Measuring Success - Are We Winning - 10 Years in Afghanistan -May 2012

7/31/2019 Measuring Success - Are We Winning - 10 Years in Afghanistan -May 2012

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www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

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Over 10 Years in Afghanistan

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Updated May 16 2012

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For the last two years, the war in

Aghanistan has taken a very dierentturn. While it used to be dened

by grinding summers o battles betweeninsurgents and Coalition troops and longwinters o relative quiet, the Aghaninsurgents have spent the last two years ona sophisticated campaign o assassinations,attacks against high-prole targets inKabul (which many considered secured andunassailable), and a sophisticated inuence

campaign.

Starting in January o 2011, they launched a brazen suicide assault on an upscalesupermarket in a secured area o Kabul, targeting the country director o a private securityrm.1 In February, suicide attackers exploded bombs at a hotel in downtown Kabul,killing two.2 In April, insurgents attacked Aghan Army and International SecurityAssistance Force bases in the city, though they killed no one other than themselves.3

In June, gunmen launched a sustained, complex attack on the heavily guarded HotelIntercontinental in Kabul, killing eighteen people.4 Over the summer, they launched astring o deadly attacks, killing dozens.5 In August, insurgents launched yet anothercomplex, sustained attack on the British Council in a wealthy, secured neighborhood oKabul, killing eight.6 In September, a small team o insurgents managed to re machineguns and launch RPGs at the U.S. embassy or over 20 hours beore being neutralized byCoalition orces. 7


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AMerIcAn SecurIty proJect

In October, an insurgent detonated a car bomb next to an armored bus in Kabul, killing at least ve trooand eight U.S. civilians. 8 In December, a wave o aliban bombing and shooting attacks targeted transitioning Aghan orces killed 13.9 In January 2012, another wave o aliban attacks targeted Aghagovernment ofcials and killed 20.10 In April, insurgents launched a sustained attack on embassies, militabases, and the Aghan parliament.11 And in May o this year, insurgents attacked Kabul during PresideObamas visit, killing 712 they also killed ve education ofcials in Paktika province near the border wi

Pakistan.13

Given the persistent underreporting o violence in Aghanistan, there is almost certainly even moviolence than this short list captures.14

Tis marked shit would seem to indicate the war is being lost. But because the U.S. ails to monitor crucaspects o the war, there is no reliable way to be certain.

10 years ater U.S. orces invaded Aghanistan, we still lack the means to tell whether the war is beinwon or not.

None o those attacks, taken in isolation, killed very many people the deadliest was the IntercontinentHotel attack, which included seven dead insurgents and they werent meant to. Even Septembers attaon the U.S. embassy wasnt very complex, and the insurgents did not demonstrate any particular tacticgenius. 15

Te insurgents, however, do not need to win large tactical victories in order to win the war: they are nghting a symmetric war. Rather, they seem intent on disrupting the Aghan governments ability govern - so that rule o the Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan becomes preerable to Aghans.

In 2008, an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul was widely considered unthinkable. Te downtow

neighborhoods were being surrounded by what many called a Ring o Steel 16 dozens o guardroadblocks, checkpoints, and barricades so that business could take place in a Green Zone wheviolence was kept at a minimum. oday, the insurgency can penetrate the Ring o Steel again and again launch attacks.

Te recent attacks served to shake condence in ISAF and the Aghan government.

In contrast, ISAF seems to be waging a diferent war altogether.

ISAF reporting on its activities seems more concerned with establishing a running tally o operations

relying on insurgent body counts to underscore progress in the war,17 publishing data only on deadattacks,18 tangible measurements o progress like counting the number o community shuras it hostsand counting how many soldiers nish basic training. 20

While ISAF data captures many physical measurements o the war, it is less successul in measuring thsocial and political eects o the war, such as which side Aghans think will ultimately win.


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In essence, the aliban and its allies must shake condence in the Aghan government and diminish theWestern appetite or staying in order to win. Te International Security and Assistance Force and itsAghan allies are waging a ar dierent war based on sweeping operations, inrastructure creation, andsecurity orce training.

With both parties to the conict ghting dierent wars with dierent types o outcomes, is it evenpossible to gauge i the ISAF and Aghan government coalition is winning? Te answer is not simple.When gauging ISAFs success in Aghanistan one should rst dene success something we show isnot easy to do. Once success is dened, one can create the metrics by which one would measure progresstoward or away rom that dened success.

We settled on the most generous interpretation o President Obamas publicly stated aims or the war:deny al Qaeda sae haven, prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government, and build up theAghan security orces and the government so they can take responsibility or their countrys uture.

How one goes about reaching this goal is also no simple matter: two o the three objectives PresidentObama stated are dened by absence rather than by achievement, and the third objective is not reallydenable in concrete terms.

While it may be difcult to say when, exactly, we can know that our goals have been met, we can developa series o metrics that should indicate whether we are progressing toward those goals or not.

Te ollowing paper describes those metrics, and tries to determine whether we are measuring the mostrelevant data to gauge success in Aghanistan.

Lastly, we ask the question: what are we actually measuring? And does the data we have allow us toaccurately gauge the success o our eorts?


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What Is Success?

he biggest problem in asking whether we are winning in Aghanistan is dening what winning loolike. What are the aims o the war?Since taking ofce, President Obama and his senior ofcials have oered a variety o denitions or succeIn his speech to West Point announcing the military surge, President Obama said:

Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and deeat al Qaeda in Aghanistan andPakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the uture.

o meet that goal, we will pursue the ollowing objectives within Aghanistan. We must deny alQaeda a sae-haven. We must reverse the alibans momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow thegovernment. And we must strengthen the capacity o Aghanistans Security Forces and government, sothat they can take lead responsibility or Aghanistans uture.21

In his State o the Union in 2011, he went on to say: Our purpose is clear -- by preventing the alibarom reestablishing a stranglehold over the Aghan people, we will deny al Qaeda the sae-haven that served aslaunching pad or 9/11. 22

Tese goals do not easily lead to dened success metrics. Rather they are linked to proving negatives: awe denying them a sae haven, and are we degrading their abilities? Tese goals create a strategy denby absence, not progress, and thus make that strategy impossible to achieve.

At any point, a single variance rom absence might indicate ailure, so the status quo must be maintaineorever to ensure there is never variance.

Winning and success requires a goal. And the only way to determine whether that goal has been met is establish metrics by which you measure your progress toward achieving that goal. Tere is, however, velittle agreement among senior ofcials in the Obama Administration about what that goal really is:

Ryan Crocker, the Ambassador to Kabul, has said, Building an Aghanistan that is a shining city on a h is not going to happen . Instead, the goal should be sustainable stability.23 He said our goal is to bringood enough governance in Aghanistan to ensure the country doesnt degenerate into a sae haven or al-Qaeda.

Former Secretary o Deense Robert Gates tried to dene success in Aghanistan without a conventionmilitary victory.

We have not had a declared victory in a war with the possible exception o the rst GuWar since World War II, he said in June last year. It is the phenomenon o modern conict.25 SecretaGates listed key attributes by which we can achieve success without victory: Are our interests protected? the security o the United States protected? Are the Americans saer at the end because o the sacrice these soldiehave made? Tats the real question.26

Beore he replaced Robert Gates as Secretary o Deense, Leon Panetta was the Director o Centr


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Intelligence. In June, then CIA Director Panetta said, Te undamental mission is to provide sufcientstability so [that nation] is never again a sae haven or al Qaeda and similar groups.27

Secretary o State Hillary Clinton has dened the terms o success in Aghanistan in several ways overthe last two years. In May o last year, she ocused on eorts to reconcile the aliban with the Aghangovernment. For reconciliation to succeed,she told reporters ater the raid that killed Osama bin Laden,

Pakistan must be part o this process.28

In 2010, Secretary Clinton told Greta van Susteren in Aghanistan,a secure and stable Aghanistan [means] a country that is able to deend itsel with an army and a police orcethat is able to protect its citizens rom the kind o terrorist activities that now plague many parts o the country.29

General David Petraeus, speaking during his testimony beore the Senate Armed Services Committeein March o this year, said, its important to remember why we are [in Aghanistan]. Tats where 9/11 began-- thats where the plan was made We do see al Qaeda looking or sanctuaries all the time. 30

President Obamas rst Special Representative or Aghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador RichardHolbrooke, or his part, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July o 2010, that when hereerences an end-state, the denition o success, it should be

a sustainable end-state which includescontinued American economic and development assistance.31

During his most recent trip to Aghanistan, President Obama signed a strategic partnership agreementwith the Aghan government, signaling a shit in bilateral relations. While the wars overall objectiveshave not changed, President Obama emphasized that the current goal o U.S. orces in the country is tosuccessully transition primary responsibility or Aghanistans security rom international orces to localones thus allowing or a withdrawal o combat troops.32

aken together, these senior ofcials reveal a worrying ambiguity about the wars strategic goals anddesired end-state. Te Aghan government is ar rom stable or capable o exercising sovereignty over

its territory; the insurgency remains undaunted rom launching horriying attacks into the biggest cities;civilian casualties in the conict are higher than they have ever been.33

Even more troubling, they dene victory in the war as absence: Aghanistan is a success i X does nothappen. It is an impossible goal, as a single act could lead to deeat. By President Obamas denition ovictory, success means al Qaeda can never use Aghanistan or Pakistan to threaten the United States.

Tis then means the war is either already won, or it will never be wonal Qaeda does not have a saehaven in Aghanistan and is on the ropes,34 or, alternatively, we must stay there orever to make sure itnever has a sae haven in Aghanistan or Pakistan.

Tis is strategic incoherence at its most stark.

Despite the vagueness o these goals or victory, we can look at certain indicators to determine whetherthe overall environment in Aghanistan is improving or degrading. By doing so, the likelihood o victory,or the specter o deeat, becomes apparent.


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Te Metrics

At a conerence in 2009, the late Ambassador Holbrooke was asked how he would measure progress Aghanistan. Holbrooke responded, In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test or another issue: Weknow it when we see it.35

While many pundits and analysts cringed at the reerence (Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, discussing his denition o pornography in 1964, said, I know it when I see it.36), Holbrooke revealedcommon problem in measuring the wars progress: it is oten not clear what we should measure, and hoto interpret the data.

We broke down President Obamas strategobjectives or the war into three broad pillaand rom that derived nine broad metrics thshould tell us whether or not the war is beinwon.

Te metrics we discuss below are not meato capture the entirety o the war, or evenecessarily to capture a representative sampo it. Rather, these nine metrics show how thwar as a system, and not just a ew points data, is progressing.

Te three pillars o President Obamas strategic objectives requires some explanation:

1. Deny al Qaeda sae haven. Te term sae haven is problematic, as it can mean many things.Tere have been many arrests and trials or attempted terrorism in the U.S.37, but very ewanalysts would say the U.S. is a sae haven or terrorism.

We chose to interpret this statement to mean what it meant when discussing al Qaeda inAghanistan in the 1990s: large training camps where recruits are indoctrinated, instructed inhow to conduct terrorist operations, and sent abroad to do so.38

2. Prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government. President Obama did not say deeat

the aliban, or end all violent attacks, he said he aimed to reverse their momentumand prevent the governments overthrow.

Te two key words we use to derive metrics are overthrow and government. Tere is adierence between a state and a government a state is an organized political communityoccupying a certain territory, while a government is an organization that has the power to make


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and enorce laws on that territory.

Te insurgency is ghting or the Islamic State o Aghanistan39 a undamentally dierentstate than Hamid Karzais regime currently in control o Kabul. In order to build that dierentstate, they must overthrow the current government that is, they must destroy or displacethe current regime, and take over the levers o government to create their alternative state. It is a

social and political act as much as it is a physical one.

3. Build up the Aghan security orces and the government so they can take responsibility ortheir countrys uture. Both governments and security orces have basic attributes to be able torule their territory eectively. Governments need sovereignty, legitimacy, and the rule o law inorder to govern.

Security services need to have a stable cadre o members trained so that institutional practicescan be developed and a sense o proessionalism can prevent widespread abuses.

Neither o these two is particularly easy to quantiy and measure, much less build up, so wetried to pick metrics that would indicate how both sets o institutions are behaving and beingperceived.

Using these three pillars, we derived nine metrics that will indicate whether those three objectives arebeing met:

Political Participation helps us understand i the Aghan government has sufcient capacity to takeresponsibility or Aghanistans uture. I Aghans eel comortable participating in the politicalprocess, then they eel condent in their governments ability to unction. Conversely, i Aghanseither eel excluded rom political lie, or eel like their participation is meaningless, then they do not

believe their government has the ability to unction.

Violent Rhetoric rom Religious and Community Leaders helps us understand i the insurgencysmomentum is really being reversed, and i there is sufcient public sentiment to support their overthrowo the Aghan government.

I religious and community leaders are constantly calling or violence against Aghan government andISAF orces, that indicates deep-seated resentment against the mission.

Shadow Government and Judicial Institutions are a good indicator o where the aliban andother insurgent groups eel most comortable operating.

By measuring the prevalence and unctionality o these insurgent institutions we can get a sense owhere government control is being superseded by the insurgency, which will tell us where governmentcapacity is being most threatened.


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Provincial and Local Institutions and Accountabilitytells us how Aghans eel about the locinstitutions o government. I Aghans are participating in and engaged with their local governmenthey are less likely to support an insurgent overthrow o the government.

Tis metric also indicates how Aghans perceive the states ability to unction. While some inorm

institutions, such as tribes or village councils might appear appropriate substitutions, PresideObamas strategy requires a government, so we ocus in this metric on presence and perormance the government.

Agricultural Production helps us measure the economic oundation o the country. I staple croare being grown in an economically sustainable way, then that will orm the oundation o a stabgovernment that can control its territory.

It also indirectly demonstrates local security conditions, as well as the state o inrastructure or movin

goods to market.

Aghan National Security Forces Retention is a crucial actor in determining the long-term prospeco the ANSF. I there is a high retention rate that is eectively a vote o condence in both the securiorces and the government they serve.

I retention is low, that indicates low condence in the prospects o success or the security services anthe government. In addition, the rise o green-on-blue attacks, where Aghan orces attack and ktheir western mentors, is a growing concern as well.

Childhood Literacyis a leading indicator o the long-term prospects o a stable Aghan government.growing rate o childhood literacy will make extremism less likely to take root in Aghan communiti

Literacy is also a strong indicator o the prospects or the development o civil institutions, which aa crucial component o a stable government.40

Sel-Identied Membership in al Qaeda is the rst objective President Obama routinely states in hstrategic commentary on the war. One o the primary goals o the war in Aghanistan is to cripple

Qaeda and deny them sae haven or the ability to launch attacks.

While sel-identied membership is not directly related to their capacity or launching attackchanges in al Qaedas sel-identied membership over time is an indirect indicator o how healthy thorganization is, and o the pool o people it has access to inside Aghanistan in order to launch attack


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Violence is vital to understanding the war. I violence is increasing over time, it may or may notindicate mission ailure: the nature o the violence, including who perpetrates it and against whom itis perpetrated, is paramount.

A granular understanding o the system o violence in Aghanistan will let us understand i the war is

working toward the uture Aghanistan controlled by a stable government, stable security services, andree o the existential threat rom the aliban or rom Al Qaeda using its territory to launch attacks.

We do not try to capture in this paper the specic numbers o any particular metric. Rather, we aim tocapture whether or not these metrics are being measured, and just as importantly i we can track howthose metrics are changing over time: is it improving, is it getting worse, and what implications we canderive rom that metrics trajectory.

Tese indicators are in no particular order, but the

data they provide should be judged as a group, andnot solo.

No one indicator stands out on its own as beingsolely indicative o success or ailurethe war is asystem.

Political Participation

An increase o non-violent political involvementshould be seen as a metric o success. Tisshould include both ormal and inormal political networks as well as movements that are pro- and anti-Aghan government. I the aliban, or example, decides it would rather oppose the Karzai governmentthrough running or ofce and holding protest marches, that is a ar better end-state than continuedghting.

More non-violent anti-government involvement indicates opposition orces turning away rom violenceand becoming part o the political ramework. Tis is a good thing, as the non-violent, political resolutiono disputes is an important milestone in ending the uncontrolled violence.

Tere are extensive data or electoral participation. Several agencies compile data on voter turnout orAghanistans elections. Te International Institute or Democracy and Electoral Assistance, or example,has national-level data or both Parliamentary and Presidential elections rom 2004-2010.41 Te FreeElections Foundation o Aghanistan catalogues Aghanistans voter registration process,42 and created adetailed map o polling centers, voting irregularity and other incidents o raud and intimidation, ElectionDay violence, and other voting issues.43 Te National Democratic Institute created a repository o reely


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available data about the Parliamentary and Presidential elections rom 2004-2010. Te InternationRepublican Institute also compiled detailed reports on electoral participation in both the Parliamenta45 and Presidential46 elections.

However, there are many data that would also lend insight into political participation that we could nnd:

Numbers attending political meetings, organizations, march, protests etc (male and emale) Number o non-violent protests Number attending shura/jirga/council meetings (male and emale) Number o individual religious and community leaders calling or political involvement (by requen

region, and afliation)

Tere are many others. Tese are the basic building blocks o a civil society, which is normally expressthrough participation in elections.

Te elections process, too, is deeply awed while the reports many NGOs assemble are unequivoc

about the problems that result rom such a awed election system, a look only at numbers o voters ovtime may not reveal i Aghans are actually buying into the idea o participating in the political system not.

As it stands now, we could not assemble sufcient data to tell whether Aghans are becoming more or leinvolved in political issues.

Violent Rhetoric rom Religious and Community Leaders

In contrast to non - political involvement, leaders calling or violence, against any party or institutio

should be seen as a negative. Preaching or calling or violence indicates an extreme rejection o the statViolent rhetoric could potentially be important, i only as an early indicator o areas that may be pronto violence later. In May o 2012, preacher erry Jones held a public rally in Florida where he lit a Koron re. While the event was largely unnoticed in the U.S., in Aghanistan several mullahs in the northecity o Mazar-i Shari preached that Muslim worshippers must exact revenge or the desecration o theholy book.47 In the ensuing riot, protesters angry at the lack o Americans to attack nearby stormed thlocal UNAMA compound, breaching its walls and killing seven U.N. workers. Rioters stirred to action bviolent preaching by religious leaders in Kandahar killed another ten people that same day.48

In February, the accidental burning o some Qurans at Bagram Aireld prompted days o occasionalviolent protests, at least some o which were reportedly whipped up by rebrand preachers.49

Ater extensive searching, we could not nd a single comprehensive study about the nature, extent, content o the rhetoric used by religious or community leaders.


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Shadow Government and Judicial Institutions

Tis is not a measurement o inormal local government or justice institutions, but rather institutionscreated by the insurgency to contest or replace state control. Shadow institutions represent a coerciveimpact on the state.

As the U.S. and its allies try to assist the Aghans in building an accountable, responsible government, agrowth in the number and extent o these shadow institutions would represent a ailure. At the same time,however, a decrease in these structures does not necessarily represent a victory o the government sucha decrease would simply mean the insurgency is not replacing those that are destroyed.

Much like religious and community leader rhetoric, there are little data about aliban institutions. Whilethis is or understandable reasons owing to the difculty o measuring, the paucity o data limited insome cases to mere anecdotes makes drawing conclusions about shadow institutions difcult.

We could nd no comprehensive study o the number o and type o shadow institutions, or even a reliable

list o known shadow ofcials (governors, judges, and so on). Te Aghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit completed a case study in 2010 about governance structures in Nimroz Province, but it relied onanecdotes and interviews rather than hard data.50 While Te Brookings Institution presents data abouthow and where Aghans choose to pursue justice, their data is rom 2007. 51

Te data on shadow institutions is badly incomplete. No one is measuring it, so it is impossible to drawconclusions rom it.

Provincial and Local Institutions, and Accountability

Related to the issue o shadow institutions, success in Aghanistan as dened by President Obamamust involve Aghans having an accountable local government by and or Aghans. Tere are moredata about local government perormance than there are about shadow institutions, but the data are stillincomplete.

As one example, we could not nd any data o how many government institutions have literate ofcialsand stas. Tis is a critical issue in measuring government perormance, as i ofcials and sta cannotread they cannot participate in a modern bureaucracy. In act, the only data we could nd about theperormance o Aghanistans governmental institutions relate to ailures. A 2011 Congressional ResearchService report catalogued how local governments in Aghanistan all short o their goals and listed how

many positions remain unlled.52

AREU has written a number o reports about government ailures,53

but these are based mostly on anecdotes and not hard data.

We also do not have data on the makeup o local governance institutions: how many ofcials are electedby their communities, how many are appointed rom Kabul, and how many are placed by Coalition orces.We do not have sufcient data to measure the unctionality and accountability o local governments inAghanistan.


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Agricultural Production

Agricultural production (licit or illicit) is linked to the use o land and the amount o capital and timinvested. I armers are growing more ood on more land, that indirectly indicates improvements security and inrastructure, along with an improvement in stability. Farmers will eel more comortabgrowing more ood i they have a stable economy and stable politics.

Te mixture o licit and illicit agriculture also matters: i armers tend to grow more cannabis or opiuthan they do licit crops, that also indirectly indicates the relative level o government control, presence organized criminal networks, and overall condence in the government.

Te challenge with measuring agricultural production in Aghanistan, however, is that the ew indicavailable arent always specic in their methodologies. So when IndexMundi compiles data rom thUSDA, there is no indication o how it was originally gathered. Moreover, given the shape o the grapabove, which tries to chart Aghanistans cotton production, the long at lines probably indicate little or ndata (it is uncertain which). Te data on cotton production are probably unreliable, as are IndexMund

charting o rice production.54

Tey draw their data or both charts rom the United States Department Agriculture, but there is no indication on how the data are collected or organized. Te USDA also publishdata on several commodities in Aghanistan like wheat.55 All datasets show enormous variations durinthe 2001-2010 period, unless there are little or no data (like the long at lines or cotton production). Itdifcult to draw conclusions rom this data.

Tere are relatively more data or opium production. Te United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crimassembles yearly reports about the production o opium in Aghanistan. Tey have data rom 2005-201and show a very mixed record: changes to opium cultivation in recent years seem to be the result o weathand ood price uctuations as much as anything else.

All told, agricultural production is one o the most closely-tracked metrics. Despite that, the data onmight use to draw conclusions is deeply awed, and does not seem to obey clear trend patterns useul analysis.

ANSF Retention

President Obamas victory denition requires a strong Aghan security sector, most commonly reerrto as the Aghan National Security Forces. Gauging the eectiveness o the ANSF can take manorms: assessments o operational independence,

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an analysis o police corruption that uels resentmetoward the government,58 measurements o brutality against Aghan citizens,59 or even how oten thoAghan orces turn violent against their own.60

We think ocusing on retention is a more neutral measurement o ANSF capability, though it is concerninto see the rise o Aghan-on-Coalition killing. A high retention rate in ANSF organizations representsgeneral belie in victory, as well as demonstrating condence in the opportunity o service and lessenin


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violence. A rise in green-on-blue violence indicates either insurgent inltration o the security servicesor a catastrophic loss in condence on the part o the Aghans (or both).

Tere are airly good data on ANSF retention: according to a recent report, desertion rates jumped 46% in2011.61 Tat is, more and more ANSF personnel are walking away rom their service duties as comparedto previous years.

Tere is also the rise o green-on-blue attacks. Since 2003, 83 Nato deaths have been at the hands o theirAghan colleagues.62 Aghan soldiers killed 34 Coalition troops in 2011; in 2012 at least ten separateattacks have killed at least 17 NAO soldiers. Te military is also acing allegations that it is consistentlyunderreporting attacks against NAO orces by Aghan security orces.63

Both trends indicate an overall breakdown o condence in the ANSF mission.

Childhood Literacy

Most studies o education in Aghanistan ocus on the number o schools built, or the number ochildren with access to education, or the number o children who attend school. Tese are allinteresting measurements, but they dont capture what is actuallyhappening at those schools.

It is important that children not only attend school, but learn at them.Tus, measuring childhood literacy, and not just school attendance,captures the eect o education programs, and not just their existence.

Furthermore, a growing number o literate children indirectlydemonstrates several phenomena: the belie and trust in educationand the state, the ability o local populations to send their childrento a school, and that schools are adequately teaching those children.

Te Brookings Institution compiled several studies to measure annualenrollment in elementary secondary education rom 2002-2011.64

While the trend lines are positive, this metric does not captureliteracy rates. UNICEF claims a 49% literacy rate in Aghans aged15-24, but these data are sourced to an unknown UNESCO survey.65 Te most recent UNESCO country programming document, rom2010-2011, uses data rom the Aghanistan National VulnerabilityRisk Assessment report, published by the Ministry o RuralRehabilitation and Development. It estimates literacy in Aghans above the age o 15 to be 26% (39% ormen and 12% or women).66 It is unclear how these statistics can be reconciled, but most surveys seem toagree that both access to and quality o education is improving.


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Sel-Identied Members o Al Qaeda

he overwhelming reason U.S. citizens are risking their lives in Aghanistan is to degrade and to denterritory to al Qaeda as stipulated in President Obamas stated strategic rationale or the war. the number o al Qaeda in Aghanistan growing or shrinking? Lowering the number o al Qaeda is a kmeasurement o mission success.

We distinguish between insurgents described by U.S. ofcials as being tied to al Qaeda and actual, seidentied members o al Qaeda. It is unclear how the U.S. government distinguishes between associatiowith al Qaeda rom membership in al Qaeda, which makes determining the eect o such a measuremean inappropriate basis or analytic conclusions. As one example, in early September 2011, the Coalitiokilled Sabir Lal, a man previously incarcerated in Guantanamo.67 Ofcials said he was responsible organizing attacks in the volatile Kunar province, and that he had links to al Qaeda. However, the natuo those links, and what it really means to be linked to al Qaeda, was let unstated apart rom his being contact with senior al Qaeda gures in Kunar and Pakistan. We have no idea what the designation meain practice: was Melma taking orders rom these senior al Qaeda gures, or was he merely coordinatin

with them because they operated in the same area? Answering that question is critical to understandinthe real nature o al Qaeda, and whether Coalition eorts to degrade its capabilities are working.

Tere are very ew data to indicate the number o sel-identiying al Qaeda in Aghanistan. In 201CIA Director Leon Panetta said, at most, were looking at maybe 50 to 100 [members o al Qaeda iAghanistan], maybe less.68 It is unclear i he meant sel-identied al Qaeda or those the U.S. identies having links with al Qaeda. In reporting on the September 2011 Sabir Lal killing, ISAF claimed to havcaptured or killed more than 40 al-Qaida [sic] insurgents in eastern Aghanistan this year. 69 Howevan analysis o ISAF reports on al Qaeda shows that they only reported 22 killed and 10 captured durin2011.70

We do not have sufcient data to show or certain what the state o al Qaeda in Aghanistan really is, how it is changing. I ISAF really has captured or killed 40 a Qaeda ghters in 2011, we still do not knohow that aects Secretary Panettas 2010 estimate o 50 to 100 al Qaeda members teen months ago

Violence

By ar the most common metric applied to Aghanistan is a measurement o violence. Methodologior measuring violence vary tremendously, and ofcial agencies disagree about how to observe it. ISeptember, both ISAF and the UN released conicting reports o violence in Aghanistan: ISAF arguethere is less violence in the country, while the UN claimed there was substantially more. 71

Te dierence between ISAFs violence metric and the UNs violence metric is most likely denitionISAF, or example, does not consider the planting o an IED to be a violent act i it is deused and no oneinjured.72 Te UN, on the other hand, uses a more traditional measurement o violence, in which the veact o planting an improvised explosive, whatever the result, is an act o violence against the state.


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Most measurements o violence in Aghanistan are too broad or drawing analytic conclusions. Lessviolence is generally a good thing, though it does not actually mean the aliban is being deeated; moreviolence doesnt automatically indicate ailure, either, it only means government control is being contested.Hence, measuring violence can require granularity depending on the ocus o measurement.

A concentration o violence against civilians probably means something dierent than a concentration oviolence against Aghan government ofcials or ISAF troops.

Dierent sources compile their data dierently, with no set denition o what constitutes combatants andnon-combatants, and, as with ISAFs statement above, no set denition o what constitutes violence. 73 Assuch, we do not believe aggregate numbers about violence say very much about the state o the war. Rather,violence in Aghanistan is part o a social and political system, and should be viewed in that context.

In terms o the social and political eects o violence, the last two years in Aghanistan have beendevastating.

While attacks like Septembers brie siege o the U.S. Embassy in Kabul did not do substantial damageor kill more than a ew people, the social and political consequences o that attack are quite signicant.As a symbol, attacking the U.S. Embassy is a devastating statement on Americas stature in Aghanistan,on the efcacy o ISAF and Aghan security orces in Kabul, and on the insurgencys belie in its chancesor victory. Rather than being harassment, as U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker described the attack,74 it instead punctured the widespread Aghan belie than American diplomats in their embassy wereuntouchable.

At the same time, ISAF ofcials are correct in a way to describe such actions as being relatively minor ando little consequence to anyones ability to ght.

Attacking the U.S. embassy, or an international hotel, or even murdering an Aghan government ofcialdoes not alter the physical status o the war it does not change the number o U.S. troops, or their abilityto move across the countryside and occupy territory, or the ability o the Aghan government to unction.From a physical measurement o war, which ISAF relies on to gauge its success, these attacks, howevercomplex and spectacular, 75 do not alter the war in any signicant way.

Te problem o violence is a perect encapsulation o the wo Wars concept we explain above: the alibanare not ghting a physical war, but a political and social war; ISAF, on the other hand, is ghting a largelyphysical war and does not measure the political and social aspects o the war.

Te symbolic, low-damage, low-casualty attacks in Kabul have not had much o a physical eect onthe war, but their political and social consequences have been enormous, and Aghanistan is currentlystruggling with a sharp brain drain, o educated Aghans eeing the country to live and work away romthe chaos.76


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Insurgent violence, like planting an IED or laying siege to a building owned by oreigners, matters becauit is an act o political violence: it is an attack on the state, a maniestation o someone rejecting participatioin the political process. In a similar vein, non-insurgent violence, like police brutality and criminal violenare only relevant to U.S. strategic decision-making in terms o how they alter the political participation ordinary Aghans.

It is the political and social consequences oviolence that matter to the question o whether weare winning the war not the violence itsel.

Tere are no comprehensive studies o the politicaland social consequences o violence. In other words,we are not measuring violence in a way that willhelp us understand i we are progressing towardPresident Obamas three objectives or not.

I we are to consider violence a political and socialact, then we should try to measure the political andsocial eects o violence.

Tese metrics are mostly correlative: i an attack or series o attacks are accompanied by a rapid change inmetric like political participation, religious and community leader rhetoric, or insurgent shadow governmeinstitutions, then we can start piecing together a picture by which violence aects Aghanistans politicand social climate.

In a political war, violence only matters in terms o how closely it correlates to sudden changes to the statquo, or how a persistent pattern o violence happens at the same time as other trends.


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Conclusions

In 2012, over 10 years ater its start, it has become clear that there are two wars in Aghanistan aphysical one being ought by ISAF and a war o inuence being ought by insurgents.President Obamas strategic objectives in Aghanistan are undened and by their very nature unachievable.Tey do though, imply a set o phenomena that can be tracked. We attempted to derive metrics, and tocatalogue whether they are being measured.

Tere are no public data that capture these metrics in their entirety, and many metrics we should beattempting to measure are simply not tracked in publicly available data.

What is clear, though, is that we are not tracking our progress in the war.

Te three pillars o President Obamas strategy are:1. Deny al Qaeda sae haven

2. Prevent the aliban rom overthrowing the government

3. Build up the Aghan security orces and the government so they can take responsibility or theircountrys uture

Using these three pillars, we derived nine metrics that will indicate whether those three objectives arebeing met:1. Political Participation

2. Violent Rhetoric rom Religious and Community Leaders

3. Shadow Government and Judicial

4. Provincial and Local Institutions and Accountability

5. Agricultural Production

6. Aghan National Security Forces Retention

7. Childhood Literacy

8. Sel-Identied Membership in al Qaeda

9. Violence


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Several success metrics are not tracked at all; the rest are tracked incompletely at best.

Because the strategy lacks specicity, direction, and an end state in the strategy, it is easy or analystpundits, and policymakers to project their own assumptions onto news about the war.

Without a solid grasp o the data that demonstrate success or ailure as laid out by the metrics in this pap

there is no way to know i the war is being won or not.

Joshua Foust is a ellow at the American Security Project, a correspondent or Te Atlantic, ancovers national security or PBS Need to Know.


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rfs1. Fox News, Aghan Police: 8 Die in Kabul Supermarket Blast, January 27, 2011, http://ww w.oxnews.com/world/2011/01/27/aghanistan-war-wont-

end-like-vietnam/

2. Shali zi, Hamid and Robinson, Matt, Suicide Attack on Kabul Hotel Kil ls wo, Reuters, February 14, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/us-aghanistan-attack-idUSRE71D1P20110214

3. Shalizi, Hamid and Graham-Harrison, Emma, Suidide Attack Hits Aghan Army Bus in Kabul: Police, Reuters, April 9, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/09/us-aghanistan-violence-idUSRE7381OV20110409

4. CNN, Attack on Kabul Hotel Ends with Deaths o 7 aliban, 11 Others , June 28, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-28/world/aghan istan.k abul.attack_1_security-orces-zabiullah-mujahid-suicide-attackers?_s=PM:WORLD

5. Associated Press, Aghan Ocia ls: String o Attacks Kil ls 21, June 12, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/aghanistan /2011-06 -11-Aghanis tan-bombing_n.htm

6. Associated Press, Deadly Explosions Rock British Counci l Compound in Kabul, August 19, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk /world/2011/aug/19/british-council-kabul-attacks

7. Rubin, Alissa J.; Rivera, Ray and Healy, Jack, US Embassy and NAO Headquarters Attacked in Kabul, Te New York imes, September 13, 2011,http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/world/asia/14aghanistan.html?r=1&re=world

8. Ackerman, Spencer, aliban Kill 13 Americans in Armored Bus Attack, Wired Danger Room, October 29, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/taliban-rhino/

9. Nissenbaum, Dion, aliban Attacks Kill 13, Reect Strategic Shit, Te Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/art icle/SB10001424052970204632204577128010613724848.html

10. aliban kill 20 Aghans in suicide attack, bombings in the south, Te Long War Journal, January 19, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/taliban_killed_20_a.php

11. Nissenbaum, Dion, and Khan otakhil, Aghan Insurgents Strike Across Nation, Te Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304432704577345292458771700.html

12. Shah, Amir, and Chris Blake, aliban kill 7 in Kabul ater Obama visit, Te Associated Press, May 2, 2012, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/05/ap-taliban-kill-7-in-aghanistan-ater-obama-visit-050212/

13. Graham Bowley, aliban Kill 5 A ghan Education Ocials Near Border, Te New York imes, May 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/asia/ta liban-k ill-a ghan-educat ion-ocial s-in-ambush.html

14. Foust, Joshua, Te Unbearable Lightness o Kabul, Columbia Journalism Review, December 1, 2008, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_unbearable_lightness_o_ka.php

15. Exum, Andrew, What We Still Dont Know about the Kabul Attacks, Foreign Policy, September 13, 2011, http://ww w.oreignpolicy.com/

articles/2011/09/13/what_we_still_dont_know_about_the_kabul_attacks

16. Wikipedia contributers, Ring o Steel (Kabul), Wikipedia, Te Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring _o_Steel_%28Kabul%29

17. Ackerman, Spencer, eam Petraeus Brings Body Counts Back, Wired, March 8, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/team-petraeus-brings-body-counts-back/


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18. Smock, Dan, ISAF Reporting and the IED Numbers Shue, Registan.net, October 17, 2011 http://registan.net/index.php/2011/10/17/isamedia-anthe-isa-ied-numbers-shue/

19. Clark, James W., Aghan Ocials, Elders Hold Shura in Marjah, May 22, 2010, http://www.isa.nato.int/article/operation-moshtarak/aghan-ocielders-hold-shura-in-marjah.html

20. Michaels, Jim, General : Heart o Aghanis tan Insurgency Beaten, USAoday, Februar y 14, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/

aghanistan/2011-02-15-1Aaghanistan15_S_N.htm#uslPageReturn

21. Obama, Barack H., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Aghanistan and Pakistan, Te White House,December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/remarks-president-address-nation-way-orward-aghanistan-and-pakistan

22. Wong, Kristina, Obama Promises to Bring roops Home rom Aghanistan Beginning July 2011, ABC News, January 26, 2011, http://blogs.abcnewcom/thenote/2011/01/obama-promises-to-bring-troops-home-rom-aghanistan-beginning-july-2011.html

23. Bennett, John ., White House Redenes Winning in Aghanistan Ahead o Review, Te Hill, June 6, 2011, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/165517-white-house-redenes-winning-in-aghanistan

24. CBC News, U.S. Cant Fail Aghanis tan, Obama Nominee Warns, June 8, 2011, http://ww w.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/06/08/us-aghanistan-.

html

25. Bennett, John ., White House Redenes Winning in Aghanistan Ahead o Review, Te Hill, June 6, 2011, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/165517-white-house-redenes-winning-in-aghanistan

26. Ibid.

27. Bennet t, John ., Panetta has ough alk or US Foes, Denes Aghanistan Mission, Te Hill, June 9, 2011, http://thehil l.com/news-by-subject /deense-homeland-security/165585-panetta-has-tough-talk-or-us-oes-denes-aghan-mission

28. Associated Press, US-Pakistan relations at turning point ater Killing o Bin Laden, Warns Clinton, May 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/27/clinton-zardari-us-pakistan-bin-laden

29. Interview with Hillary Clinton, Fox on the Record with Greta van Susteren, July 20, 2010, http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=erDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007214&docId=l:1226191650

30. Crabtree, Susan, Petraeus on Aghan War: We Have o Remember Why Were Tere, alking Points Memo, March 15, 2011, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/petraeus-on-aghan-war-we-have-to-remember-why-were-there.php

31. Gaouette , Nicole, Obama Must Dene Aghan War Goals , Senators ell Holbrooke, Bloomberg, July 14, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/obama-needs-to-dene-aghan-war-objectives-u-s-senators-tell-holbrooke.html

32. Landler, Mark, Obama Signs Pact in Kabul, urning Page in Aghan War, Te New York imes, May 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/0world/asia/obama-lands-in-kabu l-on-unannounced-visit.html

33. Haidary, Emal, Civilian deaths threaten US pace: Aghan president, AFP, May 8, 2012, http://bit.ly/Ldyabk

34. Dozier, Kimberly, US Counterterror Chie: Al-Qaida Now on the Ropes, Associated Press, September 1, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/us-counterterror-chie-al-qaida-now-ropes-070621400.html

35. iedemann, Katherine, Holbrooke on Succes s: Well Know it when we See it, Foreign Policy, August 12, 2009, http://apak. oreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/12/holbrooke_on_success_we_ll_know_it_when_we_see_it

36. Wikipedia contributors, I Know it When I See it, Wikipedia, Te Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_k now_it_when_I_see_it


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37. CNN, Spate o errorism Arre sts not Connected, Analysts Say, September 25, 2009, http://artic les.cnn.com/2009-09-25/justice/terrorism.ca ses_1_plotting-60-story-ountain-place-oce-powerul-bomb?_s=PM:CRIME

38. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aghan_tra ining_camp

39. Redif, aliban wants an Islamic state in Aghanistan: Report, November 3, 2008, http://www.redif.com/news/2008/nov/03taliban.htm

40. Curtis, Lisa, U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Trough Education Reorm Te Heritage Foundation, June 8, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/us-aid-to-pakistan-countering-extremism-through-education-reorm

41. Internationa l Institute or Democrac y and Electoral Assistance, Voter urnout Data or Aghanistan, November 8, 2010, http://www.idea.int/vt /country_view.cm?CountryCode=AF

42. Free & Fair Election Foundation o Aghanistan, 2009 Voter Registration Observation, May 2009, http://www.ea.org.a/download/Final%20Report%20FEFA.pd

43. Free & Fair Election Foundation o Aghanis tan, Aghan Election Mapper, September 18, 2010, http://www.ea2010.com/

44. National Democratic Institute, Aghanistan Election Data, http://aghanistanelectiondata.org/open

45. Te International Republican Institute, Aghanistan Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections, September 18, 2005: Election ObservationMission Final Report, http://www.iri.org/sites/deault/les/Aghanistan%27s%202005%20Parliamentary%20Elections.pd

46. Te International Republican Institute, Aghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, August 20, 2009: Election Observation Mission,http://www.iri.org/sites/deault/les/Aghanistan%27s%202009%20Presidential%20and%20Provincial%20Council%20Elections%282%29.pd

47. Najazada, Enayat and Nordland, Rod, Aghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning , Killing 12, Te New York imes, April 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02aghanistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

48. BBC News, Aghanistan: Deadly Kandahar protest at Koran burning, April 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12944851

49. van Bijlert, Martine, Te Quran burnings and the diferent aces o anger, Aghanistan Analysts Network, February 22, 2012, http://www.aan-aghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2523

50. Larson, Anna, Governance Structures in Nimroz Province, Aghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, November, 2010, http://www.areu.org.a/Uploads/EditionPds/1042E-Governance%20Structures%20in%20Nimroz%20CS%202010%20Web.pd

51. Livingston, Ian S.; Messera, Heather L. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghanistan Index: racking Variables o Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te Brookings Institution, May 31, 2011, p. 22, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index20110531.pd

52. Katzman, Kenneth, Aghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Perormance, Congressional Research Service, pp. 33-55, http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pd

53. For example, see: Coburn, Noah, Losing Legitimacy? Some Aghan Views on the Government, the International Community, and the 2009Elections, A ghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, November 2009, http://www.areu.org.a/Uploads/EditionPds/938E-Losing%20Legitimacy%20%20Some%20Aghan%20Views%20on%20the%20Government,%20the%20International%20Community,%20and%20the%202009%20Elections%20B%202009.pd

54. Index Mundi, Aghan Milled R ice Production by Year, 2011, http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=a&commodity=milled-rice&graph=production

55. U.S. Department o Agriculture, Aghanistan: W heat Production Recovers in 2009/10 Season, June 10, 2009, http://www.pecad.as.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/Aghanistan/


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56. U.N. Oce on Drugs and Crime, Aghanistan Opium Survey 2011, January 2011, p. 26, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Aghanis tan/OR AS_report_ 2011.pd

57. Ackerman, Spencer, Not a Single Aghan Batta lion Fights Without U.S. Help, Wired, September 26, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/not-a-single-aghan-battalion-ghts-without-u-s-help/

58. Harding, Tomas, Aghanistan Police Corruption is Fuelling Insurgency, Te elegraph, June 3, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

asia/aghanistan/7801459/Aghanistan-police-corruption-is-uelling-insurgency.html

59. Healy, Jack, Brutal ity by Loca l Aghan Police is Reported, Te New York imes, September 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/asia/13aghanistan.html

60. Walsh, Nick Patton, and Masoud Popalzai, 2 American ocers killed in Aghan ministry, CNN, February 25, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0225/asia/world_asia_aghanistan-americans-killed_1_aghan-police-ocial-aghan-government-aghan-capital?_s=PM:ASIA

61. Partlow, Joshua, One in Seven Aghan Soldiers Deserted During First Hal o Year, Te Washington Post, September 2, 2011, http://seattlet imes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016095986_aghan03.html

62. New America Foundation, Attack s on US and NAO Soldiers by Aghan Security Forces, http://newamericaoundat ion.github.com/security/maps/

aghanistan.html

63. Burns, Robert, US Not Reporting All Attack s by Friendlies, Te Associated Press, May 1, 2012, http://www.military.com/news/article/us-not-reporting-all-attacks-by-riendlies.html?ESRC=sm_todayinmil.nl

64. Livingston, Ian S.; Messera, Heather L. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghanistan Index: racking Variables o Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te Brookings Institution, May 31, 2011, p. 31, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index20110531.pd

65. UNICEF, Aghanistan Statistics, March 2, 2010, http://www.unice.org/inobycountry/aghanistan_statistics.html#77

66. UNESCO, UNESCO Country Programming Document (UCPD): Aghanistan, 2010-2011, p. 10, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187584e.pd

67. CNN, NAO: Man with al Qaeda links killed in A ghanistan, September 3, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-03/world/aghanistan.violence_1_kunar-province-nangarhar-nato-orces?_s=PM:WORLD

68. Sonmez, Felicia and DeLong, Matt, Panetta: 50-100 al-Qaeda Remain in Aghanistan; Cornyn: GOP is the Party o Change; Leahy, Sessions PreviewKagan Conrmation Hearings, Te Washington Post, June 27, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/06/panetta-50-100-al-qaeda-remain.html

69. ISAF Joint Command, ISAF Joint Command Morning Operational Update Sept 3, 2011, September 3, 2011, http://www.isa.nato.int/article/isa -releases/isa-joint-command-morning-operational-update-sept-3-2011.html

70. Strick, Alex, Tose 40 al-Qaeda insurgents, A Diferent Place, September 13, 2011, http://www.alexst rick.com/2011/09/those-40 -al-qaeda-insurgents/

71. Nissenbaum, Dion, Difering Data Shape Views o Surge, Te Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article_email /SB10001424053111904480904576498352990708180-lMyQjAx MAxMDIwOEyNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email

72. ISAFmedia, witter Post @joshuaoust, September 29, 2011, http://twitter.com/#!/ISAFmedia/statu s/119381386514800640

73. We ound data compiled by Te Guardian or 2007-2010:


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Te Guardian, Aghanistan Civilian Casualties: Year by Year, Month by Month, March 10, 2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/aghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#zoomed-picture

Te United Nations Security Council publishes quarterly reports or the Secretary-General: U.N. Security Council, Te Situation in Aghanistan andits Implications or International Peace and Security, September 14, 2010, pp. 12-13, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/at/c/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Agh%20S%202010%20463.pd

Te Aghanistan Conict Monitor assembled datasets o Civilian Deaths by Perpetrator and District: Human Security Report Project, AghanistanConict Monitor: Civilians, March 9, 2011, http://www.conictmonitors.org/countries/aghanistan/acts-and-gures/casualties/civiliansas well asArmed Opposition Attacks by Province and Year, 2008-2010: Human Security Report Project, Aghanistan Conict Monitor: Violent Incidents,February 14, 2011, http://www.conictmonitors.org/countries/aghanistan/acts-and-gures/violent-incidents

Te Aghanistan NGO Saety Oce has violence data or 2006-2010: Te Aghanistan NGO Saety Oce, ANSO Quarterly Data Report, April 2011, pp. 10-12, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/

ANSO-Q1-Report-2011.pd Te Congressional Research Service issued a report to Congress in December o 2010 about the United Nations Assistance Mission to Aghanistan

(UNAMA), which included data on civilian deaths by pro-government and anti-government orces: Margesson, Rhoda, United Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, December

27, 2010, p. 17, http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pd Te Brookings Institution compiles a dataset or 2006-2011: Livingston, Ian S. and OHanlon, Michael, Aghanistan Index: racking Variables o Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Aghanistan, Te

Brookings Institution, August 31, 2011, p. 15, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/aghanistan%20index/index.pd

74. Abi-Habib, Maria, Ambassador Blames Pakis tan Militants, Te Wall Street Journa l, September 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com artic le/SB10001424053111904060604576570073922364258.html

75. Foust, Joshua, A New Wave o Spectacular Attacks, Regis tan.net, Februar y 19, 2010, http://www.registan.net/index.php/2010/02/19/a-new-wave-o-spectacular-attacks/

76. Peter, om A., Can Aghanistan hang on to its newly minted college grads?, Te Chris tian Science Monitor, May 26, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0526/Can-Aghanistan-hang-on-to-its-newly-minted-college-grads


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Documents

Measuring Success - Are We Winning - 10 Years in Afghanistan -May 2012