Rotenstreich article on solomon maimon

On the Position of Maimon's PhilosophyAuthor(s): Nathan RotenstreichReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), pp. 534-545Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124632 .Accessed: 15/06/2012 13:33

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EXPLORATION

ON THE POSITION OF MAIMONA PHILOSOPHY NATHAN RUTENSTREICH

I

Interwoven in the complex texture of Solomon Maim?n 's

(1752-1800) system are strands of thought originating in the

theories of his avowed creditors. Maim?n is one of the first

modern philosophers who acknowledges his debt to diverse philo

sophical trends and traditions. Among his major creditors, Maim?n includes Maimonides and Spinoza.1 The present analysis, however, will be restricted to an exploration of his debt to Leibniz,

Hume, and Kant.

In interweaving aspects of thought from Leibniz and Hume, Maim?n takes his departure from the earlier synthesis of their posi

tions, wrorked out by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. But

Maim?n goes beyond Kant, by interlacing theories of the critical

philosophy itself, with the web Kant had woven of strands from

Leibniz and Hume. What permitted Maim?n to link the seemingly

incompatible systems of the rationalist and the sceptic? In the

first place, both thinkers sought to establish the validity of the

relation between the two pillars of knowledge, concepts and sense

data. Secondly, both philosophers believed that the way to ac

complish their aim was to derive one component of knowledge from the other. According to Leibniz, the empirical factor can be

derived from the conceptual; while, according to Hume, "ideas"

can be derived from "impressions." But the difference in direction does not alter the fact that both

Leibniz and Hume posit a genetic relation between the two factors :

according to both, concepts are applicable to sense-data because

one factor grows out of the other. Hume maintains that concepts

1 On Maimon's relation to Spinoza see S. H. Bergman, The Philosophy of

Solomon Maim?n (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 216 ff.

ON THE POSITION OF MAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY 535

are valid because they are copies of impressions; Leibniz maintains

that the empirical factor can be explained hecause it constitutes a

stage in a continuous context originating in the monad. Both

Leibniz and Hume, then, sought?albeit in opposite directions?a

continuous transition between the heterogeneous component fac

tors of human knowledge. Kant rejects this method of coping with the problem of valid

ity. Taking his departure from the assumption that there can be

no continuous transition between concepts and sense impressions, Kant sought another way of establishing the validity of concepts, or alternately, a different tnethod of justifying their application to

sense-data. According to Kant, the relation between the two fac

tors is not genetic but functional.2 Unlike Leibniz and Hume, who

abolish duality, Kant sustains it. Whereas Leibniz and Hume

represent duality as the crux and source of their problem, Kant

represents it as the framework and foundation for his solution.

Arguing that the function of relating and ordering pertains to the

very nature of concepts, and that only by being incorporated into

a conceptually determined structure does the datum occupy a log ical position. Kant establishes the interrelatedness of the two fac

tors, without assuming that one can be derived from the other.

Unlike Leibniz, who posits a genetic relation in which intelligible truths find empirical realization and unlike Hume, who posits a

genetic relation in which sense impressions find their conceptual

copies, Kant posits a relation based upon the synthetic nature of

knowledge, i.e., a relation subsisting between heterogeneous factors.

Both Leibniz and Hume furnish Maim?n with criteria for

measuring Kant's solution to the problem of validity. On the one

hand, Maim?n applies the Leibnizian criterion which?by repre

senting the empirical factor as a realization of the rational factor?

robs the former of its independence. On the other hand, he

applies Hume's criterion according to which the empirical factor

can be neither abolished nor reduced to another factor. It is not

only against Kant, but also against Leibniz that Maim?n raises his

2 See my Experience and its Systemalization, Studies in Kant (The

Hague, 1965).

536 NATHAN ROTENSTR?ICH

objections. For the burden of Maim?n 's objection is this: to

translate intelligible truths into empirical truths is impossible

owing to the irreducible residuum of experience established by Hume. If the heterogeneity of the factors is ultimate?so Maim?n 's

criticism runs?then Kant's solution is unsatisfactory. To repre sent duality as the foundation for one's solution, is merely to

pretend that the question itself is an answer.

But Maim?n uses Leibniz as a weapon rather than as a target for criticism. According to Maim?n, Leibniz provides the only

possibility of solving the problem: a relation between empirical data and intelligible concepts can be established only by eliminating the former, that is to say, only by making the empirical factor

thoroughly intelligible. In assuming a synthetic connection be

tween the factors, Kant transfers the problem and its solution to

a new sphere. But the heterogeneity of the factors is a problem

posed by synthesis as well. Kant assumes that he has overcome

the acute form of heterogeneity which might preclude the possi

bility of a synthetic connection. This, however, is analogous to

the assumption that by bringing one extreme in contact with the

other, we cancel the polar opposition between them. Like Hume, whose spokesman he purports to be, Maim?n emphasizes the ir

reducibility of the datum. But whereas Hume maintains the

primacy of the datum, Maim?n maintains its independence vis-?-vis

the concept. In this respect, Maim?n fights Kant with a Kantian

weapon; for it was Kant who taught that the empirical-perceptual factor is no less independent than the conceptual factor. Accord

ing to Maim?n, if the empirical factor is independent, then even

synthesis is impossible.

On the one hand, then, Maimon's position resembles Kant's

in that it lies midway between Leibniz's and Hume's. On the

other hand, however, Maim?n diverges from Kant in using Kant's

system as evidence that the impossibility of solving the problem raised by Hume implies the impossibility of realizing the solution

proposed by Leibniz. To put it another way, because he con

sciously confines the solution he proposes within the limits of

finite understanding, Kant draws a distinction between archetypal

understanding and ectypal understanding. Maim?n apparently

agrees with Kant that the solution is confined within the limits of


finite understanding. But he goes beyond Kant in two respects. For one thing, he stresses the limits of finite understanding by

putting more pointedly the problem posed by Hume, i.e., by

pointing out what makes human understanding finite. For an

other, he furnishes finite understanding with a criterion for

measuring its own finitude by juxtaposing it with the infinite

understanding posited by Leibniz. From Hume, Maim?n adopted the ultimate fact of sensation and the conclusion Hume based upon

it, namely that the relations among concepts are purely psycholog ical. From Leibniz, Maim?n adopted the cognitive ideal by con

trast with which the nature of empirical knowledge is illuminated.

What conclusions can we draw from Maim?n's adaptation of

elements from Leibniz, Hume and Kant? First of all, because

Kant's system constitutes the background against which Maim?n

develops his theory, we can increase our appreciation of Kant by

studying Maim?n. Secondly, we may expect that one problem with which Maim?n will be preoccupied will be the nature of valid

knowledge. Finally, we may assume that the other problem with

which Maim?n will be preoccupied will be the nature of the factors

which prevent the realization of valid knowledge.3

II

What are the distinguishing marks of valid knowledge? To

answer this question it is necessary to recall that in classical philos

ophy a distinction was drawn between the intelligible world on the

one hand, and the empirical world on the other. The first step toward cancelling this distinction was taken by Kant. By

substituting understanding and sensation for intelligible world and

sensible world, Kant transformed what liad hitherto been a differ

ence in the structure of the world, into a difference within the

limits of knowledge. But despite the enclosure of the diverse

factors within the realm of knowledge, their duality remained

intact. The cognitive significance which Kant assigns to the differ

3 See the most recent comprehensive study : Samuel Atlas, From

Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maim?n

(The Hague, 1964).

538 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

ence between understanding and sensation?as distinguished from

the ontological validity it had been assigned in classical philosophy ?can, perhaps, be said to constitute the logical condition of Kant's

idea of synthesis. Maim?n goes beyond Kant by asking: if under

standing and sensation are indeed elements of knowledge, then

why must their duality be maintained? If understanding and

sensation are indeed constituents of knowledge, then they ought to

be understood as elements of a single system, rather than as two

systems, one of which is based upon the other.

In abolishing the ontological difference, and in substituting a difference between two sources of knowledge, Kant took the first

step toward rationalization. The second step toward rationaliza

tion is taken by Maim?n, who abolishes the difference between the

two sources of knowledge and substitutes a duality immanent in

the sphere of knowledge; a duality immanent in the process of

rationalization which perpetually and progressively overcomes the

irrational factor, i.e., the datum. By being absorbed into the

process of rationalization, the irrational factor is robbed of its

irreducibility which would otherwise arrogate a stable status.

Integration into the continuous process of rationalization is

substituted for the fixed status of the components of knowledge.

The change undergone by the datum entails a new view both

of concepts and of the syntheses connected with them. From

Kant's well-known observation that concepts without intuitions are

empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind, it follows that

contents are created through synthesis. It is the content which

constitutes the encounter between the different elements. Abolish

ing the difference between the elements entails the absorption of

the content into the concept itself, i.e., into the concept as endowed

with the power of explication. As endowed with the power of

explication, the concept itself is the content. Synthesis no longer denotes the self-transcendence of concepts and their application to

intuitions. The fullness furnished by intuition is implicit, to begin

with, in the concept; and synthesis is but the fullness of the con

cept. Being full to begin with, not depending upon intuition for

its fullness, the concept can serve as a starting point for an

explicative process, i.e., for a genetic process in which the problem of validity finds its solution. It may accordingly be said that


Maim?n goes beyond Leibniz, Hume, and Kant by developing the

central tenet of each: with the help of Kant's concept of synthesis, Maim?n undertakes to demonstrate the possibility of a transition

from understanding to experience, which was maintained by Leibniz and denied by Hume. But by so doing, he assigned a new

meaning to Kant's conception of synthesis; whereas Kant defined

concepts as functions which order the datum, Maim?n defines them

as the content of the universe.

Ill

Maim?n 's new interpretation of synthesis leads him to a new

conception of the rationality of the universe. Rationality, Maim?n

maintains, consists in the creation of the datum out of the concept, not in the explanation of the datum by means of the concept.

Rationality is realized in the generation of the datum. Maim?n

sought concrete expression for this concept of rationality in the

following facets of his system :

(A) Conspicuous in its absence from the epistemological

sphere is the noncognitive factor posited by Kant, namely the

thing-in-itself.4 In Kant's system, the thing-in-itself fulfills the

twofold function of (a) supplying knowledge with the datum; and

(b) guaranteeing that the datum will not be eliminated from

knowledge. Kant's thing-in-itself frustrates, as it were, the ten

dency of the concept to produce the datum out of itself by way of a

continuous transition. If, however, by "concept" we mean the

element of fullness, then there is neither room nor reason for

limiting its fullness by assigning a cognitive function to the thing

in-itself; there is neither room nor reason for allotting a cognitive function to a factor which subsists beyond the sphere of knowl

edge. Anticipating Hermann Cohen and his followers, Maim?n

argues that the thing-in-itself cannot bear the brunt of criticism

based upon an analysis of the nature and constituent elements of

knowledge.

4 See Bergman, op. cit., pp. 7 ff., and Atlas, op. cit., pp. 20 ff.


(B) Elimination of the thing-in-itself is entailed by the

assumption concerning the synthetic character of concepts ; but no

positive characteristic of synthesis is illuminated by its elimination.

The synthetic character of concepts finds positive expression in the

apparent pivot of Maimon's system, the law of determinability

(Satz der Bestimmbarkeit). How is it possible, Maim?n asks, to

link a particular predicate with a particular subject? Predication, a fundamental function of all knowledge, is not an arbitrary act of

formal assertion. This function must necessarily be anchored in

the meaning and structure of the concepts it combines; it is not

only from the perspective of the assertion, but also from the per

spective of content, that a particular term must constitute a pred icate of a particular subject. Or, as Maim?n puts it, the content

must be the measure of whether the subject is determined by the

predicate, and whether the predicate is the determination. The

combination in the assertion is accordingly based upon the clarity of the known content; and the known content guides the combina

tion in the assertion. Not the formal facets of the proposi tional structure, but the known contents permit us to say "This is a right-angled triangle," and prevent us from saying "This is a right-angled truth." Whereas, according to the realistic

solution, knowledge is valid because it copies the clear structure

of the world, according to Maim?n, knowledge is valid when it is

formulated in assertions which reflect its own clear structure, i.e.,

the structure of a determinable subject and its determinations.

Maim?n also maintains that the concept is not merely an ordering function but also a fullness of content, because its very nature leads

us to bring forth from potentiality into actuality its implicit deter

minations. Here Maim?n seems to interweave two strands of

Aristotle's philosophy: the element of emergence from potentiality into actuality as a law of the universe, and the element of related

ness between subject and predicate as the structure of propositions. As represented by Maim?n, the passage from potentiality into

actuality is implicit in the relation between subject and predicate; the structure of the universe is implicit in the structure of proposi tions. The encounter between metaphysical and logical structure

occurs neither on the plane of the universe, nor on the plane of

formal logic, but on the plane of knowledge saturated with con

ceptual content.


(C) The pivotal notion of Maim?n's system is not exhausted

in the observation that it combines an element of Aristotelian logic with an element of Aristotelian metaphysics, the subject-predicate structure of propositions with the dynamic structure of the uni

verse. For Maim?n also adapts for his purposes the element of

substance and accident. Maim?n explicitly represents the relation

between substance and accident as displaying a structure which has

been transferred to the logical sphere : he correlates the determined

subject with substance as being independent of its determination; and he correlates the determination with the accident as being

dependent upon the determined subject. Maim?n 's transfer of

ontological categories to the logical-conceptual sphere clearly reflects his tendency to abolish the duality of the spheres. Also

reflected in this transfer is Maimon's closely related argument that

the structure of substances cannot be transparent or rational, unless

it is at the same time the structure of concepts.

To understand why Maim?n transfers the structure of sub

stance and accident to the conceptual sphere, is at the same time

to understand why he criticizes the notion that the category of

causality constitutes the supreme principle of knowledge. Were

we to represent as a central metaphysical motif the conflict between

the principle of substance and the principle of causality, we would

have to include Maim?n among the leading proponents of the

former: measuring the principle of causality by his standard of

rationality, Maim?n argues that the relation between cause and

effect is not meaningful, because?being a relation of implication rather than explication?it is not based upon the inner content of

the related terms. The assertion and determination which many thinkers represent as the strength of the causality principle are

represented by Maim?n as its weakness. A connection of this

kind, Maim?n argues, is external and meaningless. Maimon's

cognitive ideal, then, is to find an immanent-meaningful founda

tion for the interconnectedness of elements, even when their con

nection occurs merely in time. This ideal cannot be satisfied by the merely temporal relation of succession. Maim?n consequently tries to correlate the principle of causality with a type of continuous

transition based upon the content of the phases which follow one

another, not upon their position in a temporal sequence.


(D) The very terminology employed by Maim?n reflects the

rationalization predominant in his teaching. Particularly per

tinent, in this respect, is the term "differential," which Maim?n uses to denote the process of creating the datum out of the con

cept, the perceptions being integrals of the conceptual elements.

As S. H. Bergman has shown,3 the position occupied by the

concept of differential in Maimon's system is parallel to the position

occupied by the concept of schematism in Kant's system. Yet this

aspect of Maimon's concept need not detain us, since it pertains to

the technical machinery of his system, rather than to its main trend

toward rationalization.

To throw further light on that trend, it might be worthwhile

to examine the relations between Formal Logic, which pertains to

the structure of judgments, and Transcendental Logic, which per tains to objects. Maim?n was among the first philosophers to

take issue with Kant on this central matter. Unlike Kant, Maim?n

maintains the primacy of Transcendental Logic and its inde

pendence of Formal Logic. In thus diverging from Kant, Maim?n

sought, first of all, to invest thought with content and, secondly, to make Formal Logic?which deliberately disregards and abstracts

from content?merely an abstraction of the full, and consequently creative, concept. Once we admit that the concept is dynamic, that it is the precondition of rationalization through generation of

the datum out of a concept, then we are driven to regard content

saturated thought as primary, and formal thought as secondary.6

IV

If Maimon's system appears Janus-faced, it is because the trend

toward rationalization is accompanied by an awareness that ration

ality cannot be realized within the limits of finite understanding. Rationalization is obstructed by the factual difference between the

component elements of knowledge, i.e., by the dual structure de

scribed in Kant's critical system. Maimon's factual scepticism is

5 See Bergman, op. cit., pp. 65 ff.; Atlas, op. cit., pp. 109 ff.

6 See Rotenstreich, Experience and its Systematization, Studies in

Kant, pp. 14 ff.


based upon two different uses of Kant's system: on the one hand,

he measures Kant's system by the standard of rationalization, and

finds it wanting; on the other hand, he measures rationalization

by Kant's system, and finds that it cannot be realized. Thus

Maim?n seems to accept the Kantian system de facto, even though he denies that it constitutes a solution to the problem it was

designed to solve. Maimon's system may accordingly be described

as a combination of fundamental rationalism and factual scepticism. What other reason is there for Maimon's factual scepticism?

It will be recalled that there is an element of ambiguity in Kant's

concept of experience. "Experience" connotes the domain of

sensuous encounter with data. It is in this sense that Kant says

"Everything else has to be left to experience." 7

Yet when he says that he deals with experience as grounded both in perception and

in understanding,8 he refers to experience as a synthesis and not

as a mere encounter. In any case Kant does not offer an exhaustive

explanation of the relation between the two meanings of expe rience. Maim?n seems to have been more precise in this matter;

using Kantian terms, he maintained that a particular sense-impres sion is an actual experience, while the total system of knowledge

represents possible experience. This implies that concepts are

applicable to knowledge in general qua possible experience, and

that they are not applicable to actual experience qua this or that

particular impression. There is no internal connection between

this particular impression in its ultimate factuality and the system of knowledge. Hence the applicability of the system to the impres sion is not demonstrated by Kant. The question quid facti remains

unsolved; rationalization through generation of the datum from

the concept remains unattainable within the limits of finite under

standing. In the history of sceptical ideas, Maimon's factual scepticism

occupies a special position His scepticism is aware of, and mea

sures itself by, a criterion of knowledge immune against scepticism. Both scepticism and relativism are generally challenged on the

7 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B, p. 218. In trans, by Kemp Smith

(London, 1950), p. 208. 8

Prolegomena zu einer jeden k?nftigen Metaphysik, etc. S 20, trans, by Peter and Lucas (Manchester, 1953).


grounds that they presuppose what they negate. More specifically, it is objected, first of all, that the sceptic assertion "there is no

certain judgment" is itself a certain judgment. Secondly, it is

objected that scepticism is possible only by comparison with some

thing which is beyond doubt. Neither of these objections seems

pertinent to Maimon's scepticism. Maim?n explicitly restricts

doubt within the limits of empirical knowledge. Doubt, as he

puts it, applies to the existence of thought concerning objects in

conformity to the a priori conditions of knowledge. Such doubt

does not cancel itself because it applies only to knowledge of

objects, not to knowledge of the structure of knowledge. Further

more, such scepticism is explicitly formulated by reference to a

definite, crystallized, cognitive ideal. Such scepticism accordingly

implies the nonrealization of the ideal, not the self-contradiction or

self-destruction of knowledge.

V

The Janus-faced character of Maimon's system carries decisive

weight from the viewpoint of the development of philosophy. We

may venture to say that Maim?n formulated the program of nine

teenth century idealism, fully aware that the program could not be

carried out. Nineteenth century idealism may be described as a

philosophical movement which endeavors, or dares, to undertake

the execution of Maimon's program. Idealism tries to abolish the

sceptical boundary set by Maim?n; it attempts to abolish the differ ence between finite consciousness and infinite-divine consciousness.

It is not by chance that Hegel's system is described by Whitehead as a philosophic attitude of a God.9 Hegel's design was to abolish

the inner opposition between our minds and objects, and to repre sent objects or objectivity as objectified mind. Why do we describe this realization of Maimon's program as daring? Unlike Maim?n,

Hegel does not represent finite mind as a limitation of infinite

mind; he represents infinite mind as an immanent explication of

9 "Analysis of Meaning," in Essays in Science and Philosophy (London,

1948), p. 99.


finite mind. This is why Hegel assigns a central position in his

system to the Phenomenology of Spirit; for it is here that he

justifies his daring venture. Here he undertakes to demonstrate

not only that Maimon's program can be realized as a matter of

principle, but also that it is actually realized, and realized precisely

by that finite mind which Maim?n represented as incapable of

realizing rationalization. What Maim?n represents as frustrating the trend toward realization, Hegel represents as sustaining it.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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Rotenstreich article on solomon maimon