Measuring Success: Are We Winning? 10 Years in Afghanistan

8/4/2019 Measuring Success: Are We Winning? 10 Years in Afghanistan

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Measuring Success: Are We Winning?

10 Years in Aghanistan

By Joshua Foust

October 6, 2011

Introduction

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011 saw the war in Aghanistantake a very dierent turn. Ratherthan a grinding summer o battles

between insurgents and Coalitiontroops, the Aghan insurgents begana campaign o assassinations, attacksagainst high-prole targets in Kabul(which many considered secured andunassailable), and a sophisticatedinuence campaign.

Starting in January, they launched abrazen suicide assault on an upscale supermarket in a secured area o Kabul, targetingthe country director o a private security rm.1 In February, suicide attackers exploded

bombs at a hotel in downtown Kabul, killing two.2 In April, insurgents attacked AghanArmy and International Security Assistance Force bases in the city, though they killedno one other than themselves.3

In June, gunmen launched a sustained, complex attack on the heavily guarded HotelIntercontinental in Kabul, killing eighteen people.4 Over the summer, they launcheda string o deadly attacks, killing dozens o people.5 In August, insurgents launchedyet another complex, sustained attack on the British Council in a wealthy, securedneighborhood o Kabul, killing eight.6 And in September, a small team o insurgentsmanaged to re machine guns and launch RPGs at the U.S. embassy or over 20 hoursbeore being neutralized by Coalition orces.7

Given the persistent underreporting o violence in Aghanistan, there could very wellhave been even more violence than this short list captures.8

Tis marked shi would seem to indicate the war is being lost. But because the U.S. ailsto monitor crucial aspects o the war, there is no reliable way to be certain.


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AMERICAN SECURIY PROJEC

10 years aer U.S. orces invaded Aghanistan, we still lack the means to tell whether the war is beingwon or not.

None o those attacks, taken in isolation, killed very many people the deadliest was the IntercontinentaHotel attack, which included seven dead insurgents and they werent meant to. Even Septembers attackon the U.S. embassy wasnt very complex, and the insurgents did not demonstrate any particular tactica

genius.9

Te insurgents, however, do not need to win large tactical victories in order to win the war: they arenot ghting a symmetric war. Rather, they seem intent on disrupting the Aghan governments abilityto govern - so that rule o the Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan becomes preerable to Aghans.

In 2008, an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul was widely considered unthinkable. Te downtownneighborhoods were being surrounded by what many called a Ring o Steel10 dozens o guardsroadblocks, checkpoints, and barricades so that business could take place in a Green Zone where

violence was kept at a minimum. oday, the insurgency can penetrate the Ring o Steel again and again tolaunch attacks.

Te recent attacks served to shake condence in ISAF and the Aghan government.

In contrast, ISAF seems to be waging a diferent war altogether.

ISAF reporting on its activities seems more concerned with establishing a running tally o operation

relying on insurgent body counts to underscore progress in the war,11 publishing data only on deadlyattacks,12 tangible measurements o progress like counting the number o community shuras it hosts,1

and counting how many soldiers nish basic training.14

While ISAF data capture many physical measurements o the war, it is less successul in measuring thesocial and political eects o the war, such as which side Aghans think will ultimately win.

In essence, the aliban and its allies must shake condence in the Aghan government and diminish theWestern appetite or staying in order to win. Te International Security and Assistance Force and its Aghanallies are waging a ar dierent war based on sweeping operations, inrastructure creation, and securityorce training.

With both parties to the conict ghting dierent wars with dierent types o outcomes, is it even possibleto gauge i the ISAF and Aghan government coalition is winning? Te answer is not simple.

When gauging ISAFs success in Aghanistan one should rst dene success something we show isnot easy to do. Once success is dened, one can create the metrics by which one would measure progrestoward or away rom that dened success.

We settled on the most generous interpretation o President Obamas publicly stated aims or the war: denyal Qaeda sae haven, prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government, and build up the Aghan


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security orces and the government so they can take responsibility or their countrys uture.

How one goes about reaching this goal is no simple matter: two o the three objectives PresidentObama stated are dened by absence rather than by achievement, and the third objective is not really

denable in concrete terms.

While it may be difcult to say when, exactly, we can know that our goals have been met, we can developa series o metrics that should indicate whether we are progressing toward those goals or not.

Te ollowing paper describes those metrics, and tries to determine whether we are measuring the mostrelevant data to gauge success in Aghanistan.

Lastly, we ask the question: what are we actually measuring? And do the data we have allow us to accuratelygauge the success o our eorts?


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What Is Success?

Te biggest problem in asking whether we are winningin Aghanistan is dening what winning looks like.What are the aims o the war?

Since taking ofce, President Obama and his seniorofcials have oered a variety o denitions orsuccess. In his speech to West Point announcing themilitary surge, President Obama said:

Our overarching goal remains the same: to dis-rupt, dismantle, and deeat al Qaeda in Aghani-stan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity tothreaten America and our allies in the uture.

o meet that goal, we will pursue the ollowing objectives within Aghanistan. We must deny al Qaedaa sae-haven. We must reverse the alibans momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity o Aghanistans Security Forces and government, so thathey can take lead responsibility or Aghanistans uture.15

In his State o the Union in 2011, he went on to say: Our purpose is clear -- by preventing the aliban romreestablishing a stranglehold over the Aghan people, we will deny al Qaeda the sae-haven that served as alaunching pad or 9/11.16

Tese goals do not easily lead to dened success metrics. Rather they are linked to proving negatives: are

we denying them a sae haven, and are we degrading their abilities? Tese goals create a strategy dened byabsence, not progress, and thus make that strategy impossible to achieve.

At any point, a single variance rom absence might indicate ailure, so the status quo must be maintainedorever to ensure there is never variance.

Winning and success requires a goal. And the only way to determine whether that goal has been met is toestablish metrics by which you measure your progress toward achieving that goal. Tere is, however, verylittle agreement among senior ofcials in the Obama Administration about what that goal really is:

Ryan Crocker, the new ambassador to Kabul, has said,Building an Aghanistan that is a shining city ona hill is not going to happen.Instead, the goal should be sustainable stability.17He said our goal is tobring, good enough governance in Aghanistan to ensure the country doesnt degenerate into a sae havenor al-Qaeda.18

Former Secretary o Deense Robert Gates tried to dene success in Aghanistan without a conventiona


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military victory. We have not had a declared victory in a war with the possible exception o the rstGul War since World War II, he said in June o this year. It is the phenomenon o modern conict.19Secretary Gates listed key attributes by which we can achieve success without victory: Are our interestsprotected? Is the security o the United States protected? Are the Americans saer at the end because o thesacrice these soldiers have made? Tats the real question.20

Beore he replaced Robert Gates as Secretary o Deense, Leon Panetta was the Director o CentralIntelligence. In June, then CIA Director Panetta said, Te undamental mission is to provide sucientstability so [that nation] is never again a sae haven or al Qaeda and similar groups.21

Secretary o State Hillary Clinton has dened the terms o success in Aghanistan in several ways overthe last two years. In May o this year, she ocused on eorts to reconcile the aliban with the Aghangovernment. For reconciliation to succeed,she told reporters aer the raid that killed Osama bin Laden,Pakistan must be part o this process.22 In 2010, Secretary Clinton told Greta van Susteren in Aghanistan,a secure and stable Aghanistan,means a country that is able to deend itsel with an army and a policeorce that is able to protect its citizens rom the kind o terrorist activities that now plague many parts o thecountry.23

General David Petraeus, speaking during his testimony beore the Senate Armed Services Committee inMarch o this year, said, its important to remember why we are [in Aghanistan]. Tats where 9/11 began-- thats where the plan was made We do see al Qaeda looking or sanctuaries all the time.24

President Obamas rst Special Representative or Aghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador RichardHolbrooke, or his part, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July o 2010, that when hereerences an end-state, the denition o success, it should be a sustainable end-state which includescontinued American economic and development assistance.25

aken together, these senior ofcials reveal a worrying ambiguity about the wars strategic goals anddesired end-state.

Even more troubling, they dene victory in the war as absence: Aghanistan is a success i X does nothappen. It is an impossible goal, as a single act could lead to deeat. By President Obamas denition o

victory, success means al Qaeda can never use Aghanistan or Pakistan to threaten the United States.

Tis then means the war is either already won, or it will never be won al Qaeda does not have a saehaven in Aghanistan and is on the ropes,26 or, alternatively, we must stay there orever to make sure itneverhas a sae haven in Aghanistan or Pakistan.

Tis is strategic incoherence at its most stark.

Despite the vagueness o these goals or victory, we can look at certain indicators to determine whetherthe overall environment in Aghanistan is improving or degrading. By doing so, the likelihood o victory,or the specter o deeat, becomes apparent.


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Te Metrics

At a conerence in 2009, Ambassador Holbrooke was asked how he would measure progress in AghanistanHolbrooke responded, In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test or another issue: Well know it whenwe see it.27

While many pundits and analysts cringed at the reerence (Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, indiscussing his denition o pornography in 1964, said, I know it when I see it.28), Holbrooke revealed acommon problem in measuring the wars progress: it is oen not clear what we shouldmeasure, and howto interpret the data.

We broke down President Obamas strategic objectives or the war into three broad pillars, and rom thaderived nine broad metrics that should tell us whether or not the war is being won.

Te metrics we discuss below are not meant to capture the entirety o the war, or even necessarily tocapture a representative sample o it. Rather, these nine metrics show how the war as a system, and not jus

a ew points o data, is progressing.

Te three pillars o President Obamas strategic objectives requires some explanation:

1. Deny al Qaeda sae haven. Te term sae haven is problematic, as it can mean many things. Terehave been many arrests and trials or attempted terrorism in the U.S.,29 but very ew analysts wouldsay the U.S. is a sae haven or terrorism.

We chose to interpret this statement to mean what it meant when discussing al Qaeda in Aghanistan in the 1990s: large training camps where recruits are indoctrinated, instructed in how to conduct terrorist operations, and sent abroad to do so.30

2. Prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government. President Obama did not say deeathe aliban, or end all violent attacks, he said he aimed to reverse their momentum and preventhe governments overthrow.

Te two key words we use to derive metrics are overthrow and government. Tere is a dier-ence between a state and a government a state is an organized political community occupyinga certain territory, while a government is an organization that has the power to make and enorcelaws on that territory.

Te insurgency is ghting or the Islamic State o Aghanistan31 a undamentally dierent stat

than Hamid Karzais regime currently in control o Kabul. In order to build that dierent statethey must overthrow the current government that is, they must destroy or displace the currenregime, and take over the levers o government to create their alternative state. It is a social andpolitical act as much as it is a physical one.


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3. Build up the Aghan security orces and the government so they can take responsibility ortheir countrys uture. Both governments and security orces have basic attributes to be able torule their territory eectively. Governments need sovereignty, legitimacy, and the rule o law inorder to govern.

Security services need to have a stable cadre o members trained so that institutional practices can

be developed and a sense o proessionalism can prevent widespread abuses.

Neither o these two is particularly easy to quantiy and measure, much less build up, so we triedto pick metrics that would indicate how both sets o institutions are behaving and being perceived.

Using these three pillars, we derived nine metrics that will indicate whether those three objectives arebeing met:

Political Participation helps us understand i the Aghan government has sufcient capacity totake responsibility or Aghanistans uture. I Aghans eel comortable participating in the po-litical process, then they eel condent in their governments ability to unction. Conversely, i

Aghans either eel excluded rom political lie, or eel like their participation is meaningless, thenthey do not believe their government has the ability to unction.

Violent Rhetoricrom Religious and Community Leaders helps us understand i the insurgen-cys momentum is really being reversed, and i there is sufcient public sentiment to support theiroverthrow o the Aghan government.

I religious and community leaders are constantly calling or violence against Aghan governmentand ISAF orces, that indicates deep-seated resentment against the mission.

Shadow Government and Judicial Institutions are a good indicator o where the aliban andother insurgent groups eel most comortable operating.

By measuring the prevalence and unctionality o these insurgent institutions we can get a sense owhere government control is being superseded by the insurgency, which will tell us where govern-ment capacity is being most threatened.

Provincial and Local Institutions and Accountabilitytells us how Aghans eel about the localinstitutions o government. I Aghans are participating in and engaged with their local govern-ment, they are less likely to support an insurgent overthrow o the government.

Tis metric also indicates how Aghans perceive the states ability to unction. While some inor-mal institutions, such as tribes or village councils might appear appropriate substitutions, Presi-dent Obamas strategy requires a government, so we ocus in this metric on presence and peror-mance o the government.


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Agricultural Production helps us measure the economic oundation o the country. I staple cropare being grown in an economically sustainable way, then that will orm the oundation o a stablgovernment that can control its territory.

It also indirectly demonstrates local security conditions, as well as the state o inrastructure ormoving goods to market.

Aghan National Security Forces Retention is a crucial actor in determining the long-term prospects o the ANSF. I there is a high retention rate that is eectively a vote o condence in both thesecurity orces and the government they serve.

I retention is low, that indicates low condence in the prospects o success or the security serviceand the government.

Childhood Literacyis a leading indicator o the long-term prospects o a stable Aghan govern-ment. A growing rate o childhood literacy will make extremism less likely to take root in Aghancommunities.32

Literacy is also a strong indicator o the prospects or the development o civil institutions, whichare a crucial component o a stable government.

Sel-Identied Membership in al Qaeda is the rst objective President Obama routinely statesin his strategic commentary on the war. One o the primary goals o the war in Aghanistan is tocripple al Qaeda and deny them sae haven or the ability to launch attacks.

While sel-identied membership is not directly related to their capacity or launching attackschanges in al Qaedas sel-identied membership over time is an indirect indicator o how healthy

the organization is, and o the pool o people it has access to inside Aghanistan in order to launchattacks.

Violence is vital to understanding the war. I violence is increasing over time, it may or may notindicate mission ailure: the nature o the violence, including who perpetrates it and against whomit is perpetrated, is paramount.

A granular understanding o the system o violence in Aghanistan will let us understand i thewar is working toward the uture Aghanistan controlled by a stable government, stable securityservices, and ree o the existential threat rom the aliban or rom Al Qaeda using its territory tolaunch attacks.

We do not try to capture in this paper the specic numbers o any particular metric. Rather, we aim tocapture whether or not these metrics are being measured, and just as importantly i we can track how thosemetrics are changing over time: is it improving, is it getting worse, and what implications we can deriverom that metrics trajectory.


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Tese indicators are in no particular order, but the data they provide should be judged as a group, and notsolo.

No one indicator stands out on its own as being solely indicative o success or ailurethe war is a system,so it must be considered as a system.

Political Participation

An increase o non-violent political involvement should be seen as a metric o success. Tis shouldinclude both ormal and inormal political networks as well as movements that are pro- and anti- Aghangovernment. I the aliban, or example, decides it would rather oppose the Karzai government throughrunning or ofce and holding protest marches, thatis a ar better end-state than continued ghting.

More non-violent anti-government involvementindicates opposition orces turning away rom

violence and becoming part o the politicalramework. Tis is a good thing, as the non-violent,political resolution o disputes is an importantmilestone in ending the uncontrolled violence.

Tere are extensive data or electoral participation.Several agencies compile data on voter turnoutor Aghanistans elections. Te InternationalInstitute or Democracy and Electoral Assistance,or example, has national-level data or bothParliamentary and Presidential elections rom 2004-2010.33 Te Free Elections Foundation o Aghanistancatalogues Aghanistans voter registration process,34 and created a detailed map o polling centers, votingirregularity and other incidents o raud and intimidation, Election Day violence, and other voting issues.35Te National Democratic Institute created a repository o reely available data about the Parliamentary andPresidential elections rom 2004-2010.36 Te International Republican Institute also compiled detailedreports on electoral participation in both the Parliamentary37 and Presidential38 elections.

However, there are many data that would also lend insight into political participation that we could notnd:

Numbers attending political meetings, organizations, march, protests etc (male and emale)

Number o non-violent protests

Number attending shura/jirga/council meetings (male and emale)


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Number o individual religious and community leaders calling or political involvement (by requency, region, and afliation)

Tere are many others. Tese are the basic building blocks o a civil society, which is normally expressedthrough participation in elections.

Te elections process, too, is deeply awed while the reports many NGOs assemble are unequivocal abouthe problems that result rom such a awed election system, a look only at numbers o voters over time maynot reveal i Aghans are actually buying into the idea o participating in the political system or not.

As it stands now, we could not assemble sufcient data to tell whether Aghans are becoming more or lesinvolved in political issues.

Violent Rhetoric rom Religious and Community Leaders

In contrast to non-political involvement, leaders calling or violence, against any party or institution shouldbe seen as a negative. Preaching or calling or violence indicates an extreme rejection o the state.

Violent rhetoric could potentially be important, i only as an early indicator o areas that may be prone toviolence later. In May o 2011, preacher erry Jones held a public rally in Florida where he lit a Koran onre. While the event was largely unnoticed in the U.S., in Aghanistan several mullahs in the northern cityo Mazar-i Shari preached that Muslim worshippers must exact revenge or the desecration o their holybook.39 In the ensuing riot, protesters angry at the lack o Americans to attack nearby stormed the locaUNAMA compound, breaching its walls and killing seven U.N. workers. Rioters stirred to action by violenpreaching by religious leaders in Kandahar killed another ten people that same day.40

Aer extensive searching, we could not nd a single comprehensive study about the nature, extent, orcontent o the rhetoric used by religious or community leaders.

Shadow Government and Judicial Institutions

Tis is not a measurement o inormal local government or justice institutions, but rather institutioncreated by the insurgency to contest or replace state control. Shadow institutions represent a coercive

impact on the state.

As the U.S. and its allies try to assist the Aghans in building an accountable, responsible government, agrowth in the number and extent o these shadow institutions would represent a ailure. At the same timehowever, a decrease in these structures does not necessarily represent a victory o the government such a


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decrease would simply mean the insurgency is not replacing those that are destroyed.

Much like religious and community leader rhetoric, there are little data about aliban institutions. Whilethis is or understandable reasons owing to the difculty o measuring, the paucity o data limited insome cases to mere anecdotes makes drawing conclusions about shadow institutions difcult.

We could nd no comprehensive study o the number o and type o shadow institutions, or even a reliablelist o known shadow ofcials (governors, judges, and so on). Te Aghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit completed a case study in 2010 about governance structures in Nimroz Province, but it relied onanecdotes and interviews rather than hard data.41 While Te Brookings Institution presents data abouthow and where Aghans choose to pursue justice, their data are rom 2007.42

Te data on shadow institutions is badly incomplete. No one is measuring it, so it is impossible to draw

conclusions rom it.

Provincial and Local Institutions, and Accountability

Related to the issue o shadow institutions, success in Aghanistan as dened by President Obama mustinvolve Aghans having an accountable local government by and or Aghans. Tere are more data aboutlocal government perormance than there are about shadow institutions, but the data are still incomplete.

As one example, we could not nd any data o how many government institutions have literate ofcialsand stas. Tis is a critical issue in measuring government perormance, as i ofcials and sta cannotread they cannot participate in a modern bureaucracy. In act, the only data we could nd about theperormance o Aghanistans governmental institutions relate to ailures. A 2011 Congressional ResearchService report catalogued how local governments in Aghanistan all short o their goals and listed howmany positions remain unlled.43 AREU has written a number o reports about government ailures,44 butthese are based mostly on anecdotes and not hard data.

We also do not have data on the makeup o local governance institutions: how many ofcials are electedby their communities, how many are appointed rom Kabul, and how many are placed by Coalition orces.We do not have sufcient data to measure the unctionality and accountability o local governments inAghanistan.

Agricultural Production

Agricultural production (licit or illicit) is linked to the use o land and the amount o capital and timeinvested. I armers are growing more ood on more land, that indirectly indicates improvements in


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security and inrastructure, along with an improvement in stability. Farmers will eel more comortablegrowing more ood i they have a stable economy and stable politics.

Te mixture o licit and illicit agriculture also matters: i armers tend to grow more cannabis or opiumthan they do licit crops, that also indirectly indicates the relative level o government control, presence oorganized criminal networks, and overall condence in the government.

Te challenge with measuring agricultural production in Aghanistan, however, is that the ew indiceavailable arent always specic in their methodologies. So when IndexMundi compiles data rom theUSDA, there is no indication o how it was originally gathered. Te data on cotton production are probablyunreliable, as are IndexMundis charting o rice production.45 Tey draw their data or both charts romthe United States Department o Agriculture, but there is no indication on how the data are collected ororganized. Te USDA also publishes data on several commodities in Aghanistan like wheat.46 All datasetshow enormous variations during the 2001-2010 period, unless there are little or no data (like the long alines or cotton production). It is difcult to draw conclusions rom this data.

Tere are relatively more data or opium production. Te United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crimeassembles yearly reports about the production o opium in Aghanistan. Tey have data rom 2005-2011,4

and show a very mixed record: changes to opium cultivation in recent years seem to be the result o weatheand ood price uctuations as much as anything else.

All told, agricultural production is one o the most closely-tracked metrics. Despite that, the data one mighuse to draw conclusions is deeply awed, and does not seem to obey clear trend patterns useul or analysis

ANSF Retention

President Obamas victory denition requires a strong Aghan security sector, most commonly reerredto as the Aghan National Security Forces. Gauging the eectiveness o the ANSF can take many ormsassessments o operational independence,48 an analysis o police corruption that uels resentment towardthe government,49 and measurements o brutality against Aghan citizens.50

We think ocusing on retention is a more neutral measurement o ANSF capability. A high retention ratein ANSF organizations represents a general belie in victory, as well as demonstrating condence in theopportunity o service and o lessening violence.

Tere are airly good data on ANSF retention: according to a recent report, desertion rates jumped 46% in

2011.51 Tat is, more and more ANSF personnel are walking away rom their service duties as comparedto previous years.

Tis indicates an overall breakdown o condence in the ANSF mission.


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Childhood Literacy

Most studies o education in Aghanistan ocus on the number oschools built, or the number o children with access to education,or the number o children who attend school. Tese are all

interesting measurements, but they dont capture what is actuallyhappening at those schools.

It is important that children not only attend school, but learn atthem. Tus, measuring childhood literacy, and not just schoolattendance, captures the efect o education programs, and not

just their existence.

Furthermore, a growing number o literate children indirectlydemonstrates several phenomena: the belie and trust ineducation and the state, the ability o local populations to send

their children to a school, and that schools are adequately teachingthose children.

Te Brookings Institution compiled several studies to measureannual enrollment in elementary secondary education rom2002-2011.52 While the trend lines are positive, this metric doesnot capture literacy rates. UNICEF claims a 49% literacy ratein Aghans aged 15-24, but these data are sourced to an unknown UNESCO survey. 53 Te most recentUNESCO country programming document, rom 2010-2011, uses data rom the Aghanistan NationalVulnerability Risk Assessment report, published by the Ministry o Rural Rehabilitation and Development.It estimates literacy in Aghans above the age o 15 to be 26% (39% or men and 12% or women).54 It is

unclear how these statistics can be reconciled, but most surveys seem to agree that both access to andquality o education is improving.

Sel-Identifed Members o Al Qaeda

Te overwhelming reason U.S. citizens are risking their lives in Aghanistan is to degrade and to denyterritory to Al Qaeda as stipulated in President Obamas stated strategic rationale or the war. Is thenumber o Al Qaeda in Aghanistan growing or shrinking? Lowering the number o Al Qaeda is a key

measurement o mission success.

We distinguish between insurgents described by U.S. ofcials as being tied to Al Qaeda and actual, sel-identied members o Al Qaeda. It is unclear how the U.S. government distinguishes between associationswith Al Qaeda rom membership in Al Qaeda, which makes determining the eect o such a measurementan inappropriate basis or analytic conclusions. As one example, in early September 2011, the Coalition


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killed Sabir Lal, a man previously incarcerated in Guantanamo.55 Ofcials said he was responsible oorganizing attacks in the volatile Kunar province, and that he had links to Al Qaeda. However, the natureo those links, and what it really means to be linked to Al Qaeda, was le unstated apart rom his being incontact with senior al Qaeda gures in Kunar and Pakistan. We have no idea what the designation meansin practice: was Melma taking orders rom these senior Al Qaeda gures, or was he merely coordinatingwith them because they operated in the same area? Answering that question is critical to understanding threal nature o Al Qaeda, and whether Coalition eorts to degrade its capabilities are working.

Tere are very ew data to indicate the number o sel-identiying Al Qaeda in Aghanistan. In 2010CIA Director Leon Panetta said, at most, were looking at maybe 50 to 100 [members o Al Qaeda inAghanistan], maybe less.56 It is unclear i he meant sel-identied Al Qaeda or those the U.S. identies ahaving links with Al Qaeda. In reporting on the September 2011 Sabir Lal killing, ISAF claimed to havecaptured or killed more than 40 al-Qaida [sic] insurgents in eastern Aghanistan this year.57 Howeveran analysis o ISAF reports on Al Qaeda shows that they only reported 22 killed and 10 captured during2011.58

We do not have sufcient data to show or certain what the state o Al Qaeda in Aghanistan really is, ohow it is changing. I ISAF really has captured or killed 40 Al Qaeda ghters in 2011, we still do not knowhow that aects Secretary Panettas 2010 estimate o 50 to 100 Al Qaeda members een months ago.

Violence

By ar the most common metric applied to Aghanistan is a measurement o violence. Methodologies omeasuring violence vary tremendously, and ofcial agencies disagree about how to observe it. In Septemberboth ISAF and the UN released conicting reports o violence in Aghanistan: ISAF argued there is less

violence in the country, while the UN claimed there was substantially more.59

Te dierence between ISAFs violence metric and the UNs violence metric is most likely denitionalISAF, or example, does not consider the planting o an IED to be a violent act i it is deused and no one iinjured.60 Te UN, on the other hand, uses a more traditional measurement o violence, in which the veryact o planting an improvised explosive, whatever the result, is an act o violence against the state.

Most measurements o violence in Aghanistan are too broad or drawing analytic conclusions. Lessviolence is generally a good thing, though it does not actually mean the aliban is being deeated; moreviolence doesnt automatically indicate ailure, either, it only means government control is being contestedHence, measuring violence can require granularity depending on the ocus o measurement.

A concentration o violence against civilians probably means something dierent than a concentration oviolence against Aghan government ofcials or ISAF troops.

Dierent sources compile their data dierently, with no set denition o what constitutes combatants and


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non-combatants, and, as with ISAFs statement above, no set denition o what constitutes violence.61 Assuch, we do not believe aggregate numbers about violence say very much about the state o the war. Rather,

violence in Aghanistan is part o a social and political system, and should be viewed in that context.

In terms o the social and political eects o violence, the last two years in Aghanistan have beendevastating.

While attacks like Septembers brie siege o the U.S. embassy in Kabul did not do substantial damage orkill more than a ew people, the social and political consequences o that attack are quite signicant. Asa symbol, attacking the U.S. Embassy is a devastating statement on Americas stature in Aghanistan, onthe efcacy o ISAF and Aghan security orces in Kabul, and on the insurgencys belie in its chances or

victory. Rather than being harassment, as U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker described the attack,62 it insteadpunctured the widespread Aghan belie than American diplomats in their embassy were untouchable.

At the same time, ISAF ofcials are correct in a way to describe such actions as being relatively minor ando little consequence to anyones ability to ght.

Attacking the U.S. embassy, or an international hotel, or even murdering an Aghan government ofcialdoes not alter the physical status o the war it does not change the number o U.S. troops, or their abilityto move across the countryside and occupy territory, or the ability o the Aghan government to unction.From a physical measurement o war, which ISAF relies on to gauge its success, these attacks, howevercomplex and spectacular,63 do not alter the war in any signicant way.

Te problem o violence is a perect encapsulation o the wo Wars concept we explain above: the alibanare not ghting a physical war, but a political and social war; ISAF, on the other hand, is ghting a largelyphysical war and does not measure the political and social aspects o the war.

Te symbolic, low-damage, low-casualty attacks in Kabul have not had much o a physical eect on the war,but their political and social consequences have been enormous, and Aghanistan is currently strugglingwith a sharp brain drain, o educated Aghans eeing the country to live and work away rom the chaos.64

Insurgent violence, like planting an IED or laying siege to a building owned by oreigners, matters becauseit is an act o political violence: it is an attack on the state, a maniestation o someone rejecting participationin the political process. In a similar vein, non-insurgent violence, like police brutality and criminal violenceare only relevant to U.S. strategic decision-making in terms o how they alter the political participation oordinary Aghans.

It is the political and social consequences o violence that matter to the question o whether we are winning

the war not the violence itsel.

Tere are no comprehensive studies o the political and social consequences o violence. In other words,we are not measuring violence in a way that will help us understand i we are progressing toward PresidentObamas three objectives or not.


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I we are to consider violence a political and social act, then we should try to measure the political andsocial eects o violence.

Tese metrics are mostly correlative: i an attack or series o attacks are accompanied by a rapid changein a metric like political participation, religious and community leader rhetoric, or insurgent shadowgovernment institutions, then we can start piecing together a picture by which violence aects Aghanistan

political and social climate.

In a political war, violence only matters in terms o how closely it correlates to sudden changes to the statuquo, or how a persistent pattern o violence happens at the same time as other trends.

Conclusions

In 2011, 10 years aer its start, it has become clear that there are two wars in Aghanistan a physical on

being ought by ISAF and a war o inuence being ought by insurgents.

President Obamas strategic objectives inAghanistan are undened and by their very nature unachievable. Tey do though, imply a set ophenomena that can be tracked. We attempted toderive metrics, and to catalogue whether they arebeing measured.

Tere are no public data that capture these metricsin their entirety, and many metrics we should be

attempting to measure are simply not tracked inpublicly available data.

What is clear, though, is that we are not tracking ourprogress in the war.

Te three pillars o President Obamas strategy are:

1. Deny al Qaeda sae haven

2. Prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government

3. Build up the Aghan security orces and the government so they can take responsibility ortheir countrys uture

Using these three pillars, we derived nine metrics that will indicate whether those three objectives are beingmet:


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1. Political Participation

2. Violent Rhetoric rom Religious and Community Leaders

3. Shadow Government and Judicial Institutions

4.

Provincial and Local Institutions and Accountability

5. Agricultural Production

6. Aghan National Security Forces Retention

7. Childhood Literacy

8. Sel-Identied Membership in al Qaeda

9. Violence

Several success metrics are not tracked at all; the rest are tracked incompletely at best.

Due to lacks in specicity, direction, and an end state in the strategy, it is easy or analysts, pundits, andpolicymakers to project their own assumptions onto news about the war.

Without a solid grasp o the data that demonstrate success or ailure as laid out by the metrics in this paper,there is no way to know i the war is being won or not.

Joshua Foust is a ellow at the American Security Project, a correspondent or Te Atlantic, and covers national securityor PBS Need to Know.

Maria Stohler, a summer an intern at the American Security Project, assisted with the research or this paper.


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(Endnotes)

1 Fox News, Aghan Police: 8 Die in Kabul Supermarket Blast, January 27, 2011, http://www.oxnews.com/world/2011/01/27/aghanistan-war-wont-end-like-vietnam/

2 Shalizi, Hamid and Robinson, Matt, Suicide Attack on Kabul Hotel Kills wo, Reuters, February 14, 2011,http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/us-aghanistan-attack-idUSRE71D1P20110214

3 Shalizi, Hamid and Graham-Harrison, Emma, Suidide Attack Hits Aghan Army Bus in Kabul: Police, Reuters,April 9, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/09/us-aghanistan-violence-idUSRE7381OV20110409

4 CNN, Attack on Kabul Hotel Ends with Deaths o 7 aliban, 11 Others, June 28, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-28/world/aghanistan.kabul.attack_1_security-orces-zabiullah-mujahid-suicide-attackers?_s=PM:WORLD

5 Associated Press, Aghan Ofcials: String o Attacks Kills 21, June 12, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/aghanistan/2011-06-11-Aghanistan-bombing_n.htm

6 Associated Press, Deadly Explosions Rock British Council Compound in Kabul, August 19, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/19/british-council-kabul-attacks

7 Rubin, Alissa J.; Rivera, Ray and Healy, Jack, US Embassy and NAO Headquarters Attacked in Kabul, TeNew York imes, September 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/world/asia/14aghanistan.html?_r=1&re=world

8 Foust, Joshua, Te Unbearable Lightness o Kabul, Columbia Journalism Review, December 1, 2008, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_unbearable_lightness_o_ka.php

9 Exum, Andrew, What We Still Dont Know about the Kabul Attacks, Foreign Policy, September 13, 2011, http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/13/what_we_still_dont_know_about_the_kabul_attacks

10 Wikipedia contributers, Ring o Steel (Kabul), Wikipedia, Te Free Encyclopedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring_o_Steel_%28Kabul%29

11 Ackerman, Spencer, eam Petraeus Brings Body Counts Back, Wired,March 8, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/team-petraeus-brings-body-counts-back/

12 ISAFmedia, witter Post @joshuaoust, September 29, 2011, https://twitter.com/#!/ISAFmedia/sta-tus/119384425858473984

13 Clark, James W., Aghan Ofcials, Elders Hold Shura in Marjah, May 22, 2010, http://www.isa.nato.int/ar-ticle/operation-moshtarak/aghan-ofcials-elders-hold-shura-in-marjah.html

14 Michaels, Jim, General: Heart o Aghanistan Insurgency Beaten, USAoday, February 14, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/aghanistan/2011-02-15-1Aaghanistan15_S_N.htm#uslPageReturn

15 Obama, Barack H., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Aghanistanand Pakistan, Te White House, December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofce/remarks-presi-dent-address-nation-way-orward-aghanistan-and-pakistan

16 Wong, Kristina, Obama Promises to Bring roops Home rom Aghanistan Beginning July 2011, ABC New s,January 26, 2011, http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2011/01/obama-promises-to-bring-troops-home-rom-a-ghanistan-beginning-july-2011.html

17 Bennett, John ., White House Redenes Winning in Aghanistan Ahead o Review, Te Hill, June 6, 2011,http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/165517-white-house-redenes-winning-in-aghanistan
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18 CBC News, U.S. Cant Fail Aghanistan, Obama Nominee Warns, June 8, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/06/08/us-aghanistan-.html

19 Bennett, John ., White House Redenes Winning in Aghanistan Ahead o Review, Te Hill, June 6, 2011,http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/165517-white-house-redenes-winning-in-aghanistan

20 Ibid.

21 Bennett, John ., Panetta has ough alk or US Foes, Denes Aghanistan Mission, Te Hill, June 9, 2011,http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/deense-homeland-security/165585-panetta-has-tough-talk-or-us-oes-de-nes-aghan-mission

22 Associated Press, US-Pakistan relations at turning point aer Killing o Bin Laden, Warns Clinton, May 27,2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/27/clinton-zardari-us-pakistan-bin-laden

23 Interview with Hillary Clinton, Fox on the Record with Greta van Susteren,July 20, 2010, http://www6.lex-isnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007214&docId=l:1226191650

24 Crabtree, Susan, Petraeus on Aghan War: We Have o Remember Why Were Tere, alking Points Memo,March 15, 2011, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/petraeus-on-aghan-war-we-have-to-remember-why-were-there.php

25 Gaouette, Nicole, Obama Must Dene Aghan War Goals, Senators ell Holbrooke, Bloomberg, July 14, 2010,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/obama-needs-to-dene-aghan-war-objectives-u-s-senators-tell-holbrooke.html

26 Dozier, Kimberly, US Counterterror Chie: Al-Qaida Now on the Ropes, Associated Press, September 1, 2011,http://news.yahoo.com/us-counterterror-chie-al-qaida-now-ropes-070621400.html

27 iedemann, Katherine, Holbrooke on Success: Well Know it when we See it, Foreign Policy, August 12, 2009,http://apak.oreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/12/holbrooke_on_success_we_ll_know_it_when_we_see_it

28 Wikipedia contributors, I Know it When I See it, Wikipedia, Te Free Encyclopedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_it_when_I_see_it

29 CNN, Spate o errorism Arrests not Connected, Analysts Say, September 25, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-25/justice/terrorism.cases_1_plotting-60-story-ountain-place-ofce-powerul-bomb?_s=PM:CRIME

30 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aghan_training_camp

31 Redi, aliban wants an Islamic state in Aghanistan: Report, November 3, 2008, http://www.redi.com/news/2008/nov/03taliban.htm

32 Curtis, Lisa, U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Trough Education Reorm Te Heritage Founda-tion, June 8, 2007,http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/us-aid-to-pakistan-countering-extremism-through-education-reorm

33 International Institute or Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter urnout Data or Aghanistan, Novem-ber 8, 2010, http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cm?CountryCode=AF

34 Free & Fair Election Foundation o Aghanistan, 2009 Voter Registration Observation, May 2009, http://ww-wea.org.a/download/Final%20Report%20FEFA.pd

35 Free & Fair Election Foundation o Aghanistan, Aghan Election Mapper, September 18, 2010, http://www-ea2010.com/
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36 National Democratic Institute, Aghanistan Election Data, http://aghanistanelectiondata.org/open

37 Te International Republican Institute, Aghanistan Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections, Septem-ber 18, 2005: Election Observation Mission Final Report, http://www.iri.org/sites/deault/les/

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39 Najazada, Enayat and Nordland, Rod, Aghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning, Killing 12, Te New Yorkimes, April 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02aghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

40 BBC News, Aghanistan: Deadly Kandahar protest at Koran burning, April 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uknews/world-south-asia-12944851

41 Larson, Anna, Governance Structures in Nimroz Province, Aghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, No-vember, 2010, http://www.areu.org.a/Uploads/EditionPds/1042E-Governance%20Structures%20in

%20Nimroz%20CS%202010%20Web.pd

42 Livingston, Ian S.; Messera, Heather L. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghanistan Index: racking Va riables o Re-construction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te Brookings Institution, May 31, 2011, p. 22, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index20110531.pd

43 Katzman, Kenneth, Aghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Perormance, Congressional ResearchService, pp. 33-55, http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pd

44 For example, see: Coburn, Noah, Losing Legitimacy? Some Aghan Views on the Government, the Interna-tional Community, and the 2009 Elections, Aghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, November 2009, http://www.areu.org.a/Uploads/EditionPds/938E-Losing%20Legitimacy%20%20Some%20Aghan%20Views%20on%20the%20Government,%20the%20International%20Community,%20and%20the%202009%20Elections%20B%202009.pd

45 Index Mundi, Aghan Milled Rice Production by Year, 2011, http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=a&commodity=milled-rice&graph=production

46 U.S. Department o Agriculture, Aghanistan: Wheat Production Recovers in 2009/10 Season, June 10, 2009,http://www.pecad.as.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/Aghanistan/

47 U.N. Ofce on Drugs and Crime, Aghanistan Opium Survey 2011, January 2011, p. 26, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Aghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pd

48 Ackerman, Spencer, Not a Single Aghan Battalion Fights Without U.S. Help, Wired, September 26, 2011,http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-aghan-battalion-ghts-without-u-s-help/

49 Harding, Tomas, Aghanistan Police Corruption is Fuelling Insurgency, Te elegraph, June 3, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/aghanistan/7801459/Aghanistan-police-corruption-is-uelling-insur-gency.html

50 Healy, Jack, Brutality by Local Aghan Police is Reported, Te New York imes, September 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13aghanistan.html

51 Partlow, Joshua, One in Seven Aghan Soldiers Deserted During First Hal o Year, Te Washington Post, Sep-tember 2, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016095986_aghan03.html

52 Livingston, Ian S.; Messera, Heather L. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghanistan Index: racking Variables o Re-
http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/openhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=allhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdfhttp://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/Afghanistan/http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/Afghanistan/http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdfhttp://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdfhttp://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdfhttp://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.htmlhttp://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdfhttp://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdfhttp://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/Afghanistan/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=allhttp://afghanistanelectiondata.org/open


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21

construction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te Brookings Institution, May 31, 2011, p. 31, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index20110531.pd

53 UNICEF, Aghanistan Statistics, March 2, 2010, http://www.unice.org/inobycountry/aghanistan_statistics.html#77

54 UNESCO, UNESCO Country Programming Document (UCPD): Aghanistan, 2010-2011, p. 10, http://unes-doc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pd

55 CNN, NAO: Man with al Qaeda links killed in Aghanistan, September 3, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/aghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-orces?_s=PM:WORLD

56 Sonmez, Felicia and DeLong, Matt, Panetta: 50-100 al-Qaeda Remain in Aghanistan; Cornyn: GOP is theParty o Change; Leahy, Sessions Preview Kagan Conrmation Hearings, Te Washington Post, June 27, 2010,http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.html

57 ISAF Joint Command, ISAF Joint Command Morning Operational Update Sept 3, 2011, September 3, 2011, http://www.isa.nato.int/article/isa-releases/isa-joint-command-morning-operational-update-sept-3-2011.html

58 Strick, Alex, Tose 40 al-Qaeda insurgents, A Dierent Place, September 13, 2011, http://www.alexstrick-com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/

59 Nissenbaum, Dion, Diering Data Shape Views o Surge, Te Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMAxMDIwOEyN-DkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email

60 ISAFmedia, witter Post @joshuaoust, September 29, 2011, http://twitter.com/#!/ISAFmedia/sta-tus/119381386514800640

61 We ound data compiled by Te Guardian or 2007-2010: Te Guardian, Aghanistan Civilian Casualties: Yearby Year, Month by Month, March 10, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/aghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picture

Te United Nations Security Council publishes quarterly reports or the Secretary-General: U.N. Security Coun-cil, Te Situation in Aghanistan and its Implications or International Peace and Security, September 14, 2010,pp. 12-13, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/at/c/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Agh%20S%202010%20463.pd

Te Aghanistan Conict Monitor assembled datasets o Civilian Deaths by Perpetrator and District: HumanSecurity Report Project, Aghanistan Conict Monitor: Civilians, March 9, 2011, http://www.conictmonitors.org/countries/aghanistan/acts-and-gures/casualties/civilians

as well as Armed Opposition Attacks by Province and Year, 2008-2010: Human Security Report Project, A-ghanistan Conict Monitor: Violent Incidents, February 14, 2011, http://www.conictmonitors.org/countries/aghanistan/acts-and-gures/violent-incidents

Te Aghanistan NGO Saety Ofce has violence data or 2006-2010: Te Aghanistan NGO Saety Ofce,ANSO Quarterly Data Report, April 2011, pp. 10-12, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pd

Te Congressional Research Service issued a report to Congress in December o 2010 about the United Nations

Assistance Mission to Aghanistan (UNAMA), which included data on civilian deaths by pro-government andanti-government orces: Margesson, Rhoda, United Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan: Backgroundand Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, December 27, 2010, p. 17, http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pd

Te Brookings Institution compiles a dataset or 2006-2011: Livingston, Ian S. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghani-stan Index: racking Variables o Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te Brookings Institu-
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pdfhttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pdfhttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pdfhttp://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/afghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-forces?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/afghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-forces?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/afghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-forces?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.htmlhttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.htmlhttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.htmlhttp://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-joint-command-morning-operational-update-sept-3-2011.htmlhttp://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-joint-command-morning-operational-update-sept-3-2011.htmlhttp://www.alexstrick.com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/http://www.alexstrick.com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/http://www.alexstrick.com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdfhttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pdfhttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/violent-incidentshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-figures/casualties/civilianshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picturehttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwOTEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_emailhttp://www.alexstrick.com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/http://www.alexstrick.com/2011/09/those-40-al-qaeda-insurgents/http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-joint-command-morning-operational-update-sept-3-2011.htmlhttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.htmlhttp://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/afghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-forces?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/afghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-forces?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pdfhttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20110531.pdf


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tion, August 31, 2011, p. 15, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index.pd

62 Abi-Habib, Maria, Ambassador Blames Pakistan Militants, Te Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.html

63 Foust, Joshua, A New Wave o Spectacular Attacks, Registan.net, February 19, 2010, http://www.registan.net/

index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-o-spectacular-attacks/64 Peter, om A., Can Aghanistan hang on to its newly minted college grads?, Te Christian Science Monitor,May 26, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Aghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-grads
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.htmlhttp://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-of-spectacular-attacks/http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-of-spectacular-attacks/http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-of-spectacular-attacks/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Afghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-gradshttp://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-of-spectacular-attacks/http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-of-spectacular-attacks/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.html


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Building a New American Arsenal

Te American Security Project (ASP) is a bipartisan initiative to educate the

American public about the changing nature o national security in the 21stcentury.

Gone are the days when a nations strength could be measured by bombers

and battleships. Security in this new era requires a New American Arsenal

harnessing all o Americas strengths: the orce o our diplomacy; the might o

our military; the vigor o our economy; and the power o our ideals.

We believe that America must lead other nations in the pursuit o our

common goals and shared security. We must conront international

challenges with all the tools at our disposal. We must address emerging

problems beore they become security crises. And to do this, we must orge a

new bipartisan consensus at home.

ASP brings together prominent American leaders, current and ormer

members o Congress, retired military ofcers, and ormer government

ofcials. Sta direct research on a broad range o issues and engages and

empowers the American public by taking its ndings directly to them.

We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse

as terrorism, the spread o weapons o mass destruction, climate change,

ailed and ailing states, disease, and pandemics. Te same-old solutions

and partisan bickering wont do. America needs an honest dialogue about

security that is as robust as it is realistic.

ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to orge consensus, and to spur

constructive action so that America meets the challenges to its security while

seizing the opportunities the new century oers.

www.americansecurityproject.org

Documents

Measuring Success: Are We Winning? 10 Years in Afghanistan