Maimon Review of Metaphysics

SALOMON MAIMON'S COMMENTARY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GIVEN IN IMMANUEL KANT'S

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

HUGO EDUARDO HERRERA

IN THE CRITIQUE OF P URE REASON (hereafter CPR!) Kanl makes multiple allusions to t.he ~thing in itself. n~ I-Ie also mentions that, while understanding spontaneously produces concepts, sensibility receives its objects passively.3 An initial reading would lead us to infer t.he existence of a material princip le that would have a causal effect on sensibi lity, generating its material in such a way that the object of materially considered knowledge could be wlderstood as the effect. of a transcendent cause, thal it would be located beyond the phenomenal sphere. K.:"lnt himself refers to a "cause'" or "ground,"" Ole effect of which m'e perceptions.

This approach is problematic, since concepts can only reach out to the phenomenal sphere. To aim to apply them beyond tJlat scope wou ld imply a return to a precriticaJ position, from which Kant openly removes himself in CPR."

In view of this problem, we could consider that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi 's classical st..:1.tement: "without this presupposition [of the thing in itself] I cannot enter into the system, but with this presupposition I cannot remain within it" is totaJly justified.? In other words, the pretension that would appear to be the basis of K,mtian philosophy is a

Con-espondence lo: Instituto de rliosofla, Universidad de los Andes, Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200, Las Condes, Santiago, Chi le.

' J used tile Akademieausgabc; Berlin & G6ttingen: De Gruyter, 1900, vol. 3 (A edition of 1781) and 4 (B edit.ion of 1787); and the translation from N0I111an Kemp Smith; London: Macmillan, 1961.

o! See, for example, CPR B 42-5, 49-72, A 235--601B 29+-315. 'See CPR A 5O-2IB 74-6; A 68IB 93. , See CPR A 278/B 334; A 372; A 393; A 538/B 566 . • See CPR A 2771B 333; AfJaO; A 613/B 641. & Sec CPR, for example, A 146-471B 185-87. ; Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, David /fume iibe,. den Glauben oder

ldealismus WId Rea/islltus. Ein Gespriich, in Werke (Darmstadt: Wissenschafllichc BuchgeselischaJt, 1968), 2:304. The emphasis is original. All t.ranslations an~ my own, unless ot.herwise indicated,

17lc NCllielt' of MelO/Jllysic$ (j:J (March 2010): 593-61;1. Copyright (> 2010 by 17/e Rc/;ie!{' of MC/flpilysic$.

594 HUGO EDUARDO HERRERA

critical pretension, according to which the only cognoscible thing is that of which we have an immanent knowledge." For Kant, this immanent knowledge is always experiential, that is not purely intellectual, in finite beings.' To state UWl something in itself is causally determining but ullcognoscible, would require a level of acceptance tJmt goes beyond the margins of Kantian criticism.

1I0w, then, can the idea of the given to sensibility be understood so thal it does not contradict the critical pretensions of Kantian Philosophy? In ot.her words, how can we understand this as not caused by a transcendent thing in itself?

Salomon Maimon tri ed to answer this question. Not only did he show the difficulties of the Kantirul proposal, but he s ketched a way of getting round them. In t.his paper, I will present the Maimonian position ,md evaluate it in terms of this problem, l1ying to establish its contribution to the development of critical philosophy. Prior to this, however, in order to place this proposal in a proper focus, I will briefly refer to the issue of the thing in itself as broached by the first interpreters of t.he CPR: Jacobi, Gottlob El1lst Schulze, and Karl Leonhard Heinhold.

The issue of lhe given ill the /in;l commentators. The Maimonian interpretation of the CPR differs somewhat from the intcll)l'etal.ions of subsequent commentators of tile work, in the sense that on the one hand, he takes tile stance that to maintain criticism it is necessary to defuse the metaphysiC:-ll-causal charge o f his affirmation, while on tile other, he does his very best to remain close to Kantianism, which he underst.ands to be imbued in the critical sp irit, and not simply get riel of t.he CPR. Jacobi, Reinhold, and Schulze respectively stray from at least one of these two attitudes.

~ See CPR B -II, B 506-07, note; Ems! Cassia'r, Das ErkellllfnisprolJlplil il1 de/" Philosophie "I/Illl lVissellschqf/ del' n(>lIeren Zeit III, in E. Cassin'!", Geswmnelle Welke. Hamburger Ausgabe (I1ambu rg: Meiner, 2000), 4: 1-2; Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel. 4Ul ed. (Tiibingen: fo.'lohr Siebeck, 2007), 1,56-7.

"See CPR B 52, 68, 72, 9;1, 148-49, 159, 3;33-35,3-12-46, A :373-74, 389.

SALOMON MAIMON ON THE GIVEN 595

Jacobi formulates the isslie of the thing in itself in such a way that his solution does not appear possible within the framework of the CPR or of a critical model. He states I hal entering into the Kantian system involves acknowledging Kant's distinction between a thing in itse lf that is uncognoscible and phenomena that are cognoscible. Nonetheless, this distinction, which at first enables us 1.0 overcome a na'ive realism that believes ~hal we rea11y know the thing in itself without involving our way of knowing, turns against the Kantian system, as this system considers that it is incorrect to affirm the existence of a lranscendent thing in Hselr (in other words a thing in itself thaI could be reached cognoscitively), because knowledge is merely phenomenal. 1u

Now then, a sensible receptive knowledge would in itself dcmand--owing to a rational requirement- a reference to a thing in itself that operates as a source of my passive or receptive representations. To affirm a receptive sensibility would necessarily imply a thing in itself as a source of the received represellu .... tions. "To feel passively or to suffer," says Jacobi , "is only one half of a condition that cannoL be thought of the basis of this half alol1e." 1l It will therefore be necessary to suppose yet again, by need of the same rational lhought-because the matter cannol be thought of ot.herwise-Lllat the thing in itself is something existent, in such a way that the only possible course would be to abandon KanUan criticism.

Although Jacobi detects the inconsistency t.hat exists in the CPR, he gives no solution that could be framed within criticism, beyond the dogmatic implication of t he text, and he simply removes himself from the Kantian spirit. and the CPR.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold differs from Jacobi in that. he t.lies to fonnulate the Kantian theory in a plausible way. For Reinhold , there would effectively be a thing in itself that determines our representations. To return to realism, overcome by Krult, would be inconvenient. The thing in itself would not. be directly cognosdble, as would happen ill a dogmat.ic metaphysics, but its causal effect· on knowledge would be affirmable. "That by means of which the represented stands apart from the mere fonn of representation

10 Jacobi, lVerke 2:304. II Ibid. , 2:309.


belongs to lhe thing in ilseU:",t In his theory, Reinhold accepted the "existence" of something u(J.1;lernallo Htpresenl(ttion.""

This intellJretation of the CPR can also be criticised as dogmatic, since it strays from one of the fundamental principles of cliticism, namely that the use of pure concepts of understanding is only legitimate with regard to phenomena. Criticism aims to do withoUl the noncognoscible to clarify knowledge. Reinhold, on the other lumd, does not overcome this "realism" and establishes the existence of a Iranscendent entity or item that would play an aU-important role in the explanation of human knowledge. So, although Reinhold does not reject the CPR, in his attempt at solving the issue, he does s tray beyond the criticism which is its cornerstone.

In this sense, Gotllob Emst Schulze remonstrates Reinhold for the lranscendent. use of the category of cau5<'l.lity. Cause, effect, and reality (Wirklichkeit) are concepts that can only be applied validJy, within the framework of the criticaJ system, on phenomena, not within the relations between objects "in themselves," which are removed from our capacity of knowledge ancl from our intuitions. II Nonetheless, Schulze adopts a sceptical position similar to that of David Iltune, not only against Reinhold's intell)retation of t.he CPR but aJso against the CPR itself. According to Schulze, the CPR would faJl into the same error as Reinhold.'~ Schulze says "According to its most important principles and results," when refening to the CPR,

the categories of cause and actuality [Wirklichkeitj can only be applied on empiric intuitions, if they arc to have a sense and meaning. But, what we cannot do is to intuit the subject of Ole representations [the thing in itself] ... , so Ulen it cannot belong to the realm o f objects thaI are cognisable to us; in this way according to the tenets of critical ph ilosophy, it is not a cognoscible actuality

U Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Beytrt;ge zw' Bel'idtUgllng bishel'iger MissversUiminisse del' Philoso])hell, Erster Band, rlas Pwulamenl. der ElemmU017)hilosopJde betrelfend (Jena: Widlmann & Mauke, 1790), 188. The emphasis is oliginal. See ibid., 210-11 ; 24 1-47,

'l Ibid"216. The emphasis is original. 11 See GouJob Emst Schulze, Aenesidentus odeI' tiber die F'undamel1l.e

dm' von Herrn PI"OIessoJ' Rei.nhold in Jena gefiejerten ElementoJ'Philosophie. Nebst ei.ner Verlhe-idigllng gegen (lie Amnaassungen der Vemm{flkrilik (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996), 130-37,

)\ See ibid.

SALOMON MAIMON ON THE GIVEN

[WirkJ ichkeil J with a contelll [rerueJ, neiUlcr a cognosciblc causality with a contenl. '~

597

In other words, both Jacobi and Schulze wouJd break off with the CPR-for opposite reasons-and Reinhold would try to remain close to it but on the basis of a dogmatism that Schulze finds unacceptable and which is, in errect, unacceptable if criticism is assumed in a consequent way.

On the other hand, Maimon will attempt to take that criticism of the CPR as far as possible, which to a certain degree would imply Ulat he wHl not aim at completely severing his links with lhe CPR. Nonetheless, he w ill not be satisfied with keeping to a dogmatic interpretation of the work, which accepts the transcendent application of categories. In any case, this interpretation would imply going beyond the text of the CPR. What Maimon definitely aims at is to express in his thought the fundamental clitical intention of the CPR, wltich he understands to consist in Ule idea that know ledge can only be clarified with knowledge, without resOlting to entities or items that are transcendent to knowledge. In critical philosophy "we cannot refer to thaL which causes knowledge, but rather Lo what is conL:'lined in it. ~ 17 This intention, which would be the basis of the CPR, is what Maimon aims at depicting in his doctrine of the given.

n

Critical Re'inlel1J1Y1lations of lhe Kant.ian Concepts. In his interpretation of the given, Maimon tries to remain within the boundaries of critical philosophy. From this point of view, both the metaphysical-dogmatic realism o r pre-Kantian philosophy, together with Reinhold and-should we accept the intellJreL,llJons of thei r critics-Kant, when trying to explain knowledge in reference to a thing in itself, would make the mistake of crossing the threshold o f the cognoscible, and understand that. the category of cause has a transcendent application.

II Ibid., 155. The emphasis is original. ,t Salomon Maimon, K1'Uische Untersuchungen ~'iber den mellscillicilell

Geist, in Gesammef(e Werke 7:67; hereafter GW. 1 used lhe Geswmnef(e Werke, 3rd ed. lIildesheim: Ohn5, 2003, vol. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.


This means placing reason in the dogmatic position of aiming to explain knowledge on the basis of an entity or item inaccessible to this knowledge. So, nothing is clarilied, as this is an obscure item, unknOv.'11 and removed from the clarity of knowledge. The issue is rather a simple supposition of "U1 unproved l"C'iationship, " Maimon searches more for a self-foundation than for a pseudoexplanation that is based on items that are beyond knowledge. '"

The consequent asslimption, then, of tile critical attitude implies the limitation of the application of the concepts of understanding to the sphere of phenomena and not trying to explain knowledge on the basis of "causes" or "existences" that are removed from the sphere of phenomena or knowledge. CtiLi cal knowledge is limited to explaining that which is immanently accessible to us and not inaccessible transcendent beings ....

With tJlis constrain t in mind, the only possible solulion to t.he problem of explaining knowledge would be to include in some way the thing in itself within the realm of what is at least potentially cognoscible. This is the solution proposed by Maimon. "Maimoll,r says Samuel Hugo Bergman, Mplaced the two elements of knowledge, understanding and sensibility, within cognition.""

In this Maimonian intcll)retalioll of the CPR, the thing in itself is, first o f all, an idea to be attained, rather than something causal removed from us,'" "As I see it ," writes Maimon, "knowledge of the thing in itself is nothing but the complete knowledge of phenomena."~'

If the question about the thing in ilself cannOl be answered in a

,. See Salomon Mailllon, Ver!;lIch {'illC/' IlPlleU I~oyik odf'1" 11leorie de • ." DeI/kellS, Nebsl wlgehiiJlgt(?JI Bl'iefen des Pllilole/es (III Aellesidemlls, in GW 5:185i Cassircr, Dos Erkellntllisproblem, 80-1.

I' See Maimon, Versudt libel" die Tmllszendel/tulphilosopllie, in GW 2:203.

". See for example, CRP A 146-47/B 185--87; I\ lax liorkheimer, VOJ1esuIIg libel' die clc'lIfsclte iciealisfisc/te Philosoph ie, in Gesammelte S('llr~{fell (Frankflllt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 10:84-6.

" Samuel Jlugo Bt'I-gmaJl, 77w Philosophy of SolomoJ/ 1I1ai.I11011 (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 19(7), 14; see ibid., 12,22,23,29.

;;:! See Samuel Alias, From Critical to Specilialil'l' Idealism. The Philosophy of Solomoll MoimOll (Der Ilaag: Martinus Nijhofr, 1964) 14-5, 20-37.

~1 Solomon fo.laimon , Philosoplliscllf'S \Varler/J/lcll oell'l" Beleuelt/ulIY elCI" lViclltigell Gegellstiincle del" Philosophic in alplwbctise/ter On/lluIlY, in GW 3:200-0 I; see G W 2:366.


melaphysical-dogmatic way, resorting to a simply assumed but uncognosciblc cause, and the philosophical-cliticaJ response kept within Ule realm of what is cognoscibJe and of its analytically accessible conditions of possibility, Ulen the lcnll "thing in itselr only has meaning as a complete knowledge of phenomena, like the total realization of knowledge on the part of the cognoscen t s ubject. SUiclly speaking, the question regarding something Ihat goes beyond Ihis complete knowledge lacks sense for a philosophy orientated at cletcnnining the cognoscible and its conditions of possibility.

If we bear the above in mind, it can be said that the question regarding the place from which the given is given is badly phrased, as there is nothing like a place that is transcendent LO knowledge from which the given call be given. It cannot be given from another prut beyond the realm of knowledge ruld its conditions because in that case it wou ld (once again) be a causal given, which, as we have seen, is unacceptable from the critical point of view. Maimon writes,

Given docs not mean ... something within us, which has a cause outside of liS: because this cannol be immediately perceived, only concluded .... [Given ] merely means a represemalion whose way of appearing before us is unknown: 1

For Maimon, "passivity is not 'refcrenlial'."~ It is subj ectivity itself Ulat gives itself the given from itself. In

Dlher words, the given emerges from a transcendental princip le, not from a transcendent place. "AU [awareness of objectsl would be a mere modification of tile capaci ty of representation, n Z<> ruld it would not refer to another cause. The given is pure representation Ihat is not referred to something transcendent to the representative activity of the subject itself. There is no reference to a world ~beyoncl " what. can be repl'esentecl.r:

On its prut, this placement of the given in cognoscib le subj ectivity should nol. be understood causally, as if there were someUling similru'

,j Ibid., 2:203; see ibid., 7:67. z.o; Pel er Thielke, ~IJltuition and Diversity: Kant. and Maimon on Space and

Time,H in Salol1/OJ/ Mahnon: Rational Dogma/ist, Em1lil'ica{ Skeptic, ed. G. Freudenthal (Donlrec:hu'Boslon/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 113.

:<. Main lon, GW 2: 16..1. r. See ibid .. 2:205-00; 5:426-27.


to a hidden entity which we call subject, which causaJJy produces sensible representations. Such a concept would Illean that there has been no progress with respect to the dogmatism that Kant and Reinhold were accused of, s ince, if this were so, it would be a case of res0I1ing to an instance beyond knowledge to explain knowledge. The subjective pole simply alludes to the function of the act 01' the reaJizalion of knowledge. "" It is the act of knowledge ilSelf in all its shapes that is Ule core point of remission of concepts and intuitions, an act of knowledge that, just as its condition, requires a function of unity which is the lranscendental subject.""

Now, then, if sensibility is the capacity of receiving in human knowledge, the previous statements would lead us to conclude that sensib ility in itself does not exist, if by "receiving" we understand the passive act of making a place for items that are removed from the subject itself, because there is nothing different from the representations that the subject spontaneously gives to himself .... Furthenllore, according to this idea, subjectivity must be a spontaneous principle of knowledge: because it is impossible to go to a thing in itself that is different from the subjecL's knowledge, the only possibility is that subjectivity is the spontaneous principle of the totaHty of the phenomena, aHJlOugh, as I have said, not causal ly, but as

:III Maimon rejects metaphysical-dogmatic illtcll)rClaLions of the Unnscendemal subject. He understands (and approves) that CPR "does not detem1ine any being like the subject and calise of knowledge, but only investigates what is contailled in knowledge itself ... The Cri.lique oj Pure Reason does not determine the mind [Gemiitj as a thing in itself, not as a nOllrnenon, neiUler as illl idea. Mind in Ulis means no other than !he completely indeterminate subject. of representations, to whom they refer. The detemlination of this subject as a thing in itself, nomnenon, or idea would tum it. into a represent.ation of itselr. 111en, it would stop being t.he mere subject of representations. For this reason it must remain uncletemlined, according to its concept.. It is merely thought. of as a logical subject, but not in the category in which it should COITespond, in other words, never as a nouJ11enon." Solomon Maimon, Bl'ie.fe des Philaietes (1) AenesidlmlUs, in GW 5;412-13. Nicolai IImtmatm says of the text: ~Th.is by no meilllS is a hypostatisation of the absolute subject to the subject in itselC Nicolai Haltmann, Di.e Philosophie des Dell/schen Idcalismlls (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960),23.

~ See Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism , 55-6. JII wYou should avoid the word 'affecC - 1\'1aimon t.ells Kant-~which

means to Sllffer from t.he effect of an exlemal cause;~ GW 7:67.


a mere function of knowledge, which is no more than the act of knowledge itself, of which it is a principle.

But, if the principle of the given is the subject, which is a flUlction of knowledge, why is lhe given represented passively, namely as if it were received from elsewhere? I should clarify that in all truth Maimon considered tilaL sheer receptivity would never be completely attainable, as this would mean arriving at a point of utter absence of activity, and t.his is death or the utter void of knowledge. The passivity of sensation would be "a mere idea, which we are continually approaching though a reduction of awareness (but which we will never be able to reach, because I he absence of aJl awareness = 0, and consequently it cannot be a modification of the capacity for knowledge)." !!

Knowledge never contains absolute cognoscitivE' passivity. Passivity as representation emerges from the reduction of the activity of the subject, a reduction that brings the emergence of the illusion of an active extelllal cause that we simply receive. III view of the incapacity or finite understanding to pcnelrate into the rule of UlC emergence of the object, imagination tries to replace lack of vision by adding I he unpenetrated palt5 temporally and spatially.:l:! The comparison of the greater degrees of awareness with their lesser count.erparts would bring forward the idea of a receptive passivity of what is added t.o space and time, in such a way that what remains in space and time is assumed to have an origin that is unrelated to subjectivity.'"

This misunderstanding would be expressed in the Maimoni<.U1 distinction between "representation" (VOl'SteUung) and "presentation" (Darstellung). The word representation is especially suggestive in English, as it refers to presenting again or making present again something absent, alt.hough it already exists as a given thing. Representation (we inselt the hyphen between "re" and "presentation" to emphasise the sense of the action of representing again) wouJd simply

J. See ibid., 2:168. U See ibid., 2: 18-9, 133; Avraham Ehrlich, Das Problem des Besondel'en

ill del' Iheorcliscllell Philosophie Salomon Mai.mons (Kaln: Diss, 1986),37--8. J;.! See Maimon, GW 2:419-20; Manfred F'nmk, 'Unel/dUche Ann(ilterlJ.ng'.

Die Anjdnge del' pldlosophiscllen Prt'ihmnwnlik , 2nd ed. (Frankfurt, a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), 131, 136.


involve the upgrmUng of the appearance of something which already ex ists. The word itself would induce us to fall into an error which would be to suppose the existence o f an object beyond representation itself. In other words, the meaning of til(> wo rd re-presentation wou ld make om reason necessarily demand a previously existing presental ion to which we must rcsOlt for a new presentation. In this respect, Maimon says:

*The word representation [Vors1.ellung, whose literal translation from til(' Genllan is 'to plaee in front'l, used in ils plimitiv(' usage, leads us to all error, because ill fact, in I his case the issue is not a rcprcscmation, in other words. the mere prescillation of something that is not presetll, but a presentation, in olher words to represent as extam what had never existed .....

The word presentation (Darstellwlg) is best a(ljusted to the way in which knowledge effectively occurs for Maimon. In knowledge, understanding consLilUtively places the known in front of it The issue is not to bring fOl-ward an existing object but rather t.o constit.u te it in the act itself of bringing it forward.-"·

Nonetheless, we should ask oW'selves the reason for the existence of less awareness 01' reduction of the activity of knowledge in the subject., which is exactly the condition of its possibility. We have already seen thal passivcness cannot be caused by an external thing in itself because it does not admit Ill<' clitical principle from which Kant

and Maimon operat.e. Therefore, the source of that. relative passiveness or reduction of conscience should, paradoxically, be located in the activity of knowledge itself. In knowledge, I his source of re lative passiveness could be found eit.her in t.he understanding or capacity o f rules, or if not, in an au tonomous principle, differen t frolll tmderstancling.

In this last case, we would have to consider this source of autonomous passivity as a positive princip le or a generator of purely sensible represent.ations that the subject merely receives from withjn, from his own activity, ignoring alll1Jle of emergence because there is no rule of emergence whatsoever. The rules of the emergence of objects cannot belong 10 a pure sensibility, whose source would be

.. l\1aimon, GW 7:142--43. '> See ibid .• 2:29-30.


transcendental sUQjeclivity, but conceived as a sensibility that would be separated frOIll the faculty of I he rul es. These rules belong to understanding, so that consequently this sensibility, considered as an autonomous posilive plincipie, is a sensibility U13l is removed from Ule IUles.

This sensibility would be impossible as a principle of knowledge. To say "make emerge" without obeying any law of emergence is notiling but creating the emergence of something beyond the necessary rules of emergence and conslitution, in other words, removed from 1 he way in which uncierst.:'1llding itself operates; this would make absolutely impossible the conslitulion of objects able to make the correlative emergence of a conscious knowledge of objects. Whcn refening to the eventual lack of conceptuality in phenomena, Kant himself stated: in this situation our own representations would be "less even than a dream.'''·

So this passivity is not due to an external cause or to a sensible autonomous principle in the subject, and ilS source can only lie in understanding. Nevertheless, this is where two possibiliLies appear. This first, which would appear as a positive principle, is not acceptablc, because the issue is the incapacity of understanding to make cognoscible the mode of rule of emergence of the given, in other words, of its own activity. So the only possibility is a defect or limitation in the principle of U1C act of knowing: sensibilHy cannot be ~Ulything but a mere defect. of the spontaneity of the subject, nothing else than the expression of finitude of cognoscitive activity.:17

Consequcntly, sensibility and unders tanding would not be two radically different eiemE'l1l.s, founded all two diverse principles: "Sensibility is in liS incomplete unders tandingn Jll says Maimon. So that in a ce ltain way, scnsibility emerges [rom Wlderstand ing and more prccisely e!\.l)resses ilS finitude. In this way, tile given is not a positive reality that has full autonomy wit.h regard to understanding; rather, it is

"' CPR A 112. To See Bergman, Tile Philosophy oj Solomon M(t imoll, 14, 16-7; Alias,

Fl'om Critical. 1.0 S]Jeculalive Idealism, 81·2; "rutmann, Die Philosopllie des Deulschen Idealis1»llS, 21; Frank, 'Unendliche Annlihe1'll'llg', 123; Ehrlich, Das Problem des Besollderen, 24-5.

,OJ l\'Jaimon, GW 2: 183.


the defect of human understanding, of its linitude itself ml(i of nothing else. '1!1

Maimon clearly differs from Kant and resolts to the tradilion of Leibniz and Wolff and understands that the given is a less clear representation than a conceptual one," whose specific character would be caused by the "reduction of conscience" or the activity of the subject in his cognoscilive act. II ConceptuaJ representations moe transparent for LIS, we understand them fully_ We would also fully understand the object iJ13t we would completely create from our concepts, in !he guise of an infinite understanding. Nonetheless, Maimon states, with the exception of the mathemalical objects-lhat we consU'uel in accordance with om conceplS"-the rule of the emergence of the given is un known to us, 13

Human tmderstanding-the spontaneity o f the subject, the capacity of rules-is then, Maimon admits, finite, in other words, it is aJways in from of something given whose rule or way of emergence is unknown..... Finite understanding'S incapacity to understand this emergence of the given, its way or rule of emergence, is what would make its temporaJ and spatiaJ representation a simple addition (with no s ttict unity). 1:i Sensibility would be the realm of representation whose source is understanding, bu!. whose rule or way of emergence is not fuUy conscious, 1!! To be affected by perceptions is then definitely an expression of an action of wulerslandjng that is not totally perceived by our awareness; it is the manifestation of an incapacity of tinite understanding, to be aware in the act of knowledge of the

:Ie See ibid" 29; Charlotte Katzhoff, "Salomon Maimon's Critique of Kant's Theory of Consciousness, ~ in Zeitsclu'ift fiil' philosopltische Forschul1g 35 (1981): 186--8; Hartmann, Die Phifosophie des Deulscllen ldealisrnlls , 20-1; Prank, 'Unend/iche Annahel°ung', 123-32; I-iorkheimer, Gesammefte Schl"iften 10:88--9; Thielke, Mlntuition and Diversity: Kant and Maimon on Space and Time,~ 103 .

.. See Maimon, GW 2:63-4. 11 See ibid., 2: 168. Q See, ror example, ibid., 2:2; Slreijereien im Gebiele der Pltilosophie, in

GW4A2. -tJ See ibid., 2: 1-2,203; 5:250; 7:67. " See ibid., 2:86-7, n. 203. '1 See ibid. , 2: 18-9, 133. , .• See ibid. , 2: I 82-S3.


conceptual nature of the objects in front. of it (wlderst.,1nding). 17 So, this is how Maimon views Ule establishment of the relationship between the originally conceptual character of intuitions and Uw represt'ntations of intuitions in time and space.

TIT

The idea of (III 'infinite understanding For several reasons, Maimon resorts to the idea of infinite understanding as principle of all representation. First, Ulcre is the acknowledgement of the linite nature of human understanding. Second, there is tile statement of the originally conceptual nature of sensibility. We have seen ( l) that hwnan understanding is finite, in other words it docs not acknowledge the nile or mode of emergence of its objects. (2) However, sensibiJity should also be originally conceptual because it cannot proceed (a) from a third party (thing in itself, which would signify a fall into dogmatism), (b) nor from an active plinciple of subjectivity, other than understanding, because this purely sensible active principle would not be, as we have seen, able to accOlmt for the emergence of awareness itself.

Given, then, (I) that human understanding is finite and (2) that sensibility musl be originally spontaneous, we come to the need for an idea of completely spontaneous infinite understanding, which creates objects in a radically spontaneous way. If not, we would have to affirm that there are celtain objects, namely those thaI are sensilively given to finile understanding, that completely lack emergence modes or rules. This is impossible because in this way we would be dealing with objects which, in addition to being uncognoscible (because their lack of rules or their chaotic nature does not produce the emergence of an awareness), would have a transcendent origin to transcendental subjectivity, which is understanding. \II

n See ibid., 2:203. <8 Maimon's tJlOught regm'ding tJle fact that "knowledge of the thing in

itself is nothing but the complete knowledge of phenomenaH is thus validated ibid., 3:200--01; sec ibid., 2:366. There is no "otJler world" beyond the cognoscible, when cognosdble is lhe possible object of an infinite subjectivity.


Despite the limitation of finite human understanding, which determines the presence of sensibil ity and the given in our knowledge, l\1aimon sees I hat there is a difference in degree but not in essence~"

between human understanding affected by finitude (which prevents us from apprehending the rule of the emergence of the sensitive) and infinite understanding. Maimon Slates "Our understanding is exactly the same [as the infinite] but morc limited."·,o Although infinite understanding can be in plinciple distinguished from the finite, as the former is not faced with something received of which there is no awareness of the l"uJe of emergence (as it is totally spontaneous), finite understanding is definitely the same as its infinite coume1vart, and as such can also be the creHtor in lhe field of mathematics, for exmnp[e, where it would be capable of creal ing objects accord ing to Hs own rules."

All in all, the definite reason that would make impossible their essential differentiation is lhat there is nothing like an essence of the sensible. The sensibility is only a defect, 01', in other words, a lesser degree of awareness in an understanding that, therefore, has the same essence with that which realizes it to an ultimate degree. Human understanding stops being infinite understanding, because it is no longer understood totally and transparently in a conceptually aware mode within its activity of knowledge.

TV

Beyond lhe CPR. In his aHempt at solving the issue, Maimon is laking a step which, although inspired by criticism, goes beyond Kant, who clearly estab lishes t.he presence of the given as a dimension that is irreducible to understanding."" The separation of the given regarding

'" See ibid., 2:65. ~ Ibid., 2:65; see Frank, 'Uncmllichc Amdilwnmg', 130.

'" See i\laimon, GW 2:2, 4:42. '" 111is identification gives the finishing touch to the step towards strong

idealism, which will laler be developed by riehle; see Bergman, 77le Philosophy of Solomon Maimon, 240; KUllO Fischer, Gescllicllfe del" lIellcren Philosophic (Heidelberg: Winter, 1914), 0:47-50; Wilhelm Winde1band, A His/olY of PltilosopllY (New York: i\Jacmillan , 1919), 570; Wilhelm Dilthey,


the subject is replaced by the idea of an infinite understanding that is immanent to knowledge and that operates in it as the principle of all representations, both conscious and unconscious.

On the other hand, in CPR A 271-2 Kant clearly states the presence of determinations of the object that correspond to Uw dimension of the given and which are irreducible to the spontaneity of understanding and its concepts. Understanding and its concepts are unable to explain the given in an overall way, since there are objects that have a different nature fro m conceptuaJ nature. There is a part of the phenomenon that is simply given from an instance of nonconceplUaJ nature. Por Kant, not every difference between objects could be explained conceptual ly. There are merely positio nal differences beLwel2'n conceptually identical objects.

If [ know a drop of water in all its intemal determinations as a thi ng in itself, and if th(" whole concept of anyone drop is identical with that of every other, I cannot allow that any drop is different from any other. But if the drop is an appearance in space, it has its location not only in understanding (wlCler concepts) but in sensible outer intuition (in space) .... Difference of locations, without any fm1.her conditions, makes the pluralily and distinction of objects, as appearances, not only possible but also necessary. '~

In the CPR, it. is only intuition wh ich can make it possible to distinguish two objects which have an identical concept. Conceptuality is not enough, not even with all the detelllli nations it provides, to finish demarcating the phenomena. Sensibility is just able to ma ke possible the emergence of multiple phenomena, regardless of their identical concept. So sens ibility operates as a principle of nonconceptual nature. So Kant cannot give a solution s imilar to that of Maimon, for whom what is given sensibly is in the end explainable in a conceptual way.""'

With his position, Kanl remains bound to a cel1ain realism, as he cannot explain the given without referring to an item that is beyond knowledge itself, namely what is sensibly given, which in aJl truth is not a real explanation. Maimon radicalises Ule Kantian questioning in

~Die Roslockcr Kamhandschriftcn," in Gesalnm.eite Scl/rijten. 61h cd., (Gotlingcn: Vandcnhocck & Ruprecht, 1990),4:319.

,... CPR A 272; sec A 282. ,.. See M. Frank, Auswege (IUS dem Delltschen IdealistnllS (Pr:.mkfurt u.

M.: Suhrkamp. 2007), 397-406.


the measure that he completely reduces the given to understanding as a condition of knowledge. The given is definitely the result of the finitude of that understanding. So, in principle, he makes it possible for understanding- in its capacity as a funclion of knowledge-to be the only thing that can explain the way in which knowledge happens. Knowledge would fuln], at least in respect of the given, the critical ideal of explaining itself to itself and not by reference to uncognoscib le external instances.

v

Relevance and Lim'italians Qr lhe Mctimonian Solution (0 lite Issue oj the Given. With his doctrine of the given, Maimon radicaUy crosses the line of realism and understands the thing in itself as ml

idea Ulat alludes to Ule complete knowledge of the phenomenon, which, although never totally reaUzable by finite understanding, could be paltially atlained. According to Maimon (years before Schulz.e) the thing in itself should not be unders tood causally, if we ru'e to be consistent with the critical dye of the CPR. Nonetheless, he differs from Schulze and Jacobi, as he looks for a way of overcoming the problem of the tiling in itself with a systematic interpretation of the CPR so that the aJl1nmllion of the thing in iLSelf becomes plausible. On the other hand, the latter ended up by abandoning Kant.

Maimon's solulion, to a certain degree, breaks away (rom what he considered to be dogmatic remnants of the Kantian philosophy and triggers a fundamental reflection that provides the foundations of later idealism.'"' In Maimon, the step towards an idealism more radical than Kant's would have already been taken. As in F'ichte, in Maimon we can distinguish subjectivity as the source of all representations, including sensitive representations, 11 with respect to empi rical awareness, which considers sensibility receptive, despite the fact that it is also active in

See Maimon, GW 2:103, 209. ',oj See Johann GOlliieb FichlC, Gesmnlausgabe del" 8ayerischcn

Akademie del' \vissellsclwf/en (StuugartlBad Cannslatt: Fl'OmmannIlolzboog, 1962.), 312:282; 4/1:212.

~; See Maimon, GW 2:205.


nature. Yl F'ichle's felt is similar to Maimon's infinite understanding," In Maimon, human underSk'1nding is not essentially different fro m infinite understanding-the difference is only expressed in degrees-so it would perhaps be possible to consider the identification of both,'"

Most Maimonian scholars share t.he opinion that Maimon's thought could be taken as a step from transcendental Kantian philosophy to the idealism of F'ichte ~Uld later of Schelling,·' This histori cal-philosophicaJ relevance would be both negative and pos itive, since Maimon not only showed the inadequacy and problems of the Kantian approach, but he also tried to solve them.1I2 This is the case as regards the issue of the given. It is precisely the inclus ion of the thing

... See ibid., 2: 168, 205-06. (,/I Sec Frcderick C. Beiser, TIte Fale oj Reason. German Philosophy

from Kant to Fichte (CambJidgc!London: Hruvard University Press, 1987) 287.

110 l\Jaimon. GW 2:65; ~The given is Ulcn that whose way of emerging in the subject remains unknown to us .... Both material and [oml belong to the subject." J-iat1.mmm, Die Pldlosophie des Dcutsclten IdeolisJnlls, 21; see Katzhoff. ~Salolllon Maimon's Critique of Kant's Theory of Consciousness, ~ 18!Hl8.

61 In this way, AUas says thaI philosophy constitutes "a necessary and logical transition, between critical thought and metaphysical speculation." that would return with idealism. Atlas, Prom Critical to Speculative Idealism, 1. Bergman speaks of ~Maimon's great impOltance for the understanding of the development of philosophical thought in the postKamian pcriod," Bergman, 71te Philosophy of Solomon Maimon, viii. Fol' Beiser, th is Essay would be ';a work of the first importance for the history of posl-Kantian i<lealism.M Beiser, 17le Fale oj Reason, 286. lIe adds ~to study I;khte, Schelling or lIegel without having read Maimon 's Versuch is like studying Kant without having rcad lIume's TI'(!atise;~ ibid. Prank takes the opportunity to show Maimon's influence over F'ichte; see Frrulk 'Unel/dliclte AnnalterIlJlg', 124, 126, 127-28, 131--32, 136; in this s..'unc sense see Atlas. From Critical to Speculali"ve fllealism, 54. The Maimonian interpretation of the givcn as established in the subject would be what pcnniued the step towards F'icht("s id('alism, In this way, Frank concluded that the real founder of the new stream was Maimon and not Pichte, as is most usually given; see Frank 'Unendliclte Anniilwrung', 123-24, 130--32, 136--37. This step is given thanks to his rcinlCIl)retation of the given not as an "cxtemar or causally operating thing in itself, but as something that is clearly understood as not known conceptually; see Beiser, Tile Fale of Reason, 294, 306--09; Cassin~r, Das Erkennf1l isproblem, 86.

!i.! See Beiser, 771f! Fate oj Reason, 286.


in ilseJf within the cognitive faculty, which enables him to surpass Kant and pave the road for FichlC.'"

Despite its merits, the Maimonian proposal does have its problems. I should like to refer to onc which, I believe, affects its very core. Maimon's explanaLions of the given solve Ihe problem, as posed in the CPR, and advance towards a more radi cal position from a critical point of view. However, in this pass.. ... ge, he appears to abandon critic ism. On affinning that an uncognoscible item is the basis of knowledge, namely, inflllite understanding, he set aside the explanation of knowledge in terms of what is revealed in it and in doing so would be resOIting to external uncognoscible condit ions.

A possibility of saving Maimon from falling into this pit would be to intell)ret the inlinite understanding in his texts as an idea which he could consider as playing a purely regulatory role in human )Glowledge.'" Nonetheless, I believe that this interpretation faces serious constraints. First, Maimon expressly states the existence .md constitutive nature of infinite understanding: ''This schema (finite understanding] pOints at the idea [of inlinite understanding], and the idea at the thing itself or at its existence, without which this idea and its ~chema would be impossible.''''' The second, and perhaps more imp0l1ant, difllculty is that the originally conceptual nature of IJle objects of experience is a condition of a conscious knowledge of objects, and this originally conceptual nalUre implies an infinite understmlding that is the base of these objects. If we take infinite undersLanding as a merely regulatory idea, the explanation is no longer val id because it is no longer possible to afl111n that objects are original ly conceptual, when the constitutive basis of their conceptuality has disappeared . Kant himself saw that regulative ideas do not explain the way in which objects are constituted in human knowledge but only subsequently to order those that ~U"e already

m See Bergman, TIle Philosophy oj Solomon Maimoll, 240; Windelband, A His/ory oj Philosophy, 570; Dilthey, GesQlnmelle Schr({Icn, 4:319; Fischer, Geschicftle del' IIcuenm Plrilosopliic, 6:47-50 .

.... SCC' Alias From Critical 10 Speculative Idealism, 330; Beiser, 77le F(I(c oj Reasoll, 304-05. There would exist a cerlain basis in Maimon's texIS to SUppOlt Ulis: see GW 2:6.J; 7: 16:3.

" See Maimon, GW 2:365-66. The intcrpretcrs or 1I1aimon admit this dogmatic' tenc\en('y of his thought, for example, Cassirer, Dos Br~'ellllINisproulem, 92.


constituted,'" To say thai infinite understanding is a regulalive idea would consequently mean denying it i ts role in t.he constitution of objects, which is a function which Maimon also gives it.

The other possibility is to take infinite lUlderslanding as constitutive, and this necessarily implies faJling into the clutches of dogmatism once again. A constituting infinite understanding can only be understood as an absolute and se lf-conscious constitutive item. So white it is inJinite, it is ab le to produce tiw complete object. from within itself, wlti le understanding is completely produced from its own conceplS; in other words, it should be Cul1y aware of constitutive activity in ilSelf and what has been constituted as such. Taken as such, an understanding of this kind must be substantial.

Nonetheless, l\'Iaimoinian dogmatism is shaded. As I have said, there is no essential difference between finite and infinite understanding, the difference can only be expressed in degrees, so we are aware of the nature of the infinite understanding as understanding. The idea of infinite understanding would be the complet.e realization of knowledge in which we have a PaJt, namely by mCaJ1S of a conceptual construct.ion, which we would realise in mathemat.ics. "All the nwlllffnwlical concepts are thought by us and at the same time established as real objects through construction a pri01'i. Thus we are in this respect similaJ' to God. " 0; Our knowledge of infinite underst.anding would consequently be dh·ect., "as in pmt we have the same [way of thinking of infinite understandingj."·"

However, this shading in dogmatism is not enough to overcome it. For the latter to occur, Maimon would have 1.0 effectively give us a knowledge of infinite understanding, in other words, of a purely conceptual and not inl.uilive knowleflge, conscious of the creation of objects from pure concepts.

We are not really aware of th is acl. of creating objects on tJ1C basis of pure concepts in natural science or in maUlematics. We are not aware of the way in which natural objects emerge from concepts. However, ('ven when we are aware of the construction of objects in mathematics, they are really constructions based on a certain material,

" Sec CPR A 64MB 672, "'" l\laimon, GW -1:,12. The emphasis is original. ''' Ibid., -1:..\2.


and we are not aware of the respective constitutive act of tllis material. In this way, for example, we are not aware of the creative act which gives way to the spatiality which is the basis of geometrical constructions ..... Only if this consciolls knowledge took place, wouJd we have a correlative immanent knowledge of infinite understanding and nol a mere conclusion that reaches out to what wou ld definitely be a transcendent substance.

It would seem possible to indirectly show that the intuitive has a conceptual root, in the mcasm"e that the impossibility of the KanHan dualism is proven and gives credit to the conceptual origin of the given. On the other hand, given the finitude of underslanding, it is impossible to give evidence of pure and non in lUi Live knowledge. This is the impossibility that allows Kant to a rgue, for example, against the attempt lO explain conceptually sensible differences of objects that are conceptually identical.

Maimon saw the problem clearly. In his Essay on 11ran.scendental. Philosophy, when he speaks of the difficulty of tJle "explanation of the emergence of the world (in accordance with its malleI') from intelligence,"'" he is obviously refening to infinite or creative intelHgence. He outlines an explanation based on his theory of differentials, 71 affinning the purely conceptual nature of mathematical knowledge;'" he even gives an example of how what in il ially would appear as a mere intuitive conjunction could become conceptual.'"

III This will delennine t.hat thcre cannot exist a coincidence between geomelJ"ical concepts and their constnlction; see ibid., 3: 188; Gideon ~Teudenthal, Definition and COllstl"llcl,ion. Salomon Maimon's Philosophy oj Geomelly (Max-Planck-lnstitul flir Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2006), Prcprint, 317:118-20.

;II Maimon, GW 2:62. n Differentials would be the last intellectual pm1.s of what. is sensibly

presented to finite understanding; see ibid., 2:27-34, 290-92; Bergman, 77w Pllilosophy oj Solomon Ma.i1no11, 59-68, 257-71; Salomon Zac, Solomon Mat·mon. Critique de Kant (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1988), 155-71; Achim Engstlcr, Untersuchungen zum Jciea/ismus Salomon Maimolls (Stuttgm1f Bad Cmmslatt: Fromman-lIolzboog, 1990), 47-50, 128-43, 165-89; Meir Buzaglo, Solomon Marmon. Monism, Skepticism, and Malllcnwtics (Pittsburg: University of Piusburg Press, 2002), 124-28; Atlas, Prom Critical to Speculative fdealism, 109-23.

:-: See Maimon, GW 4:42; 2:2. ;:1 In his Essay he tries to redirect. the intuitive natw'e of U1C line

(recutude) towards a conceptual definilion; see ibid., 2:65-70.


Nonelheiess, these are only simple indicaLions of how the test would be possible, not ils rendition. The issue remains pendi.ng until the test is finally given.

I tend to doubt the reality of the solution because we cannot conceive a purely conceplual knowledge of how objects constitute themselves completely [rom the conceptual and how the conceplUal becomes an object.

According to habitual readings of his works, Kant on his part holds his position that understanding and sensibility are sources of knowledge that are mutually irreducib le. He is thus saved from the problems related to the affinnation of an infinite understanding as the basis of knowledge. Nonetheless, he must face the difficult and apparently insoluble question of explaining the origin of the given as something independent from the transcendental subject which is not

causally conceivable-as I have uied to put forward here-and the other difficult issue of the relationship of understanding with an um-elated sensibility, frolll which necessarily detenninecl objects should emerge, an issue that is so ample that it exceeds the boundaries of this papcr. T1

Universidad de los Andes, InSfillll0 de PilosoJfa

71 I have broached these t.opics elsewhere. This paper is prut of the results of the FONDECYT 11075027 Project, "The Juridical Standpoint and the Factic Standpoint in Salomon Maimon's Versuch iibe/" die TJ"(lIIszelldelllaiphilosophie." I am grateful to Rafael Simirul and Mario I\IoJina for vely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Salomon Maimon's Commentary on the Subject of the Given in ImmanuelKant's Critique of Pure Reason

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