Local governance and water resource management: experiences from Northern Namibia

public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 28, 200–211 (2008)

Published online in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.499

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:EXPERIENCES FROM NORTHERN NAMIBIA

FARHAD HOSSAIN1*,y AND TUHAFENI HELAO2

1University of Manchester, UK2Polytechnic of Namibia, Namibia

SUMMARY

Like many semi-arid countries in Africa, Namibia has been experiencing water shortage for a long period of time. Prior to itsindependence in 1990, most of Namibia’s water points—namely, the boreholes—served white-Namibians (about 7% of thenational population of predominantly German descent) and their commercial farming areas. But their water needs have beensatisfied at the expense of those indigenous Namibians and their communal areas (where some 80% of the national populationoriginates). Independence, however, brought with it a new hope for the indigenous population: since 1990, the government hasbeen working diligently to reform the country’s local governance, and make local government agencies more effective, efficientand responsive to common people and their needs. This article sheds light on how, within the background of the government’sdecentralisation efforts, the management and distribution of water resources have changed in an independent Namibia, reportingfindings from research conducted in a newly emerged village council in the north of the country. Drawing on historical andcontemporary practices, we describe and analyse the role of decentralised local government in water resource management innorthern Namibia, where today, more than 50% of the national population (i.e. the indigenous Oshiwambo-speaking people)resides. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

key words— local governance; water resource management; Namibia; community development

INTRODUCTION

For much of the world, the availability of adequate water poses a significant challenge to development and

environmental sustainability (Kniveton and Todd, 2006). The diminishing supply of natural water resources on a

global scale has led to serious social crises in a large number of countries; it is estimated that 460 million people

worldwide now have inadequate access to fresh water (Forrest, 2001).

For the people living in the semi-arid climate of southwest Africa in particular, water scarcity is a major restraint

to increasing societal and individual well-being (Kniveton and Todd, 2006). To the 14 countries of the Southern

African Development Community (SADC),1 water is critical, especially for agriculture which underpins the

livelihoods of the majority of the 200 million people residing in the region. Approximately one-third of this

population live in drought-prone areas where water shortages are an impediment to increased crop and food

production. The lack of availability of supplies of high-quality fresh water makes water management a priority

issue in the SADC (Manzungu, 2004).

The techno-giantism, ‘grand design’ water-policy strategy was embraced during the colonial-era in southern

Africa, where the construction of large water supply projects—that is river dams, bulk water connectors,

hydroelectric power stations and mechanised boreholes capable of the mass exploitation of underground

aquifers—was viewed by the colonial state as critical to its domination over indigenous society and to the

*Correspondence to: Dr F. Hossain, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM), School of Environment and Development,University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. E-mail: [email protected] SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN NAMIBIA 201

expansion of key colonial industries such as mining, manufacturing and commercial agriculture (Forrest, 2001).

This has made the promotion of good governance, and social and racial equality in terms of water resource

management one of the biggest challenges in the post-apartheid era, particularly in Namibia. The extent of the

inequality between commercial and communal areas regarding modern water infrastructure accessibility can

be gauged from the fact that by the time of Namibia’s independence in 1990, only 50% of the rural communal-area

populace had access to reliable sources of safe drinking water (Lange, 1997 in Forrest, 2001).

In fact, generally, as a result of economic inequality and racial practices during the colonial period, today’s

post-apartheid Namibia is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Namibia has a ‘Gini coefficient’2 of 0.7,

which is also one of the highest in the world. The inequality of wealth and income remains today along a distinct

racial bias: of the country’s 36 million hectares of commercial farmland, more than 90% is still owned by the

white-Namibians of predominantly German descent (hereafter referred as ‘white-Namibians’) (Gurirab, 2006).

According to the statistics of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the Republic of Namibia

(2001–2005), a total number of 4422 commercial farms are owned by white-Namibians and 324 commercial farms

are owned by black-Namibians. Local governance reform and water resource management in such an unequal

society has never been easy for the post-colonial democratic government of the country.

Drawing upon findings from a case study of northern Namibia, this article aims to provide empirical and

contextual understanding of the current challenges of water resource management in the country. The article draws

on practical experiences from the role of local government, particularly the village councils, in water resource

management in the region. The article critically reflects upon these findings to underscore the challenges in

promoting good governance in water resource distribution within northern Namibia.

WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN NAMIBIA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHALLENGES

Namibia suffers from extreme water scarcity. The only permanently flowing rivers lie near to, or from part of,

the country’s international boundaries. The lack of readily available freshwater in the interior of the country

remains the most important limiting factor for development (Government of Namibia, 2004).

Background

Unequal access to productive land and potable water is a central feature of Namibia’s colonial inheritance

(Tapscott, 1993). As in many other southern African countries, the colonial government in Namibia utilised

mega-sized water projects as ‘conduits of power’: pipelines, water canals, dams, hydroelectric projects and

irrigation schemes served to reinforce state authority at the same time as they helped to entrench the economic

privileges of white minority farmers. There existed in Namibia approximately 27,000 boreholes that had been

constructed in commercial farming areas and commercial-zone urban areas, mining areas, military bases and other

locales essentially serving the white-Namibian populace (some 7% of national population). This was in stark

contrast with a maximum of only 5000 boreholes in all the communal areas combined where approximately 80% of

the indigenous populace resided (Heyns, 1992; Jacobs, 1996; Turton, 2000 in Forrest, 2001).

Namibia (then, ‘South West Africa’) was under the administrative jurisdiction of South Africa; all laws

governing in South Africa applied in Namibia. Thus, when the Government of South Africa passed the Water Act

54 of 1956 to regulate water affairs in that country, such law was also applicable to Namibia (Republic of South

Africa, 1956; Wipplinger, 1960). It was a result of implementing this law that the South West Africa (Namibia)

Water Supply Branch was established and, eventually, why the Okatana–Oshikuku–Ruacana open concrete lined

water canal was constructed. This open water canal started to collect rainwater from very slow flowing rivers and

2The ‘Gini coefficient’ is a measure of economic inequality of income and wealth distribution, with a value of ‘1’ signifies absolute inequality,whereas ‘0’ signifies perfect equality.

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 28, 200–211 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/pad

202 F. HOSSAIN AND T. HELAO

water pans (oshanas) and channelled it to Okatana, on the outskirts of Oshakati Township, for irrigation and other

use (Wipplinger, 1960).

Former ‘Owamboland’ is located in the northern part of Namibia where more than 52% of the Namibian

population—mainly the Oshiwambo-speaking people—reside. The area was devastated by war between the South

West Africa Peoples Organization’s People Liberation Army of Namibia (SWAPO-PLAN) and the white minority

government of South Africa during 1966 to 1989. As a result, inhabitants were denied basic services such as clean

or tap water, schools and other essential services by the minority white South African Government. The area was

also regarded by the then-South African Government as a war zone area. Historical evidence shows that strategies

regarding the provision of water were intentionally race biased in northern Namibia (i.e. in areas like Okatana,

Oshakati and Ondangwa where European settlers lived at that time). It was in these townships that the water flowing

through the open canal was pumped into reservoirs and purified before being piped to various white residences.

Natives were forced to drawing contaminated water from the canal for personal consumption, which exposed then

to waterborne diseases (see Wipplinger, 1960). It is such, then, that over a very long period of time, colonial water

policy in Namibia not only de-prioritised the provisioning of water supply to the communal areas—regions set

aside for indigenous residency, but also endangered the health of their inhabitants. There is no dispute that this

colonial policy heavily exploited subterranean aquifers and surface-level water resources for the purpose of

supplying the water needs of white-run commercial livestock farms and their own mining concerns (Forrest, 2001).

This inequality in resource distribution from the colonial period remains a problematic legacy in modern

Namibia’s developmental process. It poses a serious challenge for the independent government to promote

sustainable livelihoods for the disadvantaged communities throughout the communal areas in the country.

Post-independence water provision policy

The independence of Namibia in 1990 has resulted in the new government prioritising basic service delivery to all

people, particularly the vast majority of previously disadvantaged rural communities. Decentralisation of functions

and services was thought to be the best solution to poverty reduction and distribution of potable water in communal

land. The government, therefore, legislated the Regional Councils Act 1992 (Act 22 of 1992) and Local Authorities

Act 1992 (Act 23 of 1992). These acts promoted governance at local levels, and, inter alia, water resources

management in communal areas.

At the same time, Namibia’s state leadership sought to reverse the historical inequity regarding distribution of

water resources by lining water pipes and constructing new water points throughout communal areas. It also provided

water facilities in traditionally under-serviced sections of the country’s regional towns and urban areas. Similarly, the

SWAPO-led government has placed considerable emphasis on enhancing the harnessing of water for household use

and agriculture. In 1997, the government also initiated a community-based water management strategy as a part of its

decentralisation policy. Water points have been created for rural communities, and water point committees were

established to manage these water points. However, as Totemeyer (1993) points out, the Regional Councils Act 1992

equips these councils with advisory powers only. This has slowed down the distribution of potable water, and still

reflects the manner in which essential services are rendered to communal areas.

It is also noted that the Namibia’s Government prioritising of water distribution to both urban and communal

areas has led to the enactment of the Namibia Water Corporation Act 1997 (Act 12 of 1997) and the repeal of both

the Water Research Act 34 of 1971 and Water Act 54 of 1956, respectively. This was a milestone as it culminated in

the establishment of the NAMWATER (Namibian Water Corporation), whose sole responsibility is to provide bulk

water to the Local Authorities, and to work in collaboration with the Department of Rural Water Supply of the

Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry. Rural water distribution responsibility had been performed by the

Department of Water Affairs since independence. Section 34 of Namwater Act 1997 states that:

the transfer of assets and liabilities . . . from the Department of Water Affairs to the Corporation. More

noticeable, is the fact that section 44 of the Namibia Water Corporation Act 1997, categorically, states that

nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting water supply functions of the State in relation to

communities or individuals in rural areas (Republic of Namibia, 1997).


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Table 1. Water situation of various regions in Namibia during 2001–2006

Region Water situation

Caprivi While the region has easy access to both ground and surface water resources, access to cleanand purified water is poor

Erongo Desert region and water is relatively scarce, high migration and water resources utilised to theirfull capacity and this hampers further development

Hardap The region has 417 rural water points, but need to be increased to meet water demandKaras The Region shares Orange river with South Africa; however, it is sparsely populated, hence, more

funds needed to set up pipelines to distribute water to remote areasKavango Due to Okavango river, the region has easy access water and numerous ground water sources.

There are 513 rural water points—however, potable water is not available throughout the regionKhomas Paucity of water resources, hence relies heavily on water generated from other regions, for

example Otjozondjupa regionKunene The region has 921 rural water points, much water but required water infrastructural developmentOhangwena About 80% of households in the region have no access to piped waterOmaheke A total of 513 rural water points—not sufficient. While commercial farmers have boreholes, communal

farmers are struggling to get waterOmusati The region has both ground and surface water, water canal and pipelines ensure constant sustainable

water supply. A total of 524 rural water points, however, high population leads to high demand of waterand part of the region suffers from water shortage

Oshana A total of 210 rural water points. Groundwater is saline and surface water is only available duringthe rainy season, hence, acute water shortages

Oshikoto Relatively good pipeline network, however, need water infrastructural developmentOtjozondjupa A total of 510 water points, abundant underground water but need water infrastructural development

Source: Adopted by the authors from Second National Development Plan 2001–2006 (Government of Namibia, 2002).


The SWAPO Party-led Government of Namibia claimed that within a period of 14 years from independence,

they managed to provide and improve the water supply to rural population by more than 75%; the target was 80% by

2006. It is projected that clean water provision will reach 85% of the population by 2010, 90% by 2015, 95% by

2020 and 100% by 2030 (Government of Namibia, 2002, 2004; Swapo Party, 2004).

However, according to the government’s Second National Development Plan [2001–2006] (Government of

Namibia, 2002), various regions in Namibia had the following water situation (Table 1) and needed improvement.

Decentralisation policy facilitates the devolution of powers and functions to the regional level, and is a key to

providing service delivery to people at the grassroots (Turner and Hulme, 1997). During colonial period, the Water

Supply Branch of South West Africa failed to provide clean water to most of the indigenous communities in

Namibia; since independence, despite their financial constraints, the SWAPO Party-led government has been trying

to distribute water to various communities in remote rural areas. In line with the Namibia decentralisation policy,

Vision 2030 and the Millennium Development Goals, water infrastructure, equitable distribution and sufficient

funds are required if the distribution of piped water to all people in Namibia is to become a reality (Government of

Namibia, 2004; United Nations, 2007). In fact, NAMWATER was established to attend to the country’s needs and

ensure that sufficient bulk water is supplied and would reach 100% coverage by 2030. As of now, according to the

government, about 75% of citizens have access to improved and clean water supply in rural areas, as opposed to

only 50% at independence in 1990 (Republic of Namibia, 2001; Swapo Party, 2004).

Between 1996 and 2000, the government, in its effort to provide services to its people, initiated plans for the

construction of Namibia’s most ambitious mega-project in the history of the country’s water resources

administration: a giant hydroelectric dam (Epupa Dam) on the Cunene River adjacent to Namibia’s northern border

with Angola (Forrest, 2001). Despite its anticipated long-term benefits, the planned project became controversial

because the earmarked site was traditionally regarded as the cultural heritage of the communities who are residing

in the area, particularly the itinerant Himba-speaking Namibians. It was argued that proper consultation with the


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inhabitants was not carried out and therefore, the community, supported by several environmental organisations in

Namibia, lobbied for international support in opposing the planned project. This brought the project to a halt, and

today, its future looks uncertain (Forrest, 2001). Thus, until recently, despite some improvements and claims by the

government, much of the desires of the independent government of the country to overcome the challenges of water

shortages remained unfulfilled.

Today, sources of water to citizens in communal lands depend on the distance between their home and the

service centres (i.e. main tarred roads or main-water pipelines). In remote rural areas, inhabitants drink from

boreholes, earth dams and/or wells. However, residents close to main-water pipelines source their water from

erected water points (taps) in communities. It has been mentioned that after independence in 1990, water was

commercialised and the functions of bulk water supply was given to Namibia Water Corporation (NAMWATER).

In the rural areas (i.e. in communal lands), supply of water has been the responsibility of the Department of Rural

Water Supply. Water pipelines were erected across communal lands and the government paid NAMWATER, which

enabled communal people to receive their water free of charges, except those who chose to have sources of private

water in their homesteads. Those who wanted to have private water in homesteads, had to pay NAMWATER

themselves.

In 2005, the government decided to transfer water payment responsibility to end users (i.e. to communal people).

NAMWATER-led voluntary Community Water Committees were elected among communities to coordinate water

points and to facilitate the payment process for water. In other words, every community member who used a specific

water point to draw water had to pay a certain amount to the Committee at the end of every month. The amount was

largely determined by the number of livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, etc.) one owned. The Committee used

to collect money and paid it over to NAMWATER. This had negative implications to most of the communities as

most of them, despite being endowed with livestock, did not have the money to make their water payments. Some of

the water points (taps) in remote areas were closed by NAMWATER due to non-payment by communal people.

This practice forced people in remote communal areas to go back to boreholes, earth dams and wells.

During early-summer 2007, the government announced over Namibian Broadcasting Corporation’s (NBC’s)

various indigenous language radio services that starting from 1 July 2007, the Department of Rural Water Supply

would no longer pay for communal water—that people had to pay for the water that they used. This will have

serious implications: again, since independence, the government has paid for communal water, with the exception

of the few wealthy individuals who have secured sources of private water for their homesteads. NAMWATER

distributes bulk water on a cost recovery basis, but from 1 July 2007 every Namibian irrespective of where s/he lives

has now to pay for water. As part of the decentralisation policy, on 24 July 2007 the Namibian Cabinet decided to

hand over the responsibility of rural water supply to regional councils (Tjaronda, 2007). The Department of Rural

Water Supply will only play a coordinating role in water pipeline distribution and will no longer pay water bills for

the poor and marginalised. With this new initiative, local government organisations (i.e. the regional councils, the

Department of Rural Water Supply and the voluntary Community Water Committees) are assigned only with minor

operational responsibilities like the repair of water taps, collection of water charges and setting up of committees.

Practically, for water charges, all these local agencies are made accountable and responsible to NAMWATER. This

commercial approach in water supply has raised serious concerns among the disadvantaged communities in various

parts of the country.

EXPERIENCES FROM OSHIKUKU VILLAGE COUNCIL IN OMUSATI REGION

Prior to independence, the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination was exercised at all levels of governance

and administration. Only the white minority was entitled to full and direct participation in local government.

Ninety-five per cent of the total population was excluded from direct participation in local governance, from policy

formulation, decision-making and from controlling the implementation of policy. Most of the central power and

some at ‘homeland’ level were directly or indirectly exercised by South Africa. Any delegation of power from

South Africa to the then-South West Africa Administration reflected a skewed ‘decentralisation’ process

(Totemeyer, 2002). It is widely believed now that decentralised local governments are more responsive to the needs


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of the poor than central governments and thus are more likely to conceive and implement pro-poor policies (Crook,

2003; Hilson and Potter, 2005). Since independence, in their search for social justice and democratic governance,

the Government of Namibia has initiated an ambitious administrative reform process to strengthen the local

governance of the country. As part of their decentralisation process, in 1992, the Namibian Parliament enacted the

Regional Councils Act 1992 (No. 22 of 1992) and Local Authorities Act 1992 (No. 23 of 1992). These two pieces of

legislation instituted the introduction and implementation of decentralisation in the country. A decentralisation

policy was subsequently launched on 30 March 1998. To further facilitate the implementation of decentralisation

policy, the government again passed a number of laws in 2000, including the Local Authorities’ Amendment Act

2000; the Regional Councils’ Amendment Act 2000; the Decentralisation Enabling Act 2000 and the Trust Fund for

Regional Development and Equity Provisions Act 2000 (Government of Namibia, 2004). The government claims to

be fully committed to the decentralisation process of the country. Despite all these decentralisation initiatives, the

government recognises the fact that for various reasons it has not been able to put in place all the institutional

measures to implement these decentralisation policies. Namibia’s current vision for decentralisation is:

Local communities and regional bodies are empowered, and are fully involved in the development process;

they actually formulate and implement their respective development plans, while the national government—

working hand-in-hand with civil society organisations—provides the enabling environment (laws, policies,

finance, security, etc.) for the effective management of national, regional and local development efforts

(Government of Namibia, 2004).

Namibia’s decentralised local government is comprised of regions, constituencies, townships, village councils

and settlements. All of these entities, whether large or small, are integral to the country’s local government system.

In Table 2, we construct a glimpse of local governance in the country:

It should also be noted here that local governance in Namibia is mostly urban biased and during the course of

research, most of the local government units were found to be in at a formative stage. Constituencies are vast

communal-land areas where indigenous communities are settled without access to any of the urban services

provided by the local government authorities. Visible grassroots-based local government units are the settlements

(i.e. mostly communal lands with limited urban services), village councils (i.e. town in-making with some urban

services) and the townships with regular urban services.

For an in-depth empirical understanding of the local context, we provide here a glimpse of the studied Omusati

Region and its Oshikuku Village Council (OVC) in northern Namibia. Omusati Region is the second-most

populated region of Namibia’s 13 regions, with a population of almost 230,000. The region has 12 constituencies,

two townships, two village councils and three settlements. Less than 15% of the entire population of the region live

in towns, village councils and in settlements. The balance (i.e. the vast majority of 85% or more) resides in

communal land areas. Like other Regional Councils in Namibia, Omusati Regional Council (ORC) provides urban

services to the settlements in order to develop these localities into village councils and eventually, towns. ORC was

closely working with Oshikuku settlement for a number of years until the settlement was declared as OVC in

December 2005 (Nghipondoka, 2006; Amakutuwa, 2006). During our research visits, OVC was working hard to

develop and maintain its urban services (mainly water, electricity and its drainage system) and to collect fees for the

Table 2. Local government system in Namibia

Structures Bureaucratic positions Political positions

Relevant ministries Permanent Secretary The Minister and Deputy MinisterRegional councils Chief Regional Officer Governors (for regions)/Regional CouncillorsConstituencies Chief Control officer Regional Councillors (for constituencies)City/townships/villages Chief Executive Officer/Town

Clerk/Village SecretaryMayor/Town Councillors/Village Councillors

Settlements Clerk Settlement Committees (not political positions)


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existing services from the local residents. The OVC was also busy clearing an area north of the main tarred road,

with the aim of serving ‘erven’ (plots) for the construction of houses.

In order to develop and maintain its urban services OVC, like all other village councils in Namibia, has been

receiving subsidies from the central government. OVC has got lack of services (e.g. water supply, electricity,

sewerage) for local land. Since its inception, 100% of OVC budget came from the central government. It was

engaged in building village council offices, designing roads, making arrangements for water and electricity for

residential and commercial plots but at the same time was struggling to attract external private investments in the

village. It is desperately searching for investors to further develop its urban services. A lack of finance is therefore

another challenge OVC is facing: the council needs NAD$10 million3 but receives an annual budget of NAD$2

million only from the central government. The villagers do not pay any taxes, neither do they want to pay for the

existing services (e.g. water, sewerage, garbage removal, etc.) they receive from OVC. So theoretically OVC

intended to be autonomous but for practical purposes it was found to be dependent on the central government. On

the other hand, central government already has other urgent financial priorities they need to attend. For example,

HIV/AIDS is a serious health hazard to the villagers and most of the developmental initiatives, including the

hospital and schools in the village, were found not to be linked with, or coordinated by, the village council.

OVC is under constant pressure from the ORC to be financially independent. As part of the central government’s

strategy, ORC is working to promote OVC autonomy and reduce its dependence on central government. It is

encouraging OVC to collect fees from residents for services provided. According to ORC, the rates of services will

increase in the future; therefore, throughout this subsidised process, OVC should look for greater economic

independence. ORC also insists that the OVC councillors and residents should understand that they have to pay for

the water and other services they receive from the government. According to ORC, day-to-day management of

OVC should further be improved along with the managerial and leadership capacity of the officials and councillors,

respectively. ORC is concerned about the poor managerial capacity of the OVC councillors and encourages them to

distinguish between their political roles (i.e. popular demands from the public) and administrative responsibilities

(i.e. executive duties related to strategic priorities of the central government). Lack of qualified personnel in the

village council is also a growing concern (Namundjebo, 2006; Nghipondoka, 2006).

Throughout the research process and interviews conducted with local people and with councillors and

administrators of OVC and ORC, it became clear that all the developmental initiatives, including water resource

management coordinated by local government institutions in northern Namibia, have an underlying commercial

objective guided by a privatisation agenda. Converting rural villages into urban settlements (locally known as

townships) seems to be the main task of OVC. The main function of the council was found to be designing effective

strategies that enable the OVC to collect fees for water, electricity and other services. It was found very difficult for

most of the poor local residents to pay for the water services they willingly or unwillingly receive from OVC. In

several participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and rapid rural appraisal (RRA) sessions, in formal and informal

thematic interviews, and in field visits, disadvantaged local communities were found to make complaints about

water supply and to raise many other developmental challenges they are facing in their everyday life. Due to

growing hardships with OVC’s urbanisation process, a large number of villagers were found relocating their

traditional homesteads and livestock to communal areas and leaving their traditional residential premises, for the

OVC to develop and provide them to rich residents who can afford to pay for the urban services.

Not every resident within OVC is connected to piped water. Provided piped water is expensive and costs up to

NAD$250 a month for a single household (Angula, 2006; Namboga, 2006). Rich people were found to use piped

water facilities, while a majority of low-income community in OVC were found still using the canal water for their

everyday consumption. People in the nearby villages were also found to be using water from the open canal which

was artificially created for public consumption during the colonial era and long before the independence of

Namibia. The role of decentralised local government in water resource management therefore raises some practical

and ethical concerns in the country. These concerns will be further elaborated theoretically in the following section.

31 USD$¼ 7.09120 Namibia dollar (NAD$).


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FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Development has a positive and negative side. It may interfere with the traditional way of life—but it has to be

compromised. Traditional way of life should not be an obstacle to development. And development also should

not destroy tradition (Mungandjera Mbokoma, Councillor, Oshikuku Village Council, 2006).

Given the prevailing inequalities with water supply, people in northern Namibia want to see their developmental

concerns reflected in the measures being taken by the central and local government. With the changing urbanisation

process by central government and their emergent local bureaucracies, locally elected councillors of OVC were

found to be unsure about their political role and administrative responsibilities. It has been pointed out by some

scholars (e.g. Turner and Hulme, 1997) that a major obstacle to the effective performance of public bureaucracies in

most developing countries is the excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within the central

government. Decentralisation within the state involves a transfer of authority to perform some service to the public

from an individual or an agency in central government to some other individual or agency closer to the public to be

served. But in practice the challenges to good governance through decentralisation are numerous. In most

developing countries, there has been a tendency of independent governments to favour the delegation of power

within public services rather than through locally elected authorities. Furthermore, the capacity of local and

regional authorities has remained generally weak. There has been significant rhetoric about participation and local

autonomy, but central governments have jealously guarded their power. This phenomenon does not only exist

particularly in Namibia. Contemporary research on developing countries in Asia (Sarker, 2003) suggest that a lack

of political will, clientelist politics and the dominance of bureaucratic institutions remain as stumbling blocks in

creating democratic and decentralised local government systems also in developing Asia. To overcome these

challenges by promoting sustainable livelihoods through a decentralisation process, OVC must ask itself: can

people be further involved, particularly from disadvantaged communities, in their developmental initiatives? Can

the Council listen more to their concerns?

More than half of the Namibia’s national population live in a small part of the country in the north—they live in a

less fertile land4 with minimum resources compared to the vast part of the relatively fertile commercial farmlands in

the rest of the country. Naturally, the existing supply of water and other resources in their part of the country are far

less than the communities there need for their sustainable livelihoods. Common people are dissatisfied with the land

ownership, land quality and livelihood challenges created by the vast commercial farmland owned by the small

white-Namibian community—some of them absentee landlords. At the time of this research process, there was a

High Court case in Namibia where two white-Namibian commercial farmers—all absentee landlords—were

contesting the government decision to expropriate their farms in Namibia (Rademeyer, 2007; Sasman, 2007;

Weidlich, 2007). The lack of land led to overuse of land resources for animal grazing and agriculture in

Owamboland which further degraded the quality of water and livelihood (see also e.g. Verlinden and Kruger, 2007).

It has been indicated earlier that the land question in Namibia remains highly problematic, with unequal access to

productive land and to water a central residue of Namibia’s colonial inheritance. Scholars (Tapscott, 1993)

recognise the fact that in a context where both resources (i.e. water and land) are absolutely scare, the private

ownership of some 45% of the total land area and 74% of the potentially arable land by some 4045 mainly

white-Namibian commercial farmers is a major factor in determining inequality of incomes and wealth. In

attempting to redress these imbalances, however, the government once again confronts the paradox of matching

increased production (or at least maintaining existing levels of production) with greater social equity, since much of

Namibia is unsuitable for modern agriculture.

Despite all recent good intentions and efforts of the government with regard to land redistribution and affirmative

action loans by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia (Agribank), not much of a dent has been made in the monolith of

white monopoly of land. In regard to land and water facilities, along with the economic prospects, Namibia remains

a country of contrasts, a prosperous and highly developed territory living cheek by jowl with a downside that

4Apart from north-east (i.e. Caprivi and Kavango region), most of the land in northern Namibia is less fertile, overgrazed and overused.


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weakens all the positives (Gurirab, 2006). Werlin (2003) claimed that ‘the inadequacy of governance rather than

resources is the primary reason for the gap between poor countries and rich countries’. Despite regional variations

with quality of land and supply of water, it can logically be argued that governance rather than inadequacy of these

resources remains the real reason for under-development in Namibia.

Over the years, access to electricity and water has improved to some urban areas in Namibia and to some extent

in the studied OVC. However, by developing a consumer culture in water use facilities, the OVC is creating a new

economic class among the local communities. The provision of billing for water has hit hard the disadvantaged

communities—those have traditionally been settled in the region. Moreover, after the inauguration of the OVC in

2005, communities are not allowed to build or live in their traditional houses inside the village border. As a result,

community members were found relocating themselves to communal land away from the OVC with their livestock

and other commodities. Peters (2001) brought valuable theoretical insights in the areas of changing states,

governance and the public sector which might provide useful perspective in this context. In order to improve local

governance, he proposes following four different models:

(1) T

Copy

he Market Model for reforming government, which claims that private-sector methods are almost inherently

superior for managing activities when compared to those of the traditional public sector.

(2) T
he Participatory State Model, which is completely the ideological antithesis of the market approach and
emphasises the promotion of political, democratic and collective mechanisms by laying emphasis on public

participation.

(3) T
he Flexible Government Model, which emphasises the capability of the government to respond effectively to
new challenges and survive in the face of change and.

(4) T
he Deregulated Government Model, which is built on the assumption that if some constraints on bureaucratic
action were to be eliminated, government could perform its functions more effectively.

It was observed that through a local government reform process in Namibia the central government, ORC and

OVC, are practicing the private sector-led market model in water resource management. Due to various concerns

with resource scarcity and other disadvantaged human development indicators in northern Namibia, this market

approach in water supply was not found particularly to be helping the rural communities at this time. Probably at

this stage, the participatory state model (No. 2 above) is more suitable than the market approach. The participatory

state model may challenge some practices of the market approach; however, with integration with other models,

this model would help local governance to promote political, democratic and collective mechanisms by promoting

public participation.

The creation of NAMWATER in Namibia and the provision of billing for water in OVC is probably a smart move

and technologically might help the country to further build its piped water infrastructure. Modernity attributed to

self-government implies that such government represents a form of governance capable to comply with the

challenges and tasks of recent developments in technology and administrative systems (Totemeyer, 2002). However,

as a system, governance is rarely static, even if the change is particular to conditions in each country reflecting

historical, political, cultural, educational and economic circumstances (Jreisat, 2004). It should not be forgotten that

northern Namibia has gone through a racial discrimination process for a long period of time and the region is still

suffering from unequal resource and income distribution. The need for freedom of expression and participation in

governance seems to have a common concern among the ordinary citizens in the region. It is imperative that these

concerns are used to inform policy. Creation of a new economic class through a decentralised governance process is

not helpful for the community. Corporations can exclude people, but states should not. The moral foundations of good

governance are democracy and the inclusive nature of the state. Performance of governance should be measured not

by the level of modernity a state achieves, but by the participation that the state promotes in its operations. This is

indeed a matter for the dynamic interplay between ethics and economics (Hossain, 2007).

Most of the village people were found to be not aware of the planned macro-scale water projects of the

government to increase the water volume channelled from the Cunene River which Namibia shares with Angola

and from the Okavango River, the southern African largest river Namibia shares with Angola and Botswana. If

right # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 28, 200–211 (2008)

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constructed, the Epupa Dam (a planned giant hydroelectric dam) on Cunene River would act as a virtual plug on the

natural water supply feeding the subterranean water plans throughout the north of the country. Planned extension of

Namibia’s Eastern Water Carrier System to Okavango River would annually divert between 20 million and

100 million cubic metres of river water for urban use. Namibia’s aim is to extract bulk water from the Okavango to

be relayed from a point on the river in Namibia (near Rundu) to Grootfontein (a Namibian regional centre) and then

onto Windhoek, where it would contribute importantly to reducing the capital city’s growing water supply

shortages (Forrest, 2001). However, both projects are facing environmental concerns from international experts.

Experts claim Epupa Dam on Cunene River would have negative ecological consequences on the region and most

importantly would have threatened the sustainable livelihood of the Himba pastoral group in Kunene region.

Similarly, Eastern Water Carrier System would have affected the riverine inflow of Okavango Delta and

river-originated groundwater streams in Kavango region (Forrest, 2001; Mbaiwa, 2004). As an alternative

approach, international experts are suggesting the government to avoid large-scale techno-giantic initiatives and

embrace micro-scale approach in dealing with growing demand of water in the country (Forrest, 2001; Kgathi et al.,

2006; Kniveton and Todd, 2006). In addition, each basin member-state should observe international and regional

conventions and treaties governing the use of water resources when designing national water development projects

that require the use of water from the river basins (Mbaiwa, 2004).

Careful planning of projects, proper consultation with the local communities and further research by local and

international experts might help the government in designing more environment-friendly water initiatives. More

importantly, it should be remembered that the lesson of history is that the most successful cures for poverty come

from within (Landes, 1999 in Werlin, 2003). In governing public affairs, public administration has shifted from

direct administration to the use of third-party implementation tools, its leadership is now achieved by negotiation

and persuasion rather than by command (Salamon, 2002 in Goodsell, 2006). Namibian leaders can improve their

governance in the water sector by consulting with local communities in various parts of the country and by making

government initiatives more transparent to them.

CONCLUSION

Namibia continues to suffer from acute water shortage. It has become clear throughout this article that as a result of

various discriminatory governance practices from the past, even today communities in northern Namibia are

suffering from unavailability of fresh water and arable land—which threatens their sustainable livelihoods.

Decentralisation is not a monolithic concept and it is not inherently positive or negative (Smoke, 2003). Local

people are often unaccustomed to expecting much response from local governments or to paying anything for

services (Smoke, 2003). It is too early to make any judgement or conclusion regarding the commercial approach to

water resource management by the Namibian government throughout the vast countryside. Although there are

examples of decentralised government in Africa enhancing participation, there is very little evidence that it has

resulted in policies that are more responsive to the ‘poor’—or indeed, to citizens generally (Crook, 2003).

Namibia’s post-independent decentralised local governance initiatives are still going through a transitional stage

and so far could not make any substantial improvements to rural livelihoods.

The historic independence of Namibia in 1990 means a lot to indigenous local communities throughout the

country. Disadvantaged communities have long been waiting for justice to come—and for governance to

improve by their independent government. However, it was a big surprise for this research to find common

people to use untreated water from the ‘open water canal’—even after 17 years of independence. Any

government can lose its legitimacy as resulting from maladministration, mismanagement, corruption,

self-enrichment of its office bearers, oppressive or discriminatory practices, nepotism and favouritism, not

adhering to the principles of the supreme law and other laws emanating from it, and by not fulfilling election

promises or purposely rigging elections. Particularly, ethics and public accountability are critical for political

and administrative systems as they underline the legitimacy of both government and public administration

(Totemeyer, 2002). In order to maintain the current political stability in the country, Government of Namibia

should promote good governance in water resource distribution. In this regard, Jreisat (2004) rightly pointed out


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that when governance system breaks down or are destroyed, the door is open to instability, oppression, conflict

and unchecked political and economic opportunism leading to further decay and conflict. None of the

communities in Namibia should expect such an outcome from their current unequal and imbalanced resource

ownership. Local governments, like the studied OVC, are familiar with local circumstances; they may be in

the best position to more equitably distribute public resources and target poverty within their own jurisdictions.

They are of course constrained by their internal resources, so the redistribution from richer to poorer areas must

be the responsibility of central governments (Smoke, 2003).

Economic globalisation-led neoliberalism involves such moves as privatisation, minimising economic

regulations, rolling back welfare, reducing expenditure on public goods, tightening fiscal discipline, favouring free

flow of capital, strict control on organised labour, tax reductions and unrestricted currency repatriation (Jreisat,

2004). This neo-liberal approach seems to be the guiding principle of the current water policy in Namibia

(Government of Namibia, 2004). The transfer of business-management techniques to government has its

advantages. Still, wholesale adoption of the business culture is incompatible with the ethos of public service and

public interest (Goodsell, 2006). By discouraging the wholesale business culture in public service, Goodsell (2006)

refuses to regard public administration as a quasi-market of non-commercial business. In order to promote public

trust, his vision contemplates consultation with citizens when appropriate but does not permit governments’

decisions to be controlled by private interests. The desired outcome of the current water policy in Namibia should

be to promote ‘public trust’. By promoting participatory good governance, grassroots-based local government

institutions like the OVC can ensure public trust much more easily than the private corporations. However, they

need ideological support and commitment from the central government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank members of the local communities in OVC for their valuable opinion and contribution to this

study. The authors also acknowledge the help from the councillors, administrative officials of OVC and ORC during

their field research to northern Namibia in August 2006. Comments and help from Dr Vazgen Arakelyan, Dr Gavin

Hilson, Dr Pete Mann and Dr Admos Chimhowu are much appreciated. Financial support from the Academy of

Finland helped to carry out this research.

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Interviews

Amakutuwa A, Village Secretary, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 9 and 10

August 2006.

Angula J, Nurse in Local Hospital, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 12 August

2006.

Hidulika S, Councillor, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 10 August 2006.

Mbokoma M, Councillor, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 10 August 2006.

Namboga T, Local Small Entrepreneur, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 12

August 2006.

Namundjebo H, Assistant Accountant, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 10

August 2006.

Nghipondoka VK, Director, Planning and Development Services, Omusati Regional Council, Outapi.

Interviewed in Outapi on 11 August 2006.

Shivute M, Councillor, Oshikuku Village Council, Oshikuku. Interviewed in Oshikuku on 10 August 2006.


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Documents

Local governance and water resource management: experiences from Northern Namibia