* XXVII*

Marsball and Korea

G E N E R A L Walker used the Inchon landings to break out of the Pusan area, aided by the severance of North Korean

supply lines, which forced withdrawal of the North Korean troops on September 23. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division drove northwestward and three days later linked up with the 7th Division at Osan, south of Seoul. The enemy was now on the run.

MacArthur's September moves had been decided and virtually completed before Marshall was confirmed as Secretary of Defense, but he arrived in time for an important presidential directive per- mitting MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel.'

Military commanders feel they must be free to continue in hot pursuit of a feeing enemy; only extremely serious factors would

' bar such a tactic The Joint Chiefs of Staff understood the political reasons for holding to boundaries, but they also favored the doc- trine of hot pursuit. In this instance, they reasoned that, since the United Nations had directed the forces under MacAi-thur to restore peace and unity to Korea, there was a legal basis for crossing the 38th Parallel. But there was also the serious intimation that such an action might provoke the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union into intervention in the Korean conflict.

TheJoint Chiefs of Staff had told Secretary Johnson before the Inchon landing that MacArthur's first objective. should be to de- stroy the North Korean forces This would require fighting south, and north of the 38th Parallel, with the attendant risk of spreading the conflict, but they saw a possible way out of the dilemma: let the South Koreans cross the border.

As an overall objective, the Joint Chiefs wanted to complete the occupation of South Korea and then remove the United Nations forces as soon as possible. They wanted President Rhee to return

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to his liberated capital and call for a general election to establish a unified government for Korea. I n a rneetin’g on September 7, the National Security Council incorporated the JCS views into agreed policy recoiiiniendations for the President. Truman approved the NSC recoinmendations two days later. But a week later, the direc- tives had not been issued by Secretary Johnson: on the i2th, he submitted his resignation, to take effect a week later.2

Thus it was Marshall who received the Joint Chiefs’ proposal on September 25. Dealing only with the military aspects of the opera- tion, the Joint Chiefs rerninded the new Secretary of Defense that other officials were also concerned and should be consulted.3 Gen- eral Charles Boltk, Army Chief of Operations (G-3), urged immedi- ate action, since MacArthur was approaching the 38th Parallel. The State Department quickly approved, adding instructions for a re- turn of the Korean government to Seoul, and the President sent out the directive on September 27.4

The U.N. ccniniander was told that his task was to destroy the forces of North Korea and that lie could conduct operations north of the 38th Parallel to do this. But definite limits were set on the conditions under which such operations could proceed. (1) if there had been prior entry into North Korea by Chinese Conirnunist or Soviet forces, (2) if there had been an announcement of the entry of such forces into North Korea; or (3) if there was a threat by such foices to counter a move of the U.N. forces northward. Under no circumstances was MacArthur to cross the Korean border at points ofjunction with Coniniunist China or the Soviet Union. In addi- tion, no non-Korean forces were to be used along these borders. Air and naval actions against Manchurian or Soviet territory in support of MacArthur’s military operations were distinctly banned

If major Chinese Coinmunis t forces were employed south of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur was to go on the defensive, act passively, and notify Washington. He was not to discontinue air and naval actions north of the 38th Parallel in Korea merely because Chinese or Soviet forces were found there, but if they announced a plan to occupy North Korea and warned MacArthur against attacking, he was to report to Washington.5

If major Chinese Communist forces were employed south of the 38th Parallel, he was to continue action as long as there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of success against them. If only small forces were encountered, lie should continue his operations.

In case of the occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces, South Korean forces should be used to disarm the enemy and to perform the main task of countering guerrilla warfare. He was to aid in the

Marshall and Korea 457 restoration of the Republic of Korea at Seoul, but must remember that sovereignty over the whole of Korea still had to be decided by the United Nations.

Washington officials could have gone no further to ensure against a chance clash with the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union. Every possible effort was made to keep the operation under the aegis of the United Nations. But these conditions seemed timid strictures to a commander flushed with victory.

Marshall shared the views of MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a commander’s need to follow up a victory When Gen- eral Walker announced that he would stop on the 38th Parallel to regroup, while waiting for the U.N. to approve pursuit, Marshall radioed MacArthur that a statement to this effect might embarrass U.N members who might prefer not to take a vote on the issue at the time. Marshall m’ade unequivocal the Pentagon’s viewpoint by saying, “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategi- cally to proceed north of the 38th Parallel.”6 The Far- Eastern commander made the most of this encouragement, later arguing that it freed hinl from the restrictions of the directive. Actually, he had merely been assured that Walker did not have to stop and regroup while waiting for further rulings. MacArthur enthusiasti- cally responded that until the enemy capitulated, “I regard all of Korea open for our military ~ p e r a t i o n s . ” ~

On September 28, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he planned to send the Eighth Army north during the last half of October to capture the North Korean capital of Pyongyong and to launch an amphibious attack on the eastern coast of Korea at Won- san, the chief port. He sought to allay the Joint Chiefs’ fears by declaring that there was no indication of entry into North Korea by major Chinese Communist or Soviet forces. Most of his assump- tions concerning the success of the landings were correct, but his views as to enemy intentions would lead to serious trouble.8

MacArthur scoffed when he heard of Chou En-lai’s remark to K. M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador in Peking, that China would send troops into North Korea if MacArthur’s force drove into that area, and pronounced the threat as all bluff. if Chou meant business, he would not have broadcast his intentions.

Despite his assurance, MacArthur soon afterward reported Chi- nese forces moving toward the North Korean border. On October 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified him that if major Chinese forces invaded North Korea, he should have his troops continue fighting as long as there was a reasonable chance of success. But he was not to attack Chinese Communist territory without authorization from

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Washington.9 Their constant caution was born of the fact was still a United Nations operation, and there was the in1 that MacArthur might be tempted to move on his own.

MacArthur was optimistic and reassuring with Truman .

hat this ate fear

at their Western Pacific meeting on October 15. Believing that MacArthur had been out of direct touch with Washiiigton for too long, and aware that such a conference might have a favorable influence on congressional races a few weeks later, the President decided that he should see the commander personally. He arranged for a meeting at Wake Island, with General Bradley representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk, Ambassador Philip Jessup, and presidential adviser Averell Harriniaii Since no detailed preparations were made, Secretaries Acheson and Marshall decided not to attend, and the conference did not come to grips with existing major problems. MacArthur said the situation in Korea was under control and that resistance would halt by Thanksgiving. In fact, he thought that the Eighth Army might be withdrawn by Christmas. Hard put for rein- forcements for Europe, Bradley asked if he could get a division froin Korea for Europe and was promised one by January.10

MacArthur seemed supremely confident. He expressed little worry about the Chinese Communists. Though the Chinese had large forces along the Ualu, he doubted they would cross the bor- der because of their lack of air power. The magic of the victor of Inchon was still potent.

Superficially, there seemed to be reason for confidence. South Korean troops had moved steadily northward, capturing Wonsan on Qctober 11. To the west, General Walker’s troops took Pyon- gyong, the North Korean capital, on October 19. O n October 24, MacArthur ordered all-out action by Walker and removed restric- tions on the use of non-Koreans. Since the Joint Chiefs had not changed their earlier instruction, they questioned his action. He replied that his directive had been only temporary, that Marshall’s message of September 30 had lifted any bar to his action, and that he had covered the subject at Wake Island.” Washington failed to call his hand.

His optimism had built grandiose hopes in Washington. The Department of the Army began to talk of redeploying two divisions from Korea to other parts of the world. Fears concerning other danger spots led Secretary Marshall to order the Army strength ceiiling lifted to i,263,000 for fiscal year 1951. It was not assumed that the men would be needed for Korea. The Army actually pro- posed a reduction of U.N. forces in Korea requiring American

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Marshall and Korea 459 logistical support. At the urging of the Joint Chiefs, Marshall dis- cussed the reduction of those forces with Acheson in early Novem- ber. Even as early as October 2 2 , General Walker had suggested that ammunition arriving in Korea be diverted to Japan Staff head- quarters in Japan asked permission to send back to the United States several ships carrying ammunition and bombs.l2

The Chinese Communists had begun to move before MacArthur reassured Truman at Wake Island. Approximately 1 oo,ooo Chi- nese troops had crossed the border; by the end of October, Chinese military units had their first clash with South Korean and American forces. Because MacArthur’s troops were driving northward, the incidents were not taken seriously. But not only were South Korean forces in the Eighth Army badly mauled (General Walker reported on November 1 that ROK I1 Corps had ceased to exist as an effec- tive fighting force), but a regiment of the U S. 1st Cavalry Division was surrounded and one of its battalions destroyed. Indeed, the Eighth Army was sufficiently challenged for Walker to stop his advance to regroup disorganized units.13

A somber MacArthur asked for reinforcements on November 7. Two days earlier, after hearing reports of the losses inflicted by the Chinese or; the Eighth Army, MacArthur directed his air forces to destroy the Korean ends of all international bridges along the Yalu in northeastern Korea, to slow the flood of Chinese troops moving southward. General George Stratemeyer, the air chief, repeated the order to the Pentagon for information. Lovett checked with the State Department and found it would be necessary to consult with the British. Infornied of these developments, Secretary Marshall ruled that, unless the Chinese were threatening the security of all MacArthur’s forces, the bombing was unwise.14 From his home in Independence, the President ordered the bombing postponed and asked for an explanation. This message was passed on to MacAr- thur by the Joint Chiefs in the form of a directive banning the bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian‘ border.15

MacArthur replied with some disdain that the bombings were “within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and direc- tions which I have received from the United Nations,” and pre- dicted dire results for his troops if he were limited in action. Acting as though Truman knew nothing of his proposals, he declared he could not take responsibility for results without Truman’s “per- sonal and direct understanding of the situation.”16 Me asked that the ban be rescinded at once.

Truman was impressed enough to allow Stratemeyer to go ahead with the bombing of the bridges, but he warned MacArthur against

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enlarging the conflict, and especially forbade him to hit north of the YaNu. The uneasy Joint Chiefs of Staff now asked for notices of impending attacks 1 7

‘Though MacArthur’s bombers began attacks on the Korean ends of the international bridges on November 8, airmen bitterly com- plained that enemy fighters could attack them from north of the Yalu, then dart immediately back to where the Allied planes were forbidden to follow. The French, upset by even the restricted Allied bombing, proposed a resolution to reassure the Chinese Commu- nists. Sympathetic to the plight of the fliers, Marshall told Acheson that it should be spelled out to United Nations member countries that “a sanctuary for attacking Chinese aircraft is not ‘explicitly or implicitly affirmed by any United Nations action.’ ”18

In an effort to prevent a wider spread in the fighting, six members of the United Nations, including the United States, Great Britain, and France, presented a resolution to the Security Council on No- vember io asking that the Chinese withdraw from Korea and assur- ing them that the United Nations would not violate the northern frontier. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. l 9

As enemy fighters continued to attack from north of the Yalu, the Joint Chiefs asked Marshall if U.N. planes could not pursue the enemy beyond the border. Marshall accepted their proposal, later indicating that both Truman and Acheson did so too, but felt they must first notify U.N. allies before so acting. When these allies expressed fear of provoking Soviet action, the United States dropped the proposal.20

As the Chinese continued their buildup south of the Yalu, the Pentagon wondered whether MacArthur’s mission should not be re-examined. He protested that it was feasible to continue his drive to destroy Chinese forces and get complete control of Korea. Re- minded that British approval was necessary before enlarging the conflict, MacArthur was furious He spoke bitingly of the British “Munich mentality” and complained that any concession to the Chinese Communists would destroy American prestige in Asia. A halt by United Nations forces south of the Yalu would repeat the British appeasement of China that had lost the respect of Asia.Z1

Behind his bitter words lay a long-time dislike of the British and a scarcely concealed contempt for officials in Washington. His anger blinded him to the mockery the Chinese had made of his assurance to Truman that the Chinese and the Russians had written off North Korea He was convinced that, if left to his own methods, he could defeat both the North Koreans and the Chinese Commu-

Marshall and Korea 461 nists without arousing the Soviet Union, never reflecting that he had been equally confident of defeating the North Koreans without arousing the Chinese Communists. Careful reflection would have reminded him that there was no grand military reserve in the United States, that he had recently promised Bradley a division from Korea for Europe, and that he needed the small forces pro- vided by Britain and other U.N. members to maintain (what the Soviets called a pretense) a United Nations effort. As long as he fought as commander of the United Nations forces, he might suffer inconveniences and frustration but he gained some advantage in world opinion from the continued support of the neutrals, a back- ing Washington sought in a time of global tension. The U.N. cover, however illusory, confronted the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union with a challenge o’f opinion outside the United States.

The dangerous international situation was examined by the Na- tional Security Council on November g. Its members reached a consensus that MacArthur’s military directives would not be changed but that the United States should assure Europe that it did not intend to allow its commitments in Korea to interfere with previous pledges to European security. Any final decision on Korea must be made in common with the United Nations.

While the debate continued on bombings, MacArthur prepared for ground-force action. Believing that the limited U.N. air action had isolated the battle area, stopped enemy troop reinforcements, and slowed down movement of their supplies, MacArthur set Walker’s offensive for November 24. He announced that the Eighth Army was ready to complete “the compression and close the vise.’’ On that hopeful note, Walker opened his offensive.22

Although MacArthur did not seem unduly worried about Chi- nese activity, the other nations in the U.N. continued to be fearful. The State Department investigated means of establishing a buffer zone, which might reduce the possibility of general war. Marshall suggested that i t would be wise for the United States to advance a solution before our Allies began to make demands. To formal suggestions sent to him for comment, the Far Eastern commander replied that failing to advance would merely bring on the perils of appeasement without furnishing a solution.23

MacArthur had his warning, but there was enough ambiguity in his instructions that he believed himself free to act as he wished. On November 24, Walker attacked as planned, and very soon the prospect of sending troops back to Japan by Christmas disap-

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peared. In the darkness on the 25th, in bitter cold, the Chinese struck with such force against Walker’s right and center that a Korean corps was scattered and an American corps in the center was thrown back.

On the 27th, Walker reported a Chinese attack in strength against him. Major General Edward M. Almond’s X Corps ’was hit at the same time, and the supply lines of his Marine unit were cut the following day. Without enough troops to deal with the new situation, and faced with considerations that lay outside his sphere, MacArthur passed fi-om the offensive to the defensive.24

On November 28, MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs that the Allies now faced a totally different war. With his current strength lie was unable to meet the changed situation. He found “an entire[ly] new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander. This command has done everything hu- manly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with condi- tions beyond its control and strength. . . .” The Allies now “must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancellories of the world ”25

This open request for sympathy from home met with a favorable response. At a meeting of the National Security Council on the 28th, when Vice President Barkley recalled the Far Eastern com- mander’s assurance that the troops would be out of Korea by Chris tiiias, Bradley said that current developments had completely surprised MacAi-thur, and Truman declared they could not allow the commander to lose face before the enemy. Secretary Marshall, having already insisted that “it would not help to interfere in MacArthur’s operations on the spot” (a view that he, Bradley, and other generals held consistently), now said they must regard MacArthur’s optimistic statement as an embarrassment that “we must get around in some manner.” He added that the failed offen- sive “was necessary to find out what the Communists were up to. Now we know ” There was no “we told you so” attitude toward MacArthur’s troubles on the part of Marshall and other U.S offi- cials. Rather, they h,unted for ways to help him.26

But Washington still opposed unilateral action. Marshall agreed with the views of the three armed-forces secretaries that: (1) they must act through the United’Nations; (2) they must avoid a separate conflict; and (3) they must not attempt to hold the Soviets responsi- ble now. To become involved in a general war with China “would be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trap.” They should, therefore, not go into Chinese Communist territory or use Chiang Kai-shek’s

Marshall and Korea 463 Nationalist forces, as MacArthur was again advising. Marshall stressed the recommendation to work through the United Nations and to maintain the Allied image in Korea.2’

To MacArthur’s recommendation that the Chinese Nationalists be used in the fight, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied in a message that drew on drafts by Marshall and Acheson:

It [your proposal] involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and leave us isolated. . . . It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the, Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in the organization.**

At the same time, the President evinced to Marshall his desire to keep closer tabs on developments by asking that all JCS instruc- tions to MacArthur be sent through Secretary Marshall to the Presi- dent.

The Communist attack at the end of the month intensified Allied concern. In London, the Australian Resident Minister called on Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to ask whether MacArthur was suffering from faulty intelligence or from a deliberate effort to get the U.N. forces embroiled with the Communist Chinese. Strang said that he thought the recent offen- sive had been unwise from both the military and political view- points. Acheson and Rusk had recently been at pains to indicate that the State Department would listen to U.N. views. The White House and the Pentagon seemed to have a steady policy. They had tended to feel that the theater commander must be given “a pretty free hand” within the limits of his directive, but wherever political matters were concerned, other nations must be consulted. At the moment, the British government was suggesting that the time was ripe to discuss a demilitarized zone.29

On November 30, wishing to calm the public about the Korean situation, President Truman upset members of the United Nations even more. He began his news conference well, assuring reporters that the United States would continue to work with the United Nations to halt aggression in Korea, and promising aid to American allies against possible threats elsewhere. He repeated assurances to the Chinese Communists that the United States and the United Nations had no aggressive intentions against China. In conclusion,

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he added that MacAi-thur had done a good job and had not ex- ceeded his authoi-ity.30

Iluring the question period, Truiiian said that the United States would take whatever action was needed to meet the military situa- tion. Asked, “Will that include tlie atomic bomb?,” the President replied, “That includes every weapon we have.” When the reporter persisted in trying to pin hiin down, the President grew cautious, but left an element of disquiet when he said: “There has always been active consideration of its use I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression That happens when it is used ”

A White House spokesman immediately recognized the misund- erstandings possible and issued a clarification to the effect that, although the possible use of any weapon was implicit in possession of that weapon, use of tlie atomic bomb had to be authorized by the President, “and no such authorization has been given.” The language used in the press conference did not “represent any change in the situation.” This statement may have allayed appre- hension at hoine, but there were flutterings abroad, where serious questions arose as to MacAi-thur’s intentions in K0rea.3~

On December 1, a full-dress discussion of the situation, neces- sary because of what Acheson called “the virtual state of panic which seemed to exist among our fi-lends 111 New Yor-k,” was held in tlie Pentagon The secretaries of State and of Defense, the ser- vice secretaries, theyoint Chiefs of Staff, the head of the CIA, and representatives fi-om other departments and agencies were pre- sent.

Acheson said that friendly powers in the United Nations were complaining of a lack of U S leadership and blaming many of the present problems on MacArthur. It was necessary to regain unity 32

Marshall asked General Bradley to show Acheson the most re- cent Joint Chiefs message to MacArthur. They had instructed the Far Eastern commander to withdraw Almond’s X Corps from its exposed position and to try to coordinate forces on the coasts so that they could not be outflanked. Marshall had inserted a state- ment that the region northeast of the waist of Korea (the area bordering on the U.S.S.R.) was to be avoided except in case of military considerations relating to the security of the command.

The Joint Chiefs wanted to set a line that could be held and to avoid actions that might bring in the Soviet Union. They disagreed on the military value of Korea. General Collins declared that i t was not worth a nickel as long as the Russians held Vladivostok and

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Marshall and Korea 465 positions on the other side of Korea. Bedell Smith, director of the CIA, wartime Chief of Staff for Eisenhower, and former Ambassa- dor to the Soviet Union, said, “We should get out of Korea al- though we do not solve the problem by getting out.” Smith thought that the Russians probably did not want war now but would be willing to have it if they could “bog us down in Asia.” As he saw the situation, “They could bleed us to death in Asia while defeating the armament effort in Europe ” Admiral Sherman and other con- ferees believed that Korea was worth holding. Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett summarized the consensus when he said that Korea was not decisive for the United States, that though the loss of Korea might jeopardize Japan and result in its eventual loss, it was West- ern Europe that was America’s main concern, and the United States would accept the loss of Korea rather than any loss in Europe. It was best to hold in Korea to get better political results. We mig-ht withdraw if the Chinese did also, although this might mean aban- doning Korea.

Further discussion led to the idea that perhaps there should be a cease-fire, but not just yet. Secretary Marshall stated that accept- ance of a cease-fire would represent a “great weakness on our part.”

T o MacArthur, agonizing over the situation in Korea, Washing- ton officials were indecisive and timorobs. He did not sense that their discussions showed sympathy with his plight, a realistic atti- tude about the U.S. global position, and an effort to end “near panic” among American supporters in the United Nations. Wash- ington knew well what was at stake and wanted to inspect all prohabilities before making a decisive move. General Collins flew to Tokyo and Korea for another look around before the full discus- sion of the situation and its implications with Prime Minister Attlee, who had asked for a conference with the President and his advisers.

The military view on December 1 was pessimistic, and the CIA statement of possible Soviet intentions did not lighten the atmo- sphere. Much of it followed the reasoning that Bedell Smith had outlined on the 1st. While uncertain of Soviet intentions to force a war with the United States in the Far East, the seniors among the American military recognized that the onset of a war between the United States and Communist China would: ( 1 ) divert U.S. and U.N. efforts to an indecisive theater; (2) create dissension between the United States and its allies; (3) disrupt the coherence achieved by the U.N. in its original response to Communist aggression in Korea; (4) obstruct plans for the defense of Western Europe; and ( 5 ) speed Communist gains in Korea and Southeast Asia.33

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Truman met with Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley on December 2 to discuss the possible submission to the General Assembly of a -

resolution that had previously been sent to the Security Council but defeated by a Russian veto, asking that the Chinese Communists refrain from intervention in Korea Both Truman and Marshall saw this as a waste of time. They agreed that i t might be worthwhile to approach the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists for a cease- fire, directly or through an intermediary, or to make this attempt thirough a resolution in the United Nations. Marshall and Acheson thought that the Communists might ask a very high price. Marshall added that the United States was in a dilemma as to how it could save its troops and its national honor He believed that w e could not in “all good conscience” abandon the South Koreans.34

There was agreement on the need to build up defense forces and to place orders for greatly increased amounts of equipment and weapons On the previous day, Truman had asked for additional appropriation for the Defense Department of $16.8 billion, nearly $2 billion more than the original request for the year, and a supple- ment of more than $1 billion for the Atomic Energy Committee; therefore, no request for additional appropriations was suggested for the moment.35

In recent discussions, some officials had suggested the censor- ship of public statements by the military concerning the precarious situation in Korea. Though Marshall thought that idea would be difficult to carry out, he may have felt differently on reading MacAr- thur’s interviews with The New York Tzrnes and U S . Neuls &? I/Vorll Report. In the first interview, MacArthur denied that he had re- ceived any suggestion that he stop his advance short of the interna- tional boundary; in the second, published on December 8, he criticized the limitations on his operations as being without prece- dent in military history. He followed the interviews with a wire to President Truman that was censorious of the policies of Washing- ton authorities .36

MacArthur had already made it clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they lacked comprehension of his situation. With the slender forces available to him and with the power of the Chinese forces before him, he complained, he could not establish a line across the ‘waist of Korea. Unless ground reinforcements “of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied,” the command would be forced to keep diminishing strength, engaging in a series of withdrawals into beachhead positions, thus placing him completely on the de- fensive.37

At the meeting on December 3, the situation looked a little less

Marshall arid Korea 467 hopeless. There was a greater inclination to question the evacua- tion of Korea Admiral Sherman opposed a cease-fire and sug- gested they tell the Chinese Communists that if they continued their actions they would find themselves at war with the United States Marshall asked about the situation in Indochina and the French attitude regarding the Korean situation. Acheson said that the French were weak and shellshocked and anxious for a deal that “would give an illusion of reality.” Rusk thought they would try to make an arrangement with Ho Chi Minh and then withdraw. They would waffle on the Korean situation unless there was a solid United Nations front To get that front, the United States must stand firm. “We could solidify the U N. with us standing on the 38th Parallel If the Chinese cross the Parallel i t would solidify our U.N. support.” Aware of growing Allied dissatisfaction with the U S. handling of the Korean military situation, Marshall observed that “the attitude described in the U.N was illogical, amounting almost to bad faith, but that one had to recognize that such situations do arise in international relations.” He recalled critical reactions in the press at the time of the Battle of the Bulge. “We must accept the U.N. procedure and try to improve [it] but not expect per- fec t io n . ”38

On the morning of December 4, Acheson talked with members of his staff, as he had on the previous day, about the gravity of the situation. Rusk argued they they should put up the best fight possi- ble in Korea. George Kennan emphasized the need to retain a position there. When Rusk urged, and Acheson agreed, that some- thing should be done to strengthen the military’s will to resist while not allowing them to bomb Manchuria, Under Secretary of State James Webb suggested that Acheson get in touch with Secretary Marshall. Acheson at once phoned Marshall to say that he felt they should try to hold on rather than talk of withdrawing or of adopting a policy of bombing or blockading China. Marshall agreed with two of Acheson’s provisos: that they first see whether MacArthur could withdraw X Corps from the eastern coast of Korea, and that they not dig themselves into a hole without an exit. Acheson then sent Kennan and Rusk for further discussions with Marshall. Kennan mentioned the political implications of a decision to withdraw, pointing that they should be borne in mind by the military authori- ties. Lovett entered the meeting at this time to report that he and Admiral Sherman had just returned from Capitol Hill and the reac- tion there now was that going into Korea had been a mistake and that we should pull out as quickly as possible. Acheson recorded: “General Marshall was not impressed. This sort of fluctuation in

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Congressional opinion was not new to him The present mood might not last for long ”39

Prime Minister Attlee and his party opened discussions with Tru- mail at the White House on December 4. Beneath the customary politeness, the opening exchanges evinced some strain. Attlee deli- cately made the point that many members of the United Nations were not at one with the United States as to actions enlarging the war with China. Any such development would be a victory for the Soviet Union’s position. He discussed the possible Chinese Com- munist price for a cease-fire: recognition of the Communist regime in China, settlement of the Formosa question, and settlement in Korea. He did not know how much they would ask, but he was certain that the Western powers should not get so involved in the East as to open Europe to attack. “The West is, after all, the vital part in our line against communism. We cannot take action that will weaken it. We must strengthen our hand in the West as much as possible.”~O

Marshall and Acheson met Attlee’s arguments for. negotiations with Communist China by mentioning the effect on Japan and the Philippines of any concessions to the Chinese, and by expressing their doubts that concessions would have any effect on China’s allegiance to Moscow. In response to Attlee’s suggestion that the Chinese Communists were not Soviet satellites, Marshall recalled an earlier meeting with Chou En-lai i n which the Chinese leader had insisted that his people were Marxian Communists and that he resented their being called agrarian reformers. Marshall stressed that the Chinese Communists made not the slightest attempt to conceal their Moscow affiliations They regarded the Russians as coreligionis ts, and their troops were thoroughly indoctrinated. The President said that he depended on Marshall’s views, though he granted that the Chinese Communists also had nationalist emo- tions. “The Russians cannot dominate them forever, but that is a long-range view and does not help usjust now.” Later that evening, Acheson met with some of the British delegation and insisted that allies should not expect the United States to give way in the Far East and then act vigorously in Europe in support of the same Allies who had urged concessions in the Far East.

In the second meeting, the tone was still formally polite and the views unchanged. Attlee, alnios t certainly voicing the opinions of other U.N. countries, mentioned Britain’s support for the United States but wondered about other U.N. members and their attitude toward a widening of the conflict. He considered it unwise to make the Chinese Communists feel that they were left with the Soviets

Marshall and Korea 469 as their only friends. Acheson took the lead in the discussion, but on the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the U.N., he later said he wished “to provoke” Marshall to speak. When the British mentioned Formosa, Marshall intervened to point out that if U.N. forces should fail in Korea and the Chinese Communists had a great triumph, “we are greatly weakened if Formosa goes to them. As a military matter only, with Japan to the north and the Philip- pines and Indonesia to the south, the problem which would con- front us would be the driving of a wedge in among those island defenses. They could make it awkward for us and we could be greatly weakened.” General Bradley interjected, “We may fail in Korea, but if so, we must draw the line on Formosa.” Marshall agreed. “We would be taking a step to liquidate our position in the Pacific if we surrendered it. It is hard enough, anyway, to settle the Japanese question. From the military point of view it was very dangerous to give up Formosa. There were other dangers in Indo- china, Malaya, and Hong Kong, but if we split the island chain that would really be serious.”41

Attlee conceded that these were sound military points about Formosa but said that keeping Chiang Kai-shek in control there was not in accord with the Declaration of Cairo, which stated that the island belonged to China. Acheson replied that in Cairo the Allies had been talking about a different China, not one supplied with Soviet planes and pilots. A member of the British delegation said they had to settle the matter of the Chinese seat in the U.N., but i t might be possible to separate the safeguarding of Formosa from recognition of the government, since Chiang Kai-shek was a provo- cation.

Acheson then asked Marshall to speak to this statement. Marshall declared that i t would be difficult to find a replacement for Chiang. Although “his followers and party were corrupt,” Marshall be- lieved that the Generalissimo was personally free of dishonesty. Attlee suggested that a U N. commission might be set up on the island to hold it until the Chinese Communists behaved. When Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder pointed out that this would depend on whether Chiang cooperated, the Prime Minister in- quired “whether he would not have to do what he was-told.” The President quickly suggested that they adjourn until the next day.

On December 5, thirteen members of the United Nations-Afg- hanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pa- kis tan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yernen-appealed to the North Koreans and Chinese Comniunists to declare they would not cross the 38th Parallel. Such a declaration would allow

47” Statesman

time to consider steps to resolve the conflict in Korea and prevent another world war.42

At a dinner at the British Embassy on December 6, referring to the conference of the previous day concerning Western Europe, Acheson bluntly stated that there was a feeling in the United States that the British were not doing all they could for their own defense effort. He thought that, if the President and General Marshall could be convinced they were, it would do much to dampen the distrust in our country 43

Attlee countered by raising the “difficult and delicate question” of Greneral MacArthur’s command in Korea. Europe had the feeling that the participating countries had little to say in what was being done. General Bradley and Secretary Marshall replied that MacAr- thur was doing what he had been told to do by the U.N. in regard to holding Korea and arranging for elections Marshall pointed out that the British had been consulted, mentioning such matters as the handling of “hot pursuit” and the bombing of Manchuria When the British proposed a committee to handle the war, Bradley ob- jected that a committee could not fight a war. If others did not agree with what was being done, they should say so and would be given assistance in withdrawing fi-om the conflict. If they stayed, they had to accept the responsibilities that had been assigned to the United Nations command. The President summarized the Anieri- can view when he said they should stay in Korea and fight. If they had support from others, fine. But they would stay on anyway.

Marshall was absent at the begmning of the meeting on Decem- ber 7 but came ~n time to declare that, If there were reasonable steps to avoid a war with Communist China, the United States would take them, in the interests of avoiding a global war. But it was almost impossible to negotiate with the Chinese Communists. As to Formosa, our military men had said that I t was not of great military importance to us but would become so in the hands of an enemy. The United States would be in an almost intolerable posi- tion if it sacrificed prestige in the Pacific and abandoned its specific commitment to Korea. Though he had no solution, Marshall thought that a little time would be useful.44

Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador, now sought to smooth over differences, observing that they were fewer than they may have seemed. Personally, he thought that the British delegation had been strongly moved by U.S. military views on Formosa. They were not asking the United States to give up Formosa or to talk about a precise time for beginning negotiations. When i t came to letting the Chinese Communists into the U.N., however, he believed it was

L

Marshall and Korea 471 a question of looking at facts rather than acting on the basis of a nation’s dislike for Communist Chinese.

The final meeting with the British Prime Minister came on Fri- day, December 8, at the White House. Attlee and Truman had reached agreement on the atomic bomb, and Acheson and mem- bers of the British entourage had ironed out other matters. ,General Collins returned from Tokyo to announce encouraging news from Korea. He thought that the Eighth Army could retire in an orderly way to Pusan, and that the X Corps could be evacuated from the Hamhung area to join the Eighth Army there.45

The final communique of the Washington meeting was carefully drawn. Attlee could report to the British and to friends in the United Nations that he had not approved some items the Ameri- cans advanced; the Americans could insist that they had safe- guarded their position. The British could be pleased by the American agreement that NATO should be developed and strengthened and that a Supreme Commander in Europe would soon be appointed. The United States indicated that it was willing to negotiate some points of agreement if the Chinese Communists and North Koreans halted their advance. The United Kingdom had recognized the People’s Republic of China and considered that its representatives should hold the seat reserved for China in the United Nations. As to Formosa, both Chinese governments held that the Cairo Declaration was valid. The United States wanted the issue settled by peaceful means and in a way that would safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the security and peace of the Pacific, and believed that consideration of the question by the United Nations would contribute to that end.

As for the atomic bomb, the President stated that he hoped world conditions would never call for its use. He proposed to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments that might bring about a change in the situation.

On December 8, MacArthur ordered General Almond’s X Corps withdrawn to the area of Pusan. In a large-scale evacuation by sea designed to preserve equipment and weapons as well as manpower, 105,000 U.N. troops, 100,ooo Korean civilians, 17,000 vehicles, and more than a third of a million tons of supplies were successfully moved southS46

Three weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur a new directive, which Marshall thought necessary in order to con- solidate the various instructions that had gone out in recent weeks. This directive assumed that the enemy was capable of forc- ing the U.N. troops out of Korea but believed that such action

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could be made very costly to the aggressors, adding that Korea was not the place to fight a major war. The directive stated that the United States was not prepared to commit its “remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war.” On the other hand, resistance to enemy attack “would be of great importance to our national interest if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses. . . .” MacArthur was now di- rected to fall back to more defensible positions, as he had pro- posed earlier in the month. Far from a heroic statement, it was an attempt to find room to maneuver politically. MacArthur, on invi- tation, gave his comments the following day.47

He paid little attention to the bar against extending the war, but spoke of his earlier views as to attacking mainland China. His reply may have been written before he received the JCS message Other- wise, his reconiniendations seemed designed to be contra erythiiig that U.S. representatives had discussed with the Mac Arthur r ec o ni ni e n d ed :

(1 ) Blockade the coast of China, (2) destroy through iiava and air bombardment China’s industrial capacity to wage

y to ev- B r i t i s h .

gu n fi r e war. (3)

secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decide to continue the fight for that peninsula, and (4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese main- land. . .

He saw no reason to worry about expanding the war to mainland China, since the Chinese were now fully committed and the possi- bility of Soviet intervention would not be affected by any action that the United States took against China. He may have been unaware of a Soviet agreement providing for Soviet aid in case of attack. He could not hope to have U.N. support for this venture, nor could it have the moral support of a U N. action against aggression against South Korea. It would undo everything leaders in Washington had attempted to gain from the meeting with the British and fi-om recent activity in the United Nations. MacArthur confirmed the fears of niaiiy U N. members by declaring that Korea’s defense needs were more immediate than those of Europe.

The directive of the Joint Chiefs was sent just after significant chainges in the Far Eastern command had taken place. Two days before Christmas, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident.

Marshall and Korea 473 When the possibility of his death in action had been discussed a short time before by MacArthur and Collins, the former had said that in that case he wanted General Matthew Ridgway as Walker’s replacement Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration for the Army, fully familiar with MacArthur’s prob- lems, was approved at once by Marshall and Truman; he reached Tokyo on the evening of Christmas Day. N o appointment could have been more acceptable to Marshall. Since Ridgway’s service under him in Tientsin in the 1920s~ Marshall had watched and aided the career of the new Eighth Army commander. He had noted Ridgway’s advancement with pride and had helped him de- velop his airborne units. Others in the Pentagon shared Marshall’s enthusiasm. As an airborne-division commander, Ridgway had been part of Bradley’s D-Day forces and part of General Collins’s VI1 Corps in the Normandy fighting. His reputation was that of an officer with charisma and brilliant leadership, who knew the prob- lems of the Department of the Army and of the troops in Korea. His loyalty to Washington was complete, a quality soon to be trea- s u red .48

General Ridgway found MacArthur ready to turn over the Eighth Army to him. It was up to him to advance or to withdraw. He decided to stay. Many of his officers had succumbed to defensive thinking, and he worked to turn this situation around.

Immediately he was tested by the enemy. Perhaps believing that the Americans would be celebrating on New Year’s Eve, the Chi- nese chose that day to strike along a wide front. Ridgway deliber- ately pulled his troops back to a more easily defended line north, of the Han River near Seoul. Two days later, he was forced to give up the Korean capital and withdraw south of the river. On the 4th’ he fell back to a new line

This situation made matters no easier for MacArthur, for Wash- ington still demanded caution. As early as September 1949, it was known that the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb. Washington was also aware that the Russians had signed a security treaty with the Chinese Communists, which became public in February 195 1.

’ The JCS instruction of January 9, in reply to MacArthur’s recom- mendations to expand the war, was largely to “wait and see” and had little resemblance to the more positive talk before the end of the year. Blockade required U.N. approval. Naval and air attacks on China must wait on Chinese attacks outside Korea. MacArthur was to fall back on successive positions, inflicting the greatest possible casualties on the enemy while keeping in mind the safety of his own troops and the protection of Japan. If he found it necessary to

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evacuate troops to avoid losses in men and materiel, the action was approved .49

MacArthur, fearing the ease with which he could be made a scapegoat, replied that the decision was not up to him and asked- Washington to declare whether he was or was not to withdraw. Under current restrictions, his position in Korea was untenable. But if political considerations required it, he could hold until his force was destroyed.

The Far Eastern commander nettled Marshall by remarking that the morale of his men would “become a serious threat to their battle efficiency unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated.”50 Deciding that these words expressed MacArthur’s ideas rather than those of his men, the Secretary remarked to Dean Rusk that when a general corn: plained about the morale of his troops, it was time to look into his own morale.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs recommended to Secretary Marshall that they make an attempt to stabilize the situation in Korea, and, if that proved impossible, then to withdraw. There should be no further ground augmentation, but two National Guard divisions might be sent to Japan. If a position could be established or if they were forced to evacuate, then a naval blockade of China should be put into effect, and air reconnaissance of the Chinese coastal areas and Manchuria should be permitted. Although Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in Korea, restrictions on their actions elsewhere should be removed. The memorandum was forwarded, at Marshall’s request, to the National Security Council for discus- si011.51

The President sought to ease MacArthur’s frustrations on Janu- ary 13 by stressing the value of a successful defense in Korea. U.S. action should be concerned with con’solidating the great majority of 1J.N. members on our side. Pending a major buildup of U.S. strength, “we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned.” It would be good to take other courses of action, but steps that “might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities. . . .” Truman noted that if we did have to withdraw, it should be evident that this course had been forced upon us by military necessity and that we would not accept it until aggression was ended. Making i t clear that he was accepting the responsibility MacArthur had refused, the President said that, in making a final decision about Korea, “I shall have to

a

Marshall and Korea 475 give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this great danger. . . . The entire nation,” he concluded his message to MacArthur, “is grateful for your splendid leadership. . . .”52

Arriving in Tokyo to discuss the situation, Generals Collins and Vandenberg tried to clarify Washington’s course of action MacAr- thur read the President’s message to them and said i t removed all doubts as to his mission and responsibility. He interpreted it as a directive to remain in Korea indefinitely. Before returning to the United States, Collins announced that U.S. troops were going to stay and fight. He was optimistic about the situation in Korea. The Eighth Army was improving under Ridgway’s leadership. The Chi- nese had not tried to push south of the Han River and were suffer- ing from supply problems and lowered morale. Ridgway was now “prepared to punish severely any mass attack.” He believed that they could stay from two to three months.53

Several months later, during the Senate hearings on his relief, MacArthur claimed that the Joint Chiefs, in their memorandum of January 12 , had agreed with his own views on expanding the war with China, but that they had been overruled by “higher authority.” In actuality, General Marshall had forwarded their memorandum, as soon as he received i t , to the National Security Council for consideration at its next scheduled meeting on January 17. More- over, as subsequent testimony revealed, the original impetus for the memorandum had been the alarming military situation in late 1950, when recommendations were needed for the contingency that U.N. units might be forced out of Korea-a situation that had considerably altered by January 12. Although the Chiefs did agree with MacArthur that, in view of the massive Chinese intervention, certain restrictions on actions against Communist China should be lifted, they at the same time strongly disagreed with his view that the danger of Soviet intervention should be discounted. Their memorandum stressed that everything possible should be done to “delay a general war with Russia until we have achieved the requi- site degree of military and industrial mobilization.” Whereas MacArthur favored an immediate U.S. naval blockade of China, the Joint Chiefs felt strongly that such action should await due prepara- tion, and come after U N. forces had been forced to evacuate or had established a defense line. Even then, they felt, implementation should depend “upon circumstances then obtaining.” Admiral Sherman, who wrote the initial draft of the JCS memorandum, testified later that he had never favored a unilateral U.S. blockade but felt it should be a joint U.N. effort. As to bombing the mainland

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of China, the January 1 2 memorandum reiterated that this should be undertaken only “at such time as the Chinese Communists at- tack any of our forces outside of Korea.”S4

All these questions were considered and debated at length in the National Security Council and its subcommittees during January and February, as General Marshall later testified. General Collins’s optimistic report in mid-January on the changed niilitary picture in Korea relieved much of the pressure in Washington for hasty deci- sions on either withdrawing U.N forces or expanding the war. As Marshall put it:

Thereafter, the situation of our forces in Korea continued to im- prove and during the latter half of January the enemy forces re- mained on the defensive. Throughout February and March our forces maintained the initiative against the enemy. . As the resu-lt of this change in the military situation from that which prevailed during the early part ofJanuary, i t became unnecessary to put into effect all of the courses of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs’ memo- randum ofJanuary 12. . . None of these proposed courses of action were vetoed or disapproved b y me or by any higher authority. Ac- tion with respect to most of them was considered inadvisable in view of the radical change in the situation which originally had given rise to them. . . 5 5