Madison’s Theory: Self-Interest & Ambition as the Solution€¦ · Reviewing Problem & SolutionAmbition as an Institutional SolutionMadison’s Republic as Theory Madison’s Theory:

Reviewing Problem & Solution Ambition as an Institutional Solution Madison’s Republic as Theory

Madison’s Theory: Self-Interest & Ambition as theSolution

Carlos [email protected]

June 28, 2017

Carlos Algara Introduction to American Politics: Meeting 3

mailto:[email protected]


Quick Syllabus UpdatesNo Seminar next Tuesday July 4th

Exam DatesI Midterm Exam: July 17, 2017 (Monday)I Midterm Exam Review: July 13, 2017 (Thursday during Discussion

Period)I Final Exam: August 2, 2017 (Wednesday, Final Class Meeting)I Final Exam Review: August 1, 2017 (Tuesday) & Half of July 27, 2017

(Thursday during Discussion Period)Substantive Discussion Sections (TR 12:10-1:50 Olson 106)

I July 6, 2017: Meeting 6 Overcoming Limited Information: How Citizensuse Short-Cuts to Act

I July 20, 2017: Meeting 14 Change in Representation: Are CitizensRepresented in the System?

I July 27, 2017: Meeting 18 How Democratic is the U.S.? PolicyResponsiveness

Note: Non-exam review & substantive discussion periods will be treated astraditional discussion seminars (i.e. discussing course material).



Solution: Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.

Meeting Agenda:

1 Problem of Human Nature & Solution of The Republic

2 Institutionalizing Ambition to Solve Human Nature

3 Madison’s Republic as a Theory


2/11


Reviewing the Problem of Human Nature

I Opening Question: According to Madison, what’s thefundamental problem of human nature in society?

I How does Madison solve the problem posed by human naturewith respect to governing & securing public goods?

I Why does Madison reject the idea of “great statesmen” asreliable agents of factions?


https://www.polleverywhere.com/free_text_polls/hjw8ikfdd0BYbon?preview=true


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3/11


Federalist 10 & Unchecked Ambition/Human Nature

Consequence of Unchecked Ambition & Faction“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerninggovernment, and many other points, as well of speculation as ofpractice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiouslycontending for preeminence and power; or to persons of otherdescriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the humanpassions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamedthem with mutual animosity, and rendered them much moredisposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for theircommon good.”


3/11


Federalist 10 & Unchecked Ambition/Human Nature

Consequence of Unchecked Ambition & Faction“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerninggovernment, and many other points, as well of speculation as ofpractice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiouslycontending for preeminence and power; or to persons of otherdescriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the humanpassions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamedthem with mutual animosity, and rendered them much moredisposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for theircommon good.”


4/11


The Republic As the Solution

Self-Interest in Design to Solve the Problem

“these exterior provisions are. . . inadequate, the defect must besupplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the governmentthat its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, bethe means of keeping each other in their proper places.”

Self-Interest inherent the Departments“But the great security against a gradual concentration of theseveral powers in the same department, consists in giving to thosewho administer each department the necessary constitutionalmeans and personal motives to resist encroachments of theothers. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases,be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition mustbe made to counteract ambition.”


4/11



Self-Interest in Design to Solve the Problem“these exterior provisions are. . . inadequate, the defect must besupplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the governmentthat its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, bethe means of keeping each other in their proper places.”



4/11




Self-Interest inherent the Departments

“But the great security against a gradual concentration of theseveral powers in the same department, consists in giving to thosewho administer each department the necessary constitutionalmeans and personal motives to resist encroachments of theothers. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases,be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition mustbe made to counteract ambition.”


4/11






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Cont. The Republic As the Solution

How to operationalize the Departments to protect Public Good

“We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributionsof power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange theseveral offices in such a manner as that each may be a check onthe other that the private interest of every individual may be asentinel over the public rights.”

Preeminence of the Legislature & Insuring Conflict“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarilypredominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide thelegislature into different branches; and to render them, by differentmodes of election and different principles of action, as littleconnected with each other as the nature of their commonfunctions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”


5/11



How to operationalize the Departments to protect Public Good“We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributionsof power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange theseveral offices in such a manner as that each may be a check onthe other that the private interest of every individual may be asentinel over the public rights.”



5/11




Preeminence of the Legislature & Insuring Conflict

“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarilypredominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide thelegislature into different branches; and to render them, by differentmodes of election and different principles of action, as littleconnected with each other as the nature of their commonfunctions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”


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Extra Layer of Complexity: Federalism

“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered bythe people is first divided between two distinct governments, andthen the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct andseparate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rightsof the people. The different governments will control each other,at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”

I How do you think the complexity of federalism further pits“ambition against ambition?”

I Currently, Republican Governors (ex: NV, OH, MA) areopposing their Senate co-partisan majority in advocating forthe BCRA. Given Madison, why is that the case?

I Further dispersion of power and pitting faction against faction


6/11



Extra Layer of Complexity: Federalism“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered bythe people is first divided between two distinct governments, andthen the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct andseparate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rightsof the people. The different governments will control each other,at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”





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7/11


The Republic Theory in PracticeInstitutional Logic of “Separation of Powers”

LegislatureHouse Senate President

IncentiveTerm of Office 2 yrs 6 yrs 4 yrsApportionment Proport. Federal Federal + PropConstituency [District] State NationalSize [435] 100 1Selection Elected [Elected] [Elected]ResourcesAction Legislate, raise army, tax, Appointment, pardon,

interstate commerce, purse, impeach Commander-in-chief,impeachment, declare war Executive

Reaction: Veto override, Senate Veto,v. Congress/Pres confirmation, treaties Execute the lawReaction: Set jurisdiction, initiate Nominationv. Courts const. amend., confirmation, purse

impeach, lower courtsNote: [brackets] denotes non-constitutional requirement.


8/11


Institutional Logic: Incentives & Resources

Incentives Key: Interest of the Man & Personal Motives“The interest of the man must be connected with theconstitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection onhuman nature, that such devices should be necessary to control theabuses of government. But what is government itself, but thegreatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, nogovernment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,neither external nor internal controls on government would benecessary.”

Constitutional Rights of Place“. . . the power surrendered by the people is. . . subdivided amongdistinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arisesto the rights of the people. The different governments will controleach other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”


8/11


Institutional Logic: Incentives & Resources

Incentives Key: Interest of the Man & Personal Motives“The interest of the man must be connected with theconstitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection onhuman nature, that such devices should be necessary to control theabuses of government. But what is government itself, but thegreatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, nogovernment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,neither external nor internal controls on government would benecessary.”

Constitutional Rights of Place“. . . the power surrendered by the people is. . . subdivided amongdistinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arisesto the rights of the people. The different governments will controleach other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”


9/11


Ex: Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV) & BRCA

I Why is Heller pledging to vote against his party’s signaturehealthcare bill?


https://youtu.be/0i-UFXBnPK8

10/11


Formalizing The Republic Theory of GovernmentRepresenting Faction (Primarily Federalist 10)

I Human Nature →1 Factions ↔2 Representation

I Where: →1 = Self-interest & ↔2 = ElectionsI Election & re-election (↔2) critical to theory: protects

against agency loss by faction (voters)

Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)I Three Departments: Congress ⇔ President ⇔ JudiciaryI Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House ⇔ U.S. SenateI Federalism: State governments ⇔ Federal governmentI Where ⇔ = conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e.

checks & balances/dependence of action)I Result: strong status-quo bias, why?I Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms &

constituency


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I Human Nature →1 Factions ↔2 RepresentationI Where: →1 = Self-interest & ↔2 = Elections

I Election & re-election (↔2) critical to theory: protectsagainst agency loss by faction (voters)



constituency


10/11



I Human Nature →1 Factions ↔2 RepresentationI Where: →1 = Self-interest & ↔2 = ElectionsI Election & re-election (↔2) critical to theory: protects




constituency


10/11





Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)

I Three Departments: Congress ⇔ President ⇔ JudiciaryI Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House ⇔ U.S. SenateI Federalism: State governments ⇔ Federal governmentI Where ⇔ = conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e.


constituency


10/11





Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)I Three Departments: Congress ⇔ President ⇔ Judiciary

I Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House ⇔ U.S. SenateI Federalism: State governments ⇔ Federal governmentI Where ⇔ = conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e.


constituency


10/11





Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)I Three Departments: Congress ⇔ President ⇔ JudiciaryI Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House ⇔ U.S. Senate

I Federalism: State governments ⇔ Federal governmentI Where ⇔ = conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e.


constituency


10/11





Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)I Three Departments: Congress ⇔ President ⇔ JudiciaryI Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House ⇔ U.S. SenateI Federalism: State governments ⇔ Federal government

I Where ⇔ = conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e.checks & balances/dependence of action)

I Result: strong status-quo bias, why?I Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms &

constituency


10/11






checks & balances/dependence of action)

I Result: strong status-quo bias, why?I Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms &

constituency


10/11






checks & balances/dependence of action)I Result: strong status-quo bias, why?

I Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms &constituency


10/11







constituencyCarlos Algara Introduction to American Politics: Meeting 3

11/11


Key Points:I Key to constitutional government: control effects (conflict) of

faction by involving spirit of party & faction, elections criticalto representative government

I Self-Interest of political actors & collective institutionssafeguards against tyranny of majority & loss of liberty:“ambition must be made to counteract ambition”

I Self-interest provided by varying incentives (personal motives)across different institutions (Congress, President, Judiciary,state governments); election incentive

I Dispersing powers across different departments (branches)provides “constitutional rights of place”

I Each department given necessary resources (constitutionalrights of the place) to check other branch

I Dispersion of power = strong status quo bias & ↑ transactioncosts


Documents

Madison’s Theory: Self-Interest & Ambition as the Solution€¦ · Reviewing Problem & SolutionAmbition as an Institutional SolutionMadison’s Republic as Theory Madison’s Theory: