Master Paper - Master Thesis - Emma Murphy - KU Leuven

KU LEUVEN MASTER OF EUROPEAN STUDIES: TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

BLIJDE INKOMSTSTRAAT 5 LEUVEN, 3000 BELGIË

The Idea of Empire in Modern European History:

To What Extent is the Ideology of the Tsars

Influencing Contemporary Russian Politics in

Reference to the Ukrainian Crisis.

Emma Murphy

R0362047

Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in European

Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Martin Kohlrausch

Academic year 2014 – 2015

Word Count: 10320

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CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES BLIJDE INKOMSTSTRAAT 5

LEUVEN, 3000 BELGIË R0362047

Table of Contents

Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................... 1

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 2

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 3

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4

Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... 5

The Three Pillars of Tsarism ................................................................................................................... 6

Official Ideology ..................................................................................................................................... 6

Chapter 1: The Pillar of Orthodoxy ........................................................................................................ 7

1.1: Tsarist Orthodoxy ............................................................................................................................ 7

1.2: Contemporary Orthodoxy .............................................................................................................. 10

Chapter 2: The Pillar of Autocracy ....................................................................................................... 14

2.1: Tsarist Autocracy ........................................................................................................................... 14

2.2: Contemporary Autocracy ............................................................................................................... 17

Chapter 3: The Pillar of Nationality ...................................................................................................... 21

3.1: Tsarist Nationality .......................................................................................................................... 21

3.2: Contemporary Nationality ............................................................................................................. 23

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 26

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 29

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Acknowledgements

Undertaking a master thesis at KU Leuven has been both a difficult but nevertheless rewarding

experience for myself. I would first like to express my gratitude to the Master of European

Studies programme for a great year and for providing a wide range of interesting topics for

students to research regarding their master thesis. Secondly I would like to thank Professor M.

Kohlrausch who has supervised me on this topic, providing much help and insightful tips for

my work. Lastly, I am very grateful to my parents who have endlessly supported me over the

past five years of university education and to Eli for his continuous motivational spirit.

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Executive Summary

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how the official ideology of the Russian Empire,

implemented by Tsar Nicholas I, has continued to influence Russian political decision making

in regards to the current Ukraine Crisis. It is not the purpose of this thesis to outline the details

of the crisis, alternatively what will be analysed is how the three factors of the state ideology;

Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality, continue to influence Russian handling of the conflict.

Throughout the thesis it will be argued that Vladimir Putin on many occasions has specifically

used imperial history to consolidate political control over Ukraine and to garner greater

political legitimation for his actions. This resurrection of Tsarist history exemplifies that the

idea of empire is far from dead within Russian-Ukrainian relations, thus the recent crisis in the

borderlands should not be analysed without taking into account the greater historical narrative.

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Introduction

“Imperial politics, imperial practice and imperial cultures have shaped the world we live in.

They have changed the past, created our present and perhaps will shape the future” (Burbank

and Cooper: 2011:2). Eloquently summed up by Burbank and Cooper, this statement defines

how empires have provided the fundamental building blocks of the contemporary society we

live in. As the dominant form of political governance for thousands of years, the ruling system

of ‘empire’ has only recently been replaced by the ‘nation-state’; the idea of a homogenous

collection of peoples within one territory. Yet despite their longevity; whereby the Chinese

dynasties spanned over two thousand years, the Roman Empire survived for 600 years, and its

successor the Byzantine Empire which survived another thousand years, still, empires continue

to be routinely dismissed as having little value to understanding contemporary changes to the

international system.

One of the most recent and dramatic changes within international relations has been the

Ukrainian Crisis, deemed by many as the “most dangerous conflict to grip Europe since the

wars in the former Yugoslavia” (bbc.co.uk). The crisis originated in November 2013 due to the

pro-Russian government abandoning deals to further integrate Ukraine into the European

Union, instead favouring closer ties with Moscow. Among demonstrations and violent protests

the situation rapidly developed whereby in March 2014, Russia annexed the region of Crimea,

integrating it into the greater Federation. Over the past year violence on both sides of the

conflict has reached detrimental levels thus according to an official OHCA report over 6000

individuals have lost their lives and 1.3 million people have been internally displaced (United

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2015).

Many explanations for the current crisis in Ukraine are, more often than not, analysed by

political scientists within a post-Cold War timeframe. The dismissal of imperial history as

irrelevant to understanding contemporary developments arguably only provides a narrow

perspective on the conflict. Russo-Ukrainian relations have been shaped by hundreds of years

of shared history, culture and religion, therefore to regard this information as irrelevant depicts

a juvenile analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to fill the gap occurring within scholarly

literature by demonstrating that longer historical analysis can help provide a more robust

understanding of current developments, especially regarding actions taken by Russia.

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The study undertaken within this thesis will investigate how old ideas of empire continue to

influence Russian political decision making, therefore should not be dismissed when trying to

grasp a greater understanding of the Ukraine Crisis. What will be specifically analysed is how

the official ideology of the Russian Empire; Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality, which

provided the “guiding dogma of the nation” (Duffy 1995: 296) from 1833-1917, continues to

have reciprocal effects within current affairs, but moreover has been (un)officially revived by

Russian President Vladimir Putin to consolidate political power and legitimise actions within

the Ukrainian Crisis. This thesis will demonstrate that ideas of empire continue to manipulate

present day politics and may continue to shape the future. Therefore, the question that will be

analysed is, to what extent is the ideology of the Tsars influencing contemporary Russian

politics in reference to the Ukraine Crisis.

Methodology

The presentation of this thesis will be a comparative analysis between the reign of Tsar

Nicholas I and the contemporary presidency of Vladimir Putin. The paper will be divided into

three chapters based on the Official Nationality ideology of Tsar Nicholas I; Orthodoxy,

Autocracy and Nationality. The first half of each chapter will give an introduction to Tsarist

history, ideology and politics and will be primarily based on research gathered from secondary

sources of published authors. In addition to this, each chapter will then be contrasted with the

rule of Vladimir Putin to express how imperialist ideas continue to permeate contemporary

Russian consciousness and political decision making. Yet, this thesis will go further than a

basic comparison between the two Russian rulers. Over and above this, each ideological pillar

of Tsarism will be analysed to demonstrate the extent that ideas of empire are influencing

Russian position within the current Ukrainian Crisis. The sources used within the contemporary

section of each chapter include contextual speeches of Vladimir Putin, newspaper articles and

recently published scholarly work. It is not the purpose of this thesis to outline all details of the

crisis, which may be interpreted as a limitation of the work, nonetheless, the purpose of the

paper is to depict how imperial ideas of the reactionary rule of Tsar Nicholas I are influencing

current political decision making in Moscow towards Ukraine.

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The Three Pillars of Tsarism

Official Ideology

Before being able to analyse the ideology of Imperial Russia, to determine what extent it is

having reciprocating effects on political decision making in Moscow in regards to the Ukraine

Crisis, first an introduction to the origins of the ideology will be given.

The official ideology of imperial Russia was devised under the rule of Tsar Nicholas I (1825-

55) by the “minister of education, Sergei Uvarov in April 1833” (Kozelsky 2014:223). Known

formerly as the ‘Official Nationality’ policy of the Russian Empire; but also as ‘three pillars of

Tsarism’ or ‘Tsarist absolutism’, the state ideology of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality

reigned dominant between 1833 through to the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. Not

since the renowned rule of Ivan ‘the Terrible’ IV, had any Tsar pursued the need for sponsoring

a national ideology. Rather, progressive rulers such as Peter the Great (1721-1725) and

Catherine the Great (1762-1796), had embraced liberal ideals from the European West and

promoted the flourishing of European culture and languages. Historians regularly note that the

Decembrist Revolt of 1825 could well have acted as a trigger for the conservative rule of Tsar

Nicholas I, as both father and grandfather were killed in the attack. The event is proclaimed to

have set the tone for the reign of Nicholas I, which was characterised by authoritarian and

reactive policies.

Tsar Nicholas I’s unique idea of empire was enforced through three structured pillars, of which

the first was Orthodoxy. This referred to the overarching position of the Orthodox Church in

Russian society, moreover to whom the population had to dedicate their lives. The second

pillar; Autocracy, referred to total devotion to the divinely appointed leader; the Tsar, who had

the right to rule unchallenged as an absolute monarch. Lastly the principle of nationality aimed

to emphasise the unique traits of the Russian civilisation through the promotion of “the

superiority of all things Slavic in general and Russian in particular” (Chubarov 1999: 110).

Unlike his predecessors who embraced liberal 18th century European thought, Tsar Nicholas I

placed significant emphasis on distinguishing Russia from the West as a unique civilisation

unwilling to be infiltrated by the enlightenment. The importance of the state ideology was that

it continued to be the “guiding dogma of the nation” (Duffy 1995: 296), specifically revived

under the rule of reactionary Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II, until the collapse of the

Russian Empire in 1917.

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Over the next three chapters, each pillar of Tsarism will be historically investigated to first

present an understanding of the core concepts of Tsar Nicholas I. As the purpose of this thesis

is to present a comparative analysis, the rule of Russian president Vladimir Putin will be

investigated to argue that, despite the contemporary Russian Federation not officially abiding

by a state ideology, many of the fundamental ideals stemming from the reign of Tsar Nicholas

I continue to permeate political decision making. More specifically, it can be argued that

current President Vladimir Putin has ‘un-officially’ resurrected many aspects of Tsarist

absolutism within his third term serving as leader of the Russian Federation. As the focus of

this thesis is the Ukraine Crisis (2013-present), it will be investigated to what extent are the

ideas; central to the Russian empire over a century ago, continuing to permeate the conflict.

Chapter 1: The Pillar of Orthodoxy

1.1: Tsarist Orthodoxy

The Orthodox Christian Religion helped shape the identity of the Russian Empire and can be

argued to be the most fundamental pillar of Tsarist absolutism. It is the one aspect which has

had the ability to wholly penetrate and influence both the remaining ideological pillars of

Imperial Russia; Autocracy and Nationality. Not only has Orthodoxy managed to shape the

perceived notion of identity within Russia, but additionally it has helped secure political control

and security over neighbouring lands to enforce a greater idea of empire, specifically in

Ukraine. Sidorov eloquently sums up that “Russian Orthodoxy has been more than a major

religion, it has played the utmost political and geopolitical role in the country” (Sidorov

2006:320).

In contrast to the Latin world, the origins of the Orthodox faith stem from the Byzantine

Empire. After the split from the Roman Empire, the distinct form of Christianity was spread

from the new capital Constantinople. The relationship of Russia and Orthodoxy stems from the

tenth century, and as the story goes, it was the conversion of Prince Vladimir to Christianity

which was the trigger for the consequential spread of the eastern form of Christianity

throughout the newly formed Russian state; Kievan Rus. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire

in the fifteenth century, the Russian Lands were regarded as the only remaining Orthodox State

(except Georgia). However, it was only three centuries later; under the conservative rule of

Nicholas I, when both religion and the state became more intertwined than ever in previous

history. Orthodox Christianity became enshrined as the core feature of the official ideology of

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the empire, which would outplay as a theocratic interpretation of Tsarist power until the 1917

Russian revolution. Nevertheless, the sole focus on the Orthodox faith within the official

ideological platform should not be interpreted by the reader as an understanding that the

Russian Empire was a homogenous ethnic and religious landmass. As Kees Boterbloem

informs, “the Tsars flock harboured millions of Muslims, Lutherans, Animists and Catholics”

(Boterbloem 2013: 134), in what would constitute as one of the most diverse empires globally.

However it was Orthodoxy which can be regarded as the hegemon in regard to all other

religions within the empire.

Orthodoxy became more than just a belief system, rather, it now was used as a tool to dominate

how the state was controlled. The Tsar took a highly pious view of political power and

understood that “the state was to serve God, not God and the state” (Koelsky 2014: 223), hence

acknowledging the need for both church and state to be intertwined; unlike his grandmother

Catherine the Great who supported the secularisation of the state. Devotion to both Tsar and

church became mandatory and consequently, apostasy from the Orthodox faith became illegal

in an attempt to “preserve and maintain true custom, faith and the practices of the past” (Suny

2000: 489). However, not only was religion used as a tool to support the rule of the Tsar and

to shape a sense of Russian identity, but furthermore a conscious policy of ‘spiritual

colonisation’, was undertaken by the Tsarist regime to coincide with the empire’s ever

expanding borders.

Such ‘spiritual colonisation’ can be argued to have taken place to support the integration of

Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Kozelsky outlines how under the reign of Tsar Nicholas I, a

“re-Christianization of Russian history and empire” (2014:223) took place, specifically

targeting Ukraine in the process. According to the author, a top-down socially constructed

process of historical manipulation took place by elites, historians and biblical scholars of the

Russian Orthodox Church in an effort to redefine Ukraine as the ‘cradle of Russian

Christianity’. Kozelsky describes how during the period 1825-55, a conscious interest was

taken by scholars to resurrect the medieval chronicle of Prince Vladimir as the father of Russian

Christianity, with Ukraine and Crimea cast as the origin of the Russian civilisation. The social

construction and manipulation of history through 19th century inventions enabled “the distant

regions of Ukraine and Crimea to be encoded into the cognitive Russian map of faith and

practice” (Kozelsky 2014:221), hence normalising Russian dominance over the region.

Furthermore, the author continues to describe how Ukraine was transformed into the spiritual

and historical heart of the Russian civilisation. She explains how financial investment was

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made by the state to “pinpoint the exact location of Prince Vladimir’s conversion to

Christianity” as well as sponsoring of the “Russian Orthodox Church to construct elaborate

networks of commemorative shrines” (Kozelsky 2014:223). The manipulation of historical

events to socially construct the idea that Ukraine existed as the religious heartland of the

Russian Empire, was purely a political tool of the Tsarist elite to rationalise imperialism and

secure both political and religious dominance over the peripheral borderlands. By emphasising

religious and historical linkages, the Tsar was able to normalise and justify Russian control

over the territories to further cement their existence within the ever expansive empire.

Therefore it is clear that religion played a vital role for the consolidation of imperialist

expansion, but furthermore within the Tsarist era, religion also played a leading role shaping

great power politics. The Tsar deemed himself master protector of all Orthodox Christians,

therefore, the safeguarding of Christian minorities within the Holy Land was one of the leading

reasons for the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-56), where Russia, led by pious Nicholas I

fought a bloody battle against the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Sardinia.

This 19th century nationalist creation of Ukraine as the ‘cradle of Russian Christianity’ was

further supported by philosophies of ‘Third Romism’. Such ideas did not originate within the

reign of Tsar Nicholas I, with certain scholars determining that “a Russian Orthodox monk

nominated Russia as the Third Rome” (Sidorov 2006:317), while others such as Chubarov

noted that “to consolidate and to assert the rising status of Russia among the European powers,

it was Peter the Great who took the title of Old East Rome (Byzantium)” (1999:3).

Nevertheless, the philosophy emphasised the religious and political duty of Russia to protect

the Orthodox faith from disintegration as the sole remaining successor of the Byzantine

Empire. The idea that the Russian Empire was the final protectorate of Orthodoxy only

bequeathed further justifications for the protection of historically significant locations such as

Kiev and Crimea.

In addition to the Tsarist desire of protecting Ukrainian territory for historic and religious

purposes, Shalepentokh raises the important point that “Byzantism also emphasised the

importance of transethnic Orthodoxy” (Shalpentokh 2013:69). By this, the author is referring

to the notion that peoples of the Orthodox faith are inevitably connected despite the presence

of national borders. By emphasising the importance of transethnic Orthodoxy, the Tsar was

also able to secure dominance by emphasising notions of a shared identity and brotherhood

between Russia and Ukraine, which could further qualify as an “imperial civilising mission for

the preservation and protection of custom (Suny 2000:489).

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Religion should not be underestimated, nor overlooked as a factor when analysing the historical

relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Orthodoxy can be argued to have been one of the

most active agents to shape relations between the two nations. By asserting a shared religious

history and religious identity, the Tsarist elite were able to consolidate unquestionable

dominance over the region. Sidorov has argued that the Orthodox religion and its relationship

to ideas of Third Romism has been “one of the most significant (if not the most significant)

historiosophical concepts of forming the ideology and character of the Muscovite state and

staying in Russian minds for several centuries. (Sidorov 2006:326). Religion and Byzantium

have remained in the Russian conception of self-identity for centuries. Despite the secular years

of the Soviet Union, it can be argued that the role Orthodoxy has once again returned to its

historical position of dominance within politics and society, whereby it is influencing Russian

political decision making in regards to the Ukrainian Crisis.

1.2: Contemporary Orthodoxy

“The era of colonialism has ended, but this has not meant the end of empire” (Zielonka

2012:506). This quote by Zielonka can be argued to hold many truths regarding Russian-

Ukrainian relations. Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 after

centuries of dominance from both the Tsarist Empire and the USSR. However, despite gaining

the formal status as an independent sovereign state, Ukraine; as well as other neighbouring

states such as Belarus and Georgia, has continuously found it difficult to be relinquished from

the grip of what is now constituted as the Russian Federation. As previously explained, under

the platform Tsar Nicholas’ state ideology, the Tsar was deemed protector of the Orthodoxy

faith, to which the population would be loyal. Furthermore, under the state ideology, religion

was used to increase control over the peripheries, thus specifically highlighting the importance

of transethnic orthodoxy. Within the post-Soviet era, once again religion can be argued to have

become a tool of the elite, increasingly used to consolidate state power.

Within the Russian Federation, due to increasing cooperation between the church and state,

religion has once again begun playing a dominant role within state domestic and foreign policy.

Examples of this include the four point programme of Patriarch Alexii II (1990-2008); former

head of the Orthodox Church, which outlined the intention to “reclaim pre-revolutionary

church property, the integration of Orthodox education into public schools, the attachment of

priests to military units and restrictions on foreign missions” (Kozelsky 2014:226).

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Furthermore, the Patriarch declared his intentions to reassert the Orthodox Church over former

regions of both the Soviet and Russian Empires. Such examples accentuate the influential

nature of religion in Russia’s post-Soviet political progression and why the Patriarch has been

consistently ranked in the “top 15 of the country’s most influential political figures” (Knox

2005: 533). However it should be emphasised that unlike in Imperial Russia; where the

Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was the official state religion, “the 1993 constitution

describes Russia as a secular state and prohibits establishment of state religion” (Danks

2014:92). Nevertheless, the relationship can be argued to have progressively strengthened since

the creation of the Russian Federation. Danks exemplifies how “Yeltsin strengthened ties with

the Russian Orthodox Church despite being an atheist, and Russian Orthodox Church

infiltration of state structures continues under President Vladimir Putin” (Danks 2014:93).

Under the presidential rule of Vladimir Putin; himself an avid follower of the Orthodox faith,

religion and religious figures such as the current Orthodox Patriarch of all Russia, Kirill I

(2009-present) have increasingly been accommodated within Kremlin politics. The symbiotic

church-state relationship now raises the question whether Orthodoxy has become the

(un)official “ideology for the new millennium? (Danks 2014:100). Like under the reign of Tsar

Nicholas I, has contemporary Orthodoxy during the presidential rule of Putin become a

fundamental pillar of the Russian Federation? Scholars such as Kozelsky support this notion,

quoting that “today, the Russian government appears to have invoked aspects of the pre-

revolutionary model, leading to the ‘re-sacralisation’ or ‘orthodoxsation’ of political behaviour

and public consciousness” (Kozelsky 2014:220). As it is clear that Orthodoxy has once again

become a dominant player in contemporary politics, the use of religion as a form of political

control will now be analysed within context of the current Ukrainian Crisis.

The Ukrainian Crisis has been plagued with religious connotations. It has become apparent that

the importance of religion within the conflict runs deep. Many observers and outsiders,

uninformed of historical relations between the states, have solely analysed current affairs

within a Soviet or post-Soviet setting, and in many cases written off the importance of religion

all together. However, by analysing a longer historical timeframe, it can be argued that there

exists many similarities between Russian-Ukrainian relations today and within the Tsarist era,

specifically regarding the importance of religion. Political elites within the Russian Federation

once again can be argued to be using Orthodoxy to retain political influence over the

neighbouring territory of Ukraine, actions previously described as ‘spiritual colonisation’.

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The re-sacralisation of history was previously described as a Tsarist motive to justify

imperialism, however the current actions of Russia within the conflict have attracted similar

criticisms. Claims have arisen that, once again Russia is using a “spiritual mask” (Kozelsky

2014:321) to retain Ukraine within its ‘sphere of influence’. The concept of the ‘spiritual mask’

used by political elites; especially President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill, has a strong

foundation. To justify the annexation and absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation;

which was deemed illegal by international law, Russia presented the affair in a religious light,

implying its historical right and religious duty to be united with the territory. President Putin’s

speech on 18th March 2014, the quoted,

“Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of

ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting

Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values

that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus” (Putin. V 2014).

The story of Prince Vladimir and the origins of the Russian civilisation have once again

resurfaced. The historical story, which highlights Kiev as the epicentre of Russian Orthodoxy

and civilisation, is interpreted by the Russian population as something for Ukraine and

Ukrainians to be proud of. However, from the counter Ukrainian perspective, it is understood

as a 19th century Russian invention to justify both historic Tsarist control and contemporary

Russian political leverage over Ukraine. The speech also raises the aspect of ‘transethnic

Orthodoxy’. Ideas of the ‘Holy Rus’; Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as a historical and

unbreakable collection of peoples, has been interpreted as a religious motive to remove any

recognition of an independent Ukrainian identity separate from Russia. Furthermore, as long

as Russian elites continue to reinstate the perception that the three east Slavic peoples are not

separate nations, and rather “integral parts of the body politic, vital limbs that needed to be

more intimately connected to the great Russian trunk” (Roshwald 2000:23), a blurring of

sovereign borderlines will continue to persist in both the minds of the Russian population and

the elites in power. Some critics have framed the religious dimension of the conflict as “a

spiritual mask for Putin’s Customs Union” (Kozelsky 2014:321) in fear of greater Ukrainian

relations with the European Union. Nevertheless, whether the key aims of the Russian elite are

to gain support for greater political or economic integration, the use of religion as a tool has

strong similarities to Tsarist policies and tactics of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the

leading role taken by Putin raises the question whether the current President views himself as

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the modern-day protector of the Orthodox faith, the contemporary equivalent to the pre-

revolutionary Tsars?

It is important to understand how the use of religious imagery by President Vladimir Putin

within the Ukrainian Conflict has influenced a stream of religious nationalism within the

conflict area. In the annual state of the nation speech, Putin remarked that Crimea was as vital

to “Russians as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem” (Putin. V 2014) is to Jews and Muslims. The

use of highly polemic religious imagery to the Russian public has casted the affair within a

‘holy war’ light, raising suggestions that through the promotion of the ‘Holy Rus’, Putin is

indirectly influencing the religious nationalism and the stream of foreign fighters within the

conflict. It is not difficult to understand how “religious issues can generate passionate feelings

and violent action” (Van De Veer 1994:7), thus a BBC.com report from 2014 stated how such

passionate feelings of the Russian population has been transformed into “as many as 1000

Russian volunteers fighting in Ukraine” (BBC.co.uk), reportedly for the purpose of defending

the historic idea of empire and the standing of Orthodoxy in a world dominated by

globalisation.

By analysing both the Tsarist era and contemporary politics, it has become clear the Russian

Orthodox Church has been one (if not the) most influential actors in Russian history; despite

its absence under Soviet rule. Orthodoxy has not only helped define the Russian identity, but

moreover it has helped to consolidate control over peripheral territories of both the imperial

Russian Empire and the Russian Federation. We can see how the idea of empire continues to

influence contemporary political decision making, as 19th century ideas of transethnic

orthodoxy continue to blur sovereign borderlands. Under the rule of President Vladimir Putin,

the role of the ROC has increased within both domestic and foreign policy, in addition to the

president himself taking the leading role as the protector of the Orthodox community. In the

context of the Ukraine conflict, “the religious dimension has become everywhere apparent”

(Kozelsky 2014:219). Historical imagery and links with the imperial Russian Empire have

become commonalities of the conflict. Despite being overlooked by many analysts and scholars

in favour of finding all answers within a post-Soviet timeframe, the ideas of empire can be

highly useful in gaining a wider understanding of deeper motives and reasoning behind the

conflict. Next we will analyse the second pillar of Tsarism; Autocracy, to gage to what extent

it is influencing contemporary Russian political decision making, with specific reference to the

Ukraine crisis.

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Chapter 2: The Pillar of Autocracy

2.1: Tsarist Autocracy

Autocracy was enshrined as the second fundamental element of Tsar Nicholas’ official

nationality policy. “The law of the land declared: the Tsar of all the Russia’s is an autocratic

and absolute monarch.” (Riasanovsky 1959:98). The absolute nature of Tsarist rule enabled the

leader of the Russian Empire to be “unconstrained by a constitution, by laws or by

representative institutions” (Lieven 2000: 251), hence an unchallengeable figure within the

state. One factor which must not be overlooked is the importance of divine right. Widespread

belief was held by the Russian population that the Tsar was divinely appointed to rule by God,

hence his actions remained indisputable. Hosking highlights the importance of this factor,

explaining that among the highly orthodox population, the belief in the Tsar as a “supreme

patron appointed by God” (Hosking 2001:267), allowed the figure to gain unquestionable

support despite engaging in acts of tyranny. The Tsar was categorised as ‘Russia’s little father’,

a just and benevolent leader for all loyal to him; while severe towards those who presented

opposition. Due to the placing of the Tsar on a divine pedestal, problems which the state

encountered were often attributed to the ‘inherently evil’ nature of landowners and oligarchy

within the state.

Autocracy had long been the dominant form of political rule within the Russian Empire,

primarily due to the size of the enormous land mass, thus absolutism under one divine leader

was accepted as the best way to assert political control. It was not until the reign of Tsar

Nicholas I (1825-55) when autocracy was enshrined as a fundamental pillar of the state

ideology. Cannady and Kubicek state that the second pillar of Tsarism was “essentially a

proclamation against any discussion of constitutional government” (Cannady and Kubicek

2012:4). To be able to understand why autocracy was upheld as a central element of the Official

Nationality doctrine, the age of enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789-99 has to be

analysed.

The enshrinement of autocracy within the official nationality ideology of the state stems from

the age of enlightenment and specifically the threat of populist demands for constitutional

government. Revolutions within Western Europe aimed for the ousting of the patrimonial state,

whereby power and sovereignty could be then transferred into the hands of the people.

Influenced by the philosophical concepts of Alexis De Tocqueville, Montesquieu and John

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Locke, the people raised new questions of political legitimacy. Ideas regarding the right to rule

“moved from the divine to the plebeian as power now flowed upward from the people” (Suny

2000:488). Such ideas are rooted in the philosophies of Western Europe, however, historians

have noted how the Napoleonic Wars helped to expose new ideologies to soldiers, who would

ultimately return to spearhead demands for change within the monolithic system of Russian

autocracy. The Decembrist Revolt of 1825 is categorised as the first significant threat to

Russian autocracy. Nobles and military officers previously exposed to liberal ideas of Western

Europe “embraced the ‘Spirit of the Age’ that demanded a constitutional government”

(Cannady and Kubicek 2012:3) and furthermore attempted to drive political change through a

military coup on the coronation of Tsar Nicholas I, however, poor organisation enabled the

rebellion to be subdued with ease by those loyal to the Tsar.

The revolutions of Western and Central Europe, and specifically the Decembrist Revolt in St.

Petersburg are keys event to understanding the enshrinement of autocracy within the official

nationality policy of the state. The attempted coup on the coronation of Nicholas I exemplified

the extent of the threat posed by the spread of the ideas of the liberal West within the Imperial

Russia. Ideas of liberty, freedom and popular sovereignty contradicted every aspect of Tsarist

rule, hence, rather than embrace such ideas and therefore cause the implosion of the state, Tsar

Nicholas I responded with “unrelenting reaction” (Burliegh 2005: 171). The threat of

revolution became Tsar Nicholas I’s ultimate obsession. The infiltration of liberal ideologies,

and ultimately the possibility of a constitutional government terrified Nicholas I. Consequently

his reign was characterised by continuous reactionary policies to halt the spread of progressive

thought. Iconic liberal ideas of ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’, which began to spread

transnationally throughout Europe were outlawed. In reaction, Tsar Nicholas I coined the

phrase ‘faith, Tsar, fatherland’, a motto aimed at counteracting the liberal west by emphasising

classic elements of Russian society and to build on the imagery of Russian uniqueness. For

Nicholas I, conservatism was the only option, emphasising that “ancient cry of faith, Tsar,

fatherland will show us the way to victory even now” (Leatherbarrow and Offord 2010:28),

while revolution would bring the demise of Mother Russia.

The Decembrist Revolt was not the only revolution Nicholas I suppressed. The Polish revolt

in 1830 and the Hungarian uprising of 1848 were equally crushed by the wrath of the Tsar.

Nicholas I quoted in his manifesto that “Russia will not be disgraced by treason to throne and

fatherland, and all efforts by evil doers will be crushed by the might of the law” (Riasanovsky

1959:125-126). The determination to punish those associated with liberal philosophies of the

16




West resulted in a stark increase in the use of secret police and military force. Monas (1962)

explains how the Third Section of Nicholas I’s imperial chancellery, was created in 1826, in

direct reaction to the Decembrist Revolt, and was thus used as the primary tool to track those

who challenged the Tsars divine right to rule. Furthermore, Nicholas I extended control over

state education and limited civil society to those only favourable to the official nationality

doctrine.

Scholars, such as Hugh Seton-Watson, have attributed the prevalence of autocracy in Russian

history to its geographic positioning and categorisation as a landed empire. The lack of natural

boundaries except the southern mountains of the Caucasus and the northern Artic ice shelf have

been used as a justification for the predominance of autocratic rule. “The dangers of invasion

was an ever present justification for monarchical power. Open frontiers for Russia meant

insecurity and subjection” (Seton-Watson 1962: 13). The problem of ‘open frontiers’ has also

been raised by historians who determine that the consolidation of surrounding land during the

reign of Nicholas I; in which the territory of the Russian Empire was expanded to the largest

yet, was in hope to protect the ‘Holy Rus’. Such ‘open frontiers’ not only posed a threat from

military invasion, but also can be associated to the perceived threat of the spread of liberal

ideologies and Western philosophy which had the potential to pollute the Russian civilisation.

The autocratic nature of the Russian state has its origins dating much further back than the rule

of Tsar Nicholas I, due to the perceived notion that one strong leader divinely chosen by God

would have the best ability to rule the enormous land mass. Geoffrey Hosking argues that the

autocratic nature of the Russian empire was the “one adhesive which might credibly be said to

have held the variegated and ramshackle structure together” (Hosking 2001:267). However, it

was not until the reactionary rule of Nicholas I whereby the autocratic nature of Tsarist rule

began to adopt a West vs. East, liberal ideology vs. conservatism nature. Unlike his progressive

predecessors; Catherine the Great and Peter the Great, who embraced Western liberal thought,

Tsar Nicholas I worked to promote Russia as a unique power based on autocracy and

Orthodoxy. The Russian Federation retains many of the autocratic tendencies similar to the

Tsarist period, however now it will be investigated to understand what extent the ‘East vs.

West’ distinction has been revived within the context of the Ukraine Crisis of 2014.

17




2.2: Contemporary Autocracy

The current Russian president Vladimir Putin has long been compared to leaders of the Imperial

Russian and Soviet past. Regular clichés exist commenting that the leadership of Putin echoes

the reign of Ivan (the terrible) IV, or in certain cases the despotic rule of Soviet leader Joseph

Stalin. However, despite negative perceptions of Putin and his policies, it can be argued that

making comparisons to the totalitarian genocidal reign of Stalin; where terror became the

primary tool of the state can be dismissed as wholly over-exaggerative. It has also gained

ground that Russia, under the rule of Putin resembles that of the Tsarist era. Cannady and

Kubicek exemplify how newspaper articles and media coverage have regularly coined

headlines to stress similarities between the two eras e.g. the Time’s headline “A Tsar is Born”

upon crowning Putin ‘Man of the Year’ in 2007 (Time, December 19, 2007) as well as the

Toronto Globe and Mail declaring “Putin was a 21st Century Czar” (Globe and Mail [Toronto],

March 3, 2012). It is important to recognise that Putin is not a ‘21st Century Tsar’ and vast

differences lie between the two categories of ruler. Putin is not royalty, rather a

‘democratically’ elected president of the state. Furthermore there looks to be no return to a

royal dynasty in Russia anytime soon. Nevertheless, it can be emphasised that similarities

between the reign of Tsar Nicholas I and the contemporary era of President Vladimir Putin do

exist. This is not to say that Putin is attempting to manifest himself into a contemporary

monarch, however it will be exemplified how echoes of the ‘Official Nationality’ (official state

ideology) have influenced political decision making of Moscow. Additionally, it will be

analysed to demonstrate how such resonances of the Official Nationality doctrine have

continuously played a role in the Ukraine Conflict.

Many parallels between Tsar Nicholas I and President Vladimir Putin can be identified when

analysing the two political characters. Both leaders are renowned for their conservative

mentality and loyalty to ‘old order’, Orthodox beliefs (resulting in the strengthening of the

ROC in political affairs) and determination to promote Russia as a unique power, distinct from

its liberal Western neighbours. Regarding the use of Orthodoxy as a political tool, like Nicholas

I, religion has regularly been drawn upon to strengthen political validity and legitimise

autocratic tendencies within the presidency of Vladimir Putin. As earlier discussed, the political

influence of the Russian Orthodox Church under both the rules of Tsar Nicholas I and Vladimir

Putin was significantly increased. Despite no wide belief being held by the Russian population

that the current president is divinely chosen by God to rule, often imagery of Tsarist divine

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right has been coined by elites in an effort to invoke historical sentiment. In 2012, Patriarch

Kirill; who was named one of the most influential political figures in Russia, famously declared

the rule of Putin as a “miracle of God”, while “Vladislav Surkov, a top Kremlin aide suggested

that Putin was sent by God to save Russia” (Cannady and Kubciek 2012:6). Such terminology

not only depicts the president alike the Tsars, by evoking that he is the saviour of the nation,

but furthermore it is implied that the Russian nation acts as passive agents, incapable of self-

rule.

One of the strongest similarities between Tsar Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin is their attempt to

retain control through autocratic tendencies. Like how “Nicholas I exalted what were claimed

as Russia’s traditional values; virtue, obedience, Christianity” (Burbank and Cooper

2011:335), Vladimir Putin has similarly attempted to retain dominance of the population by

evoking historical continuity. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 1990’s saw political elites

attempt to import the liberal economic model to Russia, however such foreign concepts did not

work well. The presidential election of Vladimir Putin sought to restore such traditional norms.

Autocracy has not been directly sworn as the official ideology of the state under the rule of

Putin, however like his Tsarist counterpart, an official slogan has been coined to stress the

traditional nature of Russian political rule and furthermore the unique position of Russian

values from the liberal West. The ‘Turn of the Millennium Manifesto’ presented a very similar

approach to Nicholas I’s. President Putin coined a three pronged approach to re-establish the

Russian nation by emphasising “Patriotism, Power and Statism” (Putin 1999), as the primary

route to restore Russia to its great power status. Furthermore, the manifesto emphasised that

“from the very beginning Russia was created as a super-centralised state” (Evans 2008:903),

hence invoking a sense of historical normalcy in a bid to reject any prospect of contemporary

change. The particular traits of the Putin administration has led to scholars coining the term

‘Putinism’; essentially a new ideology emphasising loyalty to an “inherently conservative

doctrine built on the creed of the strong Russian leader” (Lindley-French 2014:39). In a similar

manner to Tsar Nicholas I and the Official Nationality doctrine, ‘Putinism’ strongly rejects

change. Both Tsar Nicholas I and Putin can be classed as ‘restorationists’, due to their practice

of using history to justify autocratic tendencies. History has been central to Putin, once

expressing that autocracy was in the ‘genetic code’ of the state and embedded in the mentality

of the population thus cementing the “vertical of power that has centralised authority in the

hands of the president” (Cannady and Kubicek 2012:6).

19




Encroaching Western liberal ideology has been categorised throughout Russian history as the

prime threat to the Empire and the state. As previously discussed, under the rule of Nicholas I,

the threat of liberal ideas spreading to Russia encompassed the nature of the Tsar’s rule. Fanatic

obsession with distancing Russia from the West led to the period of 1825-55 being classed as

one of the most reactionary periods in Russian history. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union

additionally thrived on distancing Russia from its Western neighbours, however under the

presidency of Vladimir Putin, the idea of ‘the West’ as a worrisome force in Russian political

consciousness has been revived by elites.

Within the Ukraine Crisis, autocratic similarities to Tsar Nicholas I have increasingly begun to

outplay. Putin has increasingly been presented as the ‘saviour of Ukraine’ by pro-Russian

forces, thus embedding the distinction between the Orthodox civilisation vs the liberal

democratic West. The outbreak of the Ukraine Crisis has arguably created a new paradigm shift

in Russian-European relations. Over the years following the end of the Cold War, the European

Union and NATO have increased their influence over the former Soviet States, much to the

dismay of the Russian Federation. In some cases e.g. the Georgia Conflict of 2008, Russia

reacted with military force to retain dominant control over neighbouring states which it deems

within its own ‘sphere of influence’. However, scholars have noted that the attempt by the

European Union to integrate Ukraine into its own neighbourhood policy away from traditional

Russian control has so far had the greatest political significance. Richard Sakwa notes how

“the EU represented the core of a ‘wider Europe’, a Brussels centric vision of a European core

that extended into the heartlands of what had once been an alternative great-power system

centred on Moscow” (Sakwa 2015:10). This ‘European core’ as described by Sakwa relates to

the cultural and political norms of liberal democracy which have been presented in opposition

to the Russian political culture for centuries. Scholars have noted that the Ukraine Crisis

represents the return to an ideological battle on the European continent; one between autocracy

and liberal democracy. However, it is important to understand what makes the Ukraine Crisis

specifically unique; and arguably more important than other surrounding states which have

been ‘encroached’ upon by the West since the end of the Cold War, is that within Russian

historical memory, Ukraine is one third of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Hence, the possibility of Ukraine

forging greater political, economic and social ties with the West was interpreted as intolerably

destructive to Russian self-narrative as “to lose Ukraine would be to lose Russia’s soul”

(Lindley-French 2014:39).

20




As previously outlined, Ukraine has been historically been a key location to Russia throughout

the Tsarist, Soviet and contemporary eras. The two nations share a long geographic border

which has simultaneously led to intertwined politics, cultures and economies, thus “given

Ukraine’s geopolitics location, any government in Moscow will go to great lengths to maintain

some form of control over Kiev’s foreign and defence policy” (Götz 2015: 3). Therefore it

cannot be said that the interests of Vladimir Putin are totally irrational, new nor unique. The

prospect of Ukraine establishing closer ties with Western nations is for many in the Kremlin

an unthinkable prospect, as “the connection to Ukraine is the last pillar of Russia’s stability

and power that could not be undermined” (Tsygankov 2015:13). However, what is distinctly

unique to the Putin administration is the refocusing of Ukraine as the final stronghold of the

‘Kievan Rus’. In a similar manner to the policies of Tsar Nicholas I, Putin continues to stress

the distinctive history and culture of the Russian civilisation, however by using the term Kievan

Rus is consecutively including Ukraine and Belarus within his vision, thus refusing to

acknowledge their complete sovereignty. Putin has quoted that “Western nations are constantly

trying to sweep us (Russia) into a corner because we have an independent position” (Putin

2014). Highlighting such independent position suggests that the East vs West distinction will

only continue to increase within the future, especially in regards to the Ukraine Crisis as, “the

implication of a Western orientation Ukraine would mark in the elite Russian mind a final

humiliation and the retreat from a great power” (Lindley-French 2014: 36).

For the two leaders, both Tsar Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin, autocracy has been a core feature

of their rule. The population may not believe that Putin has been divinely chosen to rule Russia,

like his Tsarist counterpart, however the resurrection of Tsarist religious imagery by elites has

helped to strengthen ideas of Putin as the saviour of Russia. As explained, Russian interest in

Ukraine is not a new phenomenon, rather it has been consistent within Tsarist, Soviet and

contemporary politics. However, what is specifically distinctive in regards to the Putin

administration and Ukraine Crisis is the increasing resurrection of the Tsarist ‘Kievan Rus’ to

highlight a civilizational difference from the West. The use of the term presents an underlying

not only presents increasing East vs. West notions, but also a refusal to acknowledge complete

sovereignty of Ukraine.

21




Chapter 3: The Pillar of Nationality

3.1: Tsarist Nationality

“‘Nationality’ was at the time and has since remained the most obscure, puzzling and debatable

member of the official trinity” (Riasanovsky 1959:124). Scholars have noted that unlike the

other pillars of Tsarism; Orthodoxy and Autocracy, the pillar of nationality does not present an

equally clear cut definition. Rather, it has been interpreted by many as a supplement to both

the pillars of Orthodoxy and Autocracy. As previously discussed, the Tsarist enshrinement of

Orthodoxy worked to promote the official religion and endorsed Moscow as the ‘third Rome’,

while Autocracy helped distinguish an ideological battle between East and West, autocracy and

liberal democracy. The final pillar of nationality helped work in coalition with the previous

functionaries of the state ideology by promoting a form of propaganda within the Russian

Empire encouraging the belief in the distinctive nature of Russian civilisation. The official

policy worked to promote specifically Russian history, culture and language throughout the

Empire with the purpose of ensuring that “Russia proceeded along its own path, not replicating

Western developments” (Danks 2014: 96). One example includes the enforcement of the

Russian language within the courts over the traditional high language of French traditionally

spoken by elites. As the nationality divergences across the empire was so large, pursuing the

idea of a ‘unique Russian civilisation’ additionally helped forge greater unification across the

heterogeneous territory while consolidating loyalty to the Tsar.

Throughout history, empires have traditionally justified “rule over peripheries as civilising

missions of vocation” (Zielonka 2012: 509). Under the reign of Tsar Nicholas I, the territory

of the Russian Empire expanded exponentially. The colonisation of peripheral borderlands

served to act as a buffer zone from external threats, however it also created a superiority

complex for the Russian nation whereby they were classified as “ruling nation within a great

empire” (Suny 2000:491). Within the empire, only “45% of the population” (Chubarov 1999:

110) were considered ethnic Russian, however it was nonetheless considered the natural leader

of the empire. Strengthened by the Official Nationality doctrine of Tsar Nicholas I, those of

other non-Christian religions were often reduced to the status of barbarian, as for the Tsar,

religion was more than merely faith, it composed a large part of the ‘Russian identity. The three

fundamental components of Tsar Nicholas I’s Official Nationality doctrine helped to create a

22




romantic perception of Russia and consequently establish the foundations of which Pan-

Slavism was built upon. Pan-Slavism emphasised that the notion of a unique shared language,

territory, history, religion and culture generated a sense of “supreme metaphysical and even

mystical importance” (Riasanovsky 1959:124) among the Slavic peoples, of which included

the Russian nationality. When presented simultaneously alongside Tsarist policies to

distinguish Russia from the Western liberal democracies of Europe, ideas began for formulate

based the ‘great mission of Russia’. Similar to ideas of Byzantium, the ideas of the ‘higher

Russian mission’ emphasised the unity in the combined future of the Slavic peoples.

Unlike other peripheral borderlands, whereby a clear distinction can be cast between the

Russian nation and ‘other’, the case of Ukraine has historically presented a more difficult

scenario for defining what constitutes as part of the ‘core nation’ or ‘imperial consolidation’.

Anatol Lieven raises the question; “was the conquest of Ukrainian and Belarussian territory an

early example of Russian imperialism or was it rather the regaining and consolidation of

national territory? Where does the nation end and the empire begin in both time and space?”

(Lieven 2000:260). Such difficulty in defining strict separation between the Russian and

Ukrainian nation stemmed from the historical ties of the Kievan Rus. Russia, Ukraine and

Belarus share an intertwined language, culture and religious traditions, thus it has typically

been easier to solidify a greater sense of unity between the Slavic nations, than with peoples of

the North Caucasus for example, who were often classified as the ‘other’. 19th century Ukraine

and Belarus have been described as “ambiguities of empire” (Lieven 2000: 258) within

scholarly literature, as in the mind-set of the Russian population, the two nations have been

understood not as imperial consolidations, but merely ‘branches of the same nation’. Russia

has long been the dominant partner within the relationship, with Ukraine often referenced as

‘little Russia’ within 19th century texts, however “for the Tsarist elite, Belarussians and

Ukrainians were beyond any question Russians, albeit Russians speaking a strange dialect and

possessing some distinctive customs” (Lieven 2000:278). However, as previously highlighted,

historical memory of the Kievan Rus was purposely resurrected by Tsarist officials during the

‘spiritual colonisation’ of Ukraine. Therefore it can be argued that religious and nationality

references were merely tools for consolidating power over neighbouring territories, as Ukraine

specifically was core to the survival of the empire.

It is clear to understand how, throughout history, due to shared history, religion and language,

Russia has identified itself as the ‘big brother’ to Ukraine and Belarus. Nevertheless, in addition

to the shared characteristics, Russia has obtained dominance over the region due to the nature

23




of its empire. Unlike other European Empires of the 19th century, such as the British or French,

no vast distance lay between the colony and the metropolis. Russia can be classified as a landed

empire in contrast with the European maritime empires, whereby “colonial rule was an

instrument of acquiring profits through monopoly access to overseas markets and natural

resources thus benefiting their own capitalist markets” (Takimoto 1997:152). The landed

nature of the Russian Empire has shaped Russian history but also its self-identification. In many

cases, border regions were consolidated into the Russian Empire to establish a buffer zone for

greater security, however this gradual integration of neighbouring lands under Russian control

can be argued to have led to a lack of traditional distinction between the centre and periphery,

especially in the case of Ukraine.

3.2: Contemporary Nationality

Manz determines that “the imprint of earlier imperial systems of thought still exists in many

parts of the world and continues to colour perceptions of identity, definitions of difference and

expectations of community” (2003:72). Within the case of the Russian Federation, all factors

can be deemed true, Russia has not yet come to accept the modern territorial arrangement since

the end of the Cold War. Since 1991, the territorial size of Russia has shrunk to its smallest in

history, with borders retreating significantly from the “21.8m square kilometres of the Russian

Empire” (Saunders 2000:145) retained before its collapse in 1917. Nevertheless, it is often

concluded by scholars that many elites within Russian politics continue to struggle with

comprehending the new sovereign borderlines of the Federation; a premise supported when

analysing the actions taken within Russian foreign policy. Geoffrey Hosking states that “most

Russians would not identify the present Russian federation as being what they understand as

‘Russia’” (Hosking 2001:7), therefore continued interference in to the now sovereign states of

the former USSR can be deemed inevitable. Dimitri Medvedev, former President of the Russian

Federation, quoted in a 2008 speech that Russia had “regions of privileged interest” (Medvedev

2008), thus would continue to assert dominance and control within the domestic politics of

now sovereign states such as Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine. This affirmation by a senior

politician, that borderland regions of Russia are within a ‘sphere of influence’ has much

continuity with the Tsarist notion of ethnic superiority whereby due to their ethnicity, Tsarist

“intellectuals and policy makers thought they had the right, even the duty to rule over others”

(Suny 2000:491). Ideas of a ‘Russian sphere of influence’ are unlikely to change for at least a

24




generation, until the population has come to terms with the new territorial agreements after the

Cold War.

In the new millennium, Anatol Lieven predicted that a continuous blurring of sovereign

borderlines due to historical ideas of empire could “have important consequences in regards to

the legitimacy and stability of Russia’s post-imperial frontiers” (2000:226). The current crisis

in Ukraine can be argued to be an inevitable conflict, which has its roots stemming from the

Tsarist era. As already explained, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine has long been

one of paternalism, whereby Russia has acted as the dominant partner and Ukraine as the ‘little

brother’. The historical intertwinement between the two nations based on ideas of shared

culture, language and religion has, in the mind-set of many Russian’s, reduced the validity of

a totally sovereign Ukrainian state. The encroachment of the Western nations and the European

Union towards Ukraine, with the desire to incorporate it into a western ‘sphere of influence’,

has not only infuriated Russia, as “the Kremlin wanted to defend its security interests by

keeping the country out of NATO” (Tsygankov 2015: 2), but it has concurrently fuelled a surge

of Tsarist imagery, closely associated with that found in the Official Nationality doctrine of

Nicholas I. One explanation offered regarding the resurrection of imperial connotations is that,

“when pressured from outside, nations tend to react defensively by embracing ethnic

prejudices, empowering nationalist voices and engaging in exclusionary practices at home and

abroad” (Tsygankov 2015: 9). The threat of Ukraine dismissing its Kievan Rus ‘origins’ and

drifting into the sphere of Western influence, has stimulated a surge of imagery in continuity

with the Tsarist past in the effort to reignite historical bonds. The speech given by Putin

regarding the Crimea in 2014, continuously referred throughout to the Crimean population and

Ukrainian cities as ‘Russkiy’; the ethnically exclusive term for an ethnic Russian, rather than

‘Rossiyskiy’; the more exclusive name including all Russian citizens of the historic Russian

Empire, thus asserting a sense of entitlement over the region and population. Furthermore,

weeks after the annexation in April 2014, Putin continued to refer to Ukraine as “Novorossiya”

(Putin 2014) or ‘New Russia’, a highly polemical term within the context of current politics

referring to territories of Eastern Ukraine. Putin quoted that “Russia lost these territories for

various reasons, but the people remained” (Putin 2014), thus quasi-asserting claim to sovereign

Ukrainian territory. Both terms are deemed highly controversial and have generally been

avoided from public usage by political elites due to ethno-nationalist sentiments, however

within the current crisis in Ukraine, Putin has “made a conscious effort to recreate a greater

Russia built on a cult of the past” (Lindley-French 2014:39).

25




The usage of polemical terms, such as Novorossiya and Russkiy, within official speeches of

the Kremlin has gone hand in hand with the attempt by Moscow to justify its involvement

within Ukraine as more than just dissatisfaction over closer Ukrainian ties to the West. The

need to protect ethnic Russians within Ukraine has now been adopted as a core aim of the Putin

administration. In a March 2014 speech, Putin described the unjust division of ethnic Russians

across the former USSR.

Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones [after the

USSR’s collapse], overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics,

while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in

the world to be divided by borders.

The millions of ethnic Russians scattered throughout the former lands of the Soviet Union,

especially Ukraine and Belarus, has hindered the ability for Moscow to “come to terms with

the permanence of the states needs for independence or need for borders” (Kuzio 1997:37).

However, for the neighbouring states surrounding Russia, the presence of ethnic Russians is

viewed as a weak justification for Russian dominance over its ‘near abroad’. Certain scholars,

such as Danks support this notion by arguing that “ethnic Russians are often viewed as

Moscow’s fifth column for providing Moscow with an excuse to meddle in their now sovereign

neighbours domestic affairs” (Danks 2014: 87).

In the case of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea has been justified by Moscow through the

need to protect the Russian speaking population from the abolishment of protective laws by the

Ukrainian Government which would protect Russian as the second language of the state.

Within a speech made in March 2014, Putin emphasised the Russian diaspora and linguistic

community within Ukraine and Crimea, stating that “almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000

are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language” (Putin 2014) out of

the total population of 2.2 million. It can be deemed correct that ethnic Russians have been

discriminated within Ukrainian law, however “Putin grossly exaggerated the threat to the

Russians in Ukraine as a pretext for action” (Braithwaite 2014: 62).

The fact that a large proportion of ethnic Russians do now reside in neighbouring territories of

Russia will only hinder prospects of complete sovereignty within the new states of the former

Soviet Union. Based on recent actions within Ukraine it cannot be deemed irrational to predict

that ethnic Russians living in neighbouring states may provide a recurring justification for

Russian interference in domestic politics. This is not to state that the Russian Federation nor

26




Putin is attempting to specifically resurrect the Russian Empire, nor will he take the opportunity

to invade all of the post-Soviet states, however, there exists a clear difficulty with Russian elites

accepting the notion of sovereignty, and the post-1991 territorial borders. One explanation for

the difficulty of the Russian self-identity is that “historically, Russia had undertaken nation and

empire building simultaneously; it was therefore difficult to locate where Russia began and

ended” (Kuzio 1997: 37).

This historic difficulty in identifying what peoples and territory constitute as ‘Russia’ has

ultimately outplayed in the Ukraine Crisis and should be understood by political scientists who

frame the entirety of the conflict within a post-Cold war setting. The historic relationship of

Russia and Ukraine has ultimately been one of quasi-borders, shared culture, religion and

language, however in regards to the contemporary conflict, Vladimir Putin and his

administration have consequently attempted to resurrect such notions as well as reactionary

policies of the reign of Tsar Nicholas I, all in a bid to further consolidate Russian political

dominance over the territory.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to present a comparative analysis of the reign Tsar Nicholas

I (1825-55) with that of the contemporary President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin,

to investigate to what extent the Official Nationality ideology of the state, or ‘three pillars of

Tsarism’ has continued to have reciprocal influence on Russian political decision making in

reference to the Ukraine Crisis. It was not the purpose of this thesis to outline all the specific

events of the Ukraine Crisis; which could be interpreted as a limitation of the work, rather, it

was to emphasise that the conflict has much deeper roots, embedded in notions of identity,

religion and politics, which stem from the Tsarist era and Russian Empire. Analysing the

contemporary crisis solely within a post-Cold War setting; attempted by certain political

scientists, has led to narrow conclusions stating that Vladimir Putin is acting irrationally or

perhaps attempting to re-establish the borders of Imperial Russia. However, in fact it can be

argued that the current political decision making of Moscow are not entirely out of character

as many similarities can be found within the reign of Tsar Nicholas I.

In regards to religion, both leaders primed Orthodoxy as potentially the most important

characteristic of the Russian state, whereby it has come to define the total identity of the

Russian nation and immensely influence the following pillars of Tsarism; Autocracy and

27




Nationality. Religion was also used by both leaders to consolidate political power over

peripheral borderlands, specifically in reference to the Kievan Rus; Russia, Ukraine and

Belarus. A form of spiritual colonisation has taken place, whereby elites have manipulated

religious history on numerous accounts to legitimise Russian political rule. In the case Ukraine,

both Tsar Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin have resurrected historical myths and used religious

imagery to legitimise their actions. Autocracy is the second pillar of Tsarism; referring to the

chosen nature of Russian rule. Authors have described how the autocratic nature of Russia is

one of the key defining points throughout history. From the Tsarist era to contemporary Russia,

autocracy has been the principle form of governance, primarily due to the huge territorial size.

However, under the rule of Tsar Nicholas I, autocracy was enshrined into the formal ideology

of the state. Arguably formulated in response to Western liberal democratic advancements

within Europe, the Tsar responded with harsher authoritarianism and the focus on enshrining

Russia as distinct from Western civilisation. Within the 21st century, such notions have been

revived by Vladimir Putin. Himself a reactionary, conservative leader; similar to Nicholas I,

has actively pursued maintaining the West vs. East distinction especially in the context of the

Ukraine Crisis. Russian political elites have repeatedly stressed Russian distinctiveness from

the West in a bid gather political support based on notions of shared identity, history, language

and culture; alike the strategy of Tsar Nicholas I. The final pillar of Tsarism is Nationality.

Unlike Orthodoxy and Autocracy, the pillar of Nationality has been deemed the most fluid,

lacking in solid definition. However, it has routinely been identified by scholars as the attempt

to promote ‘all things Russian’. Within the empire, Russians were deemed the leading nation,

thus a sense of superiority developed over other ethnicities, which continues to permeate

Russian self-consciousness until today. However, in the case of Ukraine, slightly different

perception developed, whereby the Ukrainian and Belarussian nations were identified as mere

extensions of the Russian civilisation. In the rule of Tsar Nicholas I this outplayed in the

strengthening of ideas of ‘Kievan Rus’, essentially to consolidate political control and to

downplay regional movements. However, the idea of the three nations as ‘branches of the

Russian’ tree has continued to permeate Russian self-identity until today. The concept of a

shared nationality has been adopted by the Putin administration and used as a propaganda tool

to justify the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. One of the explanations given for Russian

actions is due to the landed nature of the Russian Empire, thus making it difficult to separate

the periphery from the centre; unlike other European Empires from the 19th century, however

it can additionally be argued that many of the Russian elites have not yet come to terms with

28




the 1991 territorial arrangement, hence continue to blur borders and disregard the terms of

sovereignty of its borderlands.

All of the factors explained above, describing the continuity between the reign of Tsar Nicholas

I and Vladimir Putin show expressively that the ‘idea of empire’ is not entirely dead within the

Russian mind set, in reality it continues to vigorously influence Russian political decision

making until this day. The Official Nationality ideology of Tsar Nicholas I can be argued to

have (un)officially been revived by Vladimir Putin in an attempt to consolidate political power

more effectively, and thus has infiltrated into the Ukraine Crisis, transforming the political

decision making of Moscow into a quasi-imperialist rhetoric. Regarding Russian-Ukrainian

relations, “the era of colonisation has ended, but this has not meant the end of empire” (Manz

2003: 507)

29




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http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30518054

Documents

Master Paper - Master Thesis - Emma Murphy - KU Leuven