MasterThesis! - SAGE · MasterThesis!!! I. Introduction)! “Adversity draws men together and produces beauty and harmony in life's relationships, just as the cold of winter produces

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

University of Strasbourg (home)University of Uppsala (host)

June 2014

The EU on IceThe Future of a Common European Arctic Policy

Submitted by:

Nicola Sephanie Wendt

Supervised by:

Home university: Jochen Sohnle

Host university: Peder Roberts

2 Master Thesis

Nicola Wendt EU on Ice

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Abstract:

“Pibloktoq“ or “Arcitc Hysteria” are the terms that could have been found on the EU’s

diagnostic sheet after its first involvement in Arctic politics. Pibloktoq is the Inuit

name of a behavioural disorder that occurs in circumpolar regions during the winter

months. Those affected suffer from disorientation as well as irrational and self-injuring

behaviour.1 Having made a rather late appearance to the negotiating table, the Union’s

political contributions have so far ranged from radical to opportunistic. Still in search

of its own legitimate role and access point, geographical, cultural as well as historical

components could not be identified as the most prominent arguments in favour of a

strong role for the supranational organization in the Arctic. The Union’s Arctic

member states appear as independent protagonists in this policy learning process with

uncertain outcomes. Nevertheless, a coherent policy approach might not only assist the

Union’s development to become a single foreign policy actor on the global stage. The

advancement of a European Arctic policy could also be of importance considering

future transitions within the region north of the Arctic Circle. Especially with regard to

environmental, social and economic transborder cooperation, the EU might be an asset.

The present thesis examines the past, present and future developments of the European

Arctic policy through the lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework while examining

the potential influences of three member states: Sweden, Denmark and Germany.

Keywords:

Arctic Policy, EU, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Denmark, Sweden, Germany

1 Michigan State University, “Introduction to Medical Anthropology - Pibloktoq,” available from http://anthropology.msu.edu/anp204-us13/2013/07/18/pibloktoq-artic-hysteria/; Internet, accessed on May 20, 2014.

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Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 3 List of Abbreviations/Acronyms ............................................................................................. 5

I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6 II. The Theoretical Framework .................................................................................... 11 2.1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework ........................................................................... 11 2.1.1. The Five Basic Premises .............................................................................................. 12 2.1.2. Identifying different sub-‐ and the belief system ................................................. 16 2.1.3. Identifying policy change ........................................................................................................ 19

III. The Arctic and its central Actors ....................................................................... 20 3.1. Relevant Subsystems -‐ Preliminary Assumptions .................................................. 24

IV. International Cooperation in the Arctic .......................................................... 25 4.1.The EU in the Arctic ........................................................................................................... 26 4.2. The EU’s Legal Basis .......................................................................................................... 29 4.2.1. Implications for the EU’s position within the ACF .............................................. 33 4.3.Key Past Developments of the EU’s Arctic Policy ..................................................... 35 4.3.1. First Steps ....................................................................................................................................... 35 4.3.2. The Involvement of European Parliament, Commission and the Council .......... 36 4.3.3. Implications for the relevant Advocacy Coalitions ....................................................... 39

V. The Kingdom of Denmark ...................................................................................... 42 5.1. Patterns of Cooperation .................................................................................................. 42 5.1.1.Cooperation in the Danish Strategy for the Arctic ......................................................... 45

5.2. Danish-‐Greenlandic Relations ...................................................................................... 46 5.2.1. EU-‐Greenlandic Relations ....................................................................................................... 50

5.3.Denmark’s General Objectives ....................................................................................... 53 5.4. Denmark’s Position within the ACF ............................................................................. 54

VI. Sweden ........................................................................................................................ 55 6.1. Political Culture and Cooperation Patterns .............................................................. 55 6.2. Sweden in the Arctic ......................................................................................................... 59 6.2.1. Historical Ties and the Power of Research ...................................................................... 59 6.2.2. Security policy and economic ties ....................................................................................... 60 6.2.3. Cultural ties ................................................................................................................................... 61

6.3. Sweden’s General Objectives ......................................................................................... 61 6.4. Sweden’s Position within the ACF ............................................................................... 63

VII. The Federal Republic of Germany ................................................................... 64 7.1.Cooperation Patterns and Main Interests .................................................................. 64 7.2. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Arctic ................................................... 69 7.2.1.What Arctic is to the Federal Republic of Germany ...................................................... 69

7.2.2 What the Federal Republic is to the Arctic ............................................................. 71 7.2.The Federal Republic of Germany seen within the ACF ........................................ 71

VIII. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 73

IX. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 76


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List of Abbreviations/Acronyms:

AC – Arctic Council

ACF – Advocacy Coalition Framework

AEPS – Arctic Environmental Strategy

ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

CAP – European Common Agricultural Policy

CFSP – European Common Foreign and Security Policy

Council – Council of the European Union

EEC – European Economic Community

EEA – European Economic Area

EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone

EFTA – European Free Trade Area

EU – European Union

GMF – German Marshall Fund of the United States

ICC – Inuit Circumpolar Council

ICJ – International Court of Justice

IMO – International Maritime Organization

ITLOS – International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

MEP – Member of European Parliament

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ND – Northern Dimension

OCT – Overseas Countries and Territories

POPs – Persistent Organic Pollutants

REACH – Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals

SWP – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

TEU – Treaty on the European Union

TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN – United Nations

UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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I. Introduction

“Adversity draws men together and produces beauty and harmony in life's

relationships, just as the cold of winter produces ice-flowers on the window-panes,

which vanish with the warmth.”2 - Søren Kirkegaard

Over the course of the last two decades, global warming has become an important

subject within international politics. While scientists were generating ever-new

findings on reasons and potential implications, politicians have often found their room

for manoeuvre bounded by their vested interests. International climate cooperation is

therefore still in its infancy and the transboundary character of the issue in question has

rather lead to reluctance and sluggish developments than to the advancement of the

respective policymaking processes. However, what often had been perceived in terms

of burdensome moral obligations seemed to appear in an altogether different light as

the Arctic emerged on the political agenda. Within the scope of the Arctic debate

future generations was given a face, climate became a question of identity and long-

term dangers turned into short-term opportunities for many public and private actors.

The predicted meltdown of the Arctic ice cap, technological advances, resource

scarcity as well as other changing conditions gradually expanded the circle of

interested groups that started to shift their attention towards the northernmost part of

the planet. The prospect of new shipping routes and access to untouched resources did

not only awaken the interest of the Arctic Ocean’s littoral states. Among others,

countries such as China but also political entities like the European Union (EU), the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN) started to

express their ambitions and tried to make their voices heard in the discussions

regarding the region’s future. 3 The Union’s performance within this political

adjustment process will be the focus of this thesis.

While the eight Arctic states Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the

United States of America and Iceland were fast to set up internal negotiation platforms

2 Carol A. Dingle ed., Memorable Quotations: Philosophers of Western Civilization (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2000), 124. 3 James Kraska ed., Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xxi – xxvii.


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such as the Arctic Council, it took the EU some more years to take notice of the

debate’s extent and the necessity to develop its own standpoint on the issue.4 Despite

extensive Arctic research activities conducted by a number of its member states and its

own expertise in regional cooperation and governance, the EU has not yet succeeded in

positioning itself as a discrete actor in the Arctic struggle for influence and legitimacy.

Behind the more or less solid façade of one of the world’s most powerful trading blocs,

inner divergences seem to smoulder and undermine the Union’s ability to act.

It is assumed that the EU’s precarious standing might be related to the reluctant or even

apathetic support of some of its own member countries. The Kingdom of Denmark,

Sweden, Finland as well as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and

European Economic Area (EEA) member states Norway and Iceland form part of the

above-mentioned Arctic Council. The Council’s history dates back to 1991, when

Gorbachev’s vision to transform the planet’s northernmost territories from a highly

sensitive military area into a “zone of peace” started to take shape.5 It was the Finnish

government that fostered the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection

Strategy (AEPS), which was eventually adopted by the ministers of the eight Arctic

countries in Rovaniemi, Finland in 1991.6 As their names suggest, the AEPS and its

corresponding Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment focused on the

Arctic countries’ political obligation to actively engage in environmental protection

measures.7 In 1995 Canada drove forward the expansion of the AEPS’ scope, striving

after the formation of a comprehensive international organization that would focus on

the wider notion of sustainable development in the Arctic.8 By signing the Ottawa

Declaration in 1996, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the US and the Russian

Federation consequently brought the Arctic Council into being.9 Sweden and Finland

had just joined the EU in 1995 while Denmark, together with Greenland, had been part

4 Andreas Maurer, “The Arctic Region – Perspectives from Member States and Institutions of the EU,” (Working Paper/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2010), 5. 5 Kristian Åtland, “Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Reltaions in the Arctic,” Cooperation and Conflict 43 ,3 (2008): 289. 6 Evan T. Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” The American Journal of International Law, 93, 3 (1999): 712-713. 7 Ibid, 713. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Rovaniemi, 1991, 2. 8 Evan T. Bloom, 713. 9 Ibid, 714.

8 Master Thesis

of the first (north-) enlargement of 1973.10 Even though the Arctic island of Greenland

decided in referendum to leave the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985, it

can be claimed that European interests had indirectly been represented in the Arctic

Council from the very beginning.

The Arctic Council developed into the key institution in the context of the matter at

hand and has thus far provided for a peaceful development in the region above the

Arctic Circle; however to the deliberate exclusion of the EU that up until today has not

been accepted as a permanent observer.11 Taking into account the lack of active

support regarding the Union’s application to become such a permanent observer to the

Arctic Council, one might even assume that the EU’s gradually adapted policy

priorities still do not align with the main aims of the Arctic Council member states.12

Thereby the latter’s desire to protect their privileges and sovereignty does not seem to

have decreased over the past developments.13 Here, one can refer to the so-called

Ilulissat Declaration. In 2008, the Arctic Ocean’s five littoral states (Canada, the US,

Russia, Norway and Denmark) came together in the Greenlandic town of Ilulissat

where the eponymous declaration was signed.14 It underscores above all the role of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the sole applicable

legal regime in the region e.g. with regard to questions of resource exploitation or

boundary lines. This course of action has been widely interpreted as a proof of the five

countries’ sovereignty concerns and their quest for exclusivity. Seen before the

backdrop of the EU’s search of political legitimacy and influence, these tendencies

could be considered as an indicator for the overall importance of identity building

processes in foreign policy making on the European level or for the boundaries of the

EU’s internal legal, political and social harmonization process.

10 Deutsche Welle, “EU enlargement,” available from http://www.dw.de/eu-enlargement/a-1756746; Internet, accessed June 1, 2014. 11 Arctic Council, “Member States,” available from http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states; Internet; accessed on March 8, 2014. 12 BBC New, “China joins Arctic Council but a Decision on the EU is deferred,” available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22527822; Internet, accessed on May 13, 2014. 13 Njord Wegge, “The EU and the Arctic: European Foreign Policy in the Making,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 3, 1 (2012): 11. 14 Brooks B. Yeager, “The Ilulissat Declaration: Background and Implications for Arctic Governance,” (Working paper/ Aspen Dialogue and Commission on Arctic Climate Change/ Aspen Institute, Aspen, 2008), 1.


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This thesis first of all aims to raise the question of whether a coherent Arctic policy of

the EU has a future or whether it might underline the Union’s previous role of an

illegitimate and misdirected latecomer. When looking at the EU’s relevant

publications, it becomes apparent that the interests and ideas of relevant member

countries have to a certain degree already led to a policy learning process on the

European and especially the supranational level.15 These policy developments can

mainly be observed in the reciprocal actions of the different EU institutions that took

place in the course of recent years and the subsequent policy amendment processes.

Hence, the EU’s policy approach will be examined through relevant past policy

statements and other aspects of relevance. Given the supremacy of European law over

national legislation and the Union’s exclusive competences in a number of crucial

areas for the Arctic certain legal aspects will also be taken into consideration (e.g.

fisheries, energy and the environment). The different policy evolutions will be

examined by means of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). This theoretical

framework has been developed by the political science scholars Paul A. Sabatier and

Hank Jenkins-Smith and describes to what extent political advocacy coalitions may

exert influence on a specific policy-making process. In doing so their individual

approaches and ideas are based on their so-called “belief systems” that, according to

the scholars, consist of a three-layered scheme of normative, political and rather

technical viewpoints.16

Accordingly, the crucial elements that define the interests of three exemplifying

member sates under study will be identified and compared with the Union’s current

position on the matter. In order to gain a rich and detailed picture of intra-European

policy tendencies, one non-arctic (Germany), one partially arctic but non-littoral

(Sweden), and one central player in the Arctic debate (The Kingdom of Denmark

including Greenland and the Faroe Islands) will be analysed by means of their

respective policy papers and past relevant actions. To channel the given information in

the most useful way, the ACF will divide the different actors exerting influence on the

15 Timo Koivurova et al., “The Present and Future Competences of the European Union in the Arctic.” Polar Record 48, 4 (2012): 369. 16 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, 1 (1998): 98.

10 Master Thesis

policy drafting process into several subgroups, the so-called “subsystems”. 17

Identifying their different fundamental interests and the values they are built on will

thereby help to determine the potential priorities of the future European Arctic Policy.

Focusing on only three of the EU’s 28 member states might thereby seem too small of

a scope of analysis but as the scholar Njord Wegge has stated appropriately: “When

analysing the EU and its interaction with actors in its external environment, it seems

reasonable that the scope and substance of the matter at stake should determine which

actors should receive the most attention.”18 The three case studies have been chosen

accordingly, focusing mainly on Arctic member countries while not neglecting the

influence of less related yet relevant internal actors.

Denmark assumes a special role in the present debate not only due to its traditionally

sceptical stance towards European supranationalism but also due to its past and present

links to Greenland. These bonds are of fundamental importance for Denmark’s

regional and global standpoint as regards its current foreign policy in general and its

role within the Arctic debate in particular. Greenland has adopted an increasingly

significant role in the Arctic and appears to be the strategic key for Danish or even

European political involvement in the region. Even though Greenland deliberately left

the EEC in 1985, certain bilateral agreements still maintain the island’s position within

the Union’s sphere of influence.19 Accordingly, special consideration will be given to

the bilateral relations between Greenland and Denmark on the one hand and Greenland

and the EU on the other. In contrast to Denmark, Sweden and the Federal Republic of

Germany do not have any direct or indirect coastline with the Arctic Ocean while

Sweden still perceives itself as a partly Arctic country. Accordingly, their interests in

the Arctic assume a different character. Furthermore, both countries have been more or

less successfully engaged in the advancement of Europe’s stand in the wider world. To

what extent these tendencies are also reflected in the countries’ support for the

establishment of a common European Arctic policy will be analysed over the following

chapters. The three case studies will thus represent an exemplifying extract of the

17 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, “Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework.” Journal of Public Policy 14, 2 (1994): 178. 18 Njord Wegge, 10. 19 European Commission, “EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed on May 01, 2014.


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multifarious positions that should be taken into consideration when developing a

common European policy approach. The Arctic and the connected policy debate will

consequently be looked at as a potential window to analyse EU-internal policy

dynamics as it provides for a stage on which particularly strong national interests

collide with supranational ambitions.

II. The Theoretical Framework

In the following chapters, a redefined version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework as

developed by the American political science scholars Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C.

Jenkins-Smith will be introduced to the reader as it may contribute to a deeper

understanding of the formation and subsequent influence of affiliated policy groups

and their respective political identities. Hence, thanks to the theory’s framing its

application to the case at hand will allow for a better grasp of the decisive group

dynamics underlying the development of a common European Arctic policy. Its

application might also shed further light on the question whether the Union has the

potential to take a leap forward in the Arctic debate due to its very own political

identity and policy initiatives. Such “pan-European” advancements on the foreign

policy level could be enabled through successful policy learning processes and

consensus building or impeded through hardened fronts between the respective

political subsystems.

2.1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework

The American political science scholar Paul A. Sabatier laid the foundation for the

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) with the publication of a range of articles

throughout the 1980s.20 Together with his colleague Hank C. Jenkins- Smith, who had

simultaneously yet individually been working in the same field of research, Sabatier

developed the ACF into more detail. The theoretical framework should outline and

clarify the influences exerted on policy-making processes by diverse interest groups.21

Since internal and external exertion of influence constitutes one basic element of the

20 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, 1 (1998): 98. 21 Peter Nedergaard, “The Reform of the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy: an Advocacy Coalition Explanation,” Policy Studies 29, 2 (2008): 179.

12 Master Thesis

European policy drafting process, many scholars already applied Jenkins-Smith and

Sabatier’s model to diverse aspects of Brussels’s political dynamics. The ACF thereby

proved to be of exceptional value as it pays special attention to the fact that the source

of most complex and long-winded political developments is to be found in the

interaction and consensus building between the various actors involved. The respective

affiliation of the different groupings is thereby, however, open to change and

evolvement and therefore not to be seen as unalterable.22 In order to exemplify the

applicability of the ACF one could refer to Peter Nedergaard. The Danish political

science scholar applied the theoretical framework in question to the policy learning

processes that occurred in relation to the European Common Agricultural Policy

(CAP). By identifying the most influential advocacy coalitions, Nedergaard offered an

explanation for the dynamics that eventually lead to the CAP reform in 2003.23

2.1.1. The Five Basic Premises

Through their conceptionalization of the ACF Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identified

five basic premises on which they based their theoretical framework:

1. The first premise describes the role played by technical and scientific data and

information that determines and depicts the scale, origins and impacts of the

problem in question as well as of the possible outcomes that might affect the

policy process.24 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume that empirical data has the

potential to shape basic perceptions and political goals of certain actors and

their coalitions. Moreover, they claim that already established positions might

under certain circumstances alternate due to changing scientific evidence that is

of relevance to the respective policy area. It can be found that this premise is

met in the case of the present research project; in particular with regard to the

environmental but also the economic and societal scope of Arctic politics which

22 Metodi Sotirov and Michael Memmler, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework in Natural Resource Policy Studies – Recent Experiences and further Prospects,” Forest Policy and Economics 16 (2012): 58-59. 23 Peter Nedergaard, 179. 24University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014.


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have evolved in a highly scientific environment due to the central role played

by e.g. global warming. In addition to this, it can be stated that European policy

drafting proceeds to a large extent in an exceptionally technical setting.25 The

resulting complexity requires thorough consideration of the decisive technical

and structural details.

2. The two scholars further noted that at least ten years must have passed after the

first occurrence of the “problem” in order to allow for a comprehensive

understanding of the policy development process.26 From the point of view of

the theory’s developers this minimum time period is required if one intends to

gain full understanding of the policies’ implications on the influencing

subsystems and vice versa. Here, one can refer to the founding date of the

Arctic Council, which was established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996.27

However, the EU only started its active engagement in the issue area around the

year 2007.28 Hence, this theoretical framework will be utilized in a rather

current matter. The evolution within the drafting process of the policy itself will

thus be the focus of analysis, rather than the changes of a long-established

policy as in the case of Peter Nedergaard’s study on the European CAP. Given

the specific circumstances of the topic at hand, it can be argued that the ACF

nevertheless provides for an adequate and applicable analytical framework.

Accordingly, the reluctance of specific member states when it comes to the

drafting of a Common Foreign and Security Policy on the European level has

been a constant companion in the EU’s political history and reflects itself in an

exemplary way in the drafting of the Union’s Arctic policy.29 Moreover, the

respective countries have been interested/engaged in Arctic related actions for

25 Vivien A. Schmidt, “The EU and Its Member-States: Institutional Contrasts and Their Consequences,” (working paper/ 99/7 / Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln, 1999), http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp99-7/wp99-7.html; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 26 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: an Assessment,” in Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 118. 27Arctic Council, “History,” available from http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/history; Internet; accessed on March 11, 2014. 28 Andreas Maurer, “The Arctic Region – Perspectives from Member States and Institutions of the EU”, 5. 29 Adam Hug ed., “Europe in the World: Can EU foreign policy make an impact?” (Working paper/ The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2013), 23-24.

14 Master Thesis

more than several decades e.g. in form of numerous research projects as will be

shown in parts of the thesis.

3. The third premise concerns the involvement of the so called “policy

subsystems”.30 These constitute the main focus within the ACF. This domain is

based on and constructed around e.g. a specific field of (political) interests or a

geographic dimension and involves a certain number of public and private

actors.31 In my analysis, I will try to identify the main areas of interest and the

resulting coalitions/political subsystems in the development process of the

European Arctic policy by looking at the position of the three above-mentioned

EU member states: Denmark, Sweden and Germany. It should be mentioned

that those actors still form part of a more wide-ranging policy

environment/subsystem that most likely involves further influential internal and

external actors whose specific role will be taken into account but not be

discussed in detail as this would exceed the scope of the present Master’s

thesis. As the positions of the three case studies can nevertheless be seen as

exemplary elements in the drafting process, it can be claimed that the expected

findings can still contribute to a better understanding of the debate in question.

Moreover, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith state that in order to produce change the

political actor and object of analysis must form a firm part of the issue area.

Meeting this third premise, one can ensure that the respective actors are aware

of the technical details of the problem area that might influence their own and

other’s coalition behaviour. Being member states of the EU, it can be said that

this premise is met in the present analysis and as mentioned above, all of the

three EU member countries have for many years been engaged in circumpolar

research activities.

4. The fourth premise of the ACF claims that the abovementioned subsystems

should incorporate agents from a number of different governmental and societal

30 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, “Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework”,178. 31 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014.


15

levels.32 According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smiths, boundaries that had been

imposed on analytical concepts by national borders, organizational frameworks

and elitist hierarchies need to be demolished in order to achieve an

encompassing picture of the exertion of influence within the issue area.33 Even

though individual member states constitute the main focus of my research, it

has to be taken into account that the complexity of European policy making

necessarily involves a range of other internal and external, national and

supranational actors. Nonetheless, the focal point of my analysis stays with the

three member states. Thus, the fourth premise is also met even though not in

the narrow sense.

5. The fifth and last premise is of utmost importance to the present work as it

states that policy programmes reflect to a certain degree the belief systems of

the different actors involved.34 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith therefore also speak

of a “policy translation of belief systems.”35 The respective belief structures

form the foundation to crucial factors and circumstances within the policy

making process. Here, the most influential actors and their belief systems take

on a predominant role. Their belief systems can inter alia be found in the

intended way to achieve the respective policy goals and include e.g. “value

priorities or perceptions of important causal relationships”.36 Moreover, they

play a central role when it comes to the differentiation of the different

subsystems. National identity, historical as well as geographic aspects and the

current political position within the Arctic debate are some of the elements

32 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 33 Ibid. 34 Simon Matti and Annica Sandström, “The Defining Elements of Advocacy Coalitions: Continuing the Search for Explanations for Coordination and Coalition Structures.” Review of Policy Research 30, 2 (2013): 243. 35 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 36 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”, 99.

16 Master Thesis

which shape the belief systems of the different actors that this analysis will take

into consideration with regard to European foreign policy making.

2.1.2. Identifying different sub-‐ and the belief systems

The image of the individual actor that can be found at the basis of the ACF stems from

the American political scientist Herbert Alexander Simon and his “Theory of Bounded

Rationality”.37 According to this theory, the restricted availability/accessibility of

relevant information and other necessary resources such as time as well as the

individual’s limited cognitive ability to process certain inputs and impetuses leads to

the usage of heuristics for decision making.38 Purely rational decision-making, which

involves the aspiration for optimal choice, therefore fades into the background. 39 The

assumption that heuristics play a surprisingly big role has to be kept in mind

throughout the following analysis.

In addition to the Theory of Bounded Rationality, Quattrone and Tversky’s “Prospect

Theory” also figure into the concept of the ACF. The Prospect Theory concludes that

individuals frame their decision making in the form of a choice between loss and

gain.40 Thereby the individual’s behaviour is marked by risk avoidance and loss

aversion that is based on the more present remembrance of former losses rather than of

prior gains.41 In “high-conflict situations” the described distortions and affinities make

it more likely that the coalitions involved perceive each other as “more evil and more

powerful” than appropriate or necessary. 42 The ACF describes these tendencies as the

37 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 38 Herbert A. Simon, “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,” in 25 Years of Economic Theory, ed. T.J. Kastelein et al., (New York: Springer US, 1976), 136. 39 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 268 – 270. 40 George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky, “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice,” The American Political Science Review, 82, 3 (1988), 720-722. 41 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 42 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”,110.


17

“devil shift”.43 The devil shift can be central to the coordination of action and

alignment among the different policy coalitions. Weible, McQueen and Sabatier

describe these effects by listing the following behavioural displays: “polarized

coordination patterns between rival coalitions, minimal communication channels

between opponents, venues shopping, and long-term disagreement about major policies

in the subsystem.”44 Against this background, it should also be noted that despite the

prominent role of technical and scientific data, specific information might be ignored

or exert only limited effect as it might challenge core beliefs or arouse the described

behavioural patterns of risk avoidance.

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith the belief system described under the fifth

premise of the ACF is the main heuristic that individual actors apply for their political

decision-making.45 When looking at the belief system itself, the ACF differentiates

between three layers. At the centre, one can find the deep core beliefs. They constitute

the most essential and basic components of a belief system and result to a great extent

from early socialization and are therefore mostly normative in nature.46 Hence, it is

quite difficult to change a core belief. Frequently used examples refer to “value

priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of world states,

and perceptions/assumptions concerning the efficacy of various policy instruments.”47

International Relations scholars such as J. Goldstein and R. Keohane have also

underlined the importance of such idealistic constructs:

“By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape

outcomes. Insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of

conceivable options, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning

43 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”,110. 44 Christopher M. Weible et al., “Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” The Policy Studies Journal 31, 1 (2009): 132-133. 45 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 46 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, “Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework”,180. 47 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: an Assessment”,118- 119.

18 Master Thesis

action onto certain tracks rather than others … but also by obscuring the other

track’s from the agent’s view.”48

The next, less “obscuring” layer within the belief system comprises the so-called policy

core beliefs. They are usually shared throughout an established policy coalition and can

be deemed to constitute the decisive catalyst regarding the coalitions’ foundation and

their further activities. Even though they are described as “resistant to change” it has to

be noted that they are much easier to be (re-) shaped than deep core beliefs.49

The third layer of the ACF’s belief system is called secondary beliefs. This category is

not only narrower in scope but also rather empirically based. As a result, it is more

likely for this third element of the belief system to change and develop in the long run

as new data and information emerges and initiates a policy learning

process.50 Common examples of secondary beliefs involve budgetary and other rather

detailed elements of policy making. As shown on Figure 1, subsystems can

furthermore be influenced by two different parameters: the external system events and

the relatively stable parameters.

48 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework”, in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993),12. 49 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 50 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”, 103-104.


19

Figure 151

2.1.3. Identifying policy change

According to the ACF, major policy change corresponds to a change within the policy

core of a subsystem while minor policy change equals a change in the secondary

beliefs (e.g. a shift in resources).52 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier claim that there are four

possible reasons that may lead to major policy change: external events or shocks,

policy oriented learning internal shocks and negotiated agreements. 53 The past and

potential future occurrence of these four elements will also be respected when

analyzing the development of the European Arctic policy.

As a further alternative Sabatier introduced consensus building to the ACF. The three

conditions that need to be met describes Sabatier as follows:

51 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: an Assessment”, 121. 52 University of Colorado, Denver –School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” available from http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx; Internet; accessed on March 10, 2014. 53 Ibid.

20 Master Thesis

1. A stalemate wherein all coalitions view a continuation of the status quo as

unacceptable;

2. The negotiations are conducted in private and last a relatively long time,

e.g. more than six months;

3. There is a facilitator (policy broker) respected by all parties and viewed as

relatively neutral.54

Given the nature of European politics, the process of consensus building might be of

utmost importance.

III. The Arctic and its central Actors

Geography and politics do not always go hand in hand with each other. Trying to

identify natural laws that set

physical boundaries to man-made

imaginative constructs has often

led to dispute and confrontation.

The settlement of a common

defining framework between the

different actors involved is

therefore an essential first step in

any geopolitical context.55

In the present case, the Arctic

Council seems to assume

definitive power. When looking

at the membership of the Arctic

Council, one can find eight countries whose territories lie partly above the Arctic

Circle: Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark (including

Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Canada, the United States of America as well as the

54 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”, 119. 55 Figure 2: Canadian Cryospheric Information Network, “Canadian Cryospheric Information Network,” available from https://www.ccin.ca/home/ccw/faq; Internet, accessed on May 10, 2014.


21

Russian Federation.56 This imaginary line of the Arctic Circle equals the parallel of

latitude that runs at 66° 32” North. The waters, which are included in this area, are

consequently referred to as the Arctic Ocean. 57

Considering inter alia the resource deposits of the underlying continental shelf the

access to and allocation of the Arctic Ocean represents one important element to the

present debate. Accordingly, bordering Arctic waters ensures to a certain degree

influence and legitimacy within the decisive decision-making processes. From this

arises the following configuration of the most influential actors in the region: Norway,

Canada, the United States of America, the Russian Federation as well as the Kingdom

of Denmark. This group is known of as the Arctic Five.58 The remaining three states

are consequently often referred to as the Arctic Three.59 It becomes apparent that there

is a strong European presence in the latter grouping while the former mainly comprises

third countries as well as Denmark and Norway.

Denmark’s link to the region heavily relies on its gradually weakening political, legal

and societal connections to the Arctic island of Greenland.60 In 2008, the Arctic Five

came together at the invitation of the Danish Foreign Ministry.61 In the city of Ilulissat

(Greenland) they discussed and eventually signed the so-called “Ilulissat

Declaration”.62 This declaration can be seen as a cornerstone for today’s Arctic

political debate since it addresses various central questions of Arctic governance.63

Without being legally binding, its indirect implications for further developments within

the Arctic Council have been significant, e.g. with regard to the main tenor of certain

56 Arctic Council, “Member States,” available from http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states; Internet; accessed on March 8, 2014. 57 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “What is the Arctic?,” available from https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic.html; Internet; accessed on March 26, 2014. 58 Andreas Maurer, “What’s the EU and the Member States’ Arctic? Perceptions and Realities,” in Report on the 3rd Annual Geopolitics in the High North Conference, ed. Andreas Maurer et al., (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012), 17. 59 James Kraska, 4-5. 60 UNRIC, “Greenland: Oil Fortune to Fund Independence,” available from http://www.unric.org/en/indigenous-people/27308-greenland-oil-fortune-to-fund-independence; Internet, accessed on April 01, 2014. 61 Ilulissat Declaration, Ilulissat,1. Geneviève King Ruel, “The Arctic Show Must Go on – Natural Resource Craze and National Identity in Arctic Politics,” International Journal 66 (2011): 830. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

22 Master Thesis

value-related aspects and internal power structures. Accordingly, the two-page

document focuses on the signatories’ commitment towards environment-friendly

resource exploration and peaceful dispute resolution.64 However, as the main point one

should refer to the decision to recognize the United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS) as the sole applicable legal regime.65 This has major implications

regarding the exploitation of natural resources as well as the usage of new

transportation corridors. It also clearly indicates that the Arctic Five are opposed to the

emergence of any additional legal or political structures, instruments or even actors in

the Arctic.

The symbolism of the described course of action is momentous. The exclusiveness of

the Arctic Five’s approach has been seen as a testament to the respective countries’

supremacy within the Arctic debate and drawn considerable criticism from the Arctic

Council’s other member countries and representatives.66 However, the Arctic Five

claimed to be justified by the preeminent and exclusive relevance of the decided

standpoints for the Arctic Ocean and its littoral states. As indicated above, the action

could also be interpreted as reaction towards the intentions voiced among others by the

European Parliament to assume an active role within the development process of a new

legal regime for the Arctic that would be comparable to the Antarctic Treaty and

impede an economic or even power politics related framing of the debate.67 Several

months after the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration such plans of setting up a new

agreement have been abandoned.

Thus, it becomes apparent that the Kingdom of Denmark is a key player in the present

issue area. One can e.g. underline the fact, that the Danish and Greenlandic Ministry

for Foreign Affairs arranged the conference in May 2008 on Greenland, deliberately

excluding other European countries. In this context, it should be underlined that

Denmark’s relation to the Arctic is mainly based on its links to Greenland, which is, 64 Brooks B. Yeager, 1. 65 Ibid, 2. 66 Kathrin Keil, 10-12. 67 GeoPolitics in the High North, “Arctic strategy documents – The European Union and the Arctic region,” available from http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84&limitstart=5; Internet, accessed on March 27, 2014. European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, Brussels.


23

however, not a full part of the EU. The exclusion of Finland, Sweden and Iceland as

well as the definite precedence of UNCLOS over any other international agreement or

entity illustrates how the EU started to lose touch with the core of Arctic policy making

shortly after its initial steps on the Arctic stage had been taken. However, first traces of

a policy learning process on the part of the EU emerged through the gradual giving-up

of its proactive ambitions to set up an alternative to UNCLOS and its shift of emphasis

towards other channels of political interference. The EU was not resuming from its

interests in the Arctic. Accordingly, the Commission stated in its Communication that

was published in the end of 2008 that the EU “should promote broad dialogue and

negotiated solutions and not support arrangements which exclude any of the Arctic EU

Member States or Arctic EEA EFTA countries.”68 The EU thereby aligned with the

complaints and criticism voiced by Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Especially after a

similar meeting had been held by the Arctic Five in Chelsea, a suburb of Montréal, in

2010, the Union took on a clear stance in favour of exceptionless involvement of the

European Arctic countries in the process. 69

68European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region, Brussels, 2008. 69 Arctic Portal, “The Arctic Ocean – Challenges in Governance,” http://arcticportal.org/features/722-the-arctic-sea-challenges-in-governance; Internet, accessed April 10, 2014.

24 Master Thesis

3.1. Relevant Subsystems -‐ Preliminary Assumptions

Seeing these developments in context with the ACF, one can make the following

preliminary assumptions regarding the formation of different influential subsystems

that might exert influence on the Arctic policy making process of the EU. Here, it

should not be forgotten that “power” and influence is not equally distributed among the

different advocacy coalitions.70

The Belief System of the three Relevant

Advocacy Coalitions

Actors within the three Relevant

Coalitions

No reform needed, changes to secondary

beliefs possible

Narrative: Arctic policy is littoral states’

business

Kingdom of Denmark, Arctic Five

(Norway, Russia, USA, Canada and

Denmark)

Moderate reform in terms of changes to

policy core possible/required, Arctic

could be seen in a new perspective, policy

might assume a new direction

Narrative: various interests need to be

considered

Sweden, Arctic Three, Arctic Council,

(Germany, European Commission,

European Council)

Fundamental reform needed in connection

with changes to deep core; new basic

approach should be adopted

Narrative: radical change in approach

towards Arctic policy issues needed

Early European Parliament, (MEP Diana

Wallis)

The following sections will now take a closer look at the role assumed by the EU in

this “region-to-be” in order to get a better grasp on its position within the network of

70 Peter Nedergaard, 184.


25

subsystems. 71 A special focus will be set on prior changes that reflect the

abovementioned subsystem allocation as well as on possible future developments.

IV. International Cooperation in the Arctic

As described in preceding sections of the present paper, the Arctic offers a particularly

complex geopolitical environment in which the EU is frequently perceived as an

incompetent or even misdirected alien element by a limited group of actors.72 This

“exclusive” group seems to carefully guard respective sovereignty rights and

privileged positions. The different actors’ alliance-forming behaviour as well as the

strong focus on resources and strategic dominance have prompted associations with

(neo-) realist views on geopolitics and world order. Certain scholars accordingly wrote

about a revitalisation of “great power rivalry over state ownership…[that will] affect

regional security” as well as about a “potential return to the realpolitik of yesteryear”.73

Nevertheless, one should not disregard former achievements regarding peaceful

elements of cooperation and negotiated agreements in line with internationally adopted

regimes and Gorbachev’s vision of a “zone of peace”.74 Already in 1987, the former

Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party promoted in his Murmansk speech a

peaceful future for the Arctic region.75 Past developments, such as the establishment of

the Arctic Council, point to the fact that this once hotly contested area will not set the

stage to invoke ghosts of the past. In this context, one might also refer to the respective

countries’ claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

Despite numerous overlapping claims for an extended continental shelf, the Arctic Five

agreed on the applicability of UNCLOS. Pursuant to Article 287(1) the following

means of dispute settlement may thus be applied: bringing the case before the

71 Kathrin Keil, 35. 72 Timo Koivurova et al., “The Present and Future Competences of the European Union in the Arctic,” 362. 73 Valur Ingimundarson, “Iceland’s Post-American Security Policy, Russian Geopolitics and the Arctic Question,” The RUSI Journal 154, 4 (2009): 99. Vsevolod Gunitskiy, “On Thin Ice: Water Rights and Resource Disputes in the Arctic Ocean,” Journal of International Affairs – Columbia University, 61, 2(2008): 262. 74 Timo Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New Proposal,” RECIEL 17,1 (2008): 15. Kristian Åtland, “Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Reltaions in the Arctic,” Cooperation and Conflict 43, 3 (2008): 289. 75 Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occassion oft he Presentation oft he Order of Lenin and the Gold Star tot he City of Murmansk, 1987.

26 Master Thesis

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or the International Court of

Justice (ICJ), applying ad hoc arbitration or calling a “special arbitral tribunal”.76 The

transfer of legal authority to e.g. the ICJ had previously been proven successful in

similar contexts. Here, one could refer to the peaceful settlement of the North Sea

Continental Shelf or the Eastern Greenland cases.77 However, it should be noted that

UNCLOS has not been signed by the US even though the respective provisions have

been acknowledged as customary law. Notwithstanding the above, this shows that it

would be misleading to assume that a neorealist perception of the world state underlies

the core belief system that seems to tie the Arctic Five together. It also makes clear that

even the Arctic Five’s policy positions have been considerably shaped by ‘external’

political and legal structures. Given the legal links between the EU, Denmark and

Norway, a future involvement of the EU becomes more conceivable, however, not

necessary.

4.1. The EU in the Arctic

Given the hitherto predominant framing of the Arctic struggle in neorealist terms, it is

implied that relative gains yet play a critical role.78 Therefore questions of security and

conflict arise in a presumably anarchic world structure. The strategies of soft power or

social and normative isomorphism that the EU has been embracing over the last

decades in regard to its external relations seem to face their limits in the given setting.

Recent developments on Europe’s Eastern borders have shown that the EU’s

occasionally blue-eyed application of carrot and stick can lead to unforeseen and

destabilizing developments.79 Accordingly, more attention and consideration should be

76 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Ad Hoc Arbitration Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” available from http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1288; Internet, accessed April 10, 2014. 77 International Court of Justice, “North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,” available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=295&code=cs2&p1=3&p2=3&case=52&k=cc&p3=5; Internet, accessed April 15, 2014. International Court of Justice, “Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway”, available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=401&p1=3&p2=3&case=78&p3=5; Internet, accessed June 01, 2014. 78 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 53-69. 79 Alexander J. Motyl, “Yanukovych’s Choice: An Association Agreement With the EU will transform Ukraine – and its President,” in Crisis in Ukraine, Rose Gideon ed., (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), 47.


27

given to the specific geographic and political circumstances. Unlike in previous

projects of democratization and Europeanization, the Arctic is a mainly uninhabited

area with high economic and military stakes.80 Thus, it would be difficult to only rely

on the usual “lingering but denied feelings of belonging” or the promotion of

democracy, rule of law and market economy in conjunction with potential accession or

association agreements. It should rather be noted that Norway and Greenland actively

decided against EU membership. This puts the EU in a new political environment in

which the given circumstances apparently require a thorough consideration of the

respective Arctic countries’ standpoints and a new policy approach towards its

Northern neighbouring region.81

Here, specific instruments and strengths of the EU come the fore: its legal

competences in certain crucial areas, its economic influence on e.g. fisheries in the

North as well as the expansion of the described elements through enlargement (Iceland,

or even Greenland). One should also not disregard aspirations for increased political

equality, respect and involvement of the Arctic minority populations. Thus, the

promotion of minority rights could be another aspect that the EU’s approach could

partly be based on as it has gained in competence in the respective area inter alia

through the adoption of its Fundamental Rights Charter and its ambitions in several

related areas.82

The predominant role of the Arctic states, however, leads to the assumption that the

EU will not be able to take on a decisive or even form-giving, proactive role. In light of

the former findings, the impact of member states’ and external actors’ interests and

positions will most likely exert considerable influence on the EU’s aim to gain the

most influence possible by dint of a multilateral approach depending on the degree to

which the Union’s policy priorities had already been woven into the national positions

80 Kathrin Keil, 11. 81 Njord Wegge, 11. 82 Timo Koivurova et al., “EU Competences Affecting the Arctic,” requested by European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (policy department study/ Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Brussels, 2010), 38.

28 Master Thesis

of countries like Sweden or Finland.83 The hitherto established perception and image of

the EU might be important in this context. Evidence suggests that the Union as an

intergovernmental organization enjoys in the Arctic debate contrary to e.g. NATO a

“rather soft and non-threatening image.”84 Hence, the final outcome could open the

possibility for the EU to establish itself as a low-profile but still significant

intermediary and watchdog of accomplished agreements. In this way the EU could

ensure its involvement in the established and arising governmental structures.

Substantive hurdles seem to stand in the way of any form of radical change that would

allow for external or supranational actors to assume a central role. Alterations within

the secondary belief-level would consequently hardly help to surmount the described

“obstacles”. Thus, changes to the policy core of both the EU in its Arctic policy but

most likely also within the Arctic governance structures are required to allow for an

involvement of the EU in the Arctic.

The subsequent section will provide some relevant background information regarding

the legal basis of the EU’s actions. These rights and obligations are building a solid

framework for the entire process of policy making and learning and might help to

illuminate the concerns of certain member states regarding the development of a

European Arctic policy as well as the Union’s position itself. General decision

procedures, as well as the shift of competences will be focal points of the discussion.

83 Michael Laiho, “Building Common Interests in the EU’s Energy Security Policy on the Arctic – from 2012 onwards,” in Report on the 3rdAnnual Geopolitics in the High North Conference, ed. Andreas Maurer et al., (Berlin:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012), 39. 84 Kathrin Keil, 7.


29

4.2. The EU’s Legal Basis

The founding treaties of the EU provide for the legal basis of the developing Arctic

Policy. The Lisbon Treaty ensued a number of additional relevant aspects such as the

Union’s legal personality, which gives it the right to negotiate and conclude

international agreements and to sign contracts with third countries or third-party

international organizations on its own behalf. 85 Consequently, new opportunities

presented themselves and European foreign policy making was raised to a higher

political and legal level.86

Furthermore, over the last years an increasing number of competences have been

shifted to the supranational level, especially regarding certain areas that are of

substantial importance to Arctic related legislation.87 Only some of those competences

are, however, exclusive. One central aspect of Arctic policy, the environment, belongs

on the list of shared competences. This implies that many of the current international

climate change treaties are so-called “mixed-agreements” that have been signed

individually by both the member states and the Union.88 However, policy areas that

have been exhaustively regulated by the EU are eventually also to be seen as de facto

exclusive.89 A further involvement in environmental policy on part of the EU might

lead into this direction and already at the present day it is difficult for most member

states to manoeuvre freely in this field. 90 Most of the EU’s policies in the

environmental realm apply by means of the EEA agreement also to Norway and

Iceland. This shows that a vast number of environmental protection policies have been

85 Europa – Summaries of EU legislation, “International Agreements,” available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/ai0034_en.htm; Internet, accessed April 15, 2014. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union (post-Lisbon). 2010 O.J. C 83/01, Article 47. 86 Antje Neumann, “The EU – A relevant actor in the field of climate change in respect to the Arctic?,” (Working paper/ Research Division EU External Relations / Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2010), 12. 87 Timo Koivurova et al., “EU Competences affecting the Arctic”, 6-7. 88 Antje Neumann and Bettina Rudloff , “Impact of EU Policies on the High North: The Cases of Climate Polity and Fisheries,” requested by European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (standard briefing/ Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Brussels, 2010), 11. 89 Timo Koivurova et al., “The Rresent and Future Competence of the European Union in the Arctic”, 365-366. 90 Ibid.

30 Master Thesis

seen in connection with the performance and implementation of internal market

policies.91

An aspect that is of relevance in this respect as it assumes great economic importance

for some of the Nordic countries is the conservation of marine biological resources

under the common fisheries policy, which constitutes an exclusive competence of the

Union and has caused considerable criticism, especially among the Arctic countries

Iceland and Greenland. Changing climate conditions have contributed to changes in the

natural habitats of certain fish populations, which consequently have been moving

northwards and are therefore not yet covered by specific regulations.92 In the eyes of

the EU, already existing arrangements should be adapted and revised in order to ensure

sustainable harvesting.93 As mentioned above, this issue area is included in one of the

EU’s exclusive competences and one of its presumably central interests but also areas

of “specialisation”.94 Two sets of data need to be considered with regard to the

potential effects of inner European coalition building. Firstly, the number of EU

flagged vessels involved in Arctic fishing activities is relatively low (4%) while the EU

stands out as the major consumer of fish caught in the Arctic.95 In 2004, half of the fish

caught in the Arctic was consumed in a EU country.96 Hence, it would not only be in

the Union’s but also in the exporting countries interest to regard the Union’s interests

in this issue. In line with the described developments, the Commission is asking in its

in 2012 published report for a precautionary approach.97 It is also referring to its

91 Timo Koivurova et al., “EU Competences affecting the Arctic” , 9. 92 Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International Affairs 85, 6 (2009): 1218. Timo Koivurova et al., “EU Competences affecting the Arctic”, 8. 93 Ibid. 94 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C83/01. Article. 3. 95 Bettina Rudloff, “EU’s Interests on Fish and Governance Challenges,” in Report on the 3rd Annual Geopolitics in the High North Conference, ed. Andreas Maurer et al., (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012), 25-26. 96 Steffen Weber and Iulian Romanyshyn, “Breaking the Ice – The European Union and the Arctic,” International Law Journal 66 (2010-2011): 849. 97 European Commission, “Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps,” (Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 2012), 10.


31

cooperative links to Greenland from which the Union will benefit and be able to exert

influence in order to ensure sustainable harvesting.98

The EU’s engagement in the

environmental area is decisive

and goes beyond the area of

fisheries. As different reports

have revealed, the EU is one of

the main contributors to

pollutants in the Arctic. 99

Research and investigation has shown that the so-called persistent organic pollutants

(POPs) are a significant environmental threat to the Arctic. Evidence suggests that they

have reached the Arctic through transportation from outside the region (including wind

patterns and ocean currents) and accumulated in the regional food web.100 Given its

geographic proximity, the Union cannot deny its co-responsibility. For example, 24%

of the mercury depositions and around 42% of sulphur dioxide emissions stem from

the EU-27 (2010).101 Moreover, the European continent’s share of black carbon

emissions to the regions above the Arctic Circle amounts to 59%.102 Regarding the

POPs, both the EU and its member countries form part of a respective regulation called

the “Stockholm Convention on POPs”. 103 The consequential European National

Implementation Plan makes clear that most issues under the Stockholm Convention

need “close and constructive cooperation between the Commission and the Member

States”.104Also, the Union has passed a significant number of legislation on specific

hazardous aspects on the European level. These, as for instance REACH –

98 European Commission, “Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps,” (Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 2012), 10. 99 Sandra Cavalieri et al., “EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment,” (report/ Ecologic Institute, Berlin, 2010), 1-2. Figure 3: Ibid, 4. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid, 103 Stockholm Convention, “Status of Ratifications,” available from http://chm.pops.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/tabid/252/Default.aspx; Internet, accessed April 20, 2014. 104 European Commission, “Community Implementation Plan for the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,” (Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 2006), 31.

Source regions of mercury depositions over the Arctic, 2005

Africa Southern hemi. EU-‐27 Rest of Europe North America Asia

32 Master Thesis

Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals, do not

specifically address Arctic issue areas but are nevertheless of importance, if only by

acting as a spur for future developments. Furthermore, they constitute a proof of the

EU’s ambitious engagement in the environmental sphere of action, which might be of

relevance for its current and future role in the Arctic.

Article 191-193 TFEU, in connection with Article 216(1) TFEU provide for the EU’s

legal basis to negotiate and conclude transnational legislation with respect to climate

change matters, while the respective procedural legal base is described under Article

218 TFEU.105 Article 191 TFEU describes the following objectives that Union policy

on the environment shall pursue: the preservation, protection and improvement of the

quality of the environment, the protection of human health, the prudent and rational

utilisation of natural resources as well as the promotion of measures at international

level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, in particular those

combating climate change. 106 The second point of the Article mentions that

environmental policy should be based on the precautionary principle. Even though

there is no official definition of this general principle, the United Nations Conference

on Environment and Development that met in Rio 1992 referred to the respective

principle under chapter 35 of its Agenda 21 stating that

“…in the face of threats of irreversible environmental damage, lack of full

scientific understanding should not be an excuse for postponing actions which

are justified in their own right. The precautionary approach could provide a

basis for policies relating to complex systems that are not yet fully understood

and whose consequences of disturbances cannot yet be predicted.”107

This indicates that environment-related policy adopted by the EU should pay special

attention to any potential threats the Arctic might be facing. Especially with respect to

the EU’s economic involvement in the Arctic, the precautionary principle should be

105 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C83/01. Article 218. 106 Ibid, Article 191. 107 Agenda 21, “Chapter 35: Science for Sustainable Development,” available from http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/a21-35.htm; Internet, accessed April 22, 2014.


33

respected in order to allow for the lawfulness of the legislative measures.108 The

proportionality principle should also be taken into consideration as another relevant

basic principle of European law. Under this principle the risk-benefit ratio is tested in

line with the efficiency and the underlying value representation of the respective

legislation.109

4.2.1. Implications for the EU’s position within the ACF

In this context, it could be noted that most scientific data would highlight the fragile

nature of the Arctic environment. The application of the described principles would

ensure that the Union’s and other member countries’ interests in new transportation

and exploitation opportunities should be dominated by a precautionary approach.

However, as assumed by the ACF, the respective coalitions will resist information that

challenges their core beliefs.110

This offers an explanation to the often-contradictory policy approaches of the EU and

its member states, underscoring the dangers of climate change and global warming in

the same breath as future plans for resource exploitation and improved access to Arctic

waters for container vessels and cruise liners. Thus, it becomes apparent that economic

interests build one basis to most national Arctic policy approaches and their respective

core beliefs/core policy systems. Nevertheless, the EU managed to stand out e.g. due to

its legislation regarding the ban on the import and sale of seal products.111 This radical

approach towards the protection of these Arctic mammals has been perceived as an

inappropriate step on part of the EU that had been based on a lack of knowledge and a

misconception of Arctic cultural habits and traditions. It also clarifies the fact that most

environment related policies may have restrictive repercussions for a number of

profitable policy areas. Accordingly, the EU’s ban on the sale and import of seal

108 Europa – Summaries of EU legislation, “The precautionary principle,” available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm; Internet, accessed April 23, 2014. 109 Tor-Inge Harbo, “The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law,” European Law Journal 10,2 (2010): 158-159. 110 Paul Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,”104-105. 111 Nikolas Sellheim, “Ignoring the Seal in the Room – The EU and the Seal Product Ban,” in Report on the 3rd Annual Geopolitics in the High North Conference, ed. Andreas Maurer et al., (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012), 41-42.

34 Master Thesis

products had much greater effects for the selling countries than for the EU. These

effects were not only economic in nature but also provoked a debate about the

underlying cultural dimensions of such legislative measures, imposing foreign value

systems on the Arctic indigenous population. Thus, states might strive for purposeful

avoidance of such measures or even the involvement of any external actors in the

Arctic. Accordingly, the implications for the EU could be various. On the one hand, it

could advantageous to the EU as it might assume the position of a gap-filler in the

environmental policy realm. On the other hand, the increasing ambitions might still be

perceived as a threat by the central actors, which will lead to a further refusal/rejection

of European involvement in the Arctic.

Other relevant aspects of Arctic policy making that are already, if only partly, included

in the EU’s legal framework are inter alia transport, energy, and the area of freedom,

security and justice.112 Looking at the relevant legislations of the different areas would

exceed the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, it has become clear that the EU is

already now able to interfere with member countries’ relevant policy making in a

number of fields. Through certain agreements such as the EEA this scope of action

even exceeds beyond its borders. Hence, the establishment of the common Arctic

policy in question appears as a rather cosmetic change. It should, however, be taken

into consideration that most of the relevant legislation misses any kind of clear

indication towards their specific application/implementation in an Arctic context. This

may limit the EU’s influence as well as its internal and external acknowledgment in the

region. The following chapter will now look at certain key past developments in the

EU’s Arctic Policy making that will indicate previous exertion of influence by specific

political subsystems as well as the resulting policy learning process on part of the EU.

112 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,2010 O.J. C83/01, Article 3.


35

4.3. Key Past Developments of the EU’s Arctic Policy

4.3.1. First Steps The very first step towards the construction of a European Arctic Policy was taken in

1999 with the establishment of the Northern Dimension (ND). This joint policy

programme included besides the EU also Norway, the Russian Federation and Iceland.

It aimed at the promotion of cooperation, stability, prosperity and sustainable

development in Northern Europe.113 Hence, the policy “answers to the EU’s intensive

cross-border relations with Russia in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Sea regions” and was

therefore one of the first European policy projects to officially mention the Arctic.114

The US and Canada are observer countries to the ND. The programme is now

subdivided into four partnerships that focus on different thematic areas: environment,

public health and social well-being, transport and logistics as well as culture. Even

though the ND cannot be seen as initiator or core of the EU’s engagement in the

Arctic, it still was the first policy approach to address related issues and is nowadays

increasingly seen in conjunction with European engagement in the Arctic as it

contributes to European expertise in the issue area. 115 It might also underpin the

previously indicated role of the EU as a low-profile, uncontroversial but still

committed Arctic actor/observer.

In 2007 the European Commission published the Integrated Maritime Strategy, in

which the Arctic Ocean was mentioned in relation to the process of global warming.116

During the same time period, the planting of a Russian flag on the bottom of the Arctic

sea aroused considerable media attention.117 A few months later, the EU’s High

Representative and the Commission set up a policy paper on climate change and

international security, which suggested the actual development of a EU Arctic

113 European Union External Action, “Northern Dimension,” available from http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/index_en.htm; Internet, accessed 22 April 2014. 114 Delegation of the European Union to Russia, “Northern Dimension,” available from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/regional_issues/northern_dimension/index_en.htm; Internet, accessed April 27, 2014. 115 Kathrin Keil, 30. 116 Kristine Offerdal, “The EU in the Arctic – In Pursuit of Legitimacy and Influence,” International Law Journal 66 (2010-2011): 867. 117 Michael A. Becker, “Russia and the Arctic: Opportunities for Engagement within the existing legal framework,” The American University International Law Review 25,2 (2010)225.

36 Master Thesis

policy.118 It can be noted, that this decision emerged comparably late given e.g. the

fact, that the Arctic Council had already been established in 1996.

4.3.2. The Involvement of European Parliament, Commission and the Council

In 2008, a debate in the European Parliament was initiated and eventually led by Diana

Wallis (ALDE). 119 The novelty of the issue and the generally limited level of

knowledge allowed a small group of people to exert considerable influence on the

course of the debate and the resulting “Resolution on Arctic governance”.120 In the

context of this debate, one referred to a number of concerns arising from the imminent

dangers of climate change for the indigenous people and the environment. It also

included the suggestion for the development of an international treaty to protect the

Arctic. The document included a specific wording that put the complexion of urgency

as well as the need for an almost radical proactive approach on the issue. Accordingly,

certain expressions such as “security threats for the EU and overall international

security” were used to highlight this image and an appeal towards the Commission was

included which “urg[ed it] to take a proactive role in the Arctic” followed by the

suggestion to become a permanent observer to the Arctic Council and to set up a

“dedicated Arctic desk.”121

This debate laid the foundation for a communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament and the Council that was published under the title “The European

Union and the Arctic Region”. Again, it was a considerable lack of expert knowledge

that built the background to the advances on the European level. 122 These

circumstances caused especially Denmark and Norway to voice their concerns and

actively engage in the Commission’s work.123 The main fear seemed to be related to

the Commission’s confirmation and approval of the European Parliament’s goals.124

After bilateral talks between Commission president José-Manuel Barroso and the

118 GeoPolitics in the High North, “Arctic strategy documents – The European Union and the Arctic region,” available from http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84&limitstart=5; Internet, accessed on April 02, 2014. 119 Steffen Weber and Iulian Romanyshyn, 855. 120 European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, Brussels. 121 Ibid. 122 Njord Wegge, 10. 123 Ibid, 17. 124 Ibid.


37

previous Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg the former consequently stated:

“as a matter of principle we can say that the Arctic is a sea, and a sea is a sea. This is

our starting point.”125 This showed that the Nordic countries’ engagement had been

fruitful and that the Commission intended to accept UNCLOS as the basic legal

document regarding the governance of the Arctic Ocean and its resources. The EU

Observer posted the next day “Commission backs Norway’s Arctic vision: no new

treaty.”126 This development mirrors not only the influence of the Nordic countries but

also the Union’s awareness of their own political lack of legitimacy as well as

openness for guidance. Norway and Denmark also underlined their position regarding

the avoidance of any kind of reform, aligning to their “Arctic” core belief systems,

which will be analysed in more detail in the following section.

The Commission’s resulting paper addressed the different interests of the EU in the

Arctic Ocean as well as the role played by the supranational/intergovernmental

organization within this context. Here, the Commission did not seem too intimidated

by the previous Nordic interference nor to query the legitimacy of the EU’s

engagement in the Arctic stating self-assuredly in the introductory phrase that the EU

is “inextricably linked to the Arctic region by a unique combination of history,

geography, economy and scientific achievements.”127 It was made clear that the

Commission’s intended approach would compromise the integration of Arctic related

aspects into EU policies and negotiation processes. The supranational body of the EU

also expressed its support for an official application to become a permanent observer to

the Arctic Council.128

The positioning of the third EU institution followed the Commission’s paper. The

Council conclusions on Arctic issues were adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council

Meeting on the 8th of December 2009.129 The Council announced in its document the

125 Njord Wegge, 17. 126 Ibid. EUObserver, “Commission backs Norway’s Arctic vision: no new treaty,” available from http://euobserver.com/news/27104; Internet, accessed on April 17, 2014. 127 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region,” Brussels, 2008. 128 Ibid. 129 European Council, “Council conclusions on Arctic issues,” adopted on the 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2009.

38 Master Thesis

upcoming “gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and

responsibilities, while recognising Member states’ legitimate interests and rights in the

Arctic.” Besides the increasing consideration for the positions of the relevant member

states, severe security challenges slipped out of the centre of attention while

cooperation and environmental protection became focal points on the agenda.130 Thus,

the Council’s main policy goals appeared to be in line with the three major policy aims

that had been proposed by the Commission: protecting and preserving the Arctic,

promoting the sustainable use of natural resources and contributing to enhanced

governance.131 The Council further provided the Commission with recommendations

regarding the construction of an Arctic policy.132

There are a number of issues that can be seen as exemplary regarding the path that the

Council aims to pursue: the encouragement to set up marine protected areas (Point 5),

the call for increased support for research that should take the bases of life of

indigenous peoples into account (Point 6), the reduction of harmful pollution in the

Arctic (Point 9) as well as a temporary ban on fisheries in “new” Arctic waters that are

not yet enclosed in any international conservation system (Point 10).133 Regarding the

exploration of Arctic resources, the Council stresses the need for cooperation that will

lead to “best practices for minimising negative environmental impacts”.134 Under Point

16, the Council further underlines the adherence to the freedom of navigation and the

right of innocent passage as they are also set out under Article 14 and 38 of

UNCLOS.135 Moreover, the Arctic Council was recognised by the Council as the

“primary competent body for circumpolar regional cooperation” and expressed its

continued support for inter alia the application of the Commission to become a

permanent observer (Point 17).136 Under the last point (23) of the document, the

130 European Council, “Council conclusions on Arctic issues,” adopted on the 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2009. 131 Ibid, 2. 132 Ibid, 2-3. 133 Ibid,2. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid, 4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, December 10 1982, 26. 136 European Council, “Council conclusions on Arctic issues,” adopted on the 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2009, 4.


39

Council requests the Commission to present a report on progress made in these areas

by the end of June 2011.137

It should be noted that it took the Commission one more year to publish the report in

question: “Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic region: progress

since 2008 and next steps.”138 This document constitutes the most recent official

document published by the EU on the issue and a considerable part of it has been

developed under the Danish EU presidency during the first half of 2012.139 The

progress since 2008 can be summarized by a continued drift towards the

acknowledgment of the relevant countries’ positions, reliance on their expertise as well

as an increasing focus on research and environment.

4.3.3. Implications for the relevant Advocacy Coalitions

While the Danish presidency was decisive for the outcome of the Commission’s report

and other prior attentional shifts, the abovementioned Council conclusions had been

published under the Swedish EU presidency, which had started in the second half of

2009.140 While the Danish involvement was mainly based on its individual initiative,

the placing of more responsibility on Sweden can be traced back to the Council’s

deliberate choice. Thus, this move can be interpreted as momentous action on part of

the EU and as a sign of acknowledgement regarding the Arctic countries’ primacy in

the issue area in question. Moreover, it revealed certain expectations that Council and

Commission were building up towards its Arctic member states.141 It appears that

Brussels was looking not only for legitimacy and expert guidance but also for a

mediator or policy broker as it is also described under the theoretical framework of the

137 European Council, “Council conclusions on Arctic issues,” adopted on the 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2009, 5. 138 Arctic Forum Foundation, “EU Commission publishes Arctic Communication and the EU Arctic Forum takes next steps,” available from http://eu-arctic-forum.org/publications/opinions-publications/editorial-summer-2012-“eu-commission-publishes-arctic-communication-and-eu-arctic-forum-takes-next-steps-”/; Internet, accessed on April 15, 2014. 139 Ibid. 140 Steffen Weber and Iulian Romanyshyn, 854. 141 Njord Wegge, 20.

40 Master Thesis

ACF.142 Sweden appeared most likely as an attractive partner as it was living up to its

pacific and conciliating reputation by withholding from the adoption of a proactive or

antagonistic role. Moreover, Sweden was to take over the chairmanship of the Arctic

Council in 2011, after Denmark’s chairmanship had led through the further exclusion

of other European countries in the Arctic debate through the signing of the Ilulissat

declaration, which will be introduced in more detail later.143

During the Swedish presidency one was also expecting the above-mentioned ban on

the sale and import of all seal products on/to the European market.144 Information

about whether or not seals are endangered is conflicting.145 However, most Arctic

countries downplay the threats to the respective seal populations and stress the

traditional value to their indigenous but also modern societies as it can be seen in the

following explanation made by Rosemary Kuptana, spokesperson for an organization

called Inuit Taiprisat representing Canada’s 35,000 Inuit:146

“[…] by following certain harvesting rituals and sharing with kinship and

community, the hunter demonstrates proper respect … the soul and spirit of

the seal is allowed to return to the sea and be reborn. This relationship

between human being and animals, therefore, sustains and renews both

human and animal populations.” 147

The EU’s move was consequently seen by many within the coalition of the Arctic

“core actors” as yet another proof of the its leading to decisions that do not take those

affected into account.148 As the scholar Njord Wegge has noted, it was clear that

Sweden was facing a challenging task combining the proof of loyalty to the EU,

142 Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson, “Competing advocacy coalitions and the process of ‘frame reflection’: a longitudinal analysis of EU steel policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 6,2 (1999): 233. 143 Arctic Council, “History”. 144 European Commission - Environment, “Trade in Seal Products,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/seal_hunting.htm; Internet, accessed on May 02, 2014. 145 Njord Wegge, 20. 146 Mark Nuttall, Protecting the Arctic: Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Survival, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publisheres, 1998), 88. 147 Ibid. 148 Njord Wegge, 20.


41

“seeking to improve its role on the world stage” with the aim to strengthen its stance

within the Arctic Council.149 The described developments make clear that the EU was

still aiming at a “prominent presence in the Arctic” through increasingly framing its

Arctic discourse in environmental terms. This can also be seen as a process of adaption

as one was no longer aiming at provoking or challenging the Arctic countries and their

high politics and their legal ambitions.150 However, the EU experienced one of its

biggest setbacks as Sweden finally took over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in

2011 and did not support efficiently the application of the EU to become a permanent

observer to the exclusive Arctic club.151

These years of first involvement reflected a certain degree of inter-institutional

rivalries within the EU that were propelled by certain developments and aspects152

Firstly, the failure to wholly include the Arctic into the framework of the ND left the

institutions in search for an adequate political framework.153 Secondly, all countries

involved, including the ‘rival’ big powers started to draft, publish and implement their

respective Arctic policies while one central but weak European link to the Arctic,

Greenland, was taking further steps towards acquiring independence. 154 Thirdly, the

interference of Norway, Denmark and Sweden showed that the Arctic countries were

willing to give guidance, even if only in order to avoid unwelcome developments.

Fourthly, the lack of clear and general guidelines regarding the EU’s Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP) restrained the Union from adapting a coherent approach

that would manage the “balancing act between complementing and competing with the

international aspirations of its member states.”155

The four described aspects made European policy-making the province of a small

number of member states and also made it also clear that the Union was hoping to 149 Njord Wegge, 21. 150 Ibid. 151 BBC New, “China joins Arctic Council but a decision on the EU is deferred,” available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22527822; Internet, accessed on May 13, 2014. 152 GeoPolitics in the High North, “Arctic strategy documents – The European Union and the Arctic region,” available from http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84&limitstart=5; Internet, accessed on March 27, 2014. 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Adam Hug ed., 8.

42 Master Thesis

include Arctic countries in its advocacy coalition while being aware that the inclusion

of Denmark in this very coalition seemed difficult if not unattainable. The previously

described Swedish indecisiveness and juggling act can also be seen as a symbol of a

certain inner turmoil. The roots of this might be found at the country’s core belief

system, torn between its obligations as a liberal member country of the EU and

Scandinavian kinship. However, as earlier assumed, this might lead to Sweden’s

consolidation in the role of the policy broker that will not be obliged to chose a

position but rather adopt the position of an intermediary. This development and the

need of a mediator/policy broker can be seen as a proof in itself of the peaceful yet

rather hardened fronts between the EU and the central Arctic actors. If this stalemate

the EU’s interest in the Arctic should linger on policy change might occur through a

adaption oriented gradual learning process or, more likely, through consensus building

guided by the assigned policy broker

V. The Kingdom of Denmark

5.1. Patterns of Cooperation

Preceding chapters already revealed Denmark’s particular role in the Arctic. When

looking at the time that has passed since the Kingdom joined the Union in 1973, a

number of forwards and backwards bear witness to the particular role the country has

also been playing within the EU. Denmark is known for its rather reluctant approach

towards European integration. For example, in 1992 Denmark initiated the signing of

the so-called Edinburgh Agreement. This agreement entailed four opt-outs from

European co-operation for the Scandinavian country and constituted a precondition for

Denmark to approve the Maastricht Treaty. 156 The agreement covers inter alia

Denmark’s exclusion form the third stage of EMU and all related economic policies.

Moreover, it allows the country to retain its powers in the field of monetary policy as

156 Europa – Summaries of EU legislation, “Denmark: EMU opt-out clause,“ available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/l25061_en.htm; Internet, accessed May 05,2014.


43

well as with regard to certain aspects of its social welfare system.157 Another decisive

element is the decision not to participate in any EU defence mechanism.158

Besides its attempts to retain its sovereign control over national politics, a strong focus

on its transatlantic relations has been manifesting itself over the last decades. It can be

claimed that the roots of this orientation can be traced back to the Second World War

as Greenland filled a central strategic position. Under the threat of German invasion

and Denmark’s potential loss of sovereignty over Greenland to one of the main allied

powers, the Danish Ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, decided to build

up the cooperative ties to the US. In 1941, he agreed that the US military should be

responsible for the defence of the island, making Greenland a de facto US

protectorate.159 It can be argued that Kauffmann perceived his course of action as “a

way of protecting Danish sovereignty – the alternative being an American or Canadian

annexation.”160 The fruits of his actions could eventually be seen in the United States

pledge “to respect Danish colonial authority over Greenland’s indigenous inhabitants,

the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine [which] would help naturalize American

presence, eased by comments such as Roosevelt’s claim that he had presumed

Greenland to be part of the Western hemisphere ever since his childhood.”161

In a more current context, one can also mention the active role that Denmark has been

playing inter alia within NATO. The Danish scholar Svend Aage Christensen

describes this engagement as characterised by “a high degree of participation, an

offensive power priority and a high degree of sensitivity to the eventuality of being left

out of the fora where decisions concerning the future security landscape of Europe are

being made.”162 He explains this westbound orientation in questions of national and

regional security with the less threatening image of NATO regarding the constraints on

157 European Council, “Edinburgh Agreement” Section B and Annex 2, Edinburgh: December 12, 1992. Protocol No.5 to the Treaty of Amsterdam, “Protocol on the position of Denmark”, Edinburgh: December 12, 1992. 158 Ibid, Part II, Article 5. 159 Peder Roberts, “Nordic or National? Postwar Visions of Conflict and Cooperation,” in Science, Geopolitics and Culture in the Polar Region: Norden beyond Borders, Sverker Sörlin ed., (New York: Ashgate, 2013), 56-60. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Svend Aage Christensen, “The Danish Experience. Denmark in NATO, 1949-1999,” in Small State Alliances, Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner eds., (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 98-99.

44 Master Thesis

its member countries’ sovereignty. Moreover, he assumes that Denmark senses the

need to compensate for its abstinence from European defence mechanisms.163

Proofs of a particularly strong influence of third countries on foreign policy making

can also be found in conjunction with Denmark’s other transatlantic relations. For

example, Denmark was the only Scandinavian country to form part of the “coalition of

the willing” in 2003.164 Here, the domestic political background should be taken into

consideration. At the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen was holding the office of the

Danish Prime Minister who in 2009 became NATO Secretary-General. Moreover,

further traces of US-Danish bonds of cooperation can be found on Greenland in form

of the US air force base “Thule” on the northwest coast of the island. The base was

built in the early 1950s and a crucial element in the defence system against the Soviet

Union during the Cold War.165 Even though the local population was forced to move as

it was constructed, the military presence of the US contributed to the amplification of

Greenlandic/Danish-US American relationships.166

These findings are of considerable importance regarding Danish policy preferences in

the Arctic. They clarify that the cooperation with the US or NATO is perceived as

being less restrictive and hostile towards the country’s specific interests and political

culture while allegedly being more profitable and efficient. The north-westbound focus

regarding questions of external relations as well as the desire for self-determined action

reflects itself also in certain recent developments. For example, in 2008 the Danish

Defence Ministry established its own Defence Commission that is supposed to

“analyse the effects of the developments in the Arctic on the Danish security

situation.” 167 Its founding led inter alia to the establishment of a Joint Arctic

163 Svend Aage Christensen, “The Danish Experience. Denmark in NATO, 1949-1999,” in Small State Alliances, Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner eds., (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 98-99. 164Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier Membership,” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (2008): 62. 165 Marc Auchet, “Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?,” International Journal 66 (2010-2011): 960. 166 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Thule Air Base,” available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/173672/Thule-Air-Base; Internet, accessed May 12, 2014. Jessica M. Shadian, The Politics of Arctic Sovereignty: Oil, Ice, and Inuit governance (New York: Routledge, 2014), 48. 167 Kathrin Keil, 27.


45

Command for the areas of/around Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which had not

existed in this form before and was eventually founded in 2012.168

5.1.1.Cooperation in the Danish Strategy for the Arctic

Additional insights into the Danish perception of Arctic cooperation can be found in

the Danish strategic document on Arctic policy. Accordingly, the word “cooperation”

appears around 160 times on about 40 pages of text. In around 40% of the cases where

the term is directly used in a specific context, it appeared in conjunction with Arctic-

internal coordination and in about 20% of the cases it referred specifically to different

forms of cooperative mechanisms between Denmark/Greenland and the US. Another

20% are accounted for by references to other member states of the Arctic Five. The EU

is, outside the chapter on Europe’s involvement in the Arctic, hardly mentioned in

direct connection to reflections on cooperation.169

Thus, Denmark apparently intends to maintain its well-established tradition of

collaboration with neighbouring Arctic countries while the work with certain bilateral

and regional partners will take pride of place. This means that Denmark aims towards

the continuance of the Arctic Five format.170 In this context, the work within the Arctic

Council is still highly appreciated but primarily associated with questions of

environmental and social policies. The Danish government stresses in its document the

need to enforce the Council’s “direct impact” exerted on the Arctic population.171 The

wish for a further empowerment of the Arctic Council can also be seen in the Danish

request to develop the Arctic platform from a decision-shaper into a decision-maker.172

According to the policy paper, “cooperation with all countries and organizations that

are of importance to the Arctic and can contribute to cooperation in the Council” Danish Defence Commission, “Danish Defence – Global Engagement,” (Report/Danish Defence Commission, Copenhagen, 2009), 4-5. 168 Ibid, 68. 168 Dansk Forsvaret, “Arctic Command,“ available from http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand.aspx; Internet, accessed May 16, 2014. 170 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 49 + 52. 171 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 52. 172 Ibid.

46 Master Thesis

should be safeguarded.173 To what extent this description actually applies to the EU in

the eyes of the Danish government remains to be seen.

With regard to the EU, whose application to the Arctic Council Denmark officially

supports, the Scandinavian country will intend to leave its “mark on the shaping and

implementation of relevant EU policies” (i.e. regarding energy, fishing, hunting and

environmental issue areas).174 According to the Danish strategic paper this will help to

ensure that “further cases where the laws, traditions, cultures and needs of arctic

societies are neglected can be avoided.”175 Herewith the Danish officials clearly refer

to the ban on the import and sale of seal products in the EU and highlight the

inappropriate handling of Arctic policy from the European side. Hence, Denmark could

engage in the promotion of friendly relations between the EU and Greenland and

follow its goal to make the Faroe Islands more visible as part of the Arctic; also to the

Union.176 Thereby, Denmark might present itself as a useful partner to Greenland as

opposed to its former role of the colonial power.

5.2. Danish-‐Greenlandic Relations

Besides the US American-Danish relations, there is another link that makes Denmark

stretch out its hand over the Atlantic Ocean: the Arctic island of Greenland. Today an

autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark, it was colonialized in 1721 by

Denmark-Norway and eventually turned into an overseas county to Denmark in

1953.177 “Home rule” was adopted in 1979, meaning the Greenlandic parliament

adopted certain administrative powers. A major advancement occurred in June 2009,

when Greenland was granted “self-government”, which extended its responsibilities

inter alia in the area of natural resource exploitation.178 However, Denmark still

maintains political authority in the following areas: the constitution, foreign affairs,

defence and security policy, the supreme court as well as currency and monetary

173 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 52. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177Jessica M. Shadian, 45-49. 178 Dansk Statsministeriet, “The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement,” available from http://www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html; Internet accessed on May 05, 2014.


47

policy.179 Accordingly, the scholar Nikolaj Petersen noted that “the official Danish

security policy in relation to Greenland has been very cautious and status-quo oriented

in order to avoid politicization of Greenland’s strategic role so as not to create a

potential conflict issue between Copenhagen and the Home Rule authorities in

Nuuk.”180 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Greenlandic government has been

involved in an increasing number of processes concerning the island’s foreign policy.

For example, the US American Thule Air Base is since 2004 based on new

agreements: the negotiations of which included all three parties concerned.181

When looking at the Danish Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, it becomes apparent

that most of its Arctic Policy revolves around Greenland and has partly been created in

coordination with the island’s political representation.182 This clarifies the significance

that Greenland assumes in one of the current core issues of Danish foreign policy.

Moreover, it should be noted that the Arctic island offers Denmark, being a rather

small member country within the EU, the opportunity to become a considerable player

on the global stage. Here, the Arctic enables Denmark to encounter great powers such

as the US or Russia on an equal footing. The described evolution also permits the

Kingdom of Denmark to receive more attention and consideration within the Union’s

political bodies. This potentially elevates its small country status and makes it one of

the central and influential decision makers in certain regards. However, as it has been

indicated before, this role heavily, if not entirely, relies on Danish-Greenlandic

relations, which are expected to gradually deteriorate over the next years as the Arctic

debate will advance and bring economic stability, political expertise and international

reputation to Greenland. 183 In line with this reasoning one might refer to the

Greenlandic parliament’s decision of October 2013 to lift its ‘zero tolerance’ ban on

179 Adam Worm, “Arctic Security: A Greenland perspective,” in Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, ed. James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 166. 180 Nikolaj Petersen, “Denmark, Greenland, and Arctic Security,” in The Arctic Challenge: Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region, ed. Kari Möttölä (London: Westview Press, 1988),60 181 Nikolaj Petersen, “The Arctic Challenge to Danish Foreign and Security Policy,” in Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, ed. James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 146. 182 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 7. 183 The Guardian, “Greenland is getting ready to stand alone,” available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/15/independent-greenland-mineral resourcesdenmark; Internet; accessed on May 5, 2014.

48 Master Thesis

uranium mining.184 Such developments will most likely attract great amounts of

Foreign direct Investments. However, Copenhagen interfered in the matter and an

agreement between the two parties is expected by the end of 2014. 185 This

development can be seen as a good example of Denmark’s sovereignty concerns and

Greenland’s strive after independent actions.

The Greenlandic people are recognized as independent people under international law

and Greenlandic became the sole official language on the island in 2009.186 The on-

going and progressive decoupling from Danish authorities and governance structures

indicates a clear trend towards Greenlandic independence.187 One precondition to

gaining this status on the international stage is, however, the stabilisation of the

economic circumstances.188 Greenland’s economy is still heavily dependent on the

Danish block grant, which amounts to DKK 3.2 billion (about € 430 million, exchange

rate May 2014). That is around 30% of Greenland’s current GDP. In 2006, the block

grant even accounted for 40% of Greenland’s GDP. The grant equals almost 40% of

the present expenditures in the governmental sector.189 Apart from the financial

support another factor needs to be taken into consideration: There is a considerable

necessity for support regarding physical, human and political-diplomatic resources that

a small nation of less than 57,000 people inhabiting an area of four times the size of

France can hardly provide for.190 However, Danish interference in this area is not very

welcomed due to the island’s colonial history.191

A look into the future might suggest that at least the economic hurdles to independence

might soon be overcome. Greenland’s geology is rich in valuable resources and

184 EurActiv – “Greenland, Denmark hope to reach uranium mining deal by end 2014,” available from http://rt.com/business/greenland-zero-tolerance-uranium-718/; Internet, accessed on June 1, 2014. 185 Ibid. 186 Dansk Statsministeriet, “The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement,” available from http://www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html; Internet accessed on May 5, 2014. 187 UNRIC, “Greenland: Oil fortune to fund independence,” available from http://www.unric.org/en/indigenous-people/27308-greenland-oil-fortune-to-fund-independence; Internet, accessed on April 01, 2014. 188 Adam Worm, 169. 189 Statistics Greenland, “Greenland in Figures,” (Report, Statistics Greenland, 2013), 17-19. 190 Ibid, 40. Statistics Greenland, “Population,“ available from http://www.stat.gl/default.asp?lang=en; Internet accessed May 16, 2014. 191 Jessica M. Shadian, 49-50.


49

minerals. 192 Accordingly, several diamond and gold mines have already been

established attracting international interest and investments.193 It has been agreed

between the Danish and the Greenlandic government that the total amount of the

Danish block grant will gradually decrease in relation to the increasing revenues that

Greenland will gain from the exploitation of its natural resources.194

Facing the loss of Greenland, Denmark stresses in its current policy paper on the Arctic

its intrinsic links to the Arctic region by referring to a number of shared values and

interests and responsibilities.195 Moreover, the Arctic “makes up an essential part of the

common cultural heritage and is home to part of the kingdom’s population.”196

Furthermore, it is emphasised that all societies that form part of the Danish Kingdom

have developed modern and developed societies based on democratic principles.”197

The Danish government thereby not only underlines the fact, that the Kingdom of

Denmark as a whole meets the principal characteristics of a sovereign state as outlined

in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, but also

puts a special emphasis on bonds that go beyond the political integrity of the actor in

question.198 Consequently, its own role as a unified Kingdom is accentuated and

perceived as “vigorous and important” - in particular regarding the active safeguarding

of the agreements that so far have been made.199

192 UNRIC, “Greenland: Oil fortune to fund independence,” available from http://www.unric.org/en/indigenous-people/27308-greenland-oil-fortune-to-fund-independence; Internet, accessed on April 01, 2014. 193 Kathrin Keil, “The European Union in the Arctic ‘Game’ – The Concert of Arctic Actors and the EU’s Newcomer Role,” (working paper/ Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies (BTS), Berlin, 2012), 24. Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 33. 194 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 10. 195 Ibid, 7. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, December 26, 1933. 199 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 7.

50 Master Thesis

5.2.1. EU-‐Greenlandic Relations

As mentioned in a previous chapter, Greenland joined the EU together with Denmark

in 1973 and left the Union again through a referendum in 1985.200 In the period from

2007-2013 Greenland received financial support from the EU amounting to €25

million per year.201 The new multiannual budget 2014-2020 includes a payment of

€217,8 million for the financial support of Greenland which is more than € 31 million

per year.202 Thus, the annual payment has increased by 24%. According to the EU, this

development can be seen in connection with of the “increasing global importance of

the Arctic.”203 For the period of 2007-2013 the target for the EU’s financial support

was Greenland’s education sector.204 Both actors signalled an interest in maintaining

this focal point for future financial cooperation while European Parliament and Council

stated within their financial framework that only a limited number of issues should be

addressed by means of the funded money.205 The money is paid through the EU’s

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) programme which exists in addition to the

EU-Greenland fisheries partnership agreement that regulates the EU’s financial

contribution for advancements in the area of fisheries.206 Thus, the main financial

support from the EU goes apart from fisheries directly into the education sector. One

could claim that there is a strong correlation between a growing political consciousness

of the Greenlandic population and the past improvements on the educational level. The

fruits of the EU’s financial efforts can consequently be seen in the depicted

200 EurActiv, “Arctic Expert: Greenland could re-join the EU in a Generation,” available from http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-rawmaterials/arctic-expert-greenland-rejoin-e-interview- 514010; Internet; accessed on May 15, 2014. 201 European Commission, “Executive Summary on the Mid-Term Review of the EU-Greenland Partnership 2007-2013,” (Report, 2006/526/EC, Brussels, May 2012), 7. 202 European Parliament, “Texts adopted: European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 February 2014 on the draft Council decision on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other,” (12274/2013 – C7-0237/2013 – 2011/0410(CNS), Strasbourg, February 2014). 203 Ibid. 204 European Commission, “Executive Summary on the Mid-Term Review of the EU-Greenland Partnership 2007-2013,” (Report, 2006/526/EC, Brussels, May 2012), 22. 205 European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 February 2014, Brussels/Strasbourg. The Arctic Journal, “EU strengthens Greenland ties with more cash, diamond agreement,” available from http://arcticjournal.com/politics/408/eu-strengthens-greenland-ties-more-cash-diamond-agreement; Internet, accessed on May 16, 2014. 206 European Commission, “EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed on May 01, 2014.


51

developments and also contribute to an increasing resistance of Greenland’s political

elite to lobbying.

More research is required in order to clarify the actual motives of the EU when it

comes to its investments in Greenlandic education. At first sight, ensuring the access to

good quality education appears in the light of an insignificant soft-policy measure ass

there is no obvious link to overtly expressed territorial claims or demands for

resources. Nevertheless, even if the EU’s financial contributions are in line with its

objective to contribute to the “development of quality education”, one should not

disregard its political consequences and side effects.207 As previous paragraphs have

shown, the invigoration of Greenlandic education already entailed tremendous

changes. Accordingly, Carl Christian Olsen of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)

stated toward the scholar Jessica Shadian:

“The new wave of emancipation showed up in the advance of high school

level and university level education. With that a whole new kind of judgment

was dominant and was at the same time welcomed by [the] ‘non-educated’

public. [That] together with the emergence of trade unions in Greenland

accelerated the emancipative trend.”208

More direct interest formulations from the EU’s side and exposing the Greenlandic

people to political pressure would counteract Danish interests in the long run. So the

matter of solidarity arises not only for the member states but also for the European

institutions. The EU’s unwillingness regarding any kind of Realpolitik also becomes

evident when looking at the Commission’s negotiations with the Greenlandic

government over access to natural resources on the island in 2013. The former

Greenlandic Prime Minister Jakob Kuupik Kleist claimed accordingly: “I don’t

understand the behaviour of the (European) Commission.”209 The Commission had not

been able to formulate clear interests and therefore no decision had been taken.

207 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 165, 2010 O.J. C 83/01. 208 Jessica M. Shadian, 49. 209 Reuters, “Greenland warns EU may miss out on its mineral wealth.” Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/us-greenland-pm-idUSBRE92617I20130307; Internet; accessed on April 28, 2013.

52 Master Thesis

Whether this behavior can actually be seen as part of an elaborate long-term plan or as

another example for the EU’s directionless search of a policy position in the Arctic

remains to be seen. Presenting itself as a considerate partner with low demands, it

could even be assumed that the EU is aiming at a “renaissance” of Greenland’s

membership in the EU. In this way, the EU could circumnavigate its current internal

challenges to a certain degree. However, as indicated before, such an evolution would

endanger Denmark’s new stance on the global scene.

Greenland is up until today the only “country” to have left the EU through a

referendum. Discontent regarding European fisheries policies can thereby be named as

a main motivation.210 Nowadays, Greenland constitutes one of the Union’s OCTs.211

Under Part IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the

Articles 198 to 204 specify the relations between the Union and those territories.212

The following main objectives and responsibilities ensue from this: the establishment

of close economic relations, the promotion of EU’s values, standards and interests, as

well as the enhancement of the OCT’s competitiveness and resilience.213 It should be

noted that the whole of the acquis is neither applicable to the OCT nor to its relation to

the Union or its associated member state. However, the citizens of OCTs are in

principle EU citizens.214

This shows that major links of the EU towards the Arctic “core regions” are still

existent even if they are mainly of economic or trade-related nature. This limits at least

the Union’s legal and normative influence within the group of the Arctic Five.

However, it has been the Union’s explicit goal to move beyond development

cooperation with respect to the OCTs and to work on a “reciprocal relationship based

210 EurActiv, “Arctic Expert: Greenland could re-join the EU in a Generation,” available from http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-rawmaterials/arctic-expert-greenland-rejoin-e-interview- 514010; Internet; accessed on May 15, 2014. 211 European Commission, “EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm, Internet; accessed on May 1, 2013. 212 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 198 to 204, 2010 O.J. C 83/01, Articles 198 to 204. 213 Ibid. 214 European Commission, “EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm, Internet; accessed on May 1, 2013.


53

on mutual interests”. 215 This objective is in line with the above-mentioned

developments and reflects itself in the EU’s legal commitments as in the “promotion of

EU’s values, standards and interests.”216 Hence, with regard to the Union’s policy

towards Greenland more comprehensive developments can be anticipated that might

reinforce the EU’s legitimate role in the region on the basis of bilateral cooperation. In

this context, the prioritisation of Danish interests might slip into the background.

Disregarding Greenland’s growing autonomy, it should, however, be underlined that

foreign policy responsibilities are still managed by Copenhagen and that past

developments have shown Denmark’s interest in maintaining its influential position in

the Arctic.

5.3.Denmark’s General Objectives

As reason for the current situation and increased interest in the Arctic, the policy paper

points towards climate change, technological developments and stresses especially the

“vast economic potential” but also the “geopolitical implications” in the context of this

“most significant global issue”.217 This again emphasizes the order of magnitude that

the Arctic debate constitutes to Danish foreign policy making.

The following main goals can be identified as central themes running like a red thread

through the Danish Strategy for the Arctic: (sustainable) growth, close international

cooperation and sustainability as well as the strengthening of the Kingdom’s role as a

global player. Regarding the conduct of cooperation, it is emphasized that it should

ideally be “appropriate” and based on “international principles of law”.218 All decisions

should be based on those legal principles as well as the “best scientific advice that

supports health productive and self-sustaining communities.”219 Furthermore, it should

be noted that this cooperation should serve to “strengthen indigenous peoples’ rights to

control their own development and own political, economic, social and cultural

215 European Commission, “EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm, Internet; accessed on May 01, 2013. 216 Ibid. 217 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 7 + 9. 218 Ibid, 7. 219 Ibid, 10.

54 Master Thesis

situation.”220 On the one hand, these remarks underscore the role played by scientific

data and legal regimes that ensure future peaceful and just developments. On the other

hand, they indicate the Danish preference for the application of UNCLOS, which has

often been criticized for its potential for ambiguous interpretations. These may leave

space to manoeuvre for the Arctic countries regarding claims on the resource rich

seabed and forestalls any discussions regarding the necessity of a new Treaty.

Thus, it is evident that the current strategy is accordance with prior Arctic Council

declarations but also embraces the spirit of the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008. In the

latter the Arctic Ocean’s littoral states put a strong emphasis on the value of

international cooperation by means of UNCLOS as well as on Arctic exclusivity in

order to ”hopefully once and for all dispelling the myth of a race to the North Pole.”221

Denmark is not acting in a legal vacuum.222 However, the legal framework that has

been established implies that political access might be limited.

5.4. Denmark’s Position within the ACF

It becomes clear that NATO, the US, the UN as well as the political bodies of Arctic

cooperation represent the focal points of Denmark’s external relations and its foreign

policy making in the Arctic. Accordingly, it can be assumed that Denmark’s core belief

system is not to be seen in close relation to ideas of pan-Europeanism or aspirations

towards the creation of an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.223 The

own identity seems to be perceived in terms, which attribute high value to the

country’s “Nordic” or “Arctic” character rather than its rights and obligations within

the EU. Accordingly, the wording and visual presentation of the Danish Arctic strategy

leave no doubt to the described self-image while European solidarity plays, if any, a

marginalized role. Hence, a shift of competences to the supranational level or an

improved bilateral relation between the EU and Greenland is to a certain degree

220 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark – Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 10. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid, 13. 223 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union (post-Lisbon). 2010 O.J. C 83/01, Article 1.


55

perceived as a danger to the country’s sovereignty; especially with regard to Arctic-

related issue areas.

As described by the ACF, member states are prone to base their policy decisions on

their belief system as main heuristic. This would imply that even changes to the policy

core of the Scandinavian country would be highly unlikely since the EU is not an

Arctic institution. As noted before these findings make clear that the EU’s 7th smallest

member country in terms of surface area perceives cooperation with e.g. the Arctic

Five as the preferred means of multilateral advancement in the issue area in question.

Thus, the ACF’s “devil shift” framing primarily concerns the Union’s supranational

policy agenda. Therewith the probability increases, that the EU’s approaches to

Greenland and its general legal supremacy are primarily perceived as threatening,

restricting or restraining Denmark’s sovereign standing and newly won significance in

the EU and the Arctic debate. Applying also the concepts of Bounded Rationality as

well as the Prospect Theory and its implications, it becomes apparent that loss aversion

will assume an additional strong role. These findings underline the previously assumed

configuration of the Advocacy Coalition that Denmark takes part in. First and foremost

it comprises the Arctic Ocean’s littoral states but also certain representatives of the

Inuit population who share the interest in keeping the influence and interference form

external, non-Arctic actors as restricted as possible.

VI. Sweden

6.1. Political Culture and Cooperation Patterns

Sweden’s position in the Arctic debate has been marked by its geographical

circumstances and specific political culture. The general perception of Swedish politics

is dominated by the idea of neutrality and military non-alliance.224 200 years of peace

in Sweden, the decision not to become a member of NATO as well as the active

promotion of the Swedish neutrality policy by Prime Minister Olof Palme (1968-76

and 1982-1986) and successful self-branding campaigns can be named to support the

224 Gunnar Lassinantti, “Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective,” in Small State Alliances, Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner eds., (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 101-102.

56 Master Thesis

previous statement.225 It should be mentioned that past decisions of non-belligerence

and neutrality had been made unilaterally and not, as in the cases of e.g. Switzerland

and Finland, based on international settlements. 226 Adapting to the intertwined

structures of the modern global society and in order to pre-empt the accusation of

double standards, the government of Carl Bildt reformulated the Swedish policy of

neutrality in the early 1990s in the following way: “non-participation in military

alliances, with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the

event of war in our vicinity.” 227Nowadays, the country is an active member of the EU

and the UN, where the country represents one of the major donors and an active

participant in past and present peacekeeping missions.228 Sweden has even started to

cooperate with NATO and there is now evidence that this cooperation was secretly

initiated already in the 1960s.229 For example, it initiated air surveillance in the High

North based on the organization’s Partnership for Peace programme.230

This increasing Swedish involvement in international politics can also be identified

with respect to Arctic politics. Accordingly, Sweden is an active member of the Arctic

Council, the Nordic Council, a supporter of the ND and engaged in numerous research

projects. The country’s government voiced strong complaints about being excluded

from the Arctic Five’s meetings in Ilulissat and Chelsea and showed its disapproval of

rival formations undermining the integrity and the influence of the Arctic Council.231

For Sweden, consensus-based multilateral organizations seem to have evolved into the

country’s preferred platforms for legitimate policy making on the global level. This

tendency can also be identified when looking at the country’s strategic paper on the

Arctic.

225 Gunnar Lassinantti, “Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective,” in Small State Alliances, Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner eds., (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 102-103. 226 Ibid, 102. 227 Ibid. 228 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden and the United Nations,” available from http://www.government.se/sb/d/11728; Internet, accessed May 14, 2014. 229 Mikael Nilsson, “Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s Infrastructure,” Journal of Contemporary History, 44,2 (2009): 287. 230 Gunnar Lassinantti, 103. 231 Kathrin Keil, 29.


57

The Swedish policy paper on the issue in question was published in May 2011. Sweden

was thus the last of the eight Arctic states to publish its respective policy document.232

Just by looking at the paper’s table of contents, it already becomes clear that close

attention has been paid to other countries’ and organizations’ positions.233 On the

multilateral level, the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, the EU itself, the Nordic

Council of Ministers as well as the Arctic Council is portrayed as pivotal to future

developments in the Arctic while the Arctic Council is presented as the prioritized

entity.234 Yet it is generally presented in the light of soft policy measures: not being

founded on legally binding agreement, it has been focusing mainly on environmental

and climate issues as well as on research in the Arctic region.235 Hence, Sweden awaits

more concrete measures and initiatives on behalf of the Arctic Council.236 According to

the Swedish officials, institutional as well as political reinforcement of the Council is

needed.237 Furthermore and in contrast to Denmark, Sweden does not emphasize the

need of exclusivity in order to increase efficiency but supports more openly the

involvement of third countries and the EU.

Thus, it is clear that Sweden, just like Denmark, privileges Arctic-related cooperation.

However, it extends its scope by turning it into a Nordic/European if not global project.

While the role of the Arctic Council is prioritized, the EU can be seen as a second

focus. In line with this approach Sweden has advocated the Union’s acceptance as a

permanent observer to the Arctic Council and welcomed the Commission’s

communication in 2009 as a “first step” in the EU’s and Sweden’s shared interest to

develop a coherent European Arctic policy that should find “broad support among all

EU member countries.”238 It noted in the same official document form the Swedish

Parliament that it was “high time” that the EU turns its attention towards the

developments going on in the Arctic emphasizing that Sweden would even like to see a

232 Kathrin Keil, 30. 233 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper, 2011), 3. 234 Ibid, 5 + 18. 235 Ibid, 19. 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 Svenska Utrikesutskottet –Sveriges Riksdag, “Utrikesutskottets utlåtande - Meddelande om EU och Arktis,” available from http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Meddelande-om-EU-och-Arktis-_GX01UU4/; Internet, accessed April 29, 2014.

58 Master Thesis

more detailed policy analysis of the EU in relation to the Arctic.239 Sweden intends to

assume responsibility and guidance in the required policy development process in

which inter alia “a powerful climate-policy” and “adaption to global warming in the

Arctic and protection of biodiversity” should not be neglected in the EU’s Arctic

policy.240 In a later publication by the Swedish parliament it was stated that due to the

increasing relevance of the Arctic, common European measures should be advanced

and positioned at the heart of EU policies.241

Accordingly, the current state of the EU’s perspective on the Arctic is presented as

highlighting an increasing mutual dependence. Furthermore, it is claimed that the

Arctic and the EU share close links to the region in question in terms of the

geographical proximity of certain member states. Sweden thereby subtly presents itself

as the EU’s intrinsic link towards the Arctic and all related debates.242 It also

emphasizes the consensus that had dominated previous developments in the Arctic

realm contrary to the picture depicted in the media. Nevertheless, security still plays a

role for the Scandinavian country and according to its Arctic policy it should be

addressed within the above-mentioned trans-border political frameworks.243

Thus it seems like Sweden strives after consensus, involvement and harmony while

trying not to get caught up in the whirlwind of activities. It seems to strive after the

role of the competent and arbitrating policy broker. At this point it should, however, be

noted that the actions of this presumptive intermediary have not always been fruitful or

in line with the noble announcements of consensus building and inclusion. For

example, the officially supported application by the EU to become a permanent

member to the Arctic Council was turned down for the second time in the beginning of

239 Svenska Utrikesutskottet –Sveriges Riksdag, “Utrikesutskottets utlåtande - Meddelande om EU och Arktis,” available from http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Meddelande-om-EU-och-Arktis-_GX01UU4/; Internet, accessed April 29, 2014. 240 Ibid. 241 Svenska Utrikesutskottet –Sveriges Riksdag, „Utrikesutskottets utlåtande – statsrådets redogörelse för eu-politiken 2013,“ (Report/Swedish Parliament, Stockholm/2013): 3. 242 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 8. 243 Ibid, 14.


59

2013, as Sweden was still in charge of the Council’s chairmanship. 244 This

development remained unmentioned by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt.

However, he commented on the admittance of China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea

and Singapore to the group of permanent observers by saying that “it strengthens the

position of the Arctic Council on the global scene.”245

6.2. Sweden in the Arctic

6.2.1. Historical Ties and the Power of Research

A characteristic aspect of the Swedish policy paper comes in form of its excessive

reflections on the country’s links to the region in question. These give the impression

that the Swedish government senses the need to justify and explain its involvement in

Arctic politics. This might be related to the fact that Sweden is, contrary to e.g.

Denmark, not a littoral state to the Arctic Ocean.

Firstly, historical developments are described, starting in the Middle Ages, when

Lapland became part of the Swedish Kingdom.246 In order to establish more “recent”

connections that go beyond territorial accessions, the Swedish strategic paper also

offers an overview of Swedish Research engagement in the Arctic starting inter alia

with Carl Linnaeus’ work in the Arctic in the 18th century.247 Strong involvement in

expeditions on Spitsbergen is presented in association with the Svea Mine that was

established in 1917 and which provided for Swedish coal supplies under the end of the

First World War and the time thereafter.248

The importance of research in the Arctic is taken to an even higher level as the

Swedish foreign ministry presents it as a tool of multilateral cooperation in the Arctic

realm. For example, Sweden supposedly engaged in close research cooperation with

244 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Arctic Council: Sweden’s Chairmanship 2011-2013,” available from http://www.government.se/sb/d/14766; Internet, accessed May 03, 2014. 245 US Department of State, “Remarks with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Arctic Council Ministerial Session,” available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209402.htm; Internet, accessed May 10, 2014. 246 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 12-14. 247 Ibid, 13. 248 Ibid.

60 Master Thesis

Norway on Svalbard. To present itself as an aspiring contributor to global Arctic

research, it is emphasized that the era of modern Arctic research started in the summer

of 1980 with the expedition of a new Swedish icebreaker.249 Shortly afterwards, in

1981 and 1984, first political bodies were established: the Swedish polar research

committee and the Swedish polar research secretariat.250 The next notable event

mentioned occurred in 1991, as the Swedish icebreaker Oden together with the German

icebreaker Polarstern was the first non-atomic vessel to reach the North Pole.251

6.2.2. Security policy and economic ties

In its quest for legitimization, the present policy paper also refers to questions of

security. Noting that the Arctic used to constitute the direct natural boundary between

the West and the East during the Cold War it is not only highlighting that Sweden used

to be positioned between the fronts but also that current Arctic policy still heavily

relies on the relationship between Russia and the US.252Having introduced this

potential for risk and confrontation, it is emphasized that there is a “common interest in

cooperation and consensus” and refers to several exemplifying cases.253

Moreover, the present policy paper refers to different economic ties, focusing on the

Swedish wood, paper and space industries, indigenous hunting and herding activities,

natural resource exploitation and tourism. 254 Stating that “Swedish expertise in

research and development in the Arctic environment leads the world and its

cooperation and efficient resource use together with the business sector are central”

highlights the relevance of Swedish scientific undertakings one more time.255

249 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 13. 250 Ibid, 14. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid, 15. 255 Ibid.


61

6.2.3. Cultural ties

Last but not least, the importance of Arctic culture for Swedish society is put into

focus.256 It is noted, that the Sámi people constitute the key link between Sweden and

the Arctic and are therefore given special attention and consideration. In this respect,

the strategy paper presents the Sámi’s identity as “inextricably linked” to the

environment.257 In general, it can be noted that the Swedish Arctic policy document

shows particular concern for the future of its indigenous population groups in the North

of the country. Here, not only the preservation of their culture and identity but also

health and economic effects are taken into consideration.258 Again, the Swedish

government suggests closer cooperation with the political representation of the

Sámi.259

6.3. Sweden’s General Objectives The previous subchapters are testament to an approach that distinguishes itself

considerably from the Danish position on the matter at hand. While both parties agree

on the origins, challenges and on the role of multilateral cooperation in general and the

importance of the Arctic Council in particular, a number of differences can be

identified. The main difference of relevance for the present paper is the consideration

that is given to the EU as a possible partner in Arctic policy making. The underlying

openness towards non-Arctic influences reflects a policy core that differs from the

Danish position. Further differences can be found when looking at the three prioritized

policy areas: climate and the environment, economic development and the human

dimension.260 The latter can be claimed to be particularly interesting as Sweden,

contrary to the other examined policy papers, tries to bring the gender perspective to

the fore.261 Special attention is thereby given to gender equality, men’s violence

against women as well as sexual harassment and abuse amongst the Arctic’s

indigenous population.262 Additionally, the survival of Sámi culture and language 256 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 17. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid, 23. 261 Ibid, 45. 262 Ibid.

62 Master Thesis

constitutes another focal point of attention.263 The focus on gender equality and

minority rights in foreign policy contexts could be noticed in other context. For

example, as the current Prime Minister Fredrick Reinfeldt was addressing the UN

General Assembly in September 2013, the equal treatment of men and women was one

of the focal points of the speech.264 More research is needed in order to clarify whether

this approach can be seen in line with Sweden’s image promotion of the liberal bringer

of peace or whether it is simply reflecting the country’s domestic policy priorities.

Nevertheless, explaining and underscoring its Arctic character while addressing human

rights and environmental issues offers a broad foundation for mediation between the

different advocacy coalitions.

Interestingly, Sweden also presents the strategies of the other Arctic countries.265

While Norway is presented as a competent and longstanding expert in the field,

Denmark’s involvement is portrayed through its aim of strengthening development in

Greenland and its wish to maintain its threatened position of a central actor.266 From

the point of view of the Swedish government the central priorities of its Danish

colleagues are: energy and minerals, trade and tourism, shipping, education and

research, nature and environment.267 Hence, one gets the impression that relative gains

play a considerable role for the Southern neighbour. Underlining Finland’s, Iceland’s

and Sweden’s positive attitude towards European involvement additionally

underscores Denmark’s tendencies towards Arctic exclusivity.268

At the heart of the document, the prioritization of efficient mechanisms of multilateral

cooperation is addressed once again. In this context, the Swedish officials make the

need of a “common policy” and “more concrete projects” to tackle this political

challenge a subject of discussion.269 Sweden intends to actively contribute to the

263 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 45-46. 264 Svenska Regeringskansliet – Fredrik Reinfeldt, “Speech by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt in the UN General Assembly,” available from http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7966/a/176352; Internet, accessed May 7, 2014. 265 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 8 -10. 266 Ibid, 8. 267 Ibid. 268 Ibid, 8-9. 269 Ibid, 18-19.


63

development of the EU Arctic policy and wants to promote the EU as a cooperation

partner within relevant policy areas in the High North. As mentioned above, it is one

central goal of the Swedish officials to keep political tensions low by strengthening

cooperation within the Arctic Council and the Barents cooperation bodies upholding

the principles of “dialogue, transparency, confidence building and cooperation in line

with international law.”270 The Arctic Five format it thereby not seen as bringing about

any valuable contribution to the matter at hand and as an obstacle to the Swedish

involvement in the Arctic.271

6.4. Sweden’s Position within the ACF

In line with its political culture, Sweden presents itself as relevant yet not too

ambitious Arctic actor that pays close attention to all other countries and organizations

involved. Emphasizing Arctic, Nordic as well as European cooperation while also

stressing its inherent ‘Arcticness’ and placing its main political concerns on rather soft

policy issues, it presents itself in the light of the perfect policy broker. This positioning

can be seen in conjunction with the described Swedish political culture with regard to

the formation of certain advocacy coalitions where it refused to strongly align with

certain political groupings.

Accordingly, it is still not a member of NATO and its approach towards the Arctic is

much less proactive in comparison with e.g. Denmark. It positive attitude towards the

EU’s involvement, its general reputation on the global sphere as well as its Arctic

character gave Sweden a specific role in the Arctic game. This rather “Europe-

friendly” approach has also been described by the Swedish historian Bo Huldt who

noted that ”today it is easier for Swedes to think in terms for European cooperation and

Swedish relations with the EU than to think in terms of Arctic cooperation.” He

motivates his claim by underlining Sweden’s mainly Baltic than Arctic character and

orientation as well as its strong economic relations to Western Europe.272

270 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 18 -19. 271 Ibid, 22. 272 Bo Huldt, “Swedish Security in the 1980s and 1990s – Between the Arctic and Europe,” in The Arctic Challenge: Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region, ed. Kari Möttölä (London: Westview Press, 1988), 318.

64 Master Thesis

Evidence suggests, that it made a final compromise showing particular sensitivity to

the Arctic states and included pushing forward non-provocative unifying language that

demonstrates respect for the Arctic Council. The implications can be seen in the report

that was finally adopted by the European Parliament in 2011.273 Thereby Sweden was

striving after deeper Nordic and European cooperation also putting forward the Arctic

debate in the Nordic Council of Ministers.274

VII. The Federal Republic of Germany

7.1. Cooperation Patterns and Main Interests

Looking back on an exceptionally dark and difficult history, the Federal Republic of

Germany has shown a lot of engagement in European politics over the last decades. In

the paper “New Power – New Responsibility” published by the German Marshall Fund

of the United States (GMF) and the think-tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

(SWP) in 2013 it is stated:

“Before 1990, (West) German foreign policy was derived from a conceptual

framework with two fixed points of reference: a past to overcome, and a future

to be achieved. […] The UN, EU, and NATO remain the defining framework

for Germany’s foreign policy – but at the same times, it is also looking for new

orientation.”275

This new orientation will, due to the country’s deep involvement in webs of

international interdependence involve “consideration and taking responsibility for the

impact of national decisions on others.”276 This will require the maintenance of long-

lasting relationships and its “traditional normative and multilateral orientation”,

compromises and patience as well as a special focus on consensus building.277 As

273 Njord Wegge, 20. 274 Svenska Regeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” (Strategic Policy Paper/Stockholm, 2011), 4. 275 “New Power – New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world,” (paper/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the German Marshall Fund/ Berlin, 2013), 2. 276 Ibid, 9. 277 Ibid, 6.


65

indicated by the title, the paper in question devotes thorough consideration to the

themes of responsibility and political realignment. A similar focus can be identified in

the Federal Republic’s policy guidelines for the Arctic.

Under the title “Germany’s Arctic policy guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize

opportunities” the Federal Foreign Office of Germany published its position paper on

Arctic issues in November 2013.278 Therein the theme of risks vs benefits dominates

the major line of reasoning. These days, risk management has increasingly compelled

international attention when it comes to security policy.279 Accordingly, the scholars

from the GMF and SWP found that globalization augmented the “privatization and

individualization of violence”, which led to the mutual reinforcement of cross-border

hazard factors.280 However, it can be claimed that this finding does not only apply to

security policy but also to most other aspects of policy making that include certain

transborder elements. It is the federal government’s belief that commitment to

international agreements such as UNCLOS or multilateral cooperation within the

Arctic Council are of tremendous importance in order to find an appropriate approach

to face different risks while not leaving potential benefits aside.281

It could be noted that the term “sustainability” appears with a striking frequency and in

all kinds of variations in the present paper. Therefore, it could be assumed that the

Federal government perceives an insufficient consideration of the environmental

component as one major challenge/risk for the Arctic. However, it could also provoke

the impression that there is an unspoken need to prove the country’s underlying good

intentions. So it should also be noted that German economic interests do not appear in

form of a hidden agenda and logically entail a number of hazardous consequences for

the Arctic environment.282 This, however, underscores, also in view of the German

government, again the importance of UNCLOS. Accordingly, the convention does not

only “clarify the usage of rights and the regulation of powers” but also incorporates 278 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013). 279 “New Power – New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world,” (paper/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the German Marshall Fund/ Berlin, 2013), 4. 280 Ibid. 281 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 1. 282 Ibid, 6-7.

66 Master Thesis

obligations regarding the protection of the marine environment.283 Taking into account

the presented German interests, one could explicitly refer to Article 234 of UNCLOS,

which addressed the issue of “ice covered areas”. Here it is stated that

“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory

laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine

pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the

exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where particularly severe climatic

conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year

create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of

the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible

disturbance for the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall

have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the

marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.”284

Supporting UNCLOS jurisdiction ensures that the respective coastal states are obliged

to establish certain protective, and desirably sustainable, measures. In addition to this,

those laws and regulations enacted under Article 234 should be non-discriminatory.

Rulings of this type would enable German economic engagement in the Arctic littoral

states EEZs. Following this, the Federal Republic of Germany also explicitly supports

the freedom of navigation and innocent passage as established by UNCLOS Articles

14 and 38.285 Thus, the Law of the Sea Convention might be the prioritized base for

multilateral cooperation in the Arctic as it clearly puts the littoral states in charge of

fulfilling their environmental obligations while granting free access for interested

parties to their EEZs within the waters of the Arctic Ocean.

Regarding the cooperation in the Arctic Council, the present policy paper notes that it

is becoming increasingly institutionalized: a development that is welcomed as it might

lead to clarifications regarding the scope and relevance of the organization’s structures,

283 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 11-12. 284 United Nations Convention on the Law oft he Sea, Montego Bay,10 December 1982, 113. 285 Ibid, 26 +33. German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 11-13.


67

which offer “the unique opportunity for balancing regional and international interests

in the Arctic through multilateral cooperation”.286 Germany has been a permanent

observer to the Arctic Council since 2011 and now officially aspires to gain more ad-

hoc participation in the working groups of the Arctic Council.287 In line with this

claim, one can find the suggestion to extend observer countries’ participation rights on

a case-to-case basis, if an observer can substantively contribute to the resolution of an

issue.288 In addition to its general adherence to broad legal instruments that currently

seem to govern Arctic politics, this might offer the Federal Republic’s representation to

the Arctic Council greater influence given the scale of German engagement in Arctic

research.289

Another organization that the German policy paper explicitly refers to is the

International Maritime Organization (IMO), which has, in comparison with UNCLOS,

presented more precise guidelines with regard to ships operating in areas of the Arctic

Ocean covered by ice.290 Thus, it becomes apparent that accessibility and transport

play a major variable in the German Arctic equation. Three aspects should be taken

into consideration in this respect: Firstly, the German intention to continue and expand

its research endeavours in the Arctic; secondly, the German backing for the opening of

new shipping routes in the Arctic. The second point should be linked to the fact that the

Federal Republic of Germany is one of the world’s largest importing and exporting

nations with the third largest merchant marine and the largest container ship fleet in the

world.291 Thirdly, consider also the interests of German shipyards that specialise in the

construction of environment-friendly ship propulsion systems, including ice class

ships.292 The German government promotes the progression of IMO guidelines by

making them legally binding and by further adjusting them according to the special

Arctic conditions.293

286 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 12-13. 287 Ibid. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid, 14. 291 Ibid, 8-9. 292 Ibid. 293 Ibid, 14.

68 Master Thesis

As a second key instrument of the IMO, the MARPOL convention is mentioned as it

makes another valuable contribution to the development of environmentally friendly

technology.294 By making full use of the MARPOL convention the federal government

is seeking to bring about the “highest possible international environmental standards

for shipping in this sensitive marine area”. Furthermore, it refers to two additional

commissions/conventions: OSPAR and NEAFC.295 Both are of relevance regarding the

protection of the marine environment. Germany works within these structures to create

special environmental standards for the Arctic.

The Federal Republic supports an active EU Arctic policy and uses the 2012 document

published by the Commission as a point of reference. The German government expects

the Commission to ensure “horizontal coherence” on Arctic issues within the CFSP but

also in the domains of environmental protection, research, industry and technology,

energy and raw materials, transport and fisheries.296 This underlines the Federal

government’s general aim to make the Arctic policy part of a long-term strategic

planning within the EU. The EU’s interests and ambitions are described as legitimate

due to the Union’s geographic and political proximity through the membership of some

“Arctic” European countries. The German officials seem convinced that the EU can

make a contribution to the Arctic debate through its extensive experience with

multilateral instruments as well as by coordinating various positions and

perspectives.297

On the bilateral basis, Denmark is acknowledged to be a particularly important partner

within the Arctic. Nevertheless, it is underlined that Germany intends to maintain

friendly relationships with all Arctic countries.298 NATO offers a good supplementary

platform for security related discussions with those actors involved299 Accordingly, it

can be said that like the Danish or Swedish policy paper, multilateral cooperation is an

end as much as it is a means to ensure peaceful development and avoid damage to the

294 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 14. 295 Ibid, 14-15. 296 Ibid, 15-16. 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid, 16-17. 299 Ibid, 17.


69

Arctic environment and its indigenous population. Not being an Arctic country, the

present policy paper nevertheless shows that there is a genuine and growing interest in

Arctic issues on the side of the German government. More research is needed in order

to identify whether this interest mainly stems from economic or environmental

concerns, group pressure or whether it can be seen as one formative element in the

European/German search for an appropriate scope of international responsibilities.

7.2. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Arctic

7.2.1.What Arctic is to the Federal Republic of Germany

The policy paper of the Federal Republic of Germany makes clear that it sees the

Arctic as a “region in transition” that is of “geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-

ecological importance” for the whole of the international community due to global

warming and its potential effects and consequences. 300 The rapid environmental

changes that have occurred in the Arctic over the last decades are thereby to be seen as

an “early warning system of the consequences of global warming” to the rest of the

world.301 The German guidelines for Arctic policies thereby present the issue in

question as a mainly international problem rather than a question exclusively reserved

to regional or national policymaking.

7.2.1.1. Risks

Potential risks seem to be perceived in the field of security and political stability even

though it is emphasized that it is difficult to predict future developments.302 The

present policy paper makes clear that the Arctic should be used for peaceful purposes

only. 303 However, the following statement illustrates the German government’s

concerns in this respect: “overlapping interests of arctic countries could trigger a

geopolitical race for sovereignty or for rights to develop the seabed and its natural

resources which would pose an economic, environmental and security policy threat to

300 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 1. 301 Ibid, 4-5. 302 Ibid, 10. 303 Ibid, 1-2.

70 Master Thesis

stability in the region and would also affect Europe’s security interests.”304 Thus, in

comparison with the other two EU member countries, Germany stands out regarding its

concerns for the escalation of political conflict in the Arctic. This position had been

abandoned by Arctic countries and even by the EU over the last years. In order to

avoid the presented worst-case scenario, the Federal Government expresses its support

for “preventive action” and “confidence-building measures, cooperation and

coordination … based on existing legislation”.305

Regarding the indigenous population of the Arctic region, the policy paper underlines

the cultural variety within this grouping by stating that there are more than 30 different

groups of indigenous peoples. These groups represent 10% of the 4 million people

living in the Arctic.306 As the increasing international interest in the Arctic might entail

inter alia health, economic and other problems, it is stressed that their position should

be taken into account. The Federal government claims that those indigenous population

groups should be guaranteed the right to free and self-determined life in their homeland

in order to avoid internal political instability or the breach of basic human rights law.307

7.2.1.2. Potential Opportunities The region, however, also offers a number of profitable opportunities. The Federal

government perceives transportation, tourism as well as fisheries as three major

opportunities.308 Here it should be noted that the freedom of navigation is regarded as a

principle of international law that needs to be safeguarded. Resource exploitation

naturally also plays a role however in conjunction with dangers regarding

sustainability, biodiversity and the Arctic and surrounding environment in general.309

304 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013), 10. 305 Ibid. 306 Ibid. 307 Ibid, 4-5. 308 Ibid, 6 309 Ibid.


71

7.2.2 What the Federal Republic is to the Arctic

The Federal Republic presents itself as a “partner” to the Arctic with vast expert

knowledge in the areas of research, technology and environmental protection

standards. In order to be able to further engage in an efficient and profitable way, the

guarantee for the freedom of Arctic research seems to be of tremendous importance to

the EU member state in question. 310 Unable to present any historical links to the

region, yet needing to present some sort of legitimization, relatively extensive

explanations of the chemical processes of global warming in the Arctic are presented in

connection with the highlighting of German expertise when it comes to the

development of new technologies.311 These reflections appear to be intended to

function as a clarification for the Germany’s importance in the Arctic when it comes to

research, technology and development.

Given the transboundary character of these scientific missions, the Federal Republic

elevates itself to the position of an international actor in the High North. Furthermore,

a certain intention to establish legitimacy by listing a number of relevant events that

had been hosted in Berlin can be found.312 As if these events are perceived as evidence

for German relevance for the Arctic the list starts with a first act of cooperation with

Denmark and Norway in 2009, followed by a second event hosted together with

Finland in 2011 and a third conference that was held in cooperation with Norway in

2013.313 It is furthermore noted, without any further explanation, that Germany is party

to the Spitsbergen Treaty and permanent observer to the Arctic Council.314

7.2. The Federal Republic of Germany seen within the ACF

In its policy guidelines for the Arctic the Federal Republic of Germany presents itself

as a capable and considerate cooperation partner for each party that shares the German

interest in balancing sustainability with economic efficiency. It can be argued that

internationally adopted political and legal frameworks are thereby perceived as the

310 German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines – Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” (policy paper/ Berlin, 2013),12-13. 311 Ibid, 4-5. 312 Ibid, 5. 313 Ibid. 314 Ibid.

72 Master Thesis

most adequate instruments to enable globally adaptable policy measures that take all

actors involved into account while not disregarding low-policy questions related to e.g.

the environment of minority rights. This position reflects certain values of the Federal

Republic’s core belief/policy belief system that had been established in the aftermath

of the Second World War. As described above, these focus on assuming responsibility

and consensus making. Sweden and Germany’s policy positions can consequently be

deemed related, focusing on an open, consensus-seeking multilateral approach for

Arctic cooperation. It could almost be assumed that the Federal Republic of Germany

competes with Sweden for the position of the policy broker in the ACF’s framing of

the Arctic debate. However, it should be underlined that Germany misses the obvious

inherent link to the Arctic and therefore it can exert only limited influence on the

regional political level.


73

VIII. Conclusion Common European policies have never emerged from thin air. Ever since its

establishment, the Union has pursued the objective of creating political, legal as well as

social coherence and solidarity among its steadily increasing number of member states.

However, placing own interests above those of the EU or specific countries has often

rendered supranational policy making excessively difficult, if not impossible. This is

particularly true when it comes to aspects likes the EU’s CFSP, which seems to lie

close to the heart of the member countries’ fears of losing sovereignty and individual

as well as global meaning. Accordingly, the EU has thus far not been able to stand out

as a single foreign policy actor on the global stage. This has become very clear in

connection with the Arctic debate where the Union is after seven years of intended

policy-making still struggling for recognition, legitimacy and acceptance. Over the

course of the last years, the EU tried to rely on its relations to certain member states

that maintain special political, geographic and/or historical links to the region above

the Arctic Circle. However, it has become clear that those actors seem to construct

their cohesion and solidarity rather within narrower regional political circles that share

a greater set of issue related perceptions, values and goals or within broader

international networks of cooperation that offer global solutions to global problems

without imposing any shift of competences on the actors involved. Other regional

political entities such as the EU thereby become constructs against which such

coalition building takes place. This might imply that cross-national solidarity rather

arises form the interaction of actors who share core value systems as well as specific

material interests in a given context and see their cooperation as a means of protection

for their economic and political privileges. This does not entail a rosy future for the

development of a common European Arctic policy in particular or for a CFSP in

general. It also implies that the shared “European values, norms and standards” are not

necessarily as solidly rooted in the various member countries’ political systems as

often assumed.

The Kingdom of Denmark with its still relatively strong links to the Arctic island of

Greenland distinguishes itself from other European (Arctic) countries in the given issue

area and thereby gives a good example of the described phenomenon. Rather gazing

across the Atlantic Ocean towards Washington and Nuuk than rallying behind

74 Master Thesis

Brussels’s ambitions of creating an “ever closer union” have clearly been underscored

by the Scandinavian country’s Arctic policy paper and thereby revealed its lack of

interest and trust in enforcing the EU’s position within the Arctic. Member states such

as Sweden or the Federal Republic of Germany seem to have adopted a more positive

stance towards a common European involvement in the Arctic by presenting

themselves as skilful and ambitious yet moderate negotiation and cooperation partners.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework as developed by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank

Jenkins-Smith can contribute to a deeper understanding of these policy positions and

tendencies. The respective political cultures and core belief systems of the three

countries date back to pre-EU times and have been shaped by a number of very

specific historical, cultural and even geographical components. According to the

theoretical framework that has been applied to the present case study, this entails that

the establishment of a coherent European Arctic policy requires the time and will to

pass through different stages of policy learning and consensus building, occasionally

facilitated by a so-called policy broker. Due to e.g. its membership in the Arctic

Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers it is highly likely that Sweden will

assume this role in the long run with regard to the issue at hand.

Thus, it becomes apparent that the European member countries are defining

autonomously the rules of the game, especially when it comes to foreign policy making

on the European level. The acknowledgement of UNCLOS and the exclusivity claims

of the Arctic Five thereby seem to have become the fulcrum of coalition alignment;

ranging from definite refusal over diplomatic acceptance to active support. Hence, it

can be claimed that the core/policy belief system of the Arctic littoral states has

become the pace-maker of European policy making in the Arctic and has also been

proven to coincide more than the one shared by Denmark and Brussels. Further

investigation is required in order to gain more knowledge on the general influence of

those belief systems on European policy making and to what extent they may

constitute a hurdle to the process of European integration.

Accordingly, Arctic/Nordic identity and sovereignty emerged as core elements of the

debate and it appeared that cultural and political identity-building aspects play an

essential role with regard to the countries’ political decision-making mechanisms. The

Union’s policies, which mainly focus on economic interests of western democracies,


75

tend to neglect those factors or address them only by means of vague or misdirected

discourse and legislation. This creates room to manoeuver for member countries that

intend to increase their political influence on the global stage by means of independent

actions that appeal purposefully to their respective citizen’s concerns. So, one might

state that the challenges the EU is currently facing also stem from a lack of European

identity, which could motivate the various member states to engage more openly in

pan-European cooperation and develop a sense of community that transcends both

materialistic interests and the pride related to national sovereignty. Therefore, serious

consideration should be given to those identity-establishing aspects, as they might

constitute a stumbling block for further European harmonization processes in the

Arctic. However, it should be borne in mind that past shifts of sovereignty and

competences subtly but surely established a number of political, legal and societal links

between the domestic and the European level of policy making. European interests are

therefore often inherently represented in its member countries Arctic policy positions.

More research is needed in order to clarify to what extent this underlying set of shared

political and ideal standards and existing legislation is sufficient to give the EU a

position on the global stage of political cooperation. The described developments

however imply that the EU still has a long way to go before it can act as a unified actor

in the wider world.

76 Master Thesis

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