COMPONENTS ARE RESTRICTED IN WHAT AND HOW THEY CAN COLLECT, RETAIN, AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO UNITED STATES PERSONS, AS EXPLAINED BELOW. 6. COMMANDERS MAY NOT LEGALLY DIRECT DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS TO TARGET OR INTENTIONALLY COLLECT INFORMATION FOR FORCE PROTECTION PURPOSES ON U.S. PERSONS UNLESS SUCH PERSONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE J, OR SUBSEQUENT VERSIONS. THE FBI PARTICIPATES IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE PERSONS. 7. COMMANDERS SHOULD BE COGNIZANT, HOWEVER, OF THE FACT THAT DURING THE CONDUCT OF ROUTINE LIAISON ACTIVITIES, DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS OFTEN RECEIVE INFORMATION IDENTIFYING U.S. PERSONS ALLEGED TO THREATEN DOD RESOURCES, INSTALLATIONS, MATERIEL, PERSONNEL, INFORMATION, OR ACTIVITIES. DOD INTEL/CI ACTIVITIES MAY ACT AS A CONDUIT AND MUST PASS ANY THREAT INFORMATION INCIDENTALLY RECEIVED IN THIS MANNER TO THE THREATENED COMMANDER AND THE ENTITY WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING THAT THREAT (E.G., MILITARY POLICY, PROVOST MARSHAL, OR SECURITY DIRECTOR). THIS TRANSMITTAL OF INFORMATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE COLLECTION BY THE DOD INTEL/CI CORGANIZATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF DOD REGULATION 5240.1-R (REFERENCE D), AND IS THEREFORE PERMISSIBLE. HOWEVER, ANY FOLLOW-ON INTEL/CI INVESTIGATION, COLLECTION, OR TARGETING OF SUCH U.S. PERSONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO EXISTING PROCEDURES AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCES A

8. IAW REFERENCE C., DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS -AS OPPOSED TO INTEL/CI COMPONENTS -MAY LEGALLY ACCEPT AND RETAIN FOR UP TO 90 DAYS, UNLESS LONGER RETENTION IS REQUIRED BY LAW OR PERMISSION IS SPECIFICALLY GRANTED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OR HIS DESIGNEE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO U.S. PERSONS WHICH THREATENS DOD RESOURCES, PERSONNEL, INSTALLATIONS, MATERIEL, INFORMATION, OR ACTIVITIES. COMMANDERS SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ADVANTAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT LIAISION ACTIVITIES TO MONITOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF THEIR INSTALLATIONS/ACTIVITIES (ACTS OF TERROR, ASSAULT, THREATS OF HARM, OR DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY ARE CRIMINAL ACTS).

001185

9. TO CLARIFY THE ROLE OF DOD INTEL/CI ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORTING COMMANDERS' FORCE PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITIES, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT. A. WHEN DOD INTEL/CI ORGANIZATIONS LEARN OF INFORMATION PRESENTING A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A U.S. PERSON OTHER THAN A PERSON IDENTIFIED BY THE DOD DIRECTOR OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (IN REFERENCE J) POSES A THREAT TO DEPARTMENTAL RESOURCES, PERSONNEL, INSTALLATIONS, MATERIEL, INFORMATION, OR ACTIVITIES, THE ACQUIRING UNIT SHALL IMMEDIATELY ALERT THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL OF THE THREATENED ENTITY AND PROVIDE THE INFORMATION TO THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY. FOLLOWING SUCH NOTIFICATION, IF THE ACQUIRING UNIT HAS REASON TO PERMANENTLY RETAIN THAT INFORMATION UNDER THE PROVISION OF PROCEDURE 3 OF DOD REGULATION 5240.1-R, IT SHALL REQUEST, BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE AND THROUGH ITS SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT, THAT OASD(C31) EVALUATE THE ACQUIRED INFORMATION FOR RETENTION ("COLLECTABILITY DETERMINATION"). OASD(C31) WILL COORDINATE THE REQUEST WITH THE DOD GENERAL COUNSEL AND

THE ATSD(IO) PRIOR TO NOTIFYING THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF THE REQUEST. THE MILITARY SERVICES ARE ENJOINED TO PROCESS COLLECTABILITY DETERMINATIONS EXPEDITIOUSLY. B. WHILE AWAITING A COLLECTABILITY/RETAINABILITY DETERMINATION, THE ACQUIRING UNIT MAY INDEX THE INFORMATION AND MAINTAIN IT ON FILE FOR A 90 DAY PERIOD. IF, DURING THAT 90 DAY PERIOD, THE ACQUIRING UNIT LEARNS OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE U.S. PERSON IN QUESTION, THE UNIT SHALL IMMEDIATELY PASS THAT INFORMATION TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL OR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY. (THIS INFORMATION MAY

BE DISSEMINATED TO AFFECTED COMMANDERS AND SECURITY OFFICIALS, ONLY.) C. IF OASD(C31) DENIES PERMISSION TO COLLECT OR RETAIN INFORMATION ON THE U.S. PERSON, THE REQUESTING ORGANIZATION WILL REMOVE ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THAT U.S. PERSON FROM ITS FILES AND DESTROY IT OR TRANSFER IT TO A DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SECURITY ACTIVITY WHICH HAS AN OFFICIAL NEED FOR THE INFORMATION. OASD(C31) WILL PROVIDE TO OATSD(IO) AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL, WITHIN FIVE WORKING DAYS, ONE COPY OF ALL PERMISSIONS TO COLLECT/RETAIN INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONS NOT LISTED IN REFERENCE J. WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSSAGE, HEADS OF DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS WILL PROVIDE TO OATSD(IO) ONE COPY OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED WHICH IMPLEMENT THIS MESSAGE.

001186

10. REQUEST HEADS OF DOD INTEL/CI COMPONENTS ENSURE THAT ALL FIELD LOCATIONS PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS RECEIVE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE. 11. ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED TO VISIT OUR RECENTLY ACTIVATED ATSD(IO) HOMEPAGE ON THE INTERNET AT HYPERLINK http://WWW.DTIC.MIL/ATSDIO WWW.DTIC.MIL/ATSDIO. 12. DEFINITIONS: A. FROM APPENDIX A, DOD REGULATION 5240.1-R: (1) THE TERM "U.S. PERSONS" MEANS: (A) A U.S. CITIZEN; (B) AN ALIEN KNOWN BY THE DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT CONCERNED TO BE A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (PRA); (C) AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION SUBSTANTIALLY COMPOSED OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PRAS; (D) A CORPORATION INCORPORATED IN THE U.S., EXCEPT FOR A CORPORATION DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENTS. A CORPORATION OR CORPORATE SUBSIDIARY INCORPORATED ABROAD, EVEN IF PARTIALLY OR WHOLLY OWNED BY A CORPORATION INCORPORATED IN THE U.S., IS NOT A U.S. PERSON. [A PERSON OR ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE THE U.S. SHALL BE PRESUMED NOT TO BE A U.S. PERSON UNLESS SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY IS OBTAINED. AN ALIEN IN THE U.S. SHALL BE PRESUMED NOT TO BE A U.S. PERSON UNLESS SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY IS OBTAINED.] [A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN IS A FOREIGN NATIONAL LAWFULLY ADMITTED INTO THE U.S. FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, IS A U.S. PERSON.] (2) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IS INFORMATION RELATING TO THE CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, AND ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN POWERS, ORGANIZATIONS, OR PERSONS, BUT NOT INCLUDING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXCEPT FOR INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. (3) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IS INFORMATION GATHERED AND ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED TO PROTECT AGAINST ESPIONAGE, OTHER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SABOTAGE, OR ASSASSINATIONS CONDUCTED FOR OR ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN POWERS, ORGANIZATIONS, OR PERSONS, OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, BUT NOT INCLUDING PERSONNEL, PHYSICAL, DOCUMENT, OR COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROGRAMS. B. FROM JOINT PUB 2-01, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, DATED 23 MAR 94: FORCE PROTECTION IS DEFINED AS "SECURITY PROGRAM DESIGNED TO PROTECTSOLDIERS, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, FAMILY MEMBERS, FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT, IN ALL LOCATIONS AND SITUATIONS, ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH PLANNED AND INTEGRATED APPLICATION

001187

OF COMBATING TERRORISM, PHYSICAL SECURITY, OPERATIONS

SECURITY, PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES, AND SUPPORTED BY

INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND OTHER SECURITY

PROGRAMS."

UNCLASSIFIED

001188

teco o/P¢ iniQg ttiJl1Pr s ri9ltives ·:that #ef:'i?Y. ed 'of e ·'$: =futetifu: p;¢_fyve ii 9 the·bri fand I.ii f1at rl - tn -L « .,.\ird,6m$tt ,h :dce s:t(}·what · .'.o#U ti m·H. uiies to: · ·). ,;-.,•,-#; .l,., '° ... f!.;.:-.·. '! -·

Sub pena Duces Te

SCHEDULE A

Subpoena Duces Tecum Government Reform Committee ·· United States House of Representatives 2157 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515.

United States Department of Defense Serve: Secretary William Coh n · 1000 Defense Pentagon Washiniton, D.C. 20301-1000

The Committee hereby subpoenas certain records. Please provide logs which indicate each record's Bates number, author, description, and source· file. If you have any questions, please contact Chief Counsel James C. Wilson at (202) 225-5074.

Definitions and Instructions

(1) For the purpses ofthis subpoena, the word " record" or ••records" shall include, but shall not limited to, any and all originals and identical copies of any item whether written, typed, printed, recorded, redacted or unredacted, transcribed, punched, taped, filmed, graphically · portrayed, video or ..audio t ped, however produced or reproduced; and includes,.but is not imited to, any writing, reproduction, transcription, photograph, or video or audio recording,

produced or stored in any fashion, including any and all activity reports, agendast analyses, . announcements, appointment books, briefing materials, bulletins, cables, calendars, card files, computer disks, cover sheets or routing cover sheets; drawings, computer entries, computer printouts, computer tapes, external and internal correspondence, diagrams, d aries, documents, electronic mail (e-mail). facsimiles, journal entries, letters, manuals, memoranda, messages,

· minutes, notes, notices, opinions, st tements or charts of organization, plans, press releases,· recordings, reports, Rolodexes, statements of procedure and policy, studies; summaries, talking points, tapes, telephone bills, telephone logs, telephone message slips, records or evidence of incoming and outgoing telephone calls, telegrams , telexes, transcripts. or any other machine readable material of any sort whether prepared by current or former employees, agents. consultants or by any non-employee without limitation. "Record" or "records" shall also include all other records, documents, data and infonnation of a like and similar n_ature not listed above.

(2) For purposes of tWs subpoena, the terms "refer" or "relate" and 11conceming11 as to any given subject means anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, identifies, mentions. deals with, or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent t o that subject, including but not limited to

· records conc_erning the preparation of other records.

(3) This subpoena calls for the production of records, documents and compilations of data

001191

Subpoenaed Items

and irifoririation that are.currently in your possession, care, custody or control; including,.but not Jiritlted to all records which you have in your physical possession as well as any records to which you have access, any records which were fonnerJy in your possession, or which you have put in storage or anyone has put in storage on your behalf. Unless a time period is specifically

· · identified, the request includes all documents to the present

(4) The conjunctions "or" and lland"' are to be read interchangeably in the manner that gives this subvoona the bro_adest rea:ding.

(5) No reeords, documents, data or infonnation called for by this subpoena sha,U be destroyed, modifled1 redacted, removed or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.

(6) Ifyou have knowledge that any subpoenaed record, document, data or information has been destroyed, discarded or lost, identify the subpoenaed reeords, doeumetlts data or infonnation and provide an. explanation of the desl:fUction, discarding, loss, deposit or disposal.

(7) When invoking a privilege as to any responsive reeord, document, data or information as a ground for withholding such record, document, data or information, list each record. document, compilation of data or information by data, type, addressee, author (and if different, the preparer and signatory), general sut,ject rriatter, and indicated or known circlllation. ·Also, indicate the privilege asserted with respect o each record, document, compilation of data or infonnation in sufficie t detail to ascertain the validity of the claim of privilege.

· (8) This subpoena is continuing in nature, Any record. document, compilation ofdata or infonnation, norproduced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date shall ,be provided immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.

Please produce to the Committee the following:

1. All records prepared or accumulated for a bpefing scheduled.to be given on December 2, 1999, to Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre by Dr. Eileen M. Kovalich-Preisser; and

2. All infonnation profiling prepare y Dr. Eileen M. Kovalich-Preisser at the Land Infonnation Warfare Activity.

2

001192

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Databases Included in this De1110

Unclassified databases used for demo

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INTERNET-engines used: Alta Vista/Yahoo/Hotbot/Lycos/Looksn1art/Excite OSIS (NAIC's PORTAL/CIRC database of technologies, Small Business Information Record, DIALOG 90-99,Dow Jones, Dunn and Bradstreet, Infonnation America, Reuters, LEXIS-NEXIS) KOMP ASS (Chinese business data) DTIC (Defense Technical Infon11ation Center S&T program and funding data) . 1DLA Industrial Analysis Support Office FBIS Chinese Mandarin, Chinese Taiwan news broadcasts (lSep-1 Oct)

Grey Technical Literature 0

g, Grey Foreign Corporate Literature . .... .... 1e:::::i

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*limited access

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Databases Included in this Demo

• Classified databases used for demo

INTELINK- access to all agency posted data up to TS/SCI SIPRNET- access to selected agency hon1epages (i.e.CAPs vveapons DB Los Ala 11os)

AMI-IS MDITDS

*DIA (SAFE, Military Industrial Cotnplex and Facilities, World Tech, Con1111unity Foreign v())

Visitor Program, A 1/ A2 visa data for En1bassy perspnnel in US) *CIA (FBIS, Leadership Analysis products on China, China corporations d'1:ta)

NGIC (Spirit/Tears technical data)

NIMA (China Raster Data)

*NSA (China cell phone intercept 1998-99)

Navy and Air Force CI case files

*ADNET (antidrug Network) DISA, FINCEN, INS, US Marshal Service, US Custon1s Service, FBI,

IRS, Dept State (DoD), DEA, NDIC, US Secret Service, US Postal

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Inspectors Service

jRoutingDate: josn

, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

, -" tion Agency: E CUTIVE SECRETARY ( 1on Required: APPROPRIATE ACTION

o.1ordinate With: LA

References:

Remarks: Document Tjpe: INCOMING

Special Instructions

Suspense Date: . October212005 CONTROL#: osn2osos-os

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTiON OFFICE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OFDEFENSE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

ASD (Legislative Affairs)

GENERAL COUNSEL INSP CTOR GENERAL EXECUTNE SECRETARY REAR EXECUTIVE SUPPORT OFFICE

Page: 1 January, 2000 001195

Representatives

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Tha United States House of

House ARMED

.SERVICES

COMMITTEE

Attention:

Fax Number:

ent By:

\

Number of Pages (Including Cover Shee ):

Note:

2120 Rayburn House

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( F:=tr): c�F THE COMMITTEE ON lli iED SERVI

m. . J!]nuse of !WP���e1ttaft"tk: 41 Wl!agfJlngton. iD 20515-6035

ON( t1UNOFIED NINTH CONGRESS

October 20, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

Secretary ofDefense

Washington DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rurnsfe1d:

As part of our oversight responsibilities. the House Amled Services Committee has been reviewing issues concerning ABLE DANGER and specificallyJ allegatjoos that Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer,s security clearance :was being revoked possibly in retaliation for bis having spoken to the 9il l Commission staff about ABLE DANG.ER. · The Committee has taken this allegation seriously and with assistance from your staff, has conducted both an internal review of documents provid_ed by the Department and infonnal interviews with persons associated with these alJegations.

On October 14, 20QS my staff met with representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to discuss in executive session certain aspects of the DIA investigation into I:.ieutenant Colonel Shaffer's.security clearance proceedings. Following that session, my staff interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer and reviewed official documents in his posstssfori concerning his military perfonna.nce and security clearance status. This review indicated that there are several inconsistencies between the DIA and Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer concerning the facts associated with his security clearanc. . investigation and revocation process. The Committee also has concern.!: with certain aspects ofhow the DIA has handled this matter. ..,

In order to resolve 1hese inconsistencies and to ensure tbere is in fact no evidence . of retaliation against a member of the armed servfoes the Committee requests the

Department of Defense Inspector General conduct an independent review of the facts and circumstances surrounding DIA's actions to revoke Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer's security clearance. The Committee requests that any further action to revoke Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer's security clearance or to terminate his employment with the Defense Intelligence Agency be suspended pending completion ofthe Department of Defense Inspector General independent review. I wou]d further request that the Committee be provided a copy ofthe Inspector General's review when complete.

OSD t!OSOS-05 001197

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Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

DH:bo

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PROJ!CDOl/FQJKIGREMIOt!At /Ill S( ;'ICES c;,ur.us October 7, 2005 OUMA -tONGRfSS nuov GllOUY

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REl'lJllllCAN S1eERING COMMITTEE OMEL.AllP$< 1.JRITYCAUCt.1$

Department of Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretaty Rumsfeld:

It is with a deep sense of disillusionment that I contact you today. In .t:ecent weeks, it has come to my attention that Defense Intelligence Agency officials, in the course of contending with the ABLE DANGERinquit:y, have engaged in behavior that is at best questionable, and perhaps better described as dishonorable. You know as weU as I that inside the Beltway, there 1s a time honored ttadicion of smearing the accuser rather than answering the charge. That method is now apparently being employed in yout departtnent, and white it may be a familiar way of doing business in \Vashington, it is no less disappointing.

Lieutenant Colonel Antl1ony Shaffer has ser:ved his coiintty in uniform for over 20 years. A recipient of the Bronze Stu and a veteran of the global wru: on terror, LTC Shaffer was tnotivated to cotne fo.cwatd with infottnation about ABLE DANGER by the same dedication to the security of the United States that has dtlven hls long and distinguished tnilitaty service. 1 believe that his actions with respect to ABLE DANGER reflect: hlghly upon him, and upon the US Anny which he setves. Howevet, rather than facing the serious questions LTC Shaffer has raised, the DIA has instead attempted to undermine hls .teputatio11 through the tired old tecl111iques of personal desttuction.

After LTC Shaffer contacted and provided in format.ion to the 9-11 Commission in October 2003, DIA suspended his clearance in March 2004. While I cannot prove a link between LTC Shaffer's cooperation with the congressionally authorized 9-11 Commission and the suspension of his security clearance, anyone that has spent 10 mfoutes in this town would find the timing to be highly suspicious.

Three allegatlc.11)$ have been cited as explanation fot the suspension: 1) Undue Awa.td ofa Defense Meritorious Medal (DMS:M); 2) lvfisuse of a Government Cell Phone (to the tune of $67.00) and; 3) Misfiling of a M.ileage Voucher (also a staggering amount: $180.00). This tematkable concern for the sanctity of the taxpayet's dollar was apparently shott lived 11owever, as it has been esti.tnated that the pursuit of these allegations has cost more than $400,000.

THIS STATIONERY PRltHED ON PAPER MADE OF l\EC'!'Cllm FIBERS

001199

(

exttetnely personal ways if necessal-y_,Jhys LTC Shaffer bad pka,'illt .adio"'g in th e-________ _

erous ----------

RTW

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DIA's allegations, all of which transpired while LTC Shaffer was on active duty with the Army, were by all appearances resolved by the Artuy to its satisfaction. No formal action was evei: taken against LTC Shaffer. Quite the contrary, LTC Shaffer was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on October 1, 2004 - a tJeculiar fate for someone under serious investigation. More peculiar is DOD's sudden interest in

If the unpleasant facts of ABLE DANGER have pfaced certain individuals in an awkward position, it seems their solution is to undermine the messenger's credibility, in

paper that he was a member of Alcoholics Anonymous (he's been sober 13 ears). More ----------c=o=nu±'c=a,....l=w=e..,..re�sa1ac1ous an prepos reports o

I am ashamed that out government has slapJled a fortnet National Security Advisor on the wrist for stealing classified documents and lying to cover up his misdeeds - all apparently in a fame attempt to hide sensitive information from the 9-11 Commission -while at the same time a brave soldier's career is systematically destroyed as punishment for cooperating with the Com.mission, and for telling the truth. If this treatment is supposed to be a warning to futw:e whistleblowers tllat the costs of speaking out ate too high, then the United States Congress will be forced to reply with a stern warning of its own.

On September 8, 2005, in a briefing by DOD offidals to members of the House Armed Setvices Committee, DIA's representative, Mr. William Huntington, admitted that LTC Shaffer's documents, which included ABLE DANGER information, had been destroyed. I would appreciate a detailed report on the desttuctlon ofLTC Shaffer's documents and other files, including answers as to why the documents were destroyed, who authorized the destruction, and who carried it out. I also expect to be presented with a mote compelling explanation of the rationale for LTC Shaffer's clearance suspension than misplaced pocket change.

Finally, as I tnentioned to you during the Armed Setvices Committee hearing last week, DIA refuses to pertnitLTC Shaffer to brief Members of Congress and :relevant oversight committees. \Vbile I would like to believe that this is due to concern over classified subjects being cliscussed in an open hearing, I cannot but help suspect that there ate ulterlor motives. Congress will not allow this brave man to be gagged by nameless bureauc:rats fearful of embarrassment. While it may be uncomfottable for some who opetate outside public view to have the light of day shone upon thetn, the ttuth will inevitably be told. The only choice fol' the likes of you and I is to decide which side we will be remembered to have been on when the history of these events is ultimately written.

Member of Congress

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SEP. 9. 2005 10: 15AM SENATOR SPECTER NO. 755 P. 1'.· 3 ARLEN i?ECTEf!. PENi'JSY'LVAMf\. CKAIRMAN

·ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH CHARLoS E. GRASSI.EV, 10WAJON KYI., ARIZONA

l'"TRICIU. LEAHY. V'eRMONT ECWAf\0 M, KENNeov. MASSACHUSETTS JOSEPH R. BIOEN, Jll., OELAWAi'tE HERBERT KOHL, WISCONSINMnce OeW?NE. OHIO

JEFF S SSIONS.Al.AeAMA DIANNE FEINSTEIN. CALIFORNIA. fll,JSSE!.1. C. FElNGOLD. WISCOMSIN CHAFH.ES S. SCHUMER. NEW YORK RICHARDJ, DUR91N, 11.LINO!S

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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY WASHINGTON, DC 20510-62.75

September 8, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rwnsfeld Secretary ofDefense 1000 Defe11se Pentagon . Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Judiciary Committee. in its oversight capacity, is reviewing the 3ctivities of the Deparnnent ofJustice including the FBI on the issue ofinfonnation·sha:ring relating to terrorism. It has come to our attention that the F,BI was denied access by the Department ofDefense to critical information Q11 Mohammed Aita prior to September 11, 2001. We have scheduled.a hearing for September 21, 2005 in connection with multiple military projects run by the Land Infonnation Warfare Activity (LIW A), now known as the Information Dominance Center (IDC), including, but not limited to a project kn0\"1.rn as ABLE DANGER. It is my understanding that LIW Al IDC is aDepartment of the Am:iy operation that supports the activities of the U.S. Anny Intelligence and Security Conunand (IN'SCO:tvI). It is further my understanding that LtwAIIDC specialized in data mining and analysis to, among other things} detect and target al Qaeda terrorists worldwide. Project ABLE DANGER has received extensive press coverage over the past month, including reports that this project may have identified the names oftl1e 9· 11 terrorists more than a year prior to 9 11, but that this infonnation was not shared v..ith the FBI on advice of legal counsel. It is my intention· to determine ifthe state ofthe law is such that it impedes the sharing of information among military and non military agencies. placing our nation in danger of another terrorist attack. It is further my intention to ensure, by legislation or otherwise, that the most sophisticated information available to us to fight terrorism be shared at all levels ofgovernment -hile protecting the privacy ofour citizens.

ABLE DANGER and other ensuing projects were reportedly initiated by General Peter Schoomaker, who was then Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command ("USSOCOM") and is now Chief of Staff, U..S. Anny. According to Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer and Navy Captain Scott Phillpott; at some point during 1999 or 2000, ABLE DA... GER identified two ofthe tbree Al Qaeda cells that conducted the attacks on September 11, 2001, including the "Brooklyn cell" to which Mohammed Atta belonged. Because some Brooklyn cell members were in the United States legally (and therefore defined as U.S. persons by Department of Defense Directive No. 5240. 1), USSOCOM la\Vyers reportedly advised Shaffer, Phillpott and others that they could take no action with regard to the information gathered against the suspected Al Qaeda terrorists.

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. Specifically, it has been reported to my staff that lawyers--and· Richard Schiffren advised the LIVI NJDC staff that they could not contmue with the ABLE DANGER project, could not share any ofthe information collected with law enforcement agencies and were required to delete all related documents and information. stored on back-up tapes: The former LIW A/IDC Chief of Intelligence, Anny Major Erik Kleinsmith confums this account.

It is my understanding that DOD and DIA have conducted an investigation into the assertions made by these individuals and have concluded that there are no documents or other support for the claim that the ABLE DANGER project identified Mohammed Atta as an Al Quaeda member prior to September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, it was reported to my staff at a recent meeting Vwith military officials that both Captain Phillpott and fonner .Army Major Erik Kleinsmith are well respected and valued members ofthe military community and that there is no reason to believe that they are lying. In fact, they stated that they found Philtpott and Kleinsmith to be credible.

Although Kleinsmith apparently does not recall whether or not Atta's name was on a chart produced prior to 9-11, contractor, J.D. Smith, and a SOCOM intelligence finnly believe that they saw Atta's name on this chart. At least five witnesses report that LIW NJDC created ''picture ch.arts" prior to 9-11 that depicted multiple suspected al Qaeda terrorists residing in the U.S. Several ofthese charts were reportedly shown to General Schoemaker and Anny Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, the commanding officer of INSCOM from February 2001 to July 200.3. now Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service.

I would like to pursue this matter further by reviewing any documents and investigation files and by speaking with certain witnesses. This is an official request that you provide all information and documents> whether in electronic or paper form, related to LIWAJIDC terrorist data mining, incluiling, but not limited to project ABLE DANGER. Such information, records or documents should include, but not be limited to, charts, e-mail messages, handwritten notes, phone mes$age slips, letters or memos, chronologies, mission statements, investigation file materials and interview reports, Further, I would like to review the entire investigation into this matter and would be happy to send a member ofmy staffto your designated location to do so early next week.

Lt. Colonel Shaffer has asserted that, in connection with his work in support of Able Danger, he kept a full set of Able Danger authorizing documents, cover support documents, charts and graphs. Shaffer has reported that, as ofMarch 2004 these documents were located on the third floor of the Defense Intelligence Agency facility in Clarendon, Virginia. He does not now know where these documents are located. He further states that there are a series ofe-mail messages discussing the events described

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above on the "TS/SCI DIA LAN." In addition, it is our understanding that DIA has e·mail messages in its possession related to Able Danger. My staff has requested and I no\V request copies ofthese emails or any other documents as described herein. My staff further requested that DIA permit Lt. Colonel ShaffeT supervised access to its computer systems and files in order for hiin to assist in locating any pertinent infonnation. This request has been denied. I reiterate this request to you and further request that you give authorization and direction to the following individuals to be interviewed by my staff: General Schoemaker, Lieutenant General C tain Scott Phillpott, Dr. Eileen Preisser, Erik Kleinsmith, Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Army General Robert Noonan, and lawyers and Richard Schiffien.

The scheduling of document review and witness interviews should be coordinated through my General Counsel, Carolyn P. Short. Thank you for your attention to this important issue regarding interagency information sharii_lg.

AS/cs

cc: Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby Director Defense Intelligence Agency

Daniel Stanley Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

William J. Haynes II

General Counsel ofthe Department of Defense

Kathleen Turner Chiefof Congressional Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency

/ NeelyMoody General Counsel, Defense Intelligence Agency

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