THIRD DIVISION

 

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,    G.R. No. 157306

                   Petitioner,

                                                                             Present:

                                               

                                                                                 Panganiban, J.,

                                                                                         Chairman,

                   - versus -                                             Sandoval-Gutierrez,  

                                                                                 Corona, 

                                                                                 Carpio Morales, and

                                                                                 Garcia, JJ

                                                                                     

ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO

and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO                             Promulgated:

(in Substitution of NAZARIA BOMBEO), November 25, 2005

                                          Respondents.                   _______________

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

 

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

 

 

o segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect.  A court judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation effective or valid.

 

 

T

The Case

 

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66807.  The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows: 

 

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.”[3]

   

The Facts 

The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:

 “This case originated from an application for registration of a

parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954.  In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit ‘A’) on June 14, 1954.

 “After due notice and publication of said application, only the

Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265,

which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army, to wit:

 ‘PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265.  RESERVING FOR THE USE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF CAGAYAN, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OF MINDANAO.

 Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce and pursuant to the provision of section eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Number One Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of settlement and reserve for the use of the Philippine Army, under the administration of the Chief of Staff subject to private rights, if any thereby, the following described parcels of public domain, situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental, Island of Mindanao, and particularly described in Bureau of Lands SWO-15234, to wit:

 Lot No. 4318. – x x x. Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.’

 “During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order

of General Default was issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was substituted by her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died on December 5, 1990.  Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of the parties, the case literally went to slumber until it was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Misamis Oriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po.  On the other hand, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines; were represented by the Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge Advocate General’s Office].  On May 27, 1994, the trial court confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po and ordered registration thereof under the names of the latter.  Consequently, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of

Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General’s Office; filed an appeal to said decision x x x.

 

“During the pendency of the appeal, however, Presidential Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20, 2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265[.]

           x x x                       x x x                       x x x “In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents urged the

CA] to finally put to rest the controversy in their favor considering that the opposition of the Republic has no longer any basis.”[5]

         

 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

         

The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc 265) failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military reservation. The CA said that the proclamation was “not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.” 

 

Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents were able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land registered under their names.  It acknowledged that possession by respondents’ predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation.  It added that ownership of the land would still be deemed vested in respondents, “in view of their almost half a century of open, continuous, adverse and peaceful possession,” even if possession by their predecessors-in-interest were not taken into consideration.

 

          Hence, this Petition.[6]

 

Issues

 

          Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

 “I. 

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively segregate Lot 4318 from the public domain. 

“II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that respondents were able to establish that they have already acquired private right over Lot 4318 which already amounted to a title. 

“III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the passage of Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which excludes from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the AFP that the land in dispute is actively possessed and used by it.”[7]   

In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their title to the subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act.

 

The Court’s Ruling

 

 

 

The Petition is meritorious.

 

Main Issue:

Validity of Respondents’ Title

 

The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove

(1) that the land is alienable public land;[9] and (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by law.  When the legal conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without

necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.[10] 

 

After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.   

 

Nature of Lot 4318

 

It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the Philippine Army.  Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively segregated as

a military reservation by the Proclamation.  Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a petition for reservation or a court judgment declaring the reservation is necessary to make Proc 265 effective.  They maintain that the provision in the Proclamation subjecting the reservation to private rights presumes that notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming ownership rights over the land.  Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.  They further allege that the AFP failed to observe these requirements, thus causing the reservation to be ineffectual. 

 

Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial order to create a military reservation.  It contends that the proviso requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims.  It contends further that respondents were afforded due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the lower courts. 

 

We agree with petitioner.  The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:  

 “SECTION 83.  Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales,

public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other improvements for the public benefit.”                       

“SECTION 86.        A certified copy of every proclamation of the President issued under the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of Lands for record in his office, and a copy of this record shall be forwarded to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified copy, the Director of Lands shall order the immediate survey of the proposed reservation if the land has not yet been surveyed, and as soon as the plat has been completed, he shall proceed in accordance with the next following section.”

 “SECTION 87.        If all the lands included in the proclamation

of the President are not registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall proceed in accordance with the provision of Section fifty-three of this Act.”

 “SECTION 53.        It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands,

whenever in the opinion of the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.”

 

 

Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose.  It must be noted that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory.  The director of lands is required to file a petition only “whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it.” 

 

Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due notice and hearing, a judicial declaration of reservation.  The subject of the application for registration in Baloy was originally private land, as evidenced by a possessory information title issued in the applicants’ favor during the Spanish era.  As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the present case is unquestionably public land.  The only issue is whether respondents have acquired title to the property. 

 

Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13]  Under the provisions of that law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any court order declaring that the property has become public.  In the case before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141.  Accordingly, only a positive act of the President is required to create a government reservation. 

Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military reservation.  Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in 1954, because it was considered

inalienable[14] since its reservation in 1938. 

 

Respondents’ Period of Possession

 

Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use, respondents maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their names.  They allege that their predecessors-in-interest were already in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the property for over 30 years prior to 1938.  Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title had already attached long before the issuance of the Proclamation segregating the land as a military reservation. 

 

We are not convinced.  As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court.  To this rule, however, there are settled exceptions; for instance, when the judgment assailed is not supported by sufficient

evidence or is based on a misapprehension of facts.[15]  We find that these exceptions apply here.

 

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,

belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[16]  For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted.

[17]  In the same manner, persons claiming the protection of “private rights” in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public

lands.[18]

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former.  However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest,

the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.[19]  The Director, Lands Management

Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:

 “x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not

incontrovertible evidence of ownership.  They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:

 ‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and

possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.’”[21]

 

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessors  had  purportedly  bought  the  property.  This  alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting

evidence on record.  Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since “time immemorial.” 

 

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo.  The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas.  It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general

statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]

 

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318.  Even the absence of opposition from the government does

not relieve them of this burden.[23]  Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that the failure of the government to

dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already amounted to a title.

 

In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of Lands v. Agustin:[24]

 

”x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land.  He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered.  Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.”

  

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The segregation of Lot 4318 as part of a military reservation is declared VALID.  No pronouncement as to costs.

 

SO ORDERED. 

                    

 

G.R. No. 41968 February 15, 1995

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs.THE HON. JUDGE DELIA P. MEDINA and DOMINGO REYES, respondents.

 

ROMERO, J.:

In 1968 Damingo Reyes sought the registration of eight (8) parcels of land in the barrios of Vigo, Catidang, and Tala in San Narciso (now San Andres), Quezon before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I, as a land registration court. The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application as did several private individuals.

In due course, the court issued a general order of default except for the Director of Lands and the private oppositors.

During the hearings of the case, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon appeared as counsel for both the Director of Lands and the then Director of Forestry. Although the latter did not formally enter his appearance in the case, the court allowed him, through the Provincial Fiscal, to introduce evidence in support of the fact that 176 hectares of the area sought to be registered fell within the forest classification and, therefore, were inalienable and unregisterable.

On July 31, 1974, Judge Delia P. Medina rendered a decision adjudicating to Domingo Reyes the four (4) parcels of land sought to be registered and ordering their registration in his name. The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, but the Solicitor General received his copy only on November 13, 1974.

On December 12, 1974, within the 30-day period then required for interposing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed for the Directors of Land and Forest Development, a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal, which the Provincial Fiscal eventually filed on January 2, 1975.

On December 26, 1974, however, counsel for Domingo Reyes filed an opposition to the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. He contended that since it was principally the Provincial Fiscal who represented both the Directors of Land and Forest Development and who received the copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time filed by the Solicitor General had been filed out of time, the Decision, having become final and executory.

The Solicitor General replied that since he was the counsel of record and principal counsel with the Provincial Fiscal appearing merely as his representative in the case, he should have been served all pleadings and processes in the case and that receipt by the fiscal of the decision was not equivalent to his receipt inasmuch as such representation did not divest him of control over the case as its principal counsel.

Domingo Reyes reacted to these avertments by arguing that although the Office of the Solicitor General filed for the Bureau of Lands an opposition to his application for registration, there was no justification for the Solicitor General's claim that he was the principal counsel for the oppositors as other lawyers had appeared for and in behalf of both the private and public oppositors. Moreover, it was the Provincial Fiscal who "carried the brunt for the oppositor Bureau of Forestry" and not the Solicitor General who did not appear and participate during the hearings of the case.

In his rejoinder, the Solicitor General asserted that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, he was the government's representative in land registration cases; that his authority to deputize the Provincial Fiscal in the performance of his duties did not divest him of control over the case; and that in the land registration case at hand, he did not empower the Provincial Fiscal to receive pleadings and court processes.

On March 31, 1975, Judge Medina issued an order ruling that, as far as the Director of Lands was concerned, the period to file an appeal should be counted from receipt of the Decision by the Solicitor General considering that the Provincial Fiscal who had appeared as counsel of record "with personality separate and distinct from that of the Solicitor General('s)," had expressly informed the court and the adverse

party that he was a mere representative of the Solicitor General. Citing Circular No. 41, 1 which was issued on November 28, 1973 by the Secretary of Justice, Judge Medina opined that in cases where fiscals had been authorized to appear by the Solicitor General, they appeared as special attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Medina also stated:

The Fiscal, being thus a mere representative and extension of the personality of the Solicitor General cannot be considered as a separate counsel of record for the oppositor,

Director of Lands, notice to whom is also notice to the Solicitor General, as contemplated in the case of Palteng vs. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 736). The Solicitor General being the principal counsel; is entitled to service of the orders, pleadings and the decision in this case and pursuant to Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice, the service to him of the decision rendered in this case shall be the basis of the finality thereof.

However, the above is true only with respect to the opposition of the Director of Lands, since it was only the Director of Lands for whom the Solicitor General entered a formal opposition and specifically authorized the Fiscal to appear in his behalf, in the light of Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice. The record shows that the Director of Forestry was represented only by the Fiscal who did not interpose for him a timely appeal despite receipt of the Decision on August 8, 1974, hence, said Decision has become final and executory as to the Director of Forestry. 2

Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal of the Director of Forestry, gave due course to the appeal of the Director of Lands, and directed the Solicitor General to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal within ten (10) days from notice.

In behalf of the Director of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975, on the ground that since Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 478 vests upon the Solicitor General the exclusive authority to represent the government and its officers, service of the Decision upon the Provincial Fiscal who had "no legal personality by himself to appear for the Director of Forestry" produced "no legal effect whatever and his inaction" could not bind the Director of Forestry. The Solicitor General also contended that although he had not filed a formal opposition to the application for land registration in behalf of the Director of Forestry, he should be "deemed for all legal intents and purposes" said Director's counsel and receipt by him of copy of the Decision should be determinative of its finality.

Said motion was denied by the lower court on June 17, 1975 for lack of merit. On July 22, 1975, the Solicitor General filed a motion for a 30-day extension within which to submit an amended record on appeal. Domingo Reyes opposed the motion, and on July 31, 1975, the lower court dismissed the Solicitor General's appeal for his failure to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal as required in the order of March 31, 1975, after a lapse of more than three months.

It turned out, however, that a motion for extension of time dated July 23, 1975, had in fact been filed by the Solicitor General because on August 1, 1975 the lower court issued an Order holding that such motion had been "rendered moot and academic" by its Order of July 31, 1975, dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General.

Nevertheless, on August 14, 1975, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an amended notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. On August 22, 1975, a special counsel filed a motion and manifestation stating that upon the instruction of the Provincial Fiscal, he was submitting a motion for reconsideration signed by the Assistant Solicitor General and an amended record on appeal incorporating relevant pleadings and orders. He manifested that "the Office of the Provincial Fiscal was not able to immediately comply with the wire-request dated July 22, 1975 for the reason that said wire-request was received by this Office only on July 30, 1975, aside from the fact that the record of this office regarding this case has all been forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General." 3

The said motion for reconsideration of the Order of July 31, 1975, was filed by the Solicitor General for the Director of Lands. It alleged:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That previously, on April 29, 1975 a partial motion for reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975 was presented by undersigned counsel which was denied in an Order dated June 17, 1975, which second order although received by the office of the Solicitor General on June 23, 1975 was actually delivered to the undersigned Solicitor in charge of the case only on July 16, 1975;

3. That, thereupon, on July 22, 1975 the Solicitor General wired the Provincial Fiscal directing him to file immediately the amended record on appeal pursuant to the order of March 31, 1971, at the same time filing a motion for extension of time to file the amended record on appeal but which was erroneously filed with the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1975. Sad to state said Provincial Fiscal did not comply with aforesaid instruction to file the amended record on appeal. Had he immediately done so upon receipt of the wire dated July 22, 1975, there would have been no occasion for this Court to issue the Order dated July 31, 1975 since the desired amendment, as we see it, merely involves the simple expedient of deleting or striking out from the notice of appeal dated December 12, 1974, the Director of Forest Development as party appellant thereby leaving the Director of Lands as the sole appellant herein, which act the Clerk of Court may well do by himself upon the direction of the Court;

4. That there being no showing that the amendment directed by the Court is necessary for the proper understanding and resolution of the issues, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 41, Rev. Rules of Court, the omission of the Fiscal in making such amendment should not prejudice the Director of Lands who has seasonably perfected his appeal; . . .

To this motion, the Solicitor General attached the amended record on appeal.

In an order dated November 12, 1975, the lower court denied the said two motions.

Thereupon, the Solicitor General instituted the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of the Directors of Land and Forest Development. He averred that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least, in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Forestry, because while said official did not file a written opposition to the application for land registration, the lower court allowed him to adduce evidence which fact "could not legally foreclose the said petitioner's right to appeal through his principal counsel — the Solicitor General — who . . . interposed for him a timely appeal."

The Solicitor General also charged the lower court with having acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Lands for his failure to file an amended record on appeal within the ten-day period granted him. He argued that while Sec. 7, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates the inclusion in an amended record on appeal of any matter essential to the determination of a case, the lower court directed the exclusion of the Director of Forestry as a party litigant as well as all pleadings bearing on his opposition.

In his manifestation and motion, private respondent alleged, among others, that certain portions of the tract of land subject of his application for registration are within the alienable and disposable areas of the public forest lands. The Solicitor General disputed said allegation, stating that according to the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), the areas referred to by private respondent are not entirely alienable and disposable.

Although the avertments of the parties are factual matters which are not within the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction, the contradictory allegations on such factual issues necessitate a review of the merits of the application for land registration. Such a review may only be done upon a favorable action on the instant petition which we find to be impressed with merit.

The instant petition actually requires an examination of the extent of the authority of the Solicitor General to represent the government and to delegate his authority to the Provincial Fiscal, although principally assailing the ruling of the lower court as regards the timeliness of the appeal interposed by the petitioners.

As regards the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the government when he entered an opposition to the private respondent's application for land registration, the law then governing was the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which states:

Sec. 1661. Duties of the Solicitor General. — As principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor-General shall have authority to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Upon the request of the President or Speaker of any of the Houses of the Congress of the Philippines, the Solicitor-General or his authorized representative shall assist and attend any legislative committee that may be practicing any investigation ordered by the Congress, or by any of the Houses thereof.

It shall, among other things, be his duty, in person or by proper subordinate:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To represent (the United States in the Supreme Court in all criminal cases, and to represent the United States and) the Government of the Philippines in the Supreme Court in all civil actions and special proceedings in which (either of) said Government, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party.

xxx xxx xxx

When the decision in the land registration case was promulgated on July 31, 1974, the law in force was Presidential Decree No. 478, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General, 4 which took effect immediately after its issuance on June 4, 1974. 5 This law provides that:

Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Deputize, whenever in the opinion of the Solicitor General the public interest requires, any provincial or city fiscal to assist him in the performance of any function or discharge of any duty incumbent upon him, within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid provincial or city fiscal. When so deputized, the fiscal shall be under the control and supervision of the

Solicitor General with regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to the fiscal, and he may be required to render reports or furnish information regarding the assignment.

The Solicitor General, therefore, has "control and supervision" over the fiscal who has been deputized to appear for him. As such deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding. 6 The Solicitor General's request for his representation does not make the fiscal the counsel of the Republic. 7 As the principal counsel, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. 8 Since court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as an agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General, 9 "service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementaryperiod for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality." 10

All these jurisprudential pronouncements inexorably point to no other conclusion than that the appeal herein involved was timely filed by the Solicitor General. Considering, however, that the Solicitor General entered his appearance only for the Director of Lands, was the appeal interposed by the Director of Forestry (later Forest Development) likewise deemed timely filed?

We hold that under the law and the peculiar circumstances of this case, such appeal was timely filed. After he had entered his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and deputized the provincial fiscal to appear during the hearings, the latter appeared, not only as counsel for the Director of Lands, but also for the Director of Forestry. In fact, the court allowed the Provincial Fiscal to adduce evidence for the latter official and his government agency without the private respondent registering any opposition. That fact estopped the court and the private respondent from later questioning the personality of the Director of Forestry. Moreover, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General acts as counsel for the government in land registration cases and not that of any particular government official and agency. His appearance therein is premised on his authority to protect the interest of the government and not that of any particular government official or agency.

Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion on dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, 11 "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony." This notwithstanding, we need not discuss the issue raised as regards the filing of the record on appeal, as such procedural requirement has been dropped under Sec. 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines dated January 11, 1983.

Now, a word about the working relationship between the Solicitor General and his deputy, the Provincial Fiscal. The problems ventilated in this petition would not have arisen had there been close coordination between the two officials and their respective offices to the end that all problems, whether substantive or procedural, could have been ironed out before they worsened. They should have remembered that they were representing the interests of the Republic which should, in no case, be compromised through neglect, inefficiency, or even ignorance, but accorded utmost attention.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the questioned orders of the lower court dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government are SET ASIDE. The Solicitor General is directed to file the proper petition for review before the Court of Appeals which shall resolve with dispatch the instant land registration case which has been pending for some twenty years.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority

Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, constitution, digest, land, law, nha, Philippines, territory 2

G.R. No. 164527                                                15 August 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.  During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place.  RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects.  Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.  The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process.  Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site.  RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area.  The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.  If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.  Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site.  Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project.  The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992.  The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos.  The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary.   On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements.  During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner

2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man

4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use

5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands

of public domain8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.  This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all.  The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided

for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.  ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project.  Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation.  It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.

3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.

4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”  Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.

5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.

6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project.  It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers.  The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same.  In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.

8. This relief must be granted.  It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA.  The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned.  The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so.  The moment to challenge has passed.

G.R. No. 133250          July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

384 SCRA 152 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Lands of the Public Domain 

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.