Loyal to Death:Blind-eye Turning and Pro-State Terrorism in Northern Ireland

Brent Cooper

HIST 403E - Dr. Vitaly Timofiiv

#92114073

March 30th, 2010

Introduction

Republican and Loyalist paramilitary violence terrorized the public on both sides of the Northern

Ireland conflict for nearly 40 years, finally winding down in 1998 after the Belfast (Good Friday)

Agreement. As with comparable ethno-political conflicts, the scholarship on “The Troubles,” as

the period of strife is commonly referred to, has been divided, particularly when it comes to

notions of terrorism, with some pointing to the British state policy as the primary cause of the

conflict. A disproportionate amount of research has been done on the IRA in contrast to Loyalist

groups. The 1990s saw the disclosure of many secrets regarding collusion between British

security forces and Loyalists; most manifestly through the Stevens Inquiries which incriminated

elements of the British government in complicity with Loyalist pro-state death squads. In this

paper I will first examine the claim that the British turned a blind eye to collusion, constituting a

de facto policy of state-terror. Second, I will review the emerging discourse on the anthropology

of state terror and apply it to the claim that Loyalist terror is the chief antagonists of the conflict.

Third, I will assess the progress of peace in light of the collusion revelations and the relationship

to truth and reconciliation. Full disclosure of the past remains elusive insofar as it threatens the

status quo of sovereignty.

 

British Position

Loyalists Neglected

Several scholars have noted that, relative to the region’s small size, there has been more research

done on the conflict in Northern Ireland than anywhere else.1 Considering this, it is puzzling why

a resolution has been so elusive. Perhaps the answer lies in the comprehensive statistics provided

by Brendan O’Duffy, which indicate Catholic civilians were the largest category of casualties in

the war.2 There were incidents of friendly fire on both sides, but the Catholic casualties were

primarily a result of Loyalist targeting and failure of the security forces to protect them. This

suggests that undue attention may be focused on the IRA. To this effect, in After the Peace

Carolyn Gallaher observes that, although admittedly unscientific, an Amazon.com search of the

term IRA compared to Loyalist groups (UVF, UDA, LVF) measure 37,000 to 10, respectively.3

Regardless, J. Bowyer Bell writes in The Gun in Politics that ironically Londoners know more

about obscure African tribes than the Irish and the IRA.4 Thus, both the neglect and ignorance of

the conflict are reflected by academics and the general public, respectively. On the whole,

Queen’s University researcher Dirk Schubotz suggests that the volume of literature expanded

mainly after the peace process began in the 1990s.5 The looming threat of reprisal had silenced

many academics but the cessation of tensions allowed for deeper ethnographical analysis. The

new research that has emerged confirms the formerly neglected allegations of collusion. This

also caused the focus to shift from the IRA to the Loyalist “death squads.”

British Collusion

The murder of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane in 1989 was one thread that would eventually

unravel the sweater of collusion between loyalists and British security forces. As early as 1992, it

was known that British spy Brian Nelson was involved in Finucane’s murder, and many other

deaths.6 In 1988, delivery of a South African arms shipment orchestrated by Brian Nelson was

permitted by British Military Intelligence in order preserve Nelson's cover. From 1985 to 1988,

an estimated three people were murdered by the Ulster Freedom Fighters. From the shipment in

January 1988 to January 1993, Loyalist hit squads were responsible for 160 murders, all killed

with the guns from the South African consignment.7 On the other hand, in UDA: Inside the

Hearth of Loyalist Terror, Henry McDonald and Jim Cusack claim that while the Republicans

capitalized on the collusion issue, Colonel Gordon Kerr, head of the Force Research Unit (FRU),

argued that Nelson was an instrumental resource in foiling a plot to kill Gerry Adams and save

countless others as well.8 The British justified their secret measures in the name of the greater

good. Despite this, Adams maintained the bold position that the British had a campaign of state

terror directed at republicans and nationalists.9

Blind Justice

In Armed Struggle: History of the IRA Richard English argues that Republicans felt that the

security force agents involvement indicated that “the most lethal injustices could be carried out

by authorities without redress.”10 Moreover, there was constant obstruction of the investigation,

particularly by the Royal Ulster Constabulary,11 which added insult to injury. According to

British military sources, unofficially collusion was not only existent but widespread.12 Bruce

observes the functional aspect of state “blind-eye turning” as a balance between maintaining its

monopoly on coercion (and therefore the primacy of the security forces) and advantaging the

Loyalists when it was the states favour.13 Only when pressed, the government concedes

collusion, but claims it was informal and rogue.14 Yet in 2003, when John Stevens completed his

third major investigation, he acknowledged that he had uncovered a depth of collusion “way

beyond” his 1990 view.15 Award winning investigative journalist Paul Larkin, in A Very British

Jihad, writes that it was a conscious decision in the top tier of government to considerably

increase the amount of agents in all paramilitary organizations.16 In 2000, Tony Blair had

promised the Finucane family that the state would not protect individuals involved in Pat’s

murder.17 Nelson was eventually convicted on lesser charges. In 2007, the BBC reported that no

other charges would be made in the case,18 and to this day it remains unsettled for the family.

Secret Backchannel

But behind all this secrecy, argues English, were also positive initiatives, such as the “secret back

channel” between the British government and the IRA19; the “full extent” of the back channel

only being revealed as late as March 18th, 2008. Apparently, the back channel was used on three

major occasions: IRA ceasefire in mid-1970s, IRA hunger strike in 1980, and the beginning of

the peace process in the 1990s. Tony Blair’s former chief of staff Jonathan Powell attributes

utmost significance to the secret communications link.20 Ironically, the success of the now

famous secret channel was dependent on a security leak and miscommunication.21 One could just

as easily imagine a scenario where similar events exacerbated the conflict. Perhaps the secret

communications link was underutilized.

The Anthropology of State Terror

State Terror Neglected

A dimension of the terrorism that has been largely ignored in academia is the nature of state

terror.22 In The Ghosts of State Terror, Richard Jackson analyzes the reasons for the silence on.

Jackson’s first order critique of the study of terrorism is that the actor based definition of

terrorism excludes state culpability, the research focus has a political bias, and the discourse

rejects the weight of empirical evidence of state terrorism.23 His second critique is that ignorance

of state terrorism in academic discourse serves to facilitate state hegemony, legitimize foreign

and domestic policy discourse to the public, and defer awareness of the terroristic tendencies of

states.24 Jackson’s most pressing insight is how deconstructing the dominant narrative gives rise

to “alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice.”25

Ethnographical Perspective

Scholars of this “new anthropology” demonstrate that the previous focus on resistance is

transitioning to the study of perpetrators of state violence.26 An increasing amount of qualitative

studies emerged in the mid-1990s that seek "make people's voices heard."27 In Death Squad: The

Anthropology of State Terror, Jeffrey Sluka’s ethnographical analysis paints the picture from the

perspective of the victims. Enthnography of state terror has been a particularly difficult task for

anthropologists due to the inherent risks – harassment, arrest, torture, assassination – of

investigating state terror,28 especially if the scholar is working in their own country of origin.29

Moreover, Paul Larkin writes on the challenges to objectivity that UK journalists faced such as

being labelled a “subversive” for questioning state-loyalist linkages.30 Sluka argues that security

policy in Belfast was dedicated to counterinsurgency against the IRA instead of peace-keeping

and protecting Catholics.31 The British also employed an effective propaganda campaign to

suppress the fact that Catholics were the demographic at greatest risk.32 If we accept Sluka’s

definition of death squads as "progovernment group who engage in extrajudicial killings of

people they define as enemies of the state, whose members are either directly or indirectly

connected with the government and/or security forces,"33 then it is not a rhetorical exaggeration

to refer to some Loyalist factions as such.

Pro-State or State Terror?

In contrast, Steve Bruce writes that the degree to which the state condones the actions of the

‘pro-state’ vigilante group is a variable matter; and the UDF and UDA would be

“incomprehensible” if we assumed the government’s complicity merely because they share

political goals.34 The British government’s position is that Loyalist force “a reaction to IRA

violence.”35 Bruce points out that if the state feels adequate to manage the violence on its own

than a pro-state terror group is a rival to the state. Bruce explains that the pro-state terror group

would be bound to lose, but by erosion from within rather than destroyed by external force. This

is precisely what happened to the Loyalist factions throughout the late 1990s, but this does not

mean that the British state never did sponsor Loyalist terror more directly at any time. Adams

claims that “The Thatcher government paid, trained, directed and equipped the death squads. It

authorised and covered up its policy of collusion and state terrorism.”36 Irish writer Tim Pat

Coogan describes the policy of the security forces as "the enemy of my enemy is my friend,"

insofar as they perceived less IRA on the streets to be advantageous to their efforts.37 But it goes

deeper: failure to reprimand those soldiers and police proven to be derelict in their duty

constitutes a double blind-eye turning. Bruce comments that whether the security forces were in

denial that Protestants would commit such acts or they simply did not want to “fight a war on

two fronts,” this was cause for them to be hesitant to act against Loyalist paramilitaries.38

Framing Attribution

A parallel can be drawn between the Loyalist behaviour is explained as state death squads and

the way the CIA involvement in drug trafficking was uncovered. Gary Webb and Gerald Posner

both published exposés on the CIA-drug connection, but Webb’s version was rejected and his

career was derailed for it while Posner was praised and rewarded.39 The reason is that Posner

depicted the drug trade as "aberrant practice of U.S. Foreign policy, one mistakenly implemented

to foster good intentions."40 Webb, on the other hand, challenged this notion, attributing more

intent and malevolent agency to the CIA. This categorized Webb as a conspiracy theorist and his

research was discredited. So the question remains, is British state complicity in terror

conspiratorial or coincidental? According to Gerry Adams, “state terrorism” was part and parcel

of the British government strategy and that collusion was an “administrative practice.”41 It is

difficult to determine whether dissident scholars like Webb and Sluka merely miss the mark a

little, or come too close to it.

By Sluka’s terminology, the Loyalist “death squad” terror continued post 1994 cease-fire. He

points to the random killing of 12 Catholic civilians in 1997, which provoked lethal retaliation

directed only at Loyalist leadership.42 The thrust of Sluka’s argument is that the British media

characterized the killings as “tit-for-tat sectarian murder cycles,” whereas in reality the IRA’s

hits carefully targeted Loyalist fighters while the Loyalist attacks were sectarian and

indiscriminate.43 The purpose was to partially exculpate Loyalists from responsibility in

perpetuating the conflict. But Bruce argues that “the mid-Ulster UVF interspersed the murders of

active republicans with what were simply tit-for-tat killings.”44 Considering that hidden power

does not wish to be investigated, and that the government may be marginalized beyond repair in

the event of full disclosure, Posner’s approach may be more productive. The important revelation

is that it only takes a little blind-eye turning to do a lot of damage; the formal separation between

security forces and death squads permits the state to deny any knowledge of systematic murder,

and thus any responsibility.45

Truth and Reconciliation?

Cease-fire

In 1993, after Sinn Fein, John Hume, and Gerry Adams began to negotiate peace, differing

opinions manifested within the UDA and UVF. On one hand the UDA declared the broadening

of what they considered “legitimate targets”; on the other, they considered adhering to the IRA

ceasefire “to call Sinn Fein’s bluff.”46 The majority of Loyalists were sceptical because the IRA

had murdered three major UDA figures right before they declared the ceasefire; a purposeful

move to entice the UDA into a trap, they had thought.47 The UDA concluded it was in their

political interests reciprocate the ceasefire, for the time being. In traditional warfare when state-

on-state conflict ended demilitarization was routine, but in contemporary warfare there is no

clear victor, so many paramilitaries become restless, and disarming was problematic.48

Demilitarization

Gallaher points out that the 1994 cease-fire was the high-point of Loyalist paramilitary unity, and

would only fracture thereafter.49 Since the paramilitary factions operate autonomously, stand-

down orders can be disobeyed.50 Furthermore, not only is there an incentive to continue criminal

activities for profit51 but some inveterate paramilitaries were addicted to the lucrative lifestyle.52

Gallaher argues that by the Loyalists breaking the accord they marginalized their own crusade

and let down their supporters.53 The Republican News still considered the sporadic Loyalist

killings "the bloody expression of a supremacist elite determined to protect its privilege."54 In

actuality, they may be more aberrant transgressions, vis-a-vis Posner contra Webb.

Majority Rules

A core premise of the developing peace process was that Irish independence was endorsed if a

majority wanted it.55 The people, however, clearly did not want it and this frustrated the

paramilitaries on both sides. Bruce, writing in 1995, thought the Loyalist paramilitaries might be

finished, citing exhaustion and retirement of many of its members.56 One such spin-off faction

formed in 1996 was the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) under Billy Wright, and they

specifically did not want peace.57 In February 1997, a British soldier was killed by the IRA and it

made headlines. Gerry Adams described the event as “tragic” and called for redoubling of efforts

towards peace.58 President Clinton issued a statement of condolences to the family and the

British government. Clinton’s message was also aimed at Loyalist leaders, urging them “to

remain steadfast” amidst the precarious situation. Meanwhile, the Real IRA spun off the

Provisional IRA in late 1997 and they also did not want peace, holding to their agenda for

independence from Britain, although they had no sensible plan for this.59 So although the

consensus among political leaders was for disarmament and peace, a dwindling violent minority

would still challenge it.

Noble Lies

In The politics of Northern Ireland: beyond the Belfast Agreement, Arther Aughey considers the

Belfast Agreement a “noble lie”; a polite fiction that provided for power-sharing of the present

and “a risk-sharing strategy for dealing with the claims of the past."60 Facing the past was

difficult and counterproductive; there was so much “bad faith” that Northern Ireland had an

entrenched “political culture of deniability."61 Aughey implies that total honesty may be “as

corrosive to political life” as total dishonesty when it comes to setting up a Truth Commission in

Northern Ireland.62 Larkin, on the other hand, proposes a Truth and Reconciliation commission

akin to South Africa, as "fierce honesty" about self and country is needed. He argues it is

important to enable the discourse to label the British Army and the RUC as "key protagonists"

(the real “terrorists”) in the war.63 It is important to consider Britain’s actions within the larger

geopolitical context and the current climate of war on the Middle East, because without such

(truth) precedents it is impossible to point out the fact that the “war on terror” mentality produces

more “carnage and martyrs” than anything.64

Reconciliation or Rehabilitation?

To scholars like Jackson, Larkin, and Sluka, their discourse is about challenging the status quo

which tends to foreclose awareness of certain illegal state practices. More pointedly, they desire

to eradicate the use of state terror as an instrument to protect the status-quo. I would also add that

the emergence of new discourses that analyze narratives of ‘state terror’ help to rehabilitate the

governmentality of the state. Governmentality, a concept from Michel Foucault, is the organized

government practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) directed at the management of

populations and their territories.65 This is important as foreign and domestic policy are often

intrinsically linked; that is, parallels can be drawn between Britain’s current controversial role in

the “war on terror” and their application of power in Northern Ireland. Some introspection, and

public reflection, on governmentality is warranted.

Conclusion

Major fighting ended in 1998, engendering just enough hope for people to forget the legacy of

conspiracy. It is now known that collusion was so extensive that some think it would be

counterproductive to know how far it truly went. There seemed to be a relationship between how

much the government chose to turn a blind-eye and the indefensibility of the sectarian crimes

committed. However, the emergence of a new discourse on state terror concurrent with the

revelations of collusion recontextualized Loyalist fighting as inciting and inflaming the violence

that might otherwise die down or be resolved diplomatically.

The fact that the conflict has tentatively ended is not necessarily evidence that the British

strategy worked and that the behind-the-scenes negotiators deserve all the credit. Praise of the

“back channel” secrecy, as well as ignorance of state terror, continues to reinforce the states

hegemonic projects, manifest in the bi-lateral (with the US) “war on terror.” Despite this,

prospects for peace are still strong, and that is what is important to the government and its

citizens. London School of Economics professor Paul Mitchell researches how prolonged

conflicts can be managed through power sharing agreements. In March 2009, he wrote that the

fact that the republican splinter groups (and the Loyalists, I would add) want to “tear the peace

process apart” ironically works against them to reinforce the various democratic parties

commitment to power-sharing. 66 Now it is strictly nationalist and loyalist extremists who

perpetuate the mayhem, with no end in sight. The British may believe, as Sun Tzu did, that the

secret to winning war is knowing your enemy. Perhaps the secret to ending war is knowing that

you are the enemy. It might have done the British good to appreciate this during the height of

The Troubles; with no public support base to speak of, it would certainly benefit the remaining

extremists now.

1 Andy Pollak. A Citizens' inquiry: The Opsahl report on Northern Ireland. (Dublin: Lilliput Press For Initiative '92, 1993), 9.

2 Jeffrey A. Sluka. ""For God and Ulster": The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in Northern Ireland." In Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Ethnography of Political Violence). (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 128.

3 Carolyn Gallaher. After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Post-Accord Northern Ireland. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), x.

4 J. Bowyer Bell. The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1987), 259.

5 Dirk Schubotz. "Beyond the Orange and the Green. The Diversification of the Qualitative Social Research Landscape in Northern Ireland." Forum: Qualitative Social Research 6, no. 3 (2005): Article 29. http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/11/23

6 Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald. Uda: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror. (Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2004), 232.

7 Tim Pat Coogan. The I.R.A.. 5th ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2000), 603.8 McDonald 232-2339 Gerry Adams. "Opening Address by Gerry Adams to the Sinn Fein Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing."

CAIN: Northern Ireland Conflict, Politics, & Society. Information on 'the troubles' . http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/ga280107a.htm

10 Richard English. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2004), 267.

11 Paul Larkin. A Very British Jihad: Collusion, Conspiracy & Cover-Up in Northern Ireland. (Belfast: Beyond Pale Publications, 2004), 302.

12 Cusack McDonald, 126.13 Steve Bruce. "Nature of Pro-state Terror." In The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.

(Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1992.) http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/bruce.htm14 Sluka, 128.15 David McKittrick. "'Now it's time for Tony Blair to fulfil the promise he made to me'." The Independent

(London), April 18, 2003. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/now-its-time-for-tony-blair-to-fulfil-the-promise-he-made-to-me-594840.html

16 Larkin, 302.17 http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/fru/fru12022k1a.html - Neil Mackay Home Affairs Editor, Sunday Herald, Nov 19 200018 BBC. "BBC NEWS | UK | Northern Ireland | No security charges over Finucane." BBC NEWS | News Front

Page. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6237428.stm19 English, 267.20 Peter Taylor. "Extent of secret links between government and IRA revealed." The Gaurdian.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/18/northernireland.past21 Ibid.22 Jeffrey A. Sluka. Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Ethnography of Political Violence).

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 1.23 Richard Jackson. "The ghosts of state terror: knowledge, politics and terrorism studies." Critical Studies on

Terrorism 1, no. 3 (2008): 377-392. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t780786797, 383.24 Ibid, 377.25 Ibid.26 Sluka, 11.27 Schubotz28 Sluka, x.29 Ibid, 23.30 Larkin, 302.31 Sluka, 147..32 Ibid, 133.33 Sluka, 141.34 Bruce. "Nature of Pro-state Terror."35 Sluka, 133.36 Adams.37 Coogan, 603.38 Bruce. "Nature of Pro-state Terror."

39 Daniel Hellinger. "Paranoia, Conspiracy, Hegemony in American Politics." In Harry G. West and Todd Sanders, eds. Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 215.

40 Ibid.41 Adams.42 Sluka, 149.43 Sluka, 149.44 Bruce. "Nature of Pro-state Terror."45 Sluka, 5.46 Steve Bruce. "Paramilitaries, Peace, and Politics: Ulster Loyalists and the 1994 Truce." Studies in Conflict

and Terrorism 18 (1995), 18947 Ibid, 190.48 Gallaher, vii.49 Gallaher, 12.50 Gallaher, viii.51 Gallaher, viii.52 Gallaher, 5.53 Gallaher, 1.54 Sluka, 148-9.55 English, 273.56 Bruce, 202.57 Gallaher, 13.58 English, 293.59 Paul Mitchell. "Northern Ireland peace process strong enough to survive ." LSE: News and Media. www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/news/archives/2009/NorthernIreland.aspx60 Arthur Aughey. The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement. (New York: Routledge,

2005), 145.61 Ibid, 143.62 Ibid, 145.63 Larkin, 303.64 John Pilger. The New Rulers of the World. (London: Verso, 2002), 156.65 Mayhew, Susan (ed) A Dictionary of Geography, Oxford University Press, 2004 (p. 224)66 Mitchell.

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