Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris

7272019 Love Loss and Identity in Solaris

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OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF

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5

Love Loss and Identity in Solaris

Christopher Grau

Steven Soderberghrsquos Solaris (983090983088983088983090) was a significant critical success Salon described it as a ldquovisually astonishing and thoroughly admirable new filmrdquo

the BBC declared it to be ldquoone of the finest science fiction films since 983090983088983088983089 A

Space Odysseyrdquo while the reviewer from ime Out claimed ldquoitrsquos probably the fin-est certainly the most stylish sci-fi film in years this is perhaps the most ambig-uous and cerebrally sophisticated Hollywood movie in nearly three decadesrdquo Allthis despite the fact that the film inevitably competes with two classic works each

of which is oen regarded as having the status of a sacred text Stanislaw Lemrsquos983089983097983094983089 science fiction novel and Andrei Tarkovskyrsquos 983089983097983095983090 cinematic adaptation ofthat novel Soderbergh managed against the odds to hold his own with somereviewers even preferring his version over Tarkovskyrsquos or Lemrsquos1048625 NeverthelessSoderberghrsquos film was a tough sell to general audiences It was poorly marketed asa supernatural romance (agrave la Ghost ) and viewers looking for the sort of action andeffects that dominate contemporary science fiction films le the theater morethan a little disappointed Costing 983076983092983095 million but bringing in only 983076983089983093 million indomestic box office receipts Solaris may eventually make money on DVD salesbut given than Amazon is currently selling the new DVD for a discounted price offive bucks I suspect the executives at 983090983088th Century Fox arenrsquot holding their breath

1048625 In his review Andrew Sarris remarks ldquoBut I prefer Soderberghrsquos concentration on his two loversover Tarkovskyrsquos mostly male mostly patriarchal debating societies I have been suspicious for along time of all the accolades bestowed by many of my colleagues on the work of Tarkovsky Wherethey see greatness I see only grandiosity and a laborious overlong grandiosity at thatrdquo (Te NewYork Observer December 983089983093 983090983088983088983090) e reviewer from ime Out proclaims ldquoSoderberghrsquos moviebeats its predecessor in virtually every respect Itrsquos not only richer and more rigorous philosophi-cally than the Russianrsquos woolly musings it also has an emotional force barely there in Tarkovskyrdquo(httpwwwtimeoutcomfilm983095983092983097983089983094html) Writing in Film Treat (December 983093 983090983088983088983090) RickKisonak discusses both the 983090983088983088983090 film and the original novel and concludes ldquoItrsquos a gutsy move and Ihave to say I find Soderberghrsquos lsquoSolarisrsquo an eminently more satisfying experience than Lemrsquosrdquo



9 8 u n d e r s t a n d i n g l o v e



Part of what has made the film both appealing to some and frustrating tomost is its ambiguity On first watch it isnrsquot that clear just what is going on and

though the film richly rewards repeat viewings the patience required for suchefforts is significant Here I want to offer an analysis of Solaris that focuses onquestions regarding love and personal identity that are raised by the film1048626 Irsquollbegin with a fairly detailed (but given the complexity of this film necessary)recounting of the narrative and then consider the philosophical puzzles ofattachment and identity that the film highlights Still focusing on issues of iden-tity Irsquoll argue that the ending of the film is plausibly construed as disturbinglyambivalent In the final section of the essay I will consider a different take onthe film one inspired by the work of the philosopher Derek Parfit A Parfitian

philosophical framework allows for a significantly more upliing vision of thefilmrsquos end but (as wersquoll see) this buoyancy comes at the cost of radically revisingour attitudes toward identity and attachment

983124983144983141 983123983156983151983154983161

e film begins with a shot of rain falling on a window pane983091 followed by ChrisKelvin (George Clooney) sitting pensively on his bed In voice-over we hear a woman say ldquoChris what is it I love you so much Donrsquot you love me any-morerdquo We then see him at work and infer that he is a therapist as we watch him

engage with patients Later he returns home and prepares a salad cutting hisfinger in the process

Two officials arrive and present him with a video message from an oldfriend Gibarian who pleads that Kelvin needs to come to a space stationorbiting the planet Solaris Gibarian also suggests that as a therapist Kelvin isideally situated to help out the crew as they attempt to deal with some as-yet-unexplained crisis1048628 We are then given our first glimpse of the bluish-purplishgaseous globe that is Solaris as we see Kelvinrsquos shuttle slowly dock with thespace station1048629

1048626 I donrsquot assume that my take on the film is an accurate reflection of all of Soderberghrsquos inten-tions Soderbergh discusses some of his intentions on the DVD commentary track as well as ininterviews One particularly informative interview with Soderbergh and Clooney can be foundat httpwwwscificomsfwissue9830909830971048627interviewhtml

983091 I suspect the appearance of rain here (and later) is a subtle reference to Tarkovskyrsquos less subtleemployment of rain in his version of Solaris

1048628 Gibarian actually goes further saying ldquoI hope you will come to Solaris Chris I think you needto You will see what I meanrdquo suggesting that Gibarian believed Kelvinrsquos encounter with a ldquovisi-torrdquo of his own may be somehow therapeutic

1048629 At this point Solaris is a bluish color As the film progresses we see the planet shi in color fromblue to purple to red



9 9c h r i s t o p h e r g r a u



Upon arrival at the station Kelvin notices bloodstains and eventually thecorpse of Gibarian1048630 He then comes upon Snow a crewmember who seems gen-

erally out of sorts and surprised to see Kelvin Snow explains that the bloodKelvin saw belonged to Gutard who was chased and killed by security forcesSnow also tells Kelvin that he is the one who discovered Gibarianrsquos death (asuicide) Kelvin shocked asks for an explanation Snow responds crypticallysaying ldquoI could tell you whatrsquos happening but I donrsquot know if that would reallytell you whatrsquos happening rdquo

Kelvin seeks out the only other living member of the crew Dr Gordon Gordonscared and unfriendly insists Kelvin not enter her cabin She refuses to explain thestate of the ship saying only ldquoUntil it starts happening to you therersquos really no

point in discussing itrdquo Kelvin then encounters a boy who quickly runs awayReturning to Snow Kelvin is told that the boy is Gibarianrsquos son Michael Wantingto know more Kelvin requests a formal interview with both Snow and Gordonand is mysteriously warned by Snow to lock his door before going to sleep1048631

In the formal interview Gordon reveals she has been suffering from assorted psychiatric maladies She doesnrsquot explain the situation on the ship saying onlyldquoJust that I want it to stop But I want to stop it If I can stop it that means Irsquomsmarter than it isrdquo1048632 Returning to his room Kelvin listens to a recorded messagefrom Gibarian in which he mocks the space program saying ldquoWe are proud of

ourselves but when you think about it our enthusiasm is a sham We donrsquot wantother worldsmdashwe want mirrorsrdquo1048633

1048630 Here we get a brief shot of a bloodstain on the ceiling Only toward the very end of the film will we come to learn the cause of this stain

1048631 What Snow actually says is ldquoI find I sleep much better with the door lockedrdquo He is presum-ably trying to encourage Kelvin to lock his door and thus come to realize that his own ldquovisitorrdquomaterializes within his quarters (and has not simply been hiding somewhere else on the ship) As

we later learn Snow (being a ldquovisitorrdquo himself ) presumably doesnrsquot actually have a need to lockhis own door

1048632

Gordonrsquos interview is followed by an exchange with Snow in which he claims ldquoI would kill to goback to Earthrdquo e irony of this statement wonrsquot become apparent until it is eventually revealedthat this version of Snow has in fact killed the original Snow

1048633 e theme of mirroring is pervasive throughout Solaris Gibarianrsquos remarks here are themselvesmirrored by the comments of the dinner party guests in one of the flashback scenes (oughthey are discussing God the ideas in circulation apply equally well to Solaris) In addition thesuspicion of distortion through projection that comes up in the context of GodSolaris is close-ly connected to the worry expressed by Gordon Kelvin and a Rheya visitor that perhaps Kel-

vinrsquos memories of Rheya are nothing more than a mirroring and projection of his own needsand wants (In one heated exchange Gordon says to Kelvin ldquoShersquos a mirror that reflects part of

your mind You provide the formulardquo) e structure of the film also offers many points at whichsegments ldquomirrorrdquo each other (eg the Earth and ldquoEarthrdquo scenes the first line of dialogue fromRheya and its later repetition the suicide doubling [flashback and on ship] the doubling of sexon Earth with sex on the ship etc)



1 0 0 u n d e r s t a n d i n g l o v e



Kelvin falls asleep and we then get a flashback sequence (in much warmeramber tones contrasting sharply with the bluish-gray shots aboard the ship)

that begins with a shot of a woman holding a doorknob on the subway We learnthis is Rheya a woman Kelvin soon meets again at a party and pursues Whilehe flirts with Rheya at the party he talks to Gibarian about the planet Solarisand is told that that ldquothe most interesting thing is well it seems to be reactingalmost like it knows it is being observedrdquo (is is said while we are presented with a shot of Rheya seductively walking off clearly aware that she is beingobserved by Kelvin) Kelvin continues to flirt with her attempting to wooher with excerpts from a poem by Dylan omas ldquoAnd Death Shall Have NoDominionrdquo

In the next sequence we return to Kelvin sleeping on the ship and see an out-of-focus figure coming up next to him Eventually this figure is revealed to beRheya A montage follows with alternate shots of Kelvin and Rheya apparentlymaking love on the ship and flashback scenes of both coupling on the night theymet e montage ends with a shot of Kelvin sleeping (clothed thus revealingthe ship sex scene we have just watched to be a dream) and a hand gently caresseshis neck Kelvin awakens and is immediately shocked by what he sees Rheyaappears to have materialized from his dreams Wondering whether he is perhapsstill asleep Kelvin jumps out of bed slaps himself and paces anxiously Eventu-

ally he gains some composure and he quizzes this ldquovisitorrdquo about where shethinks she is and who she thinks she is Accurately describing their apartmentback on Earth as well as how they met she seems to actually be Rheya butKelvin knows this is impossible10486251048624 She then echoes the lines we first heard whenthe film began saying ldquoChris Irsquom so happy to see you I love you so muchDonrsquot you love me anymorerdquo ese words however are delivered with a slightlyuncanny expression on her face and a not-quite-human blink of her eyes

Suitably distressed Kelvin says he needs to talk to the crew and attempts toleave his cabin Rheya

1048626 immediately rushes to stop him Shortly aerward we

see Kelvin lure her into an escape pod and then looking both confused anddistraught he ejects the pod into space in an effort to rid himself of this ghostly vision of his lost love

Aerward he asks Snow ldquoWhat was thatrdquo Typically Snow isnrsquot forthcom-ing When asked where his own ldquovisitorrdquo is Snow says ldquoI donrsquot know Stoppedappearingrdquo and claims the visitor was his brother Kelvin reveals to Snow thathis visitor was a copy of his dead wife Rheya Kelvin asks whether she will comeback and Snow responds ldquoDo you want her tordquo Kelvin doesnrsquot answer and hisexpression suggests that he isnrsquot sure what he wants at this point

10486251048624 From this point on Irsquoll refer to her as Rheya1048626 the next visitor as Rheya

983091 and so on



1 0 1c h r i s t o p h e r g r a u



With suitcases piled high against his door to prevent entry we see Kelvinattempt to fall asleep is leads to another dreamflashback sequence in which

we learn that Rheya was a psychologically troubled writer that Kelvin repeat-edly tried to convince her to marry him and that she eventually accepted his proposal We then cut back to Kelvin sleeping on the ship and once again ahand lovingly caresses his neck He turns and faces the new Rheya (Rheya

983091)

ere is an immediate cut to a postcoital shot of them both in bed undressed(We infer a sex scene much like the one previously dreamed has now actuallyoccurred on the ship) Lounging in bed she quizzes him about the cut on hisfinger saying ldquoI donrsquot remember that When did you get thatrdquo is leads to anextended sequence in which she questions him about how she got there and

reveals that she doesnrsquot remember much Later while Kelvin works at his deskshe gazes at Solaris and apparently has flashbacksmemories of purchasing a pregnancy kit discovering she is pregnant and arguing with Kelvin over hermoodiness and lack of sociability10486251048625

is flashback sequence culminates in memories of a dinner party in whichthe guests debate the idea of God We learn that Kelvin has a coldly rationalistic vision of a purposeless universe while Rheya seems more open to some idea of ahigher intelligence Gibarian grilling Rheya accuses her of anthropomor- phizing God ldquoYou are ascribing human characteristics to something that isnrsquot

humanrdquo e theme throughout the conversation is the utter inscrutability ofGod We see that Rheya isnrsquot particularly pleased with the vision of Kelvinrsquos (orhis friendsrsquo) worldview that manifests in this discussion ere is a cut back tothe space station where Rheya

983091 appears to be unhappily absorbing this informa-

tion She confronts Kelvin

983154983144983141983161983137 Chris Irsquove got to talk to you983147983141983148983158983145983150 Whatrsquos wrong983154983144983141983161983137 I donrsquot understand whatrsquos happening And if I do understand

whatrsquos happening I donrsquot think I can handle it983147983141983148983158983145983150 What do you mean983154983144983141983161983137 I mean I mean Irsquom not the person I rememberOr at least Irsquom not sure I am I mean I do remember things but I donrsquot

remember being there I donrsquot remember experiencing those things

10486251048625 While many of Rheya983091rsquos ldquomemoriesrdquo that are shown to us via flashbacks could plausibly be de-

rived from Kelvinrsquos own memories these shots of Rheya in the pharmacy and later responding tothe pregnancy test are harder to explain as Kelvin is clearly not present We also later see anotherscene in which she very much alone commits suicide Perhaps we are supposed to infer that theseare based on Kelvinrsquos imaginings of what must have happened or are instead Rheya

983091rsquos imaginings

of those scenes More likely (though perhaps stylistically inconsistent) we are being granted some-thing closer to an omniscient point of view






[ Kelvin attempts to calm her and encourages her to take sleeping pills ]10486251048626

983154983144983141983161983137 No you donrsquot understand Because I donrsquot think that I can live with this I donrsquot understand what is happening now And this Iremember this I have a memory of it But I donrsquot remember seeingit I donrsquot remember being there1048625983091

Rheya983091 comes to realize that she is something like a copy of someone else with

memories that are borrowed from somewhere else Kelvin already aware thatthis Rheya is an imitation has apparently gotten over his initial shock anddecided to embrace this illusion he seems eager to pacify her and prevent her

from dwelling on the reality and oddity of the situationKelvin seeks advice from Snow and warns him to never reveal to Rheya983091 that

the previous visitor Rheya1048626 was cast into space In an apparent nonsequitur Snow

says ldquoI wonder if they can get pregnantrdquo10486251048628 is leads to a flashbackmemory thatboth Kelvin and Rheya

983091 seem to experience simultaneously alternating between

shots of both of them (with Rheya983091 staring out the window at Solaris) we see Kel-

vin and Rheya back on Earth arguing over her pregnancy and a subsequent abor-tion In the flashback Kelvin yells ldquoYou should have told merdquo Rheya responds

Chris I had to Obviously I had to You know that about me I had noidea yoursquod react like this Listen Listen Whatrsquos changed I didnrsquot evenknow you wanted one

In a rage Kelvin makes it abundantly clear that he did want one He pushes heraway and when she claims ldquoPlease I wonrsquot make it without yourdquo he respondsldquoen you wonrsquot make itrdquo and storms out

10486251048626 In what may be a reference to Te Matrix (a film that Soderbergh has said he admires) the sleep-ing pills Kelvin foists on Rheya are blue while the stimulants Kelvin will take later in an attemptto avoid sleep are red (In Te Matrix Neo is offered a choice between two pills a red one that willcause him to ldquowake uprdquo from an illusory world or a blue one that will put him to sleep) In the endhowever the red pills in Solaris (combined with sleep deprivation) cause Kelvin hallucinationsrather than accurate perception

1048625983091 Tom Wartenberg has insightfully pointed out (in conversation) that Rheyarsquos description of hercondition is in some ways similar to the phenomenology of watching a film Rheya seems to ex-

perience visions and sounds playing in the ldquotheatre of her mindrdquo but lacks the conviction that she was really present when the experiences depicted actually occurred

10486251048628 I say ldquoapparentrdquo here because on reflection the juxtaposition of the mention of the expulsion ofRheya

1048626 with both Snowrsquos query regarding pregnancy and a flashback of Rheya and Kelvin arguing

over her abortion is clearly intentional the fact that Kelvin ldquoabortsrdquo Rheya1048626 against her will is bit-

terly ironic given that Rheyarsquos suicide was triggered by an argument over her receiving an abortion without Kelvinrsquos knowledge or consent






Cutting back to the station we see Snow offer up Kelvin a plan for bringingGordon and Rheya

983091 together to discuss what to do about Solaris ere is then

another flashback to Rheya committing suicide while we hear the Dylanomas poem being read in voice-over by Kelvin is is followed by a cutback to the ship and Rheya

983091 apparently taking in this information about ldquoherrdquo

suicide and contemplating her situation Somehow knowing that Kelvin dis-covered the original Rheyarsquos dead body Rheya

983091 asks him about it Responding

to Rheya983091 as though she was the original he says he came back for her and

apologizesA meeting between all four on ship occurs and they discuss the constitution of

the ldquovisitorsrdquo It is suggested that they could be disintegrated through the proper

machinery Kelvin insists he wants to take Rheya983091 back to Earth rather than haveher destroyed by the proposed machine is leads Gordon to quip ldquoShould we pick up the other one on the wayrdquo Rheya

983091 gradually figures out that a previous

incarnation of her has been forcibly evicted from the ship and she reacts accord-ingly saying ldquoOh my God Oh my God Donrsquot touch me rdquo to Kelvin10486251048629 isexchange provokes Gordon to angrily warn Kelvin that he is mistaking an artifi-cial projection for a genuine human being

Later we see Kelvin sleeping and in an apparent dream Gibarian visits himKelvin challenges this visitor saying ldquoYoursquore not Gibarianrdquo Gibarian responds

ldquoNo Who am I then A puppet And yoursquore not Or maybe yoursquore my puppetBut like all puppets you think you are actually humans Itrsquos the puppetrsquosdream being humanrdquo Asked about his ldquosonrdquo Gibarian answers ldquoatrsquos not myson My son is on Earth And thatrsquos not your wife ey are part of Solarisremember thatrdquo Kelvin asks ldquoWhat does Solaris want from usrdquo and Gibarianreplies ldquoWhy do you think it has to want something is is why you have toleave If you keep thinking there is a solution yoursquoll die hererdquo Kelvin says hecanrsquot leave and that he will figure out a solution Gibarian ends his visit with the proclamation ldquoere are no answers Only choicesrdquo

Kelvin awakens to discover Rheya983091

missing She has attempted to kill herselfby drinking liquid oxygen e attempt fails in a deliberately unsettling scene we see her body ldquoresurrectrdquo and heal itself Clearly disappointed that she hassurvived the suicide attempt Rheya

983091 simply says ldquoOh nordquo and turns away from

Kelvin When he asks ldquoWhy did you do that Rheyardquo She responds ldquoDonrsquotcall me that rdquo and cries

We then learn that Gordon has indeed constructed a device that will anni-hilate visitors Rheya

983091 expresses her desire to have the device used on her lead-

ing to an exchange with Kelvin in which she questions her own reality and her

10486251048629 For a brief discussion of the relevance of this line (and the role of touch generally) see note 983090983088






capacity for free choice Kelvin makes it clear that he needs her to help himhave a chance to ldquoundo that mistakerdquo from his past In tears she begs him to let

her go Knowing that she will attempt to have the device used on her once hefalls asleep Kelvin takes a large number of red pills in an attempt to stay awakeis leads to a series of hallucinations we see shots of him looking panickedand sweaty which alternate with shots of multiple Rheyas Rheya

983091 speaking to

Gibarianrsquos son a damaged doorway and other images of Kelvin groping alonga hallway is latter sequence is intercut with a flashback in which Kelvin dis-covers the original Rheyarsquos dead body back on Earth We see that he finds thedead Rheya holding a page ripped from a book containing the Dylan omas poem

Kelvin wakes up from this delusional sleep and finds another ldquosuicide noterdquoof sorts Rheya983091 has recorded a video message explaining to Kelvin that she

asked Gordon to destroy her She says

I realized Irsquom not her Irsquom not Rheya I know you loved me though And Ilove you I wish we could just live inside that feeling forever Maybe therersquosa place where we can but I know it is not on Earth and not on this ship

Kelvin finds Gordon argues with her and in the process both discover blood

stains on the ceiling Investigating they uncover the frozen corpse of SnowRealizing that the Snow they have been dealing with must in fact be a ldquovisitorrdquothey confront him and he claims he had to kill the original Snow in self-defenseBefore they can dwell on how to deal with this twist Snow

1048626 reveals to them that

Solaris appears to be growing and they donrsquot have long to escape We then seeKelvin and Gordon make preparations to leave

ere is a transition to a shot of a rainy window exactly similar to the one wesaw in the very first shot of the film is is followed by other familiar shots ofKelvin on a bed in the street on the train and walking up stairs in the rain tohis home We hear him talking in voice-overmdashhe comments on the oddity ofbeing back and the difficulty to readjusting We then see him back in his apart-ment preparing a salad just as he did at the beginning of the film (One notabledifference is that his refrigerator now has a picture of Rheya on it10486251048630) He cuts hisfinger as he did at the beginning of the film but this time the cut seems to healitself instantaneously as he runs it under water Looking dazed and puzzled heglances at the photo of Rheya

10486251048630 When Rheya1048626 was asked by Kelvin to describe their apartment she commented ldquoAnd there are

no paintings on the wallsmdashno pictures anywheremdashno pictures on the fridge even which I alwaysthought was a bit strangerdquo






e film then cuts back to the station as Solaris advances toward it and we seethat Kelvin chose not to accompany Gordon in the pod10486251048631 Staying behind we seehim groan and collapse while the station loses power and become enveloped bySolaris Snow

1048626 is also there and seems to possess a look of rapture as he gazes at

Solarisrsquos approach Gibarianrsquos son Michael1048626 walks up to the collapsed Kelvin and

though barely conscious at this point Kelvin manages to slowly reach out andtouch his hand in a gesture that resembles Michelangelorsquos Te Creation of Adam

ere is a cut back to the photo of Rheya on the refrigerator in Kelvinrsquosapartment While Kelvin stares at the photo he hears Rheya call to him heturns surprised and confused to see her He walks toward her and asks ldquoAm Ialive or deadrdquo She responds

10486251048631 At just this point there is a curious sequence in the station corridor in which we see him repeat-edly ldquodoubledrdquo on screen (one image of him fades out while simultaneously another fades in)is seems to hint at the interpretive decision demanded of the viewer here (as to whether wethink he stayed on board or returned to Earth with Gordon) (anks to George Wilson for

pointing out the relevance of this scene)






We donrsquot have to think like that anymore Wersquore together now Everything wersquove done is forgiven Everything

ey kiss and embrace She is smiling and seems at peace his face is harder toread he looks exhausted teary-eyed and perhaps happy e film ends withreceding shots of Solaris

983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155

e sci-fi premise of Solaris allows Steven Soderbergh to tell a distinctly philo-sophical love story e ldquovisitorsrdquo present us with a vivid thought experimentand the film effectively prods us to dwell on the possibility it illustrates If con-fronted with a near duplicate of someone you have loved and lost what would your response be What should your response be e dramatic force of this premise derives from the fact that the tensions raised by such a far-fetched situ-ation reflect tensions that can exist in real life between an attraction to qualities possessed by a person and attraction to the person in a manner that seems totranscend an attraction to qualities In short the premise of the film challengesus to reflect on what we really attach to when we fall in love do we really lovethe person or is it just the cluster of qualities the person happens to manifest andthat could (possibly) be found in another Philosophers have commented on

this topic and one particularly clear statement of the issue was offered by Rob-ert Nozick

Apparently love is an interesting instance of another relationship that ishistorical in that (like justice) it depends upon what actually occurredAn adult may come to love another because of the otherrsquos characteristicsbut it is the other person and not the characteristics that is loved elove is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristicseven to one who ldquoscoresrdquo higher for these characteristics And the love

endures through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it Oneloves the particular person one actually encountered Why love is his-torical attaching to persons in this way and not to characteristics is aninteresting and puzzling question10486251048632

As Nozick notes loversquos bond though frequently beginning in an attachmentto qualities doesnrsquot always end there A deep love for another person oen involvesan attachment that cannot be reduced without remainder to an attachment to the

10486251048632 Robert Nozick Anarchy State and Utopia (New York Basic Books 983089983097983095983092) 983089983094983095ndash983089983094983096






qualities of the beloved e beloved is in an important sense irreplaceable10486251048633 Ofcourse even those of us who affirm this sort of bond as a model of love should

admit that another form of attachment is both possible and oen tempting anattachment that remains at the level of qualities qualities that could (in theory atleast) be repeated in another How could the difference between these two sortsof attachment manifest itself Well in ordinary life it might not as qualities welove are oen multiple and complex and we donrsquot usually find them presented tous in more than one instantiation In certain crude cases we can witness the dis-tinction however To take a perhaps too-crude example a person who is primarilyattracted to say the blonde hair and biting wit of the beloved may well be willingto accept a substitute so long as the substitute possesses those desired qualities

Such a person may well be accused of being ldquosuperficialrdquo however thischarge of superficiality can have multiple sources some may object that the per-son simply values too simple a collection of qualities while others may be object-ing that it is the attachment to qualities themselves rather than the personexhibiting the qualities that is the objectionable feature of the attachment It isthe latter sort of complaint that is particularly interesting philosophically andthe nice thing about the cinematic thought experiment we get in Solaris is thatit allows us to contemplate and reflect on this question regarding the focusof onersquos attachment rough the filmrsquos presentation of a fictional scenario in

which a duplicate (manifesting many if not all of the qualities of the original)is created we can see the protagonist struggle with his own attitudes regarding what sort of bond is appropriate

At the beginning of the film Kelvin is a man still in mourning over the sui-cide of his wife Rheya He seems to feel both deep love for her and deep regretas he knows her suicide was triggered by his own actions When he travels to thespace station and Solaris offers up ldquovisitorsrdquo that are strikingly similar to his late wife his response is complicated He goes from shock to rejection to accep-tance most of the time manifesting what seems to be an appropriate level ofconfusion given the bizarre situation in which he finds himself Kelvinrsquos shiingreactions at encountering this unusual scenario are gripping because they track

10486251048633 Elsewhere (ldquoIrreplaceability and Unique Valuerdquo Philosophical opics 1048627983090 983089983089983089ndash983089983090983097) I discuss thisissue in the context of ldquoe Missyplicity Projectrdquo a now defunct research program at the Uni-

versity of Texas to clone a particular dog funded by the wealthy owners of that dog Findingthe plan deeply creepy I tried to explore what exactly is going on when we occasionally findourselves drawn to attaching to the ldquotyperdquo rather than the ldquotokenrdquo of that type In a more recentarticle (ldquoLove and Historyrdquo Te Southern Journal of Philosophy 983092983096 no 1048627) I attempt a provisional

philosophical defense of the sort of token-directed attachment that many naturally feel is appropriate in love relationships Here my goals are different I wonrsquot offer a thorough defense thatlove directed at an individual is metaphysically coherent and ethically preferable to love directedat qualities What I want to focus on instead are the conflicts that can arise from both sorts of at-traction and the way in which Solaris exploits this tension for dramatic effect






our own ambivalence about such matters Frankly most of us donrsquot know justhow we would react to such a situation e thought that accepting and embrac-

ing such a ldquovisitorrdquo involves a violation to the original person is natural and pervasive especially if the acceptance of the copy comes with a failure toacknowledge the distinct identities of the two persons At the same time a deepattraction to such a visitor would surely also be entirely natural and perhapseven inescapable10486261048624 As viewers we are like Kelvin torn in different directions bythis (perhaps thankfully) far-fetched possibility

Once Kelvinrsquos initial shock and confusion over the arrival of the first visitor(Rheya

1048626) wears off we see him decide that he ought not to accept his visitor as if

she were Rheya It has become clear to him that a miracle has not occurred

Rheya is not back from the dead Instead a copy has been created by an intelli-gent alien forcemdasha copy drawn from Kelvinrsquos own memories of his lost loveis copy is surely appealing to Kelvin as it is both physically accurate and psy-chologically very similar to his wife (or at least his memories of his wife) but hecanrsquot quite bring himself to ignore his knowledge that it isnrsquot really his wife aerall us in a decision that comes quickly but nonetheless does not seem easyfor him he chooses to mislead her and eject her out into space

It isnrsquot clear if aer the fact Kelvin regrets this rather rash decision whenSnow asks him if he wants her to return we just arenrsquot sure what Kelvin is

thinking With the arrival of Rheya983091 however his immediate willingness tobed down with her suggests at least some degree of acceptance e degree ofacceptance grows with time as he talks to her and sees her exhibit so many ofthe traits he remembers Rheya possessing While viewers naturally sympathize with his deep desire to have a second chance and understand the strong psy-chological pull he feels to embrace Rheya

983091 as his dead wife as the film pro-

gresses his attachment comes to seem increasingly problematic e ethicaldifficulties here are highlighted in a very direct fashion by Gordon when she atone point tells Kelvin ldquoShe is not human Try to understand that [ ] Your wife is dead [ ] Shersquos a copymdasha facsimile and shersquos seducing you all overagain Yoursquore sickrdquo

10486261048624 e inevitability of such an attraction is highlighted in the film through a careful emphasis onthe role of touch Shortly aer a scene in which Rheya

983091 yells to Kelvin ldquoDonrsquot touch merdquo (see

note 983089983093) Kelvin says to Gordon ldquoWhat about your visitor Does it feel Can it touch Does itspeakrdquo (emphasis mine) Each of the two copies of Rheya on the ship greets Kelvin by first gentlycaressing his neck e third copy of Rheya (on Solaris) also greets him with an embrace and thensimilarly strokes his neck ough Soderbergh does not explicitly discuss these repetitions in theDVD commentary he does at one point say ldquoIrsquom imagining that it is very hard to argue with thetactile sensation of her being next to yourdquo Note also that the original Rheya and Kelvin initiallycome together through holding hands on the elevator and when the station is being absorbed bySolaris Kelvinrsquos last act is to grasp the hand of Michael

1048626 (Gibarianrsquos son)






One explanation for the diagnosis that Kelvin is ldquosickrdquo is that he seems astime goes on to have decided to take the easy way out and embrace a comforting

illusion rather than expend the effort required to come to terms with the (moraland metaphysical) reality of his situation His motives for yielding to this denialof the facts are no doubt complicated but appear increasingly ethically suspect while he is surely motivated by a sincere longing and love for his late wife heseems equally motivated by a misguided and self-centered attempt to use Rheya

983091

as a vehicle to atone for his past sins to Rheya Trying to undo the past by recreat-

ing the past with a copy he appears more and more unhinged both psychologi-cally and morally as the story unfolds

at Gordon is on to something in her diagnosis of Kelvinrsquos state is emphasized

by his interaction with Rheya983091 as she reflects on and becomes increasingly aware ofher dubious ontological status Recognizing that she is not simply a copy of another person but a copy of Kelvinrsquos (possibly distorted) memories of another person shecomes to question her potential for free choice and any sort of authentic existence

983154983144983141983161983137983091 Donrsquot you see I came from your memory of her atrsquos the

problem Irsquom not a whole person In your memory you get to controleverything So even if you remember something wrong I am predetermined to carry it out Irsquom suicidal because thatrsquos how you

remember me10486261048625

Kelvin at this point disturbingly self-absorbed responds

I donrsquot believe that wersquore predetermined to relive our past I think we canchoose to do it differently [ ] is is my chance to undo that mistake and I need you to help me

Rheya983091 in tears exclaims ldquoBut am I really Rheyardquo and Kelvin responds as if in

a daze ldquoI donrsquot know anymore All I see is you All I see is yourdquo 10486261048626

Later Rheya983091 suggests that in order for Kelvin and her to continue on theyldquowould have to have some sort of arrangement some kind of unspoken under-standing that Irsquom not really a human beingrdquo Saying only ldquoNo Rheyardquo he reaches

10486261048625 Solaris has interesting thematic overlap with the 983090983088983088983092 film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind In both we are presented with tales of lost love and second chances and in both the femaleof the couple is presented to the viewer almost entirely as a projection based on the male charac-terrsquos memories of her Solaris also seems to implicitly reference the classic film about love loss and

projection Alfred Hitchcockrsquos Vertigo

10486261048626 To my mind this is an excellent example of someone failing (rather spectacularly) to follow IrisMurdochrsquos injunction to ldquoreally lookrdquomdashto strive to perceive the reality of a situation accurately Mur-doch eloquently argued that such perception is demanded by both love and justice For more onMurdochrsquos conception of morality and love see the contribution from Susan Wolf in this collection






for the red pills that will keep him awake and thus enable him to ensure shedoesnrsquot attempt suicide Rheya

983091 comes to reject this possibility of them staying

together saying ldquois What kind of life is this Trapped here Itrsquos not a lifeI donrsquot know what to call itrdquo Kelvin at his most disturbing replies ldquoIt is what we have It is enough for merdquo By now Gordonrsquos earlier claim that Kelvin wasldquosickrdquo seems an understatement He naturally craves his lost love and we canappreciate why he would desire some sort of redemption from her but of courseRheya

983091 is not actually in a position to forgive Kelvin for his earlier abandon-

ment of Rheya and while at some level he clearly knows this he doesnrsquot seem tocaremdashan imitation of forgiveness from an imitation of Rheya has come toseem acceptable to him us my earlier charge of self-absorption if he was

really caring about Rheya at this point hersquod be sensitive enough to notice that shersquos not there If he really cared about the visitor hersquod be sensitive enough tonotice that she isnrsquot Rheya (and is an autonomous individual) Since he isnrsquot rec-ognizing the distinct identity of either but instead blurring them he is simulta-neously disrespecting both is willingness to indulge in fantasy and ignoreRheya

983091rsquos pleas is truly striking and it is a testament to George Clooneyrsquos sympa-

thetic portrayal of Kelvin that we donrsquot find him loathsome at this point 1048626983091

at Kelvin is disregarding Rheya983091rsquos wishes her autonomy and her individu-

ality is patently clear It is possible that one might try to excuse his behavior by

pointing out that Rheya983091 isnrsquot aer all a human being and thus his violationhere is not as morally problematic as a failure to respect the needs and desires ofa real person10486261048628 While I think this defense is misguided rather than respond toit in detail with an argument in favor of Rheya

983091rsquos ldquohumanityrdquo I want to instead

focus again on the way in which Kelvin is also disregarding the memory of a veryreal person his dead wife Rheya What would the original Rheya have thoughtabout Kelvinrsquos willingness to ignore the distinction between her and the visitorsthat appear to him It seems likely that she would have been disturbed and perhaps even disgusted by his attempt to compensate for his failure to her

1048626983091 Another reason why many viewers continue to interpret Kelvin sympathetically (and one rea-son why I think this story works better on film than on the page) is that the viewers are just likeKelvin shown a woman who looks exactly like the original ldquoSeeing is believingrdquo as they say andI think part of the pull to accept Rheya

983091 as Rheya comes from our instinctual trust in what we are

shown on the screen Reflecting on the situation aer the fact it is easier to recognize that Rheya983091

is indeed a fully distinct individual (is same point will apply later to our initial willingness totrust that the Kelvin we see at the end is the original Kelvin)

10486261048628 Another rather different sort of defense might focus on the wrongness of suicide and interpretKelvinrsquos actions here as primarily motivated by a concern that Rheya

983091 not commit this wrong

act While I donrsquot want to deny that Kelvin may have this motivation it seems quite clear at this point in the film that his primary motivations concern his desire to use Rheya

983091 in order to fulfill a

misguided fantasy of moral redemption and lost love regained






through building a new life with a copy of her (ink how you would feel aboutsomeone you love behaving in a similar matter toward a ldquocopyrdquo of you ie refus-

ing to recognize that you and the copy are distinct individuals You might cometo forgive the person for this failure to acknowledge your individual identity butsuch forgiveness in itself necessarily involves an acknowledgment of a signifi-cant wrong on his or her part) Kelvinrsquos descent into denial and fantasy involvesnot just mental illness but a morally troubling attitude of disregard toward thememory of the woman he so urgently claims to love

983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143

Perhaps luckily for her Rheya983091 does manage to destroy herself (with Gordonrsquos

help) and Kelvin is le alone forced to choose whether to try and return toEarth or stay on the ship as it is absorbed (and presumably destroyed) by theever-growing Solaris e structure of the film at this point deliberately misleadsthe viewer (at least on first viewing) we are led to infer initially that Kelvinchooses to return to Earth with Gordon and we are shown several shots of himliving out his daily life that very closely echo the shots that began the film Onlylater are we shown footage that reveals that he in fact remained behind on theship What exactly occurs from that point on remains opaque even aer thecredits roll What is clear enough is that Kelvin (or someone just like him) is

reunited with Rheya (or someone just like her) in an environment that looks just like Earth However the structure of the film and the final shots of thereceding Solaris make it clear that this ldquoEarthrdquo is in fact Solaris

One tempting interpretation of the ending of the film is to see it as offeringa heartwarming tale of resurrection and redemption in an aerlife created by asympathetic God-like intelligence10486261048629 (e producer James Cameron predict-ably pushes just such a cheery interpretation in the DVD commentary)10486261048630 Ithink it is beyond doubt that we are supposed to initially consider such an out-come and surely part of the appeal of the ending for many viewers is this possi-

bility Nevertheless upon reflection I think the most plausible interpretation of

10486261048629 e inclusion of the Dylan omas poem and the focus on the line ldquoAnd death shall have nodominionrdquo (derived from Romans 983094983097) can obviously be taken to support a construal of the filmrsquosending as offering an optimistic vision of resurrection and reunion An extended consideration ofthe poem is beyond the scope of this essay but I take it that the poem like the film lends itself toboth a superficially happy interpretation and on reflection a darker reading Notably both Kelvinand Rheya agree that in the end it is ldquonot a very happy poemrdquo

10486261048630 I say ldquopredictablyrdquo here because there has traditionally been a strong commercial incentive forfilms to have ldquohappy endingsrdquo and presumably Cameron as producer is in part motivated by suchincentives For a dismissive discussion of the film as offering a happy ending see Vida Johnsonand Graham Petrie ldquoEthical Explorationrdquo Sight and Sound 9830891048627 no 983090 (February 9830909830889830881048627) 983089983095ndash983089983096






the final sequences leaves matters decidedly more nuanced and unsettled HereIrsquoll try to make the case that the most reasonable reading of the film is one in

which we take seriously the possibility that the Kelvin we see in the last sequencesof the film is not in fact the original Kelvin but some new creature created bySolaris and probably based (like the other ldquovisitorsrdquo) on memories If this isright then a straightforward reading of the ending as one involving everlastinglife and reunion with a lost love is far too simplistic

What are the reasons for thinking we should conclude that the Kelvin we seeat the end of the film is best construed as Kelvin

1048626 rather than a magically

enhanced and now immortal Kelvin First off the absorption of the space sta-tion by Solaris presumably destroys the necessary life-support mechanisms on

the ship and would cause any remaining humans to die We see Kelvin in great pain and apparently close to death when he encounters Michael1048626 (the copy of

Gibarianrsquos son) ough we donrsquot clearly see Kelvin die it is plausible to assumehe does at his final pose resembles Michelangelorsquos painting Te Creation of

Adam suggests that what we will encounter next will indeed be some kind ofsignificantly new creation

Since we eventually learn that Kelvin did not go back to Earth with Gor-don we can safely conclude that the ldquoEarthrdquo we see Kelvin ldquoreturnrdquo to is actu-ally a recreation of Earth on Solaris e Rheya who appears is also presumably

a recreation It makes sense then that Kelvin is also a recreation at this pointHis bodyrsquos ability to instantly heal the cut on his finger certainly suggests thisidea (We already know that the visitors can heal themselves and we know thatthe creation of a brand new Kelvin is entirely within Solarisrsquos powers for wehave learned that the original Snow was killed by a Solaris-created copy ofhimself)

Consider also that Kelvinrsquos monologue (delivered as a voice-over) aboutreturning to Earth takes on a different and perhaps more comprehensible toneif we imagine it being uttered by a duplicate Kelvin trying to make sense of hisnew existence and situation10486261048631

10486261048631 e shots that appear while this monologue is being delivered mirror shots we see at the begin-ning of the film but there are subtle yet important differences In all these later shots we get adistinct impression of distance that is not present in the early versions With the camera beingfurther away sometimes at a different height and usually in motion the suggestion seems to bethat the camera now represents the point of view of a removed intelligence monitoring KelvinIn contrast the earlier scenes are either shot in such a way as to align us with Kelvin or are shotin a traditional ldquotransparentrdquo style To my mind the distancing present in these later sequencesfurther suggests the idea that what we are looking at in these scenes may not be Kelvin but instead

yet another creation of Solaris e style of these shots is a subtle indicator that perhaps we as viewers should also be distancing ourselves from this man It helps push us to not be complacent with a superficial interpretation of the film that would suggest an all-too-happy ending to thisnuanced and melancholy story






Earth Even the word sounded strange to me now Unfamiliar How longhad I been gone How long had I been back Did it matter I tried to

find the rhythm of the world where I used to live I followed the cur-rent I was silent attentive I made a conscious effort to smile nod standand perform the million of gestures that constitute life on earth I stud-ied these gestures until they became reflexes again but I was haunted bythe idea that I remembered her wrong at somehow I was wrong abouteverything

e need to study and practice basic gestures is not entirely surprising if in facthe is some sort of a recreation or duplication of the original Kelvin (Recall the

somewhat odd behavior of Snow 1048626 as he struggles throughout the film to accu-rately portray the original Snow) Kelvinrsquos worry that he ldquowas wrong abouteverythingrdquo may well include a worry about the nature of his own existence atthis point

In addition it is worth remembering the dream visitation of Gibarian andhis cryptic comments to Kelvin about puppets (ldquoWho am I then A puppetAnd yoursquore not Or maybe yoursquore my puppet But like all puppets you think youare actually humans Itrsquos the puppetrsquos dream being humanrdquo) With this speechin mind note the mildly odd and artificial stance of Kelvin once he notices

Rheya and walks over to her in the final sequence of the film e somewhatunnatural posture of his arms in this scene brings to mind the image of a mari-onette a puppet held up by strings and manipulated by someone above Ofcourse if he is in fact a creation of Solaris at this point a puppet metaphor is notfar off

Finally while it may be tempting to interpret the film as telling an upliingspiritual tale of resurrection in an aerlife it is important to keep in mind thatthroughout the film various characters emphasize that Solaris is an entirely alien






sort of intelligence and attributing benevolent motives to it is little more than aleap of faith given that it has not communicated any such intentions to thosemembers of humanity it has thus far interacted with Perhaps it seeks to give Kel- vin everlasting life and perhaps it has the ability to do this but it is just as possiblethat it is merely experimenting with his memory blueprint for its own mysteriousaims10486261048632 Aer all Solaris did not seem to show benevolence in confronting Snow with a copy of himself or Gibarian with a copy of his son (while his son is still aliveback on Earth) and though we never find out who Gordonrsquos visitor was it is safe

to assume (given her response) that it was not a welcome guest To suggest thatSolaris nevertheless has created an aerlife for Kelvin and Rheya as an act of lo983158e isto make the alien planet into a disturbingly fickle God It is much more plausiblegiven all that we are shown to conclude that the ending represents somethingsignificantly less comforting than the traditional conception of Heaven

983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo

Irsquove suggested that we should resist the temptation to see Solaris as presentingan unambiguously happy ending and instead consider that the ending of

this film is actually fairly disturbing once we reflect on the possibility that theldquoreunionrdquo we see is in fact the coming together of two newly created creatures who possess merely apparent memories derived from the genuine memories of areal human who has perished However there is yet another rather different wayto make sense of the ending given the interpretation of the film Irsquove offered

10486261048632 Given that toward the end of the film Kelvin seems to have decided to accept an illusion andstop recognizing the distinct reality of Rheya

983091 it is ironic that at the very end of the film he too

appears to be a duplicate It is as if Solaris far from feeling benevolent has decided to deliver justdeserts if a copy is good enough for Kel983158in then why shouldnrsquot a copy of Kel983158in be good enoughas well






here One could challenge the presupposition that we can coherently mark offthe identities of these various entitiesmdashone could question the very reality of

the self If the boundaries of the self are in some sense illusory then perhaps theending of the film represents as genuine a reunion as is ever possible and per-haps a cheerier response to the ending is justified I want to conclude by sketch-ing out this rather radical possibility through borrowing some ideas from philosopher Derek Parfit

In discussing questions of personal identity and attachment Parfit has rec-ognized that many people would be reluctant to allow the replacement of aloved one with a duplicatemdashhe admits that we oen attach to persons in a waythat canrsquot be understood solely through reference to their qualities Regardless

of whether we naturally tend to attach to persons in this manner he argues that we are nonetheless better off if we come to love in a more reasonable way Con-sidering the fictional case of a woman named Mary Smith who creates a dupli-cate of herself using a replicating device he says

I fall in love with Mary Smith How should I react aer she has first usedthe Replicator I claim both that I would and that I ought to love herReplica is is not the ldquooughtrdquo of morality On the best conception ofthe best kind of love I ought to love this individual She is fully psycho-

logically continuous with the Mary Smith I loved and she has an exactlysimilar body If I do not love Mary Smithrsquos Replica this could only be forone of several bad reasons[ ] e remaining explanation is that my lovehas ceased for no reason No reason is a bad reason Love can cease likethis but only an inferior kind of love10486261048633

e duplicate or replicated Mary has everything about Mary that one couldreasonably love she has the same personality an exactly similar body and evenqualitatively identical memories (or ldquoquasi-memoriesrdquo as Parfit calls them) Whatrsquos not to like or in this case love

Parfit understands that few will be inclined to accept this revision but hethinks this is because most of us hold either explicitly or implicitly confused

10486261048633 Parfit Derek Reasons and Persons (New York Oxford University Press 983089983097983096983092) 983090983097983093ndash983090983097983094 Notethat this passage comes in the context of Parfit defending the more limited point that lovinga ldquoseries-personrdquo is reasonable In the end however his position commits him to denying theimportance of the identity of a loved one even in our world (and not just a world where series-

persons are common) and thus accepting replaceability as rationally appropriate is is becauseParfit argues (in Reasons and Persons) not just that identity does not matter but that what doesmatter are psychological relations with any cause and a duplicate possesses these psychological re-lations (albeit through an abnormal cause) (983090983096983095) (I also discuss this passage from Parfit in ldquoLoveand Historyrdquo Te Southern Journal of Philosophy 983092983096 no 1048627)






metaphysical beliefs Most of us think that the identity of a person is some sortof ldquodeep further factrdquo over and above the psychological and physical relations

that make up a person9830911048624

Parfit provides several intriguing thought experimentsthat are supposed to bolster his claim that identity cannot rationally have theimportance we normally grant it Perhaps his most effective argument relies onan example (derived from David Wiggins) in which we imagine one personsplitting into two Here is a brief reconstruction of that ldquofissionrdquo thoughtexperiment

983089 It is commonly accepted that a person can survive a hemispherectomy Inother words people have survived operations in which an entire hemisphere

of onersquos brain is removed While the surviving person may be changedin very significant ways we donrsquot consider the person to be numericallydistinct from the original person who chose to undergo the procedure9830911048625 (Your thought going into such a procedure is not presumably that you will be destroyed by the operation and replaced by another less functional person Rather you would anticipate surviving as a less functional versionof oneself)

983090 It is also commonly accepted that if onersquos brain could be transplanted intoa different body the person would go where the brain goes In other words

our brains are essential to our identity in a manner in which the rest of ourbody is not (us the plausibility of ldquobrain in a vatrdquo scenarios we see andaccept in so much science fiction)

1048627 Given 983089 and 983090 we can assume that if it were possible to say destroy onehemisphere of a personrsquos brain and transplant the remaining hemisphereinto a new (but similar) body the resulting person (in the new body) would be numerically identical to the original person that existed prior tothis procedure In other words the survival of half of your brain (put into anew but functional body) is enough to constitute your survival (It does notfollow that this is a happy state of affairsmdashmerely that it is a state of affairsin which you have not ceased to exist)

983092 Consider now a variation on the scenario described in 1048627 Rather than de-stroy one hemisphere imagine that we take your brain and transplant each

9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088

9830911048625 Numerical identity is being contrasted here with qualitative identity While the person who ex-ists aer the operation will not be qualitatively identical to the previous person as many of his orher qualities will have changed he will still be numerically identical in the sense that he is one andthe same person who chose to undergo the procedure Philosophers discussing personal identityare usually focusing on numerical (rather than qualitative) identity It is this sense of identity thatis being analyzed by Parfit






hemisphere into two new (but similar) bodies In the case of this ldquofissionrdquo which resulting person is you ere seem to be only three possibilities

(A) You do not survive (B) You survive as one of two people (C) Yousurvive as both

983093 None of these possibilities is satisfactory Consider each in turn (A) Howcould a double success be a failure (B) Which one Choosing either asthe survivor seems arbitrary (C) is seems nonsensical Survival involvesidentity and I cannot be identical (numerically) with more than onething

983094 ough we know all the relevant information we seem unable to come up with a determinate answer to the question of your identity in such a case

As the fission example shows there are puzzles involving personal identitythat raise questions to which we have no idea how to answer Parfit thinks thatsuch cases cannot be easily answered because they have no clearly correct answerOur criteria for identity do not cover every conceivable casemdashthere are situa-tions in which they are incomplete and come apart We readily accept that thiscan happen for concepts such as ldquotablerdquo or ldquonationrdquomdashthe indeterminacy of ourcriteria for the identity of such things doesnrsquot disturb us Cases involving per-sonal identity are importantly different however We oen feel they must have

an answer How could there not be a ldquoyesrdquo or ldquonordquo answer to the question of whether the person possessing my body tomorrow will be me We tend to thinkthat no matter what occurs between now and then the resulting person either must be me or must not be me In other words we think there must be some determinate answer even if we donrsquot currently know what it is Parfit argues that we should give up this belief and further that we should ldquogive up the languageof identityrdquo9830911048626 (Aer all the fission case shows that we can have a situation in which at the end what does matter is present but numerical identity is absent)According to Parfit what actually matters in survival comes in relations ofdegree (ie physical andor psychological continuity and connectedness) Per-sonal identity in itself (which is ldquoall or nothingrdquo) doesnrsquot matter A person is likea nationmdashwhat matters are the parts

It is natural to believe that there is some further fact about our identity thatdecides all possible cases (thus we posit the existence of a mysterious soul ormental substance) and it is also natural to believe this must be a rather deep factabout us Parfit denies that there is any such fact Surprisingly he does not seethis as a depressing conclusion

9830911048626 Derek Parfit ldquoPersonal Identityrdquo in Personal Identity ed John Perry (Berkeley University ofCalifornia Press 983089983097983095983093) 9830909830881048627






Is the truth depressing Some may find it so But I find it liberating andconsoling When I believed my existence was such a further fact I seemed

imprisoned in myself My life seemed like a glass tunnel through which I was moving faster every year and at the end of which there was darkness When I changed my view the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared I nowlive in the open air (983090983096983089)

Parfit argues that only the existence of some deep further fact would give me areason to be specially concerned about my future In the absence of this factmere personal (numerical) identity gives me no such reason To put it bluntlyself-interest becomes absurd without a self983091983091 Further an attachment to the iden-

tity of another individual (such as a friend or lover) is also on this view simi-larly problematic9830911048628

At the end of Solaris we see someone who looks like Kelvin asking some-one who looks like Rheya ldquoAm I alive or am I deadrdquo He may well just be wondering if hersquos alive back on Earth or instead in something like HeavenGiven the subtleties of the film and the peculiarities of the situation he findshimself in however I think it is plausible to take him to be asking (or at leastgroping toward) a more disturbing question is he the original Kelvin (backon Earth) or is he instead a copy of Kelvin (in some simulated world) (Cer-

tainly this is a question that we are inclined to ask about him at this point) We have now seen however that a Parfitian need not accept this sort of ques-tion as legitimate ere may be no justifiable distinction to draw betweenbeing the ldquooriginalrdquo Kelvin and being a ldquocopyrdquo for such a distinction relies ona notion of identity that according to Parfit lacks the importance we nor-mally grant it Similarly Parfitrsquos conclusions suggest that our earlier concernsover whether Kelvin was recognizing the distinct identities of the Rheya visi-tors may also have been misguided If identity doesnrsquot matter then the draw-ing of lines marking off the individual identities of the various Rheyas is

983091983091 Admittedly this phrasing puts things more strongly than Parfit does He prefers to characterizehis position as a version of ldquoconstitutive reductionismrdquo rather than ldquoeliminative reductionismrdquoParfit doesnrsquot deny that selves (in some sense) exist but he does deny that this existence has theimportance we ordinarily grant it Cf ldquoIs Personal Identity What Mattersrdquo (983090983088983088983095)

9830911048628 Effective criticisms of Parfitrsquos approach toward identity can be found in the writings of Mark Johnston See in particular ldquoHuman Beingsrdquo Te Journal of Philosophy (983089983097983096983095) and ldquoReasons andReductionismrdquo in Reading Parfit ed by Jonathan Dancy (Malden MA Blackwell Publishers983089983097983097983095) While I think Johnstonrsquos arguments are successful it should be noted that many contem-

porary philosophers have followed Parfit in rejecting the idea that identity can have importancein itself Among those who agree (more or less) with Parfit on this issue are Sidney Shoemaker

John Perry Carol Rovane Jennifer Whiting and Anthony Quinton Parfit has also claimed thatthe Buddha held something close to his view






wrongheaded e question ldquoIs Rheya983091 identical to Rheya

1048625rdquo may be as point-

less and arbitrary as asking the question ldquoDo I still have one and the same

audio systemrdquo aer I have chosen to replace some but not all of my audiocomponents9830911048629 When we encounter situations that stretch the limits of thecriteria we have for the use of a concept we can end up with genuine indeter-minacy In cases where there is no determinate answer to be uncovered all wecan do is choose to adopt or create an answer by convention We find ourselvesin a position where we might say echoing Gibarian ldquoere are no answersOnly choicesrdquo

If we accept both the occasional indeterminacy and the ultimate unimpor-tance of personal identity the ending of Solaris takes on a very different flavor

Kelvinrsquos question about his own identity is given what can now be recognized asa thoroughly Parfitian response by Rheya to give up the language of identity isindeed to recognize that ldquoWe donrsquot have to think like that anymorerdquo9830911048630 Here areParfitrsquos own comments on how his approach can allow him to deny that deathhas dominion

Aer a certain time none of the thoughts and experiences that occur willbe directly causally related to this brain or be connected in certain waysto these present experiences at is all this fact involves And in that

redescription my death seems to disappear

9830911048631

Following Parfit Kelvin can free himself from the pseudo-problem of his iden-tity and instead embrace both Rheya and the situation they now find themselvesin Free from ontological concerns they are finally able to realize Rheyarsquos earlierambition to ldquojust live inside that feeling [of love] foreverrdquo

What of Rheyarsquos final proclamation to Kelvin regarding forgiveness Inter-estingly that too can be given a Parfitian reading Parfit points out that his proj-ect of attacking the traditional notion of the self provides compelling groundsfor suspecting that the equally traditional notions of desert and punishmentshould also be rejected9830911048632 If the locus of responsible agency (ie the self ) doesnot have the robust reality we naturally take it to have then perhaps the whole

9830911048629 is example is offered by Parfit in ldquoe Unimportance of Identityrdquo in Personal Identity edsRaymond Martin and John Barresi (Malden MA Blackwell 9830909830889830881048627) 1048627983088983089

9830911048630 In keeping with the Parfitian spirit of this section from this point on I drop the use of subscriptsto identify the various versions of Kelvin and Rheya

9830911048631 Derek Parfit ldquoe Unimportance of Identityrdquo in Personal Identity eds Raymond Martin and John Barresi (Malden MA Blackwell 9830909830889830881048627) 1048627983089983095

9830911048632 Derek Parfit ldquoCommentsrdquo Ethics 983097983094 (983089983097983096983094) 9830961048627983090ndash983096983095983090






idea of moral responsibility ought to be jettisoned If this is right then there isindeed a sense in which as Rheya says ldquoeverything wersquove done is forgivenrdquo9830911048633

983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150

Irsquove been interested in two tensions elicited by Solaris One tension arises once westart to think about how best to make sense of the plot e film particularly theending is ambiguous Given that a primary theme of the film is the unknowabil-ity of the alien intelligence that is Solaris I think this ambiguity is appropriatemdashan ending in which we knew exactly what was going on would (arguably) notresonate as well with the idea of Solaris as deeply inscrutable and alien By the endof the film though things are ambiguous they are not entirely obscure and whatI have tried to show is that the film gains some of its force from the pull it createsbetween rival interpretations

ere is the pull to interpret the film as one with a conventional and happyHollywood ending and a superficial reading of the ending allows us to see Kel- vin as gaining entrance to something like Heaven while being reunited with hislost love ere is also the pull to interpret the film as offering something darkerand significantly less conventional Keeping in mind that the director startedout as an ldquoindierdquo auteur and the source material is both melancholy and complex we can look for more than standard Hollywood fare here and if we look

closely we will indeed see a film in which the ending is quite nuanced and poten-tially disturbing

I donrsquot think this tension is due simply to an unhappy compromise arisingfrom the conflicts between an auteur and a major studio (ie between art andcommerce) As I mentioned before I think the film is quite deliberately ambig-uous More specifically I think there is a way in which the narration is to useGeorge Wilsonrsquos phrase ldquorhetorically unreliablerdquo Consider Wilsonrsquos commentson You Only Live Once

e spectator is led to draw conclusions from parts and aspects of whathe sees even though the screen equally displays information that takentogether with the general knowledge of the probabilities of the actual world ought to serve to undercut some of the prompted inferences10486281048624

9830911048633 ough admittedly the sense here is not the standard one (which presupposes the existence ofgenuine moral responsibility) Instead here the idea would be that they have discovered there isnothing to forgive since no culpable wrongdoing is in fact possible (anks to David Cockburnfor pushing me to emphasize this point)

10486281048624 Wilson George M Narration in Light Studies in Cinematic Point of View (Baltimore JohnsHopkins University Press 983089983097983096983096) 983092983090






Supplement his talk here of ldquogeneral knowledge of the probabilities of the actual worldrdquo with something like our general knowledge of criteria for identity and

you end up with a description that I think fits this film pretty wellFocusing on the issues of identity and attachment as I have tried to do we

can see that our initial temptation to grant benevolent motives to both Kelvinand Solaris needs to be tempered by an appreciation of the actual facts presentedto us Kelvin isnrsquot asking his wife for forgiveness hersquos using a copy of his wife totry and get past his guilt Solaris isnrsquot a loving God-like force it is instead aninscrutable alien being whose motives remain mysterious and seem to be atbest amoral

is tension regarding how to best interpret the narrative is related to and

informed by a distinct tension elicited by the film concerning the focus ofattachment when we love e film naturally evokes contemplation on the com- plexities of love in particular it encourages us to consider the nature of loversquosbond e far-fetched scenario presented to us resonates with very ordinary ten-sions we can feel when we ourselves love I have argued that with the characterof Kelvin we see a good person go bad (or at least go ill) in deciding to ignoreimportant moral distinctions between individuals in order to satisfy a verystrong emotional thirst e interpretation of the film Irsquove offered is also com- patible with rather different philosophical approaches to questions of attach-

ment and identity however and Irsquove tried to show how in particular a Parfitian vision fits surprisingly well with the final moments of the film Irsquom not a Parfi-tian so Irsquom inclined to continue to see the filmrsquos resolution as less than heartwarming I think a Parfitian perspective is worthy of consideration howeverand the fact that film can be rewardingly construed along such lines is an addi-tional reason why this complex ambitious and ambiguous film merits ourattention

983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155

Irsquod like to thank Sean Allen-Hermanson Carlene Bauer David CockburnRichard Hanley Richard Moran Bruce Russell George Toles Tom Warten-berg Susan Watson Stephen White George Wilson Karen Wilson and Susan Wolf for helpful discussions andor comments on earlier dras of this essay





9 8 u n d e r s t a n d i n g l o v e



Part of what has made the film both appealing to some and frustrating tomost is its ambiguity On first watch it isnrsquot that clear just what is going on and

though the film richly rewards repeat viewings the patience required for suchefforts is significant Here I want to offer an analysis of Solaris that focuses onquestions regarding love and personal identity that are raised by the film1048626 Irsquollbegin with a fairly detailed (but given the complexity of this film necessary)recounting of the narrative and then consider the philosophical puzzles ofattachment and identity that the film highlights Still focusing on issues of iden-tity Irsquoll argue that the ending of the film is plausibly construed as disturbinglyambivalent In the final section of the essay I will consider a different take onthe film one inspired by the work of the philosopher Derek Parfit A Parfitian

philosophical framework allows for a significantly more upliing vision of thefilmrsquos end but (as wersquoll see) this buoyancy comes at the cost of radically revisingour attitudes toward identity and attachment

983124983144983141 983123983156983151983154983161

e film begins with a shot of rain falling on a window pane983091 followed by ChrisKelvin (George Clooney) sitting pensively on his bed In voice-over we hear a woman say ldquoChris what is it I love you so much Donrsquot you love me any-morerdquo We then see him at work and infer that he is a therapist as we watch him

engage with patients Later he returns home and prepares a salad cutting hisfinger in the process

Two officials arrive and present him with a video message from an oldfriend Gibarian who pleads that Kelvin needs to come to a space stationorbiting the planet Solaris Gibarian also suggests that as a therapist Kelvin isideally situated to help out the crew as they attempt to deal with some as-yet-unexplained crisis1048628 We are then given our first glimpse of the bluish-purplishgaseous globe that is Solaris as we see Kelvinrsquos shuttle slowly dock with thespace station1048629

1048626 I donrsquot assume that my take on the film is an accurate reflection of all of Soderberghrsquos inten-tions Soderbergh discusses some of his intentions on the DVD commentary track as well as ininterviews One particularly informative interview with Soderbergh and Clooney can be foundat httpwwwscificomsfwissue9830909830971048627interviewhtml

983091 I suspect the appearance of rain here (and later) is a subtle reference to Tarkovskyrsquos less subtleemployment of rain in his version of Solaris

1048628 Gibarian actually goes further saying ldquoI hope you will come to Solaris Chris I think you needto You will see what I meanrdquo suggesting that Gibarian believed Kelvinrsquos encounter with a ldquovisi-torrdquo of his own may be somehow therapeutic

1048629 At this point Solaris is a bluish color As the film progresses we see the planet shi in color fromblue to purple to red















1048632



















983091 and so on








983091)








































































983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155


















1048632



















983091 and so on








983091)








































































983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155


















983091 and so on








983091)








































































983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155











983091)








































































983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















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983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















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983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















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983091 speaking to































983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161 983105983156983156983137983139983144983149983141983150983156 983137983150983140 983123983151983148983137983154983145983155














































983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155























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983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















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983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















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983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155






























983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155











983091


















































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155






































983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155











983124983144983141 983109983150983140983145983150983143













































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155









































983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155























983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155











983120983137983154983142983145983156 983137983150983140 983156983144983141 ldquo983125983150983145983149983152983151983154983156983137983150983139983141 983151983142 983113983140983141983150983156983145983156983161rdquo



































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155

































9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155


















9830911048624 Ibid 983090983089983088











































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155













































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155
































9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155

















9830911048631













983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155










983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150



















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155















983105983139983147983150983151983159983148983141983140983143983149983141983150983156983155






Documents

Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris