Part I

Local Governments: Creation, Merger, Abolition and Powers

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

1987 Constitution

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,

cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the

Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and

accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective

mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their

powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and

removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to

the organization and operation of local units.

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.

Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to

component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their

prescribed powers and functions.

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to

levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,

consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to

the local governments.

Chapter 2, RA 7160 (Sec 6 – 10)

Sec. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a

province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang

panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial

jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

Comment: Congress has the power to create or abolish a province, city, municipality, or any other political

subdivision. The sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod has the power to create and abolish

barangays located within its territorial jurisdiction

Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its

conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected

capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government

facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the

local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction

of the local government unit concerned; and

(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local

government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical

descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its

populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the

National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Mariano v. Comelec (242 SCRA 211)

Facts: Petitioners assail the Constitutionality of RA 7859 on the ground that it did not properly identify the

land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bound.

Held: The petitioners in the case have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed

area of Makati (without metes and bounds) will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Congress has refrained

from using metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units.

Municipality of Jimnez v. Baz Jr. (265 SCRA 182)

Facts: EO 258 creating the Mun. of Sinacaban contained a technical description of its land area. Based on

said EO 258, Sinacaban claimed portions of several barrios previously thought to be part of the Mun. of

Jimenez. The latter Municipality asserted jurisdiction in the claimed portion on the basis of an agreement

entered into in 1950 with Sinacaban, approved by the Provincial Board.

Held: The technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipality’s territory staed in EO

258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Oriental is binding.

Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with

the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not

reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the

minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the

original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current classification prior to such division.

The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the

effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased

revenues as provided herein.

Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income,

population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its

creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to

Congress or to the sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or

barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.

Comment: The Code now lays down three important indicators of viability in the creation of local

government units namely: income, population and land area.

Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of

boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a

plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be

conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date

of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

Abbas v. COMELEC (179 SCRA 278)

Held: There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative region with the

Constitutional provision, requiring plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the

requirement of the plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or

barangays, not administrative regions.

City of Pasig v. COMELEC 314 SCRA 179

Facts: Karangalan Village petitioned that they be segregated from Brgy. Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig.

Plebiscite was scheduled but the Mun. of Cainta moved to suspend due to a pending case in RTC-Antipolo,

Rizal for settlement of boundary dispute.

Held: A case involving a boundary dispute between local government units presents a prejudicial question

which must first be decided before plebiscites for creation of proposed barangay maybe held.

ARTICLES AND REFERENCES

Public Corporations, Chapters 1-6 (Martin)

CHAPTER ONE: General Principles

A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the

powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. It exists only in

contemplation of law.

A corporation is a legal institution devised to confer upon the individuals of which it is composed powers,

privileges, and immunities which they would not otherwise possess, the most important of which are

continuous legal identity or unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the corporate name,

notwithstanding successive changes by death or otherwise, in the corporators or members.

Classes of corporations

1. Public— formed or organized for the government of a portion of a State for the accomplishment

of parts of its own public works. These are created by State either by special or general act.

2. 2. Private—formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end; organized wholly for the profit

and advantage of their own members and cannot constitutionally be granted governmental

powers. These are created by the will of the incorporators with the recognizance of the State.

Public vs Private— Consider as criterion the relation of the corporation to the State. If it is created by the

State as its own agency or instrumentality to help it carry out its governmental functions, then it is public.

Otherwise, it is private.

3. Quasi-public—private corporations that render public service or supply public wants; while

purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, the law requires them to discharge

functions for the public benefit (i.e. utility companies).

Private vs Quasi public— Consider as criterion the service the corporation renders to the public. If a

corporation performs a public sovereign power, even though its incorporators intend to obtain profits from

its undertaking, it is quasi-public.

Classes of public corporations

1. Quasi-Corporations—public corporations created as agencies of the State for a narrow and limited

purpose. They differ from other public corporations in that they do not possess the powers and

liabilities of self-governing corporations. Instead, their powers generally relate to matters of State,

and not municipal concerns. Thus, although they are public in nature, they cannot be strictly

considered municipal corporations because of their limited number of corporate powers and low

grade of corporate existence. The main purpose of their creation is to aid the State in, or to take

charge of, some public or state work other than community government for the general welfare.

2. 2. Municipal corporations

CHAPTER TWO: Nature, elements, kinds and history of municipal Corporations

A municipal corporation is a body politic constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or

town for the purpose of its local government. It is established by law partly as an agency of the State to

assist in the civil government of a country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs

of the city/town/district which is incorporated.

Courts regard these as subordinate branches of government of the State exercising delegated powers

(municipal administration as an instrumentality of state administration). Municipal corporations are granted

charters for the better government of particular areas or districts.

Municipal corporation vs public corporation—All municipal corporations are public corporations, but not

all public corporations are municipal corporations. Municipal corporations refer to incorporated villages,

towns, and cities with powers of local administration.

Elements:

1. A legal creation or incorporation;

2. A corporate name by which the legal entity is known and in which all corporate acts are done;

3. Inhabitants constituting the population invested with the political and corporate powers which are

exercised through duly constituted officers and agents;

4. Place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised.

Kinds:

1. Municipal Corporation Proper—incorporated cities/towns/villages invested with the power of

local legislation. These exist and are governed by their respective charters. Its distinctive purpose

and distinguishing feature is the power of local government.

2. Quasi-municipal corporation—same as a quasi-corporation, i.e. it operates directly as an agency

of the State to help in the administration of public functions.

Municipal corporation proper vs quasi municipal corporation— When invested with the power of local

government, the municipal corporation as an agency of the state becomes a municipal corporation proper.

Consider as criterion the voluntary or involuntary nature of the corporation; the existence or non-existence

of a charter; and whether the purpose of the corporation is solely a governmental agency or one for self-

government.

Municipal corporation proper vs quasi corporation— Both are agents of the state for limited and narrow

purposes but have different powers and liabilities. Municipal corporations proper are created either by the

direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing them while quasi corporations (also

called involuntary corporations) are only local organizations which, for purposes of civil administration, are

invested with some characteristics of corporate existence. They are local subdivisions of the state, created

by the sovereign legislative power of its own sovereign will and without any particular solicitation, consent

or concurrent action from the inhabitants (West Chicago Park Commissioners vs Chicago).

Purposes:

1. To serve as an agency or instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government

which the state cannot conveniently exercise (i.e. tax collection, assessment of property,

enforcement of police regulations)

2. To act as an agency of the inhabitants in the regulation and operation of municipal franchises and

public utilities, and the promotion and management of their local affairs (i.e. maintenance of

water system, ferries, wharves). In this character, they act as separate entities for their own

purposes and not as subdivisions of the State (Lidasan vs COMELEC).

Dual nature : Two-fold character:

1. Public—Municipal corporation acts as an agent of the State for the government of the territory

and inhabitants within the municipal limits. It exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of

the State.

2. Private—Municipal corporation acts as a business corporation with functions not strictly

governmental or political. It sees to the administration of local affairs which are beyond the

sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred (Villa vs City of

Manila, Surigao Electric Co. Inc. vs Municipality of Surigao).

Origin and history

England Municipal corporations can be traced back to the “farmer commonwealths” of the Teutons, and

each “wick,” “ham,” “stead,” or “tun” took its name form the winsmen who lived there.

United States Early American municipal corporations were similar to English municipalities of the 18th

century. Prior to the revolution, local governments in the nature of municipalities existed in the American

colonies by prescription, sovereign recognition or by virtue of special charters from the sovereign.

Philippines under the Spanish Regime The basic unit of local administration was the pueblo, composed

of numerous barrios, and governed by the cabeza de barangay, an honorific title continued by the Spaniards.

Towns were organized, under the government of a gobernadorcillo, also called capitan, who represented the

provincial governor as the arbiter of local questions, collected taxes, assisted the parish priest and

entertained visiting officials. He was assisted by tenientes (deputies), alguaciles (subordinate employees)

and chiefs of police. Elections for these municipal offices were held annually.

Barangays were administered by cabezas de barangay whose principal duties were to act as agents for the

collection of taxes. They paid no tribute on their own account and were members of the principalia, the

voting and privileged class. The position was originally hereditary and breaks were filled by appointments,

but eventually, the position became elective and service compulsory.

The Maura Law constituted a municipal council of 1 captain and 4 lieutenants, in charge of the active work

of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works and the details of taxation. These

positions were honorary, and each of the members was required to have special qualifications. The

Governor General, provincial council and provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the

council and its individual members.

Philippines under the American Regime General Order No. 43, series of 1899 first provided for the

government of municipalities. This was superseded by General Order No. 40, series of 1900, promulgated

by the Military Governor, supposedly to give the Filipino people the right to elect their municipal officers,

“only slightly restricted” by certain conditions. President McKinley’s instructions to the 2nd Philippine

Commission also directed the body to devote their attention to the establishment of municipal governments,

giving the “natives of the islands” the “opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of

which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of

their capacities and observation of the workings of native controls show to be consistent with the

maintenance of law, order and loyalty.”

The Philippine Commission passed Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, providing for the organization and

government of municipalities and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901, for the organization of provinces. These

were later modified in the Administrative Code.

CHAPTER THREE: Creation of Municipal Corporations

The power to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative, exclusive and practically unlimited.

Aside from the legislature, the President under his martial law powers can exercise legislative powers and

create municipal corporations.

In the absence of a Constitutional provision permitting it, this power cannot be delegated by the legislature

to any inferior or subordinate tribunal or board. However, it can pass a general law for the incorporation of

municipal corporations, giving the conditions on which they may be created, and determining whether such

conditions exist.

Certain conditions are needed in order to obtain a municipal corporation’s incorporation as a city or a town.

Such conditions may refer to extent of area, nature of the territory, the character of the land and the uses to

which it may be devoted, the number of inhabitants, and the density and location of the area to be

incorporated.

Creation of municipal corporations

In the Philippines, there is a general municipal law (Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code) under which

the municipalities in regularly organized provinces were organized and a special municipal law (Chapter 64

of the Administrative Code) under which municipalities in the specially organized provinces were

organized.

The legislature may, by special act organize chartered cities in the Philippines.

Under the Local Government Code, a barangay may be created, named, and its boundaries defined by an

ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod, subject to the approval of the

majority in a plebiscite called for the purpose by the COMELEC to be held in the units affected within such

a period of time as may be determined by the ordinance creating the said barangay.

Under Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President may by executive order define the

boundaries of any province, sub province, municipality or any political subdivision, and increase or

decrease the territory comprised therein, separate any political division other than a province into such

portion as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new

subdivision so created and change the seat of government within any subdivision, to such place as the

public welfare may require, provided that the authorization of Congress shall first be obtained whenever the

boundary of any province or sub-province is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more

sub provinces (**Note that this provision was later declared unconstitutional and repealed by RA No.

5185).

Municipality of Cardona vs Binangonan (36 Phil. 547) HELD: Sec 1 of Act No. 1748 which conferred upon

the Governor General the power to enlarge, constrict or otherwise change the boundary of a province, sub-

province, municipality or township does not constitute an abdication of legislative functions with regard to

this particular subject matter. It is simply transference of certain details with respect to provinces,

municipalities and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to rapid change both in

development and population. The proper regulation of this may require prompt action of such detailed

character as not to permit the legislative body to undertake efficiently.

Pelaez vs Gimenez (December 24, 1965)

HELD: Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation

of power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or

implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise. Although the last clause

of the first sentence of Sec. 68 gives the President the power to “change the seat of the government within

any subdivision to such place as the public welfare may require,” the phrase “as the public welfare may

require” qualifies not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of

government may be transferred.

Calalang vs Williams (70 Phil 726) and People vs Rosenthal (68 Phil 328) upheld public interest and

welfare as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of authority to execute a law. However, this doctrine

must be construed in the relation to the specific facts and issues involved in these cases, outside of which

they do not constitute precedents and have no bonding effect.

If the validity of the delegation of power in Sec 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal

impediment to statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything, which, in his opinion, may be

required by public welfare or interest. Such grant of authority would virtually be an abdication of power of

Congress in favor of the Executive.

The power of control under Sec 10(a) Art X of the Constitution (at the time) implies the right of the

President to interfere in the exercise of the discretion vested by law in the officers of the executive

departments, bureaus or offices, as well as to act in lieu of such offices. With respect to local governments,

the fundamental law permits the President to wield no more authority than of checking whether said local

governments or their officers perform their duties as provided by statute.

Essential requisites for the incorporation of Municipal Corporations

1. Territory

In the United States, it is within the power of the legislature, subject only to constitutional restrictions to

determine the nature and extent of the territory to be incorporated and to prescribe the minimum or

maximum area which may be incorporated. Aside from whatever restriction the constitution may impose,

the area incorporated must be contiguous.

2. Population

The Barrio Charter (RA 2370) specifies 500 as the minimum number of inhabitants required for the creation

of a barrio, and inasmuch as municipalities are composed of barrios, there should be at least 500 inhabitants

to comply with the requirement as to population.

3. Charter

The charter usually invests the people of the place with the power of local government, determines the form

of government of the municipal entity and defines its rights, powers and obligations. It is conferred for

political purposes.

The rule requiring assent of the inhabitants for incorporation of a municipal corporation to be effective is

not applicable in the Philippines. However, under the new Constitution, the creation of a political division

should be subject to the approval of majority of the votes cast in the units affected.

Municipal corporations may also exist through prescription. Its existence will be presumed in where it is

shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and

acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title

by prescription.

A corporation may exist in fact although not in point of law because of certain defects in some essential

features of its organization. It may be considered a de facto municipal corporation, if the following

requisites are complied with: 1) a valid law authorizing incorporation; 2) an attempt in good faith to

organize under it; 3) a colorable compliance with the law, and; 4) an assumption of corporate powers.

Municipality of Malabang vs Benito (March 28, 1968)

HELD: In cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the

statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that

there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. In the present case, the mere

fact that the municipality of Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated

cannot make it a de facto corporation, because independently of Sec 68 of the Administrative Code, there is

no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it is, in

legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Attack against the validity of incorporation

The validity of incorporation and the corporate existence of a municipal corporation may not be attacked

collaterally. It may be challenged only by the State in a direct proceeding such as quo warranto.

But this rule applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a public corporation. Where it is

neither a corporation de facto or de jure but a nullity, its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly

in any action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens

of territory incorporated unless they are estopped from doing so (Municipality of Malabang vs Benito).

The principle of estoppel applies to an individual who wants to attack the validity of incorporation of a

municipal corporation. Where an individual dealt with it and acquiesced in the exercise of its corporate

functions, or where he has entered into a contract with the said corporation, he may be estopped to deny its

corporate existence.

A person or private corporation may likewise be precluded by laches from attacking the validity of the

incorporation of a municipality.

Beginning of corporate existence

The legal existence of a municipal corporation is to be determined by the law creating it. However, where

the law is silent as to the beginning of its corporate existence, the rule is that this shall commence from the

moment the law or charter creating it becomes effective.

Under the Local Government Code, when a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence

shall commence upon the qualification of its executive and a majority of the member s of its legislative

body unless some other time is fixed therefor by law (Sec 6).

A distinction should be made between the creation of the corporation as a legal entity and the organization

of its government. The first should precede the second. The organization of the government of a municipal

corporation presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the said corporation at the time its

government is organized (Mejia vs Balolong, GR No L-1925, 1948).

Carreon vs Carreon (April 30, 1965)

HELD: The existence of the City of Dagupan as a corporate body is incompatible with the continued

existence of the municipal government of Dapitan. Sec 86 of RA 3811 creating the City of Dagupan out of

the municipality of Dapitan can only mean that the municipal officials become city officials upon approval

of the city charter. So when petitioners filed their certificates of candidacy for the positions in the city

government, they filed their certificates to the same positions that they were holding, and could not be

considered resigned therefrom under the old Election Code.

The existence of a municipal corporation may be proved by its record of incorporation or charter. In the

absence of a charter, its incorporation may be shown by parol evidence, at least to prove a de facto

existence. Its existence may also be shown by reputation or by long use of its corporate powers, or by

legislative grants necessarily implying a town corporation.

CHAPTER 4: Alteration and dissolution of Municipal Corporations

A municipal corporation cannot, without legal authorization, exercise its powers beyond its own corporate

limits. It is therefore necessary that it must have its boundaries fixed, definite and certain, in order that they

may be identified and that all may know the exact scope or section of territory and geographical division

embraced in the corporate limits and over which the local corporation has jurisdiction. An incorporation is

void where the boundaries of the municipal corporation are not described with certainty.

With respect to disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over areas or barangays, these shall be

heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province where the municipalities concerned are

situated. Where the areas or barangays in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different

provinces, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan involved shall jointly hear and decide the dispute. In case no

settlement is reached within 60 days from the date was referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

concerned, said dispute shall be elevated to the Regional Trial Court by the province which first took

cognizance of the dispute. The case shall be decided by the said court within 1 year from the start of the

proceedings and appeal may be taken from the decision within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules

of Court (Sec 79, Local Government Code).

Boundary disputes within barangays within the same city or municipality shall be heard and decided by the

Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned for the purpose of affording the parties an

opportunity to reach an amicable settlement. In case no amicable settlement is reached within 60 days from

the date the dispute was referred to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, the case shall be

heard and decided by the Regional Trial Court by the of the province or city where the barangays concerned

are located within 1 year from the start of court proceedings. Appeal may be taken decision within the time

and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court (Sec 80, Local Government Code).

In the absence of any Constitutional prohibition, the Congress may alter or dissolve municipal corporations

by:

1. fixing, altering, or changing the boundaries of municipal corporations for the purpose of enlarging

or decreasing its territory;

2. dividing a municipal corporation into 2 or more separate municipalities;

3. merging or consolidating 2 or more separate municipalities into 1;

4. annexing one municipality to another;

5. repealing its charter.

Effects of annexation or consolidation

1. On the legal existence of the territory annexed- Unless otherwise provided, the annexation of one

municipal corporation to another will dissolve the annexed territory.

2. On the laws and ordinances of the annexed corporations- In the absence of a provision to the

contrary, the annexed territory shall be become subject to the laws and ordinances by which the

annexing corporation is governed.

3. On the right of officers or employees of the annexed corporation to continue to hold their offices-

Subject to what the legislature provides upon annexation, the officers and employees of the

annexed territory shall terminate their official relation with their offices.

4. On the title to the property of the annexed territory- The annexing territory shall acquire title to

the property of the annexed territory at the time of the annexation unless the annexing statute

provides otherwise. When the annexed territory forms part of a municipality from which it is

taken, the legislature may provide for the payment of compensation for the indebtedness incurred

on account of the property taken. Public buildings and improvements in the annexed territory are

not required to be paid for by the annexing territory, as they have already been paid for by the

annexed territory. However, if any indebtedness on these exists, the annexing territory must be

required to share in the payment of said indebtedness.

5. On the debts and obligations of the annexed territory- Those contracted prior to the annexation

shall be assumed by the annexing territory in the absence of any provision to the contrary.

Effects of division

1. On the legal existence of the original corporation- The corporate existence of the original

municipality is extinguished.

2. On the property, powers and rights of the original corporation- Unless the law provides otherwise,

when a municipal corporation is divided into 2 or more municipalities, each municipality acquires

title to all the property, powers, rights and obligations falling within its territorial limits.

Limitations on the power to dissolve municipal corporations

1. by an express provision in the Constitution prohibiting the legislature to dissolve municipal

corporations;

2. those provisions in the Constitution affording protection to the rights, property and contracts of

the inhabitants.

Unless the Constitution has conferred such power, the courts have no power to dissolve municipal

corporations. However, they can declare the act of the legislature creating a municipal corporation illegal.

Municipal corporations cannot bring about their own dissolution by a mere surrender of their charter. A

municipal corporation is not ipso facto dissolved or destroyed by non-user of its powers in whole or in part,

or for its failure for a number of years to exercise the functions if a municipality. In such cases, the

municipal corporation would be suspended but not civilly dead, since its dormant functions could be

revived without action on the part of the sovereignty from which in theory of law, corporate life originally

came.

In the absence of a statute, a municipal corporation is not dissolved by the mere failure to elect or appoint

its officers and agents to conduct its government. The officers do not constitute a corporation. Rather, the

inhabitants of the designated locality are the corporators.

Vilas vs City of Manila (42 Phil 953)

HELD: The juristic identity of the corporation has in no wise been affected by the change of sovereignty,

and in law, the present city is in every legal sense the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to the

property and property rights of the predecessor corporation and is subject to all of its liabilities. The mere

change of the sovereign authority governing a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal

corporation organized under the former sovereign. Only such governmental functions as are incompatible

with the present sovereignty may be considered suspended.

Dissolution of a municipal corporation through the repeal of its charter or otherwise, without any provision

for reincorporation, destroys and puts an end to the existence of the corporation. Its territory and inhabitants

are then subject to such governmental functions as the State may impose subject to Constitutional

limitations.

CHAPTER FIVE: Legislative control and Executive supervision over Municipal Corporations

Limitations on legislative control

1. Constitutional Limitations

a. Those relating to the protection of private property

b. Those preventing the impairment of contractual obligations

c. Those prescribing a uniformity of law and prohibiting special or local legislation

2. Limitations depending on the nature of the rights and powers exercised by the municipality

a. a) In matters that relate to private powers or rights, the corporation is the agent of the

inhabitants, and is assumes the character and relations of private individuals, and it is

not subject to the absolute control of the legislature.

In matters that relate to public or governmental powers or rights, the corporation is the agent of the State

and is subject to its control.

Legislative control over the municipal charter

Unless prohibited by the Constitution, the charter, being a creation of the State may be modified, amended

or repealed by the legislature when it is deemed necessary or advisable (US vs Joson, 26 Phil 1)

Provisions of the charter relating to public or governmental matters do not constitute a contract within the

impairment clause of the Constitution, so the legislature has absolute power to amend or alter them at will.

Provisions of the charter granting rights, powers or privileges to the municipality for its own private interest

may be considered as a contract, falling within the protection of the impairment clause.

Legislative control over the form of government

The legislature can change the form of government of a municipal corporation since it is a mere incident of

their creation or existence, which the legislature has absolute and unlimited control over.

The right of local self government is not inherent in municipalities and the legislature has the absolute

power to deprive them of their rights to govern themselves in local affairs.

In order to deprive the people of the right of local self government or any power vested by law in the

municipality, it must be upon express terms of the legislature (City of Manila vs Manila Electric Railroad

and Light Co, 26 Phil 89).

Legislative control over municipal officers

Subject to the Constitution, the legislature has absolute discretion in providing for the manner of selection

and appointment of the officers to administer the public and governmental affairs of the municipal

corporation (i.e. justices of the peace, policemen), but the municipality may not be deprived of the right to

select the officers who will administer the private affairs of the municipality (i.e. caretakers of municipal

parks or streets). The distinction lies in the nature of their functions.

Legislative control over municipal property

Property which the municipality has acquired in its public or governmental capacity is under the complete

control of the legislature. The State, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw the power of the municipality

to hold and manage its property. It may take such property without compensation, conditionally or

unconditionally, despite protest from the citizens. It may require the municipality to spend its funds for the

acquisition and maintenance of such property and provide for any regulation for the use and management

thereof which it may deem to be for the public interest.

Property which the municipality acquired in its private or proprietary capacity is held by it in the same

character as a private individual. The legislature is subject to the constitutional restrictions when dealing

with such property and cannot control it, except through a valid exercise of police power or by taking of

private property upon payment of just compensation.

Clinton vs Rapids, et al (24 Iowa 465)

HELD: Public streets are not the private property of the city; it cannot alienate or use them for other than

legitimate purposes. And over the use of such property acquired, dedicated under the statutes to the public

use, the legislature, so far as regards the rights of public corporations, possesses an unlimited control and

therefore can divert the use of the same for some other public purposes. In this case, the legislature can

authorize the railroad company to lay its tracks on the streets of the city.

Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery vs City of Boston (153 Mass 509)

HELD: The legislature has no power to require the city to transfer the cemetery to the corporation without

compensation, because a cemetery is within the class of property which the city owns in its private or

proprietary character. Ownership of such class of property is protected under the Constitution in that it

cannot be taken without the payment of just compensation to the city.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga (March 28, 1968)

HELD: RA No 3039 which provides that all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former

Province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanaga are transferred to the city free of

charge, is valid insofar as it affects lots used as the capitol site, school site and its grounds, hospital and

leprosarium sites because they are truly private in nature. With respect to the 26 lots, the province of

Zamboanga del Norte cannot be deprived of its share in their value inasmuch as said lots are patrimonial

properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.

Legislative control over public utilities

Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, municipal regulations over the operation of a water, light or gas

company prevail against national or state regulations, because these involve the exercise of the proprietary

or business functions of the municipality. However, the service and rates of the public utility may be subject

to state regulation.

Legislative control over municipal contracts

Municipal contracts are regulated or controlled by the general legislation applicable to either all municipal

corporations created thereafter or existing ones. The legislature may prescribe the methods of making

municipal contracts or impose restrictions thereon by requiring bonds from the persons contracting with the

municipality. It may regulate municipal employment, such as by determining the number of working hours

of laborers.

Execution of municipal contracts is subject to the requirements and restrictions in Secs 606-608 of the

Revised Administrative Code.

Legislative control over municipal funds and revenues

The legislature has absolute control over the public revenues of a municipality such as those derived from

taxation. It may require the expenditure of these funds for public purposes, but it has no control over public

revenues over which the municipality or its creditors have already acquired a vested right. However, no

such right arises until after an actual appropriation is made.

The legislature may not control the private revenues of a municipal corporation because these posses the

character of trust funds equitably belonging to the inhabitants.

CHAPTER SIX: Executive and Ministerial supervision over Local Governments

The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments to ensure that local affairs are

administered according to the law. General supervision includes the power to order an investigation of the

conduct of local government officials when necessary. This general supervision shall be exercised primarily

through the Ministry of Local Government (now the DILG).

There is a difference between control and supervision. Supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that his subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as

prescribed by law if they should fail to perform those duties. Control means the power of an officer to alter,

modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute

the judgment of the former for the latter (Mondano vs Silvosa, 51 OG 3427).

This power of general supervision does not authorize the President to remove or suspend a local official

without any ground or on grounds not authorized by law (Planas vs Gil, 67 Phil 62).

Lacson vs Roque (49 OG 93)

HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of the City of Manila on the ground of a pending charge against him for

libel was illegal because it was not based on grounds provided for in law. To be a misconduct in office, the

act must be committed in relation to the performance of his duties.

Jover vs Borra (49 OG 2765)

HELD: The act of the President when, for not valid reasons, he relieved the Mayor of Iloilo City of his

office and designated an Acting Mayor in his stead, is illegal. Although the office of the mayor is

appointive, Congress fixed the term of office of the Mayor to 6 years, and this implies that the said officer

can continue in office until the expiration of his term unless removed for cause as provided by law. The

President’s action in this case amounted to an assertion of absolute control and not merely supervision.

Mondano vs Silvosa (supra)

HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of Mainit, Surigao by the Provincial Governor under an alleged authority

of the President pending the hearing of charges of rape and concubinage is illegal because the charges

preferred against him were not based on grounds provided for by law. The alleged act of the Mayor did not

involve misconduct in office. Neither was he convicted yet of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government, Chapters 1-3 (Agra)

CHAPTER ONE: Nature of Local Governments

Local Government Unit is a political subdivision constituted by law, possessing substantial control over its

own affairs.

In a unitary system of government, it is an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, and is not

intended to be imperium in imperio (empire within an empire). The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not

prescribe federalism. Autonomy does not contemplate the creation of mini-states.

A Chartered City is a political body corporate, endowed with faculties of municipal corporations exercised

through its city government in conformity with law and its proper corporate name; may sue and be sued,

enter into contracts and be contracted with.

No plebiscite is necessary when creating a national government agency such as the Metropolitan Manila

Development Authority (MMDA). Plebiscite is only required for the creation of local government units.

Dual nature/Two-Fold powers of Local Governments

1. Public, Governmental or Political – springs from sovereignty; exercised in administering the

powers of the State and promoting public welfare; include legislative, judicial, public and political

aspects

Public character as regards the State: agent of the government

2. Corporate, Private or Proprietary – arising from existence as legal persons, not as public agencies;

exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community; include ministerial, private and

corporate aspects

Private character as regards the State: promote local necessities and convenience for its own community

LGU’s as agents and delegates of the National government

Municipal Corporations (MC) derive their powers and rights from the legislature – they can only exercise

delegated legislative powers conferred by Congress as the national lawmaking body, therefore they cannot

defy Congress’ will, nor modify or violate it. As agents, they are vested with the power of subordinate

legislation, wherein the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise higher powers.

MC’s have no power to impose tax on nat’l gov’t instrumentalities, or otherwise retard, impede, burden or

in any manner control the operations of constitutional law enacted by Congress to execute powers vested in

the nat’l gov’t. Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat national policies.

Exercise of governmental functions

As agencies of the State, MC’s enjoy sovereign immunity from suit when engaged in governmental

functions. However, they are subject to suit even in the performance of these functions if their charter so

provides.

Under the Real Property Tax Code, LGU’s have no choice but to collect real property tax – this means it is

the national government expressing itself through the legislative branch that is levying the tax. The LGU’s

are merely constituted as agents to fix the rates.

As agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government, MC’s are endowed

with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.

The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercises administrative control and supervision over

PNP officers and members while local chief executives exercise operational supervision and direction.

Since the latter are only acting as representatives of NAPOLCOM, they are answerable to the former for

their actions. However, unless the acts of the local executives are countermanded by NAPOLCOM, their

acts are considered valid and binding. Although mandatory, deputization of local executives is not

automatic and self-executory – it requires a formal act of the NAPOLCOM.

Delegated powers of local governments (not inherent)

1. Police Power – inherent in the State, but not MC’s; valid delegation by Nat’l Legislature

necessary, since the latter is the repository of the inherent powers of the State

2. Power to Tax – must always yield to a legislative act; however, may be exercised pursuant to the

direct authority conferred by the 1987 Philippine Constitution

3. Power of Eminent Domain – conferring statues cannot be broadened or constricted by implication

As agents of the community

Municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion

or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular statute and therefore to pass the appropriate

ordinance to attain the object of the law.

Although the general law requires a majority vote in enacting ordinances, sanggunian may provide for

higher requisite vote in amending specific ordinances.

Corporate existence of LGU’s

Municipality [created under E.O. 265 (1949), later declared unconstitutional] which has performed

governmental acts and been given State recognition and acknowledgment is a regular de jure municipality.

[LGC of 1991 cured defect by stating that municipal districts organized pursuant to E.O.’s and presidential

issuances, which have their respective seats of office at the the of the Code’s effectivity are to be considered

regular de jure municipalities.]

Attack on legal existence of a body politic:

Quo Warranto – must be timely filed; quo warranto suit against corporation for forfeiture of charter must be

commenced within 5 years from time that act complained of was done or committed.

Any other direct proceeding which must be brought in the name of the Republic.

To change the name of a local government unit, a plebiscite is required to be conducted in the unit or units

directly effected. Cannot be effected by mere resolution of sanggunian.

Since the LGC is silent, sanggunian panlalawigan has no authority to change the name of its province –

authority lies with Congress.

Territorial jurisdiction of political subdivisions

Definition of territorial boundaries of LGU is a standard provision of the law creating them. Such

provision, however, is not a grant of ownership of National Gov’t properties within the boundaries to the

LGU. Jurisdiction refers to the sphere of political authority, not the area of ownership. An express grant is

necessary to effect transfer of ownership.

Council sessions must be conducted within territorial jurisdiction, except for instances such as lahar having

wiped out the barangay.

Punong barangay cannot alter boundaries on his/her own.

Power of LGU’s to issue fishing privileges in the municipal waters was granted for revenue purposes.

Commercial fishing operation within the 15-km. area of municipal waters is not prohibited provided: (a)

activity is not undertaken in water areas within7 km. from shoreline; (b) allowed only in waters 7 or more

fathoms deep.

CHAPTER TWO: Local Autonomy and Centralization

Local autonomy is not the same as decentralization. Local autonomy can only mean a measure of

decentralization of functions of government.

Decentralization – devolution of national administration to the local levels in which local officials remain

accountable to the central gov’t in the manner law may provide.

LGU is autonomous in the sense that is is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resource.

Power which used to be highly centralized is thereby deconcentrated.

Two levels of decentralization:

1. Decentralization of Administration/Administrative Autonomy – central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisions to achieve the ff. purposes:

broaden local power base

make units more responsive and accountable

ensure full development of local governments as self-reliant communities

break the monopoly of National Government over managing local affairs

relieve National Government from the burden of managing local affairs

Role of the President: general supervision, only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to

law. He/She has no control over their acts in the sense that he/she can substitute their judgments with

his/her own.

Administrative Autonomy primarily pertains to: power and responsibility to deliver basic services

2. Decentralization of Power/Political Autonomy – involves abdication of political power in favour

of LGU’s; autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with

minimum intervention from central authorities; amounts to “self-immolation”.

Autonomous government becomes accountable to constituency, not central authorities.

President of the Republic

Omission of phrase “as may be provided for by law” in relation to power of general supervision over

LGU’s in 1987 Constitution merely serves to underscore LGU’s autonomy from Congress and to break the

latter’s control over local government affairs. Basic law did not intend to deprive legislature of all authority

over municipal corporations, particularly concerning discipline.

Department Secretaries

Secretary of Justice – review and revoke tax ordinances with regard to constitutionality or legality; cannot

substitute own judgment nor replace the same with another version nor declare it unjust, excessive,

oppressive or confiscatory since they involve exercise of judgment or discretion as to wisdom and

reasonableness; power is of supervision, not control

Secretary of DILG – administrative supervision over local gov’t units; need not confirm the decision of a

local chief executive imposing penalty of removal against appointive officials

Congress

Retains control of the LGU, although in significantly reduced degree under present Constitution. Basic

rel’p between national legislature and local governments has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in

1987 constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.

Local autonomy not self-executing

It is subject to the passage of a local government code, local tax law, income distribution legislation and

national representation law.

Interpretations in favor of decentralization

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favour of centralized power in Malacanang and the

other beneficial to local autonomy, scales must be weighed in favour of the latter. (Should be resolved in

favour of the greater economy of the local government.)

The power to review must be guided by a liberal construction in favour of the supervised/lower LGU and in

consonance with the principles of local autonomy.

“The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that

they enjoy.”

Fiscal autonomy

Pursuant to fiscal autonomy granted to LGU’s, and although the LGC is silent as to the placement of idle or

excess funds, the sanggunian may authorize the investment, placement in time deposit or any judicious

utilization of such funds as far as general funds are concerned.

Incidents of decentralization

Under the principle of local autonomy, even though the power to abolish an office is not expressly

conferred on provincial governments, it is necessarily implied from the power to create offices.

R.A. 5185, which gives mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out of city funds, and B.P.

337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint all officers and employees of the city were

not meant to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers – rather, they underscore the transfer

of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments

and to highlight local autonomy.

LGU’s enjoy full autonomy in the operation and management of economic enterprises, such as public

markets. A sanggunian may provide for a different scheme of allocating market stalls.

LGU’s may not provide for allowances to judges assigned within a given locality since this would counter

the spirit of R.A. 6758, which standardizes the salaries of government personnel.

LGU cannot create its own government owned or controlled corporation to provide basic services, since

only Congress may create such corporation by special law. Also, it is the function of the LGu to provide

such services.

Department of Agriculture may opt to devolve the function of regulating the operation of commercial

fishing vessels within municipal waters, in consonance with the spirit of local autonomy, to LGU’s.

Centralization and national integration

Office of the President

When Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections are not conducted in certain areas, the President may appoint

SK officials in exercise of his/her residual powers and the power to appoint other officers of the government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided.

Ordinances enacted by local legislative bodies must not be repugnant to or in conflict with existing

Administrative Orders or local budget circulars issued by the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) for

gov’t employees and officials.

Classification or reclassification of public forest land is a prerogative of the President upon

recommendation of the pertinent department head.

Additional compensation outside the purview of R.A. 6758 (ex. medical benefits) only allowable if

approved by President via administrative order.

Sangguniang panlalawigan cannot authorize grant of representation and transportation allowance to all

division chiefs (divisions only components of departments/offices) of the provincial gov;t, since it violates

Admin. Order 42 (clarifying role of DBM; only allows grant of benefit to department heads or asst.

department heads).

Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

No local elective may be suspended during election period except upon prior written approval of the

COMELEC.

Omnibus Election Code states that LGU’s must share in expenses for the election of barangay officials,

therefore COMELEC may direct compliance therewith.

Commission on Audit (COA)

Approval by COA of disbursements of local funds relates to administrative aspect of the matter of the

officials’ accountability, but does not foreclose Ombudsman’s authority to investigate and determine WON

there is a crime to be prosecuted for which he/she is accountable. Compliance with COA rules and

regulations does not necessarily mean that misappropriation of public funds was not committed.

COA has power to compromise or release any unsettled claim or liability whenever government interest

requires.

Disposal of unserviceable property through public auction does not need approval by COA, but those

disposed of through negotiated sale does.

In consonance with its constitutional mandate as guardian of public funds, disposal of real property owned

by LGU shall be subject to approval of COA regardless of value or cost involved and mode of divestment,

even if Committee on Awards determines floor price that is disadvantageous to the LGU.

In exercise of its contract review functions, COA may direct the adoption of the BIR zonal valuation if it is

a more reasonable selling price as compared to the highest available bid during the public auction.

COA may employ the services of private appraisers to determine the value of real property sought to be

sold if the amount involved is substantial and the transaction is the subject of investigation by the Office of

the Ombudsman.

Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Has the power to approve or disapprove appointments set before it by inquiring into the eligibility of the

person, but does not have the power to make appointments itself or to direct the appointing authority to

change employment status of an employee, otherwise this will amount to an arrogation of power belonging

to appointing authority.

May accredit an LGU, subject to certain requirements where appointments of local officials are no longer

subject to CSC approval.

Cannot nullify a board resolution calling for a reorganization in the local government offices – CSC has

jurisdiction only insofar as the implementation of the reorganization is concerned. Proper forum to assail

resolution are the regular courts (RTC’s).

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

General supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.

Application for authority to travel abroad by all local officials and employees (other than governors, city

mayors or highly urbanized and independent component cities) shall be approved by the Secretary. Failure

to obtain authority ma constitute gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

It is the governor that has authority to impose preventive suspension against a respondent municipal elective

official. DILG has to authority to impose such suspension.

DILG shall be the lead national government agency to oversee/administer national government assistance to

local government units in the implementation of devolved infrastructure programs.

[NOTE: a basic element that determines centralization is that the effects of the concerns of a particular

department are not confined to a particular region – rather, they can be felt on a nationwide scale]

Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Telecommunications Office

(TELOF)

Cannot devolve its regional office functions to the LGU’s, considering the interdependence of various

telecom systems on a nationwide scale.

Land Transportation Office (LTO)

Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)

Department of Environment and National Resources (DENR)

Concerned with enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations, and the protection, development and

management of forest lands.

DENR retains power of control over activities concerning community-based forestry projects

(notwithstanding fact of devolution), being the national agency authorized by the Administrative Code of

1987 to protect and preserve the environment, which is a constitutional mandate. Therefore, its power

cannot be encroached upon by LGU.

Department of Justice (DOJ) (role of Secretary of Justice discussed above)

Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

Department of Finance (DOF)

Secretary of Finance is the proper appointing authority for treasurers, and the proper disciplining authority

to issue preventive suspension.

Local legislative councils are bereft of authority to initiate administrative action against the treasurer.

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

General supervision over the implementation of the National Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction

over the decisions and order of the local building officials remains with the Secretary of Public Works and

Highways.

Local chief executive possesses the authority to appoint an engineer who shall also act as local building

official.

Department of Energy (DOE)

Department of Agriculture (DA)

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)

Public Estates Authority (PEA)

Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)

Local autonomy and the judicial system

The exercise of an authority or a power by a local government unit may be judicially inquired into and

corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due

process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.

Internal acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII, which enjoyed administrative autonomy are

subject to the jurisdictionof the courts.

Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the power of eminent domain and to

determine whether there is genuine necessity therefor.

Courts, not the CSC, are the proper forum to assail and seek nullification of a resolution for reorganization

in the local government offices. CSC has jurisdiction only insofar as the implementation of the

reorganization is concerned.

Provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays

These LGU’s enjoy administrative autonomy. The 1987 constitution ensures the autonomy of local

governments and political subdivisions, and limits the President’s power to general supervision over local

governments.

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant of political autonomy (according to Cordillera

Broad Coalition vs. COA).

Registration of motor vehicles whose effects are not confined to a region should not be devolved to the

ARMM and should remain with the LTO.

CAB has no authority to devolve or share any of its general and specific functions with the ARMM in the

regulation of all entities engaged in air transportation or air commerce. However, ARMM may assist CAB

in the performance of its functions.

Regional government of ARMM may not enact a Regional Public Works Act which will absolutely

dispense with public bidding since this would be contrary to public policy in the prosecution of public

undertakings.

May not also enact a Regional Police Force Law.

Employee of Sothern Philippines Development Authority may refuse to be transferred to the ARMM and

may claim and be entitled to separation pay. Cannot be obligated to transfer because of constitutional

prohibition against involuntary servitude.

Permanent vacancies in the Sangguniang Bayan within a province situated in ARMM are filled by the

provincial governor, not regional governor.

Cordillera Autonomous Region

Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant of political autonomy. (according to

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA)

CHAPTER THREE: Devolution

Devolution – a mandatory process premised on the constitutional mandate that all local government units

possess and enjoy local autonomy

E.O. 503 effectively extends the period of devolution from 6 months as provided for in the LGC to 1 year in

order to accommodate the smooth transition and address difficulties in the devolution process.

Powers devolved to LGU’s

Specific grant necessary – the enumeration of powers and services under sec. 17 of the LGC is not

exclusive

Power to discipline locally assigned national employees cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the

municipal council (ex. fire personnel are under Bureau of Fire Protection of DILG, fire protection not being

a devolved function)

Devolution has a corresponding effect on local budgeting processes.

Although regulation of cockfighting has been devolved to local governments, a municipal government

cannot issue a permit to a promoter to hold cockfights in places other than a licensed cockpit, since this

would violate the law.

Ports which are vital to the national interest and security which are linked to each other are expressly

excluded from the coverage of devolution.

Implementation of locally-funded communal irrigation projects (CIP) shall be devolved to LGU’s. The

allocation for locally funded CIP’s will no longer be released to the National Irrigation Administration

(NIA) as a consequence of devolution. However, foreign-assisted CIP’s fall outside the coverage of

devolution.

Licensing and regulation of activities undertaken by travel agencies, tour operators and professional

congress organizers should be transferred to LGU’s.

There is partial devolution in terms of the functions of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).

The functions devolved are the promotion, organization and development of cooperatives. CDA retains the

powers relating to registration of cooperatives and the issuance of rules and regulations, policies and

guidelines.

General supervision over the implementation of the National Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction

over the decisions and order of the local building officials remains with the Secretary of Public Works and

Highways.

With regard to the compensation and position classification system, the Joint Commission on Local

Government Personnel Administration was abolished and transferred to the appropriate office in the CSC.

Absorption of personnel

Devolution does not only involve the delegation of the powers to regulate but also the transfer of the

necessary assets and personnel.

Objectives

To ensure the administrative and technical capabilities of the LGU’s to provide the devolved

basic services and facilities at the local level

To ensure that the delivery of basic services is not duly prejudiced or disrupted.

Incidents of absorption

Re-appointment of an employee to the same position held prior to the reorganization constitutes a

reconsideration of any previous objection to his/her earlier appointment.

CSC has no power to disapprove appointments made to those already employed but subsequently devolved.

Devolved personnel do not lose their security of tenure. Even without appointment, they shall continue to

hold the position to which they were last appointed.

Exceptions

Not administratively viable – there is a duplication of functions when the duties and responsibilities of

national government agency personnel are similar to those of incumbent local government employees, and

their offices perform the same functions.

However, this does not apply to a national employee who is responsible for or attached to a devolved asset

(ex. drivers of devolved agencies). The LGU and National Gov’t may invoke this provision if both agree as

to the duplication, but LGU may still opt to absorb the employee.

Involuntary servitude – employee may refuse to be transferred and may claim separation pay.

Appointment not renewed – an appointment not renewed by the DBM prior to the completion of the 6-

month process cannot be re-appointed on the basis alone of the city government affected

Devolved personnel are considered local government personnel and should be covered by the existing

Position Classification and Pay Plan. There shall be no diminution in pay or benefits, therefore they may

continue to enjoy higher rates than their counterparts. Gradual equalization of salaries of all local

government personnel must then be achieved to eliminate (or at least minimize) the aforesaid disparity. To

achieve this, LGU’s lower than special cities and first class provinces may adopt the salary schedule for

higher LGU’s subject to the following conditions:

LGU is financially capable

Salary schedule shall be uniformly applied

Schedule of the highly urbanized cities and first class provinces shall not be higher than that

adopted by the national government

In implementing a new and higher salary schedule, the salary grade allocation of positions and

salary steps of personnel shall be retained

Adoption shall be subject to budgetary and general limitations on Personal Service Expenditures

(Secs. 324-325, LGC)

In case of component cities and municipalities, schedule shall not be higher than that of the

province or city where they belong

Adoption of higher salary schedule shall not alter existing classification of LGU concerned

LGU’s may grant allowances/additional compensation to national government employees assigned in their

localities at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations, subject to the following conditions:

Annual income or finances of LGU as certified by the local treasurer concerned will allow such

grant without exceeding the general limitations for personal services

Budgetary requirements (Sec. 324 of LGC and R.A. 6758) have been satisfied and provided fully

in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative

LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the LGC

The mandatory absorption does not preclude affected LGU’s from creating equivalent positions nor

conferring functions different from the position previously held by the devolved employeee provided there

is no diminution of pay and benefits, reduction in rank and impairment of tenure. Assignment of devolved

personnel is an administrative decision of the LGU.

A local chief executive may appoint one person or a committee to investigate, hear, make findings and

submit recommendations incidental to administrative complaints against erring appointive local officials,

including devolved personnel.

Transfer of assets

Assets transferred to LGU’s pursuant to devolution cannot be recovered since the transfer is mandatory.

However, a provincial government may continue funding a general hospital until the same is officially

transferred to the DBM. Since devolved hospitals have become components of LGU’s like other devolved

national government agencies, they shall be covered by COA Circular No. 92-382.

Memoranda of Agreement to effect devolution

To effect devolution, a MOA must be effected between a National Government Agency and local

governments concerned. The local chief executive, in order to enter into an agreement, must have the

authority of the local legislative council. The DILG cannot revoke such agreement, rule on the alleged

diminution of powers, nor pass upon the merits of the contents and provisions of the agreement.

Oversight Committee

The OC is the body empowered to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for

the efficient and effective implementation of all provisions of the LGC. Opinions rendered by it shall

prevail over those of the DOJ.

The DOJ is bereft of authority to review or pass upon the rulings of the OC, unless the latter itself requests.

The OC, however, cannot expand nor constrict the law. It must always remain congruent to it. A resolution

adopted by the OC is devoid of legal force and effect unless approved by the President and subsequently

incorporated or embodied in an executive or administrative order.

Alfiler

See attachments

Tapales

See attachments

CREATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Tan v. Comelec

BP 885 (an Act creating a new province of Negros del Norte) was enacted. It provides for the new

province’s component cities, boundaries, and the conduct of a plebiscite for its creation. A plebiscite was

held, pursuant to the requirement of said BP (“shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are

the areas affected”), but the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of the new

province, to the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province. (Negros Occidental – some cities and

municipalities of Negross Occidental = Negros del Norte)

WON the petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of the plebiscite renders the case moot and

academic because the result was in favor of the creation of the new province and such creation was now fait

accompli.

HELD: No.

It is the legality of the plebiscite itself which is challenged.

WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement.

HELD: No.

Sec 3, Art XI provides that “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the

local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or

units affected”. This means that the rest of Negros Occidental must be included in the conduct of plebiscite

as the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily substantially altered by

the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province.

WON the new province complied with the requirements of land area.

HELD: No.

Sec 197 of the LGC provides that “a province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand

five hundred square kilometers, xxx. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more

islands.” The use of the word territory clearly, reflects that it has reference only to the mass of land area and

excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. It can be safely concluded that the word

territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only.

Torralba v. Municipality of Sibagat

BP 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners

assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution: “No province, city,

municipality, or barrio may be created … except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local

Government Code…”; that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of any

province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC [came into being only on 10 February 1983] had

yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any

criteria when the Municipality was created.

HELD: Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the modification of territorial and

political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It does not say that the LGC is a condition sine qua

non for the creation of a municipality. The constitutional provision simply means that once said Code is

enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of LGUs should conform with the criteria thus laid down.

The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional

limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient

administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid exercise of legislative

power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Pursuant to BP 56, a valid

plebiscite has been conducted among the unit/s affected. The officials of the new Municipality have taken

their oaths and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has been created.

Bai Sema v. Comelec

WON RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,

municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

WON a province (created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201) is entitled to one

representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district

for such province

HELD: No.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the

same time the power to create a legislative district. Congress cannot delegate to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives.

Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to

reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. However,

under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or

municipalities.

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power

to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation

under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the

express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the

question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,

cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of

the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is

followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,

shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the

Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city

whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the

immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),

Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the

same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative

district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also

the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000

involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the

city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city

inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

On 8/5/08, the government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the

Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 in Malaysia.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same

contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect

human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain

from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive

agenda are on-going.

WON the creation of the MOA-AD violates the Petitioners right to information on matters of public

concern

HELD:

(a) The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the people at large

(b) The right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction

(c) The right includes (1) the right of the people to demand information and (2) the duty of the

officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.

(d) E.O No 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”

consultations, and such establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda,

corollary to the Constitutional right.

(e) Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion

when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s

right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.

1. E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local

levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential

Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,

comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

2. The Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before

any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may

call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented

therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests

ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically

result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total

environment.

3. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut

procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other

things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural

Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department

or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by

mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the

specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive

secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the

official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Lopez v. Comelec

WON PD 824 (enacted November 1975) creating Metropolitan Manila is valid.

HELD: Yes.

In Paredes v. Executive Secretary the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in

the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the

barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite

held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not

a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen

municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional

provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such

plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan

Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for the

dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of

Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the

creation of Metropolitan Manila.

Under PD 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under

the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the

President shall have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the

Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it

confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly exercises under the present

Constitution over the ministries. His power over local governments does not go that far. It extends no

further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision.

Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. To show

fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the

constitution enters into and forms part of every statute. Accordingly, the presidential power of control over

acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character.

Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to

local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Alvarez v. Guingona

RA 7720 converted the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city. Petitioners

claim that the said municipality has not met the minimum average annual income required under the LGC.

They assert that Internal Revenue Allotments are not actually income but merely transfers and/or budgetary

aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like

population, land and equal sharing.

Another contention of the petitioner is that RA 7330 originated not from Congress but from the Senate.

Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading,

the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed

on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The committee

recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill

was identical to the senate bill.

HELD:RA 7720 is valid.

Internal Revenue Allotments are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of funds of

the LGU. They are included in computing the average annual income required to become a city. The IRA’s

regularly and automatically accrues to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of

the LGU. Thus they constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of

much needed funds.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not

contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of

Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Nor does

the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill

from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality It is a well-

entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.

Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal

breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity

must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

A. Governmental powers and functions

Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme

A collision occurred involving (1) a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate

of Macario Nieveras, (2) a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino

Velasquez and (3) a dump truck of the petitioner Municipality of San Fernando and driven by Alfredo

Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they

sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries.

HELD: the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was

then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the

municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. The municipal corporations exist in a

dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and

while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their

officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public

functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In

the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their

existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such

functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or

sovereign power."

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the

competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in

the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were

acting in a proprietary capacity.

The driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get

a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets. In the absence of any evidence

to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the municipality

cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the

discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may

be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation

B. Proprietary powers and functions

City of Manila v. IAC

Vicencio Sto. Domingo, deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Domingo was buried in a lot of the North

Cemetery which lot was leased by the City of Manila to Irene from 1971 to 2021. Irene paid the full rental

thereof. In January of 1978, the cemetery authorities exhumed and removed the remains of Vivencio from

the lot which were then placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cementery. When Irene went to the

cemetery for All Souls Day, she was shocked to learn that the remains of her husband were not anymore in

the lot as the same had been rented out to another lessee.

HELD: The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of

municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and its

proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are two fold

in character, public, governmental or political on one hand, and corporate private and proprietary on the

other hand.

The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the

Municipal Board. The City of Manila prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the disposition of burial

lots and plots within the cemetery through Admin. Order No. 5, s.1975. With said acts of dominion, the

cemetery is no doubt within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private

character.

There is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligation

arising from contracting parties. Thus, a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law

between them. Therefore a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no

penalty of such breach is prescribed in the contract.

Hence, the breach of a contractual obligation between the City of Manila and plaintiff, involving property

which is patrimonial in character entitles the latter to damages.

Part II

Decentralization; Local Autonomy; Powers of Municipal

Corporations

ARTICLES/REFERENCES

Public Corporations, Chapters IV – VII (Martin)

Chapters IV – VI, see above

CHAPTER SEVEN: Powers of municipal corprorations

Sources of Powers of Municipal Corporations:

1. Constitution

2. Statutes of the State

3. Charter

4. In some states which adhere to it, the doctrine of the inherent right of self-government, with

respect to certain municipal matters

Classification of municipal powers

1. Express Powers – are those granted in express word by the special charter or the general law

under which the corporation is organized

2. Implied Powers – are those powers which arise by natural implication from the grant of express

powers or by necessary inference from the purposes or functions of the corporation

3. Inherent Powers – are those which are necessary and inseparable from every corporation, and

which come into existence as a matter of course as soon as a municipality is created. They are the

common-law powers of a corporation

4. Legislative Power – is the authority to make laws. This power is generally vested in the common

council.

5. Executive Power – is the authority to enforce laws, or appoint the agents charged with the duty of

such enforcement; generally vested in the mayor and the heads of the designated departments and

other officers created by law.

Chapter II Book I , LGC (Sec 6 – 24)

Sec 6 – 10, see above

Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities

The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government from

where governmental and corporate services shall be delivered.

Factors relevant in selection of seat of government: geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of

transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress,

and other relevant considerations.

Transfer of seat of government:

• When conditions and developments in the LGU concerned have significantly changed

• Public hearing and two-thirds vote of all the members of the Sanggunian

• No transfer shall be made outside the territorial boundaries of the LGU.

• The old site and improvements thereon may be disposed of by sale or lease or converted

to such other use as the Sanggunian concerned may deem beneficial to the LGU

concerned and its inhabitants.

Transfer, relocation, and conversion to other uses of local government offices and facilities:

• Public hearings conducted for the purpose

i. Concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian

Sec. 12. Government Centers.

Government center - where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, LGUs, or

government-owned or controlled corporations may be located.

LGUs, in designating such a center, shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local

agencies and offices which may serve as the government center.

The National Government, LGU, or government-owned or controlled corporation concerned shall bear the

expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.

Sec. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and Structures.

By the Sanggunian

Of LGUs, public places, streets, and structures within their territorial jurisdiction (see below for

detailed list)

In consultation with PHC

o In changes of name of public schools, upon recommendation of the local school board

o In changes of names of publc hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities, upon

recommendation of the local health board

With notice to the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned,

and the Bureau of Posts

Ratified in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected

Limitations:

Cannot be named after a living person

Justifiable reason

Not oftener than once in ten years

The name of a LGU or a public place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic

significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the Sanggunian concerned and

in consultation with the PHC.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may change the names of the following:

Component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned

(i.e., Sanggunian of the component city and municipality

Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges

Public vocational or technical schools and other post-secondary and tertiary schools

Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities

Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government.

The Sanggunians of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities (i.e., component cities whose

charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials) may change the names of the

following:

City barangays, upon the recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned

City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges

Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community colleges and non-

chartered colleges

City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities

Any other public place or building owned by the city government.

The Sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may change the names of the following:

City and municipal barangays, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned

City, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges

City and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, post-

secondary and other tertiary schools

City and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities

Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government.

Sec. 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence.

An LGU’s corporate existence commences upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a

majority of the members of its Sanggunian, UNLESS some other time is fixed therefor by the law or

ordinance creating it.

Sec. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units.

Every LGU is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with

law.

As such, LGUs exercise powers…

as a political subdivision of the National Government

as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory

Sec. 16. General Welfare.

Every LGU shall exercise powers…

expressly granted

necessarily implied therefrom

necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance

essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

LGUs shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote

health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the

development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,

enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain

peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

LGUs shall…

endeavor to be self-reliant and continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and

functions currently vested upon them

discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them

pursuant to the LGC

exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are

necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and

facilities

Basic services and facilities (not an exclusive list)

For Barangays

Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation

of farm produce collection and buying stations

Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and day-

care center

Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste

collection

Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay

Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems

Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center,

and other similar facilities

Information and reading center

Satellite or public market, where viable

For Municipalities

Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities

which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seedling materials for

aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut,

and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and

improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives

inter-barangay irrigation systems; water and soil resources utilization and conservation projects;

and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves

Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,

implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry

programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forest with an area not

exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest

development projects

Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of the LGC, health services which include the

implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and

communicable and non-communicable disease control services; access to secondary and tertiary

health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the

services herein enumerated

Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family

and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons;

community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers,

juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition

services; and family planning services

Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and

marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library

Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities

related to general hygiene and sanitation

Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and

other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities

Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality

and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads and

bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics,

health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal

irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells,

spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and

sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs and similar facilities

Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises

Public cemetery

Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation

and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities

Sites for police and fire stations and substations and the municipal jail

For Provinces

Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention

and control of plant and animal pests and disease; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding

stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers' and

fishermen's cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate

technology

Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology

Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,

enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,

small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro

electric projects for local purposes

Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include

hospitals and other tertiary health services

Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees;

relief operations and, population development services

Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas, and other

similar facilities

Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province and which

are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges;

inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems;

reclamation projects; and similar facilities

Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the

Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home

Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and

projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless

to the population

Investment support services, including access to credit financing

Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of

computer hardware and software and other means

Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines

Tourism development and promotion programs

For Cities

All the services and facilities of the municipality and province

Adequate communication and transportation facilities

Support for education, police and fire services and facilities

Public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the

National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent

executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered

under this section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly

designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services.

The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials

from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall

be undertaken by the LGU concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines.

Devolution

Act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local

government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities

National agencies or offices shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the

provision of basic services and facilities within six (6) months after the effectivity of the LGC.

o Includes the transfer to LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel

of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and

responsibilities.

o Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which

they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively

viable as determined by the Oversight Committee

o The rights accorded to personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations

shall not be impaired

Regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in

the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall be retained by the National

Government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure

Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to LGUs shall be

phased out within one year from the approval of the LGC.

National agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring

purposes and providing technical assistance to LGUs.

The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the

LGUs in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the Oversight

Committee.

The National Government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the

basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when:

Services or facilities are not made available

If made available, they are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants

Funding of basic services and facilities

From the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local

revenues and funding support from the National Government, its instrumentalities and

government-owned or controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain

such services or facilities

To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, LGUs may, by

ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by

them in their proprietary capacity

Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this

Section.

Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the

provision of basic services or facilities before applying the same for other purposes, unless

otherwise provided in the LGC

Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources.

LGUs’ proprietary powers:

to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation

of their development plans, program objectives and priorities

to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue

exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them

to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them

without need of any further action

to have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national

wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same

with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits

to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property

held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive,

developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or

proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant

communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals.

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain.

LGUs’ exercise of power of eminent domain, requisites:

Through the chief executive

Pursuant to an ordinance

For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless

Upon payment of just compensation

Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws

Valid and definite offer made to the owner that was not accepted

LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon

Filing of the expropriation proceedings

Deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the FMV of the property based on the current tax

declaration of the property to be expropriated

The amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the

fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands.

City or municipality

Through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian

After public hearing for the purpose

In the following cases:

o when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as

determined by DA

o where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,

commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned:

Limited to the following percentages of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage

of the ordinance

o Highly urbanized and independent component cities - 15%

o Component cities and first to the third class municipalities - 10%

o Fourth to sixth class municipalities - 5%

BUT President upon recommendation of NEDA may authorize a city or municipality to reclassify

lands in excess of the abovementioned limits when public interest so requires

Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries under R.A. No. 6657 (CARL) shall

not be affected. Conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of

CARL.

Sec. 65, CARL

Conversion of Lands

After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound

for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic

value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the

landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the

reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully

paid his obligation.

LGUs shall continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning

ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources.

Requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into

consideration in the preparation of such plans.

When approval by a national agency (e.g., DA) is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be

unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three

(3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.

Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.

Requisites

Pursuant to an ordinance

With provisions for the maintenance of public safety

In cases of permanent closure:

Ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Sanggunian

An adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure must be provided when

necessary

BUT no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation

to a new site (adequate substitute always necessary)

o A property permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any

purpose for which other real property belonging to the LGU concerned may be lawfully

used or conveyed

Temporary closures

During an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs,

or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects

Any national or local road, alley, park, or square

Duration shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order

No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural,

or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the LGU

For the establishment of shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas where

goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed

to the general public

Any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place

By a duly enacted ordinance

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.

LGUs’ corporate powers:

To have continuous succession in its corporate name

To sue and be sued

To have and use a corporate seal

To acquire and convey real or personal property

To enter into contracts

To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided

in this Code and other laws

Corporate seals

LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals

Newly established LGUs or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals

which shall be registered with the DILG

Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered with DILG.

Contracts

Unless otherwise provided in the LGC, no contract may be entered into by the local chief

executive in behalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the Sanggunian concerned.

A legible copy of the contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or

the city, municipal or barangay hall.

Fiscal autonomy

LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the

management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in the LGC and

other applicable laws.

Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants.

Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind from local and foreign

assistance agencies

upon authority of the Sanggunian,

in support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under Sec. 17

without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or

office of the National Government of from any higher LGU

o BUT projects with national security implications shall be approved by the national

agency concerned

o When the national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30) days

from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved

report of nature, amount, and terms to both Houses of Congress and the President within thirty

(30) days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of donation

Sec. 24. Liability for Damages.

LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

Compendium on Local Government, Chapters 5 – 6 (Agra)

CHAPTER FIVE: Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain, General Powers and Authority

A. Police power, general welfare clause

Police power is inherent in the State, but not in municipal corporations. There must be a valid delegation of

such power by the National Legislature (which is the repository of inherent powers of the State) in order for

the MC to exercise such power. MC’s exercise such power under the general welfare clause. The power is

broad and is said to be commensurate with but not exceeding the duty to provide for the real needs of the

people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience, and consistently as may be with private rights.

Police power is said to be the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, and in a sense, the greatest

and most powerful attribute of government. To secure the general welfare of the State and the fundamental

aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

Two Branches of the General Welfare Clause

First: attached to the main trunk of municipal authority; relates to ordinances and regulations necessary to

carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.

Second: much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law;

authorizes ordinances that seem to be necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the

prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the

inhabitants, and for the protection of property.

General Rule: Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power of the general welfare clause must be:

Reasonable

Consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation

Not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State

The powers of the municipal corporations are to be construed strictissimi juris, and any doubt or ambiguity

must be construed against the municipality.

Exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,

unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial or due process or a violation of any other applicable

constitutional guarantee.

Zoning

A zoning ordinance or regulation is a valid exercise of police power and has the effect of nullifying or

superseding contractual obligations. The rule of non-impairment of contracts is not absolute – it must be

reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Laws and reservation of essential attributes of

sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by parties and they form part of, and are read into,

every contract, unless clearly excluded in cases where exclusion is allowed.

Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a (lease) contract earlier

executed. Police power may be activated anytime.

Financial assistance

LGU may use unappropriated available public funds for extending financial assistance to qualified

(indigent) bereaved families. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits

a limited number of persons. (However, may not be applied to heirs of deceased local government officials

as financial assistance.)

Improper exercise of police power

The prohibition of establishment of legitimate enterprises (such as night clubs and cabarets) is not valid.

Under B.P. 337, local governments are only empowered to regulate their operations.

Confiscation of products

A city mayor has no authority to cause the seizure/confiscation of meat products in contravention of a city

ordinance, as it is a violation of due process requirements.

B. Power of eminent domain

As exercised by LGU’s, it is only a delegated power. The statutes conferring such power cannot be

broadened or constricted by implication. As a right, it is founded on genuine necessity, and the necessity

must be of public character and for the public good. Therefore, LGU’s may not capriciously choose what

private property should be taken.

Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the rights and to determine whether

there is genuine necessity therefore.

Requisites for the Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain:

Ordinance must be passed authorizing the local chief executive to subject a certain property to

expropriation

Public use, purpose or welfare of poor and landless

Payment of just compensation

Valid and definite offer to pay property, which was not accepted

A municipal ordinance authorizing the mayor to file expropriation proceedings must be approved by the

provincial board.

Role of higher/supervising local government

Sangguniang panlalawigan has the power to declare a municipal ordinance providing for the exercise of

eminent domain invalid on the SOLE GROUND that it is beyond the power of the sangguniang bayan or

the mayor to issue. Therefore, the SP cannot declare the ordinance invalid for being unnecessary

considering there are other available lots.

Role of national government agencies

The approval of the national government is not required for local governments to exercise its power of

eminent domain.

Stages in actions for expropriation

First: Determination of authority of plaintiff to exercise such power, and the propriety of its exercise in the

context of the facts involved. Ends with an order (if not dismissal) of condemnation declaring the lawful

right of plaintiff to take the property. Such order is a final order.

Second: Determination by the court of the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint,

with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. Such order fixing the just compensation shall be

final as well.

Public purpose or use

Under the new concept, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit which tends to

contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community.

Right to take property

Only after the deposit of just compensation.

Complaint for eminent domain

A complaint which failed to mention the existence of a valid and definite offer, and that such offer was not

accepted but alleges that repeated negotiations were made but failed is sufficient to show cause of action.

C. General powers and authority

Restraint of Trade – Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot totally ban the buying and selling of all kinds of

liquor since this is tantamount to restraint of trade. Granting it may be done, it must be expressly provided

for by the law. However, in order to promote general welfare the State may interfere with personal liberty,

property, business and occupations. Thus, a person may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and

burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State.

Compulsory Processes – the contempt power of the national legislature is sui generis, as its exercise is a

matter of self-preservation (it asserts its authority as one of the three independent and coordinate branches

of the gov’t, independent of the judicial branch and punishes contempt) and local legislative bodies cannot

correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons the national legislature does. As the contempt power and

subpoena power partake of a judicial nature, they cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. If

there is no express statutory basis, it would run afoul of the doctrine of the doctrine of separation of powers.

This must be considered an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337, which provides for liberal rules of

interpretation in favour of local autonomy.

LGU’s cannot proclaim religious or local holidays – such power rests within the President

Reclassificaton of Land – the authority of the Sanggunian is limited to the reclassification of agricultural

lands. The power of cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural land into commercial, industrial and

residential status is only for the purpose of assessment and real property taxation.

Reclassification – power lodged with the LGU; act of allocating lands to different activities or classes of

land uses, evolved and enacted through local planning and zoning processes. DAR approval is not

necessary.

Land Conversion – power lodged with DAR; actual change in land use and takes into account tenants and

farmworkers, if any, and ascertainment of disturbance compensation. HOWEVER, such power to issue

conversion clearance and/or approve/disapprove applications can only be exercised on or after June 15,

1988, the date of the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

Role of DAR – the power of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions is limited to the applications for

reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries. DAR’s authority to convert agricultural

land should be exercised in conjunction with the devolved powers of the LGU’s to reclassify such land.

However, once a landholding has been acquired at redistributed to qualified beneficiaries pursuant to

CARL, it is excluded from the authority to LGU’s to reclassify. Nothing in the LGC shall be construed to

repeal, modify or amend the CARL.

Prescribing penal provisions

Sangguniang barangay cannot provide for the [enalty of imprisonment for violations of barangay ordinances

– LGC only provides for the imposition of a fine. Forfeiture of salary likewise cannot be validly prescribed.

Sangguniang barangay cannot enact an ordinance identical to an ordinance of the city of municipality but

with a lesser penalty, since the former is inconsistent with the latter.

Contracting Loans – LGU cannot contract external or foreign loans since LGC only provides for guarantee

by the President of local or domestic loans.

Conduct of Legislative Inquiry – municipal mayor cannot require that all heads of departments and EE’s

obtain his clearance and permission before appearing before any governmental entity.

Scholarship Grants – scholarship fund may only be applied to schools within its jurisdiction.

Legislative Voting Requirement – local legislative council cannot provide for more than majority vote for

the passage of appropriations ordinances, since LGC requires only simple majority. However, sanggunian

may provide for different vote requirement for other certain ordinances.

Change of Name of Government Center – prior consultation with Philippines Historical Commission

required

Requiring Performance Reports – may not be req’d by sangguniang panlalawigan because it may cause

work disruption, and such function is essentially executive, not legislative.

Regulation of Property – public property is outside the commerce of man, therefore cannot be the subject of

lease or contract, and constructions thereon can be summarily abated by the LGU. The power to regulate

public property is with the LGU.

Public Plaza

Public Streets – road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence local governments must first

acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation if they wish to utilize them

Land reclaimed by the PEA for and on behalf of the State is no longer part of the public domain and public

use.

An LGU must comply with the legal conditions imposed on a donation.

Public Markets

Buildings

Disposal of Real Property is Proper When:

Public bidding is conducted

Price offered by vendee is higher than the appraised value

Deed of sale is signed by the local chief executive, with the authority of the sanggunian

Certification is issued that said lot is no longer needed for public use as duly verified by the

auditor

Transfer of Property to Local Governments – lots covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award

(CLOA) issued pursuant to CARL can only be transferred or acquired through the DAR in order to be

reallocated to another beneficiary. The term “government” does not contemplate its political subdivisions.

Use of Land – a municipality may change the use of a piece of land if there are no such express restrictions

in the contract to sell/contract of sale; it may also enter into a joint venture agreement with a private entity

embodied in a MOA signed by the local chief executive, a representative of the private entity and ratified by

the sanggunian; HOWEVER, a chapel may not be constructed on land owned by the gov’t based on the

separation of church and state

As a LESSOR – LGU may file an action for illegal detention and demand eviction for violation of lease

contract and non-payment of rentals

Abatement of Public Nuisance – Local government officials cannot seek cover under the general welfare

clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This tenet applies to a nuisance

per se, which affects the immediate safety of persons and property, and may be summarily abated under the

undefined law of necessity. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven in a hearing conducted for

that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its abatement without judicial intervention. While the

Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot declare a particular thing as a

nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

Land Use Planning

Logging Activities – DENR’s powers cannot be encroached upon by the LGU

Quarrying Activities – provincial governor’s authority to grant and issue quarry permits extends only to

public lands

Fishing, Fishery Privileges

Maintaining Dumpsites – must not endanger environment, health, safety and welfare of residents

Littering – fine may be validly imposed

Power to Enter into Contracts

Contracts entered into by local chief executives have the force of law between parties and should be

complied with.

A chief executive acting pursuant to a resolution already adopted by the council in signing the deed of sale

to qualified buyers determined after public bidding was exercising a purely ministerial duty incidental to his

functions.

Council/Sanggunian authorization is a condition sine qua non for the validity of a contract entered into by a

local chief executive. Authorization may take the form of a resolution.

Traffic Regulation – temporary street closures may be done through an ordinance

Issuance of Permits – the issuance, revocation or cancellation of permits is a discretionary act subject to

strict implementation as to its scope

Authority to issue – business permits are subject to the regulatory powers of the city mayor

Rejection of application – a mayor may refuse the granting of a permit only if there are valid reasons

embodied in an appropriate ordinance or national law; in the absence of such law or ordinance, the mayor

may not validly refuse to grant the permit to a legitimate enterprise due to the principle of free enterprise

and competition; also, issuance may not be withheld based on none-payment of taxes and imposts

Cancellation of permit – may not be revoked if operator was not informed of a specific violation of the

LGC, as it will be violative of due process

Franchises – power to issue National Franchises lies with the National Government, devolution is only with

respect to regulatory powers within the jurisdictions concerned. However, the grant of franchises for the

establishment, construction, operation and maintenance of public markets and bus/jeepney terminals are

within the concern of the sanggunians. Although the municipality has the authority to grant franchises, the

authority to collect franchise tax is under the power of the province and not the municipality.

Coal Corporations – power of regulation lies with the DOE

Casinos, Gambling – power of LGU’s to suppress gambling refers only to illegal gambling

Demolition

Padlocking of Premises

Local Infrastructure Projects – authority of LGU’s to undertake reclamation projects is limited to those

funded out of local funds; projects funded by the National Gov’t are lodged with the PEA; regular courts

are prohibited from issuing writs to stop any person, entity, government official or LGU from proceeding

with or continuing the execution or implementation of amn infrastructure project approved by the President

through the Executive Secretary (P.D. 3-A).

Creation of LGU’s – the power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature (ex.

conversion of municipal districts into regular municipalities)

Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) is included in computation of average annual income (part of general

income of gov’t units)

Population requirement of 5,000 for the creation of a barangay within a highly urbanized city is mandatory

(but does not apply to those already existing)

Registered voters of highly urbanized cities shall be prohibited from voting in elections at the provincial

level, unless reclassification occurs after ratification of 1987 Constitution, but before effectivity of LGC of

1991.

Plebiscite - to be conducted in the “political units directly affected”, (1) meaning residents of the political

entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a right to vote, and (2) referring to the

plurality of political units which would participate; whole unit must participate, not merely those that form

part of the new unit

Applies only to new LGU’s created for the first time under the 1987 Constitution – therefore no

plebiscite is necessary in the case of a municipal corporation which has attained de facto status at

the time the 1987 Constitution took effect.

In case of a negative vote, sub-province shall continue to be part of the original province, to be

represented by officials of the original province.

There is no law authorizing the holding of special elections for the first set of barangay officials

of newly-created barangays, therefore, such election cannot be conducted together with the SK

elections.

Abolition of LGU’s – enactment of an ordinance by sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod concerned

and the conduct of a plebiscite required

Principle of non-user – only applies to private corporation law; does not apply to municipal corporations

Conversion of LGU’s – bills of local application must originate from the House of Representatives and

initiate the legislative process which would culminate in the enactment of a Statute. A technical description

similar to those in Torrens titles is not a condition sine qua non (it would defeat the purpose of the LGC).

What is required is a reasonable ascertainment of the area.

Reapportionment of Legislative Districts – may be made by a special law, such as the enactment by special

law of a charter of a new city. Congress may increase its own composition through legislative enactment.

Settling Boundary Disputes

Between barangays – referred to sangguniang bayan or panlungsod concerned; Office of the

President has no jurisdiction

Between adjacent municipalities within a province – elevated to sangguniang panlalawigan

Between independent component city and a municipality, or highly urbanized cities and

municipalities – jointly referred to respective sanggunians

Barangay Clearances – barangays are only authorized to issue clearances for business and impose

reasonable fees, but are not allowed to issue business permits or licenses. Barangay clearance cannot be

denied on grounds other than those specified in the appropriate ordinance.

Warrants of Arrest – mayors are no longer authorized to issue such warrants

Election Activities – COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the enforcement of the

Election Code; the transfer of officers and employees within the election period is prohibited, except for the

purpose of coping with emergencies and efficiency in the government service

Abolition of an Office – express power to create local offices (absent any contrary provision), impliedly

carries with it the power to abolish said office in GOOD FAITH.

Relocation of Homeless – responsibility of both LGU and National Housing Authority

Inclusion in Special Economic Zones – R.A. 7227 provides that the creation of the Subic Special Economic

Zone is subject to the concurrence of concerned municipalities and cities by resolution. However, the Subic

Authority shall prevail in conflicts concerning matters affecting the zone.

Assistance to Sectors – public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons

Creation of Fishery Resources Management Council by way of Ordinance

Appointment to Local Offices – punong barangays may appoint purok leaders, provided the appropriate

ordinance has been enacted and the council thereafter approves the appointment.

Projects, Countrywide Development Fund – sanggunian is authorized to compel a congressman to seek its

prior approval before the implementation of any projects, as the LGC provides that national projects must

be approved by the sanggunian prior to their implementation. However, an appropriations ordinance is not

required to facilitate the release of funds from the Countrywide Development Fund of Representatives of

Congress. Legislation, however, must be enacted specifying the infrastructure and priority projects.

Issuance of Bonds – any security issued or guaranteed by the gov’t or any of its political subdivisions is

exempt from registration; exempt securities

Ultra Vires Acts of Private Organizations – local chief executives may file a complaint against such

organizations with the appropriate national government unit pursuant to a resolution adopted by the

sanggunians

Additional Insurance Benefits – council by way of ordinance may not increase insurance benefits of

municipalities officials and EE’s since this would unreasonable add up to the tax burden of the inhabitants,

resulting in the violation of the principle forbidding the appropriation of public funds for private purposes

Imposition of Curfew – may be exercised pursuant to police power, but not by the local chief executive

alone. Sanggunian enact an ordinance – determine the necessity, reasonableness, condition and procedures.

Inter-Local Gov’t Cooperation – local government may group themselves and procure equipment from

domestic and foreign sources for purposes commonly beneficial to them, provided national policies,

standards and guidelines are followed.

Incorporation of Stock Corporations – only natural persons can become incorporators of such corporations;

prohibition extends to its local officials being agents of the province (principal).

CHAPTER SIX: Inter-Local Government Relations

Local Separation of Powers

Doctrine of Separation of Powers and System of Checks-and-Balance apply to local governments.

It is the duty of public officers to enforce ordinances not otherwise repealed by the council nor annulled by

the courts.

Local chief executive (LCE) may validly enter into a contract only with council authorization. Prior

authorization is not the same as pre-approval of contracts. Local councils do not possess the authority to

pre-approve contracts after prior authorization has been given. Prior authorization also does not mean prior

authorization for the payment of obligations.

LCE cannot require that all requests for appropriations be endorsed by him before they can be enacted.

Designation of members of the Personnel Selection Board as determined by the sanggunian by resolution

must be approved by the LCE (merely ministerial).

Mayor has no administrative supervision over sanggunian EE’s; authority to approve applications for

LOA’s of sanggunian members and appointive EE’s rests with the vice LCE.

Signature of governor required in the resolution adopted by sangguniang panlalawigan approving or

disapproving the ordinance or resolution enacted by sangguniang pankungsod/bayan.

While authority to regulate traffic and use of streets rests with the sanggunian, the execution of an

ordinance relating to it is the responsibility of the LCE.

The authority of the LCE of the higher supervising unit to impose preventive suspension is purely

ministerial, since the disciplinary authority over erring local legislative officials of the supervised unite is

the sanggunian of the higher unit.

Sanggunian is in the best position to determine rates of mayor’s permit fees to be levied are just, reasonable,

and not confiscatory.

Additional functions maybe given the vice mayor only as may be provided by law or ordinance, otherwise

he may validly refuse.

LCE is mandated by law to represent the LGU, no sanggunian authorization necessary.

Power of appointment of the vice-mayor is limited to officials and EE’s of the sanggunian, as well as EE’s

of the office of the vice mayor.

Authority to discipline municipal sanggunian members and EE’s lies with the vice LCE, since he had

administrative supervision over EE’s, being the one with the power to appoint the same.

Barangay Audit Reports to be transmitted to the vice mayor, not the LCE, for information and appropriate

action.

Mayor is administrator when drawing checks in the settlement of obligations.

Barangay kagawads perform tasks assigned pursuant to a valid resolution, and may be required to submit

monthly accomplishment forms.

Province and component city/municipality

Declaration by the sangguniang panlalawigan that a particular city or municipal ordinance or resolution is

invalid for being beyond the power conferred upon its respective sanggunians, is equivalent to a disapproval

of the subject ordinance or resolution.

When a province sells delinquent properties at a public auction, it was not only acting on its behalf but also

on behalf of the municipalities concerned. Therefore when the province buys such lot (no other bidder), the

municipalities may be considered co-owners thereof to the extent of their respective shares in the real

property taxes and penalties thereon.

The exercise of the power to tax by a (component) city also granted to a province deprives the province

from imposing a similar tax – thus exclusive power is granted to the city to collect and levy the subject tax,

fees and charges.

Real property assessments made by city or municipal assessors are not subject to approval by the provincial

assessor – the latter merely exercises technical supervision.

A municipality is entitled to a share in the proceeds from the real property tax and lease rentals of subject

property collected by the province.

The power to levy tax on sand and gravel exclusively belongs to the province although a component city or

municipality has a share in the proceeds if the said tax.

If franchise tax is imposed by the province, a component city of municipality has no share.

City/municipality and barangay

The power to regulate facilities rests upon the unit which owns the same.

In interpreting ambiguous provisions of the LGC, resolution is in favour of the lower LGU.

Authority to enter into contracts involving barangay roads within a municipality rests with the barangay

affected, not the municipality. The municipality only exercises regulatory powers over municipal roads.

Barangay ordinances are subject to review by the city or municipal councils and not the other way around.

A municipal mayor does not have authority to control the disbursement of barangay funds and internal

revenue allotments, nor withhold the share of the barangay from the internal revenue allotment on the basis

of an election protest. He/She also does not have the authority to control barangay projects. Such

prerogatives belong to the punong barangay.

A city/municipality possesses the POWER to SUPERVISE over component barangays. Such power,

however, does not permit infringement upon the legislative powers of the lower LGU to the extent of

dictating changes on the policies or decisions. The higher sanggunian must be guided by liberality of

construction and fundamental principles of local autonomy. This power does not include the power to

restrain, nor does it mean that the sangguniang bayan may invalidate any ordinance enacted by the

sangguniang barangay. It may only point out the defect.

Approval of vouchers is merely ministerial on the part of the mayor after the mayor after the treasurer (1)

has certified the availability of funds and (2) an appropriate ordinance has been enacted and was

subsequently approved by him/her. The mayor may not require a punong barangay to personally present

the barangay payroll.

Only a city and a municipality may issue business permits and licenses. Barangay has no such power.

The new sharing scheme provided for by the LGC does not take place automatically. An ordinance must be

enacted by the sangguniang bayan or panlungsod concerned in order to install it.

Appointment of the barangay treasurer only needs the concurrence of the sangguniang bayan concerned.

Confirmation from the sangguniang bayan is not required.

Services of the municipal engineer may be secured by a barangay in the implementation of barangay

infrastructure projects after prior representation has been made to the LCE concerned.

Sangguniang bayan may suspend all barangay officials, which authorizes the mayor to appoint temporary

replacements, provided such appointees possess all the necessary qualifications and none of the

disqualifications provided by law.

Where there is no law which authorizes the holding of special elections to fill-in the positions created by the

incorporation of new barangays, the mayor may fill up the vacancies, there being permanent vacancies. If

there are no permanent vacancies, neither the mayor nor the punong barangay have the authority to appoint

officials.

Past and present administrations

The newly-elected LCE must abide by the contractual obligations made by the former administration since

the party-in-interest is the LGU. However, an authority to negotiate loans granted by the local legislative

council to the past LCE does not extend to the newly-elected official.

The previous LCE, not the succeeding one, has the authority to observe and evaluate the performance of the

employee concerned, where the act complained of was done during the previous administration.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS VIS A VIS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

A. Power of general Supervision

Drilon v. Lim

Section 187 LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of the tax

ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. Pursuant to this, Secretary of

Justice Drilon declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code), null and void for non-compliance

with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions

contrary to law and public policy.

HELD: Section 187 of LGC is valid.

Under this provision, when the Secretary of Justice alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not

permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the

measure.

The acts of Secretary Drilon in setting aside the Manila Revenue Code, was of mere supervision, not

control:

he did not replace the MRC with his own version.

He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment.

He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.

All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in

accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the

grant of powers to the city government under the LGC.

On the other hand, an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,

he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it

himself.

Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules

are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or

replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to

the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on

this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to

declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this

matter.

Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

SC ruled that the confiscation of license plates by the MMC was not among the powers conferred upon it by

its charter (PD 1605). It was also “observed” by the SC that confiscation of the driver’s licenses was not

directly prescribed or allowed by PD 1605. SC received several letters-complaint that people’s licenses

were confiscated. MMA issued Ordinance No. 11 authorizing itself "to detach the license plate or tow and

impound attended or unattended or abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of

traffic in Metro Manila."

HELD: Ordinance null and void for being an invalid exercise of delegated legislative power.

Test for a valid municipal ordinance:

1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. must not be unfair or oppressive;

3. must not be partial or discriminatory;

4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

5. must not be unreasonable; and

6. must be general and consistent with public policy.

PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic

violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree

authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit

the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.

That the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are

able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature

(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the

Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of

the Congress, the LGU cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.

The enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the PD 1605, which has

the force and effect of a statute. The measures do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,

impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact, prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and

violate and in effect partially repeal the law. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by

the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.

Ganzon v. CA

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed

against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,

oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the

Constitution, and arbitrary detention. He was placed in preventive suspension for 3 times by the respondent

Secretary of Local Government on different occasions based on different administrative complaints filed

against him.

Mayor Ganzon assailed the power of the respondent to suspend him alleging that the 1987 Constitution no

longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension

and/or removal over local officials.

HELD: The Sec of Local Government, as the alter ego of the President, has the power to suspend local

officials.

Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal

governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not

control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution - and as the

"supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central

government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,

among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation,

and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also

noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general

supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the

local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise

removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the

President.

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the

central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The

Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to

regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-

government.

However, the Court held that the successive suspensions were excessive and not proper. What bothers the

Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative

charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases

yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that

Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of

suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also,

because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension,

as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation

with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other

evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring

local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need

not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it

ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos et al

The Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging

to petitioner MCIAA. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also asserted that it is an

instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which

puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC

performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the

LGC.

HELD: There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment

of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and

instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption

may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions or incentives granted to or

presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations,

Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the

LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives

duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and

unless otherwise provided in the LGC.

The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is

boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative

Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the

government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the

context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether

pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms

of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are

the political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the

central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National

Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial.

An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a

department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local

government or a distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National

Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction

by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying

operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered

institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations".

MCIAA is not an agency or instrumentality of the government but only a GOCC, thus, LGUs may tax them.

B. Decentralization, local autonomy

Limbona v. Mangelin

Petitioner Speaker Alimbusat Limbona was the speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central

Mindanao. He was invited to attend a conference and hence he advised acting secretary Alimbuyao to

inform the assemblyman that there will be no session on such that he will be away.

The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, all

present voted that the seat of the speaker be declared vacant. The petitioner then went to court praying that

judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents during the session and his ouster as

null and void.

The respondents assails the jurisdiction of the Court to rule upon the issue.

HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political

subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local

governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant

communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social

progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and

enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but

only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the

sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local

governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its

own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a

constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the

autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution

involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this

petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the

present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no

controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987

Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the

organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,

an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national

government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang

Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain

of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are

beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our

jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao

persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the

central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,

mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous

Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge

chiefly administrative services.

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,

with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

The expulsion of the petitioner has no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the

Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,

assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. In the second place,

the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner

arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. While it is within the

discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless

subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

San Juan v. Civil Service Commission

Petitioner governor San Juan recommended Santos to the position of Provincial Budget Officer for Rizal

Province. However, in defiance to such recommendation, DBM Regional Officer Galvez appointed

Almajosa instead. The governor protested. The DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioner’s protest is not

meritorious as the DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of

the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.

HELD: When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial

Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local

autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of

local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of

meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the

national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints

of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally

imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this

reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals

from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process

involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.

Ganzon v. CA (supra)

See above

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA

EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the

Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Petitioners argue that the creation of

CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for provinces and cities composing it.

HELD: It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to

the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the

decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being

guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935

Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act

(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in

the country.

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is

peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative

autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government

with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts

with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.

CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the

Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and

political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested

with political autonomy.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation

In 1992, representatives from PPC made representations with the Pagcor on the possibility of setting up a

casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. On November 1992, the parties executed a contract of

lease involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted into a casino.

Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed several ordinances prohibiting the establishment of gambling

casinos. PPC and PAGCOR assail the authority to pass such ordinances.

HELD: Ordinances should not contravene a statute. The rational for this requirement is obvious. Municipal

governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative

powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to

the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local

government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first

place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature.

It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As

it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the

legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,

sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.

We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to

phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been

enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without

meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government

units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to

create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.

True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local

government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,

however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its

will or modify or violate it.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended

or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan

de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and

Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these

ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires

and void.

Taule v. Santos

On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed

of eleven (11) members convened with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of

its officers. The election proceeded with petitioner Ruperto Taule declared as president. The governor

protested to the Secretary of DILG the election of officers on the ground of irregularities. Taule assailed the

power of the Secretary of DILG to decide FABC election contests.

HELD: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving

the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate

rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative Code. There is neither a

statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the

Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers

of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the

Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to

law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the

subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take

such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,

means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done

in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The

fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said

local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,

the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope

of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an

inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.

Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local

governments, We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election

of the officers of the katipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or

the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit

him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the

basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In

fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and

direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by

the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.

Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. To deny the Secretary of

Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be

to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments. The RTCs have the

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.

Binay v. Domingo

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60. This resolution aims

to extend P500 burial assistance to poor, bereaved families, the funds to be taken out of the unappropriated

available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Res. No. 60.

Thereafter, the Municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the

program. However, Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and disbursement of funds. The

reasons it gave were: 1)the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,

etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; 2)it will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used

for public purposes. The issue is WON Res. No. 60, reenacted as Res. No. 243, is a valid exercise of the

police power under the general welfare clause.

HELD: Yes. Police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty – inherent in the

state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there

must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature. Municipal corporations exercise police power

under the general welfare clause. Under Sec. 7 of BP 337, “every local government unit shall exercise the

powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as necessary and proper for

governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace

and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein.” Police power

is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety

and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. The police

power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,

the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as

consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense

includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. Thus, it is inadvisable to

frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is not

unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. The care for the poor

is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of

police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in

classifying paupers as subject of legislation because the classification is reasonable. Precious to the hearts

of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been

passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the

soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Res. No. 60 of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice.

City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta

Sec. 9 0f Ordinance No. 6118 requires that every memorial park cemetery shall set aside at least 6% of its

total area for charity burial. For several years, this was not enforced. However, the Q.C. Council passed a

resolution instructing the City Engineer to stop selling the memorial park lots owned by those who failed to

donate the required 6% space for paupers’ burial. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed with the CFI a

petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Sec.

9 of the said ordinance, claiming that it is contrary to the Constitution, the Q.C. Charter, the Local

Autonomy Act, and the Revised Admin. Code. The Court declared said section null and void. Petitioners

argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that

the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that

the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other

hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious

because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used

for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Is Section 9 of the

ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

HELD: NO, it is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private

property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. An examination of the Q.C. Charter

does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting

police power to the City. The power to regulate neither includes the power to prohibit nor the power to

confiscate. The ordinance not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or

property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property

with the exception of a few cases not obtaining here. There is no reasonable relation between the setting

aside of at least 6% of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers

and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance

is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who

are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building a public cemetery for this purpose, the city

passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The said expropriation without compensation is not covered by the Q.C. Charter which empowers the city

council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their

burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.

When the Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337 states that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for

the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply

authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to

construct public cemeteries. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.

had incorporated, received necessary permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of 6% of the

cemetery cannot be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it

accepted the permits to commence operations.

Villanueva v. Castaneda

The Municipal Council of San Fernando adopted Res. No. 218 authorizing 24 members of the Fernandino

United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the vicinity of the public

market of San Fernando, Pampanga along Mercado Street. The action was protested and the CFI held that

the land occupied by the petitioners/stallholders, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man

and could not be the subject of private occupancy. The decision, however, was not enforced for the

petitioners were not evicted from the place and were even assigned space allotments for which they paid

daily fees to the municipal government. Thereafter, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers

of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. No. 29 to restore the property “to

its original and customary use as a public plaza.” Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office

of the mayor of San Fernando, issued a resolution directing the municipal treasurer and engineer to

demolish the stalls. Petitioners, claiming that the area in question was leased to them by the municipal

government, filed a case for prohibition with the CFI which was denied. Do the petitioners/stallholders

have a right to the said land?

HELD: NO, the place in question is a public plaza which is beyond the commerce of man and cannot be

the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the

City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk, being likewise beyond the commerce of man.

In Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, the Supreme Court held: The town plaza cannot be used

for the construction of market stalls or residences, and such structures constitute a nuisance subject to

abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and

to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be

disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.

The occupation of stallholders (now almost 200) has caused health, safety and sanitation problems. It has

deprived the stallholders in the public market of much business and has denied to the people the proper use

of the public plaza. These problems are covered by police power as delegated to the municipality under the

general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances, not repugnant to

law, necessary to discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem

necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,

peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the

protection of property therein. This authority was validly exercised through the adoption of a resolution by

the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution should have effectively terminated the

agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the

medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in

that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This

power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for

the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not violate the impairment clause,

which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Republic v. Gonzalez

The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of 2 parcels of land in Tañong Malabon, Metro Manila (Lots 1

and 2). The said property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants

Gonzales and Josue, started filling it. Each of the appellants constructed a mixed residential and commercial

building on Lot 2.

Thereafter, then President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening

and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon,

Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and

reserved for the purposes stated in the Proclamation. The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed

Resolutions authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could

be implemented. Separate complaints were also filed against appellants for the recovery of the portions of

Lot 2 they were occupying.

Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the lots for these reasons: 1) they already filed

sales applications with the Bureau of Lands; 2) they had a municipal permit to construct a building as well

as a business license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3) the lot occupied by them

was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and the setting

aside of lots for parking does not redound to the public benefit. The Trial Court ordered the appellants to

reconvey the lots to the government. Is Proc. No. 144 lawful and valid?

HELD: Yes! Proc. No. 144 was issued by the President in response to several resolutions passed by the

Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, to address the increasing vehicular traffic along F. Sevilla Blvd. The

Municipal Council had proposed to widen the road and reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic

problems. The public has much to gain from the proposed road widening and from establishment of a

municipal parking area. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience

of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking

areas. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or

highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose.

Appellants, however, allege that the resulting benefits, if any, will be confined to people who have cars,

hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. This

conception is flawed since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is

properly reserved for public use or public benefit. To constitute public use, the public in general should

have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in

number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. There is nothing in Proc. No.

144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact

happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open to the public.

Prior to the issuance of Proc. No. 144, appellants had applied for sales applications with the Bureau of

Lands over the said lots. By doing so, they are deemed to have admitted ownership by the National

Government since the said application can only be filed in respect of public land, not private land. These

applications were either not yet approved or were already rejected by the Bureau of Lands at the time the

proclamation was issued. Thus, no private rights had accrued and become vested in appellants. The lots

remained public lands and were subject to the free disposition and control of the Government. While

appellants had secured municipal permits for the construction of buildings on the lands in dispute, the Court

held that the disposition and management of lands of the public domain were directly under the executive

control of the Director of Lands, and not of local government officials. Thus, the Malabon Municipal

Mayor exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants.

Patalinhug v. CA

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363 otherwise known as the

"Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City" which required that funeral parlors shall be built not less than

50 meters from any residential structures, churches, and other institutional buildings. A building permit

was issued in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor. Thereafter, petitioner commenced

its construction. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao, Davao City that the

construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within

a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residences (the nearest residential structure,

owned by Mr. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south). Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of

nullity of the building permit. The court dismissed the complaint finding that: 1) the residential building

and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95 m respectively from the funeral parlor; 2) Although

the residential building owned by Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, said residential building is

being rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry business with machinery

thereon.

On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court by annulling the building permit issued to the petitioner. It

disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that

although it was used by Tepoot's lessee for a laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax

declaration, thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. 363.

HELD: Petitioner’s operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within the district in Davao

City. The testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual

purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business is conducted. But while its commercial

aspect has been established by the presence of laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being

declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated.

The reversal by the CA of the TC’s decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation

purposes as residential. However, a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning

purposes. A property may be declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may

well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of

property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. A

tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration

does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and

assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation

thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as

residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is

commercial.

The finding that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang

Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was

declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as

commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the

questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present

convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was

constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a

"commercial purpose." The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is

an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.

Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,

with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of

restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of

government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of

funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the

area covered thereunder.

C. Intergovernmental relations

Book I, Chapters 3 and 4, LGC (sec 25 – 36)

CHAPTER THREE: Intergovernmental Relations

Article One. National Government and Local Government Units

Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local

autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their

acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and

independent component cities through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and

through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.

(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another

and with the local government units concerned in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the

participation of local government units both in the planning and implementation of said national projects.

(c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit concerned, direct the appropriate national

agency to provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. Such

assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit concerned.

(d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled corporations with field units

or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his

information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures.

Sec. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the

duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in

the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,

depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal

or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other

sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people

and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be

undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Sec. 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government

authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior

approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects

are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in

accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Article Two. Relations with the Philippine National Police

Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. The extent of

operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and

jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of

Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The

Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued

pursuant thereto.

Article Three. Inter-Local Government Relations

Sec. 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. The province, through the

governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts

within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent

component cities shall be independent of the province.

Sec. 30. Review of Executive Orders. (a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special

statutes, the governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal

mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by

the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the

city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of

review, the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the powers

granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal ordinances.

(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders within thirty (30)

days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.

Sec. 31. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor. In the absence

of a municipal legal officer, the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal

officer, and in the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the

municipality.

Sec. 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. The city or municipality,

through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component

barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Sec. 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. Local government units may,

through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and

resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government

units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the

purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign

personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through

Memoranda of Agreement.

CHAPTER FOUR: Relations with People's and Non-governmental Organizations

Sec. 34. Role of People's and Non-governmental Organizations. Local government units shall promote the

establishment and operation of people's and non-governmental organizations to become active partners in

the pursuit of local autonomy.

Sec. 35. Linkages with People's and Non-governmental Organizations. Local government units may enter

into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people's and non-governmental

organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects,

and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity agriculture, spur

rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social well-being of the

people.

Sec. 36. Assistance to People's and Non-governmental Organizations. A local government unit may

through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance,

financial or otherwise, to such people's and non-governmental organizations for economic, socially-

oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.

POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Municipal Corporations, Chapters VIII and IX (Martin)

CHAPTER EIGHT: Powers of municipal corporations

I. Police Power

Nature of the Power

Is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. In order that a municipal corporation may exercise

police power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the

power.

The grant of authority to the sangguniang of the particular local government unit is what is known as the

General Welfare Clause

In Barangays, the GWC is found in Section 91 (a) of the LGC

In Municipalities, the GWC is found in Section 149 (a) of the LGC

For Provinces, the GWC is found in Section 208 (a) of the LGC

2 Branches of the General Welfare Clause

General Legislative Power – the power to enact ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and

discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law

Power Power Proper – the authority to enact such ordinances as shall be necessary and proper to promote

health and safety, enhance the prosperity and general welfare, improve the morals and maintain peace and

order in the particular local government unit and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants

therein

Requisites for the Exercise of Police Power

First – that the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require such

interference, and

Second – that the means is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly

oppressive upon individuals

Liberal Interpretation of the General Welfare Clause

A restrictive view of the general welfare clause is not favored.

The view that the scope of the police power, and therefore of the general welfare clause, has been fixed by

traditional delineations is not quite accurate. Police power has not received a full and complete definition; it

is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within the narrow

circumscription of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic

way of life

Exercise of Powers Beyond Boundary

Ordinarily, the powers of a municipal corporation can be exercised only within its own territorial limits

which are contiguous. However, statutes sometimes authorize it to exercise police powers beyond its

territorial boundaries, especially for the preservation of public health (i.e., City of Manila which is

empowered by statute to extend its ordinances over the Bay of Manila, three miles beyond the city limits

and over any vessel floating within that distance)

Power of Municipal Corporations to Legislate on the Same Subject Covered by Law

A municipal corporation, under the authority of its charter, may adopt ordinances upon subjects already

covered by general law as long as the ordinance is not repugnant to nor in conflict with the latter.

The reason for the above principle is that municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils

sought to be prevented by the legislature in enacting a particular statute and, therefore, to pass the

appropriate ordinance to attain the main object of the law

Effect of conviction or acquittal under either Statute or Ordinance Punishing the Same Act

The Constitution expressly provides, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or

acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Hence, where it appears

that a person has already been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted of an act made punishable by an

ordinance he can invoke the defense of double jeopardy, should the government prosecute him further

under the statute punishing the same act.

II. Power of Eminent Domain

Nature of the Power

A municipal corporation can only exercise the right of eminent domain when the same has been conferred

upon it by the legislature, expressly or by necessary implication, since the municipal corporation has no

more right than any other corporation to condemn property.

But although there is no inherent power in a municipal corporation to acquire property thru condemnation

proceedings, in nearly all jurisdictions the legislature has conferred the power of eminent domain on cities,

towns, and villages either by express provision or in a general statute or in the municipal charter.

Who may exercise the right

The right of eminent domain may be exercised either directly by the legislature or through the medium of

corporate bodies, or of individual enterprises, by virtue of a delegation of the power. The legislature, unless

limited by constitutional restriction, is entirely free to use its discretion in the selection of agents to exercise

the power

Purposes of Expropriation

The power may only be exercised for public purposes (for examples see Section 2106[f] and Section 2245

of the Revised Administrative Code)

Power of Eminent Domain as exercised by Municipal Corporation must be strictly construed

Whether the power is directly exercised by the legislature or immediately thru municipal corporations or

other public agencies, the purpose or use for which the property authorized to be appropriated must be

specified. The power cannot be enlarged by doubtful construction.

The power of eminent domain, being in derogation of private property rights, is justified only by a clear

public necessity of an urgent public policy. The power must be strictly construed against the municipal

corporation. The purpose and procedure prescribed for its exercise must be strictly followed in all

substantial matters. This rule of strict construction is mandatory and should within reasonable limits, be

inflexibly adhered to and applied.

III. Power of Taxation

Nature of the Power as exercised by Municipal Corporations

The power to tax, although inherent in sovereignty, is not possessed by municipal corporations by the mere

fact that they are creations of the State. The Power must be expressly conferred upon them, either in their

charters or in a general law.

Requisites of Municipal Taxation

1. Municipal revenue obtainable by taxation shall be derived from such sources only as are

expressly authorized by law

2. Taxation shall be just and in each municipality uniform

3. It shall not be within the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form

whatever upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and

any attempt of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be

void (case of Laoag Producers vs. Mun. of Laoag, says this has already been impliedly

repealed by the Local Autonomy Act)

4. In no case shall collection of municipal taxes be left to any person

5. Except as allowed by law, municipal funds, shall be devoted exclusively to local public

purpose

Power to License

Where only the power to license is given to municipal corporations, the presumption is that it is regulatory,

rather than for raising of revenue. The terms in which a municipality is empowered to grant license are

expected to indicate with sufficient precision whether the power could be exercised for revenue-raising

purposes or merely for regulation

Distinction between the Power to License and the Power to Tax

Power to License is a police measure; the power to Tax is a revenue measure

Distinction between a license tax and a general tax

A license tax is not a tax upon property, but it is a burden imposed for the right to exercise a franchise or a

privilege which could be withheld or forbidden altogether. The sum charged is merely used as the mode of

computing the amount to be paid for the exercise of the privilege.

Kinds of Municipal License

1. Licenses for the regulation of useful occupations or enterprises

2. Licenses for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises

3. Licenses for revenue only

Effectivity of Tax Ordinance

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide

otherwise: Provided, however, that the Secretary of Finance shall have the authority to suspend the

effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after its passage, if, in his opinion, the tax

or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, and when the said

secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended.

Condonation of Taxes

Municipal council has no right to condone taxes already accrued. This power has been withheld from

municipal councils to prevent abuse

Under the law, it is the provincial treasurer who can condone municipal taxes (Reyes vs. Cornista, 49 OG

931)

Special Assessment; Its distinguishing Features

Like general taxes, special assessments are enforced in proportionate contributions, but instead of being

imposed at regularly recurring periods to provide continuous revenue, special assessments are levied only

occasionally as required. They are imposed not upon the general body of citizens, but upon a limited class

of persons who are interested in local government, and also are specially benefited in a local improvement

to the extend of the assessment. They are imposed and collected as an equivalent, actual or presumed, of the

benefits and are required to pay for the cost of the improvement.

Distinction between a Tax and Special Assessment

1. SA can be levied only on land

2. SA cannot be made a personal liability of the person assessed

3. SA is based wholly on benefits

4. SA is exceptional both as to time and locality

CHAPTER NINE: Powers of municipal corporations

I. Power to Appropriate and Spend Money

Nature of the Power

Unless expressly authorized by its charter or statute, a municipal corporation cannot appropriate or give

away the public money of the municipality as pure donations to any person, corporation, or private

institution, under the control of the city and having no connection with it

In the Philippines, the power of municipal corporations to appropriate and spend money is among the many

powers expressly authorized in their charters

Limitation on the Power to Appropriate and Spend

The legislature can neither compel nor authorize a municipal corporation to spend any of its funds for a

private purpose, and consequently, since practically every undertaking of a municipality does or may

require the expenditures of money, a municipal corporation cannot, even with the express legislative

sanction, embark in any private enterprise or assume any functions which are not in a legal sense public.

II. Power to Borrow Money

Nature of the Power

The power to borrow does not belong to a municipal corporation as an incident of its creation. It exists only

when conferred by express constitutional or legislative grant or by force of legislative vestment of power,

coupled with the imposition of duties which are incapable of exercise and performance without the

borrowing of money

Limitation on the Power to Borrow

A limit to municipal indebtedness may be fixed either by statute or Constitution beyond which no

obligation could be incurred by the municipality

The purpose of limiting municipal indebtedness is to protect persons residing in municipalities from the

abuse of their creditors and the consequent operation of burdensome if not ruinous taxes

III. Power to Issue Municipal Bonds

Subject to Judicial Examination. There are cases holding that the power to issue bonds is inherent in the

municipal corporation. Upon examination, however, most of the cases will be found as sustaining the

implied rather than the inherent power of a municipality to issue bonds

The power to issue negotiable paper will be implied from the express power to borrow money

IV. Power to Contract

Nature and Extent of Power

The rules that municipal corporations may exercise those powers which are expressly granted, or those

essential to the carrying out of declared objects and the purposes of the corporation, is applicable with

respect to the power of the municipality to bind itself by contract

This power, however, is not to be construed as authorizing the making of contracts of all description, but

only such as are necessary and usually fit and proper, to enable the corporation to secure or carry into effect

the purposes for which it was created

Nature of the Duty of Municipal Authorities in the Execution of Contracts

The duty of the officers of the municipal corporation in the letting of municipal contracts is not merely

ministerial but of a judicial and discretionary nature. In the absence of fraud or palpable abuse of discretion,

courts have no power to control their action

Requisites Necessary for the Validity of Municipal Contracts

a. First, that the Corporation has the express, implied, or inherent power to enter into the

particular contract

b. Second, that the contract is entered into by the proper department, board, committee, officer

or agent

V. Power to Acquire, Hold, and Dispose of Property

Nature of Power

While the power to acquire property for public purposes is deemed inherent in municipal corporations or

one necessarily implied from other express powers of municipal corporations, in the Philippines, this power

is expressly authorized in the corporate charters

Municipal Property, Classified

In the Philippines, properties of provinces, cities, and municipalities are divided into property for public use

and patrimonial property

Grants of Land in favor of municipal corporations by the State; Requisites

Two requisites are necessary in order to presume a grant of land to municipal corporations, namely, that the

land is one which the municipality itself can exclusively own; and that the land is used to meet public

necessity

Municipality may alienate its property

Municipal Corporations possess the incidental or implied power to alienate or dispose of their real or

personal properties of a private nature. Conversely, they cannot exercise a like power over their properties

of a public nature in violation of the trust in which such properties are held.

Power to Mortgage

Where property not charged with a trust or public use is held by the corporation without legislative

restriction as to its sale, it may mortgage it to secure any debt or obligation that it has the power to create or

enter into. The power to mortgage, if not expressly given or denies, can be considered an incident of the

power to hold and dispose of property, and to make contracts

VI. Power to Sue and Be Sued

Nature of the Power

The power to sue and be sued is an essential attribute of Municipal Corporation. A municipality, like any

other complete corporation or person, may appeal to the court for the vindication of its right; and for any

wrong done by it, it may be sued by the injured party. The power to sue and be sued by the injured party

includes the right to settle or compromise claims of the municipality.

Municipality may file suit in behalf of the inhabitants

In many instances, a municipal corporation may bring a representative action in behalf of its inhabitants to

protect, preserve, or establish a common right.

Venue of Action

An action against a municipal corporation is inherently local. In the absence of any statutory provision to

the contrary, it must be brought in the place or province in which the municipality is situated.

The reasons for this are: That the municipal corporation remain statutory in some place, and therefore, must

be sued where they are found; that the welfare of the municipal bodies and of their citizens require that their

officers should be permitted to remain at home and discharge their public duties instead of being called

elsewhere to attend litigation.

The venue of action in the place of the municipality applies whether the cause of action arises from the

proprietary or governmental conduct of the municipality.

Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government, Chapter 5 (Agra)

See above

Book I, Chapter 2, LGC (Sec 6 – 24)

See above

A. Police Power

Binay v. Domingo (supra)

See above

Chua Huat v. CA

Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested del Rosario, the City Engineer and Building Official of Manila, to

condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said official

issued notices of condemnation to petitioners. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings

were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor

as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the

notice was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of

the Mayor. The orders were based on inspection reports made by the Office of the City Engineer which

showed that the buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The Mayor confirmed

the condemnation orders.

Petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation. Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition

order to the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City

Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.

The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be

dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls

within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of

Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and

structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety.

HELD: The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of

Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building

Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can,

therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the

Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of

Ordinances of the City of Manila.There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City

Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's

Building Inspectors. The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done

in accordance with law. Also, the protest made by petitioners was submitted 3 months after the notices of

condemnation were issued, and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed for doing so.

Tatel v. Municipality of Virac

Due to the complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the

operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor and

dust, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The

committee noted that the warehouse was near residential houses and that the inflammable materials inside

created danger to the lives and properties of the people. Resolution 29 was passed by the Municipal

Council declaring the warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the CC. The

petitioner’s MR was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI enjoining them from

enforcing Resolution 29 of the Council. The municipal officials contend that the warehouse was

constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of

houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said

block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said

ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution

and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. The court ruled in favor of the

municipal council and held that the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the

municipal council.

HELD: Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power.

Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-

government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry

out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the

Administrative Code.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact

but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with

certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a

municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or

oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be

general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, meets these

criteria. The purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is

one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. Its purpose is well within the objectives of

sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but

merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to

the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As to the contention, that warehouses

similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, the mere fact that the municipal authorities

have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance 13 is no

reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and

the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcement.

There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas

mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged

against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

Bayan v. Ermita

Petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) and the Calibrated

Preemptive Response (CPR) policy by the Arroyo administration—which enforced a “no permit, no rally”

policy and authorized the preemptive dispersal of rallies deemed unlawful by the executive branch.

Petitioners based their arguments primarily on the ground of freedom of expression. The Court upheld the

constitutionality of BP 880. It found out that the procedure prescribed in the statute does not impose an

absolute ban on rallies, but merely a time, place and manner (TPM) regulation that was content-neutral.

Since the content of the speech was not relevant, it held that it does not impose any prior restraint. The

overbreadth argument of petitioners was also dispensed with by the Court by saying that BP 880 only

“regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a

clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent…As to the delegation of

powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test

stated in Sec. 6(a) [of BP 880]. The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec.

6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.” However, the “CPR serves no

valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else…

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and

must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by

some police agents to justify abuses.”

B. Power of Taxation: Local Taxes and Real Property Tax

Sec 5 -7, Art X, 1987 Constitution

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to

levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,

consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to

the local governments.

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which

shall be automatically released to them.

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and

development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including

sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

Sec 128 – 283, LGC

See attachments

i. Local Taxation

Basco v. PAGCOR

PAGCOR, a government owned and controlled corporation, is exempted by its charter from payment of all

kinds of taxes except for 5% franchise tax. Petitioners assail the grant of such exemption on the ground that

it infringes on the right of the City of Manila to impose local fees and taxes. The issue is whether or not

PAGCOR which is exempted by its charter from payment of all kinds of taxes except for the 5% franchise

tax is subject to the local fees and taxes imposed by the City of Manila. Ruling: yes. The taxing power of

local government units must always yield to an act of Congress. Local government has no inherent power of

tax but merely derives such power from Congress. In fact, local government units have no power to tax

instrumentalities of the National Government. Under its charter, PAGCOR is empowered to operate and

regulate gambling casinos. With its regulatory power, it becomes an instrumentality of the National

Government and hence, entitled to exemption from local taxes.

Philippine Petroleum Corp v. Municipality of Pililia Rizal

Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil

basestock which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. The

municipality of Pililia enacted a municipal tax ordinance which covers the business of petitioner. Petitioner

questions the imposition in view of several provincial circulars directing the municipality officers to refrain

from collecting the said taxes. The validity of the ordinance is undisputed for it is an exercise of the

constitutional power of LGUs to levy taxes. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth

in the circulars would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.

Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. It is an ancient rule that

exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the

taxing authority.

Floro Cement Corp. v. Gorospe

The municipality of Lugait, province of Misamis Oriental, seeks to collect from Floro Cement

manufacturers and exporter's taxes. Floro Cement says that it is exempted by virtue of PD 463 which

prevents LGUs from levying taxes on mineral products. Ruling: the Court has consistently held that it is not

a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. The exemption mentioned in P.D. No. 463 refers only

to machineries, equipment, tools for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The

manufacture and the export of cement do not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product.

Exemptions are construed strictly against the taxpayer.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA

The issue in this case is the liability of petitioners (Mayor Tuzon and Mapagu) for damages for refusing to

issue to petitioner Jurado a mayor's permit and license to operate his palay-threshing business for failure to

comply with the “1% donation”. The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted a resolution

“soliciting 1% donation from the thresher operators…to help finance the continuation of the construction of

the Sports and Nutrition Center Building”. Although the validity of the resolution was not in issue, the SC

observed that: it “seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the

mayor's permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never

obligatory…If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of

the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of

the Local Tax Code.” Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their

honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence

of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of

the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang

Bayan or annulled by the courts.

ii. Franchises

PLDT v. City of Davao

PLDT assails the franchise tax being imposed by the City of Davao. Its argument is based on its franchise in

relation to RA 7925 particularly the provision on the equality of treatment in the telecommunications

industry. It argues that because Smart and Globe are exempt from the franchise tax, it follows that it must

likewise be exempt from the tax being collected by the City of Davao because the grant of tax exemption to

Smart and Globe ipso facto extended the same exemption to it. In approving R.A. No. 7925, Congress did

not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of

strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of

municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, R.A. 7925 cannot

be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition

of local franchise taxes.

City Government of QC v. Bayantel

Bayantel claims exemption from real property taxes being imposed by Quezon City. It anchors its claim on

its legislative franchise. According to the court, the franchise distinguishes between two (2) sets of

properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and

exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used.

The power to impose realty taxes by the LGUs only covers the second category. Bayantel’s franchise being

national in character, the "exemption" thus granted in its charter applies to all its real or personal properties

found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. Although the enactment of the LGC withdrew

Bayantel’s exemption, the amendatory law of Bayantel’s franchise reenacted the exemption.

FELS Energy v. Province of Batangas

NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine power barges

moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract (Energy Conversion Agreement) was for a period

of 5 years. Article 10 states that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxes; other than (i) taxes

imposed or calculated on the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its

employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges.

Polar Energy then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite NPC’s initial opposition.

FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from the Provincial Assessor of

Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay

all real estate taxes.

FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property

assessment of the Provincial Assessor.

NPC filed a petition with the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real estate taxes. The LBAA ruled

that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are

nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location

with a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the barges–FELS, a private

corporation–is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC responsible for the payment

of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be

granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS.

Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and ruled that the power barges belong to NPC; since they

are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under

Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription did

not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No.

7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed itself.

WON the petitioner may be assessed real property taxes

Held: Yes

The CBAA and LBAA maintain that power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property

tax. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer

having the burden of proving otherwise. Factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired

expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court.

Power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination (Article 415(9) NCC), being in the

nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be

carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or

work.

Petitioners maintain that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No.

7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and

controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power.

SC affirms the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS,

which is the entity being taxed by the local government.

As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:

Ownership of power barges. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery

and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its

own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel

of NAPOCOR into electricity.

FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c)

of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used

by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in

this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement provides:

Operation. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary

Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate the Power Barges to convert

such Fuel into electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7.

It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties. Not being

contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the parties to the contract are bound by

its terms and conditions.

Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be

resolved in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a taxable entity.

The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible

for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not justify the exemption. The privilege

granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS and NPC and does

not bind a third person not privy thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas.

It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously resulted in the local

government’s deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its

magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be found

only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay for it.

The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax erosion.

This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of local governments and

the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to

empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective

partners in the attainment of national goals.

The power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance and support myriad

activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the

general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.

Digitel v. Province of Pangasinan

Section 137 LGC withdrew any exemption from the payment of franchise tax by authorizing the LGUs to

impose a franchise tax on businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts of the

business.

Section 232 also authorizes the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by the LGUs within the

Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the land, building, machinery and other improvement not thereinafter

specifically exempted.

Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, a provincial franchise to install, maintain and

operate a telecommunications system within Pangasinan.

Under the Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is required to pay franchise and real property taxes.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax Ordinance 1 (Real Property Tax Ordinance of

1992).

Section 4 expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchise of Digitel to include machineries

and other improvements, not thereinafter exempted,.

Provincial Tax Ordinance No 4 was then enacted. Sections 4, 5 and 6 positively imposed a franchise tax on

businesses enjoying a franchise within the province of Pangasinan.

Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislative franchise.

Under Section 5 of its legislative franchise, DIGITEL became liable for the payment of a franchise tax “as

may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses

transacted under it by the grantee,” as well as real property tax “on its real estate, and buildings “exclusive

of this franchise.”

Province of Pangasinan found that Digitel had a franchise tax deficiency for the years of 1992, 1993 and

1994.

In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed RA 7925 (The Public Telecommunications Policy

Act of the Philippines).

Section 23 (Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry), provided for the ipso facto

application to any previously granted telecommunications franchises of any advantage, favor, privilege,

exemption or immunity granted under existing franchises, or those still to be granted, to be accorded

immediately and unconditionally to earlier grantees.

Digitel opposed Pangasinan’s claim on the ground that:

prior to the approval of its legislative franchise, its operation of a telecommunications system was done

under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previously executed with the DOTC. Thus, all revenues

generated from the operation of the facilities inured to the DOTC and all the fees received by petitioner

DIGITEL were purely for services rendered.

under its legislative franchise, the payment of a franchise tax to the BIR would be “in lieu of all taxes” on

said franchise or the earnings therefrom.

The Province of Pangasinan filed a Complaint for Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages

before Branch 68 of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The trial court decided the Province.

Digitel maintains that its legislative franchise being an earlier enactment, by virtue of Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 7925, the ipso facto, immediate and unconditional application to it of the tax exemption

found in the franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell.

WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of provincial franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 in

relation to the exemptions enjoyed by other telephone companies?

Held: No

Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise, Digitel did not enjoy and exemption from the payment of

franchise and real property taxes. In fact the provincial franchise made Digitel liable for the payment of

such taxes.

In the case of PLDT v. City of Davao, SC already clarified the confusion brought about by the effect of

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925 – that the word “exemption” as used in the statute pertains merely to

an exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the NTC and not to the grantee’s

tax liability. Congress did not intend Section 23 to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos.

PLDT’s theory will leave the Government with the burden of having to keep track of all granted

telecommunications franchises, lest some companies be treated unequally. It is different if Congress enacts

a law specifically granting uniform advantages, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity to all

telecommunications entities.

R.A. No. 7925 is a legislative enactment designed to set the national policy on telecommunications and

provide the structures to implement it to keep up with the technological advances in the industry and the

needs of the public. The thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the entry, pricing, and

operations of all public telecommunications entities and thus promote a level playing field in the

telecommunications industry. There is nothing in the language of §23 nor in the proceedings of both the

House of Representatives and the Senate in enacting R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the

grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities, including those whose exemptions had been

withdrawn by the LGC.

In view of the passage of RA 7716 abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications companies

effective 1 January 1996 and in its place is imposed a 10% VAT, the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause/provision

in the legislative franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell, among others, has now become functus officio, made

inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Therefore, from 1 January 1996, Digitel ceased to be liable for

national franchise tax and in its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in accordance with Section 108 of the Tax

Code.

WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estate tax under its legislative franchise.

Held: Yes

SECTION 5. Tax Provisions. – The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate,

buildings, and personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or

hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x.

SC qualifies that such exemption solely applies to those real properties actually, directly and exclusively

used by the grantee in its franchise.

The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing power of Congress and the

delegated authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987 Constitution.

In the PLDT v. City of Davao, SC sustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions over and above the

power of the local government’s delegated taxing authority notwithstanding the source of such power.

Had Congress intended to tax each and every real property of Digitel, regardless of whether or not it is used

in the business or operation of its franchise, it would not have incorporated a qualifying phrase, which such

manifestation admittedly is.

The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece of legislation can be taken to mean that Congress,

knowing fully well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn exemptions from real property

taxes, chose to restore such immunity even to a limited degree.

Said exemption, however, merely applies from the time of the effectivity of petitioner DIGITEL’s

legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.

iii. Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax

Sec of Finance v. Ilarde

Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., was the Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the DOF. He co-owns

with his wife certain properties in Jaro, Iloilo City. Private respondent failed to pay the land taxes for the

years 1986 to 1992. A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes showed that more than 24%

of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private respondent by way of penalties.

Cabaluna paid his land taxes and the receipts were issued to him by the City Treasurer’s Office with the

notation “paid under protest.” After Cabaluna’s retirement, he filed a formal protest with the City Treasurer

of Iloilo wherein he contends that the computation was erroneous since the rate of penalty exceed 24% in

contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 (Real Property Tax Code).

Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real estate taxes

at 24% of the delinquent tax. The Assistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio turned down the protest, citing

Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the DOF.

WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgate Regulations prescribing a rate of penalty on

delinquent taxes other than that provided for under PD 464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code.

Held: No

The subject Regulations must be struck down for being repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real

Property Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the time material to this case.

Under Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real property

tax shall in no case exceed 24% of the delinquent tax

Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No.

2-85 issued by respondent Secretary of Finance provides that “the penalty of two percent (2%) per month of

delinquency or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on

the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that the delinquency is paid for in

full.”

The penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum

shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section

66 of the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-four percent of the

delinquent tax.

The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitioner’s contention that the Regulations at issue are

sanctioned by E.O. No. 73.

The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, is to advance the date of effectivity of the application of the

Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from 01 January 1988, the original date it was intended by E.O. No. 1019

to take effect for purposes stated therein, to 01 January 1987.

E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter the structure of the real property tax assessments as provided for in

P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.

E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of

rates of penalty on delinquent taxes.

E.O. No. 73, particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely designated the Minister of Finance to promulgate

the rules and regulations towards the implementation of E.O. No. 73, particularly on the application of the

Real Property Values as of 31 December 1984, which is the general purpose for enacting said executive

order.

PD 464 in general and Section 66 in particular, remained to be good law. To accept petitioner’s premise

would be tantamount to saying that EO 73 has repealed or amended PD 464.

Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not favored for a law cannot

be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The failure to add a

specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable

inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. SC found no such inconsistency

or repugnancy between EO 73 and Section 66 of PD 464.

A regulation which is in itself invalid for being contrary to law cannot be validated by any act of

endorsement of any official, much less, by a subordinate of the official who issued such regulation.

Estoppel, certainly, cannot make an invalid regulation valid.

The penalties imposed by respondents City Treasurer and Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on the

property of private respondent are valid only up to 24% of the delinquent taxes. The excess penalties paid

should, in view of that, be refunded by the latter.

However, from 01 January 1992 onwards, the proper basis for the computation of the real property tax

payable, including penalties or interests, if applicable, must be Rep. Act No. 7160 inasmuch as Section 534

had expressly repealed P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 7160

provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of

contracts or any source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original

terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such contracts were vested.

Benguet Corp v. CBAA

Benguet Corporation has bunkhouses used by its rank-and-file employees for residential purposes. The

Provincial Assessor of Benguet assessed real property tax on these bunkhouses. According to him, the tax

exemption of bunkhouses under PD 745 was already withdrawn by PD 1955. The main contention if

Benguet Corp is that the realty taxes are local taxes because these taxes are levied by LGUs per Section 39

of PD 464.

Section 39. Rates Of Levy—The provincial, city or municipal board or council shall fix a uniform rate of

real property tax applicable to their respective localities.

Benguet Corp contends that LGUs are without any authority to levy realty taxes on mines per PD 463 and

the Local Tax Code.

WON it is the LGUs and not the National Government which levy realty taxes

Held: No, it is the national government

While the local government units are changed with fixing the rate of real property taxes, it does not

necessarily follow from that authority the determination of the imposition of the tax. LGUs have no

alternative but to collect taxes as mandated by Section 38 ( Incidence of Real Property Tax) of the Real

Property Tax Code. It is clear that is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are

required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the

enforcement of the Real Property Tax Code. There is even no delegation of power to speak of because the

national government has already imposed realty tax in Section 38, leaving only the enforcement to be done

by the local governments.

Realty tax has always been imposed by the law-making body. It is enforced throughout the Philippines and

not merely in a particular municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city,

municipality and barrio where the municipality is situated. (Section 68 of PD 464) IN contrast, a local tax

is imposed by the municipality or city council pursuant to the Local Tax Code.

The provisions of the Local Tax Code and PD 463 alleged by the corporation regarding the absence of

power to levy realty taxes by LGUs on mines are mere limitations on the taxing power of the LGUs and are

not pertinent to the issue in the case at bar. It cannot affect the imposition of real property tax by the

national government.

National Development Co. v. Cebu City

National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCC authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining,

agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributory to economic development or important to public

interest. It also operates subsidiary corporations one of which is National Warehousing Corporation (NWC).

In 1939, the President issued Proclamation No. 430 reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu

City for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. In 1940, a warehouse with a floor area of

1,940 square meters more or less, was constructed thereon. In 1947, EO 93 dissolved NWC with NDC

taking over its assets and functions. In 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes

on the land and the warehouse thereon. By the first quarter of 1970, a substantial amount of the taxes were

paid under protest. NDC asked for a full refund contending that the land and the warehouse belonged to the

Republic and therefore exempt from taxation.

WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes

Held: Yes

To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is

important to establish that the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated agency, and once

government ownership is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or

sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred to

NDC), in the case before Us, is merely the administration of the property while the government retains

ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. 430.

A reserved land is defined as “a public land has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition”. The

government does not part with its title by reserving them, but gives notice to the world that it desires them

for a certain purpose.Absolute disposition of land is not implied from reservation; it merely means “a

withdrawal of a specified portion of the pubic domain from disposal under the land laws and the

appropriation for the time being to some particular use or purpose of the general government.”As its title

remains with the Republic, the reserved land is clearly covered by the tax exemption provision.

However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a different rule should apply

because "[t]he exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public

lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and

these are taxable by the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC

(now under administration by NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as such

improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic.

Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara

Tarlac Enterprises Inc .is the owner of a parcel of land in Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land,

machinery shed and other machinery. These properties were declared for purposes of taxation in the

Provincial Assessor’s Office. The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the years 1974 until

1992 including penalties were not yet paid. Therefore, the Provincial Treasurer filed a complaint praying

that the company pay the said sum as well as damages. The court rendered the decision dismissing the

complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real property

taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light.

The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had been required to pay 2% franchise tax in

line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private respondent to enable the

consumers to enjoy cheaper rates.

WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. No.

464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended.

Held: No

The phrase "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of

P.D. No. 551 does not expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. Said proviso

is modified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings, receipts. income and privilege of generation,

distribution and sale" which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in

view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed,

have no relation at all to, and are entirely different from real properties subject to tax.

If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise grantees from paying real property tax and to make

the 2% franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerated items would not have been added when

PD 852 was enacted to amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority would have simply stopped after the

phrase "national or local authority" by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to enumerate

what should not be subject to tax thereby delimiting the extent of the exemption.

It bears emphasis that P.D. No. 551 as amended by P.D. No. 852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel

oils and the "earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current"

are the items exempted from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff duty. On the other hand, the

collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxes due on real properties. While P.D. No. 551 was

intended to give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations," to

construe said decree as having granted such franchise holders exemption from payment of real property tax

would unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview of the law.

P.D. No. 551 is not as all-encompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the

items which are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax.

It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the

taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the lifeblood of

government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to be exempted from

payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and

too categorical to be misinterpreted. Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty.

iv. Shares of LGUs in National Taxes

1987 Constitution

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which

shall be automatically released to them.

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and

development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including

sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

Sec 284-294, LGC

See attachments

Pimentel v. Aguirre

President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in Government for

Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government departments and agencies, including state

universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will

replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services

items. Section 4 also provided that pending assessment by the Development Budget Coordinating

Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be

withheld. President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be withheld.

WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid

Held: Yes

Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce expenditures by at least 25% is a valid exercise

of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs as it is advisory only. “Supervisory power,

when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any

restraining authority over such body.” (Taule vs. Santos) Under existing law, LGU, in addition to having

administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments

have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national

taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance

with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to

work within the constraints thereof.

Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way

of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national

goals. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and

programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and

local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid

Held: No

Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy. Local

autonomy signified “a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a

system of decentralization. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the share of

LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution. Section 4 orders the

withholding of 10% of IRA “pending he assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget

Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.” Such withholding contravenes the Constitution

and the law. Although temporary, it Is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or

withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the retention does not matter. Any

retention is prohibited.

C. Abatement of Nuisance

Estate of Francisco v. CA

A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by

Gregoria Francisco. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of

Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of

port facilities. The PPA issued to Tan Gin San, spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot

where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. Tan Gin used the

quonset for the storage of copra.

On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance

No. 147, noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal

squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Likewise, according to the Mayor, the

building was outside the warehouse zone; hence it was a non-confirming structure. The notifications

remained unheeded; thus, the Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989. Petitioner sought a Writ of

Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Basilan, which denied the petition and upheld

the power of the Mayor to order the demolition without judicial authority pursuant to Ordinance 147.

On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished. The CA reversed the

RTC and ruled that the mayor was not vested with power to order summarily without any judicial

proceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se. Upon reconsideration,

however, the CA reversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a petition

for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument.

WON it was proper for the Mayor to summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of the non-

conforming structure.

Held: No (Tan Gin entitled to just compensation but not to damages)

It is not disputed that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is located outside

the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be

relocated. In the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Sec 16 of the

Ordinance provides: “A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for by

the owner or agent of the property involved within 12mo from the approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the

non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense.”

Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the provision should not

be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal

government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due

process, as originally held by the CA. The enforcement and administration of the provisions of the

Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator , who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the

necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. Violation of a municipal ordinance

does not empower municipal mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. . On the contrary, the Local

Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection

with the violation of ordinances".

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances

without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate

safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.

The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be

injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it

may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary

abatement without judicial intervention.

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec.

149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance

can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when

demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a

tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no

compelling necessity for precipitate action.

The public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's

quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law.

Technology Developers Inc. v. CA

Petitioner received a letter from acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of

the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter requested Plant Manager Armando

Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c)

Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

Petitioner undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents.

Petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits

previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air

Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner's attention

having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to

secure the same but were not entertained.

Without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent ordered the Municipality's station

commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its

operation. Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction

against private respondent. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction upon posting of a bond worth P50,000. During the MR, the Provincial Prosecutor

presented his evidence prepared by Marivic Guina, “Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw

materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to

the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air

pollution device is installed and operational." The lower court then set aside the order which granted a writ

of preliminary mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.

WON the Mayor validly issued the closure order?

Held: YES

The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought

by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. The mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its

inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to

operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or

avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the

business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant

whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the

area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,

Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic

Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding

houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented

a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution

Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had

not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution

and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It

must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the

growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the

people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA

Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the

region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of

permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held: LLDA

Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the

LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or

activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish

enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the

exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant

fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a

definite zone of the municipal waters.

The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter

water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly

repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the

legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear

and expressed.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since

it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an

exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromental protection,

navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for

the Authority to proceed with its mission.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the

Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No.

4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of

fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to

exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

D. Power of Eminent Domain

Rule 67 Expropriation, Rules of Court

Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified

complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or

personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,

or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each

defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the

Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that

the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall

be made in the complaint. (1a)

Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of

the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right

to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized

government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation

to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu

thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of

the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.

If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited

shall be promptly fixed by the court.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the

plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with

service of copies to the parties. (2a)

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his

property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically

designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the

summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or

defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The

answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the

nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his

property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or

any subsequent pleading.

A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may

permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However,

at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or

answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he

may share in the distribution of the award. (n)

Sec. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to

expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the

court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property

sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of

just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,

whichever came first.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved

thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be

paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the

proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)

Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall

appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and

report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall

designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify

the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the

commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within

thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)

Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the

commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as

commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be

introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings

before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the

parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may

measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners

shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential

damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the

property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the

corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed

the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

(6a)

Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order the commissioners to report

when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render

judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to

subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such

property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and

such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered

judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court,

such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their

appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the

clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten

(10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)

Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in

the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have

filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing,

accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the

same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new

commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render

such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of

expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (8a)

Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there

are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation

for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be

entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the

defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or

purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)

Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of

the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the

property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the

right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in

the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of

section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the

amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same

effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)

Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property

of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from

the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment

shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of

the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may

recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)

Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the

proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff,

unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the

costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)

Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state

definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature

of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy

of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated,

and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or

purpose. (13a)

Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person

judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on

behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of

property belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or

person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent.

(14a)

Sec 19, LGC

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant

to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefits

of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be

exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not

accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the

property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court

of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration

of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated

property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of

the property.

Moday v. CA

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing its municpal

mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings against he property of Percival Moday for a farmers center and

government sports facilities. The resolution was approved by the mayor and transmitted to the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan for approval. The latter disapproved it and returned it with comment to the Municipality

stating that expropriation was unnecessary because there are still available lots in Bunawan for the purpose.

The municipality filed a motion to take possession of the land and this was granted by the RTC.

The petitioner attacks the validity of the resolution because it was not approved by the province.

WON a municipality’s resolution authorizing its mayor to expropriate was rendered invalid by its

disapproval by the province

Held: No.

The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to

declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang

Bayan or the Mayor to issue.

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution for the

Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its

Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution. The resolution is, therefore, valid and

binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA

The Province of Camarines Sur authorized its governor by resolution to expropriate a piece of land

contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional

agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

The governor filed expropriation cases in the RTC and then filed motions for the issuance of writs of

possessions.

The owners, San Joaquins, moved to dismiss the complaints for inadequacy of the price offered for the

property.

The RTC granted the writs of possession. The San Joaquins appealed to the CA which set aside the order

allowing CamSur to take possession. It ordered the RTC to suspend further proceedings until after CamSur

shall have obtained the requisite approval of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of

the land from agricultural to non-agricultural.

WON a local government unit needs the approval of the DAR to reclassify land before it can expropriate it

Held: No.

A reading of previous jurisprudence shows that the power of eminent domain is superior to the power to

distribute lands under the land reform program.

The local government units power of expropriation is a delegated power. In delegating the power, the

legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local

governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.

Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law

conferring the power or in other legislations.

The Local Government Code does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the

approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-

agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no

provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of

agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or

constricted by implication.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate

agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first

applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of

these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department

of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of

the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace

the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto.

The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take

possession of private respondents' property and requiring the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the

approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from

agricultural to non-agricultural use are set aside.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor

Barangay San Roque filed an expropriation suit with the Municipal Trial Court against the properties of the

respondents. It was dismissed by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction. The lower court reasoned that an action

for eminent domain is incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction should, therefore, lie with the

RTC.

The case was then filed with the RTC but it was again dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC was of

the view that an action for eminent domain involved title to real property and the value of said property is

determinative of jurisdiction. And the property involved in this case is P1,740 or less than P20,000.

Therefore, it ruled, jurisdiction is with the MTC.

Which court has jurisdiction over actions for eminent domain?

Held: RTC.

Actions for eminent domain are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus jurisdiction properly lies with

the RTC.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,

the criterion is of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for

the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the

money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such actions are cases

where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively

by RTC.

The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class of cases, besides the determination of damages,

demands an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of RTC.

Actions for eminent domain involve two phases.

The first is concerned with the determination of

the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain

and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.

It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a

lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the

complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the

complaint.’

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of ‘the just

compensation for the property sought to be taken.’

This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the

just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final,

too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court

regarding the issue.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or

any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the

courts determine:

the authority of the government entity,

the necessity of the expropriation,

and the observance of due process.

In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter

that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-

bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation

suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the

expropriation.

Municipality of Paranaque v. VM Realty Corp

The Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over

two parcels of land for the purpose of providing socialized housing. It authorized its mayor to file the

complaint by a resolution.

Later, the Municipality passed an Ordinance for the same purpose. It is claimed that by res judicata, the

municipality is barred from filing another expropriation proceeding.

WON authorization by a resolution is sufficient for compliance with the requisites under the LGC

Held: No.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the

exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the

power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control

and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." And Section 19 of

the LGC requires authorization by ordinance.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent

domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief

executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue

expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the

benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the

Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought

to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a

resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a

lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a

resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently. A third reading is necessary

for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian

members.

WON res judicata may apply

HELD: All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. Be that as it may, the

principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right

of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent

power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior

judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every

form of property which the State might need for public use." "All separate interests of individuals in

property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the

grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the

government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to

resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its

authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-

compliance with any legal requirement.

Our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution

will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all

others are properly complied with.

However, while the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent

domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

City of Cebu v. CA

The City of Cebu authorized its mayor by both resolution and city ordinance to expropriate the property of

Merlita Cardeno. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss asseverating that the allegations in the City’s complaint

do no show compliance with the condition precedent of a valid and definite offer. The allegation states,

“that repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have the aforementioned property

purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations

failed.”

She argues that, “by definition, negotiations run the whole range of acts preparatory to concluding an

agreement, from the preliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of the agreement; the price; the

mode of payment; obligations of the parties may conceive as necessary to their agreement." Thus,

"negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the foregoing and does not automatically mean the making of

"a valid and definite offer."

WON the City has complied with the condition precedent of a valid and definite offer

Held: Yes.

1. The ambiguity in the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss but rather a bill of

particulars.

2. The RTC and CA should not have strictly applied the rule that in a motion to dismiss, no

evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of allegations

of the complaint. Jurisprudence has established exceptions to this rule. This case should

similarly be treated with liberality. Here an examination of the City’s “Comment and

Opposition” to the Motion to Dismiss leave no room for doubt that petitioner had indeed

made a “valid and definite offer.

3. Also, attached to the complaint and made an integral part of it is the Ordinance authorizing

the Mayor to expropriate the property. The rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically

admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. And the Ordinance staes that the city

government has made valid and definite offer.

(The court did not decide whether or not “negotiations” is compliance with the requirement.)

Francia v. Municipality of Meycauyan

The Municipality of Meycauayan filed a complaint for expropriation against the petitioners to obtain

property located at a highway junction to be used as a public terminal. The Municipality deposited the

fifteen percent of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration and the RTC

granted it the writ of possession.

The petitioner claims that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ without first

conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose.

WON determination of public purpose is a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession

Held: No.

The Local Government Code states that “local government unit may immediately take possession of the

property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court

of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration

of the property to be expropriated”.

The requisites before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property are only that (1)

a complaint for expropriation must have been filed sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and

(2) a deposit of 15% of the property’s fair market value based on its current tax declaration must have been

made.

The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ

of possession.

Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI Cebu City for the expropriation of some

282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for the development into

integrated sport complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The

defendants (now petitioners) have the common allegation that the taking is not impressed with public use

under the Constitution, that there is no specific provision authorizing the taking for tourism purposes. Also,

they are claiming that the lands are under the land reform program thus it is the Court of Agrarian Relations

and not the CFI that has jurisdiction. The Court issued writs of possession authorizing the PTA to take

immediate possession upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent to 10% of the

value of the properties.

HELD: Expropriation is valid.

The State’s power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although

this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution. The policy objectives of the framers can be

expressed only in general terms. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and

according to place. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes; it does not strictly mean

use by the public. Expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports

and hotel complex constitutes expropriation for public use. Also, the government is authorized to take

immediate possession, control and disposition of the property notwithstanding the issues pending in court

upon deposit with the PNB of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property.

Defendants (now petitioners) failed to show that area being expropriated is land reform area. In fact, only

8,970 square meters (less than 1hec.-just 2 property owners) of 283 hectares is part of the Operation Land

Transfer. This 8,970 sq. m. is not even within the sports complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares

resettlement area where the petitioners would be provided with proper housing, schools, etc.

Filstream International Inc. v. CA

Filstream is the property owner of parcels of lands located in Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. It filed

an ejectment suit against the occupants (private respondents) on the grounds of termination of lease and

non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and executory after the CA affirmed the decision

of the RTC.

During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of

Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance

No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means of certain parcels of

land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain

parcels of land situated along Antonio River which formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said

properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of

the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate

lands in Antonio Rivera St. the Court issued a Writ of Possession. Filstream is claiming that Ordinance No.

7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a public hearing and violative of the constitutional

guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts, the price was too low.

HELD: Expropriation is not valid.

The City of Manila did not comply with RA 7279, Secs. 9 and 10. The City of Manila has the power to

expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program which must be

done pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. There are limitations with respect to

the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to

acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the

same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have

been exhausted.

Also, Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of respondent CA which ordered the dismissal of its

Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the CA

by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings

which are blurred and unreadable. Petitioner argues that the respondent court erred in giving more premium

to form rather than substance. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would

defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of the

petitioner. At stake in the appeal is the exercise of their properties rights over the disputed premises which

have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect,

the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on those grounds is tantamount to a

deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation

proceedings

Hagonoy Market Vendors Association v. Mun of Hagonoy Bulacan

On Oct. 1, 1996, the Sanguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28

which increased the stall rentals of market vendors in Hagonoy. Art.3 provided that it shall take effect upon

approval. The subject ordinance was posted from Nov. 4-25, 1996. In the last week of Nov. 1997, the

petitioner’s members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it

shall be enforced in Jan. 1998. On Dec. 8, 1997, the petitioner’s President filed an appeal with the Secretary

of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance.

Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It

contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was

posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal, made over a year later, was

already time-barred.

The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time – beyond the 30

days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on Oct. 1, 1996 as prescribed under Sec.187 of the 1991 LGC.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the CA, claiming the Sec. erred and

should have overlooked the technicality and ruled on its petition on the merits. CA dismissed its petition for

being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the

Sec. of Justice.

HELD: Ordinance is valid & petition should be dismissed for being time-barred.

The petitioner insists that it had good reasons for its failure to comply with the rule and the CA erred in

refusing to accept its explanation. This Court agrees with the petitioner. It is clear from the records that the

petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolution certified by the Dept. of Justice

but failed to do so on account of typhoon Loleng. Nonetheless, the Court held that the petition should be

dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Sec. of Justice was already time-barred. Sec. 187 of the

1991 LGC states that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Sec. of Justice

within 30 days from the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Mun.

Ord, No. 28 took effect in Oct. 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in Dec. 1997. The periods stated in Sec.

187 LGC are mandatory. Being a revenue measure, the collection of which is of paramount importance thus

it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time.

Petitioners cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the

proposed measure were not considered by the Sanguniang Bayan. Public hearings are conducted by

legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance.

However, the views are not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the

same.

Also, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Sec. 6c.04 of the 1993 Mun. Rev. Code &

Sec 191 of the LGC limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals.

Neither can it be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed. The ordinance covered 3 public markets.

However, it excluded Bagong Munisipyo from the increase since it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place

intended for transient peddlers.

RP v. CA

Notes:

Lot to be expropriated for the broadcast operation and use of VP. Deposited amount provisionally fixed. 9

years after Court ordered condemnation and payment of just compensation.

NG failed to pay.

Santos (1) pay current zonal value or (2) return expropriated property

HELD: no right to recover

On Sept. 19, 1969, petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before RTC Bulacan covering a total of

554,980 sq.m. of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway to be utilized for the continued

broadcast operation and use of radio trasnsmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project.

Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the

property. On Feb. 26, 1979 or nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial

courts issued an order condemning the properties of the defendants and ordering the plaintiff to pay the

defendants just compensation. It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents

the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a

motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the court issued a writ of execution for

the implementation thereof. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hec. of the

expropriated land to the Bulacan State University. Despite the court’s order, the Santos heirs remained

unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the

deposit in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation. The Santos heirs submitted a

counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of

P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the expropriated property. The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the

Santos heirs declaring its previous decision to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance

with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may

be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry.

HELD: Expropriation is valid; private respondents have no right to recover the property. The right of

eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial

sovereignty for a public purpose. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial for the condemning

authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the

condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property and the

defendant asserts title/ interest in the property not to prove a right of possession but to prove a right to

compensation for the taking. Petitioner has occupied and has exercised dominion over the property pursuant

to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee has amounted to atleast a partial

compliance of the 1979 decision thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-

execution.

In determining the public use, 2 approaches are used – actual use by the public and public benefit/

advantage. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization since its present use differs from the

original use contemplated in the 1979 decision. This is of no moment, the property has assumed a public

character upon its expropriation. Petitioner is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that

property.

The constitutional limitation of the just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market

value of the property fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. However, between the actual

taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests may accrue in order to place the owner in a

position as good as but not better than the position he was in before the taking occurred.

E. Reclassification of Lands

CARP Act

See attachments

Sec 9 and 11, RA 8435

SECTION 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones. - The Department, in

consultation with the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade and Industry, the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Science and Technology, the concerned

LGUs, the organized farmers and fisherfolk groups, the private sector and communities shall, without

prejudice to the development of identified economic zones and free ports, establish and delineate, based on

sound resource accounting, the SAFDZ within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.

All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments,

and lands with existing or having the potential for growing high-value crops so delineated and included

within the SAFDZ shall not be converted for a period of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act:

Provided, however, That not more than five percent (5%) of the said lands located within the SAFDZ may

be converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and

administrative orders relating to land use conversion: Provided, further, That thereafter: 1) a review of the

SAFDZ, specifically on the productivity of the areas, improvement of the quality of life of farmers and

fisherfolk, and efficiency and effectiveness of the support services shall be conducted by the Department

and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on

Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization; 2) conversion may be allowed; if at all, on a case-to-case basis

subject to existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders

governing land use conversion; and, 3) in case of conversion, the land owner will pay the Department the

amount equivalent to the government's investment cost including inflation.

SECTION 10. Preparation of Land Use and Zoning Ordinance. - Within one (1) year from the finalization

of the SAFDZ, in every city and municipality, all cities and municipalities shall have prepared their

respective land use and zoning ordinance incorporating the SAFDZ, where applicable. Thereafter, all land

use plans and zoning ordinances shall be updated every four (4) years or as often as may be deemed

necessary upon the recommendation of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and must be

completed within the first year of the term of the mayor. If the cities/municipalities fail to comply with the

preparation of zoning and land use plans, the DILG shall impose the penalty as provided for under Republic

Act No. 7160.

SECTION 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. - Any person or juridical

entity who knowingly or deliberately causes any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7) hectares or larger,

whether contiguous or not, within the protected areas for agricultural development, as specified under

Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle and unproductive for a period exceeding one (1)

year, unless due to force majeure, shall be subject to an idle land tax of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)

per hectare per year. In addition, the violator shall be required to put back such lands to productive

agricultural use. Should the continued agricultural inactivity, unless due to force majeure, exceed a period

of two (2) years, the land shall be subject to escheat proceedings.

Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2)

to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's investment cost, or

both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement

thereon.

In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an administrative

proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:

a) Cancellation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and

b) Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications that they may

file with the DAR.

Fortich v. Corono

This concerns the motion for reconsideration of the court’s resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998 and motion to

refer the case to the Court en banc. In the previous case, the Court voted 2-2 on the separate MRs, as a

result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated Jan. 27, 1999 that the

movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already

denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited.

In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed the case be referred to the court en banc inasmuch

as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of 2-2, the required number to carry a decision under the

Constitution, 3votes, was not met.

HELD: The issues presented before the Court by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to

merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically the issue of whether or not the power of the local

government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of DAR is no longer novel, this having been

decided in Province of Camarines Sur v. CA wherein the Court held that local government units need not

obtain approval of the DAR to convert lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Intervenors insist that they are the real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued

certificates of land ownership award and that while they are seasonal farmers, they have been identified by

DAR as qualified beneficiaries of property. The issuance of CLOA to them does not grant them the

requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a

resolution that is null and void. The same is void and has no legal effect considering that the March 29,

1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing

of the MR which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution.

Roxas and Co v. IAC

Pres. Cory promulgated Proc. No. 131 instituting CARP and EO No. 229 providing for mechanisms

necessary to implement CARP. Later when Congress formally convened, it passed RA 6657 or the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner Roxas is the property owner of Haciendas Palico, Banilad

and Caylaway. Before CARL took effect, petitioner voluntarily offered to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant

to EO 229. The other two were placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance

with CARL.

Petitioner instituted a case with DAR Adjudication Bd. To cancel the CLOAs issued alleging that the place

where the haciendas are located was declared a tourist zone and that the land is not suitable for agricultural

production. DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was

subject to agrarian reform and should be submitted to the Office of the Sec. of Agrarian Reform. Petitioner

then filed a case with the CA questioning the expropriation of the properties under CARL and the denial of

due process in the acquisition of the land. CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

HELD: This Court can take cognizance of petitioner’s petition despite his failure to exhaust administrative

remedies since his action falls under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies since there is

no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The CLOAs to the farmers were issued without just

compensation to the petitioner. The transfer of possession/ ownership to the government is conditioned

upon the receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment/ deposit by the DAR. Until then, the title

should remain with the landowner. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP

bonds. Resp. DAR’s opening of a trust account deposit in petitioner’s name with the Land Bank of the Phil.

does not constitute payment under the law.

The acquisition proceedings over the 3 haciendas are invalid. (1) There was improper service of Notice of

Acquisition – Sec. 16 of CARL requires that the said notice be sent to the landowner by personal delivery

or registered mail. The Revised Rules of Proc. of DARAB states that notices and pleadings are served on

private corporations through its president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors or

partners. Jaime Pimentel to whom the Notice was served was neither of those. (2) Parcels of land were not

properly identified before they were taken by DAR – under the law, a landowner may retain not more than

5 hec. the right to choose the retained land pertains to the landowner. Upon the receipt of Notice of

Acquisition, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory

acquisition.

Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural. DAR’s

failure to observe due process does not ipso facto give the Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s

application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non. The agency charged with the mandate

of approving applications for conversion is DAR.

F. Closure and Opening of Roads

Sec 21, LGC

Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,

permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:

Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-

thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public

facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for

the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be

used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit

concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed

permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual

emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public

works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified

by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road,

alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially

sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate

the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea

or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,

commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

Cabrera v. CA

The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 which provided for the closure of an old

road leading to the new Capitol Bldng. and giving the owners of the properties traversed by the new road

equal area from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their property. Pursuant thereto,

Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to the private

respondents portions of the closed road.

In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner’s house was planted with vegetables

by one of the private respondents. Another private respondent converted a part of the old road into a piggery

farm. Learning about Res. 158, petitioner filed a complaint for Restoration of Public Road and/or

Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents for Damages. Petitioner alleges that the

land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental

function and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contends that Res. No. 158 and the deeds of

exchange were invalid as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road.

HELD: Closure is valid.

The closure of a provincial road is within the powers of the Provincial Bd. It is the authority competent to

determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary to public use. Such power to vacate a street is

discretionary and such will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts absent a plain case

of abuse or fraud. The Board has the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the

inhabitants of the province. This authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds

to the Province for the construction of roads.

Petitioner is not entitled to damages. The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the

closed section of a street has no right of compensation for the closing or vacation of the street. To warrant

recovery, the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages

differing in kind and not merely in degree from those sustained by the public generally. The construction of

the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience petitioner suffered

pales in significance to the greater convenience the new road has been giving the public.

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Association Inc.

MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, while BAVA is

a non-stock non-profit corporation whose members are home owners in Bel-Air Village, a private

subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On 26 Dec 1995 BAVA received from MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta a notice requesting it to open

Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting 2 Jan 1996. BAVA was also informed that the perimeter

wall separating the subdivision from adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On 2 Jan 1996,

BAVA instituted a petition before the RTC Makati City Br 136 for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary

injunction enjoining the opening of said street and the demolition of the wall. The TRO was issued the

following day. But on 23 Jan 1996, after due hearing, it denied the preliminary injunction. BAVA appealed.

CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on 13 Feb 1996 it issued a writ of preliminary

injunction. It later on granted the petition (making the writ permanent), reasoning that MMDA had no

authority to order the opening of a private subdivision road nor to demolish the subdivision’s perimeter

wall. MR was denied.

WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic without an ordinance enacted by

Makati City

HELD: No

MMDA is not a local government which is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted

by law and has substantial control of local affairs. MMDA’s charter RA 7924 limited MMDA’s function to

the delivery of seven basic services, one of which is transport and traffic management. It is limited to the

following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,

monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in RA 7924

that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. All its functions are administrative in

nature. MMDA is not the same entity as its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission because the charter

of MMC (PD 824) shows that MMC possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on MMDA.

Unlike MMC, MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,

acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative and police power. In this case,

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening

of Neptune Street; hence, its proposed opening by MMDA is illegal.

Sangalang v. IAC

Buyers of lots in Bel-Air Village, owned and operated by Makati Development Corporation (later on

merged with Ayala Corporation) were required to comply with certain deed restrictions, one of which is that

the lots shall be used only for residential purposes. On 4 Apr 1975 the municipal council of Makati enacted

Ordinance 81 (zonification of Makati), wherein Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential

Zone, with its boundary extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. A subsequent Ordinance 81-01 of the

Metro Manila Commission however showed that Bel-Air Village was simply bound by Jupiter Street, and

the area on the other side was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. Due to the reclassification,

commercial establishments appeared along Jupiter Street, in violation of the deed restrictions. The Office of

the Mayor of Makati wrote the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), directing that, in the interest of

public welfare, certain streets should be opened to ease traffic congestion. The Makati municipal officials

allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates forcibly, and opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to

public traffic. Ayala Corporation donated the entire Jupiter Street to BAVA, but even before 1978 the

Makati Police and the security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the traffic along Jupiter

Street after the gates were opened in 1977. Residents of Jupiter Street (the Sangalang spouses, Gaston

spouses, and Briones spouses) and the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) filed separate actions

against Ayala Corporation and the lot owners who allowed their lots to be used for commercial purposes.

Three of the five trial courts in the five petitions ruled in favor of the petitioners, while two were dismissed

on procedural and substantive grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five petitions, on the

ground that the ordinances, both being valid as a legitimate exercise of police power, allowed the use of

Jupiter Street for commercial purposes.

WON there was a violation of the deed restrictions

HELD: No

There was no violation of the deed restrictions as Jupiter Street, which was the common boundary for the

commercial and residential zones, was never exclusively for residential or commercial purposes only. This

is confirmed by the fact that both ordinances as well as the BAVA Articles of Incorporation treat Jupiter

Street as the boundary line – making it clear that Jupiter Street was intended for use by both commercial

and residential blocks from the very beginning.

WON the MMC Ordinance, raised by Ayala Corporation as an affirmative defense, was a legitimate

exercise of police power

HELD: Yes

The National Government itself, through the MMC, had reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density

commercial zone pursuant to its Ordinance 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the

strength alone of the deed restrictions. This is not to say that restrictive easements are invalid or ineffective.

As far as Bel-Air Village is concerned, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts,

subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in

the legitimate exercise of police power. The sanctity of contract cannot be raised as a deterrent to police

power, which is designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the

expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness

on the part of MMC, the ordinance reclassifying Jupiter Street should be upheld.

Macasiano v. Diokno

On 13 Jun 1990, the Municipality of Parañaque passed Ordinance 86 (Series of 1990) which authorized the

closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt Garcia Extension and Opena Streets in Baclaran and the

establishment of a flea market thereon. This ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to

the Metro Manila Commission Ordinance 2 (Series of 1979) authorizing and regulating the use of certain

city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metro Manila as sites for flea market and/or

vending areas under certain terms and conditions. The municipal council on 20 Jun 1990 issued a resolution

authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the

establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8 Aug

1990, Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag), a service cooperative was made a flea market

operator subject to municipality dues for such operation. On 13 Sep 1990, Brig Gen Levy Macasiano (PNP

Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command) ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls

along G.G. Cruz and J Gabriel Streets. B/Gen Macasiano on 16 Oct 1990 gave notice to Palanyag that it had

10 days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise the market stalls would be dismantled. The Municipality

and Palanyag filed with RTC Makati Br 62 (Judge Roberto Diokno presiding) a petition for prohibition and

mandamus with damages and a prayer for preliminary injunction. RTC issued a TRO against Macasiano

pending the hearing, and later on upheld the validity of the ordinance.

WON an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use

of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid

HELD: No

Said streets which were closed off are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered

public properties of the municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public

service are deemed public and under the absolute control of Congress. Local governments have no authority

to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec 10, Loc Gov Code (BP 337, which was the applicable law at the time)empowers the local governments

to close roads, but this provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already

established by law:

1. Art 424, CC: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in

general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private

persons.

2. To withdraw a property from public use, the requirement of due process should be complied with, and

circumstances should show that the property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public

service. (When the property is withdrawn from public use, it becomes patrimonial property of the LGU.)

The Municipality has not shown that it has complied with the conditions precedent set by the Metropolitan

Manila Authority for the latter to approve of such ordinance. (Conditions are that the streets are not used

for vehicular traffic and that majority of the residents are not opposed to the establishment of a flea

market/vending area, and that there is a time schedule in during which the flea market would operate.)

Furthermore, the powers of a LGU should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-

being of the members of the community. It is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran are congested

with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. Thus,

allowing the flea market would be contrary to the local government’s sworn obligation to enact measures

that will enhance the public health and safety of the municipality’s inhabitants.

G. Corporate Powers

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following

powers:

(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

(2) To sue and be sued;

(3) To have and use a corporate seal;

(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;

(5) To enter into contracts; and

(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this

Code and other laws.

(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals:

Provided, That newly established local government units or those without corporate seals may create their

own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the Interior and Local Government:

Provided, further, That any change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein.

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in

behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible

copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal

or barangay hall.

(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in

the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other

applicable laws.

H. Liability for damages

Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability

for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

I. Authority to negotiate and secure grants; receive donations; float bonds; build-operate-

transfer

Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. Local chief executives may, upon authority of the

sanggunian, negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or

facilities enumerated under Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity

of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or office of the National

Government of from any higher local government unit: Provided, That projects financed by such grants or

assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned:

Provided, further, That when such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30)

days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.

The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of

donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the

President.

J. Mayor’s power over the police: Operational control; suspension

RA 8551

See attachments

Sec 28, LGC

Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. The extent of

operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and

jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of

Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The

Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued

pursuant thereto.

Part III

Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

Sec 39 – 75, LGC

Qualifications of elective officials (Sec. 39)

1. citizen of the Philippines

2. registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or district (only in the case of a

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan)

where he intends to be elected

3. a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election

4. able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

5. Age requirements for candidates, as of election day:

a. governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-

mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities - at least 23

years old

b. mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or

municipalities - at least 21 years old

c. punong barangay , member of the sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or

sangguniang barangay - at least 18 years old

d. sangguniang kabataan - at least 15 years old but not more than 21 years old

Certificates of candidacy to be taken at face value

COMELEC may not deny due course or cancel a certificate without proper proceedings. To receive and

acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy is a ministerial duty of COMELEC. The COMELEC

does not have discretion to give or not to give due course to the certificate. It may not look into matters not

appearing on their face (Cipriano v. COMELEC [2004]).

Rationale of residency requirement

The residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted with

the needs, difficulties, and other matters vital to the common welfare of the constituents. The actual,

physical and personal presence is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and

for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. A very legalistic, academic and technical

approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy the rationale for the said requirement (Torayno v.

COMELEC [2000]).

Disqualifications of elective officials (Sec. 40)

1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense

punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence

2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case

3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic

4. Those with dual citizenship

5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad

and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

7. The insane or feeble-minded.

8. Other grounds for disqualification:

a. Vote-buying, upon determination in a summary administrative proceeding. (Nolasco v.

COMELEC [1997]).

b. Previously-elected official. Any elective official who has resigned from his office,

which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation

(by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason), is disqualified from running

in a special election (from RA 8295, “An act providing for the proclamation of a lone

candidate for any elective office in a special election, and for other purposes”).

c. Politically-motivated acts. Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes,

threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence,

injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons

aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his

honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate, where

evidence of guilt is strong (also from RA 8295).

Term of Office (Sec. 43)

1. For all elective officials except barangay officials: 3 years, starting from noon of June 30,

1992 or such date as may be provided for by law.

a. all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the

ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992

2. For barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan: 3 years, which shall begin

after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

3. No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.

4. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an

interruption in the continuity of service

See also Sec. 8, Art. X, 1987 Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more

than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be

considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Elections (Sec. 41, 42)

Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall be held every 3 years on the second

Monday of May.

Official How elected

Governor, vice-governor, mayor, vice-

mayor, punong barangay

At large, by all the qualified voters in

their respective units

Sangguniang kabataan chairman By the registered voters of the katipunan

ng kabataan1

Members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan

By the qualified voters in their district

1 Sec. 424, LGC: “Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months, who are 15 but not more than 21 years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.”

Members of the sangguniang barangay At large

Other members of the various sanggunian

1. The presidents of the leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall

serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

2. The presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan"

elected by their respective chapters shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan

3. There shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women, one (1) from the workers, and one

(1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, disabled

persons, or any other sector as may be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety

(90) days prior to the holding of the next local elections as may be provided for by law.

Vacancies and Succession of Elective OFficials

Permanent Vacancies (Sec. 44)

Arises when an elective local official:

1. fills a higher vacant office

2. refuses to assume office

3. fails to qualify

4. dies

5. is removed from office

6. voluntarily resigns

7. is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office

Filling of vacancy by automatic succession (Sec. 44)

Permanent Vacancy Successor

1. Office of the governor, mayor Vice-governor, vice-mayor

2. Offices of governor & vice-governor, or mayor &

vice-mayor

- Highest-ranking sanggunian member, or in case of

his permanent inability,

- The second highest-ranking sanggunian member

3. Office of the punong barangay - Highest-ranking sanggunian member, or in case of

his permanent inability,

- The second highest-ranking sanggunian member

For purposes of succession, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of

votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the

immediately preceding local election.

A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots

The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

Filling of vacancy by appointment (Sec. 45)

Resorted to when automatic succession provided in Sec. 44 does not apply

Permanent Vacancy Appointing Power

1. Sangguniang panlalawigan; sangguniang

panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and

independent component cities

President, through the Executive Secretary

2. Sangguniang panlungsod of component cities;

sangguniang bayan

Governor

3. Sangguniang barangay City or municipal mayor, upon recommendation

of the sangguniang barangay concerned

General Rule: the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member

who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. To ensure this, a

nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party

concerned are conditions sine qua non.

Effects if nomination and certificate are absent:

a. any appointment without such shall be null and void ab initio

b. ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor

Exceptions: In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any

political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint

any qualified person to fill the vacancy

In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall

be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.

Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive (Sec. 46)

Arises when the local chief executive (governor, mayor, or punong barangay):

1. is on leave of absence

2. is on travel abroad

3. is suspended from office

4. is otherwise temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons

General rule: the vice-governor, city/municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay

member shall automatically exercise the powers, and perform the duties and functions, of the local chief

executive.

Exception: The power to appoint/suspend/dismiss employees, which can be exercised only if the period of

temporary incapacity exceeds 30 working days.

General rule: The local chief executive cannot authorize any local official to assume the

powers/duties/functions of his office, other than the vice-governor, city/municipal vicemayor, or highest

ranking sangguniang barangay member.

Exception: If the local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction

for a period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge. The

authorization shall specify the powers and functions that the officer-in-charge shall exercise, which does not

include the power to appoint/suspend/dismiss EEs.

Exception to the exception: If the local chief executive fails/refuses to issue the authorization, the vice-

governor, city/municipal vice-mayor, or highest ranking sangguniang barangay member has right to assume

the powers/duties/functions of the office on the 4th day of absence.

The temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written

declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where the

temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary

documents showing that said legal causes no longer exist.

Acting governor cannot simultaneously act as vice-governor. A vice-governor who is concurrently an

acting governor is actually a quasi-governor. Being the acting governor, the vice cannot continue to

simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the governor for a

full-time occupant to discharge them. Hence, there is an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding

officer (vice-governor) to preside during the sanggunian sessions, which calls for the election of a

temporary presiding officer (Gamboa v. Aguirre [1999]).

The governor has the power to fill vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by a member not belonging to

any political party. It is the same manner as where the member belonged to a political party. Where there is

no political party to make the nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered

authority for making the recommendation. The appointing authority is limited to the appointment of those

recommended to the governor. The recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the

appointment (Fariñas v. Barba [1996]).

Leaves of Absence (Sec. 47)

LOA of To be approved by

1. Governor; mayor of a highly urbanized city or an

independent component city

The President or his duly authorized representative

2. Vice-governor; city / municipal vice-mayor Local chief executive concerned

3. Members of the sanggunian and its employees Vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned

4. Mayor or component city / municipality Governor

5. Punong barangay City / municipal mayor

6. Sangguniang barangay members Punong barangay

Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted upon within five (5)

working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence shall be deemed approved.

Local Legislation

Where local legislative power vests (Sec. 48)

1. sangguniang panlalawigan for the province

2. sangguniang panlungsod for the city

3. sangguniang bayan for the municipality

4. sangguniang barangay for the barangay

Presided over by the vice-governor, vice-mayor, or punong barangay. And because the presider is not a

member of the Sanggunian, he can vote only in case of a tie (Perez v. Dela Cruz [1969]).

Should the vice-governor, vice-mayor or punong barangay be unable to preside, the members present and

constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.

The temporary presiding officer shall certify, within 10 days from the passage of ordinances enacted and

resolutions adopted, such ordinances and resolutions in the session over which he temporarily

See also Sec. 20, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. “Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions

of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative

powers over:

1. Administrative organization;

2. Creation of sources of revenues;

3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;

4. Personal, family, and property relations;

5. Regional urban and rural planning development;

6. Economic, social, and tourism development;

7. Educational policies;

8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the

people of the region.”

Internal Rules of Procedure (Sec. 50)

Every sanggunian must adopt or update its existing rules of procedure, on the first regular session

following the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter

The rules of procedure shall provide for the following:

1. The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers

2. the creation of standing committees (eg., committees on appropriations, women and family,

human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, cooperatives, etc.), their

general jurisdiction, their chairpersons, and their members

3. The order and calendar of business for each session

4. The legislative process

5. The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions

6. The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four

(4) consecutive sessions,

a. the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-

thirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian members

b. a member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any

crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian;

and

7. Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt

Quorum (Sec. 53)

A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a

quorum to transact official business

Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to

call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results

Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as a quorum is

constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day

Majority of the members present may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without

justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by the police force assigned in

the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the session

If there is still no quorum despite this, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper

motion duly approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack of quorum

Sessions (Sec. 52)

Regular Sessions. The sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions on

the first session day immediately after the election of its members.

The minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be:

once a week for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan

twice a month for the sangguniang barangay

Special Sessions. Special sessions may be called by the local chief executive or by a majority of the

members of the sanggunian whenever public interest so demands.

In the case of special sessions, a written notice to the members shall be served personally at the member's

usual place of residence at least 24 hours before the special session is held. And unless otherwise concurred

in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no other matters may

be considered at a special session except those stated in the notice.

General rule: all sessions shall be open to the public

Exception: unless a closed-door session is ordered by an affirmative vote of majority of the members

present, there being a quorum

Reasons for closed-door session: public interest, reasons of security, decency, or morality.

No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day.

Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings, which may be published upon

resolution of the sanggunian concerned.

Full disclosure of conflict of interest of members (Sec. 51)

Conflict of interest refers in general to one where it may be reasonably deduced that a member of a

sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or other personal

considerations that may tend to affect his judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public.

Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of:

his business and financial interests

professional relationship, or

any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree

with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the

sanggunian of which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest.

Such relationship shall include:

Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the ordinance or

resolution may apply

Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or resolution under

consideration may affect

The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the secretary of the

sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member.

The disclosure shall form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be made:

before the member participates in the deliberations on the ordinance or resolution under

consideration

before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings, if the member did not

participate during the deliberations

when a member takes a position or makes a privilege speech on a matter that may affect the

business interest, financial connection, or professional relationship described herein

Approval and Vetoing of Ordinances (Sec. 54, 55)

1. Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan:

a. Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan shall

be presented to the local chief executive (i.e., the governor or mayor).

b. If the local chief executive approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and

every page thereof.

c. Otherwise, he shall veto it within 15 days (in case of a province) or 10 days (in case of a

city or municipality) and return the same with his written objections to the sanggunian,

which may proceed to reconsider the same.

i. Grounds for vetoing: the ordinance is ultra vires, or prejudicial to the public

welfare

ii. Item-vetoing: the local chief executive shall have the power to veto any

particular item or items of

1. an appropriations ordinance

2. an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and

public investment program, or

3. an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability

In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items

shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto; otherwise, any item/s in the appropriations

ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed shall be deemed reenacted.

iii. The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once.

d. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-

thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution

effective for all legal intents and purposes, even without the approval of the local chief

executive concerned.

e. If the ordinance is not returned by the local chief executive within the time prescribed,

the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.

2. Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay

a. Must be signed by the punong barangay upon approval by the majority of all the

sanggunian members.

b. The punong barangay has no veto power.

Review of Ordinances and Resolutions (Sec. 56-58)

Ordinances and resolutions by the

sangguniang panlungsod / sangguniang

bayan

Ordinances by the sangguniang

barangay

Reviewed by Sangguniang panlalawigan Sangguniang panlungsod / bayan

What may be

reviewed

1. Approved ordinances

2. Resolutions approving

a. local development plans

b. public investment programs

formulated by local

development councils

All barangay ordinances

Period for submitting

copies by the secretary

of the sanggunian

concerned

Within 3 days after approval Within 10 days after enactment

Period for review

Within 30 days after receipt of copies of

ordinances and resolutions

Within 30 days from receipt of

copies of the ordinances and

resolutions

Manner of review

1. By itself, or

2. With the help of the provincial attorney

/ provincial prosecutor. The latter must

submit his written comments or

recommendations to the sangguniang

panlalawigan within 10 days from

receipt of the documents to be examined

By itself

Ground/s for

invalidating, and

action to be taken

1. If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds

that such an ordinance or resolution is

ultra vires, it shall declare such

ordinance or resolution invalid in whole

or in part.

2. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall

enter its action in the minutes and shall

advise the corresponding city or

municipal authorities of the action it has

taken.

3. Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or

any resolution approving the local

development plan and public investment

program, after the disapproval thereof,

shall be sufficient ground for the

suspension or dismissal of the official or

employee concerned.

1. If the sangguniang

panlungsod / bayan finds

that such ordinance or

resolution is inconsistent

with law and

city/municipal ordinances,

it shall return the same with

its comments and

recommendations to the

sangguniang barangay for

adjustment, amendment, or

modification

2. In this case, the effectivity

of the barangay ordinance is

suspended until such time as

the revision called for is

effected.

3. Any attempt to enforce any

ordinance after the

disapproval thereof, shall be

sufficient ground for the

suspension or dismissal of

the official or employee

concerned.

Effect of inaction

If no action has been taken within 30 days

after submission of such an ordinance or

resolution, the same shall be presumed

consistent with law and therefore valid

If no action is taken within thirty

(30) days from receipt of the

ordinances, the same shall be

deemed approved

Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions (Sec. 59)

1. Ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment

program

Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public

investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from

Posting, by the secretary, of a copy thereof in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial

capitol / city, municipal, or barangay hall, which must be done not later than 5 days after its

approval; and

in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the LGU concerned

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the

language understood by the majority of the people in the LGU concerned

The secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of

approval and posting

2. Ordinances with penal sanctions

The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation

within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs.

In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall

be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.

3. Ordinances enacted by the local legislative bodies of highly urbanized and independent

component cities

The main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted,

be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city

In the absence of a local newspaper, the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of

general circulation

Disciplinary Actions

Grounds (Sec. 60)

1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

2. Culpable violation of the Constitution;

3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least

prision mayor;

5. Abuse of authority;

6. Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of

members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang bayan,

and Sangguniang Barangay;

7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an

immigrant of another country; and

8. Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

Removal of elective officials based on these grounds may only be done by ORDER of proper court.

Form and Filing of administrative complaint (sec. 61)

Form of Complaint: It must be VERIFIED

Where to File:

(1) Against an elective official of a province, highly-urbanized city, independent component city or

component city → Office of the President (OP);

(2) Against an elective municipal official → Sangguniang Panlalawigan, appealable to the Office of

the President (OP);

(3) Against an elective barangay official → Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan as the case may be,

non appealable.

Notice of hearing (Sec. 62)

The notice of hearing must be sent to the elective official complained of within seven (7) days from filing of

verified complaint which indicates that:

An administrative complaint is lodged against him;

Requiring him to submit his VERIFIED ANSWER within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice

The disciplining authority shall commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of

the respondent’s answer.

NOTE:

(1) No investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any LOCAL ELECTION,

and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the same period.

(2) If a preventive suspension has been imposed prior to 90-day period immediately preceding local

election, it shall be deemed AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED upon start of aforesaid period.

Preventive suspension of local elective officials (Sec. 63)

Who may impose:

Against an elective official of a PROVINCE, HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITY, INDEPENDENT

COMPONENT CITY → The President thru the DILG Secretary;

Against an elective municipal official or an elective official of a component city → The

Provincial Governor;

Against an elective barangay official → The Mayor

When to impose:

At any time after the issues have been joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the

gravity of offense, then is great possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other

evidence.

Duration of Preventive Suspension:

Any single preventive suspension of local elective official SHALL NOT extend beyond sixty (60)

days.

In the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be

preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or

grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

What happens after preventive suspension:

The suspended elective official shall be deemed REINSTATED IN OFFICE without prejudice to

the continuation of the proceedings against him

Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of Judgment):

One hundred twenty (120) days from the time the respondent was formally notified of the case

against him.

NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case is due to his FAULT, NEGLECT, or

REQUEST, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing

the time of termination of the case.

Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as ABUSE

OF AUTHORITY.

Salary of respondent pending suspension (Sec 64)

The suspended official shall not receive any salary or compensation during the pendency of the

suspension

If found GUILTY after the

proceeding

If found NOT GUILTY

after the proceeding

No compensation will be given

The suspended official

shall be paid FULL

salary or compensation

including other

emoluments accruing

during the suspension

Rights of respondent official (Sec 65)

1. To appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;

2. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;

3. To require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor

through the compulsory process of sub poena or sub poena duces tecum

Form and Notice of decision (Sec 66)

The investigation of the case SHALL be terminated within 90 days from the start thereof.

The disciplining authority shall render its decision within 30 days after the end of the investigation.

Form of decision:

It shall be in writing;

It shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for the decision.

Notice of decision:

The notice together with the copies of the decision shall IMMEDIATELY be furnished the

respondent and all interested parties.

Imposable penalty:

SUSPENSION

It shall not exceed: (1) the unexpired term of

the respondent; or (2) a period of six (6)

months for every administrative offense

It shall NOT be a bar to the candidacy of the

respondent so suspended as long as he meets

the qualifications required for the office

REMOVAL

Amounts to a bar to the candidacy of the

respondent for ANY elective position

Administrative appeals (Sec 67)

Period to appeal:

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision.

Where to appeal:

Sangguniang Panlalawigan

For the decisions of Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Component Cities and Sangguniang Bayan2

Office of the President

For the decisions of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Highly Urbanized

Cities (HUC) and Independent Component Cities

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory. (see Calingin v. CA, July 12, 2004)

Execution pending appeal3 (Sec 68)

2 The provision is not explicit whether the decision of Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of Component

Cities after appeal to Sangguniang Panlalawigan can be further appealed to the Office of the President. But the author of this reviewer humbly believes that pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in Administrative Law, it can be further appealed to the Office of the President. This view is also bolstered by the last sentence of the same provision which states that “Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.” The said statement begs the question: If the decision of the Office of the President is final and executory, how about that of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

3 This provision is poorly worded. The drafter might be drunk when he/she wrote this provision. The first and second

sentences, as written, do not make any sense. One might ask regarding the first sentence, “Why appeal if the decision will become final and executory notwithstanding the filing of an appeal?” The author humbly submits that the second and third sentences of this provision should have been written or was intended to be written this way: “ The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal[.] in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such emoluments during the pendency of the appeal”

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.

The respondent official shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension

during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal.

In the event the appeal results in EXONERATION, he shall be paid his salary and such other

emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Recall

By whom exercised (Sec 69)

It shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official

subject to such recall belongs.

Ground: Loss of Confidence

Initiation of Recall Process (Sec 70)

Contents of the Petition:

1. The names and addresses of the petitioner written in legible form and their signatures

2. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which the

petitioners belong

3. The name of the official sought to be recalled

4. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore.

Process:

1. Petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned, supported by percentage of registered voters

during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled is elected filed with the

COMELEC thru its office in the LGU concerned. (Percentage decreases as population of people

in area increases. Also, the supporting voters MUST sign the petition)

2. Within 15 days after filing, COMELEC must certify the sufficiency of the required number of

signatures. Failure to obtain required number automatically nullifies the petition.

3. Within 3 days of certification of sufficiency form and substance of the petition, the COMELEC

shall provide the official with a copy of the petition and causes its publication for 3 weeks (once a

week) in a national newspaper and a local newspaper of general circulation. Petition must also be

posted for 10 to 20 days at conspicuous places. Protest should be filed at this point and shall be

ruled with finality within 15 days from filing of such protest or challenge.

4. COMELEC then verifies and authenticates the signatures gathered. Representatives of the

petitioners as well as the official sought to be recalled shall be duly notified and shall have the

right to participate therein as mere observers.

5. COMELEC shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the

list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

Election on recall (Sec 71)

Prescribed date of Recall Election:

For recall of barangay, city, or municipal officials

Shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the

completion of the procedure for initiation of recall

process

For recall of provincial officials

Shall not be later than forty-five (45) days upon the

completion of the procedure for initiation of recall

process

The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or

candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Effectivity of recall (Sec 72)

The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of the

candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the recall election.

Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby

affirmed and he shall continue in office.

Prohibition from resignation (Sec 73)

The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in

progress.

Limitation on recall (sec 74)

Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office

No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1)

year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Expenses incident to recall election (Sec 75)

All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the COMELEC.

For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency fund for

the conduct of recall elections.

A. Qualifications

Sec 39, LGC

See above

Abella v. Comelec

Benjamin Abella was a candidate for Leyte governor for the 1988 elections. Emeterio Larrazabal was also a

candidate for Leyte governor, but was disqualified for lack of residence. On the day before the elections, his

wife Adelina Larrazabal then filed her candidacy as his substitute. The following day Silvestre de la Cruz, a

registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition to disqualify her, on the ground that she misrepresented

her residence as Kananga, Leyte when in fact she was a resident of Ormoc City like her husband. She was

however proclaimed as the winning candidate, and thus assumed office while the hearings on her

disqualification case continued. She was later on declared by the COMELEC as disqualified from running

as governor. The incumbent vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla then took his oath as Leyte Governor and

assumed office, which COMELEC resolved by ordering Petilla to maintain status quo ante and refrain from

assuming the office of governor.

WON Adelina Larrazabal was qualified to run as governor of Leyte

HELD: No

Adelina Larrazabal lacked the required residence because she has established her residence at Ormoc City

since 1975 and not at Kananga. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence one year before the

election by registering at Kananga clearly shows that she considers herself as an Ormoc City resident. There

is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence to pursue any calling, profession or

business to satisfy the principle of animus revertendi. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga through

the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Having thus been established as an

Ormoc City resident, she is disqualified from running as Leyte governor since Ormoc City’s charter

prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials, since it is treated like a highly urbanized

city which is outside the supervisory power of the province to which it is geographically attached. The

provision in the charter connotes two prohibitions: one from running and the other from voting for any

provincial elective official. (Since there was a vacancy in the Office of the Governor, the vice-governor

assumed office.)

Frivaldo v. Comelec (1989)

Juan Frivaldo assumed office as Sorsogon governor in 1988. On 27 Oct 1988 the League of Municipalities

Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its president Salvador Estuye (also suing in his personal capacity) filed

with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election on the ground that he was not a

FIipino citizen. Frivaldo admitted he was naturalized in the US, but explained that such was only to protect

himself against President Marcos. He said he could not have repatriated himself since the Special

Committee on Naturalization (created by LOI 270) had not yet been organized. He argued that his oath in

his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen was a sufficient act of repatriation, and that his

active participation in the 1987 elections had divested him of American citizenship under US laws, thus

restoring his Filipino citizenship.

WON Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen at the time of his election as Sorsogon governor

HELD: No

The alleged forfeiture of his American citizenship due to his active participation in Philippine politics does

not automatically restore his Filipino citizenship. If the Committee tasked to handle the repatriation had not

yet been constituted, it only meant that Frivaldo should have waited until this was done, or else he should

have sought reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship through other means (i.e., direct act of Congress or

applied for naturalization). Frivaldo was then not a Filipino citizen, and thus disqualified to vote and run

for office since Filipino citizenship is one of the qualifications for voting and for being a candidate for local

elective office. (There was then a vacancy in the Office of the Governor, thus the elected vice-governor

assumed office.)

Labo v. Comelec (1989)

Ramon Labo Jr married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he

was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship, and was granted Australian

citizenship on 28 Jul 1976. His marriage was later declared void for being bigamous. He returned to the

Philippines using an Australian passport and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He

applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen, but was denied by the

Commission on Immigration and Deportation since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino

citizenship. He later on ran for and won as Mayor of Baguio City. The second-placer Luis Lardizabal filed a

petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the ground that

Labo was an alien, and asking that Labo’s proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be Mayor

HELD: No

Labo is not a Filipino citizen because he has lost his Filipino citizenship by all three modes specified in the

Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)

subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Even if it be

assumed that his Australian citizenship was annulled because his marriage was void for being bigamous,

that circumstance alone does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. It does not appear that

Labo sought to reacquire his Filipino citizenship through any of the three modes provided by our laws:

direct act of Congress, naturalization or repatriation. (Also, the earlier contrary COMELEC decision can

also be reversed since res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.) Not being a Filipino citizen,

Labo is disqualified to run for mayor. (There was then a vacancy in the Office of Mayor, thus the Vice

Mayor assumed office.)

Labo v. Comelec (1992)

Ramon Labo Jr filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Roberto

Ortega also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office, and also subsequently filed for Labo’s

disqualification before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo was an alien. Labo failed to Answer and

present evidence; COMELEC subsequently cancelled Labo’s certificate of candidacy. Labo then moved to

stay the implementation of the COMELEC decision, which was granted with COMELEC issuing an Order

that “Labo may still continue to be voted upon” as mayor in the 1992 elections, but it resolved to suspend

Labo’s proclamation in the event he wins the elections.

WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be Mayor

HELD: No

Labo failed to submit proof that he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship. He claims that he has

reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed

before the OSG, but despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special Committee on

Naturalization had yet to act upon his application for repatriation. In the absence of any official action or

approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an

automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship. (Note: Second-placer Ortega is not entitled

to be proclaimed as Mayor because he was not the choice of the sovereign will. The ineligibility of a

candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number

of votes to be declared elected.)

Frivaldo v. Comelec (1996)

On 20 Mar 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for Sorsogon governor in the 1995

elections. Three days later, another Sorsogon governor candidate, Raul Lee filed for the cancellation of his

Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen. COMELEC

granted the petition. Frivaldo filed a MR, which was not acted upon until after the elections. His candidacy

then continued and was thus voted upon (he received the highest number of votes). It was only after the

elections that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of its Second Division. By order of

COMELEC, Lee was proclaimed as governor at 830 PM on 30 Jun 1995. On 6 Jul 1995, Frivaldo filed a

petition with the COMLEC praying for the annulment of Lee’s proclamation, claiming that since he took

his oath of allegiance to the Philippines at 2PM on 30 Jun 1995, there was no more impediment to his being

proclaimed as governor. In the alternative, he averred that it was the Vice-Governor-elect that should

assume the office and not Lee.

WON Frivaldo was qualified to be elected as Sorsogon governor

HELD: Yes

The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Sine

Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on 30 June 1995 – the very day the term of office of governor began –

he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and

responsibilities as of said date. Furthermore, Frivaldo’s repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his

application on 17 Aug 1994, since laws which create new rights are given retroactive effect. And even if

Frivaldo was previously declared as not a Filipino citizen by the Supreme Court, such decisions declaring

the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality, because a person

may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by

law for the purpose.

SC adds, “And let it not be overlooked that Frivaldo’s demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to

reassume his nationality of birth despite several setbacks speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth

than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native

Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years.”

Justice Davide DISSENTED, saying that “Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 refers to no

other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may

the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the

commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. Also, it is only upon taking the oath of

allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had

intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have

explicitly provided otherwise.”

Mercado v. Manzano

In the 1998 elections, 3 candidates for vice-mayor competed for the post: Eduardo Manzano, Ernesto

Mercado and Gabriel Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a

pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a Filipino

citizen but was instead a US citizen. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and thus

acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was

also a natural-born Filipino citizen by virtue of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother

were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of 6, his parents brought him to the Philippines using an

American passport. His parents registered his as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and

was thus issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). When he attained the age of majority, he

registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. On 7 May 1998,

COMELEC granted Mamaril’s petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that

he was a dual citizen and thus disqualified from running for any elective position. On 8 May 1998,

Manzano moved for reconsideration of the decision, and the motion remained pending even until after the

elections. On 31 Aug 1998 the COMELEC en banc declared that Manzano was qualified to run for vice

mayor.

(1) WON Manzano possesses dual citizenship, and (2) WON he is disqualified from running for and being

elected as vice mayor

HELD: (1) Yes and (2) No

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent

application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by

the said states. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently

considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a

person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is

involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. In including Section 5 in Article IV of

the Constitution (“Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by

law.”), the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized

citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the

phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Sec 40(d) and RA 7854 (Makati

City Charter) Sec 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Thus, persons with mere dual

citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

The oath of allegiance contained in Manzano’s certificate of candidacy is sufficient to constitute

renunciation of his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual

citizen. There is no merit to the contention that to be effective, such renunciation should have been made

upon Manzano’s reaching the age of majority, since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to

be made upon attainment of the age of majority.

Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth

and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections

in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Coquilla v. Comelec

Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He resided there until 1965, when he joined

the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. On October 15, 1998, petitioner

came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate but still made several trips to the US. On

November 10, 2000, he was repatriated and he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On February 27,

2001, after his application for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar was approved, he filed

his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2)

years.”

Respondent Alvarez (incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection) sought the cancellation

of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the Coquilla had made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years

when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his

oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.

Meanwhile, petitioner was elected by a margin of 379 votes, was proclaimed mayor, and subsequently took

his oath of office.

HELD: Petitioner had NOT been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections

held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,

municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least

one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other

local language or dialect. (Sec. 39(a), LGC)

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or

“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or

constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,

eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every

person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is

abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). Petitioner lost his domicile of origin in

Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November

10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in

the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident

alien.

It is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came

back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year

and by “constantly declaring” to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the

May 14, 2001 elections. Evidence shows that when petitioner entered the country in 1998, he did so as a

visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can be held

to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath

as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the

mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Case of Mayor Jesse Robredo

CA case

B. Disqualifications

Sec 40, LGC

See above

Caasi v. CA

Merito Miguel was elected as the municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January

18, 1988. Caasi filed a disqualification case against Miguel on the ground that he is a green card holder -

hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao – in violation of Sec. 68 of the

Omnibus Election Code.

In his "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No.

21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,

"Permanently." The green card that was subsequently issued identified him in clear bold letters as a

RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:

“Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

HELD: Miguel is disqualified under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground that he is a green

card holder.

An immigrant is a person who moves into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. Miguel's

immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the

Philippines. He entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his

application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes

temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides.

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides that “any person who is a permanent

resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office unless

said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance

with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. “

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a

green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."

Miguel’s act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself

constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of

his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his

candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any

elective office. The records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before

he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.

In addition, residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year

at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective

public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of

the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his

return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,

1988. The Court therefore holds that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

Marquez v. Comelec

At the time private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy for Governor of

Quezon, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal

property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los

Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be

served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Private respondent was

proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.

Petitioner Bienvenido Marquez, the defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the Province

of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections, argues that Rodriguez is disqualified from being a candidate by

virtue Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code which states that a “fugitive from justice in criminal or

non-political cases here or abroad” is disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Rodriguez argues that that term “fugitive from justice” is limited to one who has been convicted by final

judgment. His basis is Article 73(b) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government

Code of 1991. It states that “…fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final

judgment." The issue in this case is the meaning of “fugitive from justice”. Note: the issue of WON

Rodriguez is disqualified for being a fugitive from justice was decided by the Court in the succeeding case

of Rodriguez v. COMELEC.

HELD: The law needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 is

clear and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from

seeking any elective local office. The phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after

conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This

definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and

ordinary connotation of the term. Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a

person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue

circumscription of the law.

Rodriguez v. Comelec

(See Marquez v. COMELEC for background. The Marquez decision was promulgated for the

1992 elections. This case involves the 1995 elections)

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of

governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the

COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice."

The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the Marquez Decision definition of "fugitive from justice",

found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary evidence

consisting of an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles

Municipal Court against Rodriguez, and an authenticated copy of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez’s defense is that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent was already in

the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded

against criminally. In a sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a

fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his

disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is

predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.

HELD: Rodriguez is NOT a fugitive from justice.

To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment

but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution (from Marquez Decision). The definition

thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular

jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is

knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of

conviction.

Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. He arrived in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985

while the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court was filed and the warrant of arrest was issued only on

November 12, 1985, almost five (5) months after. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known

about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint

and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or

punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very

essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be

found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. The evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his

compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the

political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and not to evade any charge against him

in the US.

When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns

subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact

that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a

fugitive from justice.

Dela Torre v. Comelec

De La Torre was disqualified by COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in

the May 8, 1995 elections citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code which

provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense

punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are

disqualified from running for any elective local position. De La Torre was found guilty (his conviction

became final on January 18, 1991) for violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-fencing Law.

De La Torre, however, argues that the crime of fencing does not involve moral turpitude and that Section 40

(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the

MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other

legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.

HELD: The crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. Black’s Law Dictionary of “moral turpitude” as “an

act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in

general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

The elements of the crime of fencing, as defined under P.D. 1612, are:

5. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

6. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys,

receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in

any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been

derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

7. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything

of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

8. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that

property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as

that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And

although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both

the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain -

thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a

manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals

The same underlying reason holds even if the “fence” did not have actual knowledge, but merely “should

have known” the origin of the property received. The words ‘should know’ denote the fact that a person of

reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or

would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.

As to WON a grant of probation affects Sec. 40(a)’s applicability, the legal effect of probation is only to

suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally

unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso

facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution

of the application for probation.

Magno v. Comelec

A petition was filed by Montes for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate

(in the 2001 election) on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted of direct bribery of which he

was discharged after application for parole on March 5, 1998. COMELEC granted the petition of MONTES

and declared MAGNO disqualified citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

WON the crime of direct bribery did not involve moral turpitude and WON that Local Government Code,

(citing Section 40 ) and not the Omnibus Election Code that should apply in this situation.

HELD: Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or

refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the

part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the

fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by

the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good

morals.

The Local Government Code and not the Omnibus Election Code that applies in this situation. Article 12 of

the Omnibus Election Code must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code.

The Omnibus Election Code was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code took

effect on January 1, 1992. In case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must

prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.

Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes

the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. The court Citied David vs. COMELEC: RA 7160 is a

codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and

definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them

only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public

office.

The resolution of the COMELEC declaring Magno disqualified from the 2001 mayoral elections is hereby

reversed and set aside.

Lingating v. Comelec

Lingating filed a petition for disqualification against SULONG (May 2001 mayoral candidate) alleging that

Sulong was administratively charged, found guilty (by a Sangguniang Panlalawigan February 4, 1992

decision) and ordered removed from office. Sulong denied that the decision had become final and executory

since he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992. He also

denied having been removed from office.

Because COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the May 2001 elections, Sulong was voted for

and proclaimed mayor.

COMELEC (First Division) then declared Sulong disqualified citing Section 40(b) of the LGC THEN the

COMELEC en banc reversed the resolution of its First Division, dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

The COMELEC en banc found that after having been found guilty by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,

Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan Zamboanga del Sur in May 1992 & 1995 elections. Applying

Aguinaldo vs. Santos ruling that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic the

COMELEC en banc held that the re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount

to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision finding him guilty of dishonesty, malversation

of public funds etc.

Lingating, in this Petition for Certiorari, contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling

in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections. He cites Reyes v. Commission on Elections which held that an

elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected,

is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Sec. 40(b) of the LGC.

HELD: Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan.

Reyes vs. Commission on Elections cannot be applied to this case because the 1992 decision of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan has not until now become final. The filing of his motion for reconsideration

prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. While R.A. No. 7160 on

disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as

a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, considering the failure of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they

have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified.

There being no prohibition against a motion for reconsideration there can thus also be no decision finding

respondent guilty to speak of.

Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED; Resolution of the COMELEC en banc is AFFIRMED

Flores v. Drilon

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) , of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and

Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was

appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is

challenged in this petition.

Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the

Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an

elective official and the subject posts are public offices;

HELD: Gordon is ineligible for appointment as SBMA Chairman in light of the fact that he is the elective

mayor of Olongapo.

The proviso in Sec. 13 (d) of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or

designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of several public

positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be

efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Since

this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the

imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B of the Constitution. The

fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic

is of no moment.

It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective

official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is

fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.

7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the

primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of

Sec. 7 Art. IX-B of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by

an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph

appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation

of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself,

e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed

Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the

Judicial and Bar Council.

The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be

extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. The phrase "shall be appointed" in

the proviso unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to

the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex

officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have

been used. Therefore, as an incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to

the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA.

C. Election cases involving Local Elective Officials

Galido v. Comelec

Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections

for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent

filed an election protest before the RTC which upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent

appealed RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared

private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the 15 ballots in

the same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were marked ballots and, therefore,

invalid.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before SC and succeeded in

getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for

dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final decisions,

orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and

executory, and not appealable.

HELD: That decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal

and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by

way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Article IX (A), Section 7, 1987 Constitution:

“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each

(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party

within thirty days from receipt thereof.”

The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal (such as the COMELEC in the

exercise of its quasi-judicial powers) within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, SC found no GAD in

COMELEC’s part.

Rivera v. Comelec

Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position

of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay, during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal Board of

Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as Mayor by a majority of ten votes. Garcia filed an election protest with the

RTC, Legazpi City which found Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera

appealed to the COMELEC which affirmed the RTC decision. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties

and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writ of execution implementing

the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990. Rivera filed this petition for certiorari.

HELD: The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the respondent COMELEC en banc

committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division, promulgated on 2

May 1990, annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay and

when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were allegedly

misappreciated in Garcia's favor. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find

that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A

painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. Moreover, the

appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is settled that in a petition for

certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred

such factual determinations.

D. Term of Office: 3-Term Limit Rule

Sec 8, Art X, Constitution

Section 8, Art. X, Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,

which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an

interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Sec 43, LGC

Section 43. Term of Office. -

(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3)

years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of

elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections

immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3)

years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

Rivera v. Comelec

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as

candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.

Petitioners,filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on

the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat.

They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA

7160. respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July

1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the

second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer"

since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites

must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the

same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He

served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of

the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent

Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break

since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve

(12) continuous years. The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish

some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore,

having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should

be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be

considered stray votes.

Montebon v. Comelec

Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of

the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On

April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification

against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three

consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed

from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.

Respondent claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004

when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza.

Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections

HELD: While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms,

the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of

office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by

operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the

office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. In this case, a

permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.

Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is

clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary

renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. Thus, it is an involuntary severance from his office as

municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.

Borja v. Comelec

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term

ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the

incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which

ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending

June 30, 1998. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998

elections. Petitioner Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory

that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would

therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible

to run as he was not elected to the position of Mayor in the 1988 election, but succeeded by operation of

law. Thus, it is not counted as 1 term for the computation of the 3 term limitation.

HELD: A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by

local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of “the term of

office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive

terms.

The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full

term of office, states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered

as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of

this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may

serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the

service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now

withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as

well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has

served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same

position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Adormeo v. Comelec

Mayor Adormeo was elected in two consecutive elections and served out the full terms. The third time he

ran, he lost. However during the term of the winning candidate, there was a recall election, which Adormeo

won. He served the unexpired term. Adormeo wants to run again in the next immediately succeeding

elections.

HELD: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as

the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served

three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for

the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent

was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private

citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time

between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three

consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Socrates v. Comelec

A recall was initiated for the position of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto

Princesa’s mayor on June 30, 2001. Edward M. Hagedorn (“Hagedorn” for brevity) filed his certificate of

candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition was filed to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the

recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is disqualified from running

for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)

consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

HELD: These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective

local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive

terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of

office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary

severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before

and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The

prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the

next regular election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term.

Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons:

1. A subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the

three consecutive terms.

2. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Mendoza v. Comelec

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Leonardo B. Roman’s

election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8

of the Constitution.

HELD: The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three

consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of

service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an

incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B.

Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted.

Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive

terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same

position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut

short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to

prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious

preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.

E. Tenure of Office

Osmena v. Comelec

Petition assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 7056, which desynchronized the national and local elections.

This, in effect, shortened the terms of local officials to be elected on November 1992.

WON R.A. 7056 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes.

R.A. 7056 contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the

synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-

synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term

“synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding

simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or

occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official

first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056,

these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors

shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that

“it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over

until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication

prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is

no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify

within the time”.

R.A. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of

office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be

held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only

two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.

F. Vacancies and Succession

Sec 44 – 47, LGC

See above

Jainal v. Comelec

Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu – Jainal was

proclaimed the winning candidate. Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC, praying for the

annulment of certain election returns. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the

precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns

for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election, and the number of

votes cast exceeded the number of voters. The COMELEC then issued a Resolution annulling the

proclamation and ordering a recount. The COMELEC issued an Order directing the Vice-Mayor or any

councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor. Said Order was issued during the

pendency of the present petition and after Ahajan had already taken his oath and assumed office as Acting

Mayor pursuant to resolutions issued by the COMELEC.

WON the COMELEC Order is valid.

Held: No.

With the nullification of Jainal’s proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu became

vacant. Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 7160 and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the LGC then apply

– the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become mayor, a tie between or among the highest ranking

sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots, and the successor shall serve only the

unexpired terms of their predecessors.

A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume

office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently

incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each

winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding

local election.

The vacancy created by the nullification of Jainal’s proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy

and may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. However, Ahajan’s

assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be

conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC.

Labo v. Comelec (supra)

Ramon Labo, Jr. was disqualified as Mayor of Baguio City for non-compliance with the citizenship

requirement of the Constitution.

WON the person with the second highest number of votes cast may assume the position of Mayor.

Held: No.

The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot occupy the office that was vacant as

a result of the disqualification of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. The simple

reason is that, obtaining the second highest number of votes, he was obviously not the choice of the people.

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a

candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as a

representative of the constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that

they do not choose him.

Menzon v. Petilla

As no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government

designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla as Acting Governor and Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as Vice-Governor. Menzon took his oath of office before Sen. Alberto

Romulo. However, in Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Menzon’s appointment was

held to be invalid. In the meantime, Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed Governor.

WON (1) there is a vacancy, (2) the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate, and (3)

the designation of Menzon is valid.

Held: Yes.

(1) There is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the

duties of the office. The office of Vice-Governor was left vacant when Petilla was appointed as Governor.

(2) Under CA No. 558 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make

temporary appointments in certain public offices in case of any vacancies that may occur. Considering the

silence of the LGC as regards the filling up of vacancies in the position of Governor, the Court rules that, in

order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum, the President, acting through her alter ego, the

Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The Secretary of Government therefore had the

authority to designate Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor.

(3) The mode of succession provided for in permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a

temporary vacancy. Menzon’s appointment is in full accord with the intent of the LGC – the contingency of

having vacancies in office cannot be set aside. In a republican form of government, the majority rules

through a chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, the management of governmental

affairs will be hampered.

The right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor is indubitable – Menzon is a de

facto officer entitled to compensation.

Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar

Luis Capito, elected as a member of the SPES, died in office. Agustin Docena was appointed by the

Secretary of Local Government to replace him. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon Mitra

of the House of Representatives and thereafter assumed office. Socrates Alar was subsequently appointed

by the Secretary of Local Government to the position already occupied by Docena. In a First Indorsement

signed by the Department of Local Government, Alar’s appointment was recalled on the basis of the earlier

appointment of Docena. The SPES then passed Resolution No. 1, reiterating the recognition of Alar.

WON Docena’s appointment was permanent.

Held: Yes.

The appointment, having been issued by the Secretary of Local Government and accepted by Docena, had

already become complete and enforceable for all legal intents and purposes at the time it was supposed to

have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena’s appointment was intended to be

permanent and as such was valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased SPES member.

Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could only be removed therefrom for the

causes and conformably to the procedure prescribed by the LGC.

APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES

AND PROVINCES

Sec 469 – 490, LGC

Position Necessity Qualifications Duties

1. Secretary to the

Sanggunian

mandatory position Qualifications

a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. Resident of the LGU concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in law, commerce or

public administration from a

recognized college or university,

and

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent. (Sec

469[b])

a. Attend meetings of the sanggunian and keep a

journal of its proceedings;

b. Keep the seal of the LGU and affix the same

with his signature to all ordinances, resolutions, and

other official acts of the sanggunian and present the

same to the presiding officer for his signature;

c. Forward to the governor or mayor for approval,

copies of ordinances enacted by the sanggunian and

duly certified by the presiding officer;

d. Forward to the sanggunian panlungsod or bayan

or the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities

or sangguniang bayan, copies of duly approved

ordinances;

e. Furnish certified copies of records of public

character in his custody;

f. Record in a book kept for the purpose, all

ordinances and resolutions enacted or adopted by

the sanggunian, with the dates of passage and

publication thereof;

g. Keep his office and all non-confidential records

therein open to the public during the usual business

hours;

h. Translate into the dialect used by the majority of

the inhabitants all ordinances and resolutions

immediately after their approval, and cause the

publication of the same;

i. Take custody of the local archives and, where

applicable, the local library and annually account

for the same; and

j. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance relative to his position. (Sec.

469[c])

2. Treasurer mandatory position

Appointed by the

Secretary of

Finance from a list

of at least 3

ranking, eligible

recommendees of

the governor or

mayor, as the case

may be (Sec 470

[a])

a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in commerce, public

administration or law from a

recognized college or university,

and

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in treasury

or accounting service for at least 5

years in the case of the city or

provincial treasurer, and 3 years in

the case of the municipal treasurer.

(Sec 470[c])

a. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of

the Code

b. Advise the governor or mayor, sanggunian, and

other local government and national officials

regarding disposition of local government funds,

and other matters relative to public finance;

c. Take custody of and exercise proper management

of the funds of LGU;

d. Take charge of the disbursement of all local

government funds and such other funds the custody

of which may be entrusted to him;

e. Inspect private commercial and industrial

establishments in relation to the implementation of

tax ordinances;

f. Maintain and update the tax information system

of the LGU;

g. In the case of the provincial treasurer, exercise

technical supervision over all treasury offices of

component cities and municipalities; and

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec 470[d])

3. Assistant

Treasurer

optional position

Appointed by the

Secretary of

Finance from a list

of at least 3

ranking, eligible

recommendees of

the governor or

mayor (Sec 471[a])

a. A citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in commerce, public

administration, or law from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent,

f. Acquired at least 5 years

experience in the treasury or

accounting service in the case of

the city or provincial assistant

treasurer, and 3 years in the case of

the municipal assistant treasurer.

(Sec 471[b])

a. Assist the treasurer and perform such duties as

the latter may assign to him.

b. Administer oaths concerning notices and

notifications to those delinquent in the payment of

the real property tax and concerning official matters

relating to the accounts of the treasurer or arising in

the offices of the treasurer and the assessor. (Sec

471[c])

4. Assessor mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in civil or mechanical

engineering, commerce, or any

other related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in real

property assessment work or in

any related field for at least 5years

in the case of the city or provincial

assessor, and 3 years in the case of

the municipal assessor. (Sec

472[a])

a. Take charge of the assessor's office,

b. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of

the Code,

c. Ensure that all laws and policies governing the

appraisal and assessment of real properties for

taxation purposes are properly executed;

d. Initiate, review, and recommend changes in

policies and objectives, plans and programs,

techniques, procedures and practices in the

valuation and assessment of real properties for

taxation purposes;

e. Establish a systematic method of real property

assessment;

f. Install and maintain a real property identification

and accounting system,

g. Prepare, install and maintain a system of tax

mapping;

h. Conduct frequent physical surveys to verify and

determine whether all real properties within the

province are properly listed in the assessment rolls;

i. Exercise the functions of appraisal and

assessment primarily for taxation purposes of all

real properties in the LGU;

j. Prepare a schedule of the fair market value for the

different classes of real properties;

k. Issue certified copies of assessment records of

real property and all other records relative to its

assessment;

l. Submit every semester a report of all

assessments, cancellations and modifications of

assessments to the local chief executive and the

sanggunian;

m. In the case of the assessor of a component city

or municipality attend sessions of the local board of

assessment appeals whenever his assessment is the

subject of the appeal;

n. In the case of the provincial assessor, exercise

technical supervision and visitorial functions over

all component city and municipal assessors,

coordinate with component city or municipal

assessors in the conduct of tax mapping operations

and all other assessment activities, and provide all

forms of assistance; (Sec 472[b])

o. Exercise such other powers and

perform such other duties and functions as may be

prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 472[c])

5. Assistant

Assessor

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in civil or mechanical

engineering, commerce, or any

related course from a recognized

college or university

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in

assessment or in any related field

for at least 3years in the case of the

city or provincial assistant

assessor, and 1 year in the case of

the city or provincial assistant

assessor. (Sec 473[a])

a. Assist the assessor and perform such other duties

as the latter may assign to him

b. Administer oaths on all declarations of real

property for purposes of assessment. (Sec 473[b])

6. Accountant mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A certified public accountant.

e. Acquired experience in the

treasury or accounting service for

at least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city accountant, and

3 years in the case of the

municipal accountant. (Sec 474[a])

f. Incumbent chief accountant in

the office of the treasurer shall be

given preference in the

appointment to the position of

accountant.(Sec 474[c])

a. Take charge of both the accounting and internal

audit services of the LGU;

b. Install and maintain an internal audit system in

the local LGU;

c. Prepare and submit financial statements to the

governor or mayor and to the sanggunian;

d. Apprise the sanggunian and other local

government officials on the financial condition and

operations of the LGU;

e. Certify to the availability of budgetary allotment

to which expenditures and obligations may be

properly charged;

f. Review supporting documents before preparation

of vouchers to determine completeness of

requirements;

g. Prepare statements of cash advances, liquidation,

salaries, allowances, reimbursements and

remittances;

h. Prepare statements of journal vouchers and

liquidation of the same and other adjustments;

i. Post individual disbursements to the subsidiary

ledger and index cards;

Maintain individual ledgers for officials and

employees pertaining to payrolls and deductions;

j. Record and post in index cards details of

purchased furniture, fixtures, and equipment,

including disposal thereof, if any;

k. Account for all issued requests for obligations

and maintain and keep all records and reports

related thereto;

l. Prepare journals and the analysis of obligations

and maintain and keep all records and reports

related thereto; and

m. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be provided by

law or ordinance. (Sec 474[b])

7. Budget Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in accounting,

economics, public administration

or any related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in

government budgeting or in any

related field for at least 5 years in

the case of the provincial or city

budget officer, and at least 3 years

in the case of the municipal budget

officer. (Sec 475[a])

a. Take charge of the budget office;

b. Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying

instructions on budgetary and appropriation matters

for the signature of the governor or mayor,

c. Review and consolidate the budget proposals of

different departments and offices;

d. Assist the governor or mayor in the preparation

of the budget and during budget hearings;

e. Study and evaluate budgetary implications of

proposed legislation and submit comments and

recommendations thereon;

f. Submit periodic budgetary reports to the DBM;

g. Coordinate with the treasurer, accountant, and

the planning and development coordinator for the

purpose of budgeting;

h. Assist the sanggunian concerned in reviewing the

approved budgets;

i. Coordinate with the planning and development

coordinator in the formulation of the local

government unit development plan; (Sec 475 [b])

j. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec 475[c])

8. Planning and

Development

Coordinator

mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in urban planning,

development studies, economics,

public administration, or any

related course from a recognized

college or university

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

development planning or in any

related field for at least 5 years in

the case of the provincial or city

planning and development

coordinator, and 3 years in the

case of the municipal planning and

development coordinator. (Sec

476[a])

a. Take charge of the planning and development

office

b. Formulate integrated economic, social, physical,

and other development plans and policies for

consideration of the local government development

council;

c. Conduct continuing studies, researches, and

training programs necessary to evolve plans and

programs for implementation;

d. Integrate and coordinate all sectoral plans and

studies undertaken by the different functional

groups or agencies;

e. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the

different development programs, projects, and

activities in the local government unit concerned in

accordance with the approved development plan;

f. Prepare comprehensive plans and other

development planning documents for the

consideration of the local development council;

g. Analyze the income and expenditure patterns,

and formulate and recommend fiscal plans and

policies for consideration of the finance committee

of LGU;

h. Promote people participation in development

planning within the LGU;

i. Exercise supervision and control over the

secretariat of the local development council; and

(Sec 476[b])

9. Engineer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A licensed civil engineer

e. Acquired experience in the

practice of his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city engineer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

engineer. (Sec 477[a])

a. Act as the local building official (Sec 477[a])

b. Initiate, review and recommend changes in

policies and objectives, plans and programs,

techniques, procedures and practices in

infrastructure development and public works in

general;

c. Advise the governor or mayor on infrastructure,

public works, and other engineering matters;

d. Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control

the construction, maintenance, improvement, and

repair of roads, bridges, and other engineering and

public works projects;

e. Provide engineering services to the LGU,

including investigation and survey, engineering

designs, feasibility studies, and project

management;

f. In the case of the provincial engineer, exercise

technical supervision over all engineering offices of

component cities and municipalities; and (Sec

477[b])

g. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec477[c])

10. Health Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character, and

d. A licensed medical practitioner.

e. Acquired experience in the

practice of his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city health officer,

and 3 years in the case of the

municipal health officer.

(Sec478[a])

a. Take charge of the office on health services,

supervise the personnel and staff of said office,

formulate program implementation guidelines and

rules and regulations for the operation of the said

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide technical assistance and

support to the governor or mayor in carrying out

activities to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate health facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies, implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

health programs and projects which the governor or

mayor, is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Formulate and implement policies, plans,

programs and projects to promote the health of the

people;

e. Advise the governor or mayor and the

sanggunian on matters pertaining to health;

f. Execute and enforce all laws, ordinances and

regulations relating to public health;

g. Recommend to the sanggunian, through the local

health board, the passage of such ordinances as he

may deem necessary for the preservation of public

health;

h. Recommend the prosecution of any violation of

sanitary laws, ordinances or regulations;

i. Direct the sanitary inspection of all business

establishments selling food items or providing

accommodations such as hotels, motels, lodging

houses, pension houses, and the like, in accordance

with the Sanitation Code;

j. Conduct health information campaigns and

render health intelligence services;

k. Coordinate with other government agencies and

non-governmental organizations involved in the

promotion and delivery of health services;

l. In the case of the provincial health officer,

exercise general supervision over health officers of

component cities and municipalities; and

m. Be in the frontline of health services delivery,

particularly during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural disasters and calamities; and

(Sec478[b])

n. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec478[c])

11. Civil Registrar mandatory: city and

municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in civil

registry work for at least 5 years in

the case of the city civil registrar

and 3 years in the case of the

municipal civil registrar.

(Sec479[a])

a. Responsible for the civil registration program

pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the Civil Code,

and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations

(Sec479[b])

b. Take charge of the office of the civil registry

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with civil

registry programs and projects which the mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Accept all registrable documents and judicial

decrees affecting the civil status of persons;

e. File, keep and preserve in a secure place the

books required by law;

f. Transcribe and enter immediately upon receipt all

registrable documents and judicial decrees affecting

the civil status of persons in the civil registry

books;

g. Transmit to the Office of the Civil Registrar-

General duplicate copies of registered documents

required by law;

h. Issue certified transcripts or copies of any

certificate or registered documents upon payment

of the prescribed fees to the treasurer;

i. Receive applications for the issuance of a

marriage license and issue the license upon

payment of the authorized fee to the treasurer;

g. Coordinate with the NSO in conducting

educational campaigns for vital registration and

assist in the preparation of demographic and other

statistics (Sec479[c])

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec479[d])

12. Administrator mandatory:

provincial and city,

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in public

administration, law, or any other

related course from a recognized

college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

management and administration

work for at least 5 years in the case

of the provincial or city

administrator, and 3 years in the

case of the municipal

administrator.

g. Term is coterminous with that

of his appointing authority

(Sec480[a])

a. Take charge of the office of the administrator

b. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same particularly those which have to do with the

management and administration-related programs

and projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

c. Assist in the coordination of the work of all the

officials of the LGU, under the supervision,

direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and

convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of

the local government unit;

d. Establish and maintain a sound personnel

program for the LGU designed to promote career

development and uphold the merit principle in the

local government service;

e. Conduct a continuing organizational

development of the LGU with the end in view of

instituting effective administrative reforms;

f. Be in the frontline of the delivery of

administrative support services, particularly those

related to the situations during and in the aftermath

of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

g. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor and mayor on all other matters relative to

the management and administration of the LGU

(Sec480[b])

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec480[c])

13. Legal Officers mandatory:

provincial and city,

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A member of the Philippine Bar

e. Practiced his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial and city legal officer,

and 3years in the case of the

municipal legal officer

f. Term of the legal officer shall be

coterminous with that of his

appointing authority.(Sec481[a])

a. Take charge of the office of legal services

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide legal assistance and

support to the governor or mayor, in carrying out

the delivery of basic services and provisions of

adequate facilities

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

programs and projects related to legal services

which the governor or mayor is empowered to

implement and which the sanggunian is empowered

to provide

d. Represent the local government unit in all civil

actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU

or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a

party;

e. Draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and

other instruments, involving any interest of the

LGU; and provide comments and recommendations

on any instruments already drawn;

f. Render his opinion in writing on any question of

law when requested to do so by the governor,

mayor, or sanggunian;

g. Investigate or cause to be investigated any local

official or employee for administrative neglect or

misconduct in office, and recommend appropriate

action;

h. Investigate or cause to be investigated any

person, firm or corporation holding any franchise or

exercising any public privilege for failure to

comply with any term or condition in the grant of

such franchise or privilege, and recommending

appropriate action to the governor, mayor or

sanggunian, as the case may be;

i. Initiate and prosecute in the interest of the LGU

any civil action on any bond, lease or other contract

upon any breach or violation thereof;

j. Review and submit recommendations on

ordinances approved and executive orders issued by

component units;

k. Recommend measures to the sanggunian and

advise the governor or mayor as the case may be on

all other matters related to upholding the rule of

law ;

l. Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and

prosecuting any violations thereof, particularly

those which occur during and in the aftermath of

man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and

(Sec481[b])

m. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec481[c])

14. Agriculturist mandatory:

provincial;

optional: city and

municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree in

agriculture or any related course

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Practiced his profession in

agriculture or acquired experience

in a related field for at least 5 years

in the case of the provincial and

city agriculturist, and 3years in the

case of the municipal agriculturist.

(Sec482[a])

a. Take charge of the office for agricultural service

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out said

measures to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate facilities relative to

agricultural services as provided for under Section

17

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

agricultural programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian us empowered to provide for

d. Ensure that maximum assistance and access to

resources in the production, processing and

marketing of agricultural and aqua-cultural and

marine products are extended to farmers, fishermen

and local entrepreneurs;

e. Conduct or cause to be conducted location-

specific agricultural researches and assist in making

available the appropriate technology arising out of

and disseminating information on basic research on

crops, preventive and control of plant diseases and

pests, and other agricultural matters

f. Assist in the establishment and extension services

of demonstration farms or aqua-culture and marine

products;

g. Enforce rules and regulations relating to

agriculture and aquaculture;

h. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

which promote agricultural productivity through

appropriate technology compatible with

environmental integrity;

i. Be in the frontline of delivery of basic

agricultural services, particularly those needed for

the survival of the inhabitants during and in the

aftermath of man-made and natural disasters;

j. Recommend and advise on all matters related to

agriculture and aqua-culture which will improve the

livelihood and living conditions of the inhabitants;

(Sec482[b])

k. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec482[c])

15. Social Welfare

and Development

Officer

mandatory:

provincial and city;

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A duly licensed social worker or

a holder of a college degree

preferably in sociology or any

other related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in the

practice of social work for at least

5 years in the case of the

provincial or city social welfare

and development officer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

social welfare and development

officer. (Sec483[a])

a. Take charge of the office on social welfare and

development services

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to social welfare and

development services as provided for under Section

17

c. Develop plans and strategies and mplement the

same particularly those which have to do with

social welfare programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Identify the basic needs of the needy, the

disadvantaged and the impoverished and develop

and implement appropriate measures to alleviate

their problems and improve their living conditions;

e. Provide relief and appropriate crisis intervention

for victims of abuse and exploitation and

recommend appropriate measures to deter further

abuse and exploitation;

f. Assist the governor or mayor in implementing the

barangay level program for the total development

and protection of children up to six (6) years of age;

g. Facilitate the implementation of welfare

programs for the disabled, elderly, and victims of

drug addiction, the rehabilitation of prisoners and

parolees, the prevention of juvenile delinquency

and such other activities which would eliminate or

minimize the ill-effects of poverty;

h. Initiate and support youth welfare programs that

will enhance the role of the youth in nation-

building;

i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

which have for their purpose the promotion and the

protection of all needy, disadvantaged,

underprivileged or impoverished groups or

individuals, particularly those identified to be

vulnerable and high-risk to exploitation, abuse and

neglect;

j. Be in the frontline of service delivery,

particularly those which have to do with immediate

relief during and assistance in the aftermath of

man-made and natural disaster and natural

calamities;

k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all other matters related to

social welfare and development services which will

improve the livelihood and living conditions of the

inhabitants; (Sec483[b])

l. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec483[c])

16. Environment

and Natural

Resources Officer

optional position a. A citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the local

government unit concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. Holder of a college degree

preferably in environment,

forestry, agriculture or any related

course from a recognized college

or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

environmental and natural

resources management,

conservation, and utilization, of at

least 5 years in the case of the

a. Take charge of the office on environment and

natural resources

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to environment and

natural resources services as provided for under Sec

17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

environment and natural resources programs and

projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Establish, maintain, protect and preserve

communal forests, watersheds, tree parks,

provincial or city environment and

natural resources officer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

environment and natural resources

officer. (Sec484[a])

mangroves, greenbelts and similar forest projects

and commercial forest;

e. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of

forest development projects and technical, financial

and infrastructure assistance;

f. Manage and maintain seed banks and produce

seedlings for forests and tree parks;

g. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of

forest development projects and render assistance

for natural resources-related conservation and

utilization activities consistent with ecological

balance;

h. Promote the small-scale mining and utilization of

mineral resources, particularly mining of gold;

i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

in the implementation of measures to prevent and

control land, air and water pollution with the

assistance of the DENR;

j. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services

concerning the environment and natural resources,

particularly in the renewal and rehabilitation of the

environment during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural calamities and disasters;

k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all matters relative to the

protection, conservation, maximum utilization,

application of appropriate technology and other

matters related to the environment and natural

resources; and (Sec484[b])

l. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec484[c])

17. Architect optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A duly licensed architect.

e. Practiced his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city architect, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

architect. (Sec485[a])

a. Take charge of the office on architectural

planning and design

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide technical assistance and

support to the governor or mayor in carrying out

measures to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate facilities relative to

architectural planning and design as provided for

under Section 17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

architectural planning and design programs and

projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this

Code;

d. Prepare and recommend for consideration of the

sanggunian the architectural plan and design for the

local government unit or a part thereof, including

the renewal of slums and blighted areas, land

reclamation activities, the greening of land, and

appropriate planning of marine and foreshore areas;

e. Review and recommend for appropriate action

of the sanggunian, governor or mayor the

architectural plans and design submitted by

governmental and non-governmental entities or

individuals, particularly those for undeveloped,

underdeveloped, and poorly-designed areas;

f. Coordinate with government and NGOs and

individuals involved in the aesthetics and the

maximum utilization of the land and water within

the jurisdiction of the LGU, compatible with

environmental integrity and ecological balance.

g. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services

involving architectural planning and design,

particularly those related to the redesigning of

spatial distribution of basic facilities and physical

structures during and in the aftermath of man-made

and natural calamities and disasters;

h. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all other matters relative to

the architectural planning and design as it relates to

the total socioeconomic development of the local

government unit; and (Sec 485[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec485[c])

18. Information

Officer

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in journalism, mass

communication or any related

course from a recognized college

or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have experience in writing

articles and research papers, or in

writing for print, television or

broadcast media of at least 3 years

in the case of the provincial or city

information officer, and at least 1

year in the case of municipal

information officer.

g. Term of the information officer

is co-terminous with his

appointing authority. (Sec486[a])

a. Take charge of the office on public information

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in providing the information

and research data required for the delivery of basic

services and provision of adequate facilities so that

the public becomes aware of said services and may

fully avail of the same;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

public information and research data to support

programs and projects which the governor or mayor

is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Provide relevant, adequate, and timely

information to the LGU and its residents;

e. Furnish information and data on LGUs to

government agencies or offices as may be required

by law or ordinance; and NGOs to be furnished to

said agencies and organizations;

f. Maintain effective liaison with the various sectors

of the community on matters and issues that affect

the livelihood and the quality of life of the

inhabitants and encourage support for programs of

the local and national government;

g. Be in the frontline in providing information

during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural

calamities and disasters, with special attention to

the victims thereof, to help minimize injuries and

casualties during and after the emergency, and to

accelerate relief and rehabilitation;

h. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to public information and research data as it

relates to the total socioeconomic development of

the LGU; (Sec486[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec486[c])

19. Cooperative

Officer

optional: provincial

and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. Holder of a college degree

preferably in business

administration with special

training in cooperatives or any

related course from a recognized

college or university,

e. First grade civil service eligible

or its equivalent

f. Have experience in cooperatives

organization and management of at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city cooperatives

officer, and 3 years in the case of

municipal cooperatives officer.

(Sec487[a])

a. Take charge of the office for the development of

cooperatives

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of facilities through the development of

cooperatives, and in providing access to such

services and facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

integration of cooperatives principles and methods

in programs and projects which the governor or

mayor is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Assist in the organization of cooperatives;

e. Provide technical and other forms of assistance

to existing cooperatives to enhance their viability as

an economic enterprise and social organization;

f. Assist cooperatives in establishing linkages with

government agencies and NGOs involved in the

promotion and integration of the concept of

cooperatives in the livelihood of the people and

other community activities;

g. Be in the frontline of cooperatives organization,

rehabilitation or viability-enhancement, particularly

during and in the aftermath of man-made and

natural calamities and disasters, to aid in their

survival and, if necessary subsequent rehabilitation;

h. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to cooperatives development and viability-

enhancement which will improve the livelihood and

quality of life of the inhabitants; (Sec487[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec487[c])

20. Population

Officer

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

with specialized training in

population development from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have experience in the

implementation of programs on

population development or

responsible parenthood for at least

5 years in the case of the

provincial or city population

officer and 3 years in the case of

the municipal population officer.

(Sec488[a])

a. Take charge of the office on population

development

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to the integration of

the population development principles and in

providing access to said services and facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

integration of population development principles

and methods in programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Assist the governor or mayor in the

implementation of the Constitutional provisions

relative to population development and the

promotion of responsible parenthood;

e. Establish and maintain an updated data bank for

program operations, development planning and an

educational program to ensure the people's

participation in and understanding of population

development;

f. Implement appropriate training programs

responsive to the cultural heritage of the

inhabitants; (Sec488[b])

g. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec488[c])

21. Veterinarian mandatory:

provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the local

government concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A licensed doctor of veterinary

medicine,

e. Have practiced his profession

for at least 3 years in the case of

provincial or city veterinarian and

at least 1 year in the case of the

municipal veterinarian.

(Sec489[a])

a. Take charge of the office for veterinary services;

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same particularly those which have to do with the

veterinary-related activities which the governor or

mayor is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Advise the governor or the mayor on all matters

pertaining to the slaughter of animals for human

consumption and the regulation of slaughterhouses;

e. Regulate the keeping of domestic animals;

f. Regulate and inspect poultry, milk and dairy

products for public consumption;

g. Enforce all laws and regulations for the

prevention of cruelty to animals;

h. Take the necessary measures to eradicate,

prevent or cure all forms of animal diseases;

i. Be in the frontline of veterinary related activities,

such as in the outbreak of highly-contagious and

deadly diseases, and in situations resulting in the

depletion of animals for work and human

consumption, particularly those arising from and in

the aftermath of man-made and natural calamities

and disasters;

j. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to veterinary services which will increase

the number and improve the quality of livestock,

poultry and other domestic animals used for work

or human consumption; (Sec489[b])

k. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec489[c])

22. General

Services Officer

mandatory:

provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the local

government unit concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree on

public administration, business

administration and management

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have acquired experience in

general services, including

management of supply, property,

solid waste disposal, and general

sanitation, of at least 5 years in the

case of the provincial or city

general services officer, and at

least 3 years in the case of the

municipal general services officer.

(Sec490[a])

a. Take charge of the office on general services;

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17 and

which require general services expertise and

technical support services;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

general services supportive of the welfare of the

inhabitants which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Take custody of and be accountable for all

properties, real or personal, owned by the LGU and

those granted to it in the form of donation,

reparation, assistance and counterpart of joint

projects;

e. Assign building or land space to local officials or

other public officials, who by law, are entitled to

such space;

f. Recommend the reasonable rental rates for local

government properties, whether real or personal,

which will be leased to public or private entities

g. Recommend reasonable rental rates of private

properties which may be leased for the official use

of the local government unit;

h. Maintain and supervise janitorial, security,

landscaping and other related services in all local

government public buildings and other real

property

i. Collate and disseminate information regarding

prices, shipping and other costs of supplies and

other items commonly used by the LGU;

j. Perform archival and record management with

respect to records of offices and departments of the

LGU

k. Perform all other functions pertaining to supply

and property management performed by the local

government treasurer; and enforce policies on

records creation, maintenance, and disposal;

l. Be in the frontline of general services related

activities, such as the possible or imminent

destruction or damage to records, supplies,

properties, and structures and the orderly and

sanitary clearing up of waste materials or debris,

particularly during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural calamities and disasters;

m. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to general services; (Sec490[b])

n. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec490[c])

De Rama v. CA

Mayor Conrado de Rama sought for the recall of 14 municipal employees on the ground that they were

“midnight” appointees of the former mayor, in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The Civil

Service Commission declared the appointments in accordance with law and valid (approved by the head of

the CSC Field Office of Lucena City).

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments were unconstitutional. Held: No.

RULING: Rule VI, Sec. 20 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative Code

provides that appointments may be recalled on the following grounds: (1) non-compliance with procedure,

(2) failure to pass through Selection Board, (3) violation of agreement relative to promotion, (4 violation of

other existing civil service laws.

No law prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

The “midnight” appointments prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution applies only to

appointments made by the President. There were no allegations of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor

or that the appointments were tainted by irregularities – only belatedly, as a supplemental pleading on

appeal, was it alleged that CSC procedures were not followed (rules on screening, posting of notices, merit

and fitness). Failure to raise these grounds in the original pleading constitutes a waiver.

Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of position, he acquires a legal – and

not only equitable – right to the position, which cannot be taken away either by revocation or by removal

without cause and previous notice and hearing. There is no showing that any of the appointees were not

qualified. They assumed their appointive positions – this cannot be unilaterally revoked.

Rule V, Sec. 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative Code provides that an

appointment accepted cannot be revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect

until disapproved by the CSC.

a. Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials

Sec 491 – 510, LGC

Article One. Liga ng Mga Barangay

Sec. 491. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all barangays, to be known as the

Liga ng mga Barangay, for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the

sanggunians and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government

administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

Sec. 492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. Every barangay shall be represented in said liga by the

punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose

among its members, who shall attend all meetings or deliberations called by the different chapters of the

liga.

The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.

The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of municipal

and city barangays, respectively. The duly elected presidents of component municipal and city chapters

shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected

presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan

political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.

Sec. 493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and

national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors.

The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary

for the management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of the

national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The board

shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.

Sec. 494. Ex Officio Membership in Sanggunians. The duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal,

city and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall

serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang

panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga

chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.

Sec. 495. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Liga ng mga Barangay shall:

(a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in consonance with

the policies, programs and projects of the National Government;

(b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people's participation in local government

administration in order to promote united and concerted action to achieve country wide development goals;

(c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay;

(d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;

(e) Serve as a forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and non-governmental

organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and

(f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about

stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.

Article Two. League of Municipalities

Sec. 496. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all municipalities, to be known as the

League of Municipalities, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues

affecting municipal government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions

thereto.

The league shall form provincial chapters composed of the league presidents for all component

municipalities of the province.

Sec. 497. Representation. Every municipality shall be represented in the league by the municipal mayor

or, in his absence, by the vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members,

who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.

Sec. 498. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Municipalities. The League of Municipalities

shall:

(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of policies, programs and

projects affecting municipalities as a whole;

(b) Promote local autonomy at the municipal level;

(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all municipalities and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and

concerted action for the attainment of country wide development goals;

(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment

within the municipalities;

(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the municipalities in consonance with

the policies, programs and projects of the National Government;

(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the

National Government, and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the

welfare of the municipalities; and

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe

for the welfare of the municipalities.

Article Three. League of Cities

Sec. 499. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all cities, to be known as the League

of Cities, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city

government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

The league may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities of a province. Highly-

urbanized cities may also form a chapter of the league. The National League shall be composed of the

presidents of the league of highly-urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters of the league

of component cities.

Sec. 500. Representation. Every city shall be represented in the league by the city mayor or, in his

absence, by the city vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who

shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.

Sec. 501. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Cities. The League of Cities shall:

(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and

projects affecting cities as a whole;

(b) Promote local autonomy at the city level;

(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all cities and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and

concerted action for the attainment of country wide development goals;

(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment

within the cities;

(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of cities in consonance with the policies,

programs and projects of the National Government;

(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the

National Government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the

welfare of the cities; and

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe

for the welfare of the cities.

Article Four. League of Provinces

Sec. 502. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all provinces, to be known as the

League of Provinces, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting

provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government administration and securing, through proper

and legal means, solutions thereto. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area and any metropolitan

political subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial units of the league.

Sec. 503. Representation. Every province shall be represented in the league by the provincial governor, or

in his absence, by the provincial vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the

members, who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.

Sec. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Provinces. The league of Provinces shall:

(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and

projects affecting provinces as a whole;

(b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level;

(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees;

(d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and

concerted action for the attainment of countrywide development goals;

(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in creating opportunities for gainful employment

within the province;

(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the provinces in consonance with the

policies, programs and projects of the National Government;

(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the

national government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the

welfare of the provinces; and

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe

for the welfare of the provinces and metropolitan political subdivisions.

Article Five. Provisions Common to all Leagues

Sec. 505. Funding. (a) All leagues shall derive its funds from contributions of member local government

units and from fund-raising projects and activities without the necessity of securing permits therefor:

Provided, That the proceeds from said fund-raising projects and activities shall be used primarily to fund the

projects for which the said proceeds have been raised, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code and

the Omnibus Election Code.

(b) All funds of leagues shall be deposited as trust funds with its treasurer and shall be disbursed in

accordance with the board of director's resolutions, subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and

regulations: Provided, That the treasurer shall be bonded in an amount to be determined by the board of

directors. The funds of a chapter shall be deposited as chapter funds and funds of the national league shall

be deposited as national funds.

Sec. 506. Organizational Structure. To ensure the effective and efficient administration, the leagues for

municipalities, cities and provinces shall elect chapter-level and national-level boards of directors and a set

of officers headed by the president. A secretary-general shall be chosen from among the national league

members to manage the day to day operation and activities of the national league. The board of directors on

the chapter or national level may create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the

management of the chapters and of the national league. The national board directors of the leagues for

municipalities, cities or provinces shall coordinate programs, projects and activities of the chapter and the

national-level league.

Sec. 507. Constitution and By-laws of the Liga and the Leagues. All other matters not herein otherwise

provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed

by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this

Chapter: Provided, That said constitution and by-laws shall always conform to the provisions of the

Constitution and existing laws.

CHAPTER 2. Leagues and Federations of Local Elective Officials

Sec. 508. Organization. (a) Vice governors, vice mayors, sanggunian members of barangays,

municipalities, component cities, highly-urbanized cities and provinces, and other elective local officials of

local government units, including those of the Metropolitan Manila area and any metropolitan political

subdivisions, may form their respective leagues or federations, subject to applicable provisions of this Title

and pertinent provisions of this Code;

(b) Sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall form a provincial federation and

elect a board of directors and a set of officers headed by the president. The duly elected president of the

provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall be an ex officio

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned and shall serve as such only during his term of office

as president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities,

which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian panlalawigan concerned.

Sec. 509. Constitution and By-laws. The leagues or federations shall adopt a constitution and by-laws

which shall govern their internal organization and operation: Provided, That said constitution and by-laws

shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws.

Sec. 510. Funding. The leagues and federations may derive funds from contributions of individual league

or federation members or from fund-raising projects or activities. The local government unit concerned may

appropriate funds to support the leagues or federation organized pursuant to this Section, subject to the

availability of funds.

David v. Comelec

Petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional Sec. 43(c) of R.A. 7160, which limited the term of office of

Barangay officials to three years. Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653 the term of office of

barangay officials shall be for five years. This is reiterated in R.A. 6679. Petitioners further aver that

although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such

reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to

barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA 7160

does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3)

while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the

same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it

follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years.

The COMELEC maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special laws relied upon by the Petitioner.

WON the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years.

Held: Yes.

R.A. 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. In case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of

different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Also, R.A. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically

applies to local government units. It specifically provides that the term of office of barangay officials shall

be for three years. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.

Petitioners posit that by excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the

general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, the Constitution thereby

impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three year term for such officers. This is legally flawed. The

Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It

merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or

prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the

exigencies of public service.

b. Private counsel/lawyers for elective local officials

Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental

Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the Office of the Mayor of Escalante Negros Occidental.

Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day for simple

misconduct categorized as an act of insubordination.

Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with damages. Mayor Ponsica, through private

practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, claimed that Zonsayda had not yet exhausted administrative remedies and

that her suspension was in accordance with law. Alinsug moved that the respondents be all declared in

default on the ground that, since the respondents were sued in their official capacities, they should have

been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as

provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local Government Code. The respondents opposed the

motion manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer.

WON private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities.

Held: Yes.

It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is

an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the

province. This has its apparent origin in De Guia v. The Auditor General where the Court held that the

municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the

provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it.

But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not necessarily. It can happen that a government

official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his

authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people's money which

ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him

without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.

In the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its

officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in

conformity with the requirements thereof. Also, a government official sued in his official capacity may

engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral

damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.

The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of

private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the

relief that is sought.

While the petition below was filed against respondents as public officials, its allegations were also aimed at

questioning certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions; thus

The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown

by its prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a

wrongful act or omission. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if the defendant had not

acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless negligence. A

public official, who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and

his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability.

Municipality of Pililia v. CA

RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against the Philippine Petroleum

Corporation, ordering the latter defendant to pay the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on

business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said

municipality.

When Atty. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with the SC, the PPC filed a motion questioning his

authority to represent petitioner municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a

private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition

by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.

WON Atty. Mendiola has the authority to file the petition in behalf of the municipality.

Held: No.

Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits; only the provincial fiscal and the

municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory.

The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the

provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle

the case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show that the provincial

fiscal is disqualified; the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.

Also, the fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services

of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law

without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal

council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the

provincial fiscal who has declined, (Sec. 1679, Administrative Code).

Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly

authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the

municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with the

respondent. A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have

impliedly dismissed his lawyer.

Ramos v. CA

A petition was filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances and the contract of lease over a

commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. Atty. Romanillos manifested

that he was counsel for the municipality filing a motion to dismiss and an amended answer. The provincial

attorney, Atty. Regalado, who first filed the answer, appeared as collaborating counsel. However, the

Provincial Fiscal (Regalado) did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who worked the case for the

municipality.

The petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipality. In

a joint statement, Atty. Romanillos withdrew as counsel for the municipality and Atty. Regalado, as

collaborating counsel adopted the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. The

judge denied the petitioners’ motion to disqualify.

WON private lawyer is authorized to represent the Municipality in its Lawsuits?

Held: NO

General Rule: Private counsel may not represent municipality or province in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that it is the duty of fiscal to represent provinces

and provincial subdivisions in litigation EXCEPT in cases where:

1. Original jurisdiction is vested in the SC

2. The municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government

or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province.

3. He, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.

The above provision is complemented by Section 3, RA 2264, the Local Autonomy Law. The provision is

mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations

where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. This strict coherence to the letter of the law

appears to have been dictated by the fact that the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of

hiring a private lawyer and that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government

lawyer handles its litigations.

None of the exemptions are present in this case. In addition, for the exceptions to apply, the fact that the

provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. There is nothing

in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality. There

is also no estoppel on the part of the plaintiffs because the legality of the representation of an unauthorized

counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

WON Collaboration with private counsel is allowed?

Held: NO

General rule: Private counsel may not represent the municipality/province even if only in collaboration with

authorized government lawyers.

EXCEPT that in interest of substantial justice, the municipality may adopt the work already performed in

good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it, provided:

1. No injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party;

2. No compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.

Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality. The proceedings

already done are declared null and void for being participated in by unauthorized counsel.

The Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause

substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring a new trial on the mere legal technicality that the

municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice.

Salalima v. Guingona

An administrative complaint was filed against Albay Governor Salalima, Vice-Governor Azafla, and

several members of the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan because of the retainer contract for legal services

entered into between the Province of Albay and Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm (private

lawyers), and the disbursement of public funds in payment thereof.

WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement and making

payments pursuant thereto. (The retainer was for a case filed by NPC against the province).

Held: Yes

Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code which is based on Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative

Code requires the appointment of a legal officer to represent the local government unit in all civil actions

and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is

a party; EXCEPT that in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to

the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be

employed to represent the adverse party.

Local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who

can rightfully represent them. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities (i.e. No prior

written approval of Solicitor General and COA before the disbursements were made, the resolution passed

only authorized the governor to sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Loaw Firm yet he also

signed with Atty. Cornago which is a different entity, the province disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna

Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the SC case, the attorney’s fees

were unreasonable = P38.5 Million).

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

A. Sec 60 – 68, LGC

See above

Ganzon v. CA and Artieda v. Santos (joint case)

A series of administrative complaints (10) were filed against Mayor Ganzon (Mayor of Iloilo City) by city

officials on various charges: abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and others. Secretary of

Local Government, Hon. Santos, issued a preventive suspension order for 60 days. A second 60 day

suspension was ordered but Mayor Ganzon was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary

injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the

respondent in the RTC. Meanwhile, the respondent issued a third order for another 60 day preventive

suspension (3rd time in 20 months), designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor

Ganzon commenced before the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the

cases.

WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper.

Held: No

The plain truth is that this Court has been uncomfortable with suspensions because it is out of the ordinary

to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension is simply "to prevent the accused

from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible

witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist

prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the LGC (section 63), a

suspension cannot exceed sixty days. It need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is sufficient

and it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is temporary. It may be imposed for no more than sixty days, a longer suspension is unjust and

unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. Since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the

Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima

facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office but it is certainly another

question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The

Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in

fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days

of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner which amounts to a

violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend

the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted

effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

Espiritu v. Melgar

Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint to the Secretary Santos of DILG, the Provincial Governor of Oriental

Mindoro Espiritu and to the Presidential Action Center, charging Mayor Melgar of Naujan. Oriental

Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered

his arrest and detention without filing any charges until his release the following day.

Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was delivering a speech during a

graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on the part of the audience. When the

Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was

drunk. The mayor informed Garing to go home but he refused to go and only did so the following morning.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No 55, recommending to the

Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days pending the investigation of the

administrative complaint. When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a Petition for

Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order in the RTC. The RTC judge issued

a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of suspension

against Mayor Melgar. On appeal, Governor Espiritu contends that the trial judge erred in granting the

preliminary injunction since the Governor is empowered to place an elective municipal official under

preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official.

WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor

Held: Yes

Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal

mayor anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:

1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts

complained of.

2. When the evidence of culpability is strong.

3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants.

4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to

the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he

is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may

not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over

possible witnesses.Since the mayor believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically

motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor

Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature. The RTC

had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to

dismiss the case. As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or

suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. However, in this case,

since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the TRO and therefore has

already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the

administrative investigation of the charges against him.

Aguinaldo v. Santos

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d'etat

was crushed, the DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to

show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn

complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts

committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively

participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal

investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his

removal from office. The Vice Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed. While the

case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of

Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been

removed from office. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the

decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As

Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual

proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the

President

Held: Yes

The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a

statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X

(4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments,

bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional

doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly

rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present

Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to

enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials.

The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61

of BP 337. As to Aguinaldo’s argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint Vargas as

Governor, Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 shows otherwise. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that

before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required because

he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under

Article 137 of the RPC. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the

quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case

pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the

most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public

official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-

election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off

the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases

pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Reyes v. Comelec

Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative

complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Manalo. It was alleged that

Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market.

Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the

DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same

officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The

Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the

Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of

mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the

order. Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification

was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of candidacy. However, the

Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec,

proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. The Comelec en banc affirmed. Reyes argues that his election on

May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes intervened, contending that because Reyes

was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer.

WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy

thereof.

Held: No

The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of

petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on

Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or

decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the

judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver

it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyes’s refusal to receive

the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received

the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section

67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon

petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already

become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the

administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and

does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in

the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings,

there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the

lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial

Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired

after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon

petitioner.

WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic

Held: No

This case is different from Aguinaldo v. Santos. Here, although Reyes brought an action to question the

decision in the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed with the result that the

decision was served on petitioner and became final. Thus, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office

of the President, he was validly removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40(b) of the LGC, he was

disqualified from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to Section

40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been

removed as a result of an administrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be given retroactive effect.

Furthermore, the Aguinaldo decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the decision of the

then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court and that to date, the

petition remains unresolved.

Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The candidate who obtains the

second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute

our judgment for the mind of the voter. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the

belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The

subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the

votes cast for him.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

Criminal and administrative complaints were filed in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman against Mayor

Ouano, Vice-Mayor Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol of Mandaue City, by Mandaue

City Councilors. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles

170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials,

acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing

the allocated appropriation therein without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of

the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman Hagad supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear

and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to investigate

and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive

suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except

City Budget Officer Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the

Ombudsman.

A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order

was filed by respondent officials with the RTC. The RTC issued a restraining order directed at the

Ombudsman, enjoining him from enforcing the preventive suspension.

WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present case

Held: Yes

The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987

Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of

R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary

authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the

Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or

employee under investigation by it.

The argument of the respondents that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials has

been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 is without merit.

Although Section 63 of the Local Government Code provides that preventive suspension can only be

imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or

an independent component city; . . ." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether

expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific

matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and

strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that

courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,

and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is

expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi: “every statute must be

so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.” All

doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize

and give effect to all laws on the subject.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective

provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became

concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770 (Sec. 21 & 24), to the extent of the

common grant, the LGC did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in

the substitution of the Secretary of Local Government by the Office of the President.

Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of

the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63

LGC to even now maintain its application. This contention is without merit. The two provisions govern

differently and there is justification for the imposition of the 6 month preventive suspension.

Ombudsman RA 7160

6 month preventive suspension 60 day preventive suspension, at any time after the issues have been

joined

All public officials (Elective or appointive) under investigation. Elective officials only after the issues are joined.

Grounds for preventive suspension: (S. 24, RA 9770)

1. The evidence of guilt should be strong, AND

a. The charge against the officer or employee

should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave

misconduct or neglect in the performance of

duty, or

b. The charges should warrant removal from the

service, or

c. The respondent’s continued stay in office

would prejudice the case filed against him

Grounds for preventive suspension:

1. There is a reasonable ground to believe that the

respondent has committed the act or acts complained

of

2. The evidence of guilt is strong

3. The gravity of the offense so warrants

4. The continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety

and integrity of the records and other evidence

Salalima v. Guingona (supra)

Administratrive Order No. 153 was signed by the President and respondent Teofisto Guingona, which

approved the findings of an Ad Hoc Committee holding Salalima et al liable in four (4) consolidated

administrative cases. Petitioners were elective officials of the Province of Albay, and were handed out

penalties in the following manner: 1) 5 months suspension for Albay Governor Salalima and 4 months

suspension for the other respondents for abuse of authority, due to the passage of an illegal ordinance which

deprived the barangays of Tiwi and Daraga of their share in delinquency payments made by Napocor to the

government; 2) 6 months suspension for Salalima and Azana, 4 months for all the other respondents for

abuse of authority under Section 60 of the LGC, when they hired private lawyers (Cortes & Reyna Law

Firm) to represent them in their case in the Supreme Court and disbursed public money to do so; 3) 4

months suspension each for oppression and abuse of authority, when they assumed jurisdiction and hastily

and arbitrarily meted out suspensions to Tiwi Mayor Corral pending the administrative cases she had filed

against the respondents; and 4) 5 months suspension to Governor Salalima for abuse of authority and gross

negligence for failing to impose and collect damages from RYU Construction Corp when the latter incurred

in delay. Petitioners challenge AO 153 on the grounds that: 1) the AO effectively suspends petitioners for

periods ranging from twelve to twenty months; 2) the Office of the President committed grave abuse of

discretion in suspending petitioners for administrative offenses allegedly committed during prior terms.

Held: 1) Petitioners contend that the challenged administrative order deprived them of their respective

offices without procedural and substantive due process. Their suspensions ranging from twelve months to

twenty months or for the entire duration of their unexpired term, which was then only seven months,

constituted permanent disenfranchisement or removal from office in clear violation of Section 60 of R.A.

No. 7160 which mandates that an elective local official may be removed from office by order of the court.

However, Section 66(b) of R. A. No. 7160 expressly provides that the penalty of suspension shall not

exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense,

nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the

qualifications for the office. Administrative Offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts

to, or constitutes any of the grounds for disciplinary action. The Office of the President committed no grave

abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six

months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the suspension

imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that

the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the

petitioners. 2) Governor Salalima could no longer be held liable in connection with the negotiated contract

RYU Construction, nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable for the execution in November

1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so

because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed

during a prior term. His reelection to office operates a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to

the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation

cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may have committed during his

previous term. 3) The grant of the power to remove elective local officials by the Oversight Committee to

“the disciplining authority” in drafting the Implementing Rules for the LGC is ultra vires; such power is

vested only with the court.

Grego v. Comelec

October 31, 1981 (before the effectivity of the LGC), Basco was removed from his position as Deputy

Sheriff (“with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government and its agencies

and instrumentalities or GOCC’s”, in the words of the Court) upon a finding of serious misconduct in an

administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. Basco then ran as a candidate for Councilor on two

consecutive occasions and won, with subsequent challenges to his election having been dismissed. On the

third instance when Basco was again elected Councilor, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a

petition praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration

of seventh placer Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District.

While the case was ongoing, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly elected

councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats.

Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding

Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.

HELD: Section 40 (b) of the LGC disqualifies those removed from office as a result of an administrative

case from running for any elective position. However, it does NOT apply retroactively to those removed

from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature

has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously

vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so

as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied

from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that

the same operates retroactively. Lex prospicit, non respicit. As such, the issue of whether or not Basco’s

election to office in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty

against him is beside the point since he is deemed NOT subject to disqualification under Sec 40 (b) of the

LGC. Also, Basco is deemed NOT to have circumvented the prohibition in the Tordesillas decision since

under the former Civil Service Decree, (the law applicable at the time of the decision) “reinstatement”

referred only to an appointive position. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not

have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the

election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a

mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such

returns and declare the result. Lastly, Romualdo S. Maranan, the seventh placer, may NOT be legally

declared a winning candidate since Basco was not disqualified.

Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres

Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the

President charging petitioner Governor Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority, praying for his

suspension and removal from office. Governor Joson had allegedly barged into the Hall during a scheduled

session of the SP and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at

respondents while men with firearms encircled the area. Acting on the complaint, President Ramos ordered

Secretary of Internal and Local Government Robert Barbers “take appropriate preemptive and investigative

actions, but to break not the peace”. Upon recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary

Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension

for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him. Joson filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of

default, which was dismissed. Petitioner alleges that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the SILG

rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of the offenses charged, whose finding was based on

the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The Executive Secretary, by

authority of the President, then adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary and

imposed a six-month suspension. Joson now questions the CA decision affirming his preventive suspension

and the implementation of the SILG Resoultion without formal investigation.

HELD: An administrative complaint against an elective official must be verified and filed with the proper

government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office

of the President, one against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or

Sangguniang Bayan. Joson is an elective provincial official, thus the complaint against him was properly

filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, the complaint was not verified by private

respondents. However, the defect was not fatal. The requirement was deemed waived by the President

himself when he acted on the complaint. Petitioner also claims undue delegation of the disciplining

authority to the DILG. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is

lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority (the President or the Executive Secretary) and the

Investigating Authority (the DILG, as per A. O. No. 23). What is delegated is the power to investigate, not

the power to discipline. The DILG did not err when it recommended preventive suspension, which may be

imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of

guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who

continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the

records and other evidence. However, the rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him

procedural due process. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. An erring

elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially

part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in

person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the

right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. Petitioner's right to

a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of

position papers. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is

expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected

by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. Suspension and removal are thus

imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates

their imposition.

Conducto v. Monzon

Judge Iluminado Monzon was charged with ignorance of the law for deliberately refusing to suspend a

barangay chairman who was charged with unlawful appointment before his sala. Barangay chairman

Benjamin Maghirang was charged with violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code and Article

244 of the Revised Penal Code for appointing his sister-in-law as barangay secretary. The Office of the

City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint, stating that the appointment was made before the effectivity of the

Local Government Code of 1991. Complainant was later able to secure an Opinion from the DILG Director

Jacob Montesa, which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated the

Local Government Code in effect prior to that of 1991. This prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor to

file an information with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pablo. Respondent judge issued a warrant for

Maghirang’s arrest. A motion for suspension was filed pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019 or the Anti Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act (which provides that any incumbent public officer or official under criminal

prosecution under Title 7, Book II of the RPC shall be suspended). Respondent judge denied the motion on

the ground that offenses committed during a prior term shall not be cause for suspension during the present

term. In denying a motion for reconsideration of the same, Monzon stated that preventive suspension only

applies if there is an administrative case against the official filed at the same time as the criminal charge.

HELD: There is misplaced reliance by the judge upon the case of Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva

Ecija. The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation finds no application in criminal liability. It was

subsequently held in Ingco vs. Sanchez that the reelection of a public officer does not wipe away any

criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory upon the

Court to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information is filed for a violation of Title 7,

Book II of the RPC or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property.

Respondent judge is fined P5,000 for ignorance of the law and given a warning against committing similar

acts in the future.

Pablico v. Villapando

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor

of San Vicente, Palawan Alejandro Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the

Constitution because he entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty

candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a government position within the

prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Sangguniang

Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service, and was

affirmed by the Office of the President. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of

Villapando. The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to

vacate the Office of the Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.

HELD: The last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the Local Government Code clearly provides that the dismissal

from service of an erring elective local official may only be decreed by a court of law. Although Article

124(b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code adds that such

removal may be had by the disciplining authority (pertaining to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan), no rule or

regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law such as the LGC. Such power to remove

elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts.

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano v. Punong Barangay Martines

Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner

through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over

elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA 7160. The complaint was later amended for

Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from

office. The decision was conveyed to the mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija. The mayor, however, issued a

Memo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has no power to order Martinez’ removal from office.

However, the decision remains valid until reversed.

WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.

Held: No.

Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local

officials from office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,[16] the

legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts,

jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without

any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as

expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated Article 125,

Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and

Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the disciplining

authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper

courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove

Martinez.

Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard

and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter,

impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the

order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal

is warranted.

The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the

removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v. Villapando, the court declared

that:The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied,

and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good

faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the

exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or

partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to

suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the

power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is

intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority.

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an

administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or

Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the

removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this

power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the

barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office,

the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains

jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than

removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang

Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it

deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges

be filed in court.

The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in

accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective officials must not

be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. The local government units

are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing

the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Cases of Sexual Harassment versus elective local government officials and local

government employees, heads of departments

Civil Service Administrative Rule on Sexual Harassment and RA No 7877

See attachments

Book I, Title 2, Chapter 4, LGC (Sec 60 – 68)

See above

B. Disciplinary Actions over Local Appointive Officials

Sec 84 – 89, LGC

Administrative discipline (Sec 84)

Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees

as well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other

pertinent laws.

The results of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission.

Preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees (Sec 85)

Who may impose:

The local chief executive

When to impose:

Pending investigation after filing of administrative charges against the subordinate official or

employee which involves:

o Dishonesty

o Oppression

o Grave misconduct

o Neglect in the performance of duty

o If there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would

warrant his removal from the service

Duration of Preventive Suspension:

Not exceeding sixty (60) days

What happens after preventive suspension:

The suspended official shall be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of

the administrative proceedings against him until its termination.

NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the

respondent, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein

provided.

Administrative investigation (Sec 86)

Who may perform:

Any person or committee duly authorized by the local chief executive

How performed:

The person or committee duly authorized shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against appointive

local officials and employees.

The investigating body shall submit their findings and recommendations to the local chief executive

concerned within fifteen (15) days from conclusion of the hearings.

Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of Judgment):

90 days from the time the respondent is formally notified of the charges.

Disciplinary jurisdiction (Sec 87)

Imposable penalties:

1. Removal from service

2. Demotion in rank

3. Suspension for not more than one (1) year without pay

4. Fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months salary

5. Reprimand

6. Other disciplinary actions

Appeal4

APPEALABLE NOT APPEALABLE

If the penalty imposed is heavier

than suspension of thirty (30)

days

If the penalty imposed is

suspension without pay

for not more than thirty

(30) days

Where to appeal:

Civil Service Commission (judgment must be rendered within 30 days from receipt of appeal)

Execution pending appeal (Sec 88)

An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant.

In case the respondent-appellant is EXONERATED, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights

and privileges appurtenant thereto from the time he had been deprived thereof.

Prohibited business and pecuniary interest (Sec 89)

4 The provision is unclear whether the imposition of demotion, reprimands etc. are also final and not appealable. The provision speaks only of suspension without pay for not more than thirty days which is not appeable.

1. Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which he is:

a. an official, or

b. employee, o

c. over which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its

d. authorized boards,

e. officials,

f. agents, or

g. attorney,

whereby money is to be paid, or property or anything of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out

of the resources of the LGU to such person or firm;

2. Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by an LGU;

3. Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such LGU

a. for unpaid taxes or assessment, or

b. by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the said local official;

4. Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the LGU for which a surety is

required; and

5. Possess or use any public property of the LGU for private purposes.

Other prohibited businesses and interests as provided under R.A. 6713 shall also be applicable.

Mendez v. CSC

Then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint

against the petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for Gross

Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No.

209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for having pocketed it. After three months of

investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the

petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)

reversed the decision of the Mayor and dismissed Mendez from the service. The CSC affirmed the MSPB

decision. Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the reversal of the city mayor's decision by

the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected

by the decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed that his exoneration by

the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.

HELD: P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil Service Law, does not contemplate a review of

decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof,

provides: "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the

imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'

salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office " Said provision must be

read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates: "Appeals, where allowable,

shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision . . ." The phrase "party adversely affected by

the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the

purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,

removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan, who filed the appeal, cannot be considered

an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below. Moreover, The

remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed

against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for

appeal. The CSC decision is set aside and the decision of the Quezon City Mayor is reinstated (Complaint

against Mendez dismissed).

Macalingag and Carlos v. Chang

Pursuant to an administrative charge against him for dishonesty, neglect of duty, and act prejudicial to the

best interest of the service, an Order of Preventive suspension was issued against Roberto Chang, then the

acting municipal treasurer of Makati. Said Order was signed by Lorinda Carlos, the Executive director of

the Bureau of Local Government, and Victor Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, who was then the

acting Secretary. Chang filed a complaint for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the lower court.

The trial court found in that in order for preventive suspension to take effect, there are two steps involved:

1) service of the copy the order on the respondent, and 2) designation of his replacement. The order of

preventive suspension was held to have been incomplete and without effect since an acting municipal

treasurer had yet to be appointed to replace Chang.

HELD: Preventive suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Law, which does not

require a replacement to be designated for the Order to take effect. BP 337 (the LGC in effect at the time)

provides for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of

suspension of the municipal treasurer. There can be no question that the Order of Preventive Suspension

became effective upon respondent Chang’s receipt thereof. Chang argues that EO 392, which gave rise to

the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, vested in the President of the Philippines the power to

appoint the municipal treasurer, and thus only the President may suspend or remove him. However, Section

8 of EO 392 provides that the appointments made by the President of the Philippines shall be subject to the

Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Moreover, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unquestionably

falls under the Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority

to issue the preventive suspension order. Even assuming that the power to appoint includes the power to

discipline (as argued by Chang), Acting Secretary Macalingag, as Secretary of Finance, is the alter ego of

the President. It is therefore within his authority to preventively suspend Chang.

Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan

Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered suspended

by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge

filed against him. However, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension

order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him from the

Office of the City Mayor.

Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his

performance for several semesters, which is the reason why he was formally charged. Garcia was

preventively suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major offense. An investigation was scheduled

but Garcia failed to appear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro proceeded with

an ex parte investigation. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the suspension.

This was affirmed by the Regional Director. Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private

respondent was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate

officers and employees. The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process

had been fully observed by Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges

against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner chose not to

answer those charges.

HELD: Under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local

government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly

promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication

of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension

and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.

The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the primary law

governing appointive officials and employees in the government. They may be removed or dismissed

summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is

a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of procedure

and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with

that in the strict judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads

of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to

commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of

the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,

the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the

regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint. Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu

propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative

Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized

the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment

office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. In the

case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the

Administrative Code of 1987. The term “agency” refers to any of the various units of the government

including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled

corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was

the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under

him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a

preventive suspension order against him.

Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to

institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In

fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of

the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same token, there is

nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner.

Due process has not been violated. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the

opportunity to explain one’s side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before

judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also --

and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties

are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied

with. This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek

reconsideration of an action or a ruling.

In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out

in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May

30, 1990 formal charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive

Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional

director, who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated July

31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on August 15, 1990.

However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte. Fourth, the

Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision.

Recall

Sec 69-75, LGC

See above

RA 9244

See attachments

This amends Sec 70 – 71 of the LGC

Rivera v. Comelec

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of

Mabalacat. On January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On January 10, petitioners filed

before the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy on the ground that the was

elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA

7160.Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to

June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term

from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer” because he

was not validly elected as his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter, he was

preventively suspended by the ombudsman. The COMELEC ruled that Morales was disqualified to run for

public office. Morales’ MR was however granted. The COMELEC ruled that his proclamation before was

void and that the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor.

In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony

Dee filed a petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated the previous arguments of petitioners.

The RTC dismissed Dee’s petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not serve the three-term

limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term

1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed.

HELD: Morales is disqualified from running as mayor. In Ong v. Alegre the Court held, thus:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must

concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same

local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served

as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC

in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held

in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Section 8,

Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit. Respondent Morales is now serving his

fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just

over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s

freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating

excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.

Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a

“de facto officer.” Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an

official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto”

officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on

indefinitely”. Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat. Having found

respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled.

In the light of the foregoing, Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not

being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray

votes. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the

instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.

In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute

winner. As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has

occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local

Government Code.

Evardone v. Comelec

Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988

local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado,

Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the

Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the the

recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against

Evardone. Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for being

violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.

HELD: Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not

inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked.

Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10

October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the

Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local

Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of

the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the

proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272

promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the the COMELEC had the

authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.

In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or

about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following

up and determining the outcome of such notice. Despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO,

Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. The Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990

but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of

the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality

of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this

Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat,

Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. The right to recall is complementary to the right

to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must

maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a

public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public

offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and

to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost

confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the

people are the judge. Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's

ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have

made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the

highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone

of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.

However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P.

Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992,

or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to

hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative

of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code

Garcia v. Comelec

Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of

the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a

Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable

Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as

Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the

Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the

petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded." Petitioners filed

with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the

requirements under the LGC, which dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners

filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160

allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole

and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) that the initiation of a recall

through the PRA had de facto recalled Garcia from office and it effectively shortens and ends the term of

the incumbent local officials and (3 )it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the

political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC

in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate

failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. The Court granted

petition on the narrow ground that sending of selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due

process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. Requirement of

notice is mandatory and its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall Garcia as

Governor. Petitioners then filed again Urgent Petition reiterating their contention that section 70 of RA

7160 is unconstitutional.

HELD: Section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is constitutional. As to

the first contention, the Court stated that the legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons

why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish

the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. Our

lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the

electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the

city mayor failed. This initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive

and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating

the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. To be sure, there is nothing in the

Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on

whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single

mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall

elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local

government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure

through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By

this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of

recall as its discernment dictates. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to

enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct

action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the

prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy

against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of

powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.

As to the second contention, the Court held that Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory

process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation

by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit

done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act

through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is

delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a

congressional constituent assembly. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the

recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is

part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall

that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA

resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect

whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the

tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people

render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office

is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall

of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the

person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."

As to the third contention, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in

their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those

belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give

an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be

considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly, all mayors, vice-mayors

and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory

recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No

significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at

the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number,

the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code

provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people.

The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as

representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere

differences in political party affiliation. There is only one ground for the recall of local government

officials: loss of confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly

may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground except loss of

confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local

elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.

Paras v. Comelec

Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as

Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The COMELEC scheduled the petition

signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. At least 29.30% of the

registered voters signed the petition, above the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent the holding of

the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC petition for injunction. After conducting a summary

hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his

counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall

election was without COMELEC approval.

The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, hence the instant petition for certiorari with urgent

prayer for injunction the issue being WON the recall election to be held on January 13, 1996 is barred by

the SK election to be held on May 1996.

HELD: The issue on recall has become moot and academic. But the Court held that it would be more in

keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring

to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and

be filled by the electorate.

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise

known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from

the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local

election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,

and every three years thereafter. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to

recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely

designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the

second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local

election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government

Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.

And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be

deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then

no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC. In the interpretation of

a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law,

and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation

should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as

otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,

meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute

should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local

Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional

mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide

for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ." Finally, recall election

is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional

expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the

regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of

the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said

election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It

would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular

local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be

recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer

possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular

election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been

scheduled on May 1997.

Malonzo v. Comelec

Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor, winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into

his term, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen, constituting a

majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon

deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96,

expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against

him. The Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Mayor Malonzo filed a petition for

certiorari with a prayer for TRO assailing the Comelec’s resolution. The Petition, in the main, raises the

issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the

service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting

in the issuance of the questioned Resolution.

HELD: The Court ruled that notices were properly sent to the members of the PRA and that the proceedings

held by the PRA are valid. The Commission regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion of

service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied, if there was not

only service, but also completion of service thereof. Personal services were acknowledged by receipts

signed, if not by the addressee himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a

person of sufficient discretion in the member 's residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced

by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when

notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his

witnesses. The circumstances being thus, it was held that there was complete service of the notices as

contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng

mga Barangay who sent the notices is of no moment. As member of the PRA, he can legally exercise the

prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the other

members of its scheduled convening. It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so

holds that the requirements of notice had been fully complied with. Needless to state, the issue of propriety

of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a

function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the

Court should not disturb the same.

Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the

Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all

barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in

the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 LGC. It also provides that the Kagawad

may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is

undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the

personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall

Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the

recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law.

Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the

Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall

proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the

proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As the COMELEC pertinently observes:

“The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session held. Attendees

constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules

of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which

was that of petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about

the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their

signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate

his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the

resolution.”

The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during the session of the

preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of

the respondent COMELEC.

Claudio v. Comelec

Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 19, 1999,

several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard

Advincula was designated chair. The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating

Claudio’s recall. The petition for recall was filed in the Office of the City Mayor. The COMELEC also

posted the petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles,

alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution

were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only

representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the

convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by

Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as

mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and

(5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10

were actually double entries, were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 Sangguniang

Kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.

The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who

attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its

records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of

Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either

case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in

support of the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.

WON the word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of

the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution

Held: Yes.

Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of

the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the

filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition,

the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However,

as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide

whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in

support of this conclusion.

First, § 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the

other hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local

government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not

the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74

cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph

(b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for

recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for

recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal

limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the

purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which

is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to

initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place

within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the

purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that

no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned,

and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an "The

only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a

recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official

before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year

limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that

case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually

held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle

announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the

performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-

year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year

in office of a local official.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose

of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the

constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day

of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an

informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the

holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the

most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always

eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the

incumbent.

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary

proceedings to initiate recall -

1. 1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall be

exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right

except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year

period provided in paragraph (b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for

judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would

unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed

office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74 of the LGC includes the

election period or campaign period?

Held: No.

The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately

preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,

which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Petitioner's

interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because

no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,

presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following

year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days,

more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would

reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the

right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election

Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the

day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the

second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right

of the people.

WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified

Held: Yes.

Petitioner contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because

74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their

names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner

claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the

signatures of the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not

raised before the COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent

that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it

was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74

members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is

more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution

of which the pages in question are part. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in

the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as

notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised

before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

Human Resources and Development

Book I, Title 3, LGC (Sec 76 – 97)

For Sec 84 – 89, see above

Title III – Human Resources and Development

Organization structure and staffing pattern (Sec 76)

In designing and implementing the organizational structure and staffing pattern by the LGU the following

factors shall be considered:

1. Service Requirements of the LGU;

2. Financial Capability of the LGU

Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission

Responsibility for human resources and development (Sec 77)

The local chief executive of every LGU shall be responsible for human resources and development of the

said LGU.

The local chief executive shall take all personnel actions in accordance with the Constitution, pertinent

laws, rules and regulations including such policies, guidelines and standards as may be established by the

Civil Service Commission.

The local chief executive may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily wage,

piecework, or per job order basis for local projects authorized by the Sangguniang concerned, without the

need for approval or attestation by the Civil Service Commission BUT the period of employment of these

workers SHALL NOT exceed six (6) months.

Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and other related issuances (Sec 78)

General rule: All matters pertaining to human resources and development in LGU’s shall be governed by

the Civil Service Law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated pursuant thereto.

Exception: When specified otherwise by the Local Government Code.

Limitation on appointment (Sec 79)

No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local government if he is related within the fourth

civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending authority.

Public notice of vacancy; Personnel Selection Board (Sec 80)

Requirement in filling up a vacant career position:

Posting of notice of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in the LGU concerned for a

period of not less than fifteen (15) days.

Personnel Selection Board

Functions:

1. To assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for

employment and for promotion;

2. To assist the local chief executive in the formulation of policies that would contribute to

employee welfare.

Composition:

Headed by the Local Chief Executive;

Members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned;

A representative of the Civil Service Commission as an ex-officio member;

The personnel officer of the LGU also as an ex-officio member.

Compensation of local officials and employees (Sec 81)

General rule: It shall be determined by the sanggunian of their respective LGU.

Limitations of the rule:

1. The increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of

office of those approving such increase shall have expired;

2. The increase in the compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as

provided in the ordinance authorizing the such increase;

3. The increases as provided shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal

services provided under Title 5, Book 2 of LGC;

4. The compensation as provided may be based upon the pertinent provisions of R.A. 6758.

Exception: The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the SK chairman, the barangay

treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such compensation, allowances, emoluments, and

such other privileges as provided under Title 1, Book 3 of LGC. (see Sec. 393, LGC)

Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local

officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof.

Resignation of elective local officials (Sec 82)

Resignation by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance of the proper

authorities as shown below:

Officials tendering resignation Proper Authority to accept the resignation

Governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-

mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent

component cities

President of the Philippines

Municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city

mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities Governor

Sanggunian member Sanggunian to which he/she belongs

Barangay officials City or municipal mayor

Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken by the proper

authorities accepting the resignation shall be furnished the DILG.

The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within fifteen (15)

working days from receipt thereof.

Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an

open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records.

Exceptions:

1. The above rule does not apply to sanggunian members subject to recall election;

2. The same does not apply in cases where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such

resignations.

Grievance procedure (Sec 83)

The local chief executive, of every LGU shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or

settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees.

Practice of profession (Sec 90)

Governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any

business other than the exercise of their function as local chief executives.

Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools.

Exception: During session hours.

Exception to the exception: Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of

work ONLY on occasion of emergency PROVIDED; they do not derive any monetary compensation

therefrom.

Special rules for Sanggunian members who are also lawyers:

1. They shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein an LGU or any office,

agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

2. They shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the

national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

3. They shall not collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the

local government unit of which he is an official;

4. They shall not use property and personnel of the Government except when they are defending the

interest of the Government.

Statement of assets and liabilities (Sec 91)

Officials and employees of LGU’s shall file their:

1. Sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth

2. Lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service;

3. Financial and business interests;

4. Personal data sheets as required by law.

Oath of office (Sec 92)

All elective and appointive local officials and employees shall, upon assumption to office, subscribe to an

oath or affirmation of office in the prescribed form.

The oath or affirmation shall be filed with the office of the local chief executive concerned.

A copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and appointive local officials and employees shall

be preserved in the individual personal records file under the custody of the personnel office, division, or

section of the LGU concerned.

Partisan political activity (Sec 93)

No local official or career civil service employee shall:

1. Engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election,

initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall EXCEPT to vote;

2. Use his official authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by any

person or body.

Local officials or career civil service employees MAY express his views on current issues, or mention the

names of certain candidates for public office whom he supports.

Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and electoral activities BUT it shall be unlawful

for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject these subordinates to any of the

prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code.

Appointment of elective and appointive local officials; candidates who lost in an election (Sec 94)

No elective of appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to

any public office or position during his tenure.

No elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any

subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government – owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries.

Exception: When otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position (Ex officio

positions)

No candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any

office in the Government or any government – owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Exception: Losers in the barangay elections.

Additional or double compensation (Sec 95)

No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect

compensation.

Exception: When specifically allowed by law.

No elective or appointive local official or employee shall accept any present, emoluments, office, or title of

any kind from any foreign government.

Exception: When Congress gives consent.

Pension and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Permission to leave station (sec 96)

Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on OFFICIAL TRAVEL shall apply

and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives before departure.

The application (for permission to leave station) shall specify the reason for the travel.

The permission shall be given or withheld based on:

1. considerations of pubic interest;

2. financial capability of the local government unit concerned; and

3. urgency of the travel.

Should the local chief executive concerned fail to act upon the application within four (4) working days

from receipt thereof, it shall be deemed APPROVED.

Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the permission of the governor concerned for

any travel outside the province.

Local government officials TRAVELING ABROAD shall notify their respective sanggunian PROVIDED

that when the period of travel extends to MORE THAN THREE (3) MONTHS, during periods of

emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds, permission from the Office of the

President shall be secured.

Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, municipalities shall not leave

their official stations without giving PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE to the local chief executive concerned.

The written notice shall state the duration of the travel and the name of the officer whom he shall designate

to act for and in his behalf during his absence.

Annual report (Sec 97)

On or before March 31 of every year, every local chief executive shall submit an annual report to the

sanggunian concerned on the socio-economic, political and peace and order conditions, and other matters

concerning the local government unit, which shall cover the immediately preceding calendar year.

A copy of the report shall be forwarded to the DILG.

Component cities and municipalities shall likewise provide the sangguniang panlalawigan copies of their

respective annual reports.

I. Practice of Profession by Mayors, Governors and other elective officials

Sec 90, LGC

See above

Javellana v. DILG

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Council or of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City

Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana. Divinagracia's complaint

alleged that Javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that

purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum

Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department: that on

July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City

Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages"

putting him in public ridicule: that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in

the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular

No. 80-38. Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly

that DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has

the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. The motion to dismiss was denied.

A few months later, the LGC was enacted which provides: "SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.

"(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools

except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall

not:

"(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local

government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

"(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local

government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office:

"(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit

of which he is an official; and

"(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is

defending the interest of the Government.”

Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38

and 90-81 and Section 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and null and void.

HELD: The Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of RA 7160 are constitutional. In the first place,

complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties

are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a

public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer

Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of

which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, would

actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees

and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated

Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government

official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests

adverse to the government. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991

and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is completely

off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to

prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No.

90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the

discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law

allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It

applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90

explicitly provides that Sanggunian Members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or

teach in schools except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to

lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or

affect, the area of public service.

II. Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations; Limitations on Appointments; Resignation

of Elective Local Officials; Preventive Suspension of Local Officials and Employees;

Administrative Investigation; Disciplinary Jurisdiction; Additional or Double

Compensation

Local Boards and Councils

Book I, Titles 4-7 (Sec 98 – 116)

Title IV – Local School Boards

There shall be established in every province, city, or municipality a provincial, city or municipal school

board respectively.

Composition

i. Provincial School Board

Co - Chairmen 1. Provincial Governor

2. Provincial Division Schools

Superintendent

Members 1. Chairman of Education Committee in the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan

2. Provincial Treasurer

3. SK Federation Representative in the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan

4. President of the Provincial Federation of

PTA

5. Representative of the teacher’s

organization in the province

6. Representative of the non-academic

personnel of public schools in the province

ii. City School Board

Co – Chairmen 1. City Mayor

2. City Division Schools Superintendent

Members 1. Chairman of Education Committee in the

Sangguniang Panlungsod

2. City Treasurer

3. SK Federation Representative in the

Sangguniang Panlungsod

4. President of the City Federation of PTA

5. Representative of the teacher’s

organization in the city

Representative of the non-academic

personnel of public schools in the city

iii. Municipal School Board

Co – Chairmen 1. Municipal Mayor

2. District Supervisor

Members 1. Chairman of Education

Committee in the

Sangguniang Bayan

2. Municipal Treasurer

3. SK Federation

Representative in the

Sangguniang Bayan

4. President of the

Municipal Federation of

PTA

5. Representative of the

teacher’s organization in

the municipality

Representative of the

non-academic personnel

of public schools in the

municipality

In the event that a province or a city has two (2) or more school superintendents, and in the event that a

municipality has two (2) or more district supervisors, the co-chairmen of the local school board shall be

determined as follows:

1. The DepEd shall designate the co-chairman for the provincial or city schools board; and

2. The Schools Division Superintendent shall designate the district supervisor who shall serve as co-

chairman as in the municipal school board

The performance of the duties and responsibilities of the abovementioned officials in their respective school

boards shall no be delegated.

Functions of a local school board

1. To determine in accordance with the criteria set by the DepEd, the annual supplementary

budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public schools within the province, city, or

municipality, as the case may be, and the supplementary local costs of meeting such needs, which

shall be reflected in the form of an annual school board budget corresponding to its share of the

proceeds of the special levy on real property constituting the Special Education Fund and such

other sources of revenue as this Code and other laws or ordinances may provide;

2. To authorize the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, to disburse funds

from the Special Education Fund pursuant to the budget prepared and in accordance with existing

rules and regulations;

3. To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on educational matters such as,

but not limited to, the necessity for and the uses of local appropriations for educational purposes;

and

4. To recommend changes in the names of public schools within the territorial jurisdiction of the

local government unit for enactment by the sanggunian concerned.

The DepEd shall consult the local school board on the appointment of division superintendents, district

supervisors, school principals, and other officials.

Meetings and quorum

The local school board shall meet at least once a month or as often as may be necessary.

Any of the co-chairmen may call a meeting.

A majority of all its members shall constitute a quorum. However, when both co-chairmen are present in a

meeting, the local chief executive concerned, as a matter of protocol, shall be given preference to preside

over the meeting.

The division schools superintendent, city schools superintendent or district supervisor, as the case may be,

shall prepare the budget of the school board concerned. Such budget shall be supported by programs,

projects, and activities of the school board for the ensuing fiscal year.

The affirmative vote of the majority of all the members shall be necessary to approve the budget.

Priorities in the school board budget

1. Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public

elementary and secondary schools;

2. Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and

3. Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels.

Title V – Local Health Boards

There shall be established a local health boards in every province, city, or municipality.

Composition:

i. Provincial Health Board

Chairman Provincial Governor

Vice – Chairman Provincial health officer

Members

1. Chairman of the committee on health of the

sangguniang panlalawigan

2. Representative from Private sector or NGO

involved in health services

3. Representative from the DOH in the province

ii. City Health Board

Chairman City Mayor

Vice – Chairman City Health Officer

Members

1. Chairman of the committee on health of the

Sangguniang panlalawigan

2. Representative from Private sector or NGO

involved in health services

3. Representative from DOH in the province

iii. Municipal Health Board

Chairman Municipal Mayor

Vice – chairman Municipal health officer

Members

1. Chairman of the committee on health of the

sangguniang panlalawigan

2. Representative from Private sector or NGO

involved in health services

3. Representative from the DOH in the province

Functions of a local health board

1. To propose to the sanggunian concerned, in accordance with standards and criteria set by the

DOH, annual budgetary allocations for the operation and maintenance of health facilities and

services within the municipality, city, or province, as the case may be;

2. To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on health matters such as, but not

limited to, the necessity for, and application of, local appropriations for public health purposes;

and

3. To create committees, consistent with the technical standards and administrative standards of the

DOH, which shall advise local health agencies on matters such as but not limited to:

a. personnel selection and promotion

b. bids and awards

c. grievance and complaints

d. personnel discipline

e. budget review

f. operations review

g. other similar functions.

Meetings and quorum

The board shall meet at least once a month or as may be necessary.

A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum but the chairman or the vice-chairman

must be present during meetings where budgetary proposals are being prepared or considered.

The affirmative vote of all the majority of the members shall be necessary to approve such in proposals.

Compensation and remuneration

General Rule: The chairman, vice-chairman and members of the local health board shall perform their

duties without compensation or remuneration.

Exception: Members of the local health board who are not government officials or employees shall be

entitled to necessary traveling expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of the local health

board concerned, subject to the existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.

Direct national supervision and control by the Secretary of Health (Sec 105)

General Rule: The local health matters in a particular LGU shall be directly controlled and supervised by

the local health board.

Exception: In cases of epidemics, pestilence, and other widespread public health dangers, the Secretary of

Health may, upon the direction of the President and in consultation with the LGU concerned, temporarily

assume direct supervision and control over health operations in any LGU for the duration of the emergency,

but in no case exceeding six (6) months. With the concurrence of the LGU concerned, the period for such

direct supervision and control may be further extended.

Title VI – Local Development Councils

Section 106. Local Development Councils. Each local government unit shall have a comprehensive

multisectoral development plan to be initiated by its development council and approved by its sanggunian.

For this purpose, the development council at the provincial, city, municipal or barangay level, shall assist

the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and

coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

Comments: The Code has established a local development council for every province, city, municipality

and barangay. Its primary duty is to initiate a comprehensive multisectoral development plan for the LGU

concerned, which is submitted to the proper sanggunian for its approval.

By initiating the development plan for the LGU concerned, the local development council sets the direction

of economic and social development and coordinates development efforts within the said local government

unit. It is not specifically directed by the Code that development planning should start from below, the local

people, and not imposed from the top, the central government.

Section 107. Composition of Local Development Councils. The composition of the local development

council shall be as follows:

(a)The barangay development council shall be headed by the punong barangay and shall be composed of

the following members:

1. Members of the Sangguniang Barangay;

2. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the barangay, who shall constitute

not less than one fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully organized council;

3. A representative of the congressman.

(b)The City or Municipal Development Council shall be headed by the mayor and shall be composed of the

following members:

1. All punong barangays in the city or municipality;

2. The chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang

Bayan concerned;

3. The congressman or his representative; and

4. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the city or municipality, as the

case may be, who shall constitute not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully

organized council.

(c) The Provincial Development Council shall be headed by the governor and shall be composed of the

following members:

1. All mayors of component cities and municipalities;

2. The chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;

3. The congressman or his representative; and

4. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations operating in the province, who shall constitute

not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully organized council.

(d) The local development councils may call upon any local official concerned or any official of national

agencies or offices in the local government unit to assist in the formulation of their respective development

plans and public investment programs.

Comments: The local chief executives chair the local development councils: (a) the governor for the

Provincial Development Council, (b) the mayor for the City or Municipal Development Council and (c) the

punong barangay for the Barangay Development Council.

NGO Members

The Code gives the NGOs a sizable number of representatives (not less than ¼ of the total number of

council members) in the LDCs in recognition of the vital role that the private sector plays in the

development of the different provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. As members of the LDCs,

NGOs can play a substantial role in defining the thrusts of local development.

Power to Summon Assistance

The local development councils have the power to summon any official of an LGU concerned or of the

national government agency or office in the said LGU to assist them in the formulation of their respective

development plans and public investment programs.

Section 108. Representation of Nongovernmental Organizations. Within a period of sixty (6) days from the

start of organization of local development councils, the nongovernmental organizations shall choose from

among themselves their representatives to said councils. The local sanggunian concerned shall accredit

nongovernmental organizations subject to such criteria as may be provided by law.

Comments:

Period to Choose NGO Representatives

This section directs that within 60 days from the organization of the LDC, the NGOs shall choose their

representatives to the council from among themselves.

It bears repeating that NGO representatives are chosen by them. They are not to be appointed by the mayor,

the governor nor any other politician.

Accreditation of NGOs

This section deals with the accreditation of the NGOs by the local sanggunian concerned according to such

criteria as may be provided by law. Till this date, there is no such law yet. The IRR, however, indicate some

criteria for the accreditation of NGOs. The criteria laid down by the IRR are helpful guides for

accreditation.

Section 109. Functions of Local Development Councils.

(a)The Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils shall exercise the following functions:

1. Formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual socioeconomic development plans and policies;

2. Formulate the medium-term and annual public investment programs;

3. Appraise and prioritize socioeconomic development programs and projects;

4. Formulate local investment incentives to promote the inflow and direction of private investment

capital;

5. Coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of development programs and projects; and

6. Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

(b) The barangay development council shall exercise the following functions:

1. Mobilize people’s participation in local development efforts;

2. Prepare barangay development plans based on local requirements;

3. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of national or local programs and projects; and

4. Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

Comments: The Barangay Development Council does essentially the same things for the barangay,

although there is one thing that it is explicitly empowered to do which the other development councils have

not been expressly authorized to do – to mobilize people’s participation in local development efforts. It does

not mean, however, that other LDCs cannot mobilize popular participation in local development. In fact,

they should do so because without popular involvement and support, there will be no substantial

development in their community.

Section 110. Meetings and Quorum. The local development council shall meet at least once every six (6)

months or as often as may be necessary.

Section 111. Executive Committee.

(a) Each local development council shall create an executive committee to represent it and act in its behalf

when it is not in session. The composition of the executive committee shall be as follows:

1. The executive committee of the Provincial Development Council shall be composed of the

governor as chairman, the representative of component city and municipal mayors to be chosen

from among themselves, the chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, the president of the provincial league of barangays, and a representative of non-

governmental organizations that are represented in the council, as members;

2. The executive committee of the City or Municipal Development Council shall be composed of the

mayor as chairman, the chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, the president of the city or municipal league of barangays, and a representative of

nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the council, as members; and

3. The executive committee of the barangay development council shall be composed of the punong

barangay as chairman, a representative of the Sangguniang Barangay to be chosen from among its

members, and a representative of nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the

council, as members.

(b) The executive committee shall exercise the following powers and functions:

1. Ensure that the decision of the council are faithfully carried out and implemented;

2. Act on matters requiring immediate attention or action by the council;

3. Formulate policies, plans and programs based on the general principles laid down by the council;

and

4. Act on other matters that may be authorized by the council.

Comments:

Excom Functions

The main function of the executive committee of a local development council is to represent it and act in its

behalf when the council is not meeting.

Section 112. Sectoral or Functional Committee. The local development councils may form sectoral or

functional committees to assist them in the performance of their functions.

Comments: Sectoral/Functional Committees. The Code allows the LDCs to create sectoral or functional

committees to assist them. A sectoral committee may be composed of members who come from a particular

sector of society, for example, an urban poor committee or a committee of fisherfolk. Functional

committees may encompass definite duties like a committee on ways and means or a committee on

beautification.

Section 113. Secretariat. There is hereby constituted for each local development council a secretariat which

shall be responsible for providing technical support, documentation of proceedings, preparation of reports

and such other assistance as may be required in the discharge of its functions. The local development

council may avail of the services of any nongovernmental organization or educational or research institution

for this purpose.

The secretariats of the Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils shall be headed by their

respective planning and development coordinators. The secretariat of the barangay development council

shall be headed by the barangay secretary who shall be assisted by the city or municipal planning and

development coordinator concerned.

Comments: LDC Secretariat. The Code does not define the membership of the secretariat of the LDCs but it

must be headed by the provincial, city or municipal Development Coordinators in the case of a province,

city or municipality and by the barangay secretary in the case of a barangay. The barangay secretary as head

of the Barangay Secretariat shall be assisted by the city or municipal planning and development coordinator

concerned. The reason is that very few, if any, barangay secretaries would have the expertise to discharge

the duties of the head of the barangay secretariat on socioeconomic planning.

Section 114. Relation of Local Development Councils to the Sanggunian and the Regional Development

Council.

(a) The policies, programs and projects proposed by local development councils shall be submitted to the

sanggunian concerned for appropriate action. The local development plans approved by their respective

sanggunian may be integrated with the development plans of the next higher level of local development

council.

(b) The approved development plans of provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component

cities shall be submitted to the Regional Development Council, which shall be integrated into the regional

development plan for submission to the National Economic and Development authority, in accordance with

existing laws.

Comments:

Sanggunian Approval Needed. Plans, programs and projects prepared by LDCs do not automatically

acquire the force of law. They must be submitted to the sanggunian concerned, which enacts the

corresponding ordinance to make them enforceable within the territory of the LGU concerned. The

Sanggunian may or may not adopt the said plans, programs and projects.

Integration with Higher Level LDC Plans. If adopted by the Sanggunian, the said plans, programs and

projects may be integrated with the development plans of the next higher LDC. For example, if the

development plans of a Municipal Development Council is adopted by the municipal Sanggunian, the plans

may be made a part of the provincial development plan by the Provincial Development Council.

Submission to Regional Development Council. Development plans approved by the Sanggunian of a

province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city shall be submitted to the Regional

Development Council which shall integrate them into the regional development plan for submission to the

NEDA in accordance with existing laws.

The regional development Council has no authority to disapprove a provincial, city or municipal

development plan but it may make its implementation difficult by recommending its disapproval for

funding.

Section 115. Budget Information. The Department of Budget and Management shall furnish the various

local development councils information on financial resources and budgetary allocations applicable to their

respective jurisdictions to guide them in their planning functions.

Comments:

It is not a requirement for the Department of Budget and Management to furnish LDCs with information on

financial resources of and budgetary allocations to the LGUs to guide them in the discharge of their

functions.

Title VII – Local Peace and Order Council

Section 116. Organization. There is hereby established in every province, city, and municipality a local

peace and order council, pursuant to Executive Order Numbered Three hundred nine (EO No. 309), as

amended, Series of 1988. The local peace and order councils shall have the same composition and functions

as those prescribed by the said executive board.

Comments:

Composition of Peace and Order Council

Executive Order No. 309 as amended, Series of 1988, defines the membership of the local peace and order

council.

Provincial Peace and Order Council Composition

The peace and order council of the province is composed of the following: (a) the governor as chair; (b) the

representative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, chosen by its members; (c) the Social Welfare and

Development Officer; (d) the Information Officer; (e) the Health Officer; and (f) the representatives of the

central government office or agency in the province who are appointed by their respective heads, such as (i)

the PNP director of the province; (ii) the Commission on Human Rights in the province, (iii) the

commanding general or officer of the armed forces, if any, in the province; (iv) the NBI provincial office;

(v) the National Security Council, if any, in the province; (vi) the provincial prosecutor’s office; (vii) the

DILK, if any, in the province; (viii) the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board; and (ix) 3

representatives of the NGOs and Pos in the province, representing the academic, civic and religious

organizations, who are appointed by the governor.

City/Municipal Peace and Order Council Composition

The peace and order council of the city or municipality is composed of the following: (a) the mayor as

chair; (b) the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan representative, chosen by the sanggunian

from among its members; (c) the SWDO; (d) the Information Officer; (e) the Health Officer; and (f) the

representatives of the central government office or agency in the city or municipality who are appointed by

their respective heads, such as (i) the chief of police; (ii) the Commission on Human Rights, if any, in the

city or municipality; (iii) the commanding general or officer of the armed forces, if any, in the city or

municipality; (iv) the NBI city or provincial office; (v) the National Security Council; (vi) the city or

municipal prosecutor’s office or in their absence, the city or municipal attorney; (vii) the DILG, if any;

(viii) the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board; and (ix) 3 representatives of the NGOs and Pos,

representing the academic, civic and religious organizations in the city or municipality, who are appointed

by the mayor upon consultation with the members of the Council.

Local Peace and Order Council Functions

The provincial, city and municipal peace and order councils have the following duties and functions:

(a) Formulate plans and recommend such measures to improve or enhance peace and order and

public safety in their respective areas;

(b) Monitor the implementation of peace and order programs and projects at the provincial, city or

municipal levels, and the operation of Civilian Volunteer Self-Defense Organizations and such other

counter-insurgency programs and activities;

(c) Make periodic assessments of the prevailing peace and order situation in their respective areas

and submit a report thereon with recommendations to the chair of the national peace and order council; and

(d) Perform all other functions assigned by law to the peace and order council.

Regional Peace and Order Council

In between the national and the local peace and order councils, there is another council called the Regional

Peace and Order Council, which is composed of their counterpart members of the local peace and order

councils. The Regional Peace and Order Council performs essentially the same functions as those of the

local peace and order councils.

Osea v. Malaya

Petitioner filed a protest case with the Civil Service Commission alleging that she was appointed as Officer-

in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by the then Secretary of DECS,

upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. However, despite this, President

Fidel Ramos, appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was made without prior consultation with the

Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code as well as her vested

right as the Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

HELD: Section 99 of the LGC applies to appointments made by the DECS because at the time of the

enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by the DECS to specific division or

location. However, in 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued a Memorandum Circular placing the

positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career

executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was

transferred from the DECS to the President.

In addition, under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of

Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment but rather in the nature of reassignment. Therefore, Section

99 of the LGC, which requires prior consultation with the local school board does not apply.

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection,

by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.

When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person

chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.

On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to

another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and

does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the

imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official

Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly

made subject to further advice from the DECS. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a

need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied

her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating

her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division

Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters

Book II Title 3, LGC

See above

Shares of LGUs in national taxes

Pimentel v. Aguirre (supra)

See above

Local Government Units

THE BARANGAY

Sec 384-439

CHAPTER I - Role and creation of the Barangay

Section 384. Role of the Barangay. As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning

and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community,

and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered,

and where disputes may be amicably settled.

Comments:

The barangay discharges three seminal functions:

(a) as a basic political unit the barangay is the smallest political entity used for governance in the

country.

(b) as a primary planning and implementing unit the barangay is mandated to plan development projects

in its territory and to deliver some basic services of the government to its people.

(c) as a forum the barangay gets soundings of the views of the people on various topics. It also provides

a venue for the settlement of disputes amicably.

Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary

substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang

panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the

Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be

determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the

sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary.

Section 386. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A barangay maybe created out of a contiguous territory which has apopulation of at least two thousand

(2,000) inhabitants ascertified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within

Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such

territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the

creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the

minimum requirement prescribed herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created

in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by

more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or

more islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria

prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang

panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities

within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay

consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.

Comments:

Unlike provinces, cities or municipalities which need a definite territorial size to be created, all that the

Code requires in terms of area for newly created barangays is that it be contiguous. The Code takes into

account the fact that when barangays were created during the Marcos years, their territories were not

defined by specific metes and bounds and therefore came in different sizes, some comprising only a block

or two in the city and others covering areas larger than some municipalities. Now, the Code directs that the

territory of the new barangay shall be identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent

boundaries.

The requirement of contiguity of barangay areas is not mandatory when the barangay comprises two or

more islands.

Population Requirement

In general, at least 2,000 inhabitants are needed to qualify a barangay for creation. But when the barangay

being created is within highly urbanized cities or in cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila

Area or other metropolitan political subdivisions, the population requirement is 5,000. The population

required must be certified by the NSO.

It is also required that the population of the new barangay does not reduce the population of the original

barangay from which it is being created to levels below the numbers now required by the Code.

Nonetheless, barangays may be created by law within areas occupied by indigenous cultural communities

even if their population may be below the required numbers stipulated in the Code. The reason for this

exemption is to enhance the delivery of basic services.

Consolidation of Barangays

With an appropriate plan for consolidation of barangays prepared by the governor or city mayor, the local

sanggunian may consolidate barangays within its territory based upon the criteria set forth in this section.

Consolidation may be the only way to solve the problem of hundreds of barangays throughout the country

whose territorial jurisdictions are ill-defined and which in the urban centers may comprise only a block or

two.

In the Metropolitan Manila Area, the consolidation plan for barangays shall be approved by the

Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities and Sangguniang Panlungsod of the cities.

CHAPTER II - Barangay officials and offices

Section 387. Chief Officials and Offices.

(a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the

sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay treasurer.

(b) There shall also be in every barangay a lupong tagapamayapa. The sangguniang barangay may form

community brigades and create such other positions or offices as may be deemed necessary to carry out the

purposes of the barangay government in accordance with the needs of public service, subject to the

budgetary limitations on personal services prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code.

Comments:

Aside from the principal officials for the barangay, namely the punong barangay and the seven

Sangguniang Barangay members, the Sangguniang Kabataan chair, the barangay secretary and the barangay

treasurer, there are other important officials in the barangay, namely the members of the Lupong

Tagapamayapa and the Community Brigades such as the Tanod Brigade and the Disaster Brigade.

Section 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,

sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be

deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may

be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and

security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay

member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

Comments:

Punong barangays, members of Sangguniang Barangays and Lupong Tagapamayapa are considered persons

in authority under this section. For purposes of the Code, the definition of a person in authority in the

Revised Penal Code is relevant.

Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code states that “any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as

an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be

deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in

authority.”

The article also defines an agent of a person in authority as: “Any person who, by direct provision of law or

by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and

the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay

leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority…”

Definition Modified

That definition is now modified. In addition to the punong barangay, the members of the Sangguniang

Barangay and the Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered not merely as agents of but as persons in

authority in the Code. But other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or

ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or

the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid

of persons in authority continue to be deemed agents of persons in authority.

Section 388 of the Code provides that “for purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, the

Sangguniang Barangay members and the members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be

deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions…” This law expands the definition of a person in

authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain

or chairman, now called the punong barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in

Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the punong barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay

or kagawads and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered not merely agents of, but as

persons, in authority.

Protecting Environment as Agents of Persons in Authority

Barangay officials and members designated by law or ordinance to maintain a desirable and balanced

environment or who come to the aid of persons in authority who protect the environment are considered

agents of persons in authority.

Consequences of Being Persons in Authority/Agents of Persons in Authority

As persons in authority, they are entitled to respect and may request assistance from barangay residents in

the performance of their duties. Also, because they are considered persons in authority, if they are

physically harmed, the person responsible may be charged for higher degree felonies than would otherwise

be the case. For example, if a barangay resident is attacked physically but without any intent to kill and he

suffers some injuries, the attacker may be charged for physical injuries. But if the victim is a barangay

official, the charge may be for the more serious offense of assault upon a person in authority or upon an

agent of a person in authority for which a higher penalty is imposable.

Power to Arrest and Detain

A barangay captain (now called punong barangay) is a peace officer in the barrio (barangay) and is

considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrests and detain persons within

legal limits but if the detention is without legal grounds, the punong barangay may be charged for arbitrary

detention as defined in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code.

CHAPTER III - The Punong Barangay

Section 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Functions.

(a)The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and

perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b)For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of the

barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:

1. Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;

2. Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of

the sangguniang barangay;

3. Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal

mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions;

4. Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly, and

vote only to break a tie;

5. Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace

the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials;

6. Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance

of peace and order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within the barangay;

7. In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the annual executive and

supplemental budgets of the barangay;

8. Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;

9. Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment;

10. Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in accordance with the provisions of

this Code;

11. Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang kabataan;

12. Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of this Code;

13. Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines

included in national and international games, in coordination with the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports;

14. Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and

15. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance.

(c) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess

and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and

regulations.

Comments:

Barangay Chief Executive

To a lesser extent, the punong barangay is the equivalent of the governor of a province or the mayor of a

city or municipality as chief executive for his barangay.

Power of Appointment

The appointment of barangay officials by the punong barangay is subject to confirmation by the majority of

all the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.

Some Powers of Punong Barangay

Among the more important powers attached to his office by the Code are the (a)

enforcement of laws relative to pollution control and protection of the environment; (b)

administration of barangay justice or Katarungang Pambarangay; and (c) holding of

annual palarong barangay in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture

and Sports.

Enforcement of Anti-Pollution Laws. The punong barangay has the power to protect the

environment and to enforce laws against pollution

Palarong Barangay. The punong barangay has the power to conduct the annual Palarong

Barangay. The idea is to encourage the youth of the land, including those living in the

remotest areas, to participate in sports activities. It is hoped that through the palarong

barangay, they may develop into national, if not international, class athletes.

Right to Carry Firearms. The punong barangay is entitled to possess and carry a firearm

within his barangay while discharging his duties.

CHAPTER IV - The Sangguniang Barangay

Section 390. Composition. The Sangguniang Barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be

composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular Sangguniang Barangay

members elected at large and Sangguniang Kabataan chairman, as members.

Comments:

The punong barangay is a part of the Sangguniang Barangay of which he is the presiding officer.

The Supreme Court has stressed that “[a] petition or protest contesting the election of barangay officer

should be decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court within 15 days from filing thereof. xxx

Election cases, unlike ordinary actions, involve public interest. Time is of the essence in its disposition

since the uncertainty as to who is the real choice of the people for the position must soonest be dispelled. It

is neither fair nor just that one of whose right to the office is in doubt should remain in that office for an

uncertain period.”

Section 391. Powers, Duties and Functions.

(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall:

1. Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or

ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants therein;

2. Enact tax and revenue ordinances, subject to the limitations imposed in this Code;

3. Enact annual and supplemental budgets in accordance with the provisions of this Code;

4. Provide for the construction and maintenance of barangay facilities and other public works

projects chargeable to the general fund of the barangay or such other funds actually available for

the purpose;

5. Submit to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan such suggestions or

recommendations as it may see fit for the improvement of the barangay or for the welfare of the

inhabitants thereof;

6. Assist in the establishment, organization, and promotion of cooperative enterprises that will

improve the economic condition and well-being of the residents;

7. Regulate the use of multi-purpose halls, multi- purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios

and other post-harvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking areas or other

similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and

charge reasonable fees for the use thereof;

8. Solicit or accept monies, materials and voluntary labor for specific public works and cooperative

enterprises of the barangay from residents, land owners, producers and merchants in the barangay;

monies from grants-in-aid, subsidies, contributions, and revenues made available to the barangays

from national, provincial, city or municipal funds; and monies from other private agencies and

individuals: Provided, however, That monies or properties donated by private agencies and

individuals for specific purposes shall accrue to the barangay as trust fund;

9. Solicit or accept, in any or all the foregoing public works and cooperative enterprises, such

cooperation as is made available by national, provincial, city, or municipal agencies established

by law to render financial, technical, and advisory assistance to barangays and to barangay

residents: Provided, however, That in soliciting or accepting such cooperation, the sangguniang

barangay need not pledge any sum of money for expenditure in excess of amounts currently in the

barangay treasury or encumbered for other purposes;

10. Provide compensation, reasonable allowances or per diems as well as travel expenses for

sangguniang barangay members and other barangay officials, subject to the budgetary limitations

prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, however, That no increase in the

com- pensation or honoraria of the sangguniang barangay members shall take effect until after the

expiration of the full term of all members of the sangguniang barangay approving such increase;

11. Hold fund-raising activities for barangay projects without the need of securing permits from any

national or local office or agency. The proceeds from such activities shall be tax-exempt and shall

accrue to the general fund of the barangay: Provided, That in the appropriation thereof, the

specific purpose for which such fund-raising activity has been held shall be first satisfied:

Provided, further, That no fund-raising activities shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days

immediately preceding and after a national or local election, recall, referendum, or plebiscite:

Provided, finally, That said fund-raising activities shall comply with national policy standards and

regulations on morals, health, and safety of the persons participating therein. The sangguniang

barangay, through the punong barangay, shall render a public accounting of the funds raised at the

completion of the project for which the fund-raising activity was under- taken;

12. Authorize the punong barangay to enter into contracts in behalf of the barangay, subject to the

provisions of this Code;

13. Authorize the barangay treasurer to make direct purchases in an amount not exceeding One

thousand pesos (P1,000.00) at any one time for the ordinary and essential administrative needs of

the barangay;

14. Prescribe fines in amounts not exceeding One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of

barangay ordinances;

15. Provide for the administrative needs of the lupong tagapamayapa and the pangkat ng

tagapagkasundo;

16. Provide for the organization of community brigades, barangay tanod, or community service units

as may be necessary;

17. Organize regular lectures, programs, or fora on community problems such as sanitation, nutrition,

literacy, and drug abuse, and convene assemblies to encourage citizen participation in

government;

18. Adopt measures to prevent and control the proliferation of squatters and mendicants in the

barangay;

19. Provide for the proper development and welfare of children in the barangay by promoting and

supporting activities for the protection and total development of children, particularly those below

seven (7) years of age;

20. Adopt measures towards the prevention and eradication of drug abuse, child abuse, and juvenile

delinquency;

21. Initiate the establishment of a barangay high school, whenever feasible, in accordance with law;

22. Provide for the establishment of a non-formal education center in the barangay whenever feasible,

in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ;

23. Provide for the delivery of basic services; and

24. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance.

Comments:

Wider powers are now enjoyed by the Sangguniang Barangay than was previously the case.

Among the more noteworthy of its powers are: (a) to enact tax and other revenue measures authorized by

the Code; (b) to regulate and charge fees for the use of barangay facilities, including parking areas, markets,

copra dryers, multipurpose halls and the like; (c) to assist in the establishment of cooperatives to improve

the economic well-being of the barangay residents; (d) to provide compensation, allowances, per diems and

travel expenses for barangay officials subject to the limitations provided for in this Code; (e) to authorize

direct purchases by the barangay treasurer of not more than P1,000 worth of items at any one time that are

ordinarily and essentially needed by the barangay; (f) to prescribe fines of not more than P1,000 for

violations of barangay ordinances; (g) to adopt measures to combat drug abuse, child abuse and juvenile

delinquency; (h) to provide for the establishment of non-formal education centers; and (i) to provide for the

delivery of basic services.

Section 392. Other Duties of Sangguniang Barangay Members. In addition to their duties as members of the

Sangguniang Barangay, Sangguniang Barangay members may:

(a) Assist the punong barangay in the discharge of his duties and functions;

(b) Act as peace officers in the maintenance of public order and safety; and

(c) Perform such other duties and functions as the punong barangay may delegate.

Section 393. Benefits of Barangay Officials.

(a) Barangay officials, including barangay tanods and members of the lupong tagapamayapa, shall receive

honoraria, allowances, and such other emoluments as may be authorized by law or barangay, municipal or

city ordinance in accordance with the provisions of this Code, but in no case shall it be less than One

thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) per month for the punong barangay and Six hundred pesos (P=600.00) per

month for the sangguniang barangay members, barangay treasurer, and barangay secretary: Provided,

however, That the annual appropriations for personal services shall be subject to the budgetary limitations

prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(b) The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay

secretary shall also:

1. Be entitled to Christmas bonus of at least One thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) each, the funds

for which shall be taken from the general fund of the barangay or from such other funds

appropriated by the national government for the purpose;

2. Be entitled, during their incumbency, to insurance coverage which shall include, but shall not

be limited to temporary and permanent disability, double indemnity, accident insurance,

death and burial benefits, in accordance with Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred

forty-two (R.A. No. 6942), entitled "An Act Increasing the Insurance Benefits of Local

Government Officials and Providing Funds Therefor";

3. Be entitled to free medical care including subsistence, medicines, and medical attendance in

any government hospital or institution: Provided, That such hospital care shall include

surgery or surgical expenses, medicines, X-rays, laboratory fees, and other hospital expenses;

In case of extreme urgency where there is no available government hospital or institution, the

barangay official concerned may submit himself for immediate medical attendance to the

nearest private clinic, hospital or institution and the expenses not exceeding Five thousand

pesos (P=5,000.00) that may be incurred therein shall be chargeable against the funds of the

barangay concerned;

4. Be exempted during their incumbency from paying tuition and matriculation fees for their

legitimate dependent children attending state colleges or universities. He may likewise avail

of such educational benefits in a state college or university located within the province or

city to which the barangay belongs; and

5. Be entitled to appropriate civil service eligibility on the basis of the number of years of

service to the barangay, pursuant to the rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service

Commission.

(c) Elective barangay officials shall have preference in appointments to any government position or in any

government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, after their tenure of office,

subject to the requisite qualifications and the provisions of the immediately preceding paragraph.

(d) All duly appointed members of the barangay tanod brigades, or their equivalent, which shall number not

more than twenty (20) in each barangay, shall be granted insurance or other benefits during their

incumbency, chargeable to the barangay or the city or municipal government to which the barangay

belongs.

Comments:

Barangays may now grant honoraria, allowances and other emoluments to their barangay officials, barangay

tanods and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

The minimum is P1,000 per month for the punong barangay and P600 for the Sangguniang Barangay

members, Barangay Treasurers and Barangay Secretaries subject, however, to the requirement that not more

than 55% of the total annual income actually realized by the barangay from local sources during the next

preceding fiscal year shall be set aside for personal services. Increase of honoraria or compensation

awarded by the Sangguniang Barangay for their elective members cannot take effect until after their term is

over as provided for under Section 391(10).

Among the more noteworthy benefits to which barangay officials are entitled are the following: (a) a

Christmas bonus of at least P1,000 each; (b) insurance coverage; (c) free medical care in government

hospitals, (d) free education for their legitimate dependent children in state colleges or universities and for

themselves in state colleges or universities located in the province or city where their barangays belong; (e)

appropriate civil service eligibility on the basis of their length of service to their barangays; and (f) after

their tenure of office, preference in appointments to government-owned or –controlled corporations.

The insurance for barangay officials includes disability benefits, double indemnity, accident coverage, death

and burial benefits pursuant to the law that increases the insurance benefits of local government officials

(R.A. 6942).

The free medical care to which these officials are entitled includes surgery or surgical expenses, medicines,

x-rays, laboratory fees and other hospital expenses in government hospitals.

There is no limit as to the number of legitimate dependent children of barangay officials who are entitled to

free tertiary education in state colleges or universities.

Barangay tanods are also entitled to insurance coverage and other benefits chargeable to the barangay

concerned or to the city or municipality to which the barangay belongs.

CHAPTER V - Appointive barangay officials

Section 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties.

(a)The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority

of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay secretary shall not be subject to

attestation by the Civil Service Commission.

(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual resident of the barangay

concerned.

(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government

employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

(d) The barangay secretary shall:

1. Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly

meetings;

2. Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay

assembly;

3. Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same posted in

conspicuous places within the barangay;

4. Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of barangay elections,

initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec;

5. Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths, and marriages;

6. Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing the following items of

information: name, address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation,

and such other items of information as may be prescribed by law or ordinances;

7. Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as may be required by

the sangguniang barangay; and

8. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be

prescribed by law or ordinance.

Comments:

Mandatory Barangay Appointive Officials

The barangay secretary and the barangay treasurer are mandatory officers who are to be appointed by the

Punong Barangay subject to the approval of the majority of all the members of the Sangguniang Barangay

concerned. There are other mandatory barangay officials like the Lupong Tagapamayapa and the Pangkat

ng Tagapagkasundo who are mentioned specifically by the Code.

The barangay may create other positions which may be filled by appointment by the punong barangay

subject to approval of a majority of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.

Civil Registrar Duties of Barangay Secretary

One of the more important duties of the barangay secretary is to assist the municipal civil registrar in the

registration of births, deaths and marriages. Another is to keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the

barangay containing their names, addresses, places of birth, sexes, civil statuses, citizenships, occupations

and other items of information as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

Section 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties.

(a) The barangay treasurer shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority

of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay treasurer shall not be subject to

attestation by the Civil Service Commission.

(b) The barangay treasurer shall be of legal age, a qualified voter, and an actual resident of the barangay

concerned.

(c) No person shall be appointed barangay treasurer if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government

employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

(d) The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in accordance with existing laws in an amount to be determined

by the sangguniang barangay but not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (P=10,000.00), premiums for which

shall be paid by the barangay.

(e) The barangay treasurer shall:

1. Keep custody of barangay funds and properties;

2. Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other

resources accruing to the barangay treasury and deposit the same in the account of the barangay

as provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

3. Disburse funds in accordance with the financial procedures provided in this Code;

4. Submit to the punong barangay a statement covering the actual and estimates of income and

expenditures for the preceding and ensuing calendar years, respectively, subject to the provisions

of Title Five, Book II of this Code;

5. Render a written accounting report of all barangay funds and property under his custody at the

end of each calendar year, and ensure that such report shall be made available to the members of

the barangay assembly and other government agencies concerned;

6. Certify as to the availability of funds whenever necessary;

7. Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his jurisdiction; and

8. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance.

Comments:

Barangay treasurers are appointed by the punong barangay subject to the approval of the majority of the

members of the Sangguniang Barangay.

The Code prohibits the appointment of a person as barangay treasurer if he is a member of the Sangguniang

Barangay, a government employee or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity.

It is absolute only in the case of a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity. It is not absolute in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Barangay or a

government employee who can resign as such and then accept appointment as barangay treasurer.

The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in an amount not exceeding P10,000.

Section 396. Other Appointive Officials. The qualifications, duties and functions of all other barangay

officials appointed by the punong barangay shall be governed by the provisions of this Code and other laws

or by barangay ordinances.

CHAPTER VI - Barangay Assembly

Section 397. Composition; Meetings.

(a) There shall be a barangay assembly composed of all persons who are actual residents of the barangay for

at least six (6) months, fifteen (15) years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines, and duly registered in

the list of barangay assembly members.

(b) The barangay assembly shall meet at least twice a year to hear and discuss the semestral report of the

sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and finances as well as problems affecting the barangay. Its

meetings shall be held upon call of the punong barangay or of at least four (4) members of the sangguniang

barangay, or upon written petition of at least five percent (5%) of the assembly members.

(c) No meeting of the barangay assembly shall take place unless a written notice is given one (1) week prior

to the meeting except on matters involving public safety or security, in which case notice within a

reasonable time shall be sufficient. The punong barangay, or in his absence, the sangguniang barangay

member acting as punong barangay, or any assembly member selected during the meeting, shall act as

presiding officer in all the meetings of the assembly. The barangay secretary, or in his absence, any member

designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary, shall discharge the duties of secretary of the barangay

assembly.

Comments:

Barangay Assembly Composition

Actual residents of a barangay for at least 6 months who are citizens of the Republic, at least 15 years of

age and are registered in the list of barangay assembly members compose the Barangay Assembly.

Barangay Assembly Meetings

Mandatory meetings of the Barangay Assembly are at least twice a year.

Meetings may be called by the punong barangay or by at least four members of the Sangguniang Barangay

or upon petition of at least 5% of the assembly members.

Written notice is required to be sent at least one week before the meeting is held except when matters

involving public safety or security are the main agenda of the meeting, in which case, notice for a shorter

period is allowed.

The punong barangay presides at the Barangay Assembly meetings. If he is absent, the acting punong

barangay takes over or any assembly member selected during the meeting may act as president officer.

Section 398. Powers of the Barangay Assembly. The barangay assembly shall:

(a) Initiate legislative processes by recommending to the sangguniang barangay the adoption of measures

for the welfare of the barangay and the city or municipality concerned;

(b) Decide on the adoption of initiative as a legal process whereby the registered voters of the barangay may

directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; and

(c) Hear and pass upon the semestral report of the sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and

finances.

Comments:

Assemblies as Forums. Barangay Assemblies provide the forum for the discussion of barangay

development plans or petitions for the adoption of initiative to enact or amend a barangay ordinance.

CHAPTER VII – Katarungang Pambarangay

Section 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa

What

(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, composed of

the Punong Barangay, as chairman

ten (10) to twenty (20) members.

The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein.

Who

(b) Any person

actually residing or working

in the barangay

not otherwise expressly disqualified by law

and possessing integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and

reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon.

How

(c) A notice to constitute the lupon

which shall include the names of proposed members

who have expressed their willingness to serve

shall be prepared by the punong barangay

within the first fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office

Notice shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for

a period of not less than three (3) weeks

Appointment, when discretionary

(d) Taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed appointment or any recommendations for

appointment as may have been made within the period of posting, the Punong Barangay

shall within ten (10) days thereafter

appoint as members those whom he determines to be suitable therefor

Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong barangay, and attested to by the

barangay secretary.

(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay for the

entire duration of their term of office; and

(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local

systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without prejudice

to the applicable provisions of this Code.

Section 400. Oath and Term of Office.

1. Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take an oath of office before the punong barangay.

2. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on the third year following his appointment

unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of residence or place of work, or withdrawal of

appointment by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of

the lupon.

Section 401. Vacancies.

Punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired

portion of the term.

Section 402. Functions of the Lupon.

(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein;

(b) Meet regularly once a month to

provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters

relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes,

to enable various conciliation panel members to share with one another their

observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and

(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or

ordinance.

Section 403. Secretary of the Lupon.

The barangay secretary concurrently serves as the secretary of the lupon.

Records the results of mediation proceedings before the punong barangay

Submits a report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts.

Receives and keeps the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various

conciliation panels.

Section 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. (Conciliation Panel)

(a) Constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon

consisting of three (3) members

chosen by the parties to the dispute from the list of members of the lupon.

Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be

determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman.

(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves the chairman and the

secretary.

Pangkat Secretary Functions

prepares minutes of the pangkat proceedings

submits a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary and to the proper

city or municipal court

issue and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned.

The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody that is not by law

otherwise declared confidential.

Section 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat.

Chosen by the parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members.

Should the parties fail to agree on a common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the

lupon chairman.

Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members.

(a) The lupon members deemd as persons in authority (as defined in the RPC) while in the performance of

their official duties or on the occasion thereof.

(b) Lupon and pangkat members serve without compensation without prejudice to incentives.. The DILG

shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who

adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them.

While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private

employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in

compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof.

Section 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law.

The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on

matters involving questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member

whenever necessary

in the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay.

Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.

The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same

city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his

official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties

thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except

where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to

amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of Justice or upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed

may, at any time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

Section 409. Venue.

(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable

settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be

brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of

the complaint.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the

real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where

such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is

located.

OBJECTIONS to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong

barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed WAIVED.

Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to

venue may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated

representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.

(a) Who may initiate proceeding

Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee

any individual who has a cause of action against another individual

involving any matter within the authority of the lupon

may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay.

(b) Mediation by lupon chairman

Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day

summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their

witnesses

to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests.

If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the

parties before him

he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat.

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses

While dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods

for offenses and cause of action INTERRUPTED upon filing the complaint with the

punong barangay. Period RESUMES upon receipt by the complainant of the

complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued

by the lupon or pangkat secretary:

Interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the

punong barangay.

(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification

The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution

on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman

to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for

amicable settlement.

For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties

and witnesses before it.

If party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias,

interest, or any other similar grounds discovered AFTER the constitution of the

pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the

pangkat whose decision shall be final.

Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein

provided for.

(e) Period to arrive at a settlement -

Within fifteen (15) days from the day the pangkat convenes in accordance with this section. This period is

extendible at the discretion of the pangkat, which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly

meritorious cases.

Section 411. Form of settlement.

All amicable settlements shall be in writing

in a language or dialect known to the parties

signed by them

and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be.

When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement

shall be written in the language known to them.

Section 412. Conciliation.

(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.

No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority

of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office

for adjudication

unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or

the pangkat

and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon

secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman

or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court.

The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:

1. Where the accused is under detention;

2. Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus

proceedings;

3. Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,

delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

4. Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.

Customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities SHALL be applied in settling disputes between

members of the cultural communities.

Section 413. Arbitration.

(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration

award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat.

Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date

thereof for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter

prescribed.

Arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within

ten (10) days thereafter.

(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When the parties

to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect

known to them.

Section 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception.

All proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal.

Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be, may motu

proprio or upon request of a party, exclude the public from the proceedings in the interest of privacy,

decency, or public morals.

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person.

Parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and

incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award.

The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court

upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof

unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has

been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

This provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon, in which case the

compromise or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval

thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.

Section 417. Execution.

The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)

months from the date of the settlement.

After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal

court.

Section 418. Repudiation.

Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same

by filing with the lupon chairman

a statement to that effect sworn to before him

where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation.

Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a

complaint.

Section 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration.

Award to the Court. - The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the

appropriate city or municipal court

within five (5) days from the date of the award

or from the lapse of the ten-day period repudiating the settlement

and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the lupon

chairman.

Section 420. Power to Administer Oaths.

The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby

authorized to administer oaths in connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in the

implementation of the katarungang pambarangay.

Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations.

The city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and effective implementation and

administration of the katarungang pambarangay.

The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement this Chapter.

Section 422. Appropriations.

Such amount as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall

be provided for in the annual budget of the city or municipality concerned.

CHAPTER VIII - Sangguniang Kabataan

Section 423. Creation and Election. -

(a) There shall be in every barangay a sangguniang kabataan to be composed of

a chairman

seven (7) members

a secretary

a treasurer

(b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one

(21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.

Section 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan.

Composed of

all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6)

months

who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age

duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in

the custody of the barangay secretary.

Section 425. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.

At least once every three (3) months

or at the call of the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan

or upon written petition of at least one-twentieth (1/20) of its member

to decide on important issues affecting the youth of the barangay.

Section 426. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan.

The sangguniang kabataan shall:

(a) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance

with the applicable provisions of this Code;

(b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral,

spiritual, and physical development of the members;

(c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general

fund of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the specific

purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied;

(d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to effectively carry out its programs and

activities;

(e) Submit annual and end-of-term reports to the sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for

the survival and development of the youth in the barangay;

(f) Consult and coordinate with all youth organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and program

implementation;

(g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the implementation of youth development projects

and programs at the national level;

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the sangguniang barangay

may determine or delegate; and

(i) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or

ordinance.

Section 427. Meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan.

Meet regularly once a month on the date, time, and place to be fixed by the said sanggunian.

Special meetings may be called by the sangguniang kabataan chairman or any three (3) of its members

by giving written notice to all members of the date, time, place and agenda of the

meeting at least one (1) day in advance.

Notices of regular or special meetings shall be furnished the punong barangay and the

sangguniang barangay.

A majority of the members of the sangguniang kabataan shall constitute a quorum.

Section 428. Qualifications.

An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be

a citizen of the Philippines

a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan

a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election

at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty- one (21) years of age on the day of

his election

able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect

must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 429. Term of Office.

Three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law, permanently incapacitated, die or

resign from office.

Section 430. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman.

The registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan shall elect the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan

who shall automatically serve as an ex officio member of the sangguniang barangay upon his assumption to

office.

As such, he shall exercise the same powers, discharge the same duties and functions, and enjoy the same

privileges as the regular sangguniang barangay members, and shall be the chairman of the committee on

youth and sports development in the said sanggunian.

Section 431. Powers and Duties of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman.

(a) Call and preside over all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and the sangguniang kabataan;

(b) Implement policies, programs, and projects within his jurisdiction in coordination with the sangguniang

barangay;

(c) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities of the sangguniang kabataan and the official

conduct of its members, and such other officers of the sangguniang kabataan within his jurisdiction;

(d) With the concurrence of the sangguniang kabataan, appoint from among the members of the

sangguniang kabataan, the secretary and treasurer and such other officers as may be deemed necessary; and

(e) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or

ordinance.

Section 432. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary.

(a) Keep all records of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;

(b) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;

(c) Prepare all forms necessary for the conduct of registrations, elections, initiatives, referenda, or

plebiscites, in coordination with the barangay secretary and the COMELEC; and

(d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the sangguniang

kabataan may prescribe or direct.

Section 433. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer.

(a) Take custody of all sangguniang kabataan property and funds not otherwise deposited with the city or

municipal treasurer;

(b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and all other sources intended for the sangguniang

kabataan and katipunan ng kabataan;

(c) Disburse funds in accordance with an approved budget of the sangguniang kabataan;

(d) Certify to the availability of funds whenever necessary;

(e) Submit to the sangguniang kabataan and to the sangguniang barangay certified and detailed statements

of actual income and expenditures at the end of every month; and

(f) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the sangguniang

kabataan may direct.

Section 434. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials.

Same privileges enjoyed by other sangguniang barangay officials under this Code

subject to such requirements and limitations provided herein.

During their incumbency, sangguniang kabataan officials exempt from payment of

tuition and matriculation fees while enrolled in public tertiary schools, including state

colleges and universities.

The national government shall reimburse said college or university the amount of the

tuition and matriculation fees: Provided, That, to qualify for the privilege, the said

officials shall enroll in a state college or university within or nearest their area of

jurisdiction.

Section 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies.

(a) In case a sangguniang kabataan chairman

refuses to assume office

fails to qualify

is convicted of a felony

voluntarily resigns

dies

is permanently incapacitated

is removed from office

or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months

the sangguniang kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the election

immediately preceding shall assume the office of the chairman

for the unexpired portion of the term

discharge the powers and duties

enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to the office.

In case the said member refuses to assume the position or fails to qualify, the sangguniang member

obtaining the next highest number of votes shall assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired

portion of the term.

(b) Where two (2) or more sangguniang kabataan members obtained the same next highest number of votes,

the other sangguniang kabataan members shall conduct an election to choose the successor to the chairman

from among the said members.

(c) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the sangguniang kabataan chairman shall call a special election

to complete the membership of said sanggunian. Such sangguniang kabataan member shall hold office for

the unexpired portion of the term of the vacant seat.

(d) In case of suspension of the sangguniang kabataan chairman, the successor, as determined in subsections

(a) and (b) of this Section shall assume the position during the period of such suspension.

CHAPTER IX - Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan

Section 436. Pederasyon ng mga Kabataan.

(a) There shall be an organization of all the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan to be known as

follows:

1. in municipalities pambayang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan;

2. in cities, panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan;

3. in provinces, panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga kabataan;

4. in special metropolitan political subdivisions, pangmetropolitan pederasyon ng mga sangguniang

kabataan; and

5. on the national level pambansang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan.

(b) The pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan shall, at all levels, elect from among themselves the

president, vice- president and such other officers as may be necessary and shall be organized in the

following manner:

1. The panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon shall be composed of the sangguniang kabataan

chairmen of barangays in the city or municipality, respectively;

2. The panlalawigang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and

pambayang pederasyon;

3. The pangmetropolitang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and

pambayan pederasyon;

(c) The elected presidents of the pederasyon at the provincial, highly urbanized city, and metropolitan

political subdivision levels shall constitute the pambansang katipunan ng mga sangguniang kabataan.

Section 437. Constitution and By-Laws.

The term of office, manner of election, removal and suspension of the officers of the pederasyon ng mga

sangguniang kabataan at all levels shall be governed by the constitution and by-laws of the pederasyon in

conformity with the provisions of this Code and national policies on youth.

Section 438. Membership in the Sanggunian.

(a) A sangguniang kabataan chairman shall, upon certification of his election by the COMELEC and during

his tenure of office is elected as pederasyon president, serve as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, without need of further

appointment.

(b) The vice-president of the pederasyon whose president has been elected as president of a higher

pederasyon shall serve as ex-officio member of the sanggunian concerned without need of further

appointment.

(c) The pederasyon president or vice-president, as the case may be, shall be the chairman of the committee

on youth and sports development of the sanggunian concerned.

CHAPTER X - Linggo ng Kabataan

Section 439. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. -

(a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall, in coordination with the pederasyon ng mga

sangguniang kabataan at all levels, conduct an annual activity to be known as the Linggo ng Kabataan on

such date as shall be determined by the Office of the President.

(b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include the election of the counterparts of all local

elective and appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or agencies stationed or assigned in the

territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit, among in-school and community youth residing in the

local government unit concerned from ages thirteen (13) to seventeen (17). During said week, they shall

hold office as boy and girl officials and shall perform such duties and conduct such activities as may be

provided in the ordinance enacted pursuant to this Chapter.

A. Katarungang Pambarangay

Sec 399 – 422, LGC

See above

The Laws on VAW in the Philippines (expert paper of Mam Guanzon)

See attachments

Sec 14, Sec 5, RA 9262

SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection

Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to

desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives

applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte

determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application

for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by

a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the

Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for

fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay

Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to

effect is personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women

and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

a. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

b. Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

c. Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

d. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

e. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the

woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her

child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's

freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of

physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,

but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or

restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

i. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of

custody to her/his family;

ii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's

children insufficient financial support;

iii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

iv. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,

business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or

solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

f. Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of

controlling her actions or decisions;

g. Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity

which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through

intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or

her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

i. Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

ii. Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her

child;

iii. Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her

child against her/his will;

iv. Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals

or pets of the woman or her child; and

v. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

i. Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or

her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial

of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's

child/children.

Aquino v. Aure

Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino

before the MeTC, alleging that they acquired the subject property from the spouses Aquino by virtue of a

Deed of Sale. However, after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the

subject property, they refused to vacate the same. In her Answer, Aquino countered that Aure Lending do

not have any legal right over the property, as per their Memorandum of Agreement, Aure shall secure a loan

from a bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn over

the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the

spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.

MeTC decided in favor of Aquino on the ground of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process.

RTC Affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals REVERSED and reasoned that the failure of

Aure to undergo barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of

Aure’s Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.

HELD: The primordial objective of barangay conciliations is to reduce the number of court litigations and

prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of

cases in the courts. To ensure this, the law requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process as a

precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case.

This has been declared compulsory in nature.

However, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith

cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the

person of the defendant; in other words, the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from

exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to

object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.

In the case at bar, Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted

herself voluntarily thereto. An examination of Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC shows that there is utter

lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its

jurisdcition. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of

no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her

Answer. Thus, although Aquino’s defense is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available

for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.

Neither could the MeTC dismiss the case motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only

three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim. It is clear that a court may not motu

proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation,

this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own

initiative.

Morata v. Go

Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners Morata for

recovery of a sum of money plus damages. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-

litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as ground the failure of

the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by

P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation

or settlement had been reached by the parties.

HELD: Except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to

settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.

The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be

compromised at the barangay level. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law

employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage the court should neither add nor

subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not

distinguish, the court should not distinguish.

The conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in

court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed

by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior

courts is to lose sight of this objective.

Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior

courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the rule on Venue, which looks to the location

of the real property in the determination of venue, for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,

jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer

cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].

Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the

settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and

municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or

enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the

nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the

mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.

Lastly, the circular issued by then Chief Justice embodying the directive "to desist from receiving

complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has

been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of

first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now

known as regional trial courts. This clearly shows that conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed

by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling

under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by

the regional trial courts as well.

Uy v. Contreras

An argument arose between the petitioner and respondent when the former sought to withdraw from

premises of the latter certain movable properties that the petitioner failed to remove despite the expiry of

their sublease agreement. This led to a scuffle between the parties’ respective employees, which allegedly

resulted in injuries inflicted on the private respondents. The private respondents then filed a complaint with

the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, however, during their scheduled confrontation before the

barangay captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor then filed two informations for slight

physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati.

Petitioner alleged in a motion to dismiss the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to

undergo conciliation proceedings. On the other hand, private respondents contend that a denial of motion to

dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner

are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities

or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred

by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to

the case of private respondent, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement with

the subsequent certification of the barangay to file the action.

HELD: While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon

regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable

because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. In view of the

respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be

validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of criminal cases was

premature.

In addition, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC) which states that the

parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe, cannot justify the dismissal of the

case. This is because pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was

automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private

respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.

Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation

hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so

would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before

the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of

Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and invoked the pre-

condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.

Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that the parties could not agree on a

compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The

request was nearly one and a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a quo. Evidently,

this was done to support their contention that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the

requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear

at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance

of a certification to file action.

Wingarts v. Mejia

These administrative complaints were an offshoot of criminal cases decided by the respondent judge. The

respondent judge is charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking

cognizance of a criminal case for grave threats and issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused despite

the lack of prior barangay conciliation.

The respondent judge explained that he took cognizance of the criminal case in the belief that there had

been substantial compliance of the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification

of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of the partiesd, the fact that no amicable settlement was

reached by them, and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly submitted to

respondent judge.

HELD: Under the LGC of 1991, offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not

exceeding Php5,000 require prior barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art.

282 of the Revised Penal Code fall within the purview of this section. Furthermore, Sec. 412 (a) also

requires the same mandate. Therefore, respondent judge should have remanded the case to the lupon instead

of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.

The respondent judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of this case

especially since judges are directed from improvidently receiving and acting on complaints in cases falling

within the authority of the Lupon. It is a well-settled rule that proceedings before the lupon are a

precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory

pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on the motion of any

interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

Although there is no clear proof of malice or bad faith, respondent judge should have exercised the requisite

prudence, which he owes to the public and his profession, especially in a case where personal liberty of the

accused is involved.

Corpuz v. CA

Carlito Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent Juanito Alvarado with the

MTC of Manila, for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz’

children allegedly needed for their own use. Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the

MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room.

Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon

Tagapayapa as required by P.D. No. 1508

HELD: Alvarado’s defense was only stated in a single short sentence in his answer. In Dui vs. CA, the

Court held that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the

barangay conciliation procedure constitutes waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado’s answer reveals

that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance

therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court has already acquired over the subject matter

and the parties therein.

Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo

In a letter-complaint, Atty. Salomon, Jr. charged Judge Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of

discretion and obvious partiality and assailed the order of the said judge, which referred an ejectment case

back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified

complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to

File Motion was attached.

In its Answer, the judge denied the charges and averred that there was premature issuance of the Certificate

to File Action considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the

said certificate was issued. Moreover, the belated submission by complainant of the Minutes of

Proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, which was inaccurate and difficult to decipher reveals the non-

compliance of complainant with the requirement of the law.

HELD: The records reveal that the Certification to File Action was improperly and prematurely issued as it

clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took

place. This supports the respondent’s position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face

conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by

complainant. Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings.

In addition, the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996. Records show that the

hearing was scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for February 29, 1996. And yet, the

Certification to File Action was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first scheduled

hearing before the barangay chairman in contravention of Section 410 (b) of the LGC, requiring a mediation

effort within 15 days from the first meeting.

Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and

to settle the case before it. Hence, respondent judge was correct in remanding the case to it for completion

of the mandated proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking to promote the objectives of barangay

conciliation and for taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93. His referral of the

case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it constitute

grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.

Despite this, however, respondent judge failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules on Summary

Procedure when, acting on the complainant’s motion to consider the proceedings already held before the

barangay as substantial compliance with the requirements of law, he chose to continue with the proceedings

of the case, and failed to render a judgment within 30 days from the failure of the respondents to answer.

This undue delay constitutes a less serious charge of gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of

administrative sanction.

Mendoza v. Judge Afable

Mendoza alleged that on February 18, 1998, he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman a complaint

for slight physical injuries against Palada, however, despite the hearings conducted thereon, the parties

failed to reach an amicable settlement. Therefore, on May 4, 1998 complainant Mendova filed a complaint

for slight physical injuries before the MTC. However, the case was dismissed by Judge Afable on the

ground of prescription (the complaint alleging a light offense, which prescribes in two months).

In this administrative case, the complainant alleged that, in dismissing the case, Judge Afable showed his

ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of the LGC, which suspends

the prescriptive period of offences upon the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. In his

Answer, Judge Afable merely admitted his error and claimed a mere mental lapse on his part.

HELD: It is axiomatic that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or

erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for

reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act

to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge

administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred,

would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise

would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in

the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross,

deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed

against the erring judge.

In the present case, the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent

judge’s decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do

so. Thus, following our settled pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative complaint is

premature.

In addition, records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The

undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on

March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed on May 4,

1998 the criminal case for slight physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case on

November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action.

Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.

While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it

can only be an error of judgment.

Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad faith or malice on the part of respondent judge

when he dismissed the criminal case.

B. Sangguniang Kabataan

Sec 423 – 439, LGC

See above

Monteclaros v. Comelec

SK, previously known as the Kabataang Barangay is a youth organization established by PD 684. The KB

was composed of residents less than 18 years old, with no minimum age specified. The LGC renamed the

KB to SK and limited membership to those aged 15-21 years. It is tasked to initiate programs to “enhance

the social, political, economic cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the

youth.” It is composed of a chairperson and 7 members to be elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan, in turn

composed of citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months who meet the age requirement.

RA 7808 scheduled the SK elections on the 1st Monday of 1996 and every 3 years thereafter. The next

elections are supposed to be held on May 6, 2002. A bill by the Bicameral Committee however reset the SK

and barangay elections to July 15, 2002. The said bill also lowered the membership age to at least 15 but

not more than 18 years old. Montesclaros et al. filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

with prayer for TRO or preliminary injunction to: 1) prevent the postponement of the SK elections

originally scheduled for May 6, 2002, 2) to prevent respondents from passing laws that reduce the age

requirement membership in the SK, and 3) to compel respondents to allow those who have turned 21 on

May 2002 to participate in any rescheduled SK elections. They allege that those aged 18-21 will be “unduly

dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly associated and obnoxiously

disqualified from the SK”. They also allege grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC’s part. The bill

was approved by Congress and signed into law as RA 9164 on March 19, 2002.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. There is no actual controversy as to the date of the elections that

requires judicial intervention. Neither was there grave abuse of discretion in the postponement of the

elections. The prayer to prevent Congress from enacting laws that lower the age requirement cannot be

granted because a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review. The court can only exercise judicial review

after and not before a law is enacted, lest it resort to rendering advisory opinions. Absent a clear violation of

constitutional rights, Courts cannot exercise review over the internal processes of Congress. The Court has

no power to dictate the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law.

Public office is a public trust. It is not a property right. No one has a vested right to any public office, much

less the expectancy of holding a public office. While the state encourages the youth’s involvement in public

affairs, the policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the

power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK. Every law is subject to amendment or repeal and

those who no longer qualify for the SK because they are past the age limit cannot insist on being part of the

youth. Under PD 9164, Congress merely restored the maximum age requirement of 18 years in PD684,

SK’s original charter. RA 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.

THE MUNICIPALITY, CITY AND PROVINCE

MUNICIPALITY CITY PROVINCE

a. Composition

Group of barangays [§440] Group of more urbanized and developed

barangays [§448]

Cluster of municipalities, or municipalities

and component cities [§459]

b. Role

As a general-purpose government for the

coordination and delivery of basic, regular

and direct services and effective

governance of the inhabitants within its

Same as the municipality[§448] As a political and corporate of government

serves as a dynamic mechanism for

developmental processes and effective

governance of LGUs within its territorial

territorial jurisdiction [§440] jurisdiction [§459]

c. How created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered

Only by an Act of Congress and subject to

the approval by a majority of the votes cast

in a plebiscite conducted by the

COMELEC in the LGU/s directly affected

The plebiscite shall be held 120 days

from the date of its effectivity except as

may otherwise be provided in the Act.

[§441]

Same as the municipality [§449]

Same as the municipality [§460]

d. Requisites for creation

Ave. annual income of at least

P2,500,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive

years based on the 1991 constant prices, as

certified by the DOF

- includes the income accruing to the

gen. fund

- excludes special funds, transfers

and non-recurring income

Population of at least 25,000 inhabitants

as certified by the NSO

A contiguous territory of at least 50 sq.

kms. as certified by the LMB

- should be properly identified by

metes and bounds

- does not apply if there is 1 or

more islands

- need not be contiguous if thereare

2 or more islands

Municipalities existing as of the date of the

effectivity of the LGC shall continue to

exist and operate as such. Existing

municipal districts organized prusuant to

presidential issuances or EOs and which

have their respective set of elective

municipal officials holding office at the

time of the effectivity of the LGC shall be

considered as regular municipalities. [§442]

Ave. annual income of at least

P20,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive

years based on the 1991 constant prices, as

certified by the DOF

- includes the income accruing to the

gen. fund

- excludes special funds, transfers

and non-recurring income

Either of:

Population of at least 150,000 inhabitants

as certified by the NSO

A contiguous territory of at least 100 sq.

kms. as certified by the LMB

- should be properly identified by

metes and bounds

- does not apply if there is 1 or

more islands

- need not be contiguous if there are

2 or more islands

Provided, that, the creation thereof shall

not reduce the land area, population, and

income of the original unit/s at the time

of said creation to less than the min.

reqts. prescribed. [§450]

For HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES:

Ave. annual income of at least

P50,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive

years based on the 1991 constant prices, as

certified by the DOF

Population of at least 200,000 inhabitants

as certified by the NSO

[§452]

* It shall be the duty of the President to

declare a city as highly urbanized within 30

days after it shall have met the min. reqts.

upon properapplication therefor and

ratification in a plebiscite by qualified

voters therein. [§453]

Ave. annual income of at least

P20,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive

years based on the 1991 constant prices, as

certified by the DOF

- includes the income accruing to the

gen. fund

- excludes special funds, transfers

and non-recurring income

Either of:

Population of at least 250,000 inhabitants

as certified by the NSO

A contiguous territory of at least 2,000

sq. kms. as certified by the LMB

- should be properly identified by

metes and bounds

- does not apply if there is 1 or

more islands

- need not be contiguous if there are

2 or more islands

Provided, that, the creation thereof shall

not reduce the land area, population, and

income of the original unit/s at the time

of said creation to less than the min.

reqts. prescribed. [§461]

Existing sub-provinces are converted into

regular provinces upon approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to

be held in the said sub-provinces and the

original provinces directly affected. The

plebiscite shall be conducted by the

COMELEC simultaneously with the

national elections following the effectivity

of the LGC. [§462]

e. Officials

mayor

vice-mayor

sangguniang bayan members

secretary to the sangguniang bayan

treasurer

assessor

accountant

budget officer

planning and devt. coordinator

engineer/building official

health officer

civil registrar

Optional:

administrator

legal officer

agriculturist

mayor

vice-mayor

sangguniang panlungsod members

secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod

treasurer

assessor

accountant

budget officer

planning and devt. coordinator

engineer

health officer

civil registrar

administrator

legal officer

social welfare and devt. officer

gen. services officer

veterinarian

governor

vice-governor

sangguniang panlalawigan members

secretary to the sangguniang

panlalawigan

treasurer

assessor

accountant

budget officer

planning and devt. coordinator

engineer

health officer

administrator

legal officer

social welfare and devt. officer

gen. services officer

agriculturist

environment and natural resources

officer

social welfare and devt. officer

architect

information officer

The sangguniang bayan may:

1. maintain existing offices not mentioned

above

2. create such other offices as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of the

provincial government

3. consolidate the functions of any office

with those of another in the interest of

efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of

departments and offices shall be appointed

by the municipal mayor with the

concurrence of the majority of all the

sangguniang bayan members, subject to

civil service law, rules and regulations.

The sangguniang bayan shall act on the

appointment within 15 days from the date

of its submission; otherwise, the same shall

be confirmed. [§443]

Optional:

architect

information officer

agriculturist

population officer

- cities which have existing population

offices shall continue to maintain such

ofices for 5 years from the date of

effectivity of the LGC, after which said

office shall become optional

environment and natural resources

officer

cooperatives officer

population officer

The sangguniang panlungsod may:

1. maintain existing offices not mentioned

above

2. create such other offices as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of the

provincial government

3. consolidate the functions of any office

with those of another in the interest of

efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of

departments and offices shall be appointed

by the city mayor with the concurrence of

the majority of all the sangguniang

panlungsod members, subject to civil

service law, rules and regulations. The

sangguniang panlungsod shall act on the

appointment within 15 days from the date

of its submission; otherwise, the same shall

be confirmed. [§454]

veterinarian

Optional:

population officer

- cities which have existing

population offices shall continue to

maintain such ofices for 5 years from

the date of effectivity of the LGC,

after which said office shall become

optional

natural resources and envrionment

officer

cooperative officer

architect

information officer

The sangguniang panlalawigan may:

1. maintain existing offices not mentioned

above

2. create such other offices as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of the

provincial government

3. consolidate the functions of any office

with those of another in the interest of

efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads

of departments and offices shall be

appointed by the governor with the

concurrence of the majority of all the

sangguniang panlalawigan members,

subject to civil service law, rules and

regulations. The sangguniang

panlalawigan shall act on the appointment

within 15 days from the date of its

submission; otherwise, the same shall be

confirmed. [§463]

f. Composition of the sanggunian

Presiding officer: municipal vice-mayor

Members:

the regular sanggunian members

the president of the municipal chapter of

the liga ng mga barangay

the president of the pambayang

pederasyon ng mga SK

sectoral representatives

1. 1 from the women

2. 1 from the agricultural or

industrial workers

3. 1 from other sectors, including the

urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, or disabled persons

[§446]

Presiding officer: city vice-mayor

Members:

the regular sanggunian members,the

president fothe city chapter of the liga ng

mga barangay

the president of the panlungsod na

pederasyon ng mga SK

the sectoral representatives

1. 1 from the women

2. 1 from the agricultural or

industrial workers

3. 1 from other sectors, including the

urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, or disabled persons

[§457]

Presiding officer: provincial vice-governor

Members:

the regular sanggunian members

the president of the provincial chapter of

the liga ng mga barangay

the president of the panlalawigang

pederasyon ng mga SK

the president of the provincial federation

of sangguniang members of municipalities

and component cities

sectoral representatives

1. 1 from the women

2. 1 from the agricultural or

industrial workers

3. 1 from other sectors, including the

urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, or disabled persons

[§467]

g. Salary grades as prescribed under RA 6758

Municipal mayor: Salary Grade 27

[§444(d)]

Muncipal vice-mayor: Salary Grade 25

[§445(b)]

Members of the sangguniang bayan:

Salary Grade 24

Members of the sanggunian of

municipalities in Metropolitan Manila Area

and other metropolitan political

City mayor: Salary Grade 30 [§455(d)]

City vice-mayor of a highly urbanized city:

Salary Grade 28

City vice-mayor of a component city:

Salary Grade 26 [§456(b)]

Members of the sangguniang panlungsod:

Salary Grade 25

Members of the sanggunian of highly-

Provincial governor: Salary Grade 30

[§465(c)]

Vice-governor:Salary Grade 28 [§466(b)]

Members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan: Salary Grade 27 [§468(b)]

subdivisions: Salary Grade 25 [§447(b)] urbanized cities: Salary Grade 27 [§458(b)]

Classes of cities:

a. Component

1. Dependent component cities

2. Independent component cities - those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters

from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be

independent of the province

b. Highly-urbanized

- Voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial

officials.

Duties and Functions of the Municipal Mayor, City Mayor, Governor (Sec 444, 455, 465)

a. Such duties and functions as provided by the LGC and other laws

b. Efficient, effective and economical governance for the general welfare (see Sec.16) of the

(municipality/city/province) and its inhabitants

c. Hold office in the (municipal/city/provincial) hall during his incumbency

Under the efficient, effective and economical governance:

A. Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the

(municipal/city/provincial) government, and in this connection shall:

1. Determine the guidelines of (municipal/city/provincial) policies and be responsible to the

sanggunian for the program of the government;

2.1. Direct the formulation of the (municipal/city/provincial) development plan, with the assistance of

the (municipal/city/provincial) development council

2.2. Implement the (municipal/city/provincial) development plan upon approval thereof by the

sanggunian

3. At the opening of the regular session of the sanggunian for every calendar year, and as may be

deemed necessary, present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the

consideration of the sangguian as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the

(municipal/city/provincial) government may require;

4.1. Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sanggunian

4.2. Provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of

its legislative functions, from time to time as the situation may require

5. Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of

(municipal/city/provincial) funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the

LGC, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;

6.1. Represent the (municipality/city/province) in all its business transactions upon authorization by

the sanggunian

6.2. Sign on behalf of the (municipality/city/province) all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such

other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance upon authorization by the sanggunian

7. Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural disasters and calamities;

8. Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or

wages of the officials and employees of the (municipality/city/province)

9. Allocate and assign office space to (municipal/city/provincial) and other officials and employees

who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings

owned or leased by the (municipal/city/provincial) government;

10.1. Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their

duties and functions as provided by law and the LGC;

10.2. Cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of

the (municipality/city/province) who may have committed an offense in the performance of his

official duties;

11.1. Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of

the (municipality/city/province)

11.2. Require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the

(municipality/city/province) to make available to him such books, records, and other documents

in their custody, in aid of his executive powers and authority, except those classified by law as

confidential

12. Furnish copies of EOs issued by him within 72 hours after their issuance

a. if municipal mayor, to the provincial governor

b. if mayor of a municipality of Metropolitan Manila Area and that of any metropolitan

political subdivision, to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the

President

c. if component city mayor, to the provincial governor

d. if highly-urbanized city mayor, to the Office of the President

e. if mayor of a city in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political

subdivision, to the metropolitan authority council chairman

f. if governor, to the Office of the President

13. Visit component (barangays/barangays/cities and municipalities) of the

(municipality/city/province) at least once in every 6 months to deepen his understanding of

problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and

inhabitants, inform the officials and inhabitants of the component (barangays/barangays/cities and

municipalities) general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise

conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the (municipality/city/province)

will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants;

14. Act on leave applications of officials and employees appointed by him and the commutation of

the monetary value of leave credits according to law;

15. Authorize official trips outside of the (municipality/city/province) of (municipal/city/provincial)

officials and employees for a period not exceeding 30 days;

16.1. Call upon any national office or employee stationed in or assigned to the

(municipality/city/province) to advise him on matters affecting the (municipality/city/province)

and to make recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of

plans, programs, projects,

16.2. Initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government official or employee

who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or

assigned to the LGU concerned, when appropriate

17. Authorize payment of medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical

fees of (municipal/city/provincial) officials and employees who are injured while in the

performance of their official duties and functions, subject to the availability of funds;

18. Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;

19. Conduct a palarong (bayan/panlungsod/panlalawigan) in coordination with the DECS, as an

annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and

international games; and

20. Submit the following reports: (same receivers as in NO. 12)

an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertaining to the management,

administration and development of the (municipality/city/province) and all information and

data relative to its political, social and economic conditions;

and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the

year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare

of the municipality, province, region or country.

B. Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the (municipality/city/province) and the

exercise of its corporate powers (See Sec. 22), implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services

and activities of the (municipality/city/province) and, in addition shall:

1. Ensure that the acts of the component (barangays/barangays/cities and municipalities) of the

(muncipality/city/province) and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their

prescribed powers, functions, duties and responsibilites;

2. Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of

the (municipality/city/province), including provincial officials and national officials and

employees stationed in or assigned to the (municipality/city/province) at such time and place and

on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the LGU

and its inhabitants;

3. Issue such EOs as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances;

4. Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction;

5. Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and

order plan of the (municipality/city/province) and upon its approval, implement the same and

exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the

(municipality/city/province) in accordance with RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990)

6. Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence,

rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the

(municipal/city/provincial) police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;

C. Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the

implementation of development plans, programs objectives and priorities (see Sec. 18), particularly those

resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and

progress, and relative thereto shall:

1. Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations

for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation process

2. Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the

(municipality/city/province) for the ensuing calendar year

3. Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the (municipality/city/province) are collected, and that

(municipal/city/provincial) funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of

obligations of the (municipality/city/province), in accordance with law or ordinance;

4. Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions

upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

5. Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of

activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows

contrary to law, public policy and public owners;

(does not apply to governors)

6. Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the

necessary permit, subect to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, to

make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law

or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the

period prescribed by law or ordinance;

(does not apply to governors)

7.1. Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other

resources for the (municipality/city/province in coordination with the mayors of component cities

and municipalities);

7.2. Provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the

(municipality/city/province);

7.3. Protect funds, credits, rights, and other properties of the (municipality/city/province);

8.1. Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the violation of

ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property;

8.2. Cause the (municipality/city/province) to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests,

resources and rights shall be adequately protected;

D. Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities (see Sec. 17 (B) (2)), and in

addition thereto, shall:

1. Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the National

Government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner and in

coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the (municipality/city

and the province/province and its component cities and municipalities);

2. Coordinate the implementation of technical services, including public works and infrastructure

programs in the municipality

a. rendered by national and provincial offices in the case of municipalities

b. rendered by national offices in the case of highly urbanized and independent component

cities

c. rendered by national and provincial offices in the case of component cities

d. rendered by national offices for the province and its component cities and municipalities

Power, duties of the Municipal Vice-Mayor, City Vice-Mayor, Vice Governor (Sec 445, 456, 466)

1. Be the presiding officer of the sanggunian and sign all warrants drawn on the

(municipal/city/provincial) treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the

sanggunian

2. Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the

sanggunian, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in the LGC

3. Assume the office of the (municipal mayor/city mayor/governor) for the unexpired term of the

latter in the event of permanent vacancy

4. Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the (municipal mayor/city

mayor/governor) in cases of temporary vacancy

5. Exercise such powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or

ordinance

Powers, duties and functions of the Sangguniang (Bayan, Panglungsod, Panlalawigan) (Sec 444, 455, 465)

A. Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective

(municipal/city/provincial) government, and in this connection:

1. Review all ordinances approved by the (sangguniang barangay/sangguniang

barangay/sanggunians of component cities and municipalities) and EOs issued by the (punong

barangay/punong barangay/mayors of said component units) to determine whether these are

within the scope of the prescribed powers of the sanggunian and of the (punong barangay/punong

barangay/mayor)

2. Maintain peace and order by enacting measures to prevent and suppress lawlessness, disorder,

riot, violence, rebellion, or sedition and impose penalties for the violation of said ordinances

3. Appprove ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding (P2,500/P5,000/P5,000) or an imprisonment

for a period not exceeding (6 months/1 year/1 year), or both, in the discretion of the court, for the

violation of a (municipal/city/provincial) ordinance

4. Adopt measures to protect the inhabitants of the (municipality/city/province) from the harmful

effects of man-made or natural disasters and calamities and to provide relief services and

assistance for victims during and in the aftermath of said disasters or calamities and their return to

productive livelihood following said events

5. Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual

drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance

of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and

ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing,

juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials

or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of

the (municipality/city/province)

6. Protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the

environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and

smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora

and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration

of eutrophication of rivers and laks, or of ecological imbalance

7. Subject to the provisions of the LGC and pertinent laws, determine the powers and duties of

officials and employees of the (municipality/city/province)

8. Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of

officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from (municipal/city/provincial) funds and provide

for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of

the (municipal/city/provincial) government

9. Authorize the payment of compensation to a qualified person not in the government service who

fills up to a temporary vacancy or grant honorarium to any qualified official or employee

designated to fill a temporary vacancy in a concurrent capacity at the rate authorized by law

10. Provide a mechanism and the appropriate funds therefor, to ensure the safety and protection of all

(municipal/city/provincial) government property, public documents, or records such as those

relating to property inventory, land ownership, records of births, marriages, deaths, assessments,

taxation, accounts, business permits, and such other records and documents of public interest in

the offices and departments of the (municipal/city/provincial) government

11. When the finances of the (municipal/city/provincial) government allow, provide for additional

allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers,

and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the

(municipality/city/province)

12. Provide for legal assistance to barangay officials who, in the performance of their official duties

or on the occasion thereof, have to initiate judicial proceedings or defend themselves against legal

action

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

13. Provide for group insurance or additional insurance coverage for barangay officials, including

members of barangay tanod brigades and other service units, with public or private insurance

companies, when the finances of the (municipal/city) government allow said coverage

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

B. Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the development plans, program

objectives and priorities of the (municipality/city (see Sec. 18) with particular attention to agro-industrial

development and countryside growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

1. Approve the annual and supplemental budgets of the (municipal/city/provincial) government and

appropriate funds for specific programs, projects, services and activities of the

(municipality/city/province), or for other purposes not contrary to law, in order to promote the

general welfare of the (municipality/city/province) and its inhabitants

2. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and applicable laws and upon the majority vote

of all the members of the sanggunian, enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges,

prescribing the rates thereof for general and specific purposes, and granting tax exemptions,

incentives or reliefs

3. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and upon the majority vote of all the members of

the sanggunian, authorize the (municipal mayor/city mayor/provincial governor) to negotiate and

contract loans and other forms of indebtedness

4. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and applicable laws and upon the majority vote

of all the members of the sanggunian, enact ordinances authorizing the floating of bonds or other

instruments of indebtedness, for the purpose of raising funds to finance development projects

5. Appropriate funds for the construction and maintenance of the rental of buildings for the use of

the (municipality/city/province); and, upon the majority vote of all the members of the

sanggunian, authorize the (municipal mayor/city mayor/provincial governor) to lease to private

parties such public buildings held in a proprietary capacity, subject to existing laws, rules and

regulations

6. Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the

(municipality/city/province)

7.

a. For the sangguniang bayan and sangguniang panlungsod: adopt a comprehensive land use

plan for the (municipality/city), provided, that the formulation, adoption, or modification of said

plan shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan

b. For the sangguniang panlalawigan: review the comprehensive land use plans and zoning

ordinances of component cities and municipalities and adopt a comprehensive provincial land use

plan, subject to existing laws

8. Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the (municipality/city), subject to the pertinent

provisions of the LGC

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

9. Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use

plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in

populous centers; and regulate the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said

fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

10. Subject to national law, process and approve subdivision plans for residential, commercial, or

industrial purposes, and other development purposes, and collect processing fees and other

charges, the proceeds of which shall accrue entirely to the (municipality/city): Provided, however,

that where approval by a national agency or office is required, said approval shall not be withheld

for more than 30 days from receipt of the application. Failure to act on the application within the

period stated above shall be deemed as approval

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

11. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC, grant the exclusive privilege of constructing fish

corrals or fish pens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag, or fry of

any species or fish within the municipal waters

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

12. With the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the SANGGUNIAN, grant tax

exemptions, incentives or reliefs to entities engaged in community growth-inducing industries

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

* Under §192, LGC, LGUs may, through ordinances duly approved, grant tax

exemptions, incentives or reliefs under such terms and conditions as they may deem

necessary.

13. Grant loans or provide grants to other LGUs or to national, provincial and municipal charitable,

benevolent or educational institutions: Provided, that said institutions are operated and maintained

within the (municipality/city)

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

14. Regulate the numbering of residential, commercial and other buildings

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

15. Regulate the inspection, weighing and measuring of articles of commerce

(does not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

16. For the sangguniang panlalawigan: adopt measures to enhance the full implementation of the

national agrarian reform program in coordination with the DAR

C. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC, grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the

issuance of permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions

and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the (municipality/city,

and pursuant to his legislative authority shall:

1. Fix and impose reasonable fees and charges for all services rendered by the

(municipal/city/provincial) government to private persons or entities

2.

a. For the Sangguniang Bayan: regulate any business, occupation, or practice of profession or

calling which does not require government examination within the municipality and the

conditions under which the license for said business or practice of profession may be issued or

revoked

b. For the Sangguniang Panlungsod: regulate or fix license fees for any business or practice of

profession within the city and the conditions under which the license for said business or practice

of profession may be revoked and enact ordinances levying taxes thereon

c. For the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: regulate or fix the license fees for such activities as

provided under the LGC

3. Prescribe the terms and conditions under which public utilities owned by the (municipality/city)

shall be operated by the municipal/city government or leased to private persons or entities,

preferably cooperatives

4. Regulate the display of and fix the license fees for signs, signboards, or billboards at the place/s

where the profession or business advertised thereby is, in whole or in part, conducted

5. Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and

maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks:

Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced

6. Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant

franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the (municipality/city)

7. Upon approval by a majority vote of all the members of the sanggunian, grant a franchise to any

person, partnership, corporation, or cooperative to establish, construct, operate and maintain

ferries, wharves, markets or slaughterhouses, or such other similar activities within the

(municipality/city) as may be allowed by applicable laws: Provided, that, cooperatives shall be

given preference in the grant of such a franchise

(Nos. 3-7 do not apply to the sangguniang panlalawigan)

D. Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the (municipality/city) in

order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

1. Declare, prevent ora abate any nuisance

2. Require that buildings and the premises thereof and any land within the (municipality/city be kept

and maintained in a sanitary condition; impose penalties for any violation thereof, or upon failure

to comply with said requirements, have the work done and require the owner, administrator or

tenant concerned to pay the expenses of the same; or require the filling up of any land or premises

to a grade necessary for proper sanitation

3. Regulate the disposal of clinical and other wastes from hospitals, clinics and other similar

establishments

4. Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,

motels, inns, penison houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, inlcuding tourist

guides and transports

5. Regulate the sale, giving away or dispensing of any intoxicating malt, vino, mixed or fermented

liquors at any retail outlet

6. Regulate the establishment and provide for the inspection of steam boilers or any heating device

in buildings and the storage of inflammable and highly combustible materials within the

municipality

7. Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of entertainment or amusement facilities,

including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance

halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places of entertainment or amusement; regulate

such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to

disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the

same; or prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and

moral welfare of the community

8. Provide for the impounding of stray animals; regulate the keeping of animals in homes or as part

of a business, and the slaughter, sale or disposition of the same; and adopt measures to prevent

and penalize cruelty to animals

9. Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of funeral parlors, and the burial or

cremation of the dead, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations

E. Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and

facilities (see Sec. 17), and in addition:

For the sangguniang bayan and sangguniang panlungsod:

1. Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and

watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects

2. Establish markets, slaughterhouses or animal corrals and authorize the operation thereof, and

regulate the construction and operation of private markets, talipapas or other similar buildings and

structures

3. Authorize the establishment, maintenance and operation of ferries, wharves, and other structures,

and marine seashore or offshore activities intended to accelerate productivity

4. Regulate the preparation and sale of meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, fruits, fresh dairy products,

and other foodstuffs for public consumption

5. Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and

approve the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and

vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which

serve the public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to

be occupied b public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts,

awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of

streets and public places

6. Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges, prohibit the putting up of encroachments or obstacles

thereon, and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare authorize the removal of

encroachments and illegal constructions in public places

7. Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an

efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants; regulate the construction,

maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and

quantity of the water supply of the (municipality/city and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of

appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within

100 meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in

connection with the water service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage of water

8. Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for laying of water, gas, sewer, and other pipes

and the construction, repair and maintenance of public drains, sewers, cesspools, tunels and

similar structures; regulate the placing of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs, and gutters;

adopt measures to ensure public safety agaisnt open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar

hazards to life and property; and regulate the construction and use of private water closets, privies

and other similar structures in buildings and homes

9. Regulate the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains,

electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus; and, provide for the

correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or

otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitants

10. Subject to the availability of funds and to existing laws, rules and regulations, establish and

provide for the operation of vocational and technical schools and similar post-secondary

institutions and, with the approval of the DECS, fix and collect reasonable fees and other school

charges on said institutions, subject to existing laws on tuition fees

11. Establish a scholarship fund for poor but deserving students residing within the muncipality in

schools located within its jurisdiction

12. Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations to prevent the introduction and spread of

diseases

13. Provide for an efficient and effective system of solid waste and garbage collection disposal and

prohibit littering and the placing or throwing of garbage, refuse and other filth and wastes

14. Provide for the care of paupers, the aged, the sick, persons of unsound mind, disabled persons,

abandoned minors, juvenile delinquents, drug dependents, abused children and other needy and

disadvantaged persons, partcularly children and youth below 18 years of age and, subject to the

availability of funds, establish and provide for the operation of centers and facilities for said

needy and disadvantaged persons

15. Establish and provide for the maintenance and improvement of jails and detention centers,

institute sound jail management programs, and appropriate funds for the subsistence of detainees

and convicted prisoners in the municipality/city

16. Establish a municipal/city council whose purpose is the promotion of culture and the arts,

coordinate with government agencies and NGOs and subject to the availability of funds,

appropriate funds for the support and development of the same

17. Establish a municipal/city council for the elderly which shall formulate policies and adopt

measures mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the community; provide incentives for

nongovernmental agencies and entities and, subject to the availability of funds, appropriate funds

to support programs and projects for the benefits of the elderly

For the sangguniang panlalawigan:

1. Adopt measures and safeguards against pollution and for the preservation of the natural

ecosystem in the province, in consonance with approved standards on human settlements and

environmental sanitation

2. Subject to applicable laws, facilitate or provide for the establishment and maintenance of

waterworkds system or district waterworks for supplying water to inhabitants of component cities

and municipalities

3. Subject to the availability offunds and to existing laws, rules and regulations, provide for the

establishment and operation of vocational and technical schools and similar post-secondary

institutions; and, with the approval of the DECS and subject to existing laws on tuition fees, fix

reasonable tuition fees and other school charges in educational institutions supported by the

provincial government;

4. Establish a scholarship fund or the poor but deserving students in schools located within its

jurisdiction or for students residing within the province;

5. Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations to prevent the introduction and spread of

diseases within its territorial jurisdiction;

6. Provide for the care of paupers, the aged, the sick, persons of unsound mind, abandoned minors,

abused children, disabled persons, juvenile delinquents, drug dependents, and other needy and

disadvantaged persons, particularly children and youth below 18 years of age; subject to

availability of funds, establish and support the operation of centers and facilities for said needy

and disadvantaged persons, and facilitate efforts to promote the welfare of families below the

poverty threshold, the disadvantaged, and the exploited;

7. Establish and provide for the maintenance and improvement of jails and detention centers,

institute a sound jail management program, and appropriate funds for the subsistence of detainees

and convicted prisoners in the province

8. Establish a provincial council whose purpose is the promotion of culture and the arts, coordinate

with government agencies and nongovernmental organizations and, subject to the availability of

funds, appropriate funds for the support and development of the same;

9. Establish a provincial council for the elderly which shall formulate policies and adopt measures

mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the province; and subject to the availability of funds,

appropriate funds to support programs and projects for the elderly; and provide incentives for

nongovernmental agencies and entities to support the programs and projects of the elderly;

F. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or

ordinance

A. The Municipality

Scope of power to tax municipalities; share of provinces in municipal taxes (Sec

440 – 447)

See above

Munez v. Arlino

Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned Apolinario S. Munez for a conference on a land

dispute with one Tirso Amado. Munez failed to appear and Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against

him. It was served on the former although no investigation later ensued. Munez filed a criminal complaint

against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the

Ombudsman and an administrative complaint for misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. The investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman

filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against Irisari which the latter moved to quash, alleging that

Sec 143 of the former LGC authorized mayors to issue warrants of arrest. Judge Arino denied the MTQ on

the ground that the power of Mayors to issue warrants ceased to exist with the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) on the other hand adjudged Irisari to be guilty of the

administrative complaint and suspended him for 8 months without pay. The DILG reversed the SP and said

that while the warrant issued by the Mayor was one of arrest, it was actually just a summons or an

invitation. Judge Arino dismissed the case based on the decision by the DILG saying that decisions by

administrative agencies, when not tainted by unfairness and arbitrariness should be respected. Acting on the

said decision, Munez sent two letters to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging Judge Arino with

knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

HELD: The Court agrees with the Ombudsman that the Judge may have acted in good faith but must be

administratively liable. It is not true that what was issued wasn’t a warrant of arrest. The mayor even

justified his order by citing Sec. 143 of the former LGC, which provided that “in cases where the mayor

may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of the

witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused. The said provision was however repealed by

Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly provides that only a judge can personally issue

warrants. It was also held in Ponsica vs. Ognalaga that the grant of the said power on the Mayor had been

abrogated, rendered functus officio by the Constitution. That there was no pending criminal case did not

make the order any less an order of arrest. There was only a land dispute and no criminal case against

Munez. The Mayor thus performed a judicial function that even a judge couldn’t have done. Judge Arino

reversed himself citing the DILG decision when the case wasn’t before him on review from the decision of

the administrative agency. There was no reason to apply substantiality of evidence. Before him was a

criminal case and he should’ve considered solely the facts alleged in the information. The acts alleged in the

information constitute the crime of usurpation of judicial authority, satisfying the elements of the same. At

the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles. What the judge did

was to rely on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding his own previous ruling, and showing a lack of

capacity for independent judgment in the process.

Greater Balanga Dev’t Corp v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan

The case involves Lot 261 B-6-A-3 with a land area of 8,467 sq meters located behind the public market in

Balanga, Bataan, It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Dev’t. Corp, owned and controlled by the

Camacho family. The lot in question was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora

Camacho. It was subdivided into certain lots- some were sold, other donated. Five buyers of the lot filed

Civil Case 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.

Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed to

mention the existence of Civil Case 3803. The permit granted the privilege of a “real estate dealer/privately-

owned market operator”. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) however passed Resolution No.12, s-88 annulling

the Mayor’s permit issued to petitioner, mentioning that the civil dispute as to the ownership of the lot

caused “anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders in the lot”, and advising the

Mayor to revoke the permit “to operate a public market”. The Mayor took the advice and revoked the

permit by way of EO No.1, s-88. Petitioner filed instant petition with prayer for preliminary mandatory and

prohibitory injunction or restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor’s permit and the

curtailment of the municipality’s collection of market and entrance fees from the occupants of the lot.

Petitioner corporation alleges that: 1) it didn’t violate any law, thus there’s no reason for revocation of

permit 2) the respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation 3) the collection of market fees is

illegal. The Municipality asserts on the other hand that the Mayor as local chief executive has the power to

issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by the corporation of

Section 3A-o6(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made a false statement in the application form,

failing to disclose that the lot was subject of adverse claims for which Civil Case 3803 was filed, 2) failed to

apply for two separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

HELD: The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the

conditions for its grant. The application for the Mayor’s permit at bench requires the applicant to state the

“type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.” Revocation cannot be justified under the

mentioned provision for there must be 1) proof of willful misrepresentation and 2) deliberate intent to make

a false statement. Good faith is always presumed. Neither was the petitioner’s applying for two businesses

in one permit a ground for revocation. Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for two

businesses but only that separate fees be paid for each.

The Resolution by the SB stated that the land was earmarked for the expansion of the Balanga Public

Market. The SB doesn’t actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are

instituted in court, the owner cannot be deprived of its land. The SB has the duty to regulate any business

subject to municipal license fees and provide conditions for revocation but “anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness

among stallholders” who are doing business on property not owned by the Municipal government is not

among those conditions. Also, the manner by which revocation was done violated the petitioner’s right to

due process – the alleged violation of the Revenue Code was not mentioned in the revocation order, neither

was the petitioner informed of his specific violation. Moreover, the respondent Municipality isn’t the owner

of Lot 261 B-6-A-3 and thus cannot collect market fees and market entrance fees, which only an owner can

do.

B. The City

Scope of Power to tax of cities (Sec 448 – 458)

See above

Lim v. CA

Bistro Pigalle Inc. is the owner of the New Bangkok Club and Exotic Garden Restaurant in Malate Manila.

Bistro filed a case against Mayor Lim after the policemen, under the Mayor’s instructions, inspected and

investigated Bistro’s license, along with the work permits and health certificates of its staff, causing

stoppage of work in Bistro’s business operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a

business permit and its staff’s applications for work permits. Bistro says that Lim’s refusal to issue permits

is against the doctrine laid down in Dela Cruz vs. Paras that “Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the

operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business”. The trial

court issued a TRO against Lim and after receiving evidence from the parties, issued a prohibitory

mandatory injunction against the same, ordering him to cease and desist from impeding the business

operations of Bistro while the case awaits resolution on the merits. Both orders were ignored by Lim,

insisting that the power of a mayor to inspect commercial establishments is implicit in the statutory power

to issue, suspend or revoke business licenses, provided in Sec 11 (1), Art II of the Revised Charter of the

City of Manila and in Sec 455 of the LGC. Lim permanently closed down the operations of Bistro pursuant

to newly-enacted Manila City Ordinance No7783. Lim argues that the passage of the ordinance has made

the case filed by Bistro moot and academic.

HELD: The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question as the law,

specifically the Revised Charter of Manila expressly provides for such authority. The power to issue

includes the corollary power to suspend and revoke licenses premised on violation of the conditions upon

which they were granted. True, the mayor has the power to investigate whether the conditions are complied

with but he has no power to order a police raid on such establishments. In doing so, Lim acted beyond his

authority and in patent violation of Ordinance 7716, which prohibits police raid inspections of business

establishments. In refusing to issue a business permit, Lim didn’t specify any violation committed by

Bistro. Neither was Bistro given the proper notice and the opportunity to be heard, infringing its right to due

process of law. There is no provision in any law authorizing the mayor to close down establishments

without notice and hearing and if there is, such will be void.

While Lim’s campaign against prostitution is commendable, his acts were arbitrary and the trial court was

correct in restraining him. The regulatory powers of municipal corporations must be exercised in

accordance with the rights of people to due process and equal protection of the law.

C. The Province

Sec 459 – 490, LGC

For Sec 459 – 468, see above

Appointive Local Officials Common to Municipalities, Cities and Province (Sections 469-490)

Position Necessity Qualifications Duties

1. Secretary to the

Sanggunian

mandatory position Qualifications

a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. Resident of the LGU concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in law, commerce or

public administration from a

recognized college or university,

and

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent. (Sec

469[b])

a. Attend meetings of the sanggunian and keep a

journal of its proceedings;

b. Keep the seal of the LGU and affix the same

with his signature to all ordinances, resolutions, and

other official acts of the sanggunian and present the

same to the presiding officer for his signature;

c. Forward to the governor or mayor for approval,

copies of ordinances enacted by the sanggunian and

duly certified by the presiding officer;

d. Forward to the sanggunian panlungsod or bayan

or the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities

or sangguniang bayan, copies of duly approved

ordinances;

e. Furnish certified copies of records of public

character in his custody;

f. Record in a book kept for the purpose, all

ordinances and resolutions enacted or adopted by

the sanggunian, with the dates of passage and

publication thereof;

g. Keep his office and all non-confidential records

therein open to the public during the usual business

hours;

h. Translate into the dialect used by the majority of

the inhabitants all ordinances and resolutions

immediately after their approval, and cause the

publication of the same;

i. Take custody of the local archives and, where

applicable, the local library and annually account

for the same; and

j. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance relative to his position. (Sec.

469[c])

2. Treasurer mandatory position

Appointed by the

Secretary of

Finance from a list

of at least 3

ranking, eligible

a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in commerce, public

administration or law from a

a. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of

the Code

b. Advise the governor or mayor, sanggunian, and

other local government and national officials

regarding disposition of local government funds,

and other matters relative to public finance;

c. Take custody of and exercise proper management

recommendees of

the governor or

mayor, as the case

may be (Sec 470

[a])

recognized college or university,

and

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in treasury

or accounting service for at least 5

years in the case of the city or

provincial treasurer, and 3 years in

the case of the municipal treasurer.

(Sec 470[c])

of the funds of LGU;

d. Take charge of the disbursement of all local

government funds and such other funds the custody

of which may be entrusted to him;

e. Inspect private commercial and industrial

establishments in relation to the implementation of

tax ordinances;

f. Maintain and update the tax information system

of the LGU;

g. In the case of the provincial treasurer, exercise

technical supervision over all treasury offices of

component cities and municipalities; and

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec 470[d])

3. Assistant

Treasurer

optional position

Appointed by the

Secretary of

Finance from a list

of at least 3

ranking, eligible

recommendees of

the governor or

mayor (Sec 471[a])

a. A citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in commerce, public

administration, or law from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent,

f. Acquired at least 5 years

experience in the treasury or

accounting service in the case of

the city or provincial assistant

treasurer, and 3 years in the case of

the municipal assistant treasurer.

(Sec 471[b])

a. Assist the treasurer and perform such duties as

the latter may assign to him.

b. Administer oaths concerning notices and

notifications to those delinquent in the payment of

the real property tax and concerning official matters

relating to the accounts of the treasurer or arising in

the offices of the treasurer and the assessor. (Sec

471[c])

4. Assessor mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in civil or mechanical

engineering, commerce, or any

other related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in real

property assessment work or in

any related field for at least 5years

in the case of the city or provincial

assessor, and 3 years in the case of

the municipal assessor. (Sec

472[a])

a. Take charge of the assessor's office,

b. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of

the Code,

c. Ensure that all laws and policies governing the

appraisal and assessment of real properties for

taxation purposes are properly executed;

d. Initiate, review, and recommend changes in

policies and objectives, plans and programs,

techniques, procedures and practices in the

valuation and assessment of real properties for

taxation purposes;

e. Establish a systematic method of real property

assessment;

f. Install and maintain a real property identification

and accounting system,

g. Prepare, install and maintain a system of tax

mapping;

h. Conduct frequent physical surveys to verify and

determine whether all real properties within the

province are properly listed in the assessment rolls;

i. Exercise the functions of appraisal and

assessment primarily for taxation purposes of all

real properties in the LGU;

j. Prepare a schedule of the fair market value for the

different classes of real properties;

k. Issue certified copies of assessment records of

real property and all other records relative to its

assessment;

l. Submit every semester a report of all

assessments, cancellations and modifications of

assessments to the local chief executive and the

sanggunian;

m. In the case of the assessor of a component city

or municipality attend sessions of the local board of

assessment appeals whenever his assessment is the

subject of the appeal;

n. In the case of the provincial assessor, exercise

technical supervision and visitorial functions over

all component city and municipal assessors,

coordinate with component city or municipal

assessors in the conduct of tax mapping operations

and all other assessment activities, and provide all

forms of assistance; (Sec 472[b])

o. Exercise such other powers and

perform such other duties and functions as may be

prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 472[c])

5. Assistant

Assessor

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in civil or mechanical

engineering, commerce, or any

related course from a recognized

college or university

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in

assessment or in any related field

for at least 3years in the case of the

city or provincial assistant

assessor, and 1 year in the case of

the city or provincial assistant

assessor. (Sec 473[a])

a. Assist the assessor and perform such other duties

as the latter may assign to him

b. Administer oaths on all declarations of real

property for purposes of assessment. (Sec 473[b])

6. Accountant mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A certified public accountant.

e. Acquired experience in the

treasury or accounting service for

at least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city accountant, and

3 years in the case of the

municipal accountant. (Sec 474[a])

f. Incumbent chief accountant in

the office of the treasurer shall be

given preference in the

appointment to the position of

accountant.(Sec 474[c])

a. Take charge of both the accounting and internal

audit services of the LGU;

b. Install and maintain an internal audit system in

the local LGU;

c. Prepare and submit financial statements to the

governor or mayor and to the sanggunian;

d. Apprise the sanggunian and other local

government officials on the financial condition and

operations of the LGU;

e. Certify to the availability of budgetary allotment

to which expenditures and obligations may be

properly charged;

f. Review supporting documents before preparation

of vouchers to determine completeness of

requirements;

g. Prepare statements of cash advances, liquidation,

salaries, allowances, reimbursements and

remittances;

h. Prepare statements of journal vouchers and

liquidation of the same and other adjustments;

i. Post individual disbursements to the subsidiary

ledger and index cards;

Maintain individual ledgers for officials and

employees pertaining to payrolls and deductions;

j. Record and post in index cards details of

purchased furniture, fixtures, and equipment,

including disposal thereof, if any;

k. Account for all issued requests for obligations

and maintain and keep all records and reports

related thereto;

l. Prepare journals and the analysis of obligations

and maintain and keep all records and reports

related thereto; and

m. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be provided by

law or ordinance. (Sec 474[b])

7. Budget Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the LGU concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in accounting,

economics, public administration

or any related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

a. Take charge of the budget office;

b. Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying

instructions on budgetary and appropriation matters

for the signature of the governor or mayor,

c. Review and consolidate the budget proposals of

different departments and offices;

d. Assist the governor or mayor in the preparation

of the budget and during budget hearings;

e. Study and evaluate budgetary implications of

proposed legislation and submit comments and

f. Acquired experience in

government budgeting or in any

related field for at least 5 years in

the case of the provincial or city

budget officer, and at least 3 years

in the case of the municipal budget

officer. (Sec 475[a])

recommendations thereon;

f. Submit periodic budgetary reports to the DBM;

g. Coordinate with the treasurer, accountant, and

the planning and development coordinator for the

purpose of budgeting;

h. Assist the sanggunian concerned in reviewing the

approved budgets;

i. Coordinate with the planning and development

coordinator in the formulation of the local

government unit development plan; (Sec 475 [b])

j. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec 475[c])

8. Planning and

Development

Coordinator

mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned

c. Of good moral character

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in urban planning,

development studies, economics,

public administration, or any

related course from a recognized

college or university

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

development planning or in any

related field for at least 5 years in

the case of the provincial or city

planning and development

coordinator, and 3 years in the

case of the municipal planning and

development coordinator. (Sec

476[a])

a. Take charge of the planning and development

office

b. Formulate integrated economic, social, physical,

and other development plans and policies for

consideration of the local government development

council;

c. Conduct continuing studies, researches, and

training programs necessary to evolve plans and

programs for implementation;

d. Integrate and coordinate all sectoral plans and

studies undertaken by the different functional

groups or agencies;

e. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the

different development programs, projects, and

activities in the local government unit concerned in

accordance with the approved development plan;

f. Prepare comprehensive plans and other

development planning documents for the

consideration of the local development council;

g. Analyze the income and expenditure patterns,

and formulate and recommend fiscal plans and

policies for consideration of the finance committee

of LGU;

h. Promote people participation in development

planning within the LGU;

i. Exercise supervision and control over the

secretariat of the local development council; and

(Sec 476[b])

9. Engineer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A licensed civil engineer

e. Acquired experience in the

practice of his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city engineer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

engineer. (Sec 477[a])

a. Act as the local building official (Sec 477[a])

b. Initiate, review and recommend changes in

policies and objectives, plans and programs,

techniques, procedures and practices in

infrastructure development and public works in

general;

c. Advise the governor or mayor on infrastructure,

public works, and other engineering matters;

d. Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control

the construction, maintenance, improvement, and

repair of roads, bridges, and other engineering and

public works projects;

e. Provide engineering services to the LGU,

including investigation and survey, engineering

designs, feasibility studies, and project

management;

f. In the case of the provincial engineer, exercise

technical supervision over all engineering offices of

component cities and municipalities; and (Sec

477[b])

g. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec477[c])

10. Health Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character, and

d. A licensed medical practitioner.

e. Acquired experience in the

a. Take charge of the office on health services,

supervise the personnel and staff of said office,

formulate program implementation guidelines and

rules and regulations for the operation of the said

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide technical assistance and

practice of his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city health officer,

and 3 years in the case of the

municipal health officer.

(Sec478[a])

support to the governor or mayor in carrying out

activities to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate health facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies, implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

health programs and projects which the governor or

mayor, is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Formulate and implement policies, plans,

programs and projects to promote the health of the

people;

e. Advise the governor or mayor and the

sanggunian on matters pertaining to health;

f. Execute and enforce all laws, ordinances and

regulations relating to public health;

g. Recommend to the sanggunian, through the local

health board, the passage of such ordinances as he

may deem necessary for the preservation of public

health;

h. Recommend the prosecution of any violation of

sanitary laws, ordinances or regulations;

i. Direct the sanitary inspection of all business

establishments selling food items or providing

accommodations such as hotels, motels, lodging

houses, pension houses, and the like, in accordance

with the Sanitation Code;

j. Conduct health information campaigns and

render health intelligence services;

k. Coordinate with other government agencies and

non-governmental organizations involved in the

promotion and delivery of health services;

l. In the case of the provincial health officer,

exercise general supervision over health officers of

component cities and municipalities; and

m. Be in the frontline of health services delivery,

particularly during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural disasters and calamities; and

(Sec478[b])

n. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec478[c])

11. Civil Registrar mandatory: city and

municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Acquired experience in civil

registry work for at least 5 years in

the case of the city civil registrar

and 3 years in the case of the

municipal civil registrar.

(Sec479[a])

a. Responsible for the civil registration program

pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the Civil Code,

and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations

(Sec479[b])

b. Take charge of the office of the civil registry

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with civil

registry programs and projects which the mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Accept all registrable documents and judicial

decrees affecting the civil status of persons;

e. File, keep and preserve in a secure place the

books required by law;

f. Transcribe and enter immediately upon receipt all

registrable documents and judicial decrees affecting

the civil status of persons in the civil registry

books;

g. Transmit to the Office of the Civil Registrar-

General duplicate copies of registered documents

required by law;

h. Issue certified transcripts or copies of any

certificate or registered documents upon payment

of the prescribed fees to the treasurer;

i. Receive applications for the issuance of a

marriage license and issue the license upon

payment of the authorized fee to the treasurer;

g. Coordinate with the NSO in conducting

educational campaigns for vital registration and

assist in the preparation of demographic and other

statistics (Sec479[c])

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec479[d])

12. Administrator mandatory:

provincial and city,

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in public

administration, law, or any other

related course from a recognized

college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

management and administration

work for at least 5 years in the case

of the provincial or city

administrator, and 3 years in the

case of the municipal

administrator.

g. Term is coterminous with that

of his appointing authority

(Sec480[a])

a. Take charge of the office of the administrator

b. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same particularly those which have to do with the

management and administration-related programs

and projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

c. Assist in the coordination of the work of all the

officials of the LGU, under the supervision,

direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and

convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of

the local government unit;

d. Establish and maintain a sound personnel

program for the LGU designed to promote career

development and uphold the merit principle in the

local government service;

e. Conduct a continuing organizational

development of the LGU with the end in view of

instituting effective administrative reforms;

f. Be in the frontline of the delivery of

administrative support services, particularly those

related to the situations during and in the aftermath

of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

g. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor and mayor on all other matters relative to

the management and administration of the LGU

(Sec480[b])

h. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec480[c])

13. Legal Officers mandatory:

provincial and city,

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A member of the Philippine Bar

e. Practiced his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial and city legal officer,

and 3years in the case of the

municipal legal officer

f. Term of the legal officer shall be

coterminous with that of his

appointing authority.(Sec481[a])

a. Take charge of the office of legal services

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide legal assistance and

support to the governor or mayor, in carrying out

the delivery of basic services and provisions of

adequate facilities

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

programs and projects related to legal services

which the governor or mayor is empowered to

implement and which the sanggunian is empowered

to provide

d. Represent the local government unit in all civil

actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU

or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a

party;

e. Draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and

other instruments, involving any interest of the

LGU; and provide comments and recommendations

on any instruments already drawn;

f. Render his opinion in writing on any question of

law when requested to do so by the governor,

mayor, or sanggunian;

g. Investigate or cause to be investigated any local

official or employee for administrative neglect or

misconduct in office, and recommend appropriate

action;

h. Investigate or cause to be investigated any

person, firm or corporation holding any franchise or

exercising any public privilege for failure to

comply with any term or condition in the grant of

such franchise or privilege, and recommending

appropriate action to the governor, mayor or

sanggunian, as the case may be;

i. Initiate and prosecute in the interest of the LGU

any civil action on any bond, lease or other contract

upon any breach or violation thereof;

j. Review and submit recommendations on

ordinances approved and executive orders issued by

component units;

k. Recommend measures to the sanggunian and

advise the governor or mayor as the case may be on

all other matters related to upholding the rule of

law ;

l. Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and

prosecuting any violations thereof, particularly

those which occur during and in the aftermath of

man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and

(Sec481[b])

m. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec481[c])

14. Agriculturist mandatory:

provincial;

optional: city and

municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree in

agriculture or any related course

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Practiced his profession in

agriculture or acquired experience

in a related field for at least 5 years

in the case of the provincial and

city agriculturist, and 3years in the

case of the municipal agriculturist.

(Sec482[a])

a. Take charge of the office for agricultural service

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out said

measures to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate facilities relative to

agricultural services as provided for under Section

17

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

agricultural programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian us empowered to provide for

d. Ensure that maximum assistance and access to

resources in the production, processing and

marketing of agricultural and aqua-cultural and

marine products are extended to farmers, fishermen

and local entrepreneurs;

e. Conduct or cause to be conducted location-

specific agricultural researches and assist in making

available the appropriate technology arising out of

and disseminating information on basic research on

crops, preventive and control of plant diseases and

pests, and other agricultural matters

f. Assist in the establishment and extension services

of demonstration farms or aqua-culture and marine

products;

g. Enforce rules and regulations relating to

agriculture and aquaculture;

h. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

which promote agricultural productivity through

appropriate technology compatible with

environmental integrity;

i. Be in the frontline of delivery of basic

agricultural services, particularly those needed for

the survival of the inhabitants during and in the

aftermath of man-made and natural disasters;

j. Recommend and advise on all matters related to

agriculture and aqua-culture which will improve the

livelihood and living conditions of the inhabitants;

(Sec482[b])

k. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec482[c])

15. Social Welfare

and Development

Officer

mandatory:

provincial and city;

optional: municipal

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A duly licensed social worker or

a holder of a college degree

preferably in sociology or any

other related course from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

a. Take charge of the office on social welfare and

development services

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to social welfare and

development services as provided for under Section

17

c. Develop plans and strategies and mplement the

same particularly those which have to do with

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in the

practice of social work for at least

5 years in the case of the

provincial or city social welfare

and development officer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

social welfare and development

officer. (Sec483[a])

social welfare programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Identify the basic needs of the needy, the

disadvantaged and the impoverished and develop

and implement appropriate measures to alleviate

their problems and improve their living conditions;

e. Provide relief and appropriate crisis intervention

for victims of abuse and exploitation and

recommend appropriate measures to deter further

abuse and exploitation;

f. Assist the governor or mayor in implementing the

barangay level program for the total development

and protection of children up to six (6) years of age;

g. Facilitate the implementation of welfare

programs for the disabled, elderly, and victims of

drug addiction, the rehabilitation of prisoners and

parolees, the prevention of juvenile delinquency

and such other activities which would eliminate or

minimize the ill-effects of poverty;

h. Initiate and support youth welfare programs that

will enhance the role of the youth in nation-

building;

i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

which have for their purpose the promotion and the

protection of all needy, disadvantaged,

underprivileged or impoverished groups or

individuals, particularly those identified to be

vulnerable and high-risk to exploitation, abuse and

neglect;

j. Be in the frontline of service delivery,

particularly those which have to do with immediate

relief during and assistance in the aftermath of

man-made and natural disaster and natural

calamities;

k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all other matters related to

social welfare and development services which will

improve the livelihood and living conditions of the

inhabitants; (Sec483[b])

l. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec483[c])

16. Environment

and Natural

Resources Officer

optional position a. A citizen of the Philippines,

b. Resident of the local

government unit concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. Holder of a college degree

preferably in environment,

forestry, agriculture or any related

course from a recognized college

or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent

f. Acquired experience in

environmental and natural

resources management,

conservation, and utilization, of at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city environment and

natural resources officer, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

environment and natural resources

officer. (Sec484[a])

a. Take charge of the office on environment and

natural resources

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to environment and

natural resources services as provided for under Sec

17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

environment and natural resources programs and

projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Establish, maintain, protect and preserve

communal forests, watersheds, tree parks,

mangroves, greenbelts and similar forest projects

and commercial forest;

e. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of

forest development projects and technical, financial

and infrastructure assistance;

f. Manage and maintain seed banks and produce

seedlings for forests and tree parks;

g. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of

forest development projects and render assistance

for natural resources-related conservation and

utilization activities consistent with ecological

balance;

h. Promote the small-scale mining and utilization of

mineral resources, particularly mining of gold;

i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs

in the implementation of measures to prevent and

control land, air and water pollution with the

assistance of the DENR;

j. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services

concerning the environment and natural resources,

particularly in the renewal and rehabilitation of the

environment during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural calamities and disasters;

k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all matters relative to the

protection, conservation, maximum utilization,

application of appropriate technology and other

matters related to the environment and natural

resources; and (Sec484[b])

l. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec484[c])

17. Architect optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A duly licensed architect.

e. Practiced his profession for at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city architect, and 3

years in the case of the municipal

architect. (Sec485[a])

a. Take charge of the office on architectural

planning and design

b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the

sanggunian and provide technical assistance and

support to the governor or mayor in carrying out

measures to ensure the delivery of basic services

and provision of adequate facilities relative to

architectural planning and design as provided for

under Section 17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

architectural planning and design programs and

projects which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this

Code;

d. Prepare and recommend for consideration of the

sanggunian the architectural plan and design for the

local government unit or a part thereof, including

the renewal of slums and blighted areas, land

reclamation activities, the greening of land, and

appropriate planning of marine and foreshore areas;

e. Review and recommend for appropriate action

of the sanggunian, governor or mayor the

architectural plans and design submitted by

governmental and non-governmental entities or

individuals, particularly those for undeveloped,

underdeveloped, and poorly-designed areas;

f. Coordinate with government and NGOs and

individuals involved in the aesthetics and the

maximum utilization of the land and water within

the jurisdiction of the LGU, compatible with

environmental integrity and ecological balance.

g. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services

involving architectural planning and design,

particularly those related to the redesigning of

spatial distribution of basic facilities and physical

structures during and in the aftermath of man-made

and natural calamities and disasters;

h. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the

governor or mayor on all other matters relative to

the architectural planning and design as it relates to

the total socioeconomic development of the local

government unit; and (Sec 485[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec485[c])

18. Information

Officer

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

a. Take charge of the office on public information

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

preferably in journalism, mass

communication or any related

course from a recognized college

or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have experience in writing

articles and research papers, or in

writing for print, television or

broadcast media of at least 3 years

in the case of the provincial or city

information officer, and at least 1

year in the case of municipal

information officer.

g. Term of the information officer

is co-terminous with his

appointing authority. (Sec486[a])

assistance and support in providing the information

and research data required for the delivery of basic

services and provision of adequate facilities so that

the public becomes aware of said services and may

fully avail of the same;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with

public information and research data to support

programs and projects which the governor or mayor

is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Provide relevant, adequate, and timely

information to the LGU and its residents;

e. Furnish information and data on LGUs to

government agencies or offices as may be required

by law or ordinance; and NGOs to be furnished to

said agencies and organizations;

f. Maintain effective liaison with the various sectors

of the community on matters and issues that affect

the livelihood and the quality of life of the

inhabitants and encourage support for programs of

the local and national government;

g. Be in the frontline in providing information

during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural

calamities and disasters, with special attention to

the victims thereof, to help minimize injuries and

casualties during and after the emergency, and to

accelerate relief and rehabilitation;

h. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to public information and research data as it

relates to the total socioeconomic development of

the LGU; (Sec486[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec486[c])

19. Cooperative

Officer

optional: provincial

and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. Holder of a college degree

preferably in business

administration with special

training in cooperatives or any

related course from a recognized

college or university,

e. First grade civil service eligible

or its equivalent

f. Have experience in cooperatives

organization and management of at

least 5 years in the case of the

provincial or city cooperatives

officer, and 3 years in the case of

municipal cooperatives officer.

(Sec487[a])

a. Take charge of the office for the development of

cooperatives

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of facilities through the development of

cooperatives, and in providing access to such

services and facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

integration of cooperatives principles and methods

in programs and projects which the governor or

mayor is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Assist in the organization of cooperatives;

e. Provide technical and other forms of assistance

to existing cooperatives to enhance their viability as

an economic enterprise and social organization;

f. Assist cooperatives in establishing linkages with

government agencies and NGOs involved in the

promotion and integration of the concept of

cooperatives in the livelihood of the people and

other community activities;

g. Be in the frontline of cooperatives organization,

rehabilitation or viability-enhancement, particularly

during and in the aftermath of man-made and

natural calamities and disasters, to aid in their

survival and, if necessary subsequent rehabilitation;

h. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to cooperatives development and viability-

enhancement which will improve the livelihood and

quality of life of the inhabitants; (Sec487[b])

i. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec487[c])

20. Population

Officer

optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the LGU

concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree

with specialized training in

population development from a

recognized college or university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have experience in the

implementation of programs on

population development or

responsible parenthood for at least

5 years in the case of the

provincial or city population

officer and 3 years in the case of

the municipal population officer.

(Sec488[a])

a. Take charge of the office on population

development

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities relative to the integration of

the population development principles and in

providing access to said services and facilities;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

integration of population development principles

and methods in programs and projects which the

governor or mayor is empowered to implement and

which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Assist the governor or mayor in the

implementation of the Constitutional provisions

relative to population development and the

promotion of responsible parenthood;

e. Establish and maintain an updated data bank for

program operations, development planning and an

educational program to ensure the people's

participation in and understanding of population

development;

f. Implement appropriate training programs

responsive to the cultural heritage of the

inhabitants; (Sec488[b])

g. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec488[c])

21. Veterinarian mandatory:

provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the local

government concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A licensed doctor of veterinary

medicine,

e. Have practiced his profession

for at least 3 years in the case of

provincial or city veterinarian and

at least 1 year in the case of the

municipal veterinarian.

(Sec489[a])

a. Take charge of the office for veterinary services;

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same particularly those which have to do with the

veterinary-related activities which the governor or

mayor is empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for

d. Advise the governor or the mayor on all matters

pertaining to the slaughter of animals for human

consumption and the regulation of slaughterhouses;

e. Regulate the keeping of domestic animals;

f. Regulate and inspect poultry, milk and dairy

products for public consumption;

g. Enforce all laws and regulations for the

prevention of cruelty to animals;

h. Take the necessary measures to eradicate,

prevent or cure all forms of animal diseases;

i. Be in the frontline of veterinary related activities,

such as in the outbreak of highly-contagious and

deadly diseases, and in situations resulting in the

depletion of animals for work and human

consumption, particularly those arising from and in

the aftermath of man-made and natural calamities

and disasters;

j. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to veterinary services which will increase

the number and improve the quality of livestock,

poultry and other domestic animals used for work

or human consumption; (Sec489[b])

k. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec489[c])

22. General

Services Officer

mandatory:

provincial and city

a. Citizen of the Philippines,

b. A resident of the local

government unit concerned,

c. Of good moral character,

d. A holder of a college degree on

public administration, business

a. Take charge of the office on general services;

b. Formulate measures and provide technical

assistance and support in carrying out measures to

ensure the delivery of basic services and provision

of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17 and

which require general services expertise and

administration and management

from a recognized college or

university,

e. A first grade civil service

eligible or its equivalent.

f. Have acquired experience in

general services, including

management of supply, property,

solid waste disposal, and general

sanitation, of at least 5 years in the

case of the provincial or city

general services officer, and at

least 3 years in the case of the

municipal general services officer.

(Sec490[a])

technical support services;

c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the

same, particularly those which have to do with the

general services supportive of the welfare of the

inhabitants which the governor or mayor is

empowered to implement and which the

sanggunian is empowered to provide for;

d. Take custody of and be accountable for all

properties, real or personal, owned by the LGU and

those granted to it in the form of donation,

reparation, assistance and counterpart of joint

projects;

e. Assign building or land space to local officials or

other public officials, who by law, are entitled to

such space;

f. Recommend the reasonable rental rates for local

government properties, whether real or personal,

which will be leased to public or private entities

g. Recommend reasonable rental rates of private

properties which may be leased for the official use

of the local government unit;

h. Maintain and supervise janitorial, security,

landscaping and other related services in all local

government public buildings and other real

property

i. Collate and disseminate information regarding

prices, shipping and other costs of supplies and

other items commonly used by the LGU;

j. Perform archival and record management with

respect to records of offices and departments of the

LGU

k. Perform all other functions pertaining to supply

and property management performed by the local

government treasurer; and enforce policies on

records creation, maintenance, and disposal;

l. Be in the frontline of general services related

activities, such as the possible or imminent

destruction or damage to records, supplies,

properties, and structures and the orderly and

sanitary clearing up of waste materials or debris,

particularly during and in the aftermath of man-

made and natural calamities and disasters;

m. Recommend and advise on all other matters

relative to general services; (Sec490[b])

n. Exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties and functions as may be prescribed by

law or ordinance. (Sec490[c])

LOCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION

Sec 303 – 306, LGC

SEC. 303. Remedies and Sanctions. - Local government units shall appropriate in their respective annual

budgets such amounts as are sufficient to pay the loans and other indebtedness incurred or redeem or retire

bonds, debentures, securities, notes and other obligations issued under this Title: Provided, That failure to

provide the appropriations herein required shall render their annual budgets inoperative.

SEC. 304. Scope. - This Title shall govern the conduct and management of financial affairs, transactions,

and operations of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.

SEC. 305. Fundamental Principles. - The financial affairs, transactions, and operations of local government

units shall be governed by the following fundamental principles:

a. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriations

ordinance or law;

b. Local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes;

c. Local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance, and

collection thereof shall at all times be acknowledged properly;

d. All monies officially received by a local government officer in any capacity or on any occasion

shall be accounted for as local funds, unless otherwise provided by law;

e. Trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out except in fulfillment of the purpose for

which the trust was created or the funds received;

f. Every officer of the local government unit whose duties permit or require the possession or

custody of local funds shall be properly bonded, and such officer shall be accountable and

responsible for said funds and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of

law;

g. Local governments shall formulate sound financial plans, and the local budgets shall be based on

functions, activities, and projects, in terms of expected results; development plans, goals, and

strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of

fiscal and physical resources;

h. Local budget plans and goals shall, as far as practicable, be harmonized with national

development plans, goals, and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to

avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical resources;

i. Local budgets shall operationalize approved local development plans;

j. Local government units shall ensure that their respective budgets incorporate the requirements of

their component units and provide for equitable allocation of resources among these component

units;

k. National planning shall be based on local planning to ensure that the needs and aspirations of the

people as articulated by the local government units in their respective local development plans are

considered in the formulation of budgets of national line agencies or offices;

l. Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs,

transactions, and operations of the local government units; and

m. The local government unit shall endeavor to have a balanced budget in each fiscal year of

operation.

SEC. 306. Definitions. - When used in this Title, the term

a. "Annual Budget" refers to a financial plan embodying the estimates of income and expenditures

for one (1) fiscal year;

b. "Appropriation" refers to an authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and

services from local government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes;

c. "Budget Document" refers to the instrument used by the local chief executive to present a

comprehensive financial plan to the sanggunian concerned;

d. "Capital Outlays" refers to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of

which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit

concerned, including investments in public utilities such as public markets and slaughterhouses;

e. "Continuing Appropriation" refers to an appropriation available to support obligations for a

specified purpose or projects, such as those for the construction of physical structures or for the

acquisition of real property or equipment, even when these obligations are incurred beyond the

budget year;

f. "Current Operating Expenditures" refers to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services

for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year, including goods and

services that will be used or consumed during the budget year;

g. "Expected Results" refers to the services, products, or benefits that will accrue to the public,

estimated in terms of performance measures or physical targets;

h. "Fund" refers to a sum of money, or other assets convertible to cash, set aside for the purpose of

carrying out specific activities or attaining certain objectives in accordance with special

regulations, restrictions, or limitations, and constitutes an independent fiscal and accounting

entity;

i. "Income" refers to all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of

funds of the local government unit;

j. "Obligations" refers to an amount committed to be paid by the local government unit for any

lawful act made by an accountable officer for and in behalf of the local unit concerned;

k. "Personal Services" refers to appropriations for the payment of salaries, wages and other

compensation of permanent, temporary, contractual, and casual employees of the local

government unit;

l. "Receipts" refers to income realized from operations and activities of the local government or are

received by it in the exercise of its corporate functions, consisting of charges for services

rendered, conveniences furnished, or the price of a commodity sold, as well as loans,

contributions or aids from other entities, except provisional advances for budgetary purposes; and

m. "Revenue" refers to income derived from the regular system of taxation enforced under authority

of law or ordinance, and, as such, accrue more or less regularly every year.

Rivera v. Malolos

Petitioner Rivera won the bidding for supply of road construction materials in the Municipality of Malolos,

Bulacan. A contract was signed between the municipal mayor and the petitioner, with a stipulation that the

latter will supply 2700 cubic meters of crushed adobe stones and 1400 cu. m. of gravel in consideration of

P19,235.oo. A year after the contract was entered into, the petitioner still hasn’t been paid. He requested

that the balance be included in the municipality’s appropriations for the next fiscal year. The petitioner sued

for the payment of the unpaid amount but the Auditor General denied the claim on the ff. grounds: 1) that

no appropriation was made before the execution of the contract, as mandated by Revised Administrative

Code Section 607 and 2) that the deliveries could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor of

Bulacan or his representative. Petitioner Rivera argues that: 1) the annual allotment from the Motor Vehicle

Law could be used to pay the indebtedness, 2) according to the Revised Administrative Code,

municipalities are endowed with the faculties of a municipal corporation, therefore competent to contract

and be contracted with.

HELD: The Revised Administrative Code imposes the ff. requirements before a contract involving P2000

or more may be authorized: a) There must be an appropriation b) The Municipal Treasurer must certify to

the officer entering into the contract that the funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the

proposed amount is available for expenditure. The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by petitioner merely

allocates 10% of the money collected and deposited in a “special trust account of the National treasury” to

the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities in proportion to their population. This alone does

not satisfy the requisite appropriation and authority to disburse part of the proceeds from the Motor Vehicle

Law to pay the petitioner. The Auditor General had no alternative but to comply with the law and as the

contract entered into by the Malolos Mayor was contrary to it, the Auditor General was correct in denying

the petitioner’s claim.

APPLICATION OF THE LGC TO LGUS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION

Sec 526, LGC

SEC. 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions. This Code

shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time

as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code.

THE ARMM

Sec 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, Art X, 1987 Constitution

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,

cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the

Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras

consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive

historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the

framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of

the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the

laws are faithfully executed.

Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the

autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and

participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the

President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure

of government from the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of

which shall be reflective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise

provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions

of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the

constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic

areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national

laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of

the people of the region.

Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local

police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with

applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National

Government.

RA 6734

See attachments

Disomancop v. Datumanong

Pursuant to Article 10, Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution, RA 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for An

Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao” was enacted. In a plebiscite, the provinces

of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted to become part of the ARMM. To implement

RA 6734, then President Cory Aquino issued E.O 426, placing the control and supervision of the Offices of

the DPWH within the ARMM under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).

Nine years later, them DPWH Secretary issued D.O 119 creating a DPWH Marawi Sub-District

Engineering Office, which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and over all

facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur. R.A. 9054 was later passed, detailing

and expanding the specific powers of the ARG. In 2001 however, RA 8999 was enacted, establishing an

Engineering District in the First District of Lanao del Sur- in effect reestablishing the National

Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in the area. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of

R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, saying that the two run counter to the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM.

HELD: R.A 8999 is antagonistic and cannot be reconciled with the ARMM Organic Acts 6734 and 9054.

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for the autonomous regions is to allow separate development

of peoples with distinct cultures and traditions. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain caused by

the assimilationist approach. Decentralization is a prerequisite to autonomy. It comes in two forms-

deconcentration and devolution. The former is a decentralization of administration, the latter the

decentralization of power. The framers of the Constitution intended for the autonomy of the ARMM to be

in the nature of the latter- “a meaningful and authentic regional autonomy”. Ratified through a plebiscite,

the ARMM Organic Act cannot be amended without a plebiscite, which R.A. 8999 clearly lacked. It is the

intention of the ARMM Organic Acts to cede some, if not most of the powers of the national government to

the autonomous government. The enforcement of RA 8999 runs afoul of these organic acts. It bears

stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution, one of the policies of which is to ensure

autonomy of autonomous regions, subject only to general supervision by the President.

Meanwhile, the office created under D.O. 119 is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering

District in Lanao del Sur formed under the auspices of E.O. 426. The Department order in effect takes back

powers, which had already been devolved to the ARG. The DPWH order, cannot rise higher than its source

– the Executive. It is also worthy to note that E.O 124 on which D.O. 119 is based is merely a general law

organizing the DPWH while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring control and supervision of DPWH

offices within the ARMM to the ARG. The latter should prevail. Even without applying the principle of lex

specialis derogat generali, the enactment of R.A. 9054 in 2001 which repealed laws, orders and issuances

inconstent with it rendered D.O. 119 functus officio.

Abbas v. Comelec

Petitioners argue that R.A. 6734 or the “Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao” is unconstitutional. According to them, R.A. 6734 unconditionally creates an

autonomous region in Mindanao, regardless of how many provinces vote for autonomy, contrary to Article

X, Section 5 of the Constitution, which makes the creation of such a region dependent on the outcome of

the plebiscite. One of the petitioners also insist that the RA is unconstitutional because it includes non-

Muslim areas, which do not share the same characteristics with the other provinces. Seemingly

contradicting himself, the petitioner also claims that since some non-Muslim areas have been included,

other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao must also be covered in order for them to similarly enjoy the benefits

of autonomy. The RA’s failure to include all such areas is allegedly a violation of the equal protection

clause of the Constitution. Petitioners likewise assert that Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 grants the

President power to merge regions – a power not conferred by the Constitution. Lastly, they contend that the

creation of an Oversight Committee is unconstitutional in that it delays the creation of an autonomous

region.

HELD: R.A. 6734 substantially incorporates the requirements for the creation of an autonomous region

embodied in the Constitution. Creation of an autonomous region takes effect only when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities voting favorably shall be

included. Majority means a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent

units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as the constituent

units taken individually. Contrary to the petitioners’ claims, creation of autonomous region is not rendered

absolute. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the 13 provinces and 9

municipalities shall be included. This is because the plebiscite will be determinative of two points: 1)

whether there will be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, and 2) which provinces and cities shall

comprise it.

With respect to the inclusion of non-Muslim areas, the contention is not tenable. Ascertainment of the areas

that share common attributes is within the legislature’s discretion. It is beyond the review powers of the

judiciary. The same explanation supports the rejection of the claim that other non-Muslim areas should be

included in the autonomous region, lest the equal protection clause be violated. Equal protection permits of

reasonable classification. Since the Congress based its classification on real and substantial distinctions, no

violation was made.

The power of the President to merge administrative regions was upheld, it pertaining merely to groupings of

contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political

subdivisions like provinces, municipalities and barangays that require a plebiscite to be merged. The power

to merge administrative regions although not expressly provided for in the Constitution is traditionally

lodged with the President.

The questioned provisions requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of national offices to

the regional government is precisely aimed to effect a smooth transition and cannot be considered an

impediment or a cause of delay. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality and the

petitioners failed to overcome that presumption.

Pandi v. CA

Take note of the dates because they are significant in determining the validity of appointments

On August 9, 1993, Dr. Jamila R. Macacaua, in her capacity as Regional Director and DOH-ARMM

Secretary issued a Memorandum appointing Dr. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial

Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital in Lanao del Sur (IPHO-APGH) and transferring the

incumbent OIC, Dr. Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. On September 15, 1993,

Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan appointed Dr. Saber also to the position of OIC of the IPHO-

APGH. In other words, Saber and Pandi were appointed to the same position by different appointing

officers. Sani on the other hand, contests her being moved to Cotabato and claims to be the holder of a

permanent appointment as provincial health officer (PHO) of IPHO-PGH, the same post that Saber and

Pandi were appointed to. On October 5, 1993 President Ramos issued EO 133, transferring powers and

functions of the DOH in the region to the ARMM Regional Government (ARG), pursuant to which

Macacaua reiterated her appointments. The parties are in dispute as to which appointments are valid. The

case traces the enactment of various legislation, divided into five periods, to wit: 1) the time prior to

effectivity of Organic Act of 1989, 2) the time after Organic Act 1989 but before the LGC of 1991, 3) after

the LGC of 1991 but before the ARMM Code, 4) after the ARMM Code but before Organic Act of 2001, 5)

after Organic Act of 2001. During the first period, the governing law was the DOH Charter (EO 119), in

which the power to appoint was granted to the Minister of Health. Then LGC of 1984 classified the

Provincial Health Officer as a national government official whose salary is paid out of national funds. The

ARMM was created after the enactment of the Organic Act of 1989. The latter transferred certain agencies

and offices of the national government to the Regional Government but the DOH was not among them.

PHOs were still part of the national government until the Regional Government adopts its own Local

Government Code. During the third period, the LGC of 1991 took effect, naming the provincial health

officer as an official of the Provincial Government to be appointed by the Governor if his salary is paid out

of provincial funds. One must however note that although LGC 1991 is a later law than OA 1989, the latter

is not affected by the former’s enactment because an organic act requires an approval through plebiscite to

be amended. Thus, even with LGC 1991’s passage, the appointment of the PHO is still with the Secretary

of Health. It was only upon the effectivity of EO 133 in October 1993 that the power to appoint provincial

health officers to any province was assigned to the ARMM Secretary of Health (Regional Secretary). In the

fourth period, the ARMM Local Code came into being, stating that if the salary of a PHO comes from

provincial funds, appointing power is with the Provincial Governor and if it comes from regional funds,

then it is with the Regional Governor, upon recommendation from the Provincial Governor. In case of

doubt, the ARMM Local Code is interpreted in favor of devolution- in favor of the provincial governor’s

powers. The fifth period covers the passage of the Organic Act of 2001, through which the powers and

functions of any other provincial governor under the LGC of 1991, including the power to appoint PHOs,

are now enjoyed as a minimum by the Provincial Governor of the ARMM.

HELD: When Governor Mahid Mutilan appointed Saber as OIC on September 1993, the provincial health

officer was still a national government official paid out of national funds. The provincial health officer

became a provincial government official only on March 3, 1994 after the effectivity of the ARMM Local

Code. The governor had no power to make such designation at the time, hence the appointment of Saber as

OIC is void. Reliance on the LGC is misplaced since it did not amend the Organic Act of 1989. The

provision in the LGC which states that “ The appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for

provincial, city and municipal governments” is merely a directive that those empowered to appoint local

health officers are mandated to do so. With respect to the initial transfer of Sani by Macacaua from Lanao

del Sur to Cotabato on August 1993, the Court holds that the act is void, since the power to appoint was still

with the Secretary of Health at the time, not with the Regional Secretary. However, when Macacaua issued

a second memorandum on November 6, 1993, reiterating the transfer of Sani, the prior error was cured and

the transfer became valid since it was made after the issuance of EO 133 which expressly transferred

“supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health to the Head

of the Regional Department of Health”. The same is true for the appointment of Pandi, which was similarly

made by Macacaua on the same dates. The appointments made by Macacaua are valid while that made by

Governor Mutilan is void. The Court reminds us however, that after the effectivity of the ARMM Local

Code, the Regional Secretary had been stripped of authority to make such a designation. The said power is

now with the Provincial Governor.

Bai Sema v. Comelec (supra)

Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under Organic Act (RA 9054). The Ordinance appended to

the Constitution apportioned two legislative districts to the Province of Maguindanao, the first consisting of

Cotabato City and eight other municipalities. The ARMM’s legislature, exercising its power to create

provinces under Section 19 of R.A 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act

201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the said eight municipalities in

Maguindanao’s first district. The Act however provided that despite the creation of the new province, the

existing legislative district (8 municipalities + Cotabato) shall still remain. The voters of Maguindanao

ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite. Cotabato’s Sangguniang Panlunsod asked the

COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan. To this,

COMELEC answered with a Resolution maintaining the status quo- with Cotabato and Shariff Kabunsuan

constituting part of the first legislative district in Maguindanao. COMELEC later promulgated Resolution

No. 7902 renaming Maguindanao’s first district as “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City”. Bai Sema, a

candidate for Congresswoman of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City”, asserts that according to Article

VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution, and Ordinance 3 appended to the latter, Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled

to one representative, and Cotabato with a population of only 163, 849 to another. She cites Felwa vs. Salas,

which held that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding legislative district comes into

existence neither by authority of that statute nor by apportionment but by operation of the Constitution,

without reapportionment. In other words, she wants Cotabato and Shariff Kabunsuan to have separate

representatives, since according to her, the creation of a new province necessitates the creation of a

corresponding legislative district.

HELD: Although the Congress is not given by the Constitution express powers to delegate the creation of

local government units, such power may be gleaned from its plenary powers. While there is no conflict

between the Constitution and Congress’ delegation of the power to create municipalities and barangays, it is

an altogether different matter when it comes to the creation of cities and provinces. This is because of the

situation created by Article VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution which says, “"Each city with a population

of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House

of Representatives”. A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate the

aforequoted provision of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the former. For

Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate the power

to create a legislative district. The latter is however disallowed by the Section 5(1) Article VI of the

Constitution, giving Congress the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts. It would be

anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national

legislature like Congress. The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,

and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous

for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its

legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained

by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. To allow the ARMM Regional

Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's

territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the

coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "within its territorial jurisdiction." Since a province

cannot be legally created without a legislative district, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is

unconstitutional. The reliance by Sema on the Felwa case is misplaced. A district is created in two ways: a)

indirectly, through the creation of a province, and b) directly, by creation of legislative districts. The court

sustained the constitutionality of the creation of a new district in that case because it was made “indirectly”

through a special law enacted by the Congress creating a province and also because the creation of

legislative districts will not exceed the maximum number of representatives allowed by the Constitution.

Sema’s theory will lead to the following disastrous consequences: (1) An inferior legislative body like the

ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a

superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the

Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on 1 rep/at least 250,000

residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in

Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that a province or city must have a minimum population of 250,ooo; and (3)

Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives

through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. The

Congress and the framers of the Constitution did not intend such consequences.

Organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution, Sec 20 of which provides that

legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the

provisions of the Constitution.” Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants

to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. MMA 201 is thus void and of

no effect.

Separate Opinion by Tinga: The only constitutional provision that concerns with the creation of provinces is

Section 10, Article X, which reads: “No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in

the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the

political units directly affected.” Nothing in this provision specifically limits the power to create provinces,

cities, municipalities or barangays to Congress alone. The provision does embody a significant limitation -

that the creation of these political subdivisions must be in accordance with the criteria established in the

local government code, a law which is enacted by Congress. It would thus be proper to say that the

Constitution limits the ability to set forth the standards for the creation of a province exclusively to

Congress. But to say that the Constitution confines to Congress alone the power to establish the criteria for

creating provinces is vastly different from saying that the Constitution confines to Congress alone the power

to create provinces. There is nothing in the Constitution that supports the latter proposition.

CAR

Admin Order 220

See attachments

Ordillo v. Comelec

The people of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City cast their votes

in a plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera

Autonomous Region. A total of 5,889 people voted for the creation of the region while an overwhelming

majority of 148,676 votes rejected it. Consequently, COMELEC issued resolution No.2259 stating that

since the Organic Act for the region has been approved by a majority of votes in Ifugao Province only, the

latter alone will constitute the autonomous region. The President also issued Administrative Order No. 160

abolishing the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly in view of the Organic

Act’s ratification. Petitioner assails the Comelec Resolution 2259 and AO No. 160, saying that the province

of Ifugao cannot solely constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

HELD: The petition is meritorious. Article X, Sec 15 of the Constitution is explicit in providing that

“provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas” shall constitute the autonomous region- meaning

more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions we have in the country are groupings of contiguous

provinces. Ifugao is a province in itself, one of the smallest in the country to boot – making up only 11% of

the total population of the areas mentioned in RA 6766. The law reiterates the provision in the Constitution

by providing that “The Regional Government shall exercise powers...for the proper governance of all

provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. It can be gleaned that Congress never intended a single

province to constitute an autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with an absurd situation of

having two sets of officials- a set of provincial officials and a set of regional officials exercising executive

and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. Since Ifugao is very small province, it would have

too many government officials for so few people. The law also creates a Regional Planning and

Development Board consisting of several members, with functions similar to that of a Provincial

Coordinator’s. If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform those functions while it takes an

entire Board to perform substantially the same tasks in the regional level, it only means that a larger area is

contemplated by the law to make up the autonomous region. Also, the huge allotment of P10M to the

Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements is too much to fund a lone and small

province.

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,

sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the

provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs.

1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the

establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the

planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the

local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the

supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in

the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government

projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-

formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR

and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government

is established and organized [sec. 17].

In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her

legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually

pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region

in the Cordilleras.

During the pendency of this case, R.A. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the

Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the

offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A.

No. 6766, to wit:

SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices and agencies

created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic

Act.

All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly

shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government.

WON E.O.220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts the Congress from enacting an organic act for the

autonomous region in Cordillera.

Held: No.

A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and

coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the

areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras.

It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory

measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In

short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the

Constitution on autonomous regions.

The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad

Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras.” The Constitution provides for a basic

structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and

special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we

find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It merely created a region,

covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning

and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not

supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They

merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the

agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental

organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

WON the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Held: No.

E.O. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger

subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not

have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the

powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to

own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR

was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the

covered areas.

The CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National

Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Art. X,

Sec. 14 of the Constitution.

As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for

political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of

adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an

autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

MMDA AND LGUS

Sec 11, Art X, 1987 Constitution

Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a

plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic

autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of

the metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring

coordination.

RA 7924

See attachments

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Association Inc (supra)

MMDA attempted to demolish the wall separating Kalayan Avenue from the subdivision owned by the

respondent. Thus, respondents filed a case for injunction against the MMDA. The CA ruled for the

respondent and issued a permanent writ of injunction. Hence, this petition.

MMDA’s argument: that it has the authority to open the Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an

agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila (in this case,

traffic management). From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the

City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Moreover, it is alleged that the

police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate

Appellate Court.

WON MMDA has police power and WON there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance

opening the disputed street to the public.

Held: No to both.

MMDA has no police power and an ordinance enacted by the City of Makati is necessary for the opening of

Neptune Street to the public.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,

regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a

system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let

alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.

Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that

empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the

general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a

"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating

with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations,

and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan

area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself,

viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- –x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise

regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without

diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters."

Having no legislative power, the MMDA cannot enact ordinances. Thus, it becomes necessary for the City

of Makati to enact an ordinance declaring the Neptune Street open to the public before the MMDA can

implement such activity.

WON the consolidated cases of Sangalang vs. IAC (as regards the SC’s upholding of MMDA’s alleged

police power) are applicable in this case.

Held: No.

Firstly, the Sangalang cases involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the

Metro Manila Commission (MMC – the forerunner of MMDA). In the instant case, the basis for the

proposed opening of Neptune Street is a mere notice sent by MMDA to the respondent, the former relying

on its authority under its charter “to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and

convenient movement of persons.”

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the

forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of P. D. No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that

the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by P.D. 824. Its administration was placed under the Metro

Manila Commission (MMC), which was specifically vested with legislative powers. The MMC was the

“central government” of Metro Manila and fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever

legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by

the MMC.

In 1990, President Aquino issued E.O. No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA).

The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that

not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’s power was limited to the

"delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMA’s governing

body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and

municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services

requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval

of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance

of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common

problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its

power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local

development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation

proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the

comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative

region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the

autonomy of the affected local government units." The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The

power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative

rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to

enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is good to

note that the explanatory note to the bill which created MMDA stated that the proposed MMDA is a

“development authority” which is a “national agency,” not a political government unit.

It is beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with

legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11,

Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the

approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924

was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an

official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet

member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the

President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This

emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924.

Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the

local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power

and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance

or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is

illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

MMDA v. Garin

Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license was

confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 08/05/95. Due to the then

MMDA Chairman’s failure to heed Garin’s request that his driver’s license be returned and that instead he

be subjected to a case for traffic violation in court, Garin filed a cased for injunction in the RTC.

Garin’s argument: In the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924

grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, thereby violating the

due process clause of the Constitution. Garin further contends that the provision violates the constitutional

prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and

impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

MMDA’s argument: The powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing,

collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and

executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It

further argues that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude “admixture” of the three powers

of government in administrative agencies. Moreover, MMDA has already formulated its implementing rules

for Sec. 5(f), which is Memorandum Circular No. YY-95-001 dated 04/15/95.

The RTC ruled in favor of Garin. Thus, MMDA filed this petition in the SC. MMDA reiterates and

reinforces its argument that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but

is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and

welfare. It further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without

due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented

Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan

Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at

any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in

cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of

implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.

It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from

confiscating drivers’ licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court’s need to decide this

case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04,

Series of 2004. The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No.

TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers’ licenses. For the

proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner’s future programs, the Supreme Court deemed it

appropriate to make the following observations: 1) A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that

the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power; 2) The MMDA is not vested with police power;

and 3) Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations (which

means that MMDA may enforce, but cannot enact, ordinances).

WON MMDA has police power and WON it has the authority to confiscate traffic violators’ driver’s

license without an enabling law enacted by Congress.

Held: No

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the

legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and

ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for

the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Having been lodged primarily

in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing

legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and

administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units

(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by

the national lawmaking body.

In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the SC categorically stated

that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that

all its functions are administrative in nature. The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power

delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and

regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact

ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, insofar as

Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA

the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative

enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus, where there

is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers

have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-

bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and

traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations,

traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air that

the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating

with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and

the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

Municipal Contracts

CORPORATE POWERS

Sec 22, LGC

See above

Feliciano v. COA

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the Commission on Audit’s (“COA”) Resolution dated 01/03/00 and

the Decision dated 01/30/01 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The COA denied petitioner Ranulfo

C. Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services, and to stop charging auditing fees, to Leyte

Metropolitan Water District (“LMWD”). The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to refund all

auditing fees previously paid by LMWD.

Background: A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD.

Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment of auditing fees.

As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner sent a reply dated 12 October 1999 informing COA’s Regional

Director that the water district could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action

Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 (“PD 198”), as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758

(“RA 6758”). The Regional Director referred petitioner’s reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999.

On 19 October 1999, petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing

fees LMWD previously paid to COA. On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA Chairman Celso D.

Gangan’s Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying his requests. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30 January 2001. On 13 March 2001, petitioner

filed this instant petition.

WON a Local Water District (“LWD”) created under PD 198, as amended, is a government-owned or

controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.

Held:Yes.

The Constitution and existing laws mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-

owned and controlled corporations (“GOCCs”) with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an

original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA’s audit jurisdiction, as

follows:

SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine,

audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and

property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,

or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, x x x

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through

special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create

corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.

Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code.

LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation

Code states that “[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange

Commission articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and

no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs

as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor

or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court has ruled

that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code.

LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since under the Constitution only

government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if

they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special

charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.

Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code,

LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD 198. Sections 6 and 25 of PD 198 provide:

Section 6. Formation of District. — This Act is the source of authorization and power to form and

maintain a district. For purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered as a quasi-public corporation

performing public service and supplying public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers, rights

and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and

subject to such restrictions imposed, under this Act. x x x

Sec. 25. Authorization. — The district may exercise all the powers which are expressly granted by this

Title or which are necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein stated. For the

purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is hereby granted the power of eminent domain,

the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration.

Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198, which expressly confers on LWDs corporate

powers. Section 6 of PD 198 provides that LWDs “shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to

private corporations under existing laws.” Without PD 198, LWDs would have no corporate powers. Thus,

PD 198 constitutes the special enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are

government-owned and controlled corporations with a special charter.

The phrase “government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters” means GOCCs created

under special laws and not under the general incorporation law. There is no difference between the term

“original charters” and “special charters.”

Petitioner’s contention that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution creates the LWDs assumes that the

Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations. This is a patently baseless assumption. The

Local Government Code does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations. What

the Local Government Code empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide for the establishment of

a waterworks system “subject to existing laws.” Thus, Section 447(5)(vii) of the Local Government Code

provides:

SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the

legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for

the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the

proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,

and shall:

(vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an

efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants; regulate the construction, maintenance,

repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity of the water

supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all

territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir,

conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and

regulate the consumption, use or wastage of water;

The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in accordance with the provisions of PD

198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no power to create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks

system. However, the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to form and

incorporate a water district. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Sangguniang Bayan

has the power to create corporations, the LWDs would remain government-owned or controlled

corporations subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan would

constitute an LWD’s special charter, making the LWD a government-owned and controlled corporation

with an original charter. In any event, the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water District v. Trajano that

the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the special charter of LWDs, thus:

While it is true that a resolution of a local sanggunian is still necessary for the final creation of a district,

this Court is of the opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the same being intended

only to implement the provisions of said decree.

AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE OR SECURE GRANTS AND INCUR INDEBTEDNESS

Sec 23, LGC

See above

BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER

Sec 302, LGC

Sec. 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by

the Private Sector.

(a) Local government units may enter into contracts with any duly pre-qualified individual

contractor, for the financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of any financially viable

infrastructure facilities, under the build-operate-and-transfer agreement, subject to the

applicable provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No.

6957) authorizing the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure

projects by the private sector and the rules and regulations issued thereunder and such terms and

conditions provided in this Section.

(b) Local government units shall include in their respective local development plans and public

investment programs priority projects that may be financed, constructed, operated and

maintained by the private sector under this Section. It shall be the duty of the local government

unit concerned to disclose to the public all projects eligible for financing under this Section,

including official notification of duly registered contractors and publication in newspapers of

general or local circulation and in conspicuous and accessible public places. Local projects

under the build-operate-and-transfer agreement shall be confirmed by the local development

councils.

(c) Projects implemented under this Section shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The provincial, city, or municipal engineer, as the case may be, upon formal request in writing by

the local chief executive, shall prepare the plans and specifications for the proposed projects,

which shall be submitted to the sanggunian for approval.

(2) Upon approval by the sanggunian of the project plans and specifications, the provincial, city or

municipal engineer shall, as the case may be cause to be published once every week for two (2)

consecutive weeks in at least one (1) local newspaper which is circulated in the region, province,

city or municipality in which the project is to be implemented, a notice inviting all duly qualified

contractors to participate in a public bidding for the projects so approved. The conduct of public

bidding and award of contracts for local government projects under this Section shall be in

accordance with this Code and other applicable laws, rules and regulations.

In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer agreement, the contract shall be awarded to the lowest

complying bidder whose offer is deemed most advantageous to the local government and based

on the present value of its proposed tolls, fees, rentals, and charges over a fixed term for the

facility to be constructed, operated, and maintained according to the prescribed minimum design

and performance standards, plans, and specifications. For this purpose the winning contractor

shall be automatically granted by the local government unit concerned the franchise to operate

and maintain the facility, including the collection of tolls, fees, rentals, and charges in accordance

with subsection (c-1) hereof.

In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer agreement, the contract shall be awarded to the lowest

complying bidder based on the present value of its proposed schedule of amortization payments

for the facility to be constructed according to the prescribed minimum design and performance

standards, plans, and specifications.

(3) Any contractor who shall undertake the prosecution of any project under this Section shall post

the required bonds to protect the interest of the province, city, or municipality, in such amounts as

may be fixed by the sanggunian concerned and the provincial, city or municipal engineer shall, as

the case may be, not allow any contractor to initiate the prosecution of projects under this Section

unless such contractor presents proof or evidence that he has posted the required bond.

(4) The contractor shall be entitled to a reasonable return of its investment in accordance with its bid

proposal as accepted by the local government unit concerned.

In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer agreement, the repayment shall be made by authorizing

the contractor to charge and collect reasonable tolls, fees, rentals, and charges for the use of the

project facility not exceeding those proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract: Provided,

That the local government unit concerned shall, based on reasonableness and equity, approve the

tolls, fees, rentals and charges: Provided, further, That the imposition and collection of tolls, fees,

rentals and charges shall be for a fixed period as proposed in the bid and incorporated in the

contract which shall in no case exceed fifty (50) years: Provided, finally, That during the lifetime

of the contract, the contractor shall undertake the necessary maintenance and repair of the facility

in accordance with standards prescribed in the bidding documents and in the contract.

In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer agreement, the repayment shall be made through

amortization payments in accordance with the schedule proposed in the bid and incorporated in

the contract.

In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist

of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed.

(5) Every infrastructure project undertaken under this Section shall be constructed, operated, and

maintained by the contractor under the technical supervision of the local government unit and in

accordance with the plans, specifications, standards, and costs approved by it.

(d) The provincial, city or municipal legal officer shall, as the case may be, review the

contracts executed pursuant to this Section to determine their legality, validity,

enforceability and correctness of form.

Liability

LIABILITY ON CONTRACTS – ULTRA VIRES ACT

San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro

Following a public bidding for the lease of the municipal waters of Respondent, Petitioner, being the

highest bidder, was awarded a contract which granted to the lessee the exclusive privilege of erecting fish

corrals along the Butas river up to the Nuajan Lake for a period of 5 years. About a year into the lease

period, the council reduced the annual rental by 20% upon the petition of the lessee.

Petitioner later asked for an extension because a typhoon destroyed most of his fish corrals. The municipal

council adopted Resolution 222 which extended the lease for another five years on the condition that

Plaintiff would waive the privilege to seek for the reduction of the annual rent. This resolution was

approved by the Provincial Board and a new contract was drawn and approved through Resolution 229 by

the municipal council whose term was then about to expire.

The new municipal council, this time with a new set of members, adopted Resolutions 3 and 11 which

revoked Resolutions 222 and 229 respectively. Petitioner argues that these resolutions violated his

constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process. The respondent argues that

Resolutions 222 and 229 are void.

Held: Resolution 222, and hence also Resolution 229, are void. Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative

Code requires public bidding for the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct a fish-breeding

ground. There is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but

the reduction of the rental and the extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted without

previous public bidding. Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract already

executed in compliance with the law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and

essential particular.

Resolution 3 is not an impairment of the obligation of contract, because the constitutional provision on

impairment refers only to contract legally executed.

Public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the public the best possible

advantages by means of open competition between the bidders." Contracts requiring public bidding affect

public interest, and to change them without complying with that requirement would indeed be against

public policy.

Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos

Petitioners bid the lowest in the public bidding for the supply of construction materials for road repair

operations of the municipality. The acting municipal treasurer informed them that the contract was awarded

to them and the Mayor signed it in behalf of the municipality. The contracted stipulated that petitioners

were to deliver crushed adobe stones and gravel which they did in 1949 at the place designated by the

Mayor.

In 1950, petitioners wrote the municipal treasurer because the amount of P19, 339.56 that was due them

was not yet paid. The municipal treasurer informed them that Municipal Council had agreed to put said

amount as standing obligation of the municipality authorizing payment and authorizing the Municipal

Treasurer to pay as soon as funds are available. Resolution No. 68 was later passed which ratified the public

bidding held for the construction supplies.

In 1951, petitioners filed an action with the CFI which was dismissed. They filed a case with the

Presidential Complaints and Action Committee which forwarded it to the General Auditing Office. This

office denied the claim for payment on grounds which the Petitioners argue are mere technicalities.

Held: The law requires that before a contract involving the expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered

into or authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contracts that funds

have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract-

is available for expenditure on account thereof. The contracted entered into by the Petitioners is contrary to

this provision and is wholly void.

Moreover, the law provides that the provincial auditor or his representative must check up the deliveries

made by a contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly entered into. In the case at bar, there was

no such check up and the Auditor General is not in duty bound to pass and allow in audit the sum claimed

by the petitioner if he or his authorized representative did not check up the delivery of the crushed adobe

stone and gravel. To say that the purpose and aim of this checking requirement is to forestall fraud and

collusion is to state what is obvious.

Petitioners’ claim that the Motor Vehicle Law constitutes sufficient appropriation is untenable. This law

merely allocates 10 per cent of the money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the

different municipalities in proportion to population as shown in the latest available census, for the repair,

maintenance and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to

disburse part of the 10 per cent collected under the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim

of the petitioner.

Petitioners’ remedy can be found in Sec. 608 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Rivera v. Maclang

this is a continuation of the above case)

Petitioner filed a case against respondent Maclang (the Mayor) which the CFI dismissed because the

Supreme Court has already declared that the contract is void and therefore can’t produce any legal effects.

Held: The present action is against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity on the strength of section

608 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides as follows:

SEC. 608. Void contract, Liability of officer. A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements

of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make such contract

shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent

as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.

The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed the contract with appellant in violation of

section 607, comes squarely under the provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as it the transaction

had been entered into by him as a private party. We take it that the intention of the law in this respect is to

ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of

public funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or

improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

LIABILITY ON TORTS (QUASI-DELICT)

Sec 24, LGC

See above

Art 2180, 2189, 34, Civil Code

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,

but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the

minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their

authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by

their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their

functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within

the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has

been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in

article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their

pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they

observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries

suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and

other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

Thurman v. City of Torrington

Tracey Thurman repeatedly reported to the police that she and her son were being physically and

emotionally abused by her husband Charles Thurman but the police continuously ignored her. There were

instances that members of the police actually saw the abuse happening but did not intervene. Charles

Thurman lived in Torrington and worked as a counterman and short order cook at Skie’s Diner. There he

served many members of the Torrington Police Department, including some of the officers in this case.

While at work, Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he intended to “get” his wife and that he

intended to kill her.

The situation escalated to the point that after being issued a restraining order, Charles Thurman nevertheless

went to Tracey’s home and demanded to be let in. Tracey called the police and went outside to plead with

Charles not to hurt their son. Charles suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the chest, neck, and throat. 25

minutes later, a single police officer arrived and saw Charles still holding the bloody knife. In the presence

of the police officer, Charles kicked Tracey in the head then went inside the house and came back holding

their son whom he dropped on top of Tracey. Charles kicked Tracey in the head a second time.

Soon, more police arrived but they permitted Charles to wander about the crowd and continue to threaten

Tracey. Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again, this time while she was lying on a stretcher, Charles

Thurman was arrested and taken into custody.

Held: Tracey Thurman sued the city for the violations of her rights under the U.S. Constitution. The City

brought a motion to dismiss her claims arguing that the equal protection clause [no state shall deny any

person the equal protection of the laws] “only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially

motivated.” The City’s argument is clearly a misstatement of the law. The application of the equal

protection clause is not limited to racial classifications or racially motivated discrimination. Classifications

on the basis of gender will be held invalid under the equal protection clause unless they are substantially

related to strike down classifications which are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the

personal safety of persons in the community. This duty applies equally to women whose personal safety is

threatened by individuals with whom they have or have had a domestic relationship as well as to all other

persons whose personal safety is threatened, including women not involved in domestic relationships. If

officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they

are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in

the community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. The

City’s motion to dismiss is denied

Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte

Sabas Torralba was employed as a driver of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte and was detailed to

the Office of the District Engineer. While driving his truck in the performance of his duties, he ran over and

killed Proceto Palafox. Torralba was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The heirs of

Palafox instituted an action for damages against the provincial government.

Issue: WON the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte is liable.

Held: No.

To attach liability to the state, a declaration must be made that Torralba was a special agent within the scope

of Article 1903 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code. But this principle applies only to the Insular Government of

the Philippines as distinguished from provincial or municipal governments.

The heirs of Palafox invoked the doctrine of respondeat superior which provides that the master shall

answer for the negligent acts of its employees.

In the Mendoza case, it was held that if the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of

governmental duties as distinguished from proprietary or business functions, the government is not liable.

In the present case, the construction or maintenance of roads in which the driver Torralba was engaged in at

the time of the accident is admittedly governmental activities.

Mendoza v. De Leon

This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the municipality

of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the

plaintiff under the provisions of Act. No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a little more

than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein

defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.

Issue: WON the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for damages.

Held: Yes.

Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both governmental and

corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of regulation against fire and disease,

preservation of the public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and

post-offices, etc. Of the latter class are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the

inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing

establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-

breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall

be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been

previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township is

located.

The twofold character of the powers of a municipality, under our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so

apparent and its private or corporate powers so numerous and important that we find no difficulty in

reaching the conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such entities to private

individuals as enunciated in the United States are applicable to it.

The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) sections 38

and 39.

As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or

agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their

governmental character by being delegated to the municipal government. Nor does the fact that such duties

are performed by such officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the municipality

to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and

so on is to administer government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local

organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration

of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the performance of the

same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.

It should be clear that a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its

corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be

regarded as a private corporation or individual 153113-13 so far as its liability to third persons on contract

or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, valid entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected

from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same

manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the

principle of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits

in the courts.

Here it is clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not

a governmental but corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with

the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. The matter is thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal

Corporations (5th ed., sec. 1306):

"Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or legislative authority, containing grants to water and

light companies and other public service corporations of the right to use the street pipes, mains, etc., upon

the condition of the performance of service by the grantee, are, after acceptance and performance by the

grantee, contracts protected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitution against the enactment of any

State Law impairing the obligation of contracts."

It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referred

to, the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his

lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for damages against it

for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages,

either ex contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities.

There is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff

from the ferry which he had leased. On the contrary, the defendant councilors attempted to justify their

action on the ground that the ferry which he was operating was not the one leased to him; this in spite of the

fact the vice-president had personally placed him in possession of it more than a year before, and the fact

that he had operated this ferry for over a year, evidently with the knowledge of the defendants. The

evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he had leased

that no reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, we cannot say that in

rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to an action for damages

for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages

sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in

accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December

16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the

Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino

Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.

Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they

sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

Private respondents (heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr.) instituted a compliant for damages against

the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot in the CFI of La Union. The aforesaid defendants

filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Thereafter,

the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo

Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.

The trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La

Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay them jointly and severally. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion which was then pending but the MR

was denied.

WON respondent Judge Firme exceeded his jurisdiction when he ruled on the issue of liability of the

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union.

Held: Yes

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the

Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."

Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to

be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be

sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special

law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied

when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting

party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are

engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.

Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter

provided that they can sue and be sued.

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the

competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in

the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were

acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant

the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was

committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot

recover.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the

Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is

presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the

driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the

municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in

the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it

may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

Fernando v. CA and City of Davao

On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request

with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An

invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and

Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the

purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four

other companions were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. The City

Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without

clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was

found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan

Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five

victims as `asphyxia' caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal

conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their

intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic

tank.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the case. Petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate

Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). The IAC reversed the appealed judgment and ordered the

defendant to pay the plaintiffs.

Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals rendered an Amended

Decision dismissing the case against the City of Davao.

WON the City of Davao is guilty of negligence.

Held: No

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person

that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other

person suffers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what would

constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the

answer, to wit:

"The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary

person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

"The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course

be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular

case. The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said

to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect

harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its

consequences.

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish

the relation between the omission and the damage. He must drove under Article 2179 of the New Civil

Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The test is

simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without

which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,

but contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its

determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to

his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such

injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank

annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master

about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent

immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the

lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial

measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure

to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their

personal necessities but have remained unscathed.

The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing

specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could

not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight.

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which

would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of these public

facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs

is not one of those requirements.

It would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless

one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and

without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of

emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person

should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.

Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,

therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the

accident.

The market master knew that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered that the

bidding had just been conducted. Although the winning bidder was already known, the award to him was

still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which befell the victims

who are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be given.

Considering that there was yet no award and order to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the

market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started. The surreptitious way in

which the victims did their job without clearance from the market master or any of the security guards goes

against their good faith. Even their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the

septic tank.

There is a total absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City Government of Davao

City that could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any liability on the part of Davao City.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA and Jurado

The petitioners are questioning the decision of the respondent court holding them liable in damages to the

private respondent for refusing to issue to him a mayor's permit and license to operate his palay-threshing

business.

The case goes back to March 14, 1977, when the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan,

unanimously adopted Resolution No. 9 which authorizes the municipal treasurer to enter into an agreement

to all thresher operators, that will come to apply for a permit to thresh palay within the jurisdiction of the

municipality to donate 1% of all the palay threshed by them to help finance the continuation of the

construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building.

To implement the above resolution, petitioner Lope C. Mapagu, then incumbent municipal treasurer,

prepared a document for signature of all thresher/owner/operators applying for a mayor's permit.

Private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurer's office to pay the license

fee of P285.00 for thresher operators. Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him to first

secure a mayor's permit. Mayor Domingo Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9

and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent

the P285.00 license fee by postal money order to the office of the municipal treasurer who, however,

returned the said amount.

Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan a special civil action for mandamus with actual and

moral damages to compel the issuance of the mayor's permit and license. He filed another petition with the

same court for declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing agreement) for being

illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the same respondents and all the

members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan.

The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu

liable for acting maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application for the mayor's permit

and license.

WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having withheld from him the

mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution No. 9.

Held: No

The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or

neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief

against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private

respondent's application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his

application. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal

spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private

respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing

to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurado's business

competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the

record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without

discrimination or preference.

The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with

their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that it was not for them to rule on its

validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As

executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by

the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating

his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the

petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under

protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he could

have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante that he now says was

the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still

dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

Torio v. Fontanilla

On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 159 whereby

"it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959."

Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee"

which in turn organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The

council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and

another for the "cancionan". Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage.

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravanganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of

the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. One of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla.

Before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the

rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San Carlos General Hospital where he

died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover

damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui

and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Judge Gregorio T. Lantin dismissed the

complaint.

The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all

the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla.

WON the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's governmental or

public function or is it of a private or proprietary character.

Held: Private or proprietary character

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character: public, governmental, or political on the one hand,

and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the

corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the

legislative, judicial, public, and political. Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special

benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.

This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality

for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the

performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality

unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties

honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary

functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or

ex delicto.

Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provision simply gives

authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one.

Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in

essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public

performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to

secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test.

There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function

of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be

decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is

governmental in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no

governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the

death of Vicente Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,

employees, or agents. The Court of Appeals found and correctly held that there was negligence. It is

incredible that any person in his right mind would remove the principal braces of the stage and leave the

front portion of the stage practically unsupported as claimed by the defendants. Moreover, if that did

happen, there was indeed negligence as there was lack of supervision over the use of the stage to prevent

such an occurrence.

At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to as the person who removed the two bamboo braces denied

having done so. The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only

P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was

of wooden planks, the posts and braces used were of bamboo material. Having failed to take the necessary

steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in

connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators

from mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the additional weight, the

defendants-appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla.

The "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by

an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the

Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for

the purpose, the participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its

"Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain

the weight or burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of

the participants.

Petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade responsibility and/or liability under the claim that it was

Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed

Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the

"zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent

superior, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council

acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate

and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-

responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence (culpa aquiliana) committed by the corporation's

employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The

municipal councilors are not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said

petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally

permitted spectators to go up the platform.

LIABILITY BY EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW AND CONTRACTS

Art 34 and 2189, Civil Code

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to

any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,

and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized

shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support

such action.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries

suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and

other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

City of Manila v. Teotico

On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted

catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he was stepping down from the curb to board a jeepney .

Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces

thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole.

One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after

which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered

contusions on different parts of his body. These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus

injections administered to him in the hospital required further medical treatment by a private practitioner.

Teotico filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint — which was subsequently amended —

for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief

of police. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint. On appeal taken by plaintiff, this

decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which

was sentenced to pay damages to Teotico.

WON Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) or Article 2189 of the Civil Code

is applicable to the present case.

Held: Article 2189 of the Civil Code

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reads:

"The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of

the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any

other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while

enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."

While Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any

person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public

works under their control or supervision."

It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and

the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject- matter of the provisions above quoted,

Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for

"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions

of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or

other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189

of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable

for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the

defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or

supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless

of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets, "in particular. Since

the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive

thereon.

Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that

the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is

exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or

supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this

circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under

Republic Act 409.

The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of

Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road,

which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said

Court, thereon are not subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Abella v. Municipality of Naga

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur sentencing the

municipality of Naga, now Naga City, to pay the plaintiff, now appellee, P300 damages resulting from the

closing of a municipal street.

The defendant municipality by resolution ordered the closing of that part of a municipal street which ran

between the public market and the plaintiff's property, and used the closed thoroughfare to expand the

market. As a consequence of this resolution, and immediately after the passage of the same, permanent,

semi-permanent, as well as temporary constructions were allowed by the defendant municipality of Naga

along the sidewalk of plaintiff's property and abutting to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and

extending out in the middle of the same street, hence depriving the plaintiff's property of access to said

street, and consequently retarding her reconstructions.

WON appellant municipality of Naga is liable for damages to Abella.

Held: Yes

The municipality or city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or with acting without authority,

or with invasion of plaintiff's property rights; the basis of the lower court's decision is Section 2246 of the

Revised Administrative Code which provides that no municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof "shall

be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."

That plaintiff was economically damaged is admitted in the stipulation of facts and it is not disputed that the

indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered. As a matter of fact, the damages awarded

seem to be nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff's interests adversely affected by the conversion

of P. Prieto Street into a market.

Statutory obligations: Magna Carta for Health Workers

See attachments

Credit financing: Sec 297 – 302

SATISFYING/EXECUTING JUDGMENT AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo

Vda. de Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for P42,966.40, the purchase price of two strips of

land, which the municipality appropriated for street widening. Iloilo CFI decided in favor of Tan Toco.

Judgment upheld by SC. Due to lack of funds, the municipality was unable to satisfy the judgment. Tan

Toco had a writ of execution issue against the property of the municipality. The sheriff attached two auto

trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, police stations, and lots and concrete

structures therein used as markets. The provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that

the attachment on the said property be dissolved since the said attachment was null and void as being illegal

and violative of the rights of the municipality. CFI granted the motion.

WON the abovementioned property of the municipality may be attached.

HELD: No.

The Civil Code divides the property of provinces and municipalities into property for public use and

patrimonial property. The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to

property for public use of the municipalities. Hence, property for public use of the municipality is not

within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also

inalienable and exempt from attachment and execution.

Rationale for the rule: The character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The

necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt from

execution

Municipality of Makati v. CA

No citation

Pasay City Government v. CFI

V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates entered into a contract (“Contract of Agreement”) with Pasay City

(represented by then Mayor Pablo Cuneta) for the construction of a new city hall. Isip proceeded with the

construction of the new city hall building as per duly approved plans and specifications and accomplished

under various stages of construction the amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to an

estimated value of P1,713,096 of the total contract price of P4,914,500.80. Pasay City paid only

P1,100,000, leaving a balance of P613,096.

Isip filed an action for specific performance with damages against Pasay City before CFI Manila. The

parties arrived at an amicable agreement which was submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for its

consideration. The Municipal Board then enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise

Agreement and also authorized and empowered then incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the

city government. The court approved the compromise agreement. Isip then filed an urgent motion seeking a

declaration of legality of the original contract and compromise agreement. Motion granted. An application

for and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the funds of the city government with the PNB.

Pasay City filed an urgent motion to set aside the abovementioned order and to quash the writ of execution

issued on the following grounds: (1) that the execution sought was then still premature, the period of 90

days stipulated not having elapsed as yet; (2) that the obligations of the parties under the Compromise

Agreement were reciprocal and isip not having put up a new performance bond in the sufficient amount

equivalent to 20% of the remaining cost of construction as per agreement, the Pasay City cannot be obliged

to pay the sum due as yet; (3) that the Sheriff has no power or authority to levy or garnish on execution the

general funds, especially more so, the trust funds of the Pasay City. Motion denied.

WON Pasay City government funds in PNB may be garnished to effect the compromise agreement.

HELD: Yes.

A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid

contract which is the law between the parties themselves. A judgment on a compromise is a final and

executory. It is immediately executory in the absence of a motion to set the same aside on the ground of

fraud, mistake or duress.

The general rule is that all government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency or instrumentality of

the government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be

subject to garnishment or levy (Commissioner of Public Highways v San Diego).

However, an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of

payment to Isip. Hence, the case is covered by the exception to the general rule stated in the case of

Republic v. Palacio: "Judgments against a State in cases where it has consented to be sued, generally

operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise

they cannot be enforced by processes of the law; and it is for the legislature to provide for the payment in

such manner as sees fit."

Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois

Manaois obtained a judgment against Paoay. CFI Pangasinan issued a writ of execution against the

municipality. The Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached the following properties: (1)

an amount of P1,712.01 in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Tabije of a

fishery lot belonging to the municipality, and; (2) about forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different

persons by the municipality. The municipality asked for the dissolution of the attachment since they are

properties for public use.

WON the properties can be levied

Held: As to the fishery lots, NO. As to the revenues, YES. Properties for public use like trucks used for

sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets, together with the land on which

they stand held by municipal corporations are not subject to levy and execution. Even public revenues of

municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the municipality are also exempt from the execution.

The reason behind this exemption extended to properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is

that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for

which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution

would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose (Vda. de Tan Toco v.

Municipal Council of Iloilo).

Property, however, which is patrimonial and which is held by municipality in its proprietary capacity is the

private asset of the town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule

applies to municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties.

The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled out or divided

into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an annual rental are not subject to

execution. They do not belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. What

the municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right to use said

municipal waters, which is not also subject to execution.

But the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is subject to execution. Unlike

revenue derived from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees, revenue from rentals were granted by the

Legislature merely to help or bolster up the economy of municipal government, and hence are not

indispensable for the performance of governmental functions. They are also not definite or fixed; it depends

upon the amounts which prospective bidders or lessees are willing to pay. This activity of municipalities in

renting municipal waters for fishing purposes is a business for the reasons that the law itself allowed said

municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate

obligations contracted in connection with said fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.

PENAL PROVISIONS AND REPEALING CLAUSE

Sec. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. (a) Ordinances with penal

sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as

the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be

published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the

local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided

therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of

posting, whichever occurs later.

(b) Public officer or employee who violates an ordinance may be meted administrative disciplinary action,

without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate civil or criminal action.

(c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief

executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval of the said ordinance

for publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and

reference purposes.

Sec. 512. Withholding of Benefits Accorded to Barangay Officials. Willful and malicious withholding of

any of the benefits accorded to barangay officials under Section 393 hereof shall be punished with

suspension or dismissal from office of the official or employee responsible therefor.

Sec. 513. Failure to Post and Publish the Itemized Monthly Collections and Disbursements. Failure by the

local treasurer or the local chief accountant to post the itemized monthly collections and disbursements of

the local government unit concerned within ten (10) days following the end of every month and for at least

two (2) consecutive weeks at prominent places in the main office building of the local government unit

concerned, its plaza and main street, and to publish said itemization in a newspaper of general circulation,

where available, in the territorial jurisdiction of such unit, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five

hundred pesos (P500.00) or by imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both such fine and

imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary Interest. Any

local official and any person or persons dealing with him who violate the prohibitions provided in Section

89 of Book I hereof, shall be punished with imprisonment for six (6) months and one day to six (6) years, or

a fine of not less than Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), or

both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 515. Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness to Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat. Refusal or

willful failure of any party or witness to appear before the lupon or pangkat in compliance with a summons

issued pursuant to the provisions on the Katarungang Pambarangay under Chapter 7, Title One of Book III

of this Code may be punished by the city or municipal court as for indirect contempt of court upon

application filed therewith by the lupon chairman, the pangkat chairman, or by any of the contending

parties. Such refusal or willful failure to appear, shall be reflected in the records of the lupon secretary or in

the minutes of the pangkat secretary and shall bar the complainant who fails to appear, from seeking

judicial recourse for the same cause of action, and the respondent who refuses to appear from filing any

counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily connected with the complaint.

A pangkat member who serves as such shall be entitled to an honorarium, the amount of which is to be

determined by the sanggunian concerned, subject to the provisions in this Code cited above.

Sec. 516. Penalties for Violation of Tax Ordinances. The sanggunian of a local government unit is

authorized to prescribe fines or other penalties for violation of tax ordinances but in no case shall such fines

be less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), nor shall

imprisonment be less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months. Such fine or other penalty, or both,

shall be imposed at the discretion of the court. The sangguniang barangay may prescribe a fine of not less

than One hundred pesos (P100.00) nor more than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00).

Sec. 517. Omission of Property from Assessment or Tax Rolls by Officers and Other Acts. Any officer

charged with the duty of assessing real property who willfully fails to assess, or who intentionally omits

from the assessment or tax roll any real property which he knows to be taxable, or who willfully or

negligently underassesses any real property, or who intentionally violates or fail to perform any duty

imposed upon him by law relating to the assessment of taxable real property shall, upon conviction, be

punished by a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00), or by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both such

fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty be imposed any officer charged with the duty of collecting the tax due on real property

who willfully or negligently fails to collect the tax and institute the necessary proceedings for the collection

of the same.

Any other officer required by this Code to perform acts relating to the administration of the real property

tax or to assist the assessor or treasurer in such administration, who willfully fails to discharge such duties

shall, upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than Five hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than

Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6)

months, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 518. Government Agents Delaying Assessment of Real Property and Assessment Appeals. Any

government official who intentionally and deliberately delays the assessment of real property or the filing of

any appeal against its assessment shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than Five hundred

pesos (P500.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or by imprisonment of not less than one

(1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 519. Failure to Dispose of Delinquent Real Property at Public Auction. The local treasurer concerned

who fails to dispose of delinquent real property at public auction in compliance with the pertinent

provisions of this Code, and any other local government official whose acts hinder the prompt disposition of

delinquent real property at public auction shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than One

thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less

than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of

the court.

Sec. 520. Prohibited Acts Related to the Award of Contracts Under the Provisions on Credit Financing. It

shall be unlawful for any public official or employee in the provincial, city, or municipal government, or

their relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, to enter into or have any pecuniary

interest in any contract for the construction, acquisition, operation, or maintenance of any project awarded

pursuant to the provisions of Title Four in Book II hereof, or for the procurement of any supplies, materials,

or equipment of any kind to be used in the said project. Any person convicted for violation of the provisions

of said Title shall be removed from office and shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1)

month, nor more than two (2) years, at the discretion of the court, without prejudice to prosecution under

other laws.