According to the increasing aw-areness of the importance, advant-ages and feasibility of represent-ing/visualizing spatial relations andspatial content through correspond-ing cartography – maps are becomingincreasingly more frequent and elab-orate when one needs to representsome aspect of reality from variousstandpoints: economical, natural sci-entific or politological. Some contentspractically impose the need for ap-plied cartography which is especiallytrue of international-political, milit-ary, geopolitical and transport issues.Therefore, mass communication me-dia have been increasingly acceptingand adopting specific cartography assignificant content which success-fully compete with the importance ofthe text itself – this is the case every-where, including in Croatia. TheFrench geographical-political-carto-graphic school is the model and ex-ceptional accomplishment. It also haspredecessors in the German/Nazigeopolitical school from the first halfof the 20th century.

Maps and the Concept of SpatialCulture

Position characteristics – location,position and spatial relations are ob-served, understood and interpretedbest using maps: they are an image ofreality which geographers (and notonly geographers) need to be able tosee at all times. Therefore, when mapsare concerned, one needs to studythem within the context of spatialculture – which can be defined as theintroduction of characteristics asso-ciated with space (and which are im-manent) into a complex aiming tounderstand particular modes of socialreality and its changes – of course,where it is suitable and in a suitableway. It is because space is not a neutralframe of happening, but it can be one

of the most influential foundationsand factors of that happening, whichat the same time means the exclusionof the so-called geographic determ-inism. However, while determinism isexcluded, the same is not true forstronger or weaker, more or less clearinfluences. Without those influences,it would not be the true, but narrowerreality, i.e. its origin and development.

According to the roughest cate-gorization, there are two kinds ofmaps. General geographic with synt-hetic content, because they contain amultitude of content intending to re-present the objective and completereality in the most comprehensiveway possible. There are also appliedmaps which only represent some co-ntent, problems and ideas, and thereare two types: a) analytic, which re-present only one content, b) synthe-tic, which represent more specificcontents, not by simple accumulati-on, but rather in the form of relationand interaction between certain con-tent grouped around a common ideaor issue. The nature of analytic mapsis positivistic-informative. They feat-ure/represent some content whichcan be considered on its own. Thusthey are really only an illustration orsupplement. On the contrary –complex maps include several inter-related contents associated with phe-nomena and processes in space,making them interpretative. They in-clude all contents relevant to certainunderstandings and interpretationsand are thus not just an illustration,but an important aspect in under-standing reality. Applied/complexmaps are not just illustrations andsupplements of text, but the diversityof their relevant interrelated contentsis at the same time origin of new in-sight, meaning they can precede textor at the very least be its peer. Appliedcomplex maps can be used to readcomplex reality, but it is more an issue

of personnel than the subject of thispaper.

Without further ado – it is best topresent some possibilities and exam-ples of our applied cartography fromthe field of transport relations, ge-opolitics and geostrategy, distingu-ishing thee cartographic fields, eachof which is creative and synergizingin its own way: first – individuals whouse historical cartographic sourcesfor a particular purpose, second –creators of applied maps, and third –people who draw and realize themtechnically.

Therefore, what follows are someexamples from the second and thirdgroup by the same author as this pa-per’s.

MapNo. 1ColdWar Geostrategic Position ofUSSR

Due to the vast space, overlappingcharacteristics (transitional areas), aswell as the need to indicate only ba-sics of the noted geostrategic divisionof the area, they can only be repre-sented as highly generalized, but arestill in accordance with main princi-ples, criteria and spatial relations.

1 – a) – True Soviet Geostrate-gic Heartland, consisting of the geos-trategically even safer Lena Land (2)between Yenisey and Lena, as the ab-solute Heartland.

1 – b) 1a – The largest part of theso-called South East Asia ("five sta-tes") is the border area of the true He-artland.

2 – – Kazakhstanian-Mongolianand Chinese part of Heartland (Xinji-ang, Tiber, Qinghai, Gansu, part ofinland Mongolia)

3 – – Russian European Hear-tland, which can be called like thatonly conditionally, so it is better to re-fer to it as the political/conditionalHeartland.

U skladu sa sve razvijenijom svi-ješću o značenju, prednostima i veli-koj uvjerljivosti prikazivanja/vizuali-zacije prostornih odnosa i sadržaja uprostoru putem odgovarajuće karto-grafije – zemljovidni prikazi postajusve učestaliji i razrađeniji kada trebadočarati neki oblik stvarnosti i to s vr-lo različitih stajališta bilo onog gos-podarskog, prirodoslovnog ili polito-loškog. Pri tome neki sadržaji upravonameću potrebu postojanja aplika-tivne kartografije što naročito vrijediza pitanja međunarodno-političkog,vojnog, geopolitičkog i prometnogznačaja i značenja. Zbog toga sredstvamasovnih komunikacija sve više pri-hvaćaju i udomljuju specifičnu karto-grafiju kao bitne sadržaje koji se usvojoj važnosti uspješno natječu svažnošću samog teksta – tako je svug-dje, pa tako i u Hrvatskoj. Pri tome kaona uzor i naročito dostignuće trebaukazati na francusku geografsko-po-litičko-kartografsku školu koja ima istarije preteče i to iz redova njemač-ke/nacističke geopolitičke škole izprve polovice 20. st.

Zemljovidi i pojam prostornekulture

Osobine položajnosti – smještaj,položaj, prostorni odnosi najbolji su uuočavanju, shvaćaju i interpretiranjupomoću zemljovida: oni su slikastvarnosti koju geografi (i ne samooni) uvijek moraju imati pred očima. Izato, kada je o zemljovidima riječ, po-trebno ih je promatrati u kontekstukoji se odnosi na prostornu kulturu – anju je moguće definirati ovako: onaznači uvođenje osobina u svezi s pros-torom (koje su mu imanentne) ukompleks kojim se pokušava razu-mjeti određene vidove društvenestvarnosti i njezinih promjena – na-ravno tamo gdje je to primjereno i nanačin na koji je primjeren. I to zato jerprostor nije nikakav neutralni okvir

zbivanja, nego može biti i jedan odutjecajnijih temelja i čimbenika tihzbivanja, što ujedno znači da je svakitzv. geografski determinizam pri to-me isključen. Ali, dok je determinizamisključen, to ne vrijedi za jače ili slabi-je, jasnije ili nejasnije utjecaje, jer sebez tih utjecaja ne radi o istinskoj, ne-go tek o suženoj stvarnosti, tj. njezi-nom nastanku i razvitku.

Prema najgrubljoj podjeli, zem-ljovidi mogu biti dvojaki: prvo, oniopći geografski, koji su sintetiziraju-ćeg sadržaja, jer sadrže što je mogućeviše različitih sadržaja kojima se nas-toji što potpunije prikazati objektivnai cjelovita stvarnost. I – drugo – pos-toje primjenjeni zemljovidi koji pri-kazuju samo neke određene sadržaje,probleme i ideje, a i oni mogu bitidvojaki: a) analitički kada prikazujusamo jedan sadržaj, i zatim b) sinteti-zirajući kada prikazuju više raznihspecifičnih sadržaja, ali ne na načinjednostavne kumulacije, nego u obli-ku povezanosti i međuutjecaja poje-dinih sadržaja okupljenih oko nekezajedničke ideje ili nekog problema.Analitički zemljovidi su po svojoj na-ravi pozitivističko-informativni. Onidonose/prikazuju neki sadržaj kojistoji kao posebnost i sam za sebe. Zatosu oni zapravo samo ilustracija i do-puna nečega. Za razliku – kompleksnizemljovidi uključuju više međusobnopovezanih sadržaja u svezi s pojavamai procesima u prostoru, i zato su oniinterpretativnog karaktera. Oniuključuju sve sadržaje koji su rele-vantni za određena shvaćanja i tuma-čenja, i zato nisu tek puka ilustracija,nego bitni aspekt u razumijevanjustvarnosti. Primijenjeni/kompleksnizemljovidi ne samo da nisu ilustracijai posljedica/dopuna onoga što se iz-nosi u tekstu, nego su zbog različitostirelevantnih međusobno povezanihsadržaja ujedno i izvorište i novihuvida, dakle oni mogu i prethodititekstu, ili su barem njegov apsolutno

ravnopravni partner. Iz primijenjenihkompleksnih zemljovida iščitava se ikompleksna stvarnost, ali to više nijepitanje ovih teza, nego je kadrovskiproblem.

No o svemu ne treba duljiti – bolje jeprikazati neke mogućnosti i primjerenaše primijenjene kartografije i to s po-dručja prometnih odnosa, geopolitike igeostrategije razlikujući pri tome trikartografska područja od kojih je svakokreativnonasvojnačinpričemudolazi ido sinergije s odgovarajućim rezultati-ma: prvo – ono gdje se pojedinci služepovijesnim kartografskim izvorima zaneku određenu svrhu, drugo – u što seubrajaju oni koji su kreatori primijenje-nih zemljovida, i treće – oni koji ih teh-nički/crtački ostvaruju.

Zato će se na ovom mjestu iznijetinekoliko primjera iz spomenute dru-ge i treće skupine i to iz pera istogautora.

Zemljovid br. 1.Hladnoratovski geostrateškipoložaj SSSR-a

Zbog naročite veličine prostora,osobina koje se preklapaju (prijelaznapodručja), kao i potrebe da se naglasesamo osnove navedene geostrateškerazdiobe tog prostora, mogu se prika-zati samo u okviru visokog stupnjageneralizacije, koja, međutim, gleda-jući onako grosso modo, ipak poštujuglavna načela, kriterije i prostorneodnose.

1 – a) – Pravi sovjetski geostra-teški Heartland u kojem se nalazi ge-ostrateški još sigurniji Lena Landizmeđu Jeniseja i Lene, kao apsolutniHeartland.

1 – b) 1a – Najveći dio tzv. područjajugozapadne Azije ("pet država") jegranični prostor pravog Heartlanda.

2 – – Kazahstansko-mongolski ikineski dio Heartlanda (Xinjiang, Ti-ber, Qinghai, Gansu, dio unutrašnjeMongolije)

4 – – An important geostrategiccharacteristic of the Russian arcticspace is that it still behaves as a Sout-hern Heartland on mainland. Themore intense opening of the arcticmaritime route related to climatechanges is still a distant possibility,but one that is obviously going to ca-use new geostrategic relations: due to

international transport, the singlemainland-sea (once Soviet, now Ru-ssian) Heartland is going to be splitinto two parts.

5 – Border zone coast (Rimland)surrounding Heartland.

5 – a) – Although much of theFar East Rimland (Sea of Okhotsk,Kamchatka, and area around the

Bering Strait) belongs to Russian Fe-deration, Russian geostrategic cha-racteristics can not be described astrue Rimland because it lacks theessential maritime component. In ad-dition, Rimland is an exceptionallyWestern-geostrategic term. Thus theSoviet (Russian) Far East Rimland ismerely strain without content.

3 – – Ruski europski Heartlandkoji se tako može nazvati samo uvjet-no zbog čega je bolje govoriti o poli-tičkom/uvjetnom Heartlandu.

4 – – Važna je geostrateška oso-bina da se ruski arktički prostor danasjoš uvijek ponaša kao južnije lociraniHeartland na kopnu. Intenzivnijeotvaranje arktičke pomorske rute usvezi klimatskih promjena još je po-prilično daleka mogućnost, ali će onaočito uvjetovati nastanak novih geos-trateških odnosa: zbog međunarodnogprometa jedinstveni kopneno – morski(nekada sovjetski, a danas ruski) Hear-tland bit će presječen na dva dijela.

5 – Obala rubne zone (Rimland)koja okružuje Heartland.

5 – a) – Iako Ruskoj Federacijipripada znatan dio Rimlanda na Dale-kom istoku (Ohotsko more, Kamčatka,prostor oko Beringovog tjesnaca),ruske se geostrateške osobine tu nemogu okarakterizirati kao istinski Ri-mland, jer mu nedostaje bitna mari-timna sastavnica, a osim toga,Rimland je izuzetno zapadnjačko–ge-ostrateški pojam. Sovjetski je, (ruski)dakle, Rimland na Dalekom istoku teknatega bez sadržaja.

5 – b) – Obala ostalog Pravog glo-balnog Rimlanda. Prostoru Rimlandapripada ne samo niz država na kopnu,lociranih oko Heartlanda, nego i nizotoka.

6 – H + R – Važno je uočiti kako jeKina u isto doba i izrazita heartland-ska, ali i izrazita rimlandska zemlja, ato je očito najpovoljniji geostrateškipoložaj na "svjetskom otoku" (Europa,Azija, Afrika).

7 – 7) – Važnost geostrateškog po-ložaja SSSR-a u doba hladnog rata vidise i po relativno bliskoj lokaciji ruskogHeartlanda u odnosu na Angloameri-ku, pri čemu je za SAD povoljno da nasjeveru ima tamponski kanadskiprostor.

8 – a) – Mongolija kao glavni povi-jesni i suvremeni tamponski među-prostor između Rusije i Kine (t.).

8 – b) – Pored Mongolije, SSSR zaHladnog rata ima i tamponsku zonu uEuropi (Varšavski ugovor iz 1955, štoje povijesno najdalji prodor Istokaprema Zapadu.

9 – Položaj SSSR-a u okruženju –ovisno o pojedinim razdobljima, onoje bilo dvostruko: jednu je vrstu orga-nizirao Zapad (NATO, 1949., CENTOpakt 1955., 1979.), a drugo je ovisilo oodnosima s Kinom.

9 – a) – (Turska – Irak – Iran – Pa-kistan): države CENTO pakta (CentralTreaty Organisation u funkciji okru-ženja Sovjetskog bloka u zoni Rimlan-da (od izvanregionalnih članica u tomsu bloku bili još i Velika Britanija iSAD).

9 – b) J–SAD – Japansko – američkiobrambeni sporazumi (1951, 1960) suu funkciji obrane Japana, ali i okruže-nja SSSR-a.

9 – c) – U funkciji okruženja SSSR-a treba, ovisno o pojedinim razdoblji-ma, spomenuti i Kinu.

9 – d) a,b,c – Izravni granični dodi-ri sovjetskog bloka i NATO-a (norve-ška, istočnonjemačka, češka i turskagranica). Ovakav izravni dodir očito jegeostrateški bio izuzetno osjetljiv, ali inikada nije došlo do nekog sukoba, jersu se obje velevlasti čuvale svega što jeu hladnoratovskim uvjetima Svijetmoglo odvesti u katastrofu.

Zemljovid br. 2.Glavna težišta ruskih državnosti(regije jezgre) i odnos premamorima

Zemljovid je uvelike pojednostav-ljen/generaliziran, jer potpisanomsve potankosti nisu poznate, te stogapredstavlja samo pokušaj jednog po-vijesnog/zemljopisnog prikaza u smi-slu opoviješćene geografije i geografi-zirane povijesti.

1 – Jedna od mogućih inačica me-đe poluotočne i kopnene Europe kojojpripadaju ruske zemlje. One su pr-venstveno karakterizirane kontinen-talnošću, što znači i stalnom borbomza izlaze i pristupe do otvorenih mora

2 – a) – Zatvoreno Baltičko, Crno iEgejsko more, kao i Kaspijsko jezero.

2 – b) – Otvoreno Sredozemlje, aliipak zatvoreno u odnosu na svjetskomore.

2 – c) – Bijelo more, kao jedini mo-gući otvoreni izlaz Rusije za veze saZapadom, koji je Rusija povijesno

intenzivno koristila, naročito poslijeuspostavljanja mongolsko-osmanlij-ske barijere prema Crnom moru.

3 – a) 1, 2 – Glavne izvorne regijejezgre russtva: 1 – Kijevska Rusija iz9.st, cvat do 13. st. (do mongolske po-hare), 2 – Moskovija (moskovska veli-ka kneževina iz 12. st. koja kao regijajezgre zamjenjuje Kijevsku Rusiju).

3 – b) 3 – Od ruskih zemalja važnaje još jedino Bjelarus, dok je sve ostalo(obale Baltika, Kavkaz, dio centralneAzije, Sibir) – poprište carskog osvaja-laštva pri čemu je ono u Sibiru najma-nje zazorno, jer se doista radi ojednom demografskom i politogent-skom desertumu. U vrijeme KijevskeRusije, russtvo je bilo uspostavljeno ina Crnom moru, gdje je na mjestuOdesse postojala ruska tvrđava, ali jeona stradala od Polovaca u 11. st. Kas-nije širenje Rusije na jug mora sesmatrati opravdanim jer je ono za-pravo rekonkvista u odnosu na Tatarei Osmanlije.

4 – a – U najranijem razdoblju ru-ske povijesti funkcionira plovidbeniput Baltik – Zapadna Dvina (Daugava) –Dnjepar – Crno more – Konstantinopolkao tzv. Grčka cesta, koja je prekinutamongolskom invazijom u 13. st.

5 – a) – Mongolski prodor (13. st.)olakšan stepskom prohodnošću kojiruši Kijevsku Rusiju (1), zbog čega seregija jezgre i težišta ruske državnostipomiče prema Moskoviji (2), koja jezatvoreni šumski i vrlo bogat hidro-grafski prostor pogodan za izbjegava-nje apsolutne strane dominacije ikontrole. U toj novoj i logičnoj polito-genetskoj jezgri moskovski velikiknez postaje knez sviju Rusa, i oko teće se jezgre okupiti ruske zemlje, i izte će jezgre krenuti oslobodilački po-kreti Rusije protiv Mongola, kao idaljnja osvajanja prema Sibiru, Balti-ku, Crnom moru i Kavkazu. U južnojRusiji/Ukrajini od 13. st. formira sedugotrajna mongolska barijera (Zlat-na horda), a zatim i ona osmanlijskakoja priječi pristup russtva crnomor-skom bazenu, ali i Aziji kroz Vrata na-roda. Međutim, treba naglasiti da jeKijevska Rusija i prije mongolske pro-vale imala problema s pristupomCrnom moru zbog Pečenjega, Hazara i

5 – b) – Coast of the remainingTrue Global Rimland. Rimland inclu-des a series of continental countriesaround Heartland, but also a series ofislands.

6 – H + R – It is important to notethat China was at the time excepti-onally Heartland- and Rimland-like,and it is obviously the most favoura-ble geostrategic position in the "glo-bal island" (Europe, Asia, Africa).

7 – 7) – Importance of USSR’s ge-ostrategic position during the ColdWar can also be seen in the relativecloseness of the Russian Heartland inrelation to Anglo-America, with USAhaving the favourable Canadian buf-fer zone.

8 – a) – Mongolia as the main his-torical and contemporary buffer zonebetween Russia and China (t.).

8 – b) – In addition to Mongolia,USSR also had a buffer zone in Europeduring the Cold War (Treaty of War-saw from 1955), which represents thehistorically furthest breach of theEast toward the West.

9 – Position of USSR in context – itwas twofold, depending on the peri-od: one was organized by the West(NATO 1949, CENTO 1955, 1979), andthe other depended on relations withChina.

9 – a) – (Turkey – Iraq – Iran – Pa-kistan): CENTO (Central Treaty Orga-nisation) countries in function ofsurrounding the Soviet Bloc in the Ri-mland (Great Britain and USA werealso in the bloc).

9 – b) J-SAD – Japan-Americantreaties (1951, 1960) for defending Ja-pan and surrounding USSR.

9 – c) – China also has to be menti-oned related to surrounding USSR.

9 – d) a,b,c – Direct border contac-ts of the Soviet Bloc and NATO(Norwegian, East German, Czech andTurkish border). Such a direct contactwas clearly very sensitive from a ge-ostrategical perspective, but therewere never any conflicts, becauseboth big powers guarded againsteverything which could have led theWorld to catastrophe in the Cold Warconditions.

MapNo. 2Main Centres of RussianSovereignties (Core Regions) andAttitude toward Seas

The map is greatly simplified/ge-neralized because the author is notaware of all the details, so it is just anattempt at a historical/geographicrepresentation in the sense of histori-zed geography and geographized his-tory.

1 – One possible version of theborder between the peninsular andcontinental Europe which Russianlands belong to. They are primarilycharacterized by continentality, wh-ich means a constant struggle forexits and access to open seas.

2 – a) – Closed Baltic Sea, Black Seaand Aegean Sea, as well as the CaspianSea.

2 – b) – Open Mediterranean, butstill closed in comparison to the glo-bal sea

2 – c) – White Sea, as the only po-ssible open exit of Russia for connec-ting with the West, which Russiahistorically intensively used, especi-ally after establishing the Mongolian –Ottoman barrier toward the Black Sea.

3 – a) 1, 2 – Main source core regi-ons of Russianhood: 1 – Kievan Russia

from the 9th century, flourished untilthe 13th century (until Mongoliandevastation), 2 – Grand Duchy ofMoscow, Moscowia (great Moscowprincipality from the 12th centurywhich replaced Kievan Russia as thecore region)

3 – b) 3 – Belarus is the only otherimportant Russian country, whileeverything else (Baltic Sea coasts, Ca-ucasus, part of central Asia, Siberia) –is the scene of imperial conquest,with the one in Siberia the leastobjectionable because it is a demo-graphic and politogenetic desert. Du-ring the Kievan Russia, Russianhoodwas also established at the Black Sea,where there was a Russian fortress inplace of Odessa, but the fortress wasdestroyed by Cumans in the 11th cen-tury. Subsequent expansion of Russiato the South has to be considered re-asonable because it is actually a re-conquest in relation to Tatars andOttomans.

4 – a – The earliest period of Ru-ssian history saw the functioning ofthe maritime route Baltic Sea – Wes-tern Dvina (Daugava) – Dnieper –Black Sea – Constantinople as the so-called Greek route, which was brokenup by the Mongolian invasion in the13th century.

5 – a) – Mongolian invasion (13thcentury) facilitated by passable step-pes, ravaging Kievan Russia (1), due towhich the core region and the centresof Russian sovereignty moves towardMoscowia (2), which is a closed forestand hydrographically reach space su-itable for avoiding absolute sides ofdomination and control. In this newand logical politogenetic core, theMoscow grand duke became the dukeof all Russian, and Russian countriesare going to gather around that coreand a go to liberate Russia from theMongols, as well as conquer Siberia,Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Caucasus. Alasting Mongolian barrier (GoldenHorde) formed in South Russia/Ukra-ine in the 13th century, and subsequ-ently also an Ottoman one blockingthe access of Russianhood to the BlackSea, as well as Asia through the Do-orway of Nation. However, it has to bepointed out that Kievan Russia hadproblems accessing the Black Sea be-cause of Pechenegs, Khazars and ot-hers even before the Mongolianinvasion. After the plague in the 14thcentury, while the European West waseconomically developing and prepa-ring for global conquests during timeof very favourable navigation – Russiawas just liberating from the savageAsian devastation, which is obviouslyone reason for its overall lapsing.

5 – b) – Broad space of the Do-orway of Nation, part of Ukraine andthe Azovian-Black Sea littoral as anunstable zone exposed to invasionsfrom the East which made it signifi-cantly more difficult to establish Ru-ssianhood in its South until Peter theGreat (18th century).

6 – Russian expansion toward theBaltic Sea and lasting struggle withSweden, which was greatly suppre-ssed (Battle of Poltava in 1709), wassealed with the founding and deve-lopment of Saint Petersburg from1703. The exceptional importance ofsea for Russia at the time can be seenfrom the fact that Saint Petersburgwas the capital of Russia between 1712and 1918: a harbour and openness aremore important than continentallyclosed and isolated Moscowia.

7 – a – Due to the Mongolian-Ot-toman barrier toward the South, Ru-ssia had to focus no only toward theBaltic Sea, but also toward cold Nort-hern Seas (White Sea). Archangelskwas founded in 16th century with fa-mous Novgorod traders. Archangelskbecame (until foundation of Saint Pe-tersburg) an important Russian har-bour for commerce with the West. Insearching fur-bearing animals thePechora River area was reached.

8 – a) – For the first time since theMongolian Invasion, conquests ofIvan the Terrible (16th century) ena-bled Moscowia to reach the South (al-so conquering the Archangelsk watersupply system) and allowed Russia toget close to the Doorway of Nationwhich lead to Siberia and enabledVolga to be the great Russian backbo-ne. Russia reached the Caspian Sea,but this did not have a decisive im-pact, because it does not lead any-where except the competing Persia.

8 – b) – After the former Normannavigational system Baltic Sea – Wes-tern Dvina – Dnieper – Black Sea (thementioned "Greek route"), Volga (b)became an important internal con-nection and Russian backbone. Nov-gorod traders traded via rivers towardthe South (Black Sea and Constanti-nople) prior to the Mongolian period.

9 – At the end of the 17th century,Russia conquered Azov, which meansit also had to conquer Kerch Strait,and in 1792 coasts of the Black Sea upto the mouth of Dniester to Novoro-ssiysk belonged to Russia, after Ode-ssa was conquered by the Turks(1791), and Krim was annexed in 1830.

10 – 16th century – The Russianinvasion of Siberia started as early asthe 16th century. Only distances re-presented barriers to the invasion,while Siberian demographic and po-litogenetic desert facilitated it.

11 – In order to operate in the Bal-kans to the benefit of Balkan nationsagainst Turkey (18th century), theRussian Baltic fleet had to go aroundmost of Europe, without friendly har-bours on its way, and wage war in ahostile (Ottoman) environment.

12 – Strength of the fleet itself was

insufficient and continental expansi-on was not possible due to the Roma-nian barrier to the Russian expansiontoward the South, in order for theempire’s establishment in the Straits.

13 – The solution of Russian mari-time participation was the most pro-mising with the Treaty of San Stefanoin 1878, but it could not have been re-alized due to Western objections (Co-ngress of Berlin in 1878. According tothe Treaty of San Stefano, Bulgaria(referred to as Great Bulgaria) wassupposed to bridge Russia with theAegean Sea.

14 – S – Russia’s expansion is notonly based on territory, but it is im-portant (the most important) to solvethe issue of accessing sea, but Serbiaand Montenegro are too far away, iso-lated by Romanian etnikum, withMontenegro also not solving the issueof maritime participation for a longtime (until the Congress of Berlin in1878, Bar harbour), and Serbia did notsolve it at all.

15 – I.–V. – Important centres ofpower outside of Russia (besides theMongolian) which significantly affec-ted its history (I – Swedish, II – Ger-mans, III – Polish, IV – Lithuanians, V –Ottoman), because of which Russia’sfear of containment politics is histori-cally completely founded and under-standable. It is especially important tonotice that Russia always had to fighton both the Baltic Sea and the BlackSea front with some of the mostpowerful European and Asian forces(Sweden, Turkey).

16 – Part of border Europe-Asia.

MapNo. 3Characteristics of 3G Positions ofRussian Countries (Geotransporti-ve, Geopolitical, Geostrategical)

The issue of 3G positions of Russiais such a comprehensive theme thatgiving up would be the most logicalsolution for all true laymen. However,it is still possible to provide some in-sight which combine with the textualand cartographic part to introducethe theme, which is to be analysed bymore proficient authors.

drugih. U vrijeme dok se europski Za-pad, preboljevši kugu u 14. st., gospo-darski razvija i počinje spremati zaglobalna osvajanja, i to u uvjetima vrlopovoljne maritimnosti – Rusija se tekoslobađa divljačke azijske pohare, štoje očito jedan od razloga za njeno sve-ukupno zaostajanje.

5 – b) – širi prostor Vrata naroda,dijela Ukrajine i azovsko-crnomor-skog primorja kao nestabilna zona iz-ložena prodorima s Istoka, koja je svedo Petra Velikog (18. st.) bitno oteža-vala uspostavljanju russtva na svomjugu.

6 – Rusko širenje prema Baltiku idugotrajno hrvanje sa Švedskom kojaje uvelike potisnuta (Poltavska bitka1709. god.) zapečaćeno je osnutkom irazvitkom Sankt Peterburga od 1703.god. Izuzetno značenje mora za ta-dašnju Rusiju vidi se i po tome što je urazdoblju 1712–1918. Sankt Peterburgglavni grad Rusije: luka i prozor u svi-jet važniji su od kopneno zatvorene iizolirane Moskovije.

7 – A – Zbog postojanja mongol-sko-osmanlijske barijere prema juguRusija se morala orijentirati ne samoprema Baltiku, nego i hladnim sjever-nim morima (Bijelo more). U 16. st.osniva se Arhangeljsk, tu djeluju i ču-veni novogordski trgovci. Arhangeljskpostaje (do osnutka Sankt Peterburga)važna ruska luka za trgovinu sa Zapa-dom. U potrazi za krznašima dosiže sei prostor Pečore.

8 – a) – Osvajanjima Ivana Groznog(16. st.) Moskovija je po prvi puta pos-lije Mongola ozbiljno zakoračila na jug(osvojen je i Astrahanjski kanat), pričemu se Rusija približila Vratima na-roda koja vode u Sibir, a omogućeno jei da Volga bude velika ruska životnaokosnica. Rusija time doseže Kaspijskojezero, ali to nema šireg i odlučujućegznačenja, jer ono ne vodi nikuda, osimprema konkurentskoj Perziji.

8 – b) b – Nakon nekadašnjeg nor-manskog (Varjazi) plovidbenog sus-tava Baltik – Zapadna Dvina – Dnjepar– Crno more (spomenuta "grčka ces-ta"), Volga (b) postaje važna unutraš-nja poveznica i životna okosnicaRusije. Prije mongolskog razdoblja saSredozemljem trguju i novogordski

trgovci i to rijekama prema jugu (Crnomore i Konstantinopol).

9 – Krajem 17. st. Rusija zauzimaAzov, što znači da treba ovladati iKerčkim vratima, a 1792. obale Crnogmora do ušća Dnjestra do Novorisijkapripale su Rusiji, nakon što je od Tu-raka osvojena Odessa (1791.), a 1830.anketiran je Krim.

10 – Već u 16. st. počinje ruski pro-dor prema Sibiru. Kao zapreka na tomprodoru stoje jedino udaljenosti, doksve olakšava sibirska demografska ipolitogenetska pustoš.

11 – Da bi djelovala i na Balkanu ukorist balkanskih naroda protiv Tur-ske (18. st.) ruska baltička flota moraobići najveći dio Europe, i to bez pri-jateljskih usputnih luka, i ratovati uposvemašnjem neprijateljskom (os-manlijskom) okruženju.

12 – U ruskom širenju prema jugu,kako bi se carstvo nekako uspostavilou Tjesnacima – snaga same flote nijebila dovoljna, a širenje kopnom nijebilo moguće zbog barijere rumunj-skog etnikuma.

13 – Rješenje ruske maritimneparticipacije bilo je najizglednije 1878.godine sa San Stefanskim mirom, alioni nije moglo biti ostvareno zbogprotivljenja Zapada (Berlinski kon-gres 1878.). Po odredbama San Ste-fanskog mira, Bugarska (i to kaoVelika Bugarska) trebala je imatimostnu ulogu u funkciji ruskog izlazana Egejsko more.

14 – S – Širenje Rusije nema samoteritorijalnu osnovu interesa, nego jepri tome uvijek važno (i najvažnije)rješavanje pitanja pristupa moru, ali iSrbija i Crna Gora su predaleko, izoli-rane su rumunjskim etnikumom, pričemu dugo vremena ni Crna Gora nijeriješila pitanje maritimne participa-cije (tek na Berlinskom kongresu1878., luka Bar), a Srbija nije riješilauopće.

15 – I.–V. – Važna izvanruska sre-dišta moći (osim mongolskog), koja subitno utjecala na njezinu povijest (I –Šveđani, II – Nijemci, III – Poljaci, IV –Litvanci, V – Osmanlije), zbog čega jestrah Rusije od politike okruženja po-vijesno posve utemeljen i razumljiv.Posebno je pri tome važno uočiti da se

Rusija uvijek morala boriti na dvijefronte, onoj baltičkoj, i onoj crnomor-skoj, i to s nekim od tadašnjih najjačiheuropskih i azijskih sila (Švedska,Turska).

16 – Dio granice Europe i Azije.

Zemljovid br. 3.Svojstva 3G položaja ruskihzemalja (geoprometni,geopolitički, geostrateški)

Pitanje 3G položaja Rusije toliko jezamašita tema da bi za sve istinskeskromnike odustajanje bilo najlogič-nije rješenje. Međutim, pri svemu to-me ipak su moguće barem nekenaznake koje u kumulaciji tekstovnogi zemljovidnog dijela pružaju moguć-nosti nekog uvoda u samu temu kojase nadalje prepušta jačim perima.

U ovom prilogu pitanje se razma-tra u okviru cjelovitog russtva kojegčini rusko trojstvo, tj. njezina tri etni-kuma: onaj velikoruski, zatim ukra-jinski i bjelaruski, čemu treba dodati ione rubne prostore koji su s russtvombili na ovaj ili onaj način duže ili kraćevrijeme povezani uz razu-mljive me-đuutjecaje. Pojam "ruskih zemalja" i"ruskog trojstva" može se alternativ-no svesti na pojam "Rusije", što, da-kako, valja razlučiti od RuskeFederacije.

Elementi položaja Rusije – općigeografski vidovi. Navedena temamože se na rezimirajući način sažeti unekoliko točaka: prvo, za ruske zemljeje u najširem (čak i globalnom) smislukarakterističan naglašeni kontrast iz-među zaista golemih kopnenih di-menzija, izuzetno dugih obala, u Svi-jetu maksimalnih dubina teritorija iparticipacije na svjetskim morima(Sjeverno ledeno more, Pacifik) i oso-bina zatvorenosti u odnosu na povolj-na svjetska mora (zatvoren je Baltik,Crno more, zatvoreno je Japanskomore, zatvoreno je Kaspijsko jezero).Otvoreno je jedino Sjeverno ledenomore, otvoreno je i Ohotsko more, alije ta otvorenost od male koristi.

Dok u Zapadnoj Europi položaj uzmore znači poziv u svijet, europska seRusija suočava s ogromnim pros-transtvima Azije, iz koje nadiru i

The issue discussed in this mapwithin the entire Russianhood com-posed of the Russian trinity, i.e. itsthree etnikums: Great Russian, Ukra-inian and Belarus, in addition to al theperipheral areas associated with Ru-ssianhood in one way or another for abrief or longer period of time. Theterms "Russian countries" and "Ru-ssian trinity" can alternatively be re-duced to the term "Russia", which ofcourse has to be distinguished fromthe Russian Federation.

Elements of Russian position –basic geographic modes. This themecan be summarized in several points:first, Russian countries are broadly(even globally) characterized by thecontrast between the truly vast con-tinental part, exceptionally long co-asts, maximum depth of territory inthe World and participation in seas

(Arctic Ocean, Pacific Ocean) and en-closure in relation to favourable glo-bal seas (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Sea ofJapan, Caspian Sea). Only the ArcticOcean and the Sea of Okhotsk areopen, but they are not very useful.

While position near sea in theWestern Europe means an invitationto the word, European Russia is facedwith vast expanses of Asia with itsMongolian and Ottoman dangers.While the rest of the maritime Europeis already preparing for the colonialperiod after recovering from theexhaustive Crusades (11th–13th cen-tury) and the plague (14th century), itwas not until the 15th century thatRussia was freed from Asian conqu-erors and started territorially for-ming Russianhood and was late to setout toward seas (18th century). Theonly advantage favouring Russia was

its closeness and openness toward Si-beria, which would end up as the areaof Russian colonialism (a type of ter-ritorially continuous colonies) inwhich conquests were not deman-ding because Siberia is desolate in allregards and does not hide an indige-nous political will (as was the case inCaucasus and South West Asia). In ad-dition to the enclosure established innatural characteristics, it also followsfrom geostrategic characteristics. Atone time, Russia was enclosed bySweden, Teutons, Lithuania, Polandand Ottoman. Nowadays, it is also en-closed by NATO, meaning it has thetraditional problem of enclosure andrightfully suffers from geopoliticalclaustrophobia.

Furthermore, in a sense Russiahas the ideal intermediate/transitposition between Western and Middle

mongolska i osmalijska opasnost. Idok će se ostala maritimna Europa većpripremati za izlazak u svijet i koloni-jalno razdoblje oporavivši se od iscrp-ljujućih križarskih ratova (11–13. st.) iod kuge (14. st.), Rusija će se tek u 15.st. osloboditi od azijskih osvajača i ot-početi teritorijalno formiranje russ-tva, u svakom slučaju, zakašnjelokrenuti prema morima (18. st.). Jedinaprednost koja će pogodovati Rusiji jestblizina i otvorenost prema Sibiru, toće biti područje ruskog kolonijalizma(tip teritorijalno kontinuiranih kolo-nija) u kojem osvajački zahvati nećebiti zahtjevni, jer je Sibir pust u sva-kom pogledu, ne krije nikakvu autoh-tonu političku volju, i u tom prostorurusstvo ne nailazi na konkurente (kaošto je to bio slučaj na Kavkazu i u ju-gozapadnoj Aziji). Osim navedenog,što je prije svega utemeljeno u priro-doslovnim osobinama, zatvorenostslijedi i iz geostrateških osobina, takoda je nekada Rusija bila zatvorena i odŠvedske, Teutonaca, Litve, Poljske iOsmanlija, a danas i od NATO-a, Rusija,dakle, osjeća tradicionalni problemokruženja i s pravom trpi od geopoli-tičke klaustrofobije.

Zatim, u određenom smislu, Rusijaima idealan posrednički/tranzitnipoložaj između zapadne i SrednjeEurope i životnih žarišta na Dalekomistoku (Kina, Japan, Koreja). Međutim,taj je položaj ostao gotovo nevalorizi-ran: udaljenosti su velike, između na-vedenih životnih žarišta postoji samodemografski i gospodarski desertum(osim donekle na jugu Sibira, gdje ćeproć Transsibirska željeznica), (ne)-mogućnosti kopnenih komunikacijatjeraju u očaj, velike su rijeke, istina,plovne, ali posve beskorisno teku uSjeverno ledeno more, što znači da sene može pronaći niti jedna prednostkoja bi bilo prispodobiva maritimnimmogućnostima Zapada, iako taj Zapadsve do 1869. god (Sueski prokop) po-vezuje svoje atlantsko pročelje s Dale-kim istokom – oko Afrike: to je zaistadaleko, ali se isplati, pri čemu je izu-zetno važna jedna prednost: nemasukoba s protivnicima na kopnu, mo-ru se može posvetiti u cijelosti. Važnoje naglasiti da niti nakon izgradnje

Transsibirske željeznice (9441 km –mandžurska inačica dovršena 1901., aamurska 1916. godine). Rusija nije is-koristila potencijalnu ulogu europ-skog dalekoistočnog mosta, čak niti uonoj kraćoj varijanti (veza Transsi-birske željeznice i Beijinga prekoMongolije), a što je posebno karakte-ristično, tako je i danas, jer Kina pro-dire na europska tržišta, neposredstvom Ruske Federacije, negomorskim putem preko Sueskog pro-kopa (a odatle i interes za Pirej, Rijekui nizinsku željeznicu Rijeke prema za-leđu), a vrijedi to čak i onda kada su upitanju crnomorske luke. Jedino štonas podsjeća na povijesno tranzitnuulogu Rusije jest trenutak kada pije-mo "ruski čaj", koji je zapravo – kine-ski.

Sve u svemu, zaostalost Rusije imavažna i opravdana opravdanja: dok jedrugima more poklonjeno, ona se zanjega morala krvavo boriti, sukobilase (i iscrpljivala) s dva izrazita osvaja-ča svjetskih razmjera (Mongoli,Osmanlije). Rusija je tako ostala izvanglavnih životnih tokova i nije se moglauključiti u tranzitne funkcije u odno-su na Daleki istok, u Europi je ostalaizvan životnih tokova koji su vezani uzLevant, ostala je izvan veza Atlantik –Mitteleuropa i Sredozemlje – Mitte-leuropa, a navedeno bili su važni po-kretači svekolikog razvoja. Svenavedeno može se provjeriti na prilo-ženim zemljovidima, koji očito otva-raju i nova pitanja.

Osnove zemljopisnog položajaruskih zemalja. Rusko trojstvo (Rusija,Ukrajina i Bjelarus i osvojene zemlje iinteresna područja).

1 – a) S obzirom na kopneni ka-rakter ruskih regija jezgre, izvornoodijeljenih od mora – svaki je govor opoložaju Rusije/ruskog trojstva nuž-no započeti s problemom pristupamorima i jezerima koja su uglavnomsvugdje zatvorenog značaja (Baltik,Crno more, Kaspijsko jezero, Japanskomore).

1 – b) A, A1 – međutim, postoji iruski pristup otvorenim morima(Sjeverno ledeno more, Ohotsko mo-re, A1) ali je taj položaj od malog zna-čenja.

1 – c) A1, Ohotsko more je takođerjedno Sredozemlje, ali vrlo specifič-nog karaktera, jer je od Pacifika odije-ljeno samo jednom otočnom zonom.Ohotsko i Japansko more (B) može sepromatrati i kao jedno jedinstvenoSredozemlje, koje se, kao i klasičnoSredozemlje, sastoji od dvojstva:Ohotskog i Japanskog mora odijelje-nih Tatarskim prolazom. Važnostparticipacije Rusije na otvorenimmorima bitno je umanjeno činjeni-com da su ona daleko od vlastitih ru-skih i ostalih, pogotovo europskihživotnih težišta.

2 – Izlazi/prolazi koji povezuju ja-pansko sredozemlje s ostalim svjet-skim morem nisu kontroliraniisključivo od Rusije, nego i od Japana(prolaz La Perousa), a za izlaz iz Ja-panskog mora prolaz Tsušima/Korej-ski prolaz kontroliraju još Japan iKoreja. Tatarski prolaz, kao vezaOhotskog i Japanskog mora samo jeprivid kada je riječ o modernoj plo-vidbi. Inače, Ohotsko more, kao jednood svjetskih sredozemnih mora, u ko-jem apsolutno dominira Ruska fede-racija, ima za nju bitnostrateško/obrambeno značenje.

3 – Murmansk – jedina istinski re-levantna ruska luka locirana na otvo-renom moru.

4 – – Velika i snažna povijesnaruska životna žarišta u Euroaziji, –kinesko životno žarište. Važno je na-glasiti da se kopnene veze između tadva životna žarišta nisu nikada moglemjeriti s onim pomorskim izmeđueuropskog Zapada i Indije/Kine(Mandžurija, Prava Kina), bilo okoAfrike, bilo putem Sueskog prokopaod 1869. iako su udaljenosti na tomeuroazijskom kopnenom pravcu da-leko manje, a isto tako manje i mo-gućnosti osporavanja od straneregionalnih čimbenika.

5 – 1 – Kao izvorno kopnena zem-lja koja je uvijek, bez obzira na svojeimpresivno teritorijalno širenje bilaizolirana od svjetskih mora, Rusija senužno morala okrenuti azijskom kop-nu, a pretpostavka za to bio je velikiinteres za velike prometne putove.Čak niti čuvena Transsibirska željez-nica (1), koja se s pravom smatra za

All of this can be verified using thesemaps, which obviously raise new qu-estions.

Basics of geographic positions ofRussian countries. Russian trinity(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and conqu-ered countries and areas of interest)

1 – a) – Considering the continen-tal character of Russian core regions,which were initially separated fromsea – any discussion about the positi-on of Russia/Russian trinity has to bestarted by analysing the issue of ac-cess to seas and lakes, most of whichare closed (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Cas-pian Sea, Sea of Japan).

1 – b) A, A1 – however, Russians al-so have access to open seas (ArcticOcean, the Sea of Okhotsk, A1), but itis not significant.

1 – c) A1 – The Sea of Okhotsk canalso be considered Mediterranean,but very specific, because the onlything separating it from the Pacific isan insular zone. The Sea of Okhotskand the Sea of Japan (B) can also beconsidered as a unique Mediterrane-an, which also consists of two partslike the classical Mediterranean: theSea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japandivided by the Strait of Tartary. Theimportance of Russian participationin open seas is significantly dimini-shed by the fact that they are far fromRussian and other (especially Euro-pean) centres.

2 – Exits/passages connecting theJapanese Mediterranean with otherglobal seas are not controlled exclu-sively by Russia, but also Japan (LaPerouse), and the exit of the JapaneseSea, the Korea Strait is controlled byJapan and Korea. The Strait of Tartary,as the connection between the Sea ofOkhotsk and the Sea of Japan is onlyan illusion when modern navigationis considered. The Sea of Okhotsk, as aglobal Mediterranean sea with abso-lute domination of the Russian Fede-ration, is only important for Russiastrategically and defensively.

3 – Murmansk – the only truly re-levant Russian harbour located in theopen sea

4 – – Great and powerful Russi-an foci in Eurasia, - Chinese focus. Itis important to emphasize that conti-

nental connections between the twofoci could never measure up againstthe maritime ones between the Euro-pean West and India/China (Manc-huria, True China), neither aroundAfrica nor via the Suez Canal from1869, even though distances in theEurasian continental connection we-re much shorter and the probabilitiesof opposing by regional factors lesser.

5 – 1 – As a primarily continentalcountry which has always been isola-ted from global seas, regardless of itsimpressive territorial expansion, itwas necessary for Russia to turn tothe Asian continent, and great inte-rest in great transport routes was aprecondition. Even the prominentTrans-Siberian Railway (1), which isrightfully considered one of Russianconstruction enterprises, could notcompete with maritime connections,but it still represented the first andtruly significant opening and con-necting of Europe with Siberia andthe Far East (if one does not count theold Silk Road dating back to Rome, butwhich only related to a part of Chinaand not the Far East in the broad sen-se). Considering the Russian Trans-Siberian connection to Vladivostok,the Manchurian Railway (Chita-Har-bin-Vladivostok) complete in 1901 al-so has to be mentioned (1a). However,its significant disadvantage is not be-ing on Russian territory, which can bedangerous considering Japanese am-bitions related to Manchuria, becauseof which Russia constructed indirec-tly to Vladivostok (Amurian version).As a Northern route, the Trans-Sibe-rian Railway was not able to continuethe Silk Road tradition, which mostlywithered during the global maritimeperiod and its adequate renovationwas simply not possible. The old SilkRoad avoided the forest and relief en-closure of the South Siberia, as well aslarge flows, which were not open untilthe Trans-Siberian Railway – and thustwo great transport lines in Eurasiacompletely missed each other, whichis actually a good thing, because con-flicts were avoided. Russia could notbe involved in expansive conquests inthe South and build a transcontinen-tal railway there; the Silk Road

Europe and focal points in the Far East(China, Japan, Korea). However, thatposition is almost not utilized at all:distances are great, there is only de-mographic and economical desert(except in the South of Siberia and theTrans-Siberian Railway), (in)abilitiesof continental communication arehopeless, rivers are long and naviga-ble, but they uselessly flow toward theArctic Ocean, which means there isnot a single advantage to be comparedto maritime possibilities of the West,even though until 1869 (Suez Canal)the West connects its Atlantic frontwith the Far East – around Africa: it isreally far, but it pays off, with an im-portant advantage: there are nostruggles with rivals on the mainlandand the sea can be dedicated to com-pletely. It is important to point outthat even the construction of theTrans-Siberian Railway (9441 km –Manchurian version complete in 1901and Amurian in 1916) did not enableRussia to take advantage of the po-tential role of European Far East brid-ge, not even the shorter variant(connection of the Trans-Siberia Ra-ilway and Beijing via Mongolia), andwhat is especially characteristic, evennowadays, because China is breakingthrough to European markets, not viathe Russian Federation, but on the seathrough the Suez Canal (from whichthere is also interest in Piraeus, Rijekaand the railway between Rijeka andhinterland), which is true even whenBlack Sea harbours are in question.The only thing reminding us of thehistorically transit role of Russia iswhen we drink "Russian tea", which isactually – Chinese.

Altogether, Russia’s backwardnesshas important and reasonable justifi-cation: while others were endowedwith sea, Russia had to fiercely fightfor it, it struggled with (and exhaus-ted) two impressive global conquerors(Mongolians, Ottomans). Thus Russiawas left out of the mainstream andcould not be involved in transit func-tions of the Far East, and in Europe itwas excluded from the mainstreamrelated to Levant and Atlantic – Mit-teleuropa and Mediterranean – Mit-teleuropa, which drove development.

jedan od ruskih građevinarskih po-duhvata (uvelike izgrađena na osnovikažnjeničkog rada), nije mogla kon-kurirati pomorskim vezama, ali je ipakznačila prvo i zaista bitno otvaranje ipovezivanje Europe sa Sibirom i Dale-kim istokom (ako ne računamo starijePuteve svile koji datiraju još od dobaRima, ali koji se odnose samo na dio Ki-ne, a ne i Daleki istok u širem smislu). Uvezi s ruskom Transsibirskom vezomza Vladivostok, treba spomenuti iMandžursku istočno-kinesku željezni-cu (Čita-Harbin-Vladivostok) dovršenu1901. god. (1a), koja međutim, ima bitninedostatak što nije na ruskom teritori-ju, a to može biti opasnu u odnosu najapanske ambicije prema Mandžuriji,zbog čega je Rusija poduzela gradnjuzaobilaznom rutom prema Vladivos-toku (amurska inačica). Transsibirskaželjeznica kao sjevernija ruta ipak nijemogla nastaviti tradiciju Puta svile,koji kao životna i prometna veza uveli-ke zamire u doba globalnog maritim-nog razdoblja i njezina adekvatnaobnova jednostavno nije bila moguća.Stari Put svile izbjegavao je šumsku ireljefnu zatvorenost južnog Sibira, kaoi velike tokove, što je sve otvorila tekTranssibirska željeznica – i tako su sedva velika prometna/životna pravca uEuroaziji posve mimoišla, što je zapra-vo dobro, jer su izbjegnuti sukobi. Ru-sija se nije mogla upuštati u opsežnijaosvajanja na jugu, i tamo graditi tran-skontinentalnu željeznicu, Put svile jeizbjegao sjeverniju rusku dominaciju ifizičko – geografske probleme.

6 – a) 1b – Željeznički prodor izEurope prema Pravoj Kini naglašen je iželjezničkom prugom Ulan Ude –Ulaan Baatar – Peking iz sredine 1950-ih godina. Ulaan Baatar je staro trgo-vačko središte za Rusiju i Kinu, ali taželjeznička pruga nije značila povezi-vanje Europe i Kine preko Mongolije iRusije.

6 – a) 2 – Pruga europska Rusija –Kazahstan – Džungarska vrata – Uj-gurija – Urumči – ostala Kina, takođerne znači bitniji prilog vezama Europe iDalekog istoka.

6 – b) – Džunagrska vrata7 – 3 – Kada je riječ o perspektivi

prodora na Istok, onda treba spome-nuti pomorski put (Glavsevmor put)

duž sjeverne obale europske Rusije iSibira, što će ovisiti o klimatskim pro-mjenama i drugim političkim pitanji-ma.

8 – N – Geopolitički je položaj Rusi-je kao međuprostora o odnosu na In-diju i Kinu takav da nije mogućeisključiti niti mogućnost da su posto-jale francuske ambicije u doba Napo-leona početkom 19. st., kako bi sepreko Rusije (koja je i sama po sebi za-mašit i dragocjen cilj) doseglo još jedanpredragocjeni cilj, a to je Indija prekokopnenog mosta, jer to nije bilo mo-guće postići morem zbog britanskemoći, bilo na pravcu oko Afrike, bilokasnije posredstvom Sueskog prokopa,pri čemu je temeljito nepoznavanje fi-zičke geografije također imalo svogudjela u imperijalističkim tlapnjama.

9 – Međuprostor između ru-ske/europske životne jezgre i Indije sinteresima Rusije i V. Britanije za pro-dorom prve prema Indiji, odnosnodruge prema unutrašnjosti Azije. Tajstepsko – polupustinjski – pustinjskiprostor relativno je lako savladiv idućiiz Rusije, ali je prema jugu zagrađenvisokim gorskim nizom Hindukuša(7750 m) i Tjan-šana (7439 m).

10 – Zbog različito usmjerenih in-teresa (ruskog i britanskog) logično jeda je u ovom prostoru nastala jednatamponska tvorevina (Afganistan) sprovincijom Wakhan dugom oko 200km, a širokom na najužem mjestusvega oko 20 km, koja je odijeljivalaruske i britanske interese, sve na os-novici vojno-politički nesavladivogafganistanskog etnikuma, čijoj ne-savladivosti svjedočimo i dan-danas.

11 – T, I – Prostrani, brojčano, voj-no i civilizacijski snažni etnikumiTurske i Perzije koji su nakon ruskogsavladavanja Kavkaza (19. st.) sprije-čili daljnji prodor Rusije prema toplimmorima.

12 – Povijesna Vrata naroda.

Zemljovid br. 4.Osnove položajnosti Mongolije

U odnosu na različite vrste polo-žaja, Mongolija je u Svijetu zaista je-dinstven slučaj:1) Ona je već dugo vremena (od 17.

st.) locirana između dviju očito

ekspanzionističkih velevlasti, pričemu treba uočiti i snage i dimen-zije, ta riječ je o – Rusiji i Kini. A talokacija očito ne može donijeti ni-šta dobra u doba kada se ostvarujeuvelike izvorna politička podjelaSvijeta, koja je danas uglavnomdovršena.

2) A da bi stvar bila još i gora i teža –Mongolija je u skupini LLC država(Land Locked Countries), što značida ne može imati prekomorskesaveznike koji niti ne mogu savla-dati izolacionu ulogu nametnutuposredstvom i Rusije i Kine.

3) Mongolija je tamponska zona po-ložena (dijelom) između vrlo gus-to naseljene Prave Kine i praktičkipustog i praznog Sibira, koji jepravi demografski i životni deser-tum (osim u uskoj zoni na jugu). Ataj dodir i položaj između spome-nutih kontrasta isto tako u bu-dućnosti ne može donijeti ništadobra. I najzad,

4) Mongolija je tamponski među-prostor u geostrateškom smisluizmeđu jedne velevlasti koja sevraća kao stara/nova moć u glo-balne odnose (Rusija) i jedne dru-ge velevlasti koja nahrupljuje nasva vrata i prozore globalnih od-nosa (Kina).

Imajući sve to u vidu, važno je is-taknuti jedan novi, pozitivni i relaksi-rajući momenat, a taj je: Mongolijaima uvjeta da između spomenutih ve-levlasti postane i provozni prostor ipoveznica. Dijelom je to već ostvarenoželjezničkom vezom od Transsibirskeželjeznice (Ulan Ude preko Ulaan Ba-atara za Peking), a moguće je da ćeuslijediti i povezanost energetskimcjevovodima, i to na jasnim osnova-ma: Sibir ima velike izvore energena-ta, Kina postaje nezajažljivi potrošač,a Mongolija je povoljno locirani me-đuprostor.

1 – a) 1-4 – Turkijsko (1) – tatarsko(2) – mongolsko (3) – mandžurska zo-na (4) važna od 17. st. kao diobeni/iz-olacioni prostor (I) između russtva(R) i hanstva (H) u Euroaziji. Iako su utu zonu prodirali i Rusi (dio Swasiae,"pet država" i Tuva) i Kina (17. st.) pu-tem dinastije mandžu koja se 1644.

avoided Northern Russian dominati-on and physical-geographical issues.

6 – a) 1b – railway breach fromEurope toward True China is also ac-centuated by the Ulan Ude – Ulan Ba-tor – Beijing railway from the mid1950’s. Ulan Bator is an old centre ofcommerce for Russia and China, butthe railway did not imply connectingEurope and China via Mongolia andRussia. 2 – Railway European Russia –Kazakhstan – Jungar Gate – Uiguria –Urumchi – rest of China also did notentail a significant connection bet-ween Europe and the Far East.

6 – b) – Jungar Gate.7 – When the perspective of the

breach of the East is considered, onehas to note the maritime route (Glav-sevmor Route) along the Northerncoast of European Russia and Siberia,which is going to depend on climatechanges and other political issues.

8 – N – Geopolitical position ofRussia as a buffer zone in relation toIndia and China is such that one is notable to exclude the possibility ofFrench ambitions during the period ofNapoleon at the beginning of the 19thcentury, in order to reach anotherprecious goal via Russia (which is itselfa precious goal) which is India via thecontinent, because it was not possibleto accomplish on sea due to Britishpower around Africa or via the SuezCanal, where a fundamental lack ofphysical geography also played a rolein imperialist delusions.

9 – Buffer zone between Russi-an/European core and India with in-terests of Russia and Great Britain inbreaching India and other countriesin Asia’s interior. The steppe-half de-sert-desert area is easily surmounta-ble from Russia, but its Southern partis inaccessible due to the mountains ofHindu Kush (7750 m) and Tian Shan(7439 m).

10 – Due to different interests(Russian and British), a logical con-clusion was the creation of a bufferzone in this area (Afghanistan) withthe Wakhan province about 200 kmlong and only 20 km wide at the nar-rowest part which divided Russianand British interests based on the mi-litarily-politically indomitable Afghan

etnikum, which is still indomitablenowadays.

11 – T,I – Expansive, numerous,militarily and civilization strong et-nikums of Turkey and Persia whostopped further breach of Russiatoward warm seas after Russianconquest of Caucasus (19th century).

12 – Historical Doorway of Nation.

MapNo. 4Basic Position Characteristics ofMongolia

Mongolia is truly a unique case inthe World in relation to various typesof position:1) It has been located between two

clearly expansionist big powers(since 17th century), Russia andChina, and one has to considertheir power and size. Such a lo-cation can obviously not be go-od during a period of originalpolitical division of the Worldwhich has mostly been comple-ted.

2) Another problem is Mongolia be-ing an LLC (Land Locked Country),which means it can not haveoverseas allies who can not evenovercome the isolation imposedby Russia and China.

3) Mongolia is a buffer zone partiallybetween the densely populatedTrue China and practically deso-late Siberia, which is a true de-mographic desert (except thenarrow zone in the South). Such acontact and position betweencontrasts can not bode well in thefuture. Finally,

4) Mongolia is a geostrategical buf-fer zone between one big power,which returns as an old/newpower in global relations (Russia)and another one, which invadesglobal relations (China).

Considering everything menti-oned, it is important to point out anew, positive and relaxing moment:Mongolia has conditions to become alinking zone. It has already partiallybeen realized by the Trans-SiberianRailway (Ulan Ude via Ulan Bator toBeijing), and it is possible an energy

pipeline will follow on clear foundati-ons: Siberia has great energy sources,China has become an insatiable con-sumer and Mongolia is a favourablylocated buffer zone.

1 – a) 1-4 – Turkish (1) – Tatar (2) –Mongolian (3) – Manchurian zone (4)important since the 17th century asan isolation space (I) between Russi-anhood (R) and Hanhood (H) in Eura-sia. Although both Russia (part ofSwasia, "five countries" and Tuva)and China (17th century) invaded thezone, it was still a buffer zone stop-ping both Russia and China, whichwas fortunate for Asia, because Russi-an and Chinese imperialism as greatpolitical forces with ambitions andlarge territories were not in conflict.

1 – b) – Part of Swasia invadedby Russians to the Afghan province ofWakhan (1895) in the 19th century,while further expansion was not po-ssible (Persian and British interests),which means the isolation came intoeffect (there was no isolation in the13th century, when the impressiveMongolian expansion began towardthe West, because Russians were faraway, and Siberia was not owned byanyone, but the isolation came intofull effect in the 17th century; in 1991,Soviets retreated from the area of "fi-ve countries", which also indicates is-olation).

1 – c) – The area of Tuva (TannuTuva) became a part of USSR in 1944,after a long and intricate history in-cluding Russia and China.

1 – d) 2,3 – In the 17th century,Mongolia became a part of China andfortified its buffer role toward Russia,which expanded toward Siberia: in1648, Russians breached the ChukchiPeninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk in1649.

1 – e) 4 – Manchurian etnikumimposed upon China from 1644 to1912, which means the mentionedbuffer zone (1–4) also has an offensi-ve/expansionist meaning, but is alsoan important constant: dividing Ru-ssianhood from Hanhood.

1 – f) M – Mongolian core region(13th century), which moved towardOuter Mongolia (capital of Karako-rum).

uspostavila u Kini), ipak je to bilaizolaciona zona preko koje nisu us-pjeli prijeći ni Rusija, a niti Kina, što jebila sreća za Aziju, jer se ruski i kineskiimperijalizam kao velike političke vo-lje i ambicije i teritorijalne cjeline navelikim prostorima nisu sukobljavali.

1 – b) – dio Swasije u koju pro-diru Rusi u 19. st. do afganistanskeprovincije Wakhan (1895), dok daljnješirenje nije bilo moguće (perzijski ibritanski interesi), što znači da i tudolazi do izražaja izolaciono značenje

(u 13. st. kada počinje impresivno ši-renje Mongola prema zapadu diobe-no/izolaciono značenje još ne postoji,jer su Rusi daleko, a Sibir nije ničiji, aliće ono u 17. st. doći do punog izražaja;godine 1991. Sovjeti će se povući izprostora "pet država", što takođernaglašava izolaciono značenje).

1 – c) – Područje Tuva (Tanu Tuva)koje je nakon duge i vrlo zapletenepovijesti, u kojoj su sudjelovali i Rusijai Kina, priključeno SSSR-u 1944. godi-ne.

1 – d) 2,3 – U 17. st. Mongolija jepotpala pod Kinu i time učvrstila svo-ju ulogu tampona prema Rusiji, kojase intenzivno širi po Sibiru: 1648. go-dine Rusi će prodrijeti do Čukotskogpoluotoka, a 1649. do Ohotskog mora.

1 – e) 4 – Mandžurski etnikum kojise nametnuo Kini od 1644. do 1912,što znači da spomenuti izolacioniprostor (1–4) ima i ofenzivno/eks-panzionističko značenje, ali je važna ikonstanta: odjeljivanje russtva odhanstva.

2 – Gradual expansion of Russian-hood from European core regionstoward the East is especially impor-tant in the 17th century (Yeniseisk1618, Yakutsk 1632, Okhotsk 1649,Alaska 1741, Kamchatka 1725, foun-dation of Vladivostok in 1860)

3 – In contrast, China expandedtoward the West, but with the menti-oned buffer zone between Russian-hood and Hanhood, so that the twoimperialisms missed each other inAsia, which was fortunate. In 1885,Xinjiang became a part of China(completely in 1949), in 1652 Tibet re-cognized China (completely in 19520);it is important to note that new Chinawas not interested in Russia and neit-her was Russia interested in China,except the Far East (Amur Oblast, Pri-morsky Krai), all of which secured pe-ace in Asia. In addition, there was thementioned buffer zone (1–4).

4 – Neither the Russians nor theChinese ruled the Mongolian areapermanently, the Russians managedto conquer the old Mongolian coreregion South East of Lake Baikal, butOuter Mongolia stayed intact.

5 – Railway connection betweenthe Trans-Siberian Railway and Be-ijing from the 1950’s.

MapNo. 5European Buffer Zones on Landand Sea

Fate of a buffer zone is one of themost important issues in understan-ding political-geographical/geopoli-tical reality of Europe because bufferzones are always a problem of relati-ons between larger and strongerpowers, which means the fate of abuffer zone is determined by others,up to the moment when they start

realizing special sovereignties basedon their own political will.

There are four characteristic buf-fer zones in Europe and the borderbetween Europe and Asia: 1) Finnishbetween Sweden and Russia, 2 – Polishbetween Germany and Russia, 3 – Bal-kan (including the medieval andMediterranean Croatia, originally bet-ween Rome and Constantinople, sub-sequently between Austria-Hungaryand Turkey), and 4 – Caucasus areabetween Russia, Turkey and Persia.

By definition, a buffer zone is aborder territory between larger cen-tres of power whose conquests/re-treats significantly affect its politicaland economic fate. Therefore, the ge-opolitical/life fate of a buffer zone isalways unfavourable, even though abuffer zone can also be under positiveinfluence of a more developed civi-lization, such as the Polish or Balkan

1 – f) M – mongolska regija jezgre(13. st), koja se pomiče prema VanjskojMongoliji (prijestolnica Karakorum).

2 – Postupno širenje russtva izeuropske regije jezgre prema istokunaročito važno u 17. st. (Jenisejsk 1618,Jakutsk 1632, Ohotsk 1649, da bi se1741. stiglo u Aljasku, 1725. na Kam-čatku, a 1860. bio osnovan Vladivos-tok).

3 – Za razliku, Kina se širi premaZapadu, ali tako da između russtva ihanstva ostaje spomenuta izolacionazona, tako da su se ta dva imperijaliz-ma u Aziji mimoišla, što je bila vrlosretna okolnost. Godine 1885. Xinjiangdolazi pod Kinu (definitivno 1949.),godine 1652. Tibet priznaje vlast Kine(definitivno 1950.), važno je pri tomeuočiti da novovjeka Kina nije imalainteresa za Rusiju, a niti Rusija za Kinu,osim na Dalekom istoku (Poamurje,Primorski kraj), što je sve osiguralomir u Aziji. A osim toga, postoji i spo-menuta tamponska zona (1–4).

4 – Ni Rusi, a ni Kinezi nisu trajnozavladali mongolskim prostorom, is-tina, Rusi su se domogli stare mon-golske regije jezgre jugoistočnije odBajkalskog jezera, ali je Vanjska Mon-golija ostala nedirnuta.

5 – Željeznička veza između Tran-ssibirske željeznice i Pekinga iz 1950-ih godina.

Zemljovid br. 5.Europski međuprostori na kopnu imoru

Pitanje životne sudbine međupro-stora jedno je od bitnih u razumi-je-vanju političko-geografske/geopoli--tičke stvarnosti Europe, i to iz razlogajer su međuprostori uvijek problemodnosa među onima većim i snažni-jima, što znači da u političku/životnusudbinu međuprostora određuju onidrugi, i to sve do trenutka kada se umeđuprostoru počnu ostvarivati pos-ebne državnosti na osnovici vlastitepolitičke volje.

U europskim okvirima, ali i nagranici Europe prema Aziji, postoječetiri karakteristična međuprostora:1) finski između Švedske i Rusije, 2)poljski između Njemačke i Rusije, 3)balkanski (kojemu i ovom slučaju

treba pridodati i srednjoeuropsku imediteransku Hrvatsku, izvorno iz-među Rima i Konstantinopolisa, a za-tim između Austrougarske i Turske), i4) kavkaski između Rusije, Turske iPerzije.

Po definiciji, međuprostor je gra-nični teritorij između većih središtamoći koje osvajalaštvom/povlače-njem bitno utječu na njegovu poli-tičku i gospodarsku sudbinu. Zato jegeopolitička/životna sudbina među-prostora uvijek nepovoljna, iako me-đuprostor može biti i pod pozitivnimutjecajem neke razvijenije civilizacije,kao onaj poljski i balkanski, na granicigermanskog i romanskog svijeta. Pro-blem je međuprostora da se na povi-jesnim odnosima snaga ne možetrajno uspostaviti/održati, u smislupostojanja države, koje se u europ-skim međuprostorima ostvaruju tek u20. st., i to ne uvijek i ne svugdje. Takokavkaski prostor, tj. Predkavkazje, za-pravo je još i danas u okviru krajnjezakašnjelog ruskog kolonijalnog sus-tava, koji je uvelike nestao 1990-ihgodina (ali u Predkavkazju još ne upotpunosti) gdje i dalje traju pokušajiosnivanja muslimanske državnosti(emirat) – zato Predkavkazje i danaskarakterizira status nedovršene poli-togeneze, baš kao i u slučaju BiH, Ko-sova, (ili još drastičnije – Transdnji-strije, ali bez izgleda za neki povoljniregionalni rezultat). Povijesno gleda-no, u najnepovoljnijoj su situaciji onimeđuprostori koji se nalaze na puta-njama jakih žarišta moći, a takav jeupravo balkanski međuprostor.

1 – a) Kopneni europski među-prostori: 1 – švedsko-ruski (spramFinske), 2 – njemačko-ruski (spramPoljske), 3 – austrougarsko-turski (naBalkanu i rubovima) i 4 – rusko-turskina Kavkazu. Pri svem je važno spo-menuti da germanski prodor na Istoki ruski na Zapad ostaju u okviru istogkontinenta, dok je onaj osmanlijski nasjeverozapad, a austrijski na jugoistokmeđukontinentalnog karaktera.

1 – b) Posve specifičnog značaja jemeđuprostor Sjevernog mora, s inte-resima Velike Britanije i Njemačke. Utom akvatoriju V. Britanija mora po-tiskivati Njemačku, dok Nizozemskanije u igri, jer za nju Sjeverno more ne

znači mnogo u odnosu na njezine in-terese na dalekim i debelim morima.

1 – c) U Europi pored navedenihpostoje još dva međuprostora – to sunizozemski i švicarski, i to na tipičnimlokacijama mogućih različitih utjeca-ja: britanskih, njemačkih i francuskihu slučaju Nizozemske i njemačkih,austrijskih i francuskih u slučaju Švi-carske. Održavanje malih naroda natakvim lokacijama pravi je podvig: uslučaju Švicarske on je razumljiv – ži-votna sredina tu pruža vrlo malo(mala prehrambena baza i ostale siro-vine), novi eventualni životni prostorveličinom nije impresivan, obrambe-ne su mogućnosti velike, nema nitinekih značajnijih prometnih pravaca,izlaz na Sredozemlje zapriječavabrojni i snažni talijanski etnikum –zbog svega navedenog Švicarska (u13. st. pod dominacijom habsburških isavojskih grofova) praktički pred-stavlja međuprostor koji je međuna-rodno priznat tek 1648. godine.Donekle slične osobine vrijede i za Ni-zozemsku, ali za potpisanog ostajenepoznanica kako se jedan relativnomali narod mogao održati i superior-no razviti na takvom važnom i osjet-ljivom geografskom/geopolitičkompoložaju i u krajnje nepovoljnim pri-rodoslovnim uvjetima, kao što to vri-jedi za širi prostor ušća Rajne, tj. naušću jedne velike rijeke, koja otvaraprostrano i gospodarski važno zaleđe,i vodenim i kopnenim putem. Objaš-njenja koja su potpisanom pristupač-na postoje, ali ona nisu dovoljna. Štose tiče Njemačke, ona nema snage zajoš jednu novu frontu (ona francuskasasvim je dovoljna), osim toga, Nje-mačka na Sjevernom moru raspolažesvojim lukama, V. Britanija i Francu-ska su više orijentirane prema debe-lim morima, također imaju svoje luke,čemu treba dodati neprijepornu sna-gu samog holandskog etnikuma ("Bogje stvorio zemlju, a Holanđani su je zasebe napravili sami!"). A tom je etni-kumu nezavisnost priznata još od1648. god., dakle, nakon dominacijeHabsburgovaca iz Španjolske, koji su,uostalom, bili isuviše daleko, da bitrajno mogli biti odlučujući/vladaju-ći/politički čimbenik. I najzad, ušćeRajne dugo je vremena jedan od

one, on the border of the Germanicand Romanic world. The problemwith a buffer zone is that its power cannot be established or maintained per-manently on historical relations, inthe sense of being a country, whichdoes not establish in European bufferzones prior to the 20th century, andneither always or everywhere. Thusthe area of Caucasus, i.e. Pre-Cauca-sus, is nowadays really still within thelate Russian colonial system, most ofwhich disappeared in 1990’s (but notcompletely in Pre-Caucasus), wherethere are still attempts of establishingMuslim sovereignty (emirate) – the-refore Pre-Caucasus is still characte-rized by status of unfinishedpolitogenesis, just like Bosnia andHerzegovina and Kosovo (or evenmore drastic – Transnistria (Transd-niestria), but without a chance for so-me favourable regional result).Historically, buffer zones in path ofcentres of power are in the worst si-tuation, and the Balkan buffer zone isexactly that type of buffer zone.

1 – a) – Continental European buf-fer zones: 1 – Swedish-Russian (in re-lation to Finland), 2 – German-Russian(in relation to Poland), 3 – Austrian-Hungarian-Turkish (in the Balkansand the edges) and 4 – Russian-Tur-kish on Caucasus. It is important tomention that the Germanic invasionto the East and the Russian to the Westremained on the same continent,while the Ottoman one to the Nort-hwest and the Austrian toward theSoutheast were intercontinental.

1 – b) – Buffer zone of the NorthSea is very specific, with interests ofGreat Britain and Germany. In this seaarea, Great Britain had to overpowerGermany, while The Netherlands wasnot active, because it was not as inte-rested in the North Sea as it was indistant and deep seas.

1 – c) There are two additionalbuffer zones in Europe – the Dutchand the Swiss ones in typical locationsof various possible influences: British,German and French for the Dutch oneand German, Austrian and French forthe Swiss one. Maintaining small po-pulations in such locations is a diffi-

cult endeavour: it is understandablefor Switzerland – the environmentdoes not offer much there (small foodbase and other resources), the newpossible space is not impressive in si-ze, defensive capabilities are strong,there are no significant transport ro-utes, exit to the Mediterranean isblocked by numerous and powerfulItalian etnikum, – therefore Switzer-land (dominated by Habsburg andSavoyan countries) is practically abuffer zone which was not recognizedinternationally until 1648. Similarholds true for The Netherlands, butthis author does not understand howsuch a small nation could have pre-served and developed on such an im-portant and sensitive geographic/geopolitical area and in very unfavo-urable natural conditions, i.e. the wi-der area of the mouth of Rhine, themouth of a large river which opens anexpansive and economically impor-tant hinterland, both on water andland. There are explanations, but theyare not enough. Considering Ger-many, it did not have energy foranother new front (the French one isquite enough). In addition, Germanyhas harbours in the North Sea, whileGreat Britain and France are moreoriented toward deep seas, they alsohave their own harbours, with theundeniable force of the Dutch etni-kum also worth mentioning ("Godcreated earth, and the Dutch peoplecreated it for themselves!"). This et-nikum had its independence recog-nized as early as 1648, i.e. after theSpanish domination by Habsburgs,who were too far away to be a cruci-al/governing/political factor. Finally,the mouth of Rhine had long been ahydrographically entirely disorderedarea (meliorations still continue). Inaddition, conquerors unwillingly en-ter areas they would have to makepurposeful, because the logic ofconquering is clear: use the existingand accomplished and do not makepersonal effort.

It is important that Rotterdam iscompeting with Amsterdam, so theconstruction of a new water route (Ni-euwe Waterweg) in the second half of

the 19th century opens up new possi-bilities. In addition, it is already time inwhich no foreign interest can questionThe Netherlands as a country.

However, this is not everything –not only is The Netherlands a bufferzone, but the same is true for thearea of Scheldt (Belgium). It beco-ming a country in 1831 obviouslyhad some international geopoliticalfactors at work, i.e. a buffer zonebetween Germany and France wasnecessary.

2 – A problematic buffer zone forsome political forces is still Bosnia andHerzegovina.

3 – a) – The Balkan buffer zone isin the most difficult historical situati-on because it is located on the trajec-tory of an intercontinental interest,which refers to Mitteleuropa and thePersian Gulf (Baghdad Railway),which is much wider than interestsdirected toward one buffer zone, as isthe case for 1, 2 and 4.

3 – b) – The main relatively recentGermanic invasion was directedtoward Russia (Drang nach Osten)

4 – European seas as (comple-te/double) buffer zone, a) Baltic Sea –complete – double buffer zonebetween Russia and Sweden, b) – TheAdriatic Sea also as a complete bufferzone in relation to Italy and Austria-Hungary, c) – Aegean Sea, also a com-plete buffer zone in relation to Greeceand Turkey, which is also true for d) –Black Sea, because of Russia and Tur-key. Cases a), b) and c) relate to com-pletely conquering aspirations fromboth coasts, while d) is characterizedby a one-way ambition (Ottoman).

5 – M – Moscowia as an origin andtoward the Baltic Sea, Mitteleuropaand Caucasus.

MapNo. 6Serbia – Historical and GeographicModes: Position and Expansion ofSerbia from the Original CoreRegion

Serbia and sea. Much of Europeanhistory can be reduced to the ma-ritime component, both its sti-mulating and exceptionally difficult

hidrografski posve neuređenih pros-tora (melioracije se nastavljaju i da-nas). Osim toga, svaki osvajač neradoulazi u prostor, koji bi tek on moraoprivesti svrsi, jer je logika osvajalaštvajasna: okoristiti se postojećim i dos-tignutim, a ne izlagati se vlastitim na-porima.

Važno je, da za Rotterdam postoji ikonkurencija Amsterdama, tako datek izgradnja novog vodenog puta(Nieuwe Waterweg) u drugoj polovici19. st. otvara nove mogućnosti. Osimtoga, to je većdoba kada nikakvi straniinteresi ne mogu dovesti u pitanje Ni-zozemsku kao državu.

Međutim, to nije sve – nije samoNizozemska međuprostor, nego se toodnosi i na područje Šelde (Belgija), začiji su nastanak kao države 1831. Očitomorali djelovati neki međunarodnigeopolitički čimbenici, tj. bio je po-treban jedan tamponski prostor iz-među Njemačke i Francuske.

2 – Kao problematični međupros-tor za neke političke snage još se i da-nas izdvaja Bosna i Hercegovina.

3 – a) – U najtežoj je povijesnoj si-tuaciji balkanski međuprostor, jer jelociran i na putanji jednog međukon-tinentalnog interesa, koji se odnosi naMitteleuropu i Perzijski zaljev (Bag-dadska željeznica), a to je daleko šireod onih interesa usmjerenih samoprema nekom međuprostoru, kao štoje to slučaj s 1, 2 i 4.

3 – b) – U relativno još novije dobaglavni je germanski prodor bio us-mjeren prema Rusiji (Drang nach Os-ten).

4 – Europska mora kao (potpu-ni/dvostruki) međuprostor, a) Baltič-ko more – potpuni – dvostrukimeđuprostor između Rusije i Švedske,b) – Jadran kao također potpuni me-đuprostor, s obzirom na Italiju i Aus-trougarsku, c) – Egejsko more, istotako potpuni međuprostor, s obziromna Grčku i Tursku, što vrijedi i za d) –Crno more, zbog Rusije i Turske. Uslučaju a), b) i c) – radi se o potpunimosvajalačkim težnjama, dakle, s objeobale, dok slučaj d) karakterizira samojednostrana težnja (ona osmanlijska).

5 – M – Moskovija kao ishodište iprema Baltiku, Mitteleuropi i Kavkazu.

Zemljovid br. 6.Srbija – povijesni i geografskividovi: položaj i širenje Srbije izizvorne regije jezgre

Srbija i more. Veliki dio europskepovijesti mogao bi se svesti na mari-timnu sastavnicu, bilo u vidu da je onaimala poticajno, bilo izuzetno teško iinhibirajuće značenje. I u tom smisluSrbija je zanimljiv i poučan primjer,koji je podjednako važan i u kontekstuprošlosti i sadašnjosti.

Teritorijalno širenje Srbije (makako ono bilo impresivno) nije otva-ralo nikakvu perspektivu za rješenjenjezine maritimne participacije: Sr-bija je izvorno bila (i ostala) konti-nentski zatvoren prostor zbog čega jezanimljivo usporediti povijesni ge-opolitički položaj Hrvatske i Srbije,naime, dok su se Hrvati odmah podoseljenju čvrsto uspostavili na moru,pri čemu je dio Jadrana posve oprav-dano postao njihov mare nostrum (11.st.) i gdje su odmah inicijalno nastalinjihova regija jezgre u obalnom tro-kutu Nin – Knin – Cetina s obalskimprodužetkom na Crvenu Hrvatskuprema jugoistoku, dotle se Srbija stal-no morala boriti za pristup moru, dana kraju ne uspije, i to uz poraz u hr-vatskom i bosansko-hercegovačkomratu 1990-ih godina, kada je definitiv-no nestala mogućnost za bilo kakvu"Veliku Srbiju" do crte Virovitica –Daruvar – Pakrac – Sava – Sisak – Kar-lovac – Gospić – Karlobag, od čega sr-pska radikalija zapravo ne odustajeniti danas, ali čime se nećemo baviti.

1 – I. – Izvorna gorska srpska/ra-ška regija jezgre s logičnim pravcimaširenja.

2 – Širenje prema Pomoravlju (1a,1b) i Kosovu (1c).

3 – II. – Na taj način nakon rasapaDušanove države i poraza u kosovskojbitci (sve 14. st.) središte srpstva kon-centrira se u području triju Morava sNišom, da bi stalno postojala tenden-cija širenja prema sjeveru (Podunav-lje) i prema jugu (Stara Srbija/Makedonija)

4 – a) 2 – Međutim, sva širenja iuspostavljanje novih životnih težišta(sekundarne/izvedene regije jezgre)

ne rješavaju pitanje odnosa Srbije imora, i to iz razloga što nastojanje dase dopre do mora nailazi na više pre-preka. (2) Širenje je prema Jadranuotežano/onemogućeno prirodoslov-no vrlo teškom i nepristupačnom pri-rodnom sredinom (visoki reljef, krš,duboki kanjoni, općenito teška pro-hodnost), a sve uz vrlo male životnemogućnosti koje ne mogu privlačiti ibiti oslonac jednog bogatijeg i slože-nijeg života, da bi se onda na kraju(eventualno) doprlo do mora koje jegorskom zaleđu ipak posve strana ži-votna sredina.

4 – b) – Osim toga, na tom pravcuširenja postoje i druge politogenetskejezgre i ambicije (Crvena Hrvatska iCrna Gora), što ima bitno otežavajućeznačenje važno i u slučaju crnogor-skog otpora Osmanlijama.

5 – 3 – Isto je tako otežano i even-tualno rješenje preko BiH/Hrvatske dohrvatske obale zbog također postojećihdrugih politogenetskih ambicija i rel-ativno znatnih udaljenosti, što je svebio prevelik zalogaj za neki uspješni os-vajački pohod, dok je vlastita demo-grafska snaga ipak bila preslaba zanaseljavanje, koje bi onda bilo temelj zapolitičko/teritorijalno svojatanje. Dru-gim riječima, u BiH se razvijaju vlastitedržavnosti, i to u jednoj dobro bra-njenoj geostrateškoj jezgri, koja očitonije sinonim bogatstva, te stoga i nijetako neodoljivo privlačna.

6 – – Prilike za uspostavljanjena zapadnijem Jadranskom morupružale su se i s osmanlijskom osvaja-njima. Ali, iako se srpstvo proširilo uzpomoć Osmanlija (Pećka patrijaršija1557–1766, migracije na sjeverozapadi pretvaranje Vlaha u Srbe), od toga usmislu maritimizacije nije bilo velikekoristi, jer Osmanlije nisu bili pomor-ski narod: njihova su osvajanja išlakopnom (Hrvatska – Panonija – Sred-nja Europa), pri čemu jadranska obalanije imala značenja ni u doba maksi-malnih turskih osvajanja, a niti u dobakada se na sjeveroistočnoj obali Ja-drana uspostavlja Venecija.

Osmanlijski prodor imao je bitnoznačenje za temeljito prestrukturira-nje odnosa snaga na Balkanu (s rubo-vima). Iako bi trebalo izbjegavati

and inhibiting importance. Thus Ser-bia is an interesting and instructiveexample, equally important in thecontext of history and the present.

The territorial expansion of Serbia(as impressive as it may be) did notprovide a new perspective for solvingits maritime participation: Serbia wasoriginally (and still is) a continentallyclose area, making it interesting tocompare historical geopolitical posi-tions of Croatia and Serbia. Namely,Croatians established themselves onsea as soon as they arrived, with a partof the Adriatic Sea understandablybecoming their mare nostrum (11thcentury) and where their core regionoriginated within the coastal triangleNin – Knin – Cetina with a coastalextension to Red Croatia toward So-utheast. Meanwhile, Serbia had tofight constantly to access sea and fi-nally fail after being defeated in theCroatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinawar in the 1990’s, when there was nopossibility left for any kind of “GreatSerbia” up to Virovitica – Daruvar –Pakrac – Sava – Sisak – Karlovac –Gospić – Karlobag. Serbian radicalsstill do not give up the idea, but thisissue is not going to be discussed furt-her.

1 – I. – Original mountain Serbi-an/Raška core region with logicalexpansion routes.

2 – Expansion toward the area ofMorava (1a, 1b) and Kosovo (1c).

3 – II. – Thus after the end of theDušan State and defeat in the Battle ofKosovo (until the 14th century), Ser-bia was centred in the area of threeMorava rivers with Niš, but at all timesthere were tendencies for expandingtoward North (area of Danube) andSouth (Old Serbia/Macedonia).

4 – a) 2 – However, all expansionsand establishing of new centres (se-condary/derived core regions) do notsolve the issue of Serbia and sea beca-use there were several obstacles in ef-forts to reach sea. (2) Expansiontoward the Adriatic Sea was made dif-ficult/impossible by very difficult andinaccessible natural environment(high relief, karst, deep canyons, andgenerally difficult movement) on topof very bad life possibilities which can

not attract or support a richer andmore complex life, and finally even-tually reach the sea, which is a com-pletely foreign environment to themountainous hinterland.

4 – b) – In addition, there were ot-her politogenetic cores and ambitions(Red Croatia and Montenegro) in theway of the expansion, which is alsoimportant for the Montenegrin resis-tance to Ottomans.

5 – 3 – The possible solution viaBosnia and Herzegovina/Croatia to-ward the Croatian coast is also madedifficult because of other politogene-tic ambitions and relatively signifi-cant distances, all of which was toomuch for a successful conquest, whileits own demographic force was still tooweak for settling, which would havebeen the foundation of political/terri-torial ownership. In other words, pro-per sovereignties developed in Bosniaand Herzegovina, which was a well-defended geostrategic core, but obvi-ously not a synonym for richness andconsequently not irresistible.

6 – – Opportunities for establi-shing in the Western part of the Adri-atic Sea were also available toOttoman conquerors. However, alt-hough Serbia expanded with helpfrom Ottoman (Peć Patriarchy1557–1766, migrations to Northwestand conversion of Vlachs to Serbs),there was not much use of it for mari-timization, because Ottomans werenot a maritime nation: their expansi-on was continental (Croatia – Panno-nia – Central Europe), with theAdriatic Sea coast not being impor-tant neither during greatest Turkishconquests nor when Venice was beingestablished on the North-eastern co-ast of the Adriatic Sea.

The Ottoman invasion was signi-ficantly important for fundamentalrestructuring of power relations inThe Balkans (with borders). Although"what if" discussions should be avo-ided, some conclusions are compel-lingly imposed, i.e.: this area (withoutOttoman) would have had three cen-tres of power: central Dušan's Empire(which would have eventually obvi-ously lost the Greek and Albanian et-nikum), Western Croatian-Hungarian

Kingdom (with Bosnia and Herzego-vina) and Bulgaria in the East. Byzan-tium would have survived, but only asa territorially narrow remnant of oldglory, as well as Greece, while otherwould have been endangered by bar-barians.

7 – AU – However, while some po-ssibilities of maritime participation ofSerbia existed during the Ottomanperiod, they definitely ceased to existwith the Austrian occupation of Bos-nia and Herzegovina in 1878, whenBosnia and Herzegovina became afirm wall for any kind of Serbian at-tempt to access sea.

8 – 5 – With the gradual territorialexpansion of Serbia, it became a Da-nube area factor, but that transportroute toward the East/Black Sea didnot mean much, because there was noway to go from the Black Sea basinand it was difficult to get there due toĐerdap cliff, while Serbia itself did nothave sufficient economic power tobecome a significant Danube factor.Therefore, Danube remained a relati-vely important international trans-port route, but without a significantshare of Serbia. In sum, although it isimportant, Danube is a more modesteconomic/life phenomena whencompared with Rhine: nevertheless, italso connects Central Europe with asea, but it is closed because it does notlead further East as is the case withNorth-western coasts of Turkey, TrueLevant and Fertile Crescent.

9 – 6 – The possibility of expansiontoward the Bay Medovski was pre-vented primarily by strong Albanians,which could not be overcome even inthe state of disorder of the Ottomansultanate in the Balkan War.

10 – 7 – Expansion toward Bulga-ria and possible solution to maritimeparticipation by breaking through tothe Aegean Sea was not successfuleven during the time of greatest ter-ritorial expansion of the Dušan's Em-pire (14th century), and especially notafter failures of the Serbian-BulgarianWar (1885) and the Balkan War (1913).While Macedonia, which was ownedby Bulgaria, became a part of Serbia(1913), Solun was still elusive. Consi-dering the circumstances, Bulgaria

raspravljanje u stilu "što bi bilo, kad bibilo" – neki se zaključci neodoljivonameću, tj. taj bi prostor (bez Osma-nlija) imao tri jaka žarišta moći: u sre-dištu Dušanovo carstvo (koje bi svremenom očito izgubilo grčki i al-banski etnikum), na zapadu Hrvat-sko–ugarsko kraljevstvo (s Bosnom iHercegovinom) i na istoku Bugarsku.Bizant bi opstojao, ali samo kao teri-torijalno skučeni prežitak stare slave,kojemu bi se otela i Grčka, dok bi dru-go ugrozili barbari.

7 – AU – Međutim, dok su zaOsmanlija neke mogućnosti maritim-ne participacije ipak postojale, one zaSrbiju definitivno nestaju s austrij-skom okupacijom BiH 1878. godine,kada BiH postaje čvrsta brana za bilokakav srbijanski pristup moru.

8 – 5 – S postupnim teritorijalnimširenjem Srbije, ona je postala i podu-navski čimbenik, ali, taj je prometnipravac prema istoku/Crnom moruznačio relativno vrlo malo, jer se izbazena Crnog mora nije imalo kudastići, a teško je bilo do tamo doprijetizbog Đerdapske klisure, dok sama Sr-bija nije imala dovoljno gospodarskesnage da postane važniji podunavskičimbenik, tako da je Dunav ostao, is-tina, relativno važan međunarodniplovni put, ali i bez bitnijeg udjela Sr-bije. Sve u svemu, uza sve svoje zna-čenje Dunav je u usporedbi s Rajnomipak skromnija gospodarska/životnapojava: doduše, i on veže Srednju Eu-ropu s jednim morem, ali je ono za-tvoreno, jer ne vodi dalje na istok kaošto se to odnosi na sjeverozapadne

obale Turske, Pravi Levant i Plodnipolumjesec.

9 – 6 – Eventualno širenje premaMedovskom zaljevu bilo je onemogu-ćeno prije svega snažnom albanskometničkom prečagom, koja nije moglabiti savladana čak niti u općem rasuluosmanlijskog sultanata u Balkanskomratu.

10 – 7 – Širenje prema Bugarskoji eventualno rješavanje maritimneparticipacije tako da se preko njezinateritorija izbije na Egejsko more nijeuspijevalo čak niti u doba maksimal-nog teritorijalnog proširenja za Duša-novog carstva (14. st.), a pogotovo nekasnije kada ništa nije riješio ni Srp-sko-bugarski rat (1885), niti balkanskirat (1913). Istina, Makedonija, koju jesvojatala Bugarska, pripala je Srbiji

itself did not succeed in establishingitself permanently on the coasts of theAegean Sea (only from 1912 to 1919),let alone Serbia.

11 – 8 – Finally, in expandingtoward the South, Serbia could alsonot access the sea because of impene-trable Greek force.

12 – a) 9 – In sum, the initial curseof continental enclosure was sup-plemented by such geographic (in-cluding distances), demographic, poli-tical and economic factors that it wasimpossible for Serbia to become amaritime country. It was not until thefirst Yugoslavia that Serbia solved (viaan intermediary) the issue via Croatia,i.e. harbours of Sušak, Šibenik andSplit, because neither Bar nor Pločeexisted at the moment.

12 – b) – Parts which became partsof Italy during the first Yugoslavia.

13 – In sum, the conclusion is clear.With the exception of the first Yugosla-viaperiod,Serbiaisfacedwithadifficultproblemofaccessingsea.Therefore, it isinteresting to note the position of Cro-atian etnikum: originally, its core regionwas in the triangle of sea coast-Nin-Zr-manja-Knin-Cetina in addition to thestill strong ethnic hinterland in Herze-govina. Precisely the unity of coast andhinterland was a developmental ad-vantage of Croatia, in spite of everyoneand everything.

MapNo. 7Buffer Zone betweenAustria-Hungary and Turkey

The first Yugoslavia (1918) as apolitical/geopolitical "solution" inthe buffer zone between formerEuropean big powers: Austria-Hun-

gary and Turkey.An important characteristic of

this part of Europe located South-eastern of Central Europe (it is not re-ally "South-eastern Europe", butCentral Southern Europe) is that it is abuffer zone less important by mainparticipants, Austria-Hungary andTurkey, which includes two negativecharacteristics: there are two perip-heries which were paid no heed fromthe centre, their contact: the first me-ans possible neglect and the othermeans everything a location amongenemies implies.

1 – Countries among the remainsof Austria-Hungary.

2 – Turkey after losing most ofterritory in Europe.

3 – 4 – Serbia (3), Montenegro (4)as independent and recognized co-untries prior to World War I.

(1913), ali Solun je i dalje nedostižan.Osim toga, prilike su takve da se ni sa-ma Bugarska nije uspjela trajno us-postaviti na obalama Egejskog mora(jedino od 1912. do 1919.), a kamoli bito mogla Srbija.

11 – 8 – I najzad, u širenju premajugu nesavladiva je bila snažna grčkaprečaga, tako da niti ovdje Srbija nijemogla riješiti pitanje pristupa moru.

12 – a) 9 – A sve to znači da je inici-jalno prokletstvo kontinentalne za-tvorenosti dopunjeno takvim geo-grafskim (u čemu su važne i udalje-nosti), demografskim, političkim igospodarskim čimbenicima, koji suSrbiji onemogućili da postane pri-morska država. I tek za prve Jugosla-vije, Srbija rješava (makar i prekoposrednika) to pitanje putem Hrvat-ske, i to preko luka Sušak, Šibenik iSplit, jer još ne postoje ni Bar, a nitiPloče.

12 – b) – Dijelovi koji su za prve Ju-goslavije pripali Italiji.

13 – Iz svega navedenog, zaključakje, dakle, jasan. Osim za vrijeme drugeJugoslavije, Srbija je suočena s teškimproblemom vlastitog pristupa moru,zato je, za usporedbu, zanimljivouočiti položaj hrvatskog etnikuma:izvorno, njegova se regija jezgre nalaziu trokutu morska obala-Nin-Zrmanja-Knin-Cetina, čemu treba dodati još idanas snažno etničko zaleđe u Herce-govini. I upravo je to jedinstvo obale izaleđa bila prednost razvitka i opstoj-nosti Hrvatske svima i svemu usprkos.

Zemljovid br. 7.Međuprostor izmeđuAustrougarske i Turske

Prva Jugoslavija (1918. god.) kaopolitičko/geopolitičko "rješenje" umeđuprostoru između bivših europ-skih velevlasti: Austro-Ugarske i Tur-ske.

Bitna osobina tog dijela Europesmještenog jugoistočnije od SrednjeEurope (pri čemu to nije nikakva "ju-goistočna Europa", nego Središnjajužna Europa) da se radi o međupros-toru koji je kao međuprostor manjevažan od glavnih sudionika odnosa tj.Austro-Ugarske i Turske, što uključujedvije negativne osobine: postoje,

naime, dvije periferije za koje se malomarilo iz središta, njihov međusobnidodir: prvo znači moguću zapuštenostna rubu interesa, a drugo sve ono štodonosi lokacija među neprijateljima.

1 – Države na prostoru ostatkaAustro-Ugarske.

2 – Turska nakon gubitka većineposjeda u Europi.

3 – 4 – Srbija (3), Crna Gora (4) kaonezavisne i priznate države prije Prvogsvjetskog rata.

5 – a b c – Prva Jugoslavija s potpu-nim gospodarsko-zemljopisnim profi-lom: Panonija (a), gorska jezera (b) iprimorje (c).

6 – S prvom Jugoslavijom Srbijanapokon (makar i neizravno) rješavapitanje pristupa Jadranu.

7 – Prometni pravac savsko-mo-ravsko–vardarskom udolinom izmeđuEurope i Levanta/Bliskog istoka veli-kog ne samo gospodarskog nego i ge-opolitičkog značenja

8 – Iako je Italija dijelom stupilasvojim posjedom na sjevernoistočnuobalu Jadrana – ipak je prva Jugoslavijabila ujedno i prepreka pretvaranju Ja-drana u posvemašnje talijanski "marenostro".

Zemljovid br. 8.Položajnost TurskeHrvatske ukontekstu povijesnog zemljopisa

Osmanlijskim prodorom na Bal-kanski poluotok (tada to još nije bioBalkan!) hrvatske zemlje doživljavajubitnu transformaciju barem u tri razli-čita vida: prvo, nestaje hrvatski etničkimeđuprostor u zapadnoj i sjeveroza-padnoj Bosni kasnije poznat kao Tur-ska Hrvatska (koji je i zbog etničkogsastava i položaja bio logična potenci-jalna spojnica i poveznica između Pri-morske i Panonske Hrvatske). Zbogtoga je mogućnost da taj prostor pos-tane životna i težišna jezgra Hrvatske ihrvatstva posvema nestala.

Drugo, životno se sve više afirmirasjeverozapad Hrvatske, čime stara hr-vatska regija jezgre na Primorju, izlože-ne i mletačkom pritisku, gubi naznačenju.

I treće, pomicanjem životnih težištaprema sjeverozapadu, goranski reljefniprag (Gorski kotar) postaje važna

prometna spojnica između Panonije ikvarnerskog primorja, unatoč relativ-nih reljefnih nepogodnosti.

1 – Gorsko-kotlinska Hrvatska, spo-jni prostor Istre i ostalog Hrvatskog pri-morja (koje se proteže između Savu-drijske vale, i rta Oštra na Prevlaci) sPeripanonskom i Panonskom Hrvat-skom.

2 – a) – Primorska, ujedno i pri-marna izvorna hrvatska regija jezgreizmeđu obale, Nina, Knina i Cetine (Bi-jela Hrvatska). Osim važne participacijena moru, također je važno uočiti posto-janje životno relativno vrijednog zale-đa, s velikim geostrateškim prednos-tima pojedinih lokaliteta (Knin, Klis...).

2 – b) – 1a – Crvena Hrvatska, kojazauzima prostor do sjeverne Albanije,što nije izraz nikakvog hrvatskog osva-jalaštva, i nacionalizma nego nekadaš-njeg narodnosnog stanja

2 – c) – 2a – Prostori stare hrvatskenaseljenosti (Panonija), izgubljeni uskladu s odnosima snaga, pri čemu od-nos s Mađarima (10. st.) ima samoobrambeni karakter, dok odnos s hrvat-stvom u BiH – (d) – 2a1) – također nije uokviru nikakvog osvajalaštva, nego jetek izraz protežnosti starog hrvatskogetnikuma (ikavskog i katoličkog).

3 – – Sekundarna panonska/pe-ripanonska hrvatska regija jezgre, čijeznačenje bitno raste u 16. st., u sveziosmanlijskih osvajanja.

4 – a) T.H. – Središnji hrvatskietnički međuprostor između najdonjeKupe, preko Une, sve do Vrbasa i Vr-banje (povijesno nazvan Turska Hr-vatska – T.H.). Po svom smještaju ipotencijalima položaja, prirodna jespojnica između Primorske i Panon-ske Hrvatske i isto tako potencijalnotežište hrvatske državnosti, što se nijemoglo ostvariti zbog Osmanlija.

4 – b) Taj prostor neprijepornoghrvatstva prije Osmanlija (velikaškirod Hrvatinića) uključuje i dvije velikeprometnice, važne za povezivanjePrimorske i Panonske Hrvatske, tj.one Pounjem (a) i Povrbasjem.

5 – – Međutim, zbog osmanlij-skog prodora (15. st.), taj izgubljeniprostor nije mogao preuzeti nikakvulogičnu ulogu u kontekstu hrvatskedržavnosti utemeljenu na osobinamalokacije.

5 – a, b, c – first Yugoslavia withcomplete economic – geographicprofile: Pannonia (a), mountain lakes(b) and littoral (c).

6 – Serbia finally (even though in-directly) solved the issue of accessingthe Adriatic Sea with first Yugoslavia.

7 – The transport route via the Sa-va-Morava-Vardar vale betweenEurope and Levant/Near East withgreat economic and geopolitical im-portance

8 – Although Italy partially set fo-ot on the North-eastern coast of theAdriatic, the first Yugoslavia was atthe same time an obstacle for turningthe Adriatic Sea in an entirely Italian"mare nostro".

MapNo. 8Position of Turkish Croatiawithinthe Context of Historical Geography

The Ottoman invasion of the Bal-kan Peninsula (not Balkan at the ti-me!) meant that Croatian countriessignificantly transformed in at leastthree ways: first, the Croatian ethnicbuffer zone in the Western and Nor-th-western Bosnia subsequentlyknown as Turkish Croatia disappe-ared (which was a logical potentionalconnection between the Littoral andPannonian Croatia due to its popula-tion and position). Therefore, therewas no longer a possibility for thatarea to become a centre core of Cro-atia and Croatian people.

Second, North-western Croatiabecame increasingly more populated,which makes the old Croatian coreregion in the Littoral, exposed to theViennese, less important.

And – third, by moving vital cen-tres toward the Northwest, Gorski ko-tar became an important transportconnection between Pannonia andthe Kvarner littoral, in spite of relati-ve relief disadvantages.

1 – Mountain-Basin Croatia, areaconnecting Istria and the rest of Cro-atian Littoral (which extends from theGulf of Piran and the Cape Oštro onPrevlaka) with Peri-pannonian andPannonian Croatia.

2 – a) – Littoral, at the same ti-me primary originally Croatian coreregion between the coast, Nin, Kninand Cetina (White Croatia). In additi-on to important participation at sea, itis also important to note the existenceof a relatively valuable hinterlandwith great geostrategic advantages ofparticular localities (Knin, Klis…).

2 – b) 1a – Red Croatia, whichextends to Northern Albania, which isnot an expression of Croatian conqu-est and nationalism, but former stateof nationality.

2 – c) 2a – Areas of old Croatiansettlement (Pannonij), lost accordingto relations of power, with the relati-on with the Hungarians (10th cen-tury) having only a defensivecharacter, while the relation withCroatian people in Bosnia and Herze-govina – (d) – 2a1) – is also not anyform of conquest, but is an expressionof the extent of old Croatian etnikum(Ikavian and Catholic).

3 – – Secondary Pannoni-an/Peri-pannonian Croatian core re-gion, whose importance grewsignificantly in the 16th century, inrelation to Ottoman conquests.

4 – a)-(3) – T.H. – Central Croatianethnic buffer zone between lowest

Kupa, via Una, all the way to Vrbasand Vrbanja (historically called Tur-kish Croatia – T.H.). According to itslocation and position potentials, it is anatural connection between the Lit-toral and Pannonian Croatia, as wellas a potential centre of Croatian sove-reignty, which could not be realizeddue to Ottomans.

4 – b) – The area of undeniableCroatian sovereignty prior to Otto-mans (noble family Hrvatinić) inclu-ded two great roads important forconnecting Littoral and PannonianCroatia, i.e. area of Una (a) and area ofVrbas.

5 – – However, due to Ottomaninvasion (15th century), the lost areacould not take any logical role withinthe context of Croatian sovereigntybased on location characteristics.

6 – At the time, Gorski kotar is of acompletely peripheral importance,but its transport role was related toOttoman conquests. Namely, as aconnection between Littoral andPannonian Croatia, there first appe-ared the Bihać Route (a), then theModruš Route (b). It was not until theTurkish weakening in relation to newneeds within the context of connec-ting Pannonia and the NorthernAdriatic that Gorski kotar was foundon the important backbone of Croatia(Zagreb – Sisak – Karlovac with theGulf of Kvarner and Senj (c)).

In such a way, the exceptionallytopographic peripheral position ofGorski kotar and the Ogulin-Plaškisubmontanius valley) obtainedexceptional functional importanceand some of its position characteris-tics became some of its most impor-tant characteristics.

6 – U doba o kojemu je riječ, Gorskikotar ima posve periferni značaj, ali seupravo u svezi s osmanlijskim osvaja-njima začinje njegovo prometno zna-čenje. Naime, kao veza Primorske iPanonske Hrvatske najprije nestaje Bi-haćki put (a), a zatim i Modruški put

(b), i tek će nova sigurnost slabljenjemTurske u vezi s novim potrebama ukontekstu povezanosti Panonija – sje-verni Jadran, uvjetovati da se Gorskikotar nađe na važnoj životnoj okosniciHrvatske (veza Zagreb – Sisak – Karlo-vac s riječkim zaljevom i Senjom (c)).

Na taj će način izrazito perife-rijski položaj Gorskog kotara ufunkcionalnom smislu dobiti iz-razito središnje značenje, i od tadaće (neke) prednosti položajnostipostati jedna od najbitnijih zna-čajki toga prostora.