A theory about how a scientific psychology works (Watson,
Skinner) To be properly scientific, psychology must deal with what
can be observed, not what cannot Therefore, psychology should aim
only at the explanation and prediction of behaviour without
appealing to inner mental states Methodological behaviourism
Slide 3
A philosophical theory about what mental states are Talk about
the mind and mental states is talk about behaviour Rejecting
dualisms ghost in the machine (Ryle) Our psychological terms are
about what people do, and how they react This is a claim about what
mental states are, not just about how we know about them Logical
behaviourism
Slide 4
Behaviourism is a materialist theory: There is no mental
substance Mental states are analyzed in terms of behaviour, which
depends upon physical properties Simplest from: to be in mental
state x is to behave in way y E.g. To be in pain is to exhibit
pain- behaviour The basics
Slide 5
Objections Suppressed pain: Pain without pain behaviour Same
mental state can be expressed by different behaviour on different
occasions Many mental states, e.g. knowing French, are
dispositions, not occurrences
Slide 6
Mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain
ways (in certain circumstances) To be in pain is to be disposed to
cry out, nurse the injured part of the body Analytic behaviourism
Concepts that refer to mental states can be completely translated
(or reduced) into concepts that refer only to behaviour The
analysis
Slide 7
Ryle against dualism Ryle understands substance dualism (the
official doctrine) as claiming: the mind can exist without the
body; the body is in space and is subject to mechanical (physical)
laws, while the mind isnt; in consciousness and introspection, we
are directly aware of our mental states and operations in such a
way that we cannot make mistakes; and we have no direct access to
other minds, but can only infer their existence.
Slide 8
Ryle against dualism If this were right, our mental concepts
would refer to secret episodes in our minds We cant know whether a
mental description of someone is true unless they introspect and
tell us This makes using these concepts impossible
Slide 9
Psychological terms must be grounded on what is publicly
available Children can only learn to name and report their mental
states through interaction with others Other people must therefore
be able to identify the expression of mental states in our
behaviour The meaning of psychological terms
Slide 10
The category mistake Category mistake: To treat a concept as
belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually
belongs to E.g. Oxford university; team spirit The mind is not
another thing Mental concepts (of states and processes) do not
operate like physical concepts The para-mechanical hypothesis:
since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms,
mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical
processes
Slide 11
Dispositions How something will or is likely to behave under
certain circumstances E.g. solubility, being hard Mental concepts,
e.g. being proud, pick out a set of dispositions that are
indefinitely heterogenous But statements using mental concepts cant
be reduced to hypothetical statements about behaviour
Slide 12
Thinking How can an internal process like thinking quietly be a
disposition to behaviour? Reply: thinking is internalized speaking
Speaking is behaviour, and thinking is acquired later The silence
is inessential to the nature of thinking you can think out loud or
with pen and paper Thinking isnt just a disposition, but also an
occurrence Cp. it is dissolving It is still the basis for
attributing dispositions