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MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA
KES NO: 18(10)/4-1728/12
BETWEEN
KHAIRUL ANUAR BIN ABD RADZAI
AND
MAYBANK BANKING BERHAD ('MAYBANK')
AWARD NO: 1268 OF 2014
Before : Y.A. TUAN FREDRICK INDRAN X.A. NICHOLASCHAIRMAN (Sitting Alone)
Award Issued at : Industrial Court of Malaysia, Penang Branch
Venue of Hearing : Industrial Court of Malaysia, Penang Branch
Date of Reference : 25.9.2012
Dates of Mention : 29.11.2012; 13.12.2014; 15.1.2013; 20.3.2012;23.4.2013; 15.5.2013; 9.7.2013; 9.10.2013;
Dates of Hearing : 24.2.2014 & 25.2.2014
Company's Written Submission: 23.7.2014
Claimant's Written Submission : 5.5.2014
Claimant's Reply To Claimant's Written Submission: 22.8.2014
Representation : Mr. Raam KumarMessrs K.B. Tan, Kumar & PartnersAdvocates & Solicitors(Learned Counsel for the Claimant)
Miss Jenice Leo & Mr. Darmain SegaranMessrs Shook Lin & Bok Advocates & Solicitors(Learned Counsel for the Respondent)
1
AWARD
The Reference:
Khairul Anuar bin Abd Radzai (‘the Claimant’) ceased from his erstwhile service with
Malayan Banking Berhad (‘Maybank’) (‘the Company’) with effect from 21.7.2011.
The Claimant, being aggrieved by the circumstances surrounding the cessation of his
employment, made a written representation on 29.7.2011 to the Director General for
Industrial Relations, Malaysia under s. 20 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the
Act’). The said representation was duly entertained by the Director General as it was
formally and presumably regularly filed within the sixty day period allowed under s. 20
(1A) of the Act.
The conciliatory exertions thereafter undertaken by the said Director General’s office in
pursuance of that representation turned out to be of no avail; wherefore that office,
being convinced that the matter could not be amicably resolved thereat, duly notified the
Honourable Minister of Humans Resources, Malaysia of that failed reconciliation
process. This notification was made pursuant to s. 20 (2) of the Act.
Upon the perusal of this notification and its ancillary papers, and by virtue of s.20 (3) of
the Act, the Honourable Minister found it fit to exercise those powers under that section
to refer this matter to the Industrial Court of Malaysia for due determination and final
disposal.
2
As a result of which the Claimant’s initial representation was transformed into a
Ministerial Reference for an Award before this Court. The said Ministerial Order was
dated 25.9.2012.
The Matrix:
The Claimant commenced his employment with the Company on 4.2.2002 in the
position of Assistant Accounts Officer on a salary of RM1,449.00 per month. His last
held post there was that of Senior Executive Accounts Officer earning a salary of
RM5,175.00 per month.
The Claimant’s troubles began with the advent of the following communiqué from the
Company (exact copy);
*1
~ intentionally left blank ~
3
4
5
Pursuant to the domestic inquiry convened on 14th & 15th April 2011, the Claimant was
dismissed from employment vide the following missive (exact copy):
*2
6
The Claimant now comes before this Court to aver that his dismissal from employment
pursuant to the above said letter was without just cause or excuse and was contrary to
the principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice. He prayed to be reinstated
in his former position without loss of seniority, wages or benefits, monetary or otherwise,
together with arrears of salary or alternatively, any other remedy that this Court may
deem fit in the circumstances.
The Company, on the other hand, has denied the Claimant’s allegations and contends
instead that it was unequivocally correct in taking the action that it did in all the
circumstances of this case.
{NB/ As there was no adverse comment flowing from the Claimant with regard to the
legitimacy of the said domestic inquiry, this Court will deem it valid.}
The Issue:
As there was no dispute as to the actual factum of dismissal in this case, the sole issue
that arose for the determination of this Court was whether the Claimant was dismissed
with just cause or excuse. That noteworthy utterance of the then Lord President, the
Honourable Mr. Justice Tun Salleh Abas in the case of WONG CHEE HONG v
CATHAY ORGANISATION (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 1 CLJ 45; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 298 (of
the then Supreme Court of Malaysia), has practical relevance here; which went like this:
7
“When the Industrial Court is dealing with a reference under s. 20, the first thing that the
Court will have to do is to ask itself a question whether there was a dismissal, and if so,
whether it was with or without just cause or excuse.”
The General Principles:
In COLGATE PALMOLIVE Sdn. Bhd. v. YAP KOK FOONG (Award 368 of 1998), it
was held as follows:
“In a section 20 reference, a workman’s complaint consists of two elements: firstly, that
he has been dismissed, and secondly that such dismissal was without just cause or excuse.
It is upon these two elements being established that the workman can claim his relief, to
wit, an order for reinstatement, which may be granted or not at the discretion of the
Industrial Court. As to the first element, industrial jurisprudence as developed in the
course of industrial adjudication readily recognizes that any act which has the effect of
bringing the employment contract to an end is a ‘dismissal’ within the meaning of section
20. The terminology used and the means resorted to by an employer are of little
significance; thus, contractual terminations, constructive dismissals, non-renewals of
contract, forced resignations, retrenchments and retirements are all species of the same
genus, which is ‘dismissal’.”
8
As there is no quarrel that there was a clear cut dismissal of the Claimant by his
employer and bearing in mind the factual matrix of this case, I take cognizance of the
declaration of the late Mohd. Azmi FCJ in the cases of WONG YUEN HOCK V.
SYARIKAT HONG LEONG ASSURANCE SDN. BHD. & ANOR [1995] 3 CLJ 344 and
MILAN AUTO SDN. BHD. V. WONG SHE YEN [1995] 4 CLJ 449 wherein His Lordship
articulated the two-fold function of the Industrial Court under a section 20 reference. To
paraphrase; it is first ~ to determine whether the alleged misconduct of the employee
had been established; and second ~ whether that proven misconduct constitutes just
cause or excuse for the decision by the Company to dismiss.
In GOON KWEE PHOY v J & P COATS (M) Bhd. [1981] 1 LNS 30 Raja Azlan Shah CJ
(Malaya) (as DYMM Paduka Seri Sultan Azlan Shah Sultan Perak Darul Ridzuan
then was) speaking for the Federal Court ruled: -
“Where representations are made and are referred to the Industrial Court for enquiry, it
is the duty of that court to determine whether the termination or dismissal is with or
without just cause or excuse. If the employer chooses to give a reason for the action
taken by him, the duty of the Industrial Court will be to enquire whether that excuse or
reason has or has not been made out. If it finds as a fact that it has not been proved, then
the inevitable conclusion must be that the termination or dismissal was without just
cause or excuse. The proper enquiry of the court is the reason advanced by it and that
court or the High Court cannot go into another reason not relied on by the employer or
find one for it.”
9
That learned author, Dr. Dunston Ayadurai in his erudite text Industrial Relations In
Malaysia: Law & Practice 3rd Edition at page 297 states: -
“A workman can seek a remedy under section 20 only if he had been dismissed. More
often than not, there is no dispute that there was an actual dismissal of the workman by
his employer. The only issue for the Industrial Court to determine is whether the
dismissal had been for just cause or excuse, the onus of proving the existence of the
same being cast upon the employer.” [emphasis added]
And this onus or burden of proof on the Company is based on a standard of a balance
of probabilities (see UNION of CONSTRUCTION, ALLIED TRADES AND
TECHNICIANS v. BRAIN [1981] ICR 542, [1981] IRLR 224, CA; SMITH v. CITY of
GLASGOW DISTRICT COUNCIL [1987] ICR 796, [1987] IRLR 326, HL; POST OFFICE
(Counters) Ltd V. HEAVEY [1990] ICR 1, [1989] IRLR 513, EAT; IREKA
CONSTRUCTIONS BERHAD v. CHANTIRAVATHAN a/l SUBRAMANIAM JAMES
[1995] 2 ILR 11 and TELEKOM MALAYSIA KAWASAN UTARA v. KRISHNAN KUTTY
SANGUNI NAIR & Anor. [2002] 3 CLJ 314).
In the above said book entitled Industrial Relations In Malaysia: Law & Practice 3rd
Edition the learned author Dr. Dunston Ayadurai had this to say at pages 325 & 326:-
“The Industrial Court has confirmed that it is for the employer to determine initially
whether or not an employee has committed a misconduct, but that in doing so the
10
employer must act fairly and reasonably, after appropriate investigation, and on the basis
of fact rather than assumptions. In Shell Malaysia Trading Co Sdn. Bhd. v
National Union of Petroleum & Chemical Industry Workers (Award 134 of
1986): -
The company cited various authorities from Soonavala’s ‘The Supreme Court on
Industrial Law’ ….. But one authority relied on by the company goes on to add:
It is for the management to determine whether the act of the workman
constitutes misconduct, and whether it merits an order of dismissal.
However, in determining whether there has been such misconduct, it must
have facts upon which to base its conclusions, and it must act in good faith
without caprice or discrimination, and without any motive of victimization
or intimidation or resorting to unfair labour practice, and there must be no
infraction of the accepted rules of natural justice. When the management
does have facts from which it can conclude misconduct, its judgement
cannot be questioned, provided the aforementioned principles are not
violated. On the other hand, in the absence of these facts, or in the case of
any violation of the aforementioned principles, its position is untenable,
and it becomes a fit case for interference by the Industrial Tribunal.”
In AZAHARI SHAHROM & Anor. v. ASSOCIATED PAN MALAYSIA CEMENT Sdn.
Bhd. [2010] 1 ILR 423 @ 436 this Court was of the view that:
11
“It is trite that the association between employer and employee out of necessity is
fiduciary in nature. There has to be mutual trust and confidence that one would deal with
the other in all fairness and rectitude over the rights and obligations flowing between the
parties under the employment agreement. If one does an act or commits an omission
which is inconsistent with that fiduciary relationship then that act or omission will be
mala fides. This principle has equal application as against the employer and the
employee in their respective positions viz. the employment relationship between them.”
B.R. Ghaiye in his text Misconduct in Employment Chapter XIX at page 650 states:
“The relation between an employer and an employee is of a fiduciary character. The word
“fiduciary” means belonging to trust or trusteeship. It means that whenever an employer
engages a worker he puts trust that the worker will faithfully discharge the service and
protect and further the interest of the employer.”
In TIAN SAN Sdn. Bhd. v. LIN KIM PING (Award 483 of 1997) the Court held:
-“It is an established principle in industrial jurisprudence that in every employment
contract there is an implied term that a party thereto will not without reasonable cause
conduct himself in a manner likely to damage or destroy the relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties as employer and employee: see Bliss v. South
Thames Regional Health Authority [1995] IRLR 308 (Court of Appeal).”
12
In CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Bhd. v ILHAM MOHAMAD (Award 29
of 2001) it was stated:
“The implied term of contract relied upon by the company can hardly be gainsaid. In
‘The Modern Law of Employment’ at p. 446, G H I Fridman puts the matter this
way:
The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that the servant shall be in a
position to perform his duty duly and faithfully, and if by his own act he prevents
himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him. There are thus two aspects of
the employee’s duty under a contract of employment. He must provide a
satisfactory performance of the work he has contracted to do; and he must act
faithfully and in accordance with the interest of his employer.”
And Professor of Law Alfred Avins in his book Employees’ Misconduct wrote at pages
537 & 538:
“The servant is bound to give faithful personal service to his master and, as a
consequence, to refrain from any course of conduct the natural tendency of which must
be to injure the master’s trade or business.”
In PEARCE v. FOSTER [1886] (17) QBD 536, Lord Esher MR observed:
13
“The rule of law is that where a person has entered into the position of servant, if he does
anything incompatible with the due and faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the
latter has the right to dismiss. The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that
the servant shall be in a position to perform his duty and faithfully, and if by his own act
he prevents himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him.”
And Lopes LJ in the same case stated as follows:
“If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty
in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That need not be a
misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is a
misconduct which is prejudicial to the interest or reputation of the master.”
And in TELEKOM MALAYSIA Bhd. v. S. SIVALINGAM (Award 427 of 1995) it was
said:
“The only issue for the court to decide is: was the conduct committed by the claimant of such a
serious nature that it warranted the punishment of dismissal? In other words, what the Court has
to determine is whether the nature and extent of the misconduct could constitute just cause or
excuse for the dismissal. The question therefore arises whether the employer was reasonable
under the circumstances in its decision to dismiss the claimant.”
14
In the persuasive authority of the case of TAYLOR V. PARSONS PEEBLES NEI
BRUCE PEEBLES LTD. [1981] IRLR 119, the English Employment Appeals Tribunal
held as follows:
“In determining the reasonableness of an employer’s decision to dismiss, the proper test
is not what the policy of the employer was, but what the reaction of a reasonable
employer would be in the circumstances. …. That includes taking account of the
employee’s length of service and previous record.”
A Preamble to the narration of the Evidence:
In an effort to be free of the drag and load of unrequired detail, I will attempt to distil the
review of this case to its essence without, as far as possible, compromising upon its
critical features.
Having said that, unless otherwise indicated in the context, this narration is an amalgam
of the plausible evidence which was presented in this case grounded upon the
jurisprudence peculiar to Industrial Law; and upon which the final order is based.
The Evidence:
The Company’s Case & the Claimant’s response thereto
15
To cut to the chase the Company’s case was that the Claimant was dismissed upon
charges of misconduct relating to the authoring and issuing of an anonymous letter on
9.3.2011; which was sent via fax transmission to the Company’s Industrial Relations
Unit. The said letter contained various allegations against named individual officers of
the Company.
The Company then directed its officers to carry out an investigation on the provenance
of the said letter; both with regard to its source as well as its contents. The latter was
revealed to be unfounded, while the former was ostensibly discovered to be the
Claimant.
The shop from where the fax was sent was said to have been inquired into; and two
shop assistants (both called as witnesses before this Court) identified the Claimant as
the person responsible for having sent the offending article, i.e. the said anonymous
letter; through them from their shop at the material time.
That being established the Company took the action that it did which led to the
Claimant’s dismissal. The Company, through its Head of Group I.R. & Governance ~
witness designated ‘COW 5’ at trial ~ explained why the decision to terminate was
taken. I can do no better that to quote him verbatim thus:
“Every employee of the Bank (the Company in this instance) has the right to raise
concerns it [sic] may have to the Bank’s management so long as those concerns are
legitimate and are made through the proper channels.
16
It is clear that the Claimant’s allegations against specific individuals in the Bank’s SME
Business Center Perak and Perak Region Management Team were tainted with mala fide.
As it had been shown that the allegations in the said letter were baseless it was obviously
the case that the Claimant had set out to defame and scandalously bring disrepute to the
Bank and/or the named individuals in the said letter.
Bearing this in mind, the deceptive conduct of the Claimant in denying his authorship of
the said letter and refusing to take ownership of the allegations he had raised shows a
clear intent of hostility towards the Bank. As such the Bank decided that it could no
longer repose any trust and confidence in the Claimant to continue in employment with
the Bank.”
It transpired during the course of the trial that the Claimant had appealed his dismissal
and pursuant to this COW 5 had occasion to converse with the Claimant; this is what he
(COW 5) had to say on the issue:
“Based on his appeal letters, the Bank’s management instructed me to have a
conversation with him and also the Union representing him with a view to reinstate him
back [sic] as an officer of the Bank. Based on all the evidence advanced, the
management felt that he had sent out that complaint letter. As such, the management was
prepared to give him another chance if he has been remorseful and realized that he has
made a mistake. Unfortunately, he did not admit or still maintained that he did not do it.
Therefore the matter did not proceed further.” [emphasis added]
17
The long and short of the Claimant’s response was that he did not do it ~ i.e. neither did
he author the offending letter nor was he responsible for sending it.
The Evaluation:
It is trite that the Claimant is not the one who must prove that he was not guilty of
misconduct [see the case of STAMFORD EXECUTIVE CENTRE v. DHARSINI
GANESAN (Award No. 263 of 1985)]. That burden is cast squarely upon the Company.
The entire flavor Company’s case was that the Claimant was dismissed for his
intransigent attitude in not owning up to having authored and sent the offending letter.
While what can be deduced from the evidence on the whole and upon a balance of
probabilities is that the Claimant did send the fax; there was no real or cogent evidence,
that was forth-coming at trial, with regard to the authorship of the same. Just because
one may have been instrumental in sending or dispatching a letter does not, by any
stretch of the imagination, necessarily connect to having been the composer thereof.
Nonetheless, the letter was sent and dire consequences befell the Claimant, but not
upon those innocents named therein. The Company, in its wisdom and wherewithal,
established that the allegations put forth were unfounded; and so they, if you will, “shot
the messenger”. And all because he would not own up to being the likely, nay, the
revealed herald!
18
That the contents of letter concerned was perhaps mischievous (see the documentary
exhibit at pages 22 to 25 in bundle marked ‘A’); and possibly targeted at embarrassing the
individuals named therein; this Court found it too much of a stretch to consider it as
embarrassing and/or hostile towards the Company per se; or how, if at all, it could
seriously and/or adversely effect the relevant employment relationship between it (the
Company) and the Claimant.
Was the Company’s response a proportionate measure to the Claimant’s proven
misconduct, such as it was? A reprimand perhaps was surely in order; but could the
punishment extend to a dismissal?
In the entire circumstances of this case, I think not.
The action of the Company to dismiss must measure up to the test of reasonableness
which include the notions of proportionality; i.e. the punishment must be proportional to
the culpability that may be apportioned for the misconduct. The arbitrary and/or
capricious deprivation of a person’s livelihood by managerial authority must be inhibited
and tempered by compassion. There appeared to be a semblance of it when the
Company’s management instructed COW 5 to look into the reinstatement of the
Claimant upon his appeal, but nothing, it appears, came of this exercise. It does show
however, the fact that the Company was prepared at that stage to give the Claimant
another chance at earning his livelihood; but that it did not follow through effectively and
practically upon that commendable and worthy emotion of ‘compassion’.
19
Thus, applying the test as suggested in TAYLOR V. PARSONS PEEBLES NEI BRUCE
PEEBLES LTD. (supra); and if viewed in equity, good conscience and the substantial
merits of this case as prescribed by s. 30 (5) of the Act; the termination by the Company
of the Claimant in this instance appears excessively harsh, bordering on the inequitable
and certainly disproportionately stark.
That there were other less severe sanctions available in the “armoury of punishment”
open to the Company to redress the situation brought about by the Claimant of sending
the impugned fax, is trite. That they chose the ultimate and terminal one was somewhat
draconian in all the circumstances of this case.
Hardly a reasonable reaction from a reasonable employer in the entire state of affairs
revealed in this case!
As a consequence, it is the inevitable finding of this Court that on the evidence in its
entirety; and based upon a balance of probabilities; the Claimant’s dismissal from
employment by the Company in this particular and peculiar set of circumstances was
sans just cause or excuse.
20
The Remedy:
The Claimant has sought the intercession of this court to order his reinstatement at the
company without loss of wages, allowance, service, seniority, privileges or benefits of
any kind and/or any other alternative relief as this Court deems fit and proper. In the
circumstances of this case, particularly the manner of the parting of ways, I am of the
considered view that the interest of both parties and that of industrial harmony as a
whole would not be served by an order of reinstatement. Thus, compensation in lieu of
reinstatement; and backwages, shall be the alternative remedy ordered here.
The Federal Court in DR. A. DUTT v ASSUNTA HOSPITAL [1981] 1 MLJ 304 held that
the Industrial Court is authorized to award monetary compensation if of the view that
reinstatement is not appropriate. Compensation constitutes two elements viz. a)
compensation in lieu of reinstatement and b) backwages. [See also the Court of Appeal
in KOPERASI SERBAGUNA Bhd. SABAH v JAMES ALFRED, SABAH & Anor.
[2000] 3 CLJ 758].
In HOTEL JAYAPURI v NATIONAL UNION OF HOTEL BAR & RESTAURANT
WORKERS [1980] 1 MLJ 109 the Federal Court held that if there was a legal basis for
paying compensation, the question of amount is very much at the discretion of the Court
to fix under section 30 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.
21
In the exercise by the court of its discretion reference is had to O P Malhotra’s The Law
of Industrial Disputes Vol. 2, 6th Edition at page 1432: -
“ ….. the tribunal has the discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the
situation of a particular case is unusual or exceptional so as to make reinstatement
inexpedient or improper. The tribunal has to exercise its discretion judicially ….”
And at page 1434 of the same book: -
“There is no fixed formula for the computation of compensation in cases of wrongful
dismissal of a workman. The amount of compensation has to be fixed taking all the
relevant facts and circumstances of a particular case into account.”
It is undisputed that the Claimant’s last drawn monthly remuneration amounted to
RM5,175.00.
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement:
As there is prevalence in the Industrial Court of this nation to base compensation in lieu
of reinstatement on the multiplicand of one (1) month’s remuneration, this Court can
see no justification from departing from this norm.
The multiplicand is therefore RM5,175.00.
22
As regards the multiplier, it is undisputed that the Claimant had served the Company
for a period of about 9 years or thereabouts (i.e. from 4.2.2002 to 21.7.2011). The
multiplier will therefore be 9.
In the circumstance, compensation under this head amounts to RM46,575.00
[RM5,175.00 x 9].
Backwages:
In DR. A. DUTT V. ASSUNTA HOSPITAL (supra) Hashim Yeop A. Sani J. held that “a
reinstatement order carries with it a prima facie right to an order for the recovery of wages since
the date of dismissal. Such an order is ancillary to the order of reinstatement.”
In RANK XEROX LTD. v CHOONG SIN SING @ CHONG LIAN HWA [1990] 1 ILR 455,
it was held that where reinstatement is ordered, full backwages up to the date of
reinstatement should be paid save for cogent reasons.
And in THILAGAVATHY ALAGAN MUTIAH v MENG SING GLASS Sdn. Bhd. & Anor
[1997] 4 CLJ Supp 368, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J. held that full backwages from the time
of dismissal up to the date of the award were payable to the workman in respect of
whom reinstatement was not ordered by the Industrial Court.
23
However, this court is mindful of the Second Schedule to the Act, introduced by the
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A1322) which came into force on
28.2.2008 (PU(B) 84/08); which provides that back pay may be ordered from the date of
dismissal based on the last drawn salary but subject to a maximum of 24 months.
[emphasis added]
Proviso: The Rescaling of Compensation:
As the principles of equity and good consciences have to be applied in the exercise of
discretion in the granting of financial relief, consideration ought to be had to the
possibility of rescaling the monetary award ordered for backwages. To that end, this
court will now reflect on the heads that it considers relevant under which the
recompense could or should be rescaled; and in the instant case it is the Claimant’s
contributory conduct which has led to the quandary of his dismissal from employment;
and for his admitted post dismissal gainful employment. He was re-employed
elsewhere within 4 months of his instant dismissal.
Contributory Conduct
It is irrefutable that the Claimant’s action in sending the relevant fax got him into his
troubles in the first place. Although not shown by the Company to this Court to be grave
enough to warrant dismissal in this instance, his proven misconduct is sufficiently
significant to be taken into account in relation to the measure of recompense to be
24
ordered. The Claimant, in all good conscience, must be made to bear some
responsibility for his ill thought-of transgression. To allow him to go ‘scot-free’ would
send the wrong message to would-be perpetrators of this type of misconduct. Under the
circumstances and in view of the Claimant’s contributory conduct this Court sees fit to
rescale downward the award for backwages under this head to the extent of 50% of
what is to be awarded below, having taken into consideration his post dismissal
earnings.
Given the circumstances established during the trial of this case with regard to the post-
dismissal earnings of the Claimant, an appropriate adjustment has to be made under
this head of compensation; which I now order as follows:
i) Full backwages for a period of 4 months: RM5,175.00 x 4 = RM20,700.00;
ii) Backwages for the balance of 20 months @ RM5,175.00 per month less
50% to account for post dismissal earnings: RM5,175.00 x 20 =
RM103,500.00 – RM51,750.00 (representing 50%) = RM51,750.00.
[Making the total backwages thus ordered as: RM20,700.00 + RM51,750.00 =
RM72,450.00 less 50% (for contributory conduct) = RM36,225.00].
25
The Final Order:
This Court now orders that the Company do pay the Claimant the sum of RM82,800.00
less statutory deductions, if any, not later than 15 days from the date of this Award. The
said sum is made up as follows:-
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement: RM46,575.00
Backwages as scaled down above: RM36,225.00
Total (before statutory deductions): RM82,800.00
In Extenso & Under My Hand.
HANDED DOWN AND DATED THIS 14th DAY OF NOVEMBER 2014.
~ Signed ~(FREDRICK INDRAN X.A. NICHOLAS)
CHAIRMANINDUSTRIAL COURT OF MALAYSIA
PENANG BRANCHAT GEORGETOWN
26