With an Expert Panel including Admiral (ret) Mark Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy Lieutenant General (ret) David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Colonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army

Shaping the Army for Joint Warfighting

Capitol Hill Club, 19 November 2013

An event sponsored by the General Billy Mitchell Institute for Aerospace

Studies

The MTM (Macgregor Transformation Model)

What you should take away from this presentation:

1. Convert Army ground forces to Combat Groups, 5-6,000 troops under Brigadier Generals;

2. Organize around Maneuver, Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and Sustainment

3. Build Combat Groups that punch above their weight, (high lethality, low density);

4. Prepare Army Combat Groups to surge from a joint rotational readiness base and fight under regionally focused Joint command and control (C2);

5. Organize the Army National Guard and Reserve to mirror the AC Combat Groups.

The MTM can produce a new 21st Century Army of 420,000—450,000 troops with greater Joint Warfighting capability including more deployable combat power than today’s Army.

END STATE: More teeth, less overhead, at lower cost.

What is a Combat Group?

A Combat Group is a Mission focused force package organized around Maneuver (ground), Strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and Sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint Command and Control (C2).

What’s the difference between a Combat Group and a BCT?

(CSA plans to restore the

third maneuver battalion

increasing BCT strength from

3,700 to roughly 4,500

men.) Fires Battalion

Support Battalion

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

Colonel Commands 4,500 troops

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

BG Commands 5,500 troops

Strike Battalion

C4I Battalion (Joint Plugs)

Support Battalion

Consolidate more combat power under fewer headquarters; Scrap colonel level of command, flatten C2; Create greater autonomy /independence at lower levels; ISR, Strike and Sustainment Groups will be larger or smaller.

32 BCTs projected 26 CGs projected

Brigade

Division

HQ

Corps HQ

ARMY

HQ

Battalion

Company

• Too Many Single Service C2 Echelons • Too Slow to Decide • Too Expensive to Modernize • Too Vulnerable to WMD! • Each echelon too dependent on the next higher

echelon for decisions and support

Fighters!

What’s wrong with the current Industrial Age C2?

What does the flatter, faster C2 Structure look like?

• Fewer C2 Echelons • Faster Decision Cycle • Mobile and Dispersed:

Less Vulnerable to WMD • More independence at

lower levels • Cheaper to Modernize

Industrial Age Information Age

Stand up initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters (JFC) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.

Flag officers for JFC are drawn from all services.

What would Reorganized Army Expeditionary Forces look like? (250,100 inside 420,000-450,000 man AC Army)

Maneuver Echelon: (4) LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group – 5,150 (12) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – (Armor) 5,500 (6) ICG: Infantry Combat Group – (Motorized) 5,000 (4) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group – (Light) 5,000 Strike Echelon: (Aviation/UCAV/MLRS), TMD (4) ACG: Aviation Combat Groups – 3500 (2) STG: Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) – 3,000 (4) TMD: Theater Missile Defense Groups – 4,000 ISR Echelon: (C4I plus SR/manned/unmanned) (4) C4I Groups – 5,000 Sustainment Echelon: (See engineer consolidation) (8) CSG: Combat Support Groups – 6,000 (2) ENG: Engineer Groups (construction) – 4,000 (1) CBG: Chem-Bio Warfare Group – 3,000

Manpower Total 20,000

Manpower Total 36,000

Manpower Total 136,600

Manpower Total 57,500

• The numbers and types of Combat Groups is an NCA decision. Red denotes new; • The 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers + 26,000 Marines

1. Army can provide 35,000 to 50,000 ready, deployable troops at all times; the National Command Authorities (NCA) always know what forces/capabilities can deploy;

2. Funding for O&M is managed efficiently; 3. Army Force Packages are aligned with strategic air and sea lift; 4. No more last minute, hasty assembly of units and equipment for crisis or conflict; 5. Deployments become predictable improving quality of life for soldiers and families;

Pre-deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Deployment Phase (6-9 months)

Reconstitution Phase (6-9 months)

Modernization TNG/ED Phase (6-9 months)

What is Joint Rotational Readiness?

The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group has a joint mission focus:

Provides a credible land component with the mobility, firepower, protection and organic sustainment to operate autonomously under Joint C2 in dispersed/distributed mobile warfare;

Integrates all arms/all effect within the joint construct;

Signals escalation dominance to the enemy;

Bypasses or punches through enemy resistance for operational maneuver to encircle and destroy nation-state forces or sub-national groups ;

Provides test bad for new equipment!

Brigadier General commands 5,150 troops

CMD (C4ISR)

& CONTROL

ARMED

RECON STRIKE SUSTAINMENT

How do you design new equipment without a new Organization? Answer: You don’t.

How does the Army reduce unneeded overhead?

Army Materiel Command Training and Doctrine Command Forces Command

Cyril Northcote Parkinson’s (1909-1993) Law Applies: An inflated bureaucracy “will generate enough internal work to keep itself 'busy' and so justify its continued existence without commensurate output.”

What is to be done?

“If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old… People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete.”

Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century, 1999

1. First, Direct GAO to examine the MTM alternative Army Force Design outlined in this presentation and the book, Transformation under Fire, (Praeger, 2003) and report its findings to Congress. Direct GAO to provide briefings on interim findings 60 and 90 days into the study.

2. Second, Direct the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (VCJCS, JROC Chairman) to model the MTM alternative Army Force Design in simulation using a current warfighting scenario. Direct the VCJCS to report his findings on the proposed alternative to Congress within 90 days.

Back-Up Slides

“The advanced world, too vulnerable to survive a war of attrition or mass destruction, must learn to conduct its affairs by the Rapier.” R. E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 1985

Without reform and reorganization on the MTM model, the nation ends up with a smaller, less capable, “Hollow” Army than the one the Army Chief of Staff says we have now.

MTM will save money, but it’s also designed to cope with the unexpected, “Strategic Surprise;” a “Korean-like Emergency” in 1950 or a “Sarajevo-like” event in 1914, not counterinsurgency and nation building;

MTM employs force integration thru Joint C2 and ISR to confer a war-winning advantage on the US Armed Forces. The ISR, Strike, Maneuver, Sustainment Framework is crucial to integration of capabilities across service lines.

With a new, integrative Army force design, $ Savings emerge because it’s easier to identify

unneeded equipment, reduce and eliminate command overhead the Army no longer needs:

Adopt joint rotational readiness: It preserves depth in the force and provides more ready, deployable combat power at lower cost to the Joint Operations.

“The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten…. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking…” General Matthew Ridgway, The Korean War, page 88.

Summary of Key Points:

What does a new Professional Development Paradigm look like?

New Human Capital Strategy values talent more than longevity! (C2I = Character, Competence, Intelligence).

This is the path to Secretary Hagel’s goal: “more agile and effective organizations and more empowered junior

leaders.”

US Operational Concepts

US Military Strategy

US National Security Strategy

Strategic

Operational

Acquisition

Tactical

What is the new Strategy?

Outcome: Reorganize the Army to expand the nation’s range of strategic options; Combat Groups – Forces in Being – capable of conducting operations on land under Joint C2 against a mix of potential opponents, conventional and unconventional.

Outcome: Build regionally focused, integrated, Joint Force Commands, (not ad hoc Joint Task Force Hqtrs), to conduct “all arms/all effects” operations (new operational concept) in dispersed mobile warfare.

1. Maintain the military power to ensure no one power or coalition of powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass and restrict the U.S. freedom of maneuver in any area of importance to the U.S.

2. Defend the Western Hemisphere and ensure the security of U.S. borders and coastal waters;

3. As required, conduct punitive military operations to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to U.S. national security interests.

4. Defend and maintain the lines of communication and bases necessary for the execution of the above tasks.

Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

The Framework is not just about “things.” It’s about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding.

It’s an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.

The Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare beyond the ad hoc coordination of Federal Agencies or combined arms, air-ground cooperation, air-sea battle, amphibious and special operations.

U.S. capabilities must be integrated at the operational level to detect, deter, disrupt, neutralize or destroy opposing forces/threats decisively;

Apply the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework as a methodology for investment planning and programming as constrained budgets compel force optimization;

Develop the framework inside a reduced number of regional unified commands.

The ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework:

Army, Navy, AF, Marine capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.

Deputy CDR for Maneuver

Deputy CDR for Strike

Deputy CDR for ISR

Deputy CDR for Sustainment

Joint Force Commander

These are modular HQTRS. More C-2 modules can be

added as required.

A Regionally Focused Joint Force Command Structure

THAAD

PATRIOT

JLENS

NASAM

Ballistic Missiles

Cruise Missiles

Aircraft

Drones

This Combat Group from the Strike Echelon can be deployed for Homeland Defense or Expeditionary Missions.

• 4000 Troops • 27 THAADs • 48 PATRIOTs • 72 NASAMs

C4I/SUST BN

ADA BN

1x THAAD Battery 2x PATRIOT Batteries 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co

X-Band

ADA BN

1x THAAD Battery 2x PATRIOT Batteries 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co

ADA BN

1x THAAD Battery 2x PATRIOT Batteries 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co

Example: Theater Missile Defense Group (TMDG)

• The Joint Force needs this capability.

• National Command Authorities should begin fielding TMD Groups from existing assets.

Without ground-based TMD, the Joint Force is at risk.

The Light Reconnaissance-Strike Group (LRSG)

The LRSG is the place for new

Puma variants!

Estimated cost of fielding four LRSG “all arms” battle groups equipped with 1,010 Puma variants in 5 to 7 years = $7.2 billion;

Versus 1,748 Bradley Replacements (GCVs) for $28.8 billion in 8 years.

PUMA variants are non-developmental, speeding delivery. (Pumas can be built in U.S.).

Rapid prototyping applies to the operational force design and the technologies they employ. When tied to a new force design, rapid prototyping explores/develops new capabilities quickly with smaller inventories of new equipment in soldiers’ hands before larger investments are made; Using a proven platform mitigates risk and speeds up delivery. Innovate, don’t invent from scratch. (German/IDF approach).

The Puma AFV

Don’t bind Army efforts through massive programs intended to stamp out 20,000 ideal designs over two decades of production runs (FCS);

Don’t build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection; equip a new force design with new technology; Don’t stuff a squad into one platform and court catastrophic losses!

How can the Army modernize in a period of fiscal austerity?

What works now should triumph over “unobtainium.”

VS.

Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)

3,739 Troops RECON

Fires Battalion

Support Battalion

• 58 M1 Tanks

• 82 M2/3 BFVs

• 36 LRAS HMMWVs

• 10 120mm Mortars

• 16 155mm SP Guns

• Target Acquistion

Battery

• UAVs and UCAVs

MANEUVER

MANEUVER

Combat Maneuver Groups (CMG)

5,500 Troops

• 114 M1 Tanks

• 131 M2/3 BFVs

• 12-16 Armed

Helicopters +2

UH60s LRAS

• 27 120mm Mortars

• 24 155mm SP Guns

• 6-8 MLRS (Rocket)

• Target Acquistion

Battery + Radars

and UCAVs

• Joint C4ISR/MI

• C2/MPs/SHORAD

MANEUVER

ARMORED RECON SQDN

Strike Battalion

C4I Battalion

Support Battalion

MANEUVER

MANEUVER

Current Comparison of BCT with CMG

CGs (Maneuver Echelon) LRSGs 4 20,600 Troops CMGs 12 66,000 Troops ICGs 6 35,000 Troops AAGs 4 15,000 Troops Total CGs 26 136,600 Troops

Combat Group Types in Maneuver Echelon: LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (5,150) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – armor (5,500) ICG: Infantry Combat Group - motorized (5000) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group (5,000)

A Snapshot of BCTS versus Combat Groups (CG)

VS

BCTs (Projected) Infantry BCT 13 Armor BCTs 12 Stryker BCTs 7 Total BCTs 32 144,000 Troops

The BCTs are the reinforced brigades inside divisions with roughly 4,500 men (projected).

The BCTs are aligned with division and corps headquarters to restore the ten division force structure, a smaller version of the Cold War Army that emerged after Desert Storm.

Who is Douglas Macgregor?

• Colonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor was commissioned in the US. Army in 1976 after 4 years at West Point and 1 year at VMI.

• In 1991, Macgregor was awarded the bronze star with “V” device for valor for his personal leadership of the lead cavalry troops that destroyed an Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade in the Battle of the 73 Easting, the U.S. Army’s largest tank battle since World War II. His latest book, Warrior’s Rage. The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Naval Institute Press, 2009) describes the action from his tank turret.

• As the Chief of Strategic Planning and Director of the Joint Operations Center at SHAPE (1997-2000), Macgregor supervised the planning and strategic conduct of the Kosovo Air Campaign and subsequent occupation of Kosovo.

• On 16-17 January 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed General “Tommy” Franks to meet with Macgregor to discuss his concept for the attack to seize Baghdad. Though modified Macgregor’s offensive concept was largely adopted.

• Macgregor’s concepts from his groundbreaking books on military transformation, Breaking the Phalanx (1997) and Transformation under Fire (2003) continue to exert influence inside the world’s militaries. His books are available in Chinese, Korean and Hebrew, as well as English. The French and Russian Armies have adopted the essential features of his force design.

• Macgregor holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia.

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