Lenneberg - Cognition Ethnolinguistics

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1/10

Linguistic Society of America

Cognition in EthnolinguisticsAuthor(s): Eric H. LennebergReviewed work(s):Source: Language, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1953), pp. 463-471Published by: Linguistic Society of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/409956.

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2/10

COGNITION IN ETHNOLINGUISTICS

ERIC

H.

LENNEBERG

Massachusetts

Institute

of

Technology

The

republication

of

Benjamin

L.

Whorf's articles

on

what

Trager

calls

metalinguistics

has

aroused

a

new

interest

in

this

country

in the

problem

of

the

relationship

that

a

particular language may

have

to

its

speakers' cognitive proc-

esses.

Does

the

structure

of a

given language

affect the

thoughts (or

thought

potential),

the

memory,

the

perception,

the

learning

ability

of those who

speak

that

language?

These

questions

have often

been asked

and

many

attempts

have

been

made to answer

them.'

The

present

paper

is an

attempt

to

lay

bare

the

logical

structure

of

this

type

of

investigation.

CRITICALRETROSPECT

A

basic

assumption. Underlying

all

of

Whorf's theoretical

work is

the

funda-

mental

assumption

that the

individual's

conception

of the

world

(including per-

ception,

abstraction, rationalization, categorization)

is

intimately

related

to the

nature

of his native

language.2 Throughout

his

work

Whorf

illustrates

this

idea

with

examples

from American Indian

languages,

showing

how

they

differ from

English.

However,

a

demonstration that

certain

languages

differ from

each

other

suggests

but does not

prove

that

the

speakers

of

these

languages

differ

from

each other as a group in their psychological potentialities. To prove this, it would

be

necessary

to

show

first

that certain

aspects

of

language

have

a

direct

influence

on or

connection

with a

given

psychological mechanism,

or

at

least

that

speakers

of

different

languages

differ

along

certain

psychological

parameters.

In

addition

to

comparative

data

Whorf adduces

occasionally

a

different

type

of

evidence.

An

example

is his

analysis

of

many

hundreds

of

reports

of

circumstances sur-

1

Bibliographies

of

the

voluminous

literature

may

be

found

in

the

following

works:

Kurt

Goldstein,

Language

and

language

disturbances

(New

York,

1948);

Friedrich

Kainz,

Psychologie

der

Sprache (Stuttgart, 1941/43); George

A.

Miller,

Language

and

communi-

cation

(New

York, 1952);

Charles

Morris,

Signs,

language

and behavior

(New

York, 1946);

David L.

Olmsted,

Ethnolinguistics

so

far

(SIL,

Occasional

papers,

No.

2;

1950);

N. H.

Pronko,

Language

and

psycholinguistics:

A

review, Psych.

bull.

43.189-239

(1946).

This

paper

was stimulated

by

research

carried

on under

the

auspices

of

the Values

Study

in

the

Laboratory

of

Social

Relation,

Harvard

University,

and

the

Communications

Project

at the

Center

for

International

Studies,

Massachusetts

Institute

of

Technology.

I

wish

to

express

my

thanks to

both

institutions.

I am

also

greatly

indebted

to

Harry

Hoijer

for

inviting

me

to

participate

in the

Conference

on

Ethnolinguistics,

held in

Chicago

during

March

1953,

where the

discussion

of

some

of

the

problems

raised in

this

paper

helped

to

clarify

my

thoughts.

Finally

I

gratefully

acknowledge

the

many

helpful

suggestions

made to

me

by

Noam

Chomsky,

who

read two

earlier

versions

of

this

article.

2

Whorf

is not alone in

making

this

assumption.

Cf.

Dorothy

D.

Lee,

Linguistic

reflection

of Wintu thought, IJAL 10.181-7(1944);Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Lesfonctionsmentalesdans les

societts

infirieurs,

Ch.

4

(Paris,

1910);

Leo

Weisgerber,

Adjektivistische

und

verbale

Auffassung

der

Gesichtsempfindungen,

Wirter

und

Sachen

12.197-226

(1929).

The last

of

these

is

a

representative

of

what H.

Basilius has

called

Neo-Humboldtian

ethnolinguistics,

Word

8.95-105

(1952);

the

entire

movement

is based on

the

assumption

discussed here.

463

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3/10

464

LANGUAGE,

VOL.

29,

NO. 4

rounding

the

start

of

fires,

for

instance

the

empty-gas-drum

case.3

An

explosion

had been caused

by

an

individual

who had

carelessly flung

a

burning cigarette

stub into a

gas

drum

which

this

person

in

his insurance

report

called

empty.

Whorf argues that the individual's carelessness was caused by the fact that the

word

empty

has two different

meanings

in

English: (1)

null

and

void,

negative,

inert,

and

(2)

a

space

which

may

contain

nothing

but

a

vapor, liquid vestiges,

or

stray

rubbish.

The

English

language

forced

the individual

to call the

gas

drum

empty,

and

think

of it

in

terms of

that

word.

Since

this word

could mean

null

and

void,

Whorf

argues

that

the

presence

of

explosive vapors

and

inflammable

liquid

vestiges

could be

disregarded

by

the

speaker,

who

then behaved

towards

the drum as

if it were

absolutely empty.

I

cannot

accept

this as evidence for

the

assumption

that behavior

is

influenced

by

language. Clearly, English

is

capable of distinguishing between a drum filled with an explosive vapor, one

that

contains

only air,

and

one which

is

void

of

any

matter.

This

very

sentence

is

my

evidence. The

person

who

caused the

fire could

have

replaced

the word

empty

by filled

with

explosive vapor.

His

failing

to do so

(as

well as

his

careless

behavior)

points

to

a

lack of

experience

with

explosive

vapors, perhaps complete

ignorance

of

their

existence. The

linguistic-or

rather

stylistic-fact

of

the

occurrence of

the

word

empty

in the

individual's insurance

report

would

indeed

be

interesting

if

Whorf could have shown at the same time that this

man

had had

plenty

of contact

with and

knowledge

of the

explosive vapors

which form in

emptied gas

drums. This

Whorf

did

not

try

to

do.

In

short,

the

basic

assump-

tion that language affects non-linguistic behavior derives from an inspection of

linguistic

facts. Therefore

nothing

is added to such

an

hypothesis by referring

back

to

the same or

similar

linguistic

facts.

Translation.

(a)

Translation,

while useful for the

formulation

of

working

hypotheses

of

the most

exploratory

nature,

is

in

itself

an

inadequate way

towards

the

finding

of

objective

facts.

Obvious as this

may

seem,

it

is

necessary

to

spell

out

in

detail the

shortcomings

of

the

translation method

in

ethnolinguistics.

(b)

I

illustrate

my point

with

another

example

taken from Whorf.

After

posing

the

question:

'What do different

languages

do

... with

the

flowing

face

of nature

...?',

Whorf answers: 'Here

we

find differences

in

segmentation

and

selection

of

basic terms.

We

might

isolate

something

in nature

by saying,

"It

is

a

dripping spring."

Apache

erects the

statement

on

a verb

ga:

"be

white

(includ-

ing clear,

uncolored,

and

so

on)."

With the

prefix no-,

the

meaning

of

downward

motion enters:

"whiteness moves

downward." Then

to, meaning

both

"water"

and

"spring"

is

prefixed.

The

result

corresponds

to

our

"dripping

spring,"

but

synthetically

it

is: "as

water,

or

springs,

whiteness

moves

downward."

How

utterly

unlike our

way

of

thinking

[NB

]

The

same

verb,

ga,

with a

prefix

that

means

"a

place

manifests the

condition"

becomes

gohlga:

"the

place

is

white,

clear;

a

clearing,

a

plain."

These

examples

show

that some

languages

have

means

of expression ... in which the separate terms are not as separate as in English

but flow

together

into

plastic synthetic

creations.'

Whorf

analyzes

the

Apachean

3

Whorf,

The relation of

habitual

thought

and behavior to

language, Language, culture,

and

personality

75-93

(Menasha,

Wis.,

1941).

4Whorf,

Languages

and

logic,

The

technology

eview,

Vol. 43

(1941).



4/10

COGNITION

N

ETHNOLINGUISTICS

465

statement

by

giving

the

English

equivalent

for the

general

meaning

of

each

Apachean element,

and then

compares

the

resulting

sequence

of

meanings

to

the

phrase,

'it is a

dripping

spring'.

The

sequence

of

meanings

(i.e.

the

glosses)

and the

English

phrase are not, however,

quite

comparable. Whorf does not

give

the

general

meaning

of

the

English

morphemes.

If he

had, something

like

this would have resulted:

it, any

object

or

organism

which

is

not

an adult human

being; is,

particle

which

denotes

that

what

follows

is

a

predicate

of what

precedes;

a, particle

which

denotes

that

what follows

is

to

be understood

generically,

not

specifi-

cally;

drip(p), process

in

which

any

liquid

falls

in small

natural

segments;

-ing,

particle

which

denotes

that the

preceding

process

has

not

come to an

end;

spring,

something

that is

not static

(eruption

of

water,

device to

make

mattresses

elastic,

and so

on).

To abstract

a

general meaning

of a

morpheme

or lexeme

may

occasionally

be

of

some

methodological use;

but we must not confuse such

an abstraction

with

an

isolable

segment

of an

utterance. General

meanings

lack

reality,

so to

speak.

It

makes

no sense to

equate

the

global meaning

of an utterance

with

the

sequence

of

abstracted,

general meanings

of

the

morphemes

that occur

in

that

utterance.

To

translate the

Apachean

statement it is

a

dripping spring

appears

no

less

reasonable than

to

translate

it as

water or

springs,

whiteness moves

downward

at

a

place

(or,

the

place

is

white,

clear;

a

clearing;

a

plain--which,

I

gather

from

Whorf,

is

the

synthesis

of

the

elements);

for

what we translate are

equivalent

ver-

bal responses to particular stimulus situations, and the Apachean responseto the

natural

phenomenon

in

question

corresponds

to our

response

it is

a

dripping

spring.

This

type

of

linguistic evidence,

therefore,

stands

or falls with our

philoso-

phy

of translation. It

might

be

objected

here that Whorf's evidence

is

not the

translation

itself but the fact

that the

Apachean's

verbal

response

to

this

natural

phenomenon

is the same

as his

verbal

response

to

a

different

phenomenon,

namely

one to

which we

respond

the

place

is

white, clear,

etc.

and

that

the

Apachean

therefore

makes

a

single response

to

stimuli

to

which we

make

distinct

responses.

This

objection,

while

touching

upon

an

important

problem,

does

not

justify

the translation

method. For

what we

really

want to know

is

how the

Apachean

structure

of

syntactic categories

differs from the

English

one.

Translation cannot answer

this

problem.

Through

it-and

that is its

value-we

merely

know

that the

problem

is

not

a

spurious

one.

(c)

A

further

objection

to

translation

as a

sufficient

method

in

this

type

of

research

is that

it

actually

vitiates the

attempt

to demonstrate

cognitive

differ-

ence as

evidenced

in

two

or

more

languages. For,

if a

language

were

actually

an

aspect

of a

particular

psychological

make-up

or state of

mind

(or

more

precisely,

an

aspect

of

a

cognitive process,

which is

not

to be confused with the

thought

content),

then,

in

the

process

of

translation,

we

would be

substituting

the

psycho-

logical elements characteristic of one make-up for those of another, so that we

would

finally compare

two sets of

elements

of one and the

same

psychological

structure.

(d)

There is a

metaphorical

element

in

language

per

se.

The

literal

meaning

of

many

metaphors,

especially

the most

frequent ones,

never

penetrates

conscious-



5/10

466

LANGUAGE,

VOL.

29,

NO.

4

ness, e.g. everybody,

n

the

face of,

beforehand, breakfast,

inside,

already.

The

translation

method,

however,

distorts the

significance

of such forms

of

speech

and often

induces

investigators

to draw rather

ludicrous

conclusions.

To

illus-

trate the

mentality

of certain African

tribes,

Cassirerwrites:' 'The

languages

of

the

Sudan

usually express

the circumstance

that a

subject

is

in

process

of

action

by

means of

a

locution

which

really

means

[NB ]

that the

subject

is

inside that

action. But

since,

moreover,

this

inside is

usually

expressed

very

concretely,

phrases

result such

as I am on

the inside

of walking,

I am the

belly of

walking,

for

"I

am

in

the

process

of

walking".'

(e)

The

process

of

taking

stock

of

general meanings,

which underlies

transla-

tions,

engenders

the belief

that

languages

can

convey

no more

and

no

less than

the

general

meanings

of

morphemes.

It seems

more

fruitful

to

assume6

that much

more is cognized than is expressed by individual morphemes. Morphemes and

their

meaning

are

regarded

more

appropriately

as

mnemotechnical

pegs

of a

whole

situation which

is

brought

into consciousness

by

the

statement

as

a

whole.

The

general meaning

of

morphemes

is

probably

of lesser

importance

in

cognition

than the

SUM

OF

ASSOCIATIONS

bound

up

with the

complete

utterance,

or even

with

individual

morphemes

or

groups

of

morphemes.

(f)

When the

translation involves

a

juxtaposition

of

totally

different cultures

(say

Chukchee and

English)

we

are not

only

faced

with

a

semantic

problem.

No

matter what

precautions

we

take

in

glossing

a

word,

almost

no

correspondences

can be

established

between

many

denotata.

For

instance,

the cultural

and

physi-

cal contexts of Chukchee utterances are, with a few exceptions, incomparable

with

the contexts

within

which

English

is

spoken.

Chukchee

weapons,

food,

manners,

standards of

any sort,

landscape,

fauna,

and flora

are

mostly

unfamiliar

to

English-speaking

cultures.

Thus,

practically

no common

frame of

reference,

no basis for

a

segmental,

one-by-one comparison

exists between these

two

lan-

guages.

Translation

here

can be

only

a

very rough approximation

of what has

been

said and

intended

originally.

Ad-hoc

theories.

It is a

commonplace

in

scientific

methodology

to avoid

etiological

theories

which

are

incapable

of

satisfying

more

than one

single

and

specific

occurrence of

events; yet by necessity

working

hypotheses

often

have

to

be

of

this

nature.

We see

a

picture

fall

off a

wall

directly

after

hearing

a

dog

bark

in

the

neighborhood.

As

a

working

hypothesis

the

two events

might

be

causally

related.

Upon

verification of

the

hypothesis

we

note,

however,

that

in

general

barking

is not

followed

by things

dropping

to the

ground,

nor

is

the

falling

of

pictures

from

the

wall

usually

preceded

by barking

or similar noises. We

are

unable in

this

instance to

formulate

a

theory

because the

working hypothesis

cannot be

generalized.

Turning

to

ethnolinguistic

literature we find

an

abundance

of

working

hypotheses

where it

is

difficult to

see

how

they might

contribute

to

a

universally

valid and

useful

theory

of

language

(such

that

language

is

related

5

Ernst

Cassirer, Philosophie

der

symbolischen

Formen: Die

Sprache

1.168-9

(Berlin,

1923).

Cassirer's source is D.

Westermann, Sudansprachen.

6

This assertion and the

following

are based on evidence from

experimental psychology.

See

George

Humphrey, Thinking:

An

introduction to

experimental

psychology,

Chs.

4

and

8

(London,

1951);

Miller,

Language

and communication

passim.



6/10

COGNITION

N

ETHNOLINGUISTICS

467

to

non-linguistic

behavior),

because the facts

underlying

such

working hypotheses

cannot

be

generalized

so as to fit more than a

single

language.'

I

am not

saying

that

such

hypotheses

are

right

or

wrong; many

have been

proposed

by

experts

on specific cultures, by scientists of undisputed merit. I am merely pointing to

the

difficulty,

if not

impossibility,

of

deducing

from these

hypotheses,

if

they

are

sound,

general

and

verifiable

laws. A

common

means of

validating hypotheses

has been

barred

from the

beginning

in

these

cases, namely

cross-cultural

verifica-

tion.

This,

however,

does not exclude

the

possibility

that

the

investigators

may

have intra-cultural vidence

for each individual

hypothesis proposed.

TOWARDS METHODOLOGY

Codification

nd

cognition.

(a)

A basic

maxim

in

linguistics

s that

anything

can be expressed in any language.8 There may be differences in the ease and

facility

for

the

expression

of

certain

things

among

various

languages

but at

present

we

do

not

know whether this

difference

in

ease is attributable

to the

properties

of a

given language

qua

vehicle

of

communication9

or

to

the

cultural

development

of

the

speakers.

In

fact,

this is

one

of

the

problems

to be solved in

ethnolinguistics.

Now,

if

we

believe,

as

we

do,

that we

CAN

ay anything

we wish

in

any language,

then

it

would seem as

if

the

content

or

subject

matter of

utter-

ances

does

not

characterize

or,

indeed, give

us

any

clear

information on

the

communicative

properties

of a

language.

Thus we

are

led

to

the somewhat

banal

conclusion

that the

only pertinent linguistic

data

in this

type

of research is

the

HOW of

communication nd not

the WHAT.

This

HOW call

the

codification;

he

WHAT

I

call

the

messages.

Codification

can

be

studied in three

phases:

(1)

the

process

of

encoding;

(2)

the

code;

(3)

the

process

of

decoding.10

The

study

of

the

code

results,

for

instance,

in

statements about

the

structure of

phonemes,

mor-

phemes,

and

syntactic

categories;

about

acoustic

characteristics

of

speech

sounds;

about

the

frequency

distributions and

the

transitional

probabilities

of

given

segments;

about

the

efficiency

of

the code

within

stated contexts. In

these

in-

stances

meaning

can be

excluded

entirely

from

our

research,

at

least

theoretically,

and

we have

therefore

an

assurance that

we

are

actually studying aspects

of

codification. Unfortunately, however, it is not always equally easy to decide

whether

a

phenomenon

is

pertinent

to codification

or

not.

Many

assertions

about

language

which

derive from

semantic

observations

or,

at

any

rate,

which

include

elements

of

meaning,

nevertheless seem

to be

relevant to

codification.

Most

7

Most of

Whorf's

and

Dorthy

Lee's

working

hypotheses

are

of this

nature.

Harry

Hoijer's

Cultural

implications

of

some Navaho

linguistic

categories,

Lg.

27.111-20

(1951),

and

the

tentative connections

between

various

linguistic

features

and

nonlinguistic

behavior men-

tioned

by

Claude

L6vy-Strauss,

Language

and

the

analysis

of social

laws,

Amer. anthr.

53.155-63

(1951),

also

fall into this

category

of

working

hypotheses.

8

Cf.

Sapir,

The

grammarian

and his

language,

Selected

writings of

Edward

Sapir

153-4

(Berkeley, 1949).

It

is assumed here that

any vocabulary

can

be

expanded.

9

The

use

of

the term

vehicle

of

communication

does not

mean

that

I

deny (or

even

take a

position

toward)

the

epistemological

contention that

language

and

knowledge

are

in-

distinguishable.

I

am

merely referring

to

the

communicative

capacities

of

language.

10

John B.

Carroll,

Report

and

recommendations

f

the

Inter-disciplinary

Summer

Seminar

in

Psychology

and

Linguistics

8

(Ithaca,

N.

Y.,

1951).



7/10

468

LANGUAGE,

VOL.

29,

NO.

4

obvious

in

this

connection

is the fact that

a

language always

selects

for

codifica-

tion

highly

specific aspects

from

the

physical

and

social environment.

This

raises

two

questions:

How can

we

describe

objectively

the

aspects

that

are

being

selected out of a great number of other possible aspects? Why are these aspects

selected

and

not

others? There can be little doubt

that these

considerations,

though clearly

of

a

semantic

character,

have a

bearing

on the

problem

of codifica-

tion.

Hence,

the

distinction between codification and

messages

is not

the same

as between

syntactics

and semantics or between form and

meaning.

All

those

observations

about

meaning

are relevant

to

codification which

refer to

an

aspect

of

speech

behavior which

is forced

upon

the individual

speaker by

the

rules

of

his

language

and

where

infringement

of

the rules would

result

in

defective

com-

munication. For

instance,

an individual

reporting

about

a

given

event

is

forced

to

stipulate very

definite

conditions, aspects,

and

relationships

if

he wants

to be

understood."

However,

he

is free

to

report

on

the event

in

the first

place,

and

also to elaborate on

circumstances of the

event which

are not included

in

the

compulsory

stipulations.

Whatever information is

optional

in

his

communication

is

message.

(b)

Once we have

clearly

isolated data on

codification,

such

data

may

be

related

hypothetically

to

nonlinguistic

behavior.

If the

researcher is

interested

in

cognition,'2

as

I

am,

he

will

investigate

relations

that

obtain between codifica-

tion

and such behavior as

is

indicative

of

memory,

recognition,

learning,

problem

solving,

concept

formation,

and

perception,

hoping

to show that certain

peculiari-

ties in these processes can be explained by--and only by-knowledge of the

speakers'

peculiarities

of

codification.'3

The

intra-cultural

approach. (a) Ethnolinguistic

research

based

on

cross-

cultural

comparison

must

endeavor to isolate

data,

both on

codification

and on

cognition,

that

are

general

enough

to

have

comparable equivalents

in

at least

two

different

languages

and

cultures;

otherwise

comparison

would be

meaning-

less.

It is not

infrequent,

however,

that

a

working

hypothesis

relates

a

certain

cognitive

datum

to some

phenomenon

pertinent

to

codification

which

appears

to

be

unique,

lacking

entirely

a

parallel

in

any

other

language.

There

is

a

simple

way

of

studying

this

situation;

I

call it the

intra-cultural

approach,

because

it

reduces

cross-cultural

comparison

to a desirable but not

indispensable expansion

of in-

vestigations.

This

method is

so

easy

to

manipulate

that

many investigators

may

perhaps

come

to

use

it

even where the

cross-cultural

approach

is

applicable

directly.

(b)

I

begin

with

a

practical

demonstration of the

method. Problem:

Languages

differ

in

their

systems

of

classifying

the ten

million

odd

colors which

every

normal

individual

can

discriminate.'4

Under

laboratory

conditions

the

power

of color

"'

These

conditions,

aspects,

and

relationships

are

primarily

but not

exclusively

ex-

pressed

by grammatical categories.

12

For a modern definition of this term see Robert Leeper, Cognitive processes, Hand-

book

of experimental

psychology

730-57

(ed.

S.

S.

Stevens;

New

York, 1951).

13

What

I

am

proposing

to

do

here is not in

principle

different from what Whorf

(for

instance)

occasionally

suggested.

The

difference

between

Whorf and

me

is rather

in

our

respective attempts

to

substantiate

our

hypotheses.

14

Cf.

Ralph

M.

Evans,

An

introduction to color 230

(New York,

1948).



8/10

COGNITION

N

ETHNOLINGUISTICS

469

discrimination is

probably

the same

for

all human

beings,

irrespective

of

their

language

background.

But

we

do not know whether the habitual

grouping

of

colors,

according

to

certain

labels

provided

by

every

language,

might

not

affect

some other

cognitive processes

involving

color stimuli. To be more

specific,

in

English

obviously

not all

colors are named

with

equal

ease

and

unambiguity.

Do

English-speaking

people

therefore

recognize easily-named

(i.e.

highly

code-

able)

colors with

greater

facility

than colors not so

easily

named?'5

The first

step

toward

solution

of

this

problem

is to ascertain

the

linguistic

facts.'6

A

representative

sample

of

English speakers

is

drawn and

a

number

of

colors

are

prepared

that have

comparable perceptual properties.

Then the

notion

'codeable'

is

investigated

and defined

operationally,

so

that

we

can

divide

the

physical

color stimuli

by

means

of one or a

combination

of a few

simple criteria,

into two groups: one consisting of 'highly codeable' and one of 'less codeable'

colors.

I

must omit

here the

details of this

procedure

and

also

the

reasoning

that

underlies the

individual

steps

leading

to

the

development

of

such

a

criterion. Let

me

simply

state that

UNANIMITYN

RESPONSE

proves

to

be a useful

criterion

(among others)

in

this

connection. Some

colors are

consistently

given

the same

name

by

every

speaker;

others are

given

a

variety

of

names,

sometimes as

many

names as

there are

subjects.

Regarding

the

speakers

now as

a

group

giving

a

linguistic

response

to each

color,

we

may

say

that

some

colors

have the

property

of

eliciting

a

homogeneous

response

from

English-speakers,

whereas other

colors

elicit

a

heterogeneous

response.

This is

to

say

that

linguistic

communication

in

English is more efficient when some colors are referred to than when others are.'7

There

are

cogent

reasons

to

assume that the

distinction

made here between

the

colors

is a

purely

linguistic one,

and

that

there are

no

physical

properties

in

the

colors or

physiological

ones

in

the

eye

which

would

elucidate the difference

in

response

made

by

English-speakers

to

these

colors.'8

15

This

is

a

specific

question

within

a

problem

that

has

been

posed by many

other in-

vestigators.

Sapir

said:

'Language

is a ...

self-contained,

creative

symbolic

organization,

which

not

only

refers

to

experience

largely

acquired

without

its

help,

but

actually

defines

experience

for

us

by

reason

of

its formal

completeness

and because of our

unconscious

projection

of

its

implicit expectations

into

the field of

experience.' (Conceptual categories

in

primitive languages,

quoted

by

I.

J.

Lee,

The

language

of

wisdom and

folly

265

[New

York,

1949].)

Sapir

makes the

same

point

in

The

status

of

linguistics

as a

science,

Selected

writings

162.

'1

The

following

is

an

outline of

research in

progress

carried

on

by Roger

Brown

of

Har-

vard

University

and

myself.

The

details of

the

project

will

be

published

as

soon

as

the data

are

fully

assembled.

17

If

there is

no

well

defined

name

for

a

color,

it

is

reasonable

to

assume

that

linguistic

communication about

it is

poor.

18

Again

space

does not

permit

me to

cite

all

the

evidence

in

support

of

this

assertion.

The

interested reader

may

inspect

the

colors

used;

they

are

produced by

the

Munsell

Color

Co.,

a

scientific

research

organization.

Most of

them are

published

in

the two

volumes of

the Munsell bookof colors (Baltimore, 1921 and 1942). Codeable colors have the notation

2.5

PB/7/6,

5

PB/4/10,

10

P/3/10,

5

RP/6/10,

5

YR/3/4,

3

GY/7.5/11.2,

7.5

GY/3/4,

2.5

G/5/8,

5

Y/8/12,

7.5

G/8/4,

2.5

R/7/8.

Non-codeable

colors have the

notation 10

BG/6/6,

8.5

B/3/6.8,

10

PB/5/10,

2.5

R/5/10,

8

RP/3.4/12.1,

7.5

R/8/4,

2.5

Y/7/10,

7.5

Y/6/8,

7.5

YR/5/8,

5

P/8/4,

5

BG/3/6.

Colorimetric

and

psycho-physical

data

on these

colors

are

pub-

lished

in

Journal

of

the

Optical Society of

America

30.573-645.



9/10

470

LANGUAGE,

VOL.

29,

NO.

4

The

next

step

is

to

determine

whether

there

is a difference

in ease of

recognition

by

English-speakers

between the colors

constituting

one

group

and those

con-

stituting

the

other.

The

two

groups,

I

repeat,

are

perfectly

balanced in

physical

and

perceptual properties;

the

only

difference is that the colors in one group

have

well

defined

names

in

English,

whereas

the

colors

in

the

other

do

not.1g

If

we

now

use,

in random

order,

colors

belonging

to

either

group,

say

ten

from

each,

in

a

standard

recognition test,20

we

can

easily

discover

whether

English

speakers

do

better when

they

have

to

recognize

colors

which

are

highly

codeable

in

their

language

than when

they recognize

less codeable

colors.

In the

actual

performance

of the

experiment21

this

appears

to be

the case.

Statistically,

code-

able

colors

are

recognized significantly

more

often

than

less codeable

ones,

and

thus

there is

good

evidence that the

particular linguistic

fact, codeability,

affects

the cognitive process, recognition.

(c) Suppose

now

that

this

entire

color

research

were

repeated

in a

different

culture

where a different

language

is

spoken.

If our

predictions

about

recognition,

based

on

previously

determined

facts

of

codification

(which

vary

of

course

from

language

to

language),

should

not be borne out

in this

other

language,

the

argu-

ment

advanced

in

the first

experiment

would

be

seriously

weakened.

Conversely,

if

the

results should

be

confirmed,

this

would

fortify

the

argument.

In either

case,

however,

VALIDATION

f the

basic

hypothesis

is

independent

of cross-cultural

comparison.

The

cross-cultural

comparison

merely

adds

or

subtracts

weight.

It

is

very important

to

realize

that the validation itself

is

the

result of intra-cultural

correlation of two sets of recognition behavior on the one hand (in the described

context

we

may say

'good'

and

'bad'

behavior)

with

two

sets

of

English

speech

behavior on

the

other hand

(efficient

and

not

so

efficient

linguistic

communica-

tion).

It

appears

that

recognition

behavior is

inefficient

where

speech

behavior

is

inefficient.

(d)

Not

only

is the

validity

of

this

experiment

independent

of

cross-cultural

comparison;

but

if

cross-cultural

comparison

is

desired,

the method

dispenses

with the

necessity

for

translation,

or the exact

equation

of

linguistic

data between

one

language

and another.

For what

will be

compared

are

CORRELATIONS

F

SPEECH

BEHAVIOR WITH RECOGNITION

BEHAVIOR,

not

linguistic

forms.

Super-

ficially

it

may

look

as

if

the

translation

method were

implicitly

the

same

as the

intra-cultural

method,

for

both methods

seem

to be concerned

with

the

meaning

of

certain

linguistic

forms which are

being

compared.

However,

the

intra-cultural

method

resembles the translation

method

only

in

its

very elementary

and

primary

step:

both methods

recognize

the

existence of

a

problem

on

the

grounds

of intui-

19

Codeability

of colors

does

not

seem

to

be linked

to

cultural

importance

or

preference

for

these colors.

The

reader

may

convince himself

of

this

by

trying

to name all the colors

in

his environment.

He

will

notice

that colors

for

which he has

a

'good'

name

occur much

less

frequently

than colors

which

are

difficult to label

unambiguously.

20

Such tests

are

described

in K.

Koffka, Principles of

Gestalt

psychology,

Chs.

11-3

(New York,

1935).

21

The

test

colors were

exposed

four at a

time,

for two

seconds.

After

a

waiting

period

of

thirty

seconds,

subjects

had to find

the test

colors

on

a color

chart

of

120

colors. All colors

were

identified

by

numbers.

The

subjects

used

in

this

experiment

were

not

required

to

use

any

color name

whatever.



10/10

COGNITION N ETHNOLINGUISTICS

471

tive

knowledge

of

the

meaning

of forms.

The

translation

method defines

meanings

by trying

to

equate

forms

of

a

language

foreign

to

the

investigator

to

forms of his

native

language

(where

meanings

are said

to

be

known).

The

intra-cultural

method need not

rely

on

this

haphazard procedure;

instead,

it

objectifies

the

intuited

meanings

of forms

by

carefully

relating

them

to

stimuli

of

the

environ-

ment.

Thus

it is

possible

(at

least

in

some

instances)

to

specify

meaning

by

referral to

the

physical

properties

of those

stimuli.

(e)

Stated

in

general terms,

the

intra-cultural

approach

consists

of

the

follow-

ing.

Some

aspect

of

codification is

described

in

order

to correlate it

with non-

linguistic

behavior. A frame of

reference is

established

in

terms of which both

the

speech

behavior and the

non-linguistic

behavior can

be

described

or

specified;

a

particularly

convenient frame of reference is

the

physical

environment within

which both types of behavior take place. In the experiment described, the frame

of reference was

provided

by

the

stimuli sensed

as

colors. The

speech

events

(color

terms)

and the

behavioral events

(recognition)

were

related to

these

stimuli.

The

specifications

of

the

physical

properties

of the

stimuli

served

as a

metalanguage,

so to

speak,

for the

description

of both

types

of

events.

The

fundamental

principle

of the

intra-cultural

method is that the

physical

stimuli,

whatever

they

may be,

can

be

classified on

the

grounds

of

linguistic

criteria so

that

the

constituents of

each class are

all

characterized

by

the

particu-

lar

way

in

which

they

are

codified. It is

necessary

that the

codification

criterion

should

be the

ONLY

riterion

by

which the stimuli

can

be

grouped

in

this

way.

If

now the non-linguistic behavior in response to the stimuli thus classified varies

systematically

in

accordance with the

class

to

which

the

individual

stimulus

has

been

assigned,

we

may

attribute

such

regular

variation

in

non-linguistic

behavior

to

the

regular

variation

in

the

speech

correlates.

Documents

Lenneberg - Cognition Ethnolinguistics