Legal Aspects and Economic Impacts of the new KAGB on the ... · The impact of these two characteristics may cause fundamental changes, from a legal as well as from an economic standpoint

Legal Aspects and Economic Impacts of the new KAGB on the Alternative Fund Industry

Bucerius Law School and WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management

Master Thesis

Master of Law and Business 2014

RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN THE KAGB

Legal Aspects and Economic Consequences

for the Alternative Investments Fund Industry

Submitted to:

Supervisor 1: Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Veil

Supervisor 2: Dr. Carsten Jungmann

Submission Date: July 25th, 2014

12,431 words (excluding footnotes)

Patrick Schulz

Isebekstrasse 18

D – 22769 Hamburg

Jan 25, 1991, Frankfurt / Main

Matr. No.: 20134033

Legal Aspects and Economic Impacts of the KAGB on the Alternative Fund Industry

ii

Abstract

Compliance and risk management are key aspects of the current regulation waves caused

by the financial crisis in the European Union. For the first time, the EU legislator

implemented a directive, the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD),

which regulates a large part of the shadow banking system, the alternative investment

funds. This directive was implemented in 2013 in the new German Investment Code

(KAGB) and focuses on compliance and risk management as well as the regulation of so

far unregulated funds. The impact of these two characteristics may cause fundamental

changes, from a legal as well as from an economic standpoint. The research objective of

this paper’s is to identify and evaluate the consequences of these two characteristics from

a legal and economic perspective.

The author discovers that the new risk and compliance mechanisms in the German

Investment Code are stricter than the ones in the old German Investment Act (InvG), and

furthermore, also exceed organizational obligation under company law, which in part leads

to emergence of tensions between the two fields of laws. Furthermore, he also identifies

the operational implementation for new market participants and transparency

requirements for classical alternative investment funds as key challenges for the new

regulatory environment.


iii

Table of Content

Abstract ..................................................................................................................... ii

Table of Content ....................................................................................................... iii

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... iv

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1

2. Background and Development of Alternative Investments ............................... 2

2.1. Definition and characteristics ........................................................................... 2

2.2. Emergence and Development ........................................................................... 4

2.3. The AIFMD - the first regulation for the AIF industry ...................................... 5

2.3.1. Development .................................................................................................... 6

2.3.2. Aim ................................................................................................................... 6

2.3.3. Key concepts ................................................................................................... 7

3. Legal Analysis ..................................................................................................... 10

3.1. The new investment regulatory law – the KAGB ........................................... 10

3.1.1. KAGB in General ........................................................................................... 10

3.1.2. Compliance and Risk Management in the KAGB ....................................... 11

3.1.3.1. Definitions and Relation ............................................................................ 11

3.1.3.2. Changes ...................................................................................................... 13

3.2. Areas of tension between regulatory law and company law ........................ 17

3.2.1. Organizational obligations under company law ......................................... 18

3.2.2. Comparison of corporate and regulatory organization obligations ......... 23

4. Economic consequences ................................................................................... 25

4.1. The European Fund market ............................................................................. 26

4.2. Consequences for market participants .......................................................... 27

4.3. Impact on fund types ....................................................................................... 30

4.4. Strategic impacts on the regional and global competitiveness ................... 32

5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 33

Appendix .................................................................................................................. 35

List of References ................................................................................................... 46


iv

List of Abbreviations

AIF Alternative Investment Fund

AIFM Alternative Investment Fund Manager

AIFMD Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive

AktG Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act)

AuM Assets under Management

BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code)

BilMoG Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz

(German Accounting Law Modernization Act)

DCGK Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex

(German Corporate Governance Codex)

ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority

EU European Union

HGB Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code)

IDW Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland

(Institute of Public Auditors in Germany)

InvG Investmentgesetz (German Investment Act)

InvMaRisk Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement

(Minimum Requirements for a risk management)

InvVerVo Investment-Verhaltens- und Organisationsverordnung

(Organisation Ordinance for investments and conduct)

KAG Kapitalanalagegesellschaft (Investment company)

KAGB Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (New German Investment Code)

KonTraG Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im

Unternehmensbereich

(Corporate Supervision and Transparency Act)

KVG Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft

(Investment management company)

KWG Kreditwesengesetz (German Banking Act)

Level II Regulation EU Delegated Regulation No.231/2013

UCITS Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable

Securities

Legal Aspects and Economic Impacts of the new KAGB on the Alternative Fund Industry

1

1. Introduction

Within the last fifteen years, alternative investments have experienced a rapid rise due to

their low correlation to traditional investments and the high return potential. In 2007, the

global market size of alternative investments reached its preliminary peak, with EUR 3.8

trillion assets under management (AuM), before it all started to fall during the global

financial crisis.1 In 2008, the market size decreased to only EUR 3.4 trillion AuM, and the

alternative investment fund industry, which belongs to the shadow banking system, was

linked to the causes of the financial crisis by the EU Commission. It was rumored that

alternative investment funds had increased the systematic risk within the financial markets

by influencing companies and markets, and hence, accelerated the global financial crisis.2

Despite the rumors, alternative investments market started to grow again in 2009 and

reached five trillion Euros assets under management in 2014.3 Due to the crisis, and the

increasing interest in alternative investments, not only from institutional investors but also

from retail investors, legislators in the European Union (EU) started to draft and implement

regulations. The aim was to create a “comprehensive and effective regulatory and

supervisory framework”4 for these unregulated, non-transparent, and non-traditional

investment classes. Especially, compliance mechanisms and risk management

obligations were on the legislator’s agenda, to avoid future financial meltdowns and

ensure the stability of European capital markets. The result of their efforts was the

Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD) which was implemented in the

German Law by the new German Investment Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch, KAGB)

and the EU Delegated Regulation No.231/2013 (Level II Regulation) in the summer of

2013.5

That context raises the questions as to which extent the German Investment Code has

reinforced compliance and risk management provisions, and supplemented the existing

organizational requirements under company law with regulatory ones. Furthermore, the

effects of this new structure of rules, legally as well as economically, are unresolved.

In order to address these questions, the present paper will cover and evaluate the

implementation of the AIFMD in the German law by considering compliance and risk

management aspects for the alternative investment fund industry from a legal and

economic perspective.

1 McKinsey, Mainstreaming of Alternative Investments p.1

2 KPMG, AIFMD - Richtlinie für Verwalter alternativer Investmentfonds

3 McKinsey, Mainstreaming of Alternative Investments p.5 4 Linklaters, AIFM Directive 5 The KAGB entered into force on the 22nd July 2013


2

The first part of the paper will introduce alternative investments to the reader. Within this

section, the characteristics, variety, and emergence of this asset class will be described

and explained. Moreover, it will also provide a background on the formation of the AIMFD

and its key concepts.

The second part of the paper will analyze how the EU legislator tried to subdue and retain

the alternative investment fund industry with the help of the KAGB. Therefore, the author

conducts a legal analysis in which (I) the progress of compliance and risk management

provisions in the German investment law is examined, and (II) the arising area of tension

between German regulatory and company law are analyzed.

In the third part of this paper, the economic consequences of the new Investment Code on

the alternative investment fund industry will be inspected. For that reason, the impacts on

market participants, fund types, and competitiveness of the European market will be

discussed before the paper will summarize the key lessons by examining their legal and

economic implications.

2. Background and Development of Alternative Investments

2.1. Definition and characteristics

There is no universal definition of alternative investments; however, the common

understanding is that investments which do not belong to one of the three traditional asset

classes: stocks, bonds, and cash, are considered as alternative (non-traditional)

investments6. The term is often used in connection with hedge funds and private equity;

however, the scope of alternative investments is much larger. Real estate and

commodities are also characterized as non-traditional asset classes. Next to the

alternative assets, also alternative investment strategies are classified as alternative

investments. All investment strategies, except the traditional “long-only” investment

strategies, are mostly categorized as alternative strategies.7;8

Non-traditional asset funds pursue absolute performance objectives. The performances of

these funds depend largely on the advisor’s skill to produce alpha9, and therefore, are also

connected to higher fees which may include performance fees. In that reason, alternative

investment fund managers use tools and strategies, such as leverage, short selling,

6 BVAI, definition of Alternative Investments 7 Dornseifer, Raus aus Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative Investments 8 Alternative investments could also be investments in traditional assets with an alternative investment strategy 9 A mathematical value that indicates an investment’s excess return relative to a benchmark. It

measures the value added by the manager in relation to a passive strategy


3

derivatives and illiquid securities, to enhance returns and reduce risks. Traditional

investment funds, on the other side, pursue only relative performance targets which

depend primarily on market returns. In general, traditional fund managers do not use any

leverage and have a fixed management fee for assets under management.10

Next to these traits, alternative investments often share four more principal characteristics

that help identify them as such. First, due to the complex nature,11 most alternative

investment assets are held by institutional investors or accredited high net worth

individuals. Second, these non-traditional funds have typically reduced liquidity ranging

from monthly to 12 years lock-ups because, third, they are not listed on any exchange.

Traditional investments, on the other side, typically offer daily liquidity because of the

listing at an exchange. The fourth and last characteristic is crucial to these asset classes.

It is the historical low to moderate correlation with traditional classes, which brings us to

the next point, the benefits of alternative investments.12

Alternative investments entail mainly two benefits, (I) low correlation to traditional

investments and (II) high return objectives. These two benefits have gained in importance

in recent years, due to the low interest rate environment and the increasing correlation of

traditional investment classes. This subject matter raises the question of how the low

correlation can help investors and how the low interest rates implicate alternative

investments. Low correlation between two asset classes can help to diversify a portfolio

and mitigate the overall risk.13 Diversification plays a crucial role for all investors who

structure their portfolio on the basis of a risk/return approach, which follows as the new

portfolio theory.14 The idea of this theory is to optimize the risk/return profile of the portfolio

by selecting assets with negative or small correlation to hedge against market risks. Due

to increasing global interlacing of the international capital markets, correlations in

traditional asset classes started to increase, whereby diversification in different regional

markets, and partly even in different asset classes, no longer lead to the desired effect of

risk mitigation.15 Alternative investments, with their low correlation historically, could offer

a solution to that problem.

The second benefit of alternative investment, the high return objectives, was enhanced by

the low interest environment in recent years, which minimized the returns of other

traditional asset classes, such as bonds, and made alternative investment more attractive

10 Morgan Stanley, Introduction to Alternative Investments p.6 11Complex nature comprises a leverage structure, multilayered performance and risk measurement, and an asymmetrical payout structure 12 Morgan Stanley, Introduction to Alternative Investments p.4 13 Cuming / Haß / Schweizer, Strategic Asset Allocation 14 Markowitz, Portfolio Selection 15 Dornseifer, Raus aus Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative Investments


4

to investors.16 The high return objectives are achieved by investment strategies and

concepts that are characterized by an asymmetric risk profile, and hence are not exposed

proportionally to market losses (e.g. hedge funds) nor have long-term investment horizons

which eliminate cyclical fluctuations (no marked to market) and bring stability to the funds’

volume and value (e.g. private equity).17

This beneficial combination of low correlation to traditional investment and the potential

upside of these non-traditional asset classes were already identified by David Swensen

and Dean Takahashi, who implemented alternative investments as foundation in the Yale

Endowment fund. This model became the benchmark for most college endowment funds

in the US and is known as the “Yale model”. In 2013, alternative investment accounted for

nearly 78 percent of the total portfolio,18 with an average annual return of 13.5 percent

over the last twenty years.19 This consistent track record has attracted also the attention of

Wall Street portfolio managers, since it outperformed every stock exchange index during

that period of time.

2.2. Emergence and Development

The name, alternative investments, indicates something new and obscure about the

investments; however, alternative investments have existed and have been established

for decades.20 Real estate is the oldest alternative asset class.21 Investments in real estate

have existed since centuries. Hedge funds and private equity, on the other hand, emerged

after the Second World War in 194622 and 194923. In the late 1980’s, these two asset

classes started to grow in size and have not stopped until today. The growth of this asset

class over the last fifteen years is just phenomenal. One reason is, certainly, the

extraordinary returns of the funds, however, often at the cost of the general public.

Famous examples, therefore, are George Soros, who forced the British government onto

its knees with his bet on the depreciation of the British pound in 1992,24 or John Paulson,

16 VC-Magazin, BAI Investor Survey 17 Dornseifer, Raus aus Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative Investments 18 Portfolio structure: Absolute Return: 17.8%; Domestic equity: 5.9%; Fixed Income: 4.9%; Foreign Equity: 9.8%; Natural Resources: 7.9%; Private Equity: 32.0%, Real Estate: 20.2%; Cash: 1.6% 19 Yale Investment Office, Report 2013 20 Morgan Stanley, Introduction to Alternative Investments 21 Assumption: Trade of commodities is excluded 22 Ansons, Handbook of Alternative Assets, p. 262 23 Marston, Portfolio Design, p. 167 24

Venezaini, the story about George Soros


5

who became famous with his bet against the US real estate market during the subprime

crisis, which led to profits worth fifteen billion U.S. Dollars (USD).25

The meaning of alternative investments will further increase; Infrastructure, private equity

and hedge funds will be part of portfolios more often. Moreover, the borders between

traditional and alternative asset classes will become indistinct. Many categories that have

been labeled as alternative investments will be recognized over time and also become

traditional investment. The paradigm change is based on the higher risk awareness, the

illiquidity of respective asset classes, and the search for high returns.26

Even though, institutional investors in Germany are not used to using alternative

investments for portfolio structuring, estimates expect that in the following year insurance

industry will increase its stake from 32 to 52 billion Euros.27 Alternative investments, such

as stocks and bonds, are seen more and more as major part of the overall portfolio. In the

light of increasing demand, and the role of alternative investments in the financial crisis,

the basic knowledge and practice becomes more and more important, not only for the

investors but also for the public, politics and regulation.

2.3. The AIFMD - the first regulation for the AIF industry

When the heads of states and governments of the most powerful economies of the world

met during the summit in London in the early April of 2009, the global financial crisis was

at its peak. It was immediately clear that financial markets need more regulations.28 The

result was the AIFMD which focuses on the managers of alternative investments funds,

including open-ended and close-ended real estate funds as well as German

“Spezialfonds”. Not only managers of EU funds should be addressed, but also fund

managers that manage alternative investment funds (AIFs) established in the EU, and

fund managers that market the units or share of an AIF in the EU, irrespective of their

location or incorporation.

The AIFMD constitutes the most important codification of the “investment law” since the

creation of the UCITS Directive in 1985.29 It governs the regulation of the managers of

investment funds (so called alternative investment funds), which are not in the scope of

the UCITS directive. Before the AIFMD came into force, only the Undertakings for

25 Zuckerman, the Greatest Trade Ever, p.2 26

State Street, Increase of Risk Awareness 27 Dornseifer, Raus aus Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative Investments 28 Summit Declaration, London (2009) 29

Tollmann, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Einleitung Rn. 1


6

Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and their management

companies were regulated.

2.3.1. Development

On the 29th of April, 2009, the EU Commission proposed a Directive on Alternative

Investment Fund Managers, with the objective “to create a comprehensive and effective

regulatory and supervisory framework for AIFMs at the European level”.30 Half a year

later, on 11th of November, 2010, a political agreement was reached by the European

Parliament. The Council of Ministers approved it on 27 May 2011, and it was published on

the 1st of July, 2011, in the EU official Journal.31 This was supposed to be the first general

attempt to regulate non-traditional asset classes, such as private equity and venture

capital, which mean that closed-ended fund managers will, for the first time, be obliged to

comply with the type of legislation that has long governed open-ended funds.32 The scope

of the AIFMD was chosen to be very broad and with a few exceptions. It covers the

management, administration and marketing of alternative investment funds. Its focus is on

regulating the Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM). The Alternative Investment

Fund Manager Directive 2011/61/EU follows the Lamfalussy process, and has so far been

supplemented with three Level II regulations by the EU Commission, namely, (I)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 231/2013, (II) Regulation No. 447/2013

concerning the procedure for AIFM which chose to opt in under the AIFMD, and (III)

Regulation No. 448/2013 regarding the procedure for determining the Member State of

reference of a Non-EU-AIFM.33 In addition, also the European Securities and Markets

Authority (ESMA) has published several guidelines to national competent authorities as

supplements.

2.3.2. Aim

The Directive aims at providing “robust and harmonized regulatory standards for all AIFM

with the scope and enhancing the transparency of the activities of AIFM and the funds

they manage towards investors and public authorities” (European Commission website).

To realize this overall goal, four objectives were formulated: (I) confine the systematic risk

and market instability in the European financial system by enhancing supervisory

practices among EEA competent authorities to support timely and pre-emptive actions; (II)

improve investor protection by imposing new depositary standards; (III) enhanced

transparency through new investor disclosure and mandatory reporting to competent

30 European Commission, Website - alternative investments 31 FCA, website - AIFMD 32 GSK Stockmann + Kollegen, company website 33

GSK Stockmann + Kollegen, Level II Regulations


7

authorities to prevent exploitation of target companies by Private Equity funds; and (IV)

deregulation of national barriers and creation of a level playing field with harmonized rules

on an EEA-wide passport for full scope EEA AIFMs to market and manage AIFs to foster

efficiency and cross border competition.34 These goals would be beneficial not only for

investors, but also for fund managers. Investors would profit from the higher transparency

and the limited systematic risk, whereas the fund managers would benefit from the EEA-

wide passport which enables them to explore new customer segments.35

2.3.3. Key concepts

With the direct focus on managers, the AIFMD introduces a new model to regulate the

investment fund industry, the manager regulation. Previous to the AIFMD, the German

Investment Act (Investmentgesetz, InvG) and UCITS directive regulated investment funds

only on a product level (product regulation). The intention of the model shift was the

reasoning that professional investors do not need product regulation, which only harms

product innovations.36 In addition, it was assumed that managers are the driving force in

an alternative investment fund that decides on risk management and investment

decisions, and therefore, should be regulated, and moreover, many fund managers

circumvent product regulations by incorporating funds in third countries such as Cayman

Island. With a manager regulation, this bypassing could be stopped.37

The definition of the Alternative Investment Fund Manager is crucial, due to its position as

protagonist of the AIFMD. The AIFM is the recipient of nearly all rights and obligations.

Therefore, the AIFMD states in Article 4(1) (b) that for any legal person whose regular

business is to manage (the AIFM), one or more alternative investment funds must comply

with the AIFMD, unless they fall out of its scope.

An alternative investment fund (AIF) is defined in Article 4 (1) (a) of the AIFMD as a

“collective investment undertaking, or its compartments: which raises capital from a

number of investors; with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment

policy for the benefit of those investors”; which is not covered by the Directive 2009/65/EC

(Undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS and the UCITS

Directive).38

34 European Commission, AIFMD - Frequently asked questions 35

Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD 36 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD 37

Tollmann, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Einleitung Rn. 24-25 38 See also § 1 (2) & (3) KAGB


8

The result of this new approach is that the AIFMD will cover all undertakings for collective

investments with external procurement, irrelevant of whether the AIF is an open-ended or

closed-ended fund or a hybrid form. Hence, all investment fund types fall under the

AIFMD, whether they have already been regulated by the German investment Act, or

have been unregulated, such as closed-ended funds, including private equity, commodity,

even wine or art funds.39 This broad approach however, also carries a legal uncertainty

with it because of the vagueness of the fund term.

The new German Investment Code adapts that broad approach in § 1 (1) KAGB and also

defines AIFs as non-UCITS funds § 1 (3) KAGB. The term manager is defined in

§ 17 KAGB. The new Investment Code, therefore, introduces the

Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft (KVG) (which can be translated as investment

management company) and represents the fund manager in the German investment law.

That new term comprises not only the “old” investment companies,

Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAG) which were covered by the German Investment Act,

but it also addresses all other fund managers or investment management companies

§ 17 (1) S.1 KAGB.

An AIF has the choice either to appoint (a) an external manager who is a legal person or

(b) an internal manager where the legal form of the AIF permits an internal management

and where the AIF’s governing body chooses not to appoint an external AIFM. In the latter

case, the AIF itself has to be authorized as AIFM by the competent authority. This choice

is covered by § 17 (2) KAGB.

The AIFM has, according to Article 6 (5) (d) of the Directive, to fulfill certain organizational

requirements in order to be authorized under the AIFMD as an AIFM; Therefore, AIFMs

have to provide portfolio management functions and risk management functions.

Article 4 (1) (w) defines the activity of managing AIFs as performing at least portfolio

management functions or risk management functions. ESMA considers that this means

that an entity performing either of the two functions is to be considered as managing an

AIF, according to Article 4 (1) (w).40 Such entity must therefore seek authorization as an

AIFM under Article 6, it being understood that delegation of either the portfolio

management or the risk management function is allowed, as long as it is in accordance

with Article 20 of the AIFMD. The new German investment Code agrees with the ESMA

proposal and requires that the AIFM performs at least one of the two core competencies

§ 17 (1) S. 2 KAGB.

39

Tollmann, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 2 Rn. 5 40 Tollmann, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 4 Rn. 54


9

The AIFMD scope is established by defining two sub-scopes. The Directive applies, first,

to AIFMs established in a Member State of the EU, which manages an AIF irrespective of

where such AIFs are, and second, to AIFMs that are established outside of the EU, to the

extent that they manage AIFs established within the EU, or market AIFs (wherever these

funds are located) to investors in the EU.41 With this comprehensive scope, the EU

legislator tries to cover all funds in the EU, which conduct business either to manage or to

market, irrespective of their location or incorporation.42 Therefore, the German legislator

translated that definition word for word in §17(1) S.1 KAGB.

Due to its broad definition, also some companies are addressed that are not supposed to

be addressed by the AIFMD. Therefore, the EU legislator has introduced three ways by

which certain types of companies can be exempt from the scope.

First, the AIFMD exempts certain organizations due to their operational focus. These

companies are listed in Article 2 (3) of the AIFMD and comprise (i) holding companies, (ii)

pension funds, (iii) securitization vehicles, (iv) central banks, (v) governments, (vi)

employees saving plans, and (vii) special purpose vehicles.

The second group is exempt from the AIFMD because of their size, even when classified

as an AIF. The threshold which is relevant for the exemption differs due to the capital

structure of alternative investment fund. In the case of abdication of leverage and a

redemption right exercisable during a period of five years following the date of the initial

investment, the threshold for AIFs assets under management is set at EUR 500 million.

However, the use of leverage reduces the threshold to EUR 100 million, including the

assets acquired through leverage. AIFMs that are exempt under Article 3 (2) must

nonetheless register with the relevant supervisory authorities of their home member state.

The third group of fund managers is excluded due to their shareholder structure,

according to Article 3 (1) of the Directive. In case an AIFM manages an AIF whose only

investor is his parent undertakings, his subsidiaries, or other subsidiaries of his parent

undertakings, and none of these investors is himself an AIF, then he is excluded from the

AIFMD.

These three possibilities are also implemented in the new German Investment Code. The

exemption due to their operational focus is governed by § 2 (1) KAGB, the exemption of

their size is covered by § 2 (4) and the exemption due to the shareholder structure is

regulated by § 2 (3) KAGB.

41 Loyens Loeff, AIFMD Client Memorandum 42 Tollmann, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 2 Rn. 18


10

3. Legal Analysis

After this paper has construed an overview of alternative investments and the

development and key concepts of the AIFMD, this paper will continue with the

implementation of the AIFMD in German law by analyzing the changes to previous legal

texts with a special focus on risk management and compliance obligations. Furthermore,

the emergence of the area of tension between the regulatory and the company law will be

examined in view of the new regulations to analyze the legal consequences on the

alternative investment fund industry.

3.1. The new investment regulatory law – the KAGB

Beginning on 22 July, 2013, the statutory basis for managing both open-ended and

closed-ended funds is the new German Capital Investment Code. The German Capital

Investment Code, which transposes the European Union’s Alternative Investment Fund

Managers Directive, will replace the German Investment Act.

3.1.1. KAGB in General

The Capital Investment Code, with its 355 paragraphs, governs the collective investment

industry. The central term of the KAGB is thereby the Investmentvermögen, characterized

as fund and its associated institutional, functional and instrumental organization, which

“collects capital from a plural number of investors and invest it on the basis of a fixed

investment strategy to the benefit of the investors”.43 The KAGB distinguishes between

two fund types, defined as either

Undertakings for Collective

Investment in Transferable

Securities (UCITS) § 1 (2) KAGB or

as alternative investment funds. The

AIF category will include all closed-

ended funds and those open-ended

investment funds regulated under

investment legislation that are not

defined as UCITS, § 1 (3) KAGB.

These are mainly open-ended special institutional funds (German Spezialfonds) and

open-ended property funds. Different admission requirements and reporting obligations

43 See Art 4 (1) (a) (i) of the AIFMD and § 1 (1) KAGB


11

apply to managers of UCITS and AIFs, which in turn leads to different organizational

embodiment because of different requirements for risk management and compliance.44

According to Eric Romba, CEO of the close-ended fund association,45 up to ninety percent

of the close-ended fund market in Germany will be covered. However, this broad

regulation will lead to a fundamental change in the fund industry. Fund managers expect

significant consequences that especially increase the pressure of profit margins and are

associated with the examination of the current supply chain.46 This topic will be discussed

later in part IV, Economic consequences.

Goal of the KAGB is the creation of one self-contained set of regulations for investment

funds and their managers by the further development of a regulatory and supervisory

framework and the adjustment of the changed European requirements for the realization

of the European level playing field for the investment fund industry and uniform standards

for investor protection.47

3.1.2. Compliance and Risk Management in the KAGB

The intention of the EU regulator was to reinforce compliance and to enhance risk

management after what happened with the financial markets between 2007 and 2009.

The EU legislator tried to deal with these two problems with the new regulation. In order to

analyze and evaluate the attempt from a legal perspective, the following section will focus

on the general compliance and risk management provisions in the KAGB. Therefore, the

author will first provide definitions for the two terms and will continue with analyzing the

changes by comparing the old Investment Act (InvG) with the new Investment Code

(KAGB).

3.1.3.1. Definitions and Relation

A. Definitions

Compliance is relatively new in the legal terminology, and one of the most controversially

discussed legal concepts.48 Despite of the general meaning of the term “compliance” – to

comply with – which means, to act in conformity with rules, no uniform understanding of

44 PricewaterhouseCoopers (Pwc), company website 45 Romba, Zeitwende am Fondsmarkt 46 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD; Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD; PricewaterhouseCoopers (Pwc), company website 47 BVI, das Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch 48 Veil, European Capital Markets Law, § 28 Rn. 1


12

the term has been established.49 From the meaning of the word “to comply with”, the

question arises as to what the reference point is. The reference point acquires a critical

position because the scope of the compliance depends on it. The academic literature

distinguishes between the narrow scope, in which only the conformity with statutory

provisions is applied, and the broad scope which additionally covers, for example,

company-internal rules. Another reason why no universal definition of compliance exists

could be due to the reason that the term has not only a functional meaning, the obligation

to act in accordance with the law, but also an organizational meaning which describes an

independent department of an organization responsible for any compliance-related

tasks.50

Risk management within companies has become the focus of attention since globalization

and technology changes increased the speed and complexity of business activities.51 As

the name states, it comprises the management of risks. From a legal perspective, risk can

be described as the “exposure to events that would have a negative effect”.52 Applied to a

business environment, risk management can be seen as the professional and systematic

management and mitigation of exposure to events which cause an economic loss of the

company’s objectives (performance). A sufficient risk management has to include all risks

which encompass corporate functions and the company’s environment in order to assess

the overall risk adequately and, hence, mitigate the exposure.53

B. Relation

Compliance and risk management are often used in the context of corporate governance

which comprises the general decision on making the standards and rules of conduct for

organizational bodies in their relation to share and stakeholders.54 However, their relation

differs, due to goal-oriented and functional perspective. From the goal-oriented

perspective, compliance ensures conformity with legal requirements, whereas risk

management systematically identifies, assesses, monitors, controls and mitigates the

material risks that are likely to affect the company. From a functional perspective, on the

other hand, the relation between these two corporate governance elements cannot be

drawn that clearly. The problem is that both areas overlap each other to the extent that the

risk of non-compliance with the law always describes an operational risk, and hence, is an

aspect of risk management. Thus, compliance can be categorized as an element of the

49 Legal definition, 4.1.3 German Corporate Governance Code 50 Veil, European Capital Markets Law, § 28 Rn. 2 51 Chew, Corporate Risk Management p.323 52 Josek, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 15 Rn. 4 53 Romeike, Lexikon Risiko Management p.151 54 Grundmann/Mülbert, ZGR 2001, p. 215-224


13

risk management. On the other hand, risk management has become subject to

supervisory law in recent years, which makes it relevant to the compliance department

responsible for enforcing the compliance rules, such as the risk management provision. If

these two approaches are combined, the functional relationship between compliance and

risk management can be explained as an interaction of two corporate governance

elements, whereby compliance embodies a part of the qualitative risk management, and

also determines the formation of the risk management by monitoring the effectiveness of

the risk management system and ensuring the adherence to the regulatory

requirements.55

3.1.3.2. Changes

On the 13th of July, 2013, the new Investment Code that implements the AIFMD in the

national law replaced the Investment Act in Germany. With the AIFMD’s intention of

enhancing compliance and risk management standards, the question arises as to what

has changed from the old (InvG) to the new (KAGB) law.

The normative coverage of risk management and compliance in the new law is much

stronger for investment management companies. These two topics are covered mainly by

the §§ 28 and 29 KAGB, however, §§ 26, 27, 36, and 37 KAGB also refer to compliance

and risk management topics which is why they, in a broader sense, also account for

compliance and risk management provisions.56 These articles are complemented by

references to the Commission-delegated regulation (EU) No 231/2013. Articles 38-45, 50-

56, as well as Article 57-62 of the regulation, define compliance obligations and risk

management requirements in further detail.

Within the provisions for compliance and risk management, two concepts frequently

appear. The first one is the principle-based approach which appears in form of the

adequacy and proportionality principle.57 As the name states, the principle-based

approach establishes principles (standards) that investment firms need to follow and apply

to themselves, instead of setting specific rules. The benefit of that approach is the

flexibility within the implementation. Especially in a heterogeneous landscape of activities,

such as the European fund market, this approach is favorable because it allows the firms

to implement the regulatory objectives by considering the adequate measures regarding

55 Veil, European Capital Markets Law, § 28 Rn. 3 56 Kort / Lehmann, in Möllers / Kloyer, das neue KAGB, Rn. 498 57

Heist, in D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 18 Rn. 8 - 9


14

the size and the nature of their business.58 Nevertheless, this approach is able to impose

a sufficient level of responsibility on all market participants with its abstract regulatory

objectives. Detailed prescriptive rules, on the other hand, are deemed inadequate for such

a diverse universe of entities and are not able to provide a sufficient level of investor

protection.59

The second concept is the functional segregation, also known as segregation of duties.

This concept is a key concept of internal control, and aims to avoid conflicts of interests

due to separation of tasks.60 In general, functional segregation comprises the allocation of

incompatible tasks and operations to departments, positions and persons under

consideration of the requirement for two signatures.61 That means that control functions

have to be independent of the operational business in order to mitigate any emerging

mistakes and fraud.

A. Compliance

The introduction to the compliance obligations provisions in the KAGB constitutes a broad

definition of compliance. According to § 28 (1) KAGB, compliance is defined as the

“obligation to act in accordance with the law, as well as comprising the organizational

provisions, policies and procedures that aim to prevent or expose breaches of law.” This

general clause was nearly copied from § 9a InvG. Only one minor wording change was

made, which however, had significant effect on the scope of the KAGB.62

In the following subsection, the relation between compliance and risk management is

established. This was also inherited from the InvG. According to § 28 (1) (1) KAGB, an

adequately conforming business organization (compliance) comprises especially an

adequate risk management. At the first glance, the old provision in the InvG 9a (1) seems

to be more precise by explaining the risk management to be the monitoring and controlling

of all related risks and their consequences for the overall portfolio. However, it will turn out

differently. From the structure of that Article, as well as from the wording, it can be

concluded that the law for investment management companies perceives risk

management as part of compliance. Thereby, the principle of functional separation

survives, and the monitoring and controlling of the compliance is ensured.63 Contrary to

this legal position, economic literature proposes that risk management is not seen as part

58 Weber-Rey, ZGR 2010, 543-590 59 Veil, European Capital Markets Law, § 29 Rn. 4 - 6 60

Roggenbuck, in Hopt/Wohlmannstetter, Handbuch Corporate Governance von Banken, p. 632 61

Grützner/Jakob, Compliance von A-Z, Vier-Augen-Prinzip 62 See Section 2.3.3. Key concepts (of the AIFMD) 63 See Level II Regulation, Article 60


15

of the compliance, but rather as an integral element of the controlling function.64 The latter

approach was supported by the (old) InvVerVO which constituted the risk management as

part of the risk controlling (§ 10 InvVerVO).

By further comparing § 28 KAGB with § 9a InvG, it can be observed that at the first

glance, the two sections appear very similar from a structural perspective. This

observation is correct; however, several changes were made within the subsections,

which have to be analyzed. According to § 28 (1) S.2 KAGB, only the abidance of rules no

longer cover compliance. It needs personnel and technical resources to realize it, which

means implementing a self-sufficient compliance organization.65 Second, the legislator

emphasizes the “adequacy” requirement in §28 (1) S.2 (1,2,5) KAGB), which limits the

scope. With this principal, the legislator accounts for the economic calculus of cost and

benefits consideration, and emphasizes that the organizational structure and size is

pivotal to the respective compliance requirements.66

Moreover, technology changes have led to the emergence of high-frequency trading,

which presents a great challenge for the organizational compliance, since fictional offers

can be deleted within seconds and cannot be traced back to the initial trader. This makes

a proof of non-compliance nearly impossible.67 Therefore, a reference can be found in the

KAGB to the respective new article in the WpHG (§ 33 (1a)). This new article plans

additional compliance and risk management duties, compared to the old §33(1), for

investment service companies providing high-frequency trading.

Overall, we see that some subsections were added to the general obligations, due to

changes in the industry, but that is not all. In § 28 (3) KAGB refers to the Level II

Regulation which further defines compliance functions in the Article 57-62. Within these 64 Kajüter, in Wagenhofer,Risikomanagement als Controllingaufgabe, p. 109ff 65 Kort / Lehmann, in Möllers / Kloyer, das neue KAGB, Rn. 500 66 Drechsler/ Karg, IZG-SH, A 16 SH, § 2, 3.6 Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse und wirtschaftliche Analysen 67 See characteristics of alternative investments, Section 2.1.


16

Articles, the regulation sets the foundation of the compliance functions by determining the

decision-making processes and the organizational structure, whereby reporting

obligations are set and documented as well as functions and responsibilities are clearly

allocated and documented.68 Furthermore, different mechanisms have to be implemented

to ensure the confidentiality of information, data protection, and viability in case of a

system failure.69 Especially in the last point, the handwriting of the EU legislator can be

observed, who tries to mitigate systematic risks. In addition, these articles also illustrate

the supervisory nature of compliance, which enables the authorities to exercise their

power effectively, and emphasize the functional segregation of risk management,

compliance and internal revision.

B. Risk management

In the previous law, risk management was briefly mentioned in the InvG, in relation with

compliance, however; it was mainly governed by the InvVerVO. There, it was embedded

in the risk controlling function. § 10 S.1 InvVerVO required an implementation and

maintenance of a permanent risk-controlling function, with its function and hierarchy

independent from the operating business. In reality the majority of accruing tasks have

been transferred to already existing departments, such as the internal revision or the

controlling department. The promotion of the risk management from the regulation to the

new investment code will have a direct effect on the organizational framework, due to the

separation of functional independence of the risk management and the risk controlling.70

This shall change with the new KAGB. § 29 KAGB emphasizes the new position of risk

management in investment law. The beginning of the article refers to the two concepts

described, the functional segregation and the adequacy principle. These two principles

help to set up the organizational position and its impact on the firm. However, these two

principles are not new to risk management in the investment law. § 10 InvVerVO also

constituted these principles earlier, even though not that precise. Furthermore, the new

provision in the KAGB implements minimum requirements in the case of non-compliance.

Thus investment management companies have to be able to demonstrate that protection

mechanisms against conflicts of interest to maintain an independent risk management

process that complies with § 29 KAGB are implemented.71

68 The AIFM has to ensure that all relevant employees know the procedures and to perform their task correctly 69 See Art 57 (2)-(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 70 Kort / Lehmann, in Möllers / Kloyer, das neue KAGB, Rn. 516 71 Kort / Lehmann, in Möllers / Kloyer, das neue KAGB, Rn. 519


17

Also, § 29 (2) KAGB gives us a much clearer picture, as the less meaningful §10

InvVerVO constitutes the duty to establish an adequate risk management system.72

According to this subsection, the goal of a risk management system is to guarantee that,

at any point in time, all essential risks are “covered, measured, controlled and monitored”.

Such a risk management system for investment management companies has at least to

cover market, credit, liquidity, counterparty, and operational risks.73 Thereby, one has to

consider that the emphasis and importance of individual risk types can change over time

and between investment strategies thus investment management companies.

§29 (5) also refers to the Level II regulation which further defines procedures of risk

management and division of responsibilities among employees as well as the continuous

implementation of risk management systems.

3.2. Areas of tension between regulatory law and company law

Over the last two years, the legislation was mainly influenced by the global financial

market crisis that emerged due to deficiencies in the risk management and other

compliance areas of financial institutions, including the remuneration system. The financial

crisis affects several fields of law. Especially, company law and regulatory law have been

involved at their interface, the corporate governance. This gives occasion to analyze the

relation of both fields of law.74

In order to examine the relation and these tensions between the two fields of law, this

chapter will first give brief definitions of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG)

and the investment law, before continuing with the illustration of compliance and risk

management obligations under company law and then comparing them with the ones of

the regulatory law.75

This paper will use the German stock corporation Act and the new Investment Code to

demonstrate the above-mentioned examinations. A stock corporation is suitable for that

analysis, because it is the typical legal form of large companies which have, by nature, a

complex organizational structure with various legal requirements. The KWG will be

neglected in this examination, because investment management companies (KVGs) are

exempt from the KWG under § 2 (1) 3b KWG and § 2 (6) S.1 No. 5a KWG as long as they

72 See principal base approach, Section 3.1.2. 73 See Art 44 (2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 74 Weber-Rey, ZGR 2010, 543-590, p. 544,565 75 Definitions of regulatory obligations were already explained in Section 3.1.2.


18

comply with the scope of tasks stated in the new Investment Code under

§ 20 (2;3) KAGB.76

The Stock Corporation Act forms the foundation of the existence of a stock corporation by

setting up a legal framework for its founding, legal relationships and constitution. With the

exception of provisions on accounting and sanctions, the stock corporation act belongs to

private law.77 The new Investment Code, on the other side, is part of the securities law,

and hence, belongs to the regulatory law. Its responsibilities are to regulate all types of

investment funds by providing a German legal framework regarding investments in which

all European regulations are implemented.

3.2.1. Organizational obligations under company law

A general rule for the compliance and risk management obligations does not exist in the

German company law. The majority assumes that the obligation of the implementation of

a risk management system and a comprehensive compliance organization results from

the general policy of law that the management board has to guarantee the compliance

within the corporation by taking adequate organizational measures.78 This policy of law is

based on two Sections, namely § 91 (2) AktG and § 76 AktG, which will be examined in

detail.

A. Risk monitoring under § 91 (2) AktG

Risk management was implemented in the corporation law by the Corporate Supervision

and Transparency Act in 1998 (KonTraG).79 According to § 91 (2) AktG, the board of

directors of a stock corporation has to implement adequate measures to detect early

developments that threaten the continued existence of the corporation. Therefore, the

board of directors is obligated to implement a controlling system. That norm is formulated

as an organizational law principle with an objective (the early detection of developing

threats to continued existence) and organizational requirements (taking adequate

measures, especially the implementation of a controlling system).80

The objective of § 91 (2) AktG focuses only on the early detection of developments which

jeopardize the continued existence of a corporation. § 29 (2) S.1 KAGB, on the other

hand, requires the implementation of the adequate risk management system. These

76 BaFin, KWG exemption 77 Weber-Rey, ZGR 2010, 543-590, p. 545 78 Schmidt, Compliance in Kapitalgesellschaften, p. 23ff 79 Weber-Rey, ZGR 2010, 543-590, p. 569 80 Spindler, Münch Komm AktG, §91 Rn. 15


19

differences of the formulation already indicate that required standards of the company law

will differ from the regulatory law.

In order to understand the objective of § 91 (2) AktG and demonstrate the differences

between it and the regulatory law, three aspects of the objective have to be emphasized,

namely the development, second, the jeopardy of the corporation’s existence and, third,

the early detection.

The term “developments” in § 91 (2) AktG refers to processes and changes, and not to

certain risk conditions.81 The Investment Code, however, uses another approach by

mentioning risk in § 29 as a situation, or possibility. The consequence for these two

different definitions is that the regulatory identification of risks, according to the new

Investment Code, starts earlier than the duty to detect developments within the stock

corporation Act, because the possibility existed before it became real and the

developments were initiated.82

The second aspect which leads to a divergent scope of the two provisions is the further

concretizing of the developments as developments which jeopardize the continued

existence of a corporation in § 91 (2) AktG. With that addendum, the stock corporation Act

implements a high threshold which leads to the consequence that “ordinary” risks are not

considered within this early detection process.83 The board will therefore not necessarily

be informed about these kinds of risks. According to the law, developments are classified

as jeopardy to the continued existence, in case the financial position of the company is

affected significantly.84 This means that the default risk essentially has to be increased to

overcome that threshold.85 However, in comparison to the regulatory law that will lead to

no vital restriction of the board’s organizational responsibility, because § 29 (2) 1 KAGB

also requires only substantial risk integrated in the process of risk management.

The third and most relevant aspect is the “early detection” of developments which can

jeopardize the continued existence of a corporation in § 91 (2) AktG. That term, however,

only covers the identification process of the risks, not a comprehensive risk management.

Hence, the legal text does not implement a comprehensive risk management as it was

developed in the economy86. Such a risk management system would require an extensive

risk inspection and risk control regarding every operational field as well as the external 81 Spindler, in Fleischer, VorstandsR-HdB, § 19 Rn. 8 82 Kort, ZGR 2010, 440-471 83 Baums, ZGR 2011, 218–274 84 BT Druck, 13/9712, p. 15; Wundenberg, Compliance und prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über Bankengruppen, p. 119; Spindler in Fleischer VorstandsR-HDB § 19 Rn 9 85 Spindler, in Fleischer, VorstandsR-HdB, § 19 Rn. 9 86 Dreher, FS Hüffer, p. 161 - 178; Kort, ZGR 2010, 440, 443; Spindler, in Fleischer VorstandsR-HdB § 19 Rn. 7


20

environment. All organizational rules and measures which support risk detection and the

management of operational risks can be called risk management in the broader sense.

This concept can be found in the § 29 (2) KAGB which (I) requires an adequate risk

management which “assesses, manages, and controls” all ordinary risks and (II) the audit

and adjustment of it at least once a year. Considering that difference between company

law and regulatory law, the latter proves the central meaning of a risk management

system in the regulatory law.

That difference can be further emphasized by the level of concretization of organizational

requirements which have to be met to accomplish the objectives. § 91 (2) AktG constitutes

the only adequate measures for the early detection to be performed as well as a

controlling system. These adequate measures have to be constructed in such a way that

the board of directors will be able receive the required information at the right time. That

means that the § 91 (2) AktG only obligates the board of directors to implement a

sufficient information system in the organization, which guarantees the collection, the

review, and the forwarding of relevant information to the board of directors regarding

developments in the company, which may jeopardize the continued existence of the

company.87 Therefore, the board of directors is not obliged to implement a risk

management system as in § 29 (2) KAGB. That position is also held by the prevailing

opinion. Therefore, the implementation of a risk management system depends on the

general management responsibility and their duty of care (§ 76 AktG) of the board of

directors with their business judgment and the risk profile of the company88. That point of

view can be further supported by a court decision of the Regional Appeal Court Celle

which ruled in 2008 that the obligations under § 91 (2) AktG and industrial specific

requirements have to be distinguished, and that under § 91 (2) AktG, no managerial

obligation arises to implement a risk management.89

The duty of implementing an early detection mechanism for development that jeopardizes

the firm’s continued existence can be structured as a two-step process. The first step is

for the board of directors to take adequate measures regarding the implementation, and

second, the monitoring and controlling of that system. This interpretation of the

organizational requirement is in accordance with the auditing standards of the institute of

public auditors in Germany (IDW) under § 317 (4) HGB. This means, by implication, that

the auditing standards also clearly differentiate between a comprehensive risk

management and an early detection system and interpret § 91 (2) AktG in favor of a risk-

detection mechanism, and not a management system.

87 Wundenberg, Compliance und prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über Bankengruppen, p. 120 88 Spindler, Münch Komm AktG, §91 Rn. 28 89 OLG Celle, WM2008, 1745, 1756


21

In 2009, this seemed to change due to the introduction of the German Accounting Law

Modernization Act (BilMoG) which implemented the term “risk management” in various

sections of the German Stock Corporation Act and the German Commercial Code. The

introduction of “risk management systems” eventually results in the infliction of new

requirements.90 According to § 289 (5) HGB, capital market-oriented companies which are

defined in § 264 (d) HGB had to describe from that point of time on “substantive”

characteristics of their internal control and risk management systems regarding their

accounting process. In addition, § 107 (3) S.2 AktG established the right of the

supervisory board to request an audit committee to control accounting processes and

effectiveness of controlling and risk management systems.

The interpretation that these new rules may transmit into an obligation of the board to

implement a comprehensive risk management system under § 91(2) AktG seems,

however, to be doubtful, because § 289 (5) HGB constitutes neither the implementation

nor the configuration of an internal control system or an internal risk management as

mandatory.91 In these legislative materials, it has to be distinguished carefully between the

organizational obligations of the management board, and on the other side, the modified

control obligations of the supervisory board, due to the BilMoG (§ 107 (3) S.2 AktG). The

result of different interpretation methods, such as the historical one, or the approach to

explain it with the negative pledge, all came to the conclusion that the duties of the

management board under § 91(2) AktG do not expand by means of the duty of

implementing a comprehensive risk management.92

The picture of the BilMoG is completed by considering the interpretation of the European

Directive, upon which the German Accounting Law Modernization Act is based, or the

German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) or the Auditing standards, which illustrate

no indication that §91(2) AktG requires a new interpretation.93 Hence, the difference

between the minimum content of an early detection system, as required by §91(2) AktG

and the extensive risk management system, will further exist.

B. Compliance as management responsibility of the board

The principles whether a duty exist to implement a compliance organization or not is

similar to the risk management subject matter not yet resolved. Different levels of duties

have to be distinguished regarding compliance, namely the internal and the external one.

The latter one is characterized by the relation between a managing director and a third

90 Kort, ZGR 2010, 440-471 91 BT Druck, 16/10067, p. 76 92 Kort, ZGR 2010, 440-471, p.452 93 Wundenberg, Compliance und prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über Bankengruppen, p. 123


22

party. From that perspective §§ 823, 831 BGB form the relevant legal basis. For the

discussion of this paper, however, the internal level is more interesting. In that scenario,

the focus is the relationship between the board of directors and its own company. The

management has the responsibility to implement all needed organizational precautions

mechanisms to ensure the compliance of the company and the employees.94 This

compliance responsibility is derived from the management responsibilities and the duty of

care of the board under §§ 76, 93 AktG, and maybe also due to § 91 (2) AktG.95

The internal compliance obligation is based on the board’s duty of legality.96 This principle

consists of two components: First, it obligates the board to comply with all rules which

either involve himself as person, as body of the company or the company as legal person.

Second, next to the own compliance, the principle also requires the obligation to control

the legality. This means that the board’s duty is also to ensure that all other bodies of the

company, as well as the employees, comply with the law and rules. This responsibility of

the control of legality is derived from the principle of general damage control which is one

of the board’s obligations,97 the principle used to establish the compliance obligation of

managing directors. A breach of the laws will trigger sensitive sanctions and damages in

reputation; therefore, the board of directors is motivated to avoid breaches and will

establish a respective organizational structure. Control of legality can only be executed in

a complex organization if the necessary precautions are implemented, which is also

supported by the Corporate Governance Codex.

The scope of compliance obligations also differs according to the subject. In the case of

the control of legality, in which employees or the bodies of the company are the subjects

of legality, the responsibilities of the directors are limited to the company’s interest under

§§ 76 and 93 AktG. However, if he is the legal subject, the legality obligation is

boundless.98

The execution and implementation of these compliance obligations causes a lot of costs,

not only because of the monitoring efforts, but also the “surveillance” leads to a certain

demotivation among employees.99 The amount, however, can differ, due to the precise

configuration of the controlling system as well as the size and the nature of a company.100

Due to the general nature of that obligation, it is not possible to derive a catalogue with 94 Cf. Dreher, FS Hüffer, 2010, S. 161,168ff; Fleischer, in Fleischer, VorstandsR-HdB, § 8 Rn. 40 95 Fleischer, BB 2008, p. 1070 – 1072; Bürkle, BB 2005, p. 565; Schmidt, Compliance in Kapitalgesellschaften p.20 96

Fleischer, CCZ, 2008, p. 1 - 6 97 Schneider, ZIP, 2003, 645ff 98

Bürkle, BB 2005, p. 565; Dreher, ZWeR 2004, p.74, 79 99 Christ et al., Effects of Preventive and Detective Controls on Employee Performance and Motivation 100 Cf. BT Druck, 13/9712, S.15


23

mandatory compliance measures such as in the Investment Code. This leads to the

consequence that the board of directors has great discretion regarding the compliance

structure, since it only focus on damage and threat potential of singular instances.101

These broad compliance requirements can also not be specified by the obligation to

implement an early detection system according to §91 (2) AktG.

The regulatory law, in form of the new Investment Code, remedies that imprecision by

concretizing measures to ensure the compliance. Next to the implementation of risk

management, it also requires adequate personnel and technical resources, which could

be interpreted as compliance department, and six additional requirements to accomplish

the objective § 28 (1)1-8 KAGB.

3.2.2. Comparison of corporate and regulatory organization obligations

A lot of similarities, and also differences, emerged out of organizational obligations under

company and regulatory law. Overall, it can be determined that the regulatory law

establishes more comprehensive obligations. Therefore, KAGB’s requirements are stricter

and more precise than their counterpart, the company law. In order to understand the

intension of the stricter nature of the regulatory law and may identify areas of tensions

between these two fields of law, one must interpret its contextual setting in which the law

is embedded. Therefore, the target audience, the objectives, and enforcement

mechanisms need to be considered.

A. Target Audience

The board as collective body is jointly responsible for the compliance and risk

management from a company law perspective. § 91 (2) AktG, as well as the responsibility

for corporate compliance, are parts of the general management responsibilities and the

board’s duty of care (§§ 76, 93 AktG). In that case the established organizational

obligation concerns the internal relation between the corporation and its management

board.

The regulatory law, on the other hand, handles that topic differently. The KAGB does not

directly use the approach of the KWG which assigns the responsibility of compliance to

the institute § 25a (1) S1 KWG and the managing director § 25a (1) S1 KWG, and hence,

establishes an instant external responsibility of the managing director towards the banking

regulator which allows the BaFin to sanction not only the institute, but also the director

101 Bürkle, BB 2007, p. 1797ff; Dreher, FS Hüffer, p. 161 - 178


24

himself.102 The KAGB rather uses a more implicit approach by admittedly addressing the

institute in § 26 (1), and also establishes a possibility of sanctioning managing directors

with their dismissals, § 40 KAGB in case of breaches of laws, and § 39 (3) (5) by the KVG.

In practice, it will not make any difference; in theory, however, the company law approach

is the more favorable due to its explicit nature.

B. Objectives

The organizational requirements, under company and regulatory law, differ due to the

different regulatory objectives. The obligations to implement an early detection system, as

well as compliance obligations, are from a company law perspective, the result of the

damage control duty of the management. Therefore, it serves the purpose of the

company’s interest. The normative obligation in the KAGB in § 28 (2) S.1 KAGB, on the

other hand, aims at financial market stability § 172 (2) KAGB as well as investor protection

§ 26 (2) (2) KAGB. The control of operational risks under § 28 (2) S.1 KAGB implies the

function of the protection of the continued existence, such as § 91 (2) AktG does.

As it was carved out in the first part, the content of the regulatory governance

requirements goes beyond the simple securing solvency of the institute. They are

considered as core elements of the qualitative regulation within the internal risk

management systems. This characteristic contextual integration of internal control and the

state regulation leads naturally, not reflected within the organizational duties which

emerge out of the management responsibility of the top management.

This integration of internal control and the state supervision in the regulatory law is not

applicable to the organizational obligations under company law, because they emerged

from the management responsibilities of the management board.

C. Enforcement mechanisms

In the case of a managing director’s breach of their organizational obligation under

company law, there will be different damages claims. Of importance are, primarily, the

damages claims of the company, according to § 93 AktG. This regulation governs,

according to the prevailing opinion in paragraph 1, the standard of care and the level of

culpability, and constitutes in paragraph 2 a principle of general liability.103 This is

conceptualized as the internal liability of governing organs. That damage claim is due to

the company. Moreover, according to § 84 (3) S.1 AktG, the supervisory board is allowed

to dismiss the board in case of gross breaches of duties.

102 Cf. Wundenberg, Compliance und prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über Bankengruppen, p. 127 103 Raiser/Veil, Kapitalgesellschaften § 14 Rn. 65


25

Next to the sanctions under company law, the regulatory law also provides sanction

mechanisms to counteract breaches to a third party. The main enforcement mechanism of

the BaFin is the threat of withdrawal of a firm’s license, which means that they are not

allowed to further practice the operations of a KVG. The BaFin could also order the

dismissal of a managing director under § 40 (1) KAGB. This dismissal and withdrawal

competence of the BaFin had become a powerful tool in practice in recent years. Often

times it is not necessary to make use of this formal competence. The informal

administrative actions trigger the dismissal of a managing director by the corporation itself.

The basis for these enforcement mechanisms is the legality principle104 which obliges the

management board of a corporation to comply with the law and ensure the proper

compliance of his organization. This principle leads to the consequence that the

management board has to implement all regulatory laws even though it might harm the

interest of the company. In case this situation arises, the management board would be on

the horns of a dilemma between company law and regulatory law. On the one hand, he

would be obliged to act in the best interest of the company under §§ 76 and 93 AktG105,

and on the other hand, on the principle of legality on which he would be also obliged to

implement the infringing obligations, from a shareholder perspective. This is seen as area

of tension between two fields of law. In order to avoid this conflict, the principle-based

approach provides remedy. The principle-based approach is covered by the § 93 (1) AktG

and in the adequacy principle of the regulatory law which gives the management board

the necessary discretion to act in accordance with both laws and avoids the emergence of

an area of tensions between regulatory and company law.

4. Economic consequences

The goal of the AIFMD was to stabilize the financial markets by eliminating systematic

risks, enhancing transparency, and providing a legal framework for the fund industry. This

goal is only achievable with incisions in the freedom of funds unaffected by regulations.

These impacts lead to a change within the whole of the fund industry, new business

models emerge, old ones have to be reconsidered, and the cost structures of several

market participants will change. These fundamental changes will also lead to a shift of

Europe’s competitive position, as a fund location in the global market. In order to analyze

and evaluate the economic impact of the AIFMD and thus the KAGB, the author will start

104

Cf. Section 3.2.1. Organizational obligations under company law 105 Peschke, in Saenger et. al, Handels und Gesellschaftsrecht, § 8, Rn. 777


26

with a small overview of the European fund industry and its characteristics. He will

continue with illustrating the impacts on market participants and fund types before closing

with discussion of strategic impacts on the European competitiveness in the global fund

market.

4.1. The European Fund market

The European fund market currently comprises EUR 10.2 trillion of assets under

management. Previous to the AIFMD, seventy percent of the market was covered by the

UCITS Directive; the remaining EUR 3.1 trillion assets under management were partly

regulated within national laws. With the broad definition of alternative investment funds as

non-UCITS funds, the EU

legislator bundles the remaining

thirty percent of the fund market

to one “fund class” to regulate

the whole market.106 This

approach, however, has also

led to the consequence that

classical investment funds were

transformed into “new”

alternative investment funds by the Directive and the new Investment Code. At this point,

the question arises whether the legislator does not overshoot, since classical alternative

investments, such as private equity and hedge funds, only account for one third of the

newly regulated group.

One of the “new” alternative investment funds types is the special or institutional fund.

Institutional funds are the largest group among AIFs and account for twenty percent of the

total assets under management in Europe. This strategic asset allocation is also seen in

Germany. In the German fund market, sixty percent of the EUR 1.9 trillion assets under

management are invested in German Spezialfonds which are an alteration of institutional

funds. The remaining forty percent are covered by mutual funds available for the general

public.107

Next to the institutional funds / Spezialfonds, which are now regulated by the AIFMD, also

closed-ended funds will be covered by the new Directive. On the European level, closed-

ended funds account only for three percent of the total assets under management;

106 EFAMA, Quarterly Statistical Release Q1/2014 107 BVI, Investmentstatistik 2014


27

however, in Germany, this fund type contributes with EUR 200bn, ten percent to the

overall assets under management.108 This fund category has never been considered as

assets manager and was never regulated by national laws and standards. Moreover, they

have never before been compared with investment funds and alternative investments.

This has changed with the AIFMD. For the first time, the firms and the managers are

confronted with aspects, such as risk management, minimum capital requirements, and

depositary banks. The impact of these new requirements on old and new market

participants and funds types needs to be discussed and evaluated, which will be the

purpose of the next two subsections.

4.2. Consequences for market participants

New (fundamental) regulations always present opportunities for new market participants

to enter a market and threaten the old market participants to lose their current business

model. In the following section, the main market participants, as well as the consequences

resulting from the AIFMD and the KAGB, will be analyzed.

The German classical fund market comprises a great number of “new alternative

investments”, not only because of the large market share of Spezialfonds but also

because of open-ended real estate funds which account for alternative investments funds

from now on, too. Consequently, nearly all investment companies, asset managers, and

depository banks have to face changes, due to the implementation of AIFMD in the

KAGB, and therefore, have to reposition for the future.

Existing investment firms (KAGs) have to raise moderate efforts to comply with the new

requirements. Despite of the name change from Kapitalanlagegesellschaft to Kapital-

verwaltungsgesellschaft, many of the fundamental requirements have already been

known in Germany (See §§ 80b, 90 InvG, InvMaRisk, or InVerVO).109 One critical issue is

the level of outsourcing of responsibilities. Especially, the outsourcing requirements affect

one business model of KAG’s, the one of letterbox companies.110 This special aspect will

mainly affect the Luxemburg market, where that model was very common.111 In general,

however, the main challenge for KAGs will be to implement the new regulations in the

existing structure, without losing efficiency and flexibility.

108 Jochims, Privatanleger sollen so viel zahlen wie die Profis 109 Bearing Point, White Paper - Asset Management 110 BaFin, Questions regarding (Outsourcing) §36 KAGB, Question 11 111 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD


28

Next to the challenge of flexibility and efficiency, classical alternative investment funds

also have to face operational challenge. These essential challenges will lead to a

fundamental change of the organizational structure within classical alternative investment

firms such as private equity and venture capital.112 In addition, these firms have to

overcome these challenges without any significant performance losses. Also, hedge funds

will be the prime target of the AIFMD. Although hedge funds have been partly regulated in

Germany, they, too, will pass through this fundamental change. The costs of this transition

for small and medium sized funds will be proportionally very high, which will probably lead

to the retraction of these funds from the European market 113 or an outsourcing of all

responsibilities to an external manager and new service provider.114

These closed ended funds will be analyzed further in the next section. They have to

overcome a large amount of legal requirements such as reporting and valuation

obligations, implementation of a depositary and risk management system as well as

authorization and transparency issues. Some of these tasks are ongoing, others are a

onetime deal. The largest obstacle is the setup of a qualitative risk management and the

required organizational requirements.115 As soon as the business is running, the costs and

efforts do not differ too much from the open-ended investment funds. This can be

explained by the fact that alternative investment funds have to compensate for previous

regulation expenses of regulated investment firms. Therefore, the motto “who wants to

play along, has to pay” can be applied to that situation. 116

Due to the new legal requirements, the field of depositary banks as custodian will widen

and, hence, their role will change. The KAGB implements the requirement for all

investment management companies (KVGs) to have a custodian. This requirement

applies, for the first time, to classical alternative investment funds. In Germany, these

responsibilities can be shouldered by credit institutes and financial service providers. With

this new opportunity, there will be also certain costs. Apparently, the functions of a

depositary are different for a private equity fund, or closed-ended fund, compared to

UCITS funds which were governed by the InvG. The exercise of this new business

opportunity in the depositary business requires the necessary expertise. Thus, not every

institute is able to benefit from the new opportunity.117 However, the main tasks of the

AIFMD allocated to the depositary banks do not differ too much from those of a UCITS

depositary bank. According to that, the tasks consist of the management of payment

112 Ernst & Young, AIFMD - EU Commission adopts Level 2 Regulation 113 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD 114 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD 115 Hilton, Challenges in Risk Management 116 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD 117 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD


29

transaction, safe keeping of the invested assets as well as control obligations towards the

fund manager.

The liability of depositary banks for the safe keeping risk was reinforced, in comparison to

the previous law. Before the AIFMD, depositary banks were only liable for a breach of

duty in two cases: First, if they kept it safe themselves or a central security depository did

it, and second, in case a sub-custodian, a third party was appointed.118 In the latter case,

the depositary banks were only liable for the diligent selection and the adequate

instruction of the sub-custodian. The AIFMD, however, increase the liability and constitute

a custodian liability to the funds or its investors in case of a loss of safe-kept financial

instruments with Article 21 (12). This increased liability risk on the side of depositary

banks raises the question, which bank is willing to offer these services to private equity or

closed ended funds. Surely, there will be several banks which will not offer these services

to their clients; however, experts estimate that there will be enough banks which will go

this step to avoid a high market concentration and thus systematic risks.119 According to

the BVI, in the end of 2013, forty-eight depositary institutions were registered and

therefore willing to take on the increased liability risk.120

In case where a risks arises, there is always an opportunity. In this case, it demonstrates

an opportunity for the insurance industry. Insurance companies could evaluate the risk

and also insure, which takes the increased liability risk from the books of the depositary

banks. Other benefiters of the regulatory changes are service providers which can relieve

the fund from non-core responsibilities (risk management and portfolio management), or

perform required duties such as the external valuation. Experts expect that KVGs will

outsource nearly every task which can be characterized as commodity, in order to achieve

efficiencies and flexibility of organizational structure. This approach is a tradeoff between

the monitoring and coordination costs, and the efficiencies and flexibility gains.121 In order

to ensure the quality of outsourced responsibilities, the legislator implemented certain

quality standards and requirements regarding the service provider as well as the

monitoring of the fund management.

Next to the emergence of all these assisting companies, also new AIFM will enter the

market to market their funds in Europe. The intention of this strategic step is that it seems

to be easier for some companies to found a subsidiary in the EU than reorganize their

118 Bearing Point, White Paper - Asset Management 119 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD 120 BVI, Verwahrstellenstatistik 2013 121

Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD


30

whole organization worldwide to comply with the new legal framework in Europe. This

applies especially to off shore funds such as those on the Cayman Islands.122

4.3. Impact on fund types

Due to regulation, the impact between different alternative investment fund types can

differ significantly. Thus classical alternative investments funds, such as private equity,

venture capital, hedge funds, and closed-ended funds will need more adjustments than

investment funds which came under the AIFMD, such as open-ended real estate funds,

institutional funds, and other non-UCITS funds. The largest strategic challenge for all

alternative investment funds will be to build a strong position for the future, by

implementing the new requirements in the operational structure in such a way that

flexibility, efficiencies and compliance can be ensured.123 The operational challenges can

be divided in to eight categories: capital requirements, risk management, rules &

valuations, provisions regarding

outsourcing, depository,

transparence, leverage, as well

as sales and marketing.

Capital requirements mainly

affect all funds with illiquid

investment strategies. That

means private equity, venture

capital, hedge funds and closed

ended funds. Due to the new

regulations, the initial capital of

these funds has to be increased,

and additional own funds are

required, dependently on the

assets under management. According to § 25 KAGB, the AIFM must provide an additional

amount of equity, equal to 0.02% of the amount by which the assets under management

of the AIFMs exceed EUR 250 million. However, the sum of the initial capital and the

additional equity shall not exceed the threshold of EUR 10 million.

The need for action regarding risk management is estimated to be medium to high

because of two reasons. Firstly, risk management is one of the cornerstones of the

122 Bearing Point, White Paper - Asset Management 123 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD


31

AIFMD to ensure the financial market stability. Hence, stricter rules were implemented.

However, these rules do not mitigate or restrict the risk as one would assume, the new

risk management rules oblige fund managers only to disclose the entered risks in at high

frequent intervals124. This enhances the investors’ protection125. In order to also ensure the

financial markets’ stability the BaFin has reserved the right to examine and authorize the

level of systemic risk within alternative investment funds. The second reason for the

increased need of action is that classical alternative investment funds did not have the

obligation to implement a risk management so far, neither by regulatory nor company law.

Therefore, classical alternative funds have to catch up with the traditional funds in respect

of this point. This new challenge is also connected with a lot of resources, since the

legislator opted the option of outsourcing out, § 36 KAGB.

As explained in the previous section, outsourcing will become a big deal in the near future,

not only from an economic but also from a legal perspective. The legislator tries to govern

the outsourcing process by implementing restrictions regarding the scope and

requirements for the quality of the service provider. That leads not only to the illegality of

the common letterbox company, but also complicates the implementation process of the

new regulations within a private equity or venture capital organization. Therefore, classical

alternative investment funds have to build on their own expertise, instead of outsourcing

the respective responsibilities, which might had been more favorable from an economic

perspective.126

The depositary will be a comprehensive issue for the hedge fund industry. Hedge fund

strategies are characterized as very complex investment structures executed at high

frequency, and really fast. In this light, general tasks of a depositary, such as

management of payment transaction, safe keeping of the invested assets, as well as

control obligations towards the fund manager, could be prove difficult.

Another critical operational topic for the classical alternative investment funds is

transparency. Hedge funds and private equity firms belonged, not for nothing, to the

shadow banking system. These funds were, to a certain extent, transparent to its

investors, but not, however, to the respective supervisory authority. This will change now.

Due to legal requirements, private equity and hedge funds have to provide not only

reports about their investments to the authority, but also information regarding their

124

Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD 125

Jirasakuldech et al., Financial disclosure 126 (Theoretical economic losses can emerge in case one does not pursue the cheapest sourcing option. Cf. Make or Buy Principal


32

organizational structure such as the remuneration system of managers to be

authorized.127

The regulator also put an end to excessive use of leverage. With the § 215 KAGB, the

legislator implemented the obligation of the AIFM to report the leverage-related changes

and KPIs to the investor and the BaFin. The BaFin has the duty to control the leverage

regarding systematic risks for the stability of the financial markets. In case a threat exists,

the BaFin is obliged to restrict these. Furthermore, § 263 caps the leverage within a

closed ended mutual AIF to 60% of the assets under management. Hedge funds, on the

other hand, do not have that cap; however, they also do have the reporting obligation.

These new legal requirements regarding leverage do not jeopardize the existence of a

business model; they only enhance transparency of the entered risks. However, for the

fund management this enhanced transparency is connected to a lot of reporting and

documentation, which in the end implicates higher costs and reduced flexibility.128

All these operational challenges are naturally related to higher costs which lead to margin

pressure within funds. Furthermore, these increased requirements demand more time,

which could harm the execution of investments. Especially, the areas of hedge funds and

venture capital investments can be time sensitive, hence be connected with a loss of

performance or higher costs,129 and hence reduce the competitiveness in a global market.

4.4. Strategic impacts on the regional and global competitiveness

The impact of the AIFMD on the global as well as on the regional competitiveness of the

European fund market is a controversially discussed topic. In respect to the global

competitiveness, some experts speak about the EU as a “fortress” towards third

countries;130 other experts state that it the competitiveness will benefit from these

regulations.131 However, when regulatory measures are compared on a global scale, a

great discrepancy can be observed. On the one side are the United States and the

European Union, with their wave of regulations for alternative investment funds, and on

the other side is Asia, without these measures. The questions which rises out of this

subject matter is whether regulations are beneficial or costly for an industry, and thus the

EU loses its competitiveness in the global market. The latter aspect is, at that point of

time, unforeseeable. However, in the short term, European AIFs have to face higher costs

127 Citi OpenInvestor, New risks for hedge funds 128 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD 129 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD 130 Klinz, parliamentary speech about AIFMD 131 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD


33

due to the new regulation, which could be seen as competitive disadvantage. Despite the

increasing costs, the AIFMD may lead to a certain re-domiciliation of fund managers in the

EU, which could be accounted as benefit.132 This decision is mainly driven by the

respective investors who appreciate regulated and transparent environments. Also the

fear that domestic AIF’s leave the EU will not occur as significant as expected in the

beginning.133 Even, some experts expect that, in the long run, the European fund market

will benefit from these new standards because of standardization and professionalization.

Enhanced transparency and increased compliance requirements are reasonable because

after the implementation, efficiencies in form of economies of scale can be achieved by

optimization. Hence, the AIFMD’s economic impact on the fund industry has to be

assessed differentially due to changes over time.

The AIFMD also leads to competitive change within the EU (on the regional basis). One

would assume, due to the uniform requirements and the EU marketing passport, that the

competitiveness across countries would be equal, it is not. Italy for example had, previous

to the AIFMD, a highly regulated closed-ended fund market which had reduced the

implementation requirements and hence leading to a competitive edge. Therefore,

countries which have a backlog demand will suffer a loss of competitiveness in the short

run. However, as soon as they have caught up with the uniform legal requirements, this

loss of competitiveness will be gone. This short-term reduction of competitiveness,

however, will not lead to any significant impact.134

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to identify and evaluate the legal and economic

consequences of the new compliance and risk management provision in the new

Investment Code (KAGB) for the alternative investment fund industry. In a brief overview

of alternative investments, a legal analysis compared the progress of compliance and risk

management obligations, as well as the interaction with other fields of law, such as the

company law; an economic analysis studied the impact on market participants and

different fund types. It can be concluded that the new compliance and risk management

provisions will fulfill the objectives of the EU legislator to ensure financial market stability

and investor protection, albeit connected with costs for several market participants in the

short term.

132 The study of the Luxemburg Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (LPEA) supports this strategic shift from off- to on-shore products with recent observations 133 Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of the AIFMD 134 Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the AIFMD


34

Especially, unregulated classical alternative investment funds are affected by the new

regulation, and have to catch up with the funds already regulated. These types of funds

have to face challenges in regard to capital requirements and transparency obligations.

Particularly, the transparency obligation towards the competent authority is an obstacle,

as it is connected with a lot of documentation and evaluation, in other words, costs. But

these challenges will lead to the emergence of new businesses that focus exactly on

these assisting tasks.

The legal impact of the new German Investment Code on the alternative investment fund

is significantly. Not only because it introduces for the first time a regulation to this industry

but also because compliance and risk management obligations were enhanced due to the

financial crisis. These regulatory obligations also “outperform” the organizational

obligations under company law. This is caused by the public interest of the regulatory law

which differs from the objectives of the company law, which could led to areas of tensions,

however, with the help of the legality principle and the principle-based approach, the

legislator is able to implement the regulations in the company law relatively smoothly.


35

Appendix

Appendix 1: Interview am 10. Juli 2014 mit Frau Dr. Carmen von Nell Breuning

(Frau von Nell arbeitet bereits seit zehn Jahren in der Finanzindustrie und ist seit fünf

Jahren bei Ernst & Young im Private Equity Business Development tätig.)

CN: Carmen Nell; PS: Patrick Schulz

PS: Die AIFMD ist eine Managerregulierung im Gegensatz zu den anderen

nationalen Gesetzen, die bis jetzt hauptsächlich Produktregulierungen waren, ist

dieser Ansatz der Managerregulierung der richtige Ansatz um die Alternative

Investment Fonds Industrie zu regulieren?

CN: Der Ansatz einer Managerregulierung war daher getrieben, dass man realisiert hat,

wie groß und wie verschieden das Produktangebot in diesem Segment ist und dass es

schwierig bzw. unübersichtlich geworden wäre, alle möglichen Produkte in diesem

Bereich zu regulieren. Deshalb hat man sich bei der Regulierung auf den Manager

konzentriert. Dies macht Sinn, weil der Manager die Verantwortung für die

Vermögenswerte trägt und diese verwaltet. Zudem bestand hierbei die Möglichkeit, eine

Regulierung präzise zu formulieren.

Die Definition des Managers ist klar definiert worden durch seinen Aufgabenbereich.

Sobald jemand das Portfoliomanagement und / oder das Risikomanagement eines AIF

innehat, ist er der Manager. Alle Produkte und Fonds, die er verwaltet werden dann

reguliert. Dieser Ansatz ist sicherlich effizient und auch sinnvoll.

PS: Durch die AIFM Regulierung entsteht für manche unregulierten Fonds ein

gewisser Wettbewerbsnachteil auf dem globalen Markt. Wie groß schätzen Sie

diesen Nachteil aufgrund der regulatorischen Eingriffe ein?

CN: Dies ist ein viel diskutiertes Thema im Rahmen des „level playing field“ mit vielen

unterschiedlichen Meinungen.

Einige sprechen in diesem Kontext von einer „EU Festung“ gegenüber anderen Ländern.

Vergleicht man USA, EU und Asien, besteht aktuell sicherlich ein großer Unterschied

zwischen USA und EU auf der einen Seite und Asien auf der anderen Seite. In den USA

gab und gibt es eine ähnlich motivierte Regulierungswelle für die Alternative

Investmentfonds Industrie. Ob wir einen Wettbewerbsnachteil der EU gegenüber anderen


36

Regionen sehen werden, bleibt noch abzusehen. Das geht erst mit dem Sommer 2015

richtig los. Es wird sicher so sein, dass einige Fonds die EU verlassen. Es wird aber auch

so sein, dass andere Fonds bzw. deren Manager in die EU redomizilieren. Die

Entscheidung in die ein oder andere Richtung wird vorrangig Investoren getrieben sein.

Luxemburg zum Beispiel als „On-shore Fondsplatz“ ist für Private Equity Fonds oder

Alternative Investment Fonds schon seit langem ein attraktiver Standort. Die Luxemburger

Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (LPEA) hat vor kurzem eine Studie in

Luxemburg durchgeführt bzgl. der zukünftigen Nachfrage für Off- und On-shore

Standorte. In Luxemburg operierende Private Equity Häuser haben in dieser Umfrage

bestätigt, dass sie eine verstärkte Nachfrage nach On-shore Produkten sehen. Die neue

Regulierung wird unmittelbar erst einmal zu höheren Kosten führen. Kleine Fonds und

deren Manager werden tendenziell am meisten davon betroffen sein. Durch die

Regulierung wurde die Hemmschwelle angehoben, einen Fonds neu aufzulegen. Da

überlegt sich ein Manager zweimal, ob er einen Fonds auflegen möchte. Diese

Anfangseffekte können auch schon zu einer eingeschränkten Konkurrenz am Markt

führen. Langfristig glaube ich aber, dass durch die Regulierung Standards im Markt

gesetzt werden, welche die Fondsindustrie effizienter gestalten. Verstärkte Transparenz

und erhöhte Compliance Vorschriften machen Sinn, und wenn diese erst einmal

implementiert und optimiert sind, können Skaleneffekte (Economies of Scale) erreicht

werden. Langfristig sind die Auswirkungen der AIFMD in Bezug auf die

Wettbewerbsfähigkeit demnach durchaus differenziert einzuschätzen. Auch dass die

Fonds die EU aufgrund der Regulierung verlassen und in Off-shore Länder umsiedeln,

wird sicherlich nicht so stark eintreten wie am Anfang erwartet, weil Investoren ein

reguliertes und transparentes Umfeld durchaus zu schätzen wissen.

PS: Und was sind die größten strategischen Herausforderungen für Alternative

Investment Fonds?

CN: Die größte strategische Herausforderung für AIFs ist wirklich das operative Umfeld:

die Prozesse aufzusetzen und einzuhalten. Hierbei geht es künftig um sehr viel

Dokumentation. Bewertung ist sicherlich auch ein großes Thema. Also die internen

operativen Prozesse sind sicherlich die größte Herausforderung in naher Zukunft, die es

zu bewältigen gilt. Diese sind selbstverständlich mit Kosten verbunden.

PS: Laut dem BVI, kommt die Alternative Investment Fondsindustrie unter

Margendruck. Ist das nur durch die neue Regulierung bedingt oder gibt es auch

andere Kostentreiber?


37

CN: Der Margendruck ist primär sicherlich durch die höheren Anforderungen bedingt,

welche zu höheren internen Kosten führen. Daneben kann es zusätzlich zu einem

indirekten Margendruck kommen, der durch Offenlegungspflichten wie zum Beispiel im

Rahmen der Vergütungen der Fondsmanager oder im Rahmen einer erhöhten

Transparenz gegebenenfalls Druck auf Margen verursachen könnte. Aber das sehe ich

nicht an erster Stelle. An erster Stelle dürften es wohl bzw. werden es die internen Kosten

aus den operativen Aspekten sein. Ein anderer Aspekt, der indirekt auch zu höheren

Kosten und damit geringeren Margen führen kann, ist die Überlegung, dass interne

Prozesse aufgrund gestiegener Anforderungen mehr Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. Der

Abschluss und die Durchführung einer Investition bspw. kann länger dauern als dies

früher war. Gerade in Bereichen wie Venture Capital, in denen es darum gehen kann,

schnell eine Investitionen zu tätigen, führt die Regulierung zu Geschwindigkeitseinbußen.

Diese Reduktion an Schnelligkeit kann im Zweifelsfall auch höhere Kosten mit sich

bringen.

PS: Würden Sie sagen, dass Hedge Fonds und Private Equity Fonds am meisten

Handlungsbedarf haben von den Alternative Investment Fonds?

CN: Wo es den größten Handlungsbedarf gibt, kann ich Ihnen leider per se nicht sagen.

Der Handlungsbedarf ist aber sicherlich auch stark abhängig von den nationalen

Rahmenbedingungen. In Luxemburg, zum Beispiel, gab es schon vor der AIFMD ein

relativ stark reguliertes Umfeld für Alternative Investment Fonds. Da wurden schon sehr

viele Anforderungen der AIFMD abgedeckt (bspw. über das Gesetz des Spezialisierten

Investmentfonds von 2007). Von daher gibt es nationale Unterschiede in der EU, was den

Handlungsbedarf angeht, aber für Luxemburg ist der Aufholbedarf relativ klein gewesen.

PS: Was für theoretische Möglichkeiten gibt es denn, die Regulierungen zu

umgehen?

CN: Man braucht keine AIFM Regulierung, wenn man einen Fonds nicht vermarkten

möchte. Im Falle eines „Club Deal“ zum Beispiel, bei dem sich ein paar Investoren zum

Beispiel zum privaten Abendessen treffen und eine hervorragende Idee haben und diese

wenig später in Form eines Fonds realisieren möchten. Unter diesen Bedingungen würde

der Fondsmanager nicht unter den AIFMD fallen, weil es keine aktive Vermarktung der

Fondsanteile gab. Diese Möglichkeit wird in der Praxis allerdings nur eine begrenzte Rolle

spielen. Gleiches gilt für die sogenannte „Reversed Solicitation“. Auch bei diesem Fall


38

geht es wieder darum, dass der Fonds nicht direkt durch den AIFM vermarktet wird,

sondern Investoren ihrerseits den Fondsmanager ansprechen, weil sie gerne ihr Geld in

den entsprechenden Fonds investieren möchten. Auch in diesem Beispiel wird der

Fondsmanager nicht aktiv, sondern die Investoren haben den Fondsmanager aufgesucht.

Das gibt es in der Realität allerdings selten. In jedem Fall würde die passive Haltung des

Fondsmanagers überprüft werden. Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass sobald wir

in den Bereich der Vermarktung kommen und bestimmte Vermögenswerte einen fixen

Grenzwert überschreiten, man von der Regulierung der AIFMD betroffen ist.

PS: Glauben Sie, dass es in der Zukunft noch straffere Regulierungen geben wird,

oder wird es nur noch Anpassungen geben?

CN: Ich glaube, dass es in naher Zukunft weitere Anpassungen geben wird. Der Ursprung

der AIFMD ist als eine politische Reaktion auf die Finanzmarktkrise zu verstehen. Am

Anfang hat man hier durchaus verschiedene Anlageklassen in einen Topf geworfen und

daraus eine Regulierung gebündelt, die dann nur mit sehr starken Lobbying

Anstrengungen angepasst wurden, damit es dann doch zu gewissen Unterscheidungen

zwischen Hedge Fonds, Private Equity und Real Estate gekommen ist. Dazu kam

natürlich noch ein gewisser Zeitdruck. Von daher wird es wohl noch zu weiteren

Anpassungen kommen. Aber dass die Regulierungsdichte an sich noch einmal

angehoben wird, kann ich mir für die kommenden Jahre nicht vorstellen.

PS: Sind die hohen Renditeziele von Hedge Fonds und Private Equity in Gefahr

durch die Regulierung?

CN: Es gibt zwei Renditen. Einmal die der Investition und zweitens die des Fonds. Die

zuerst genannte Rendite wird durch die AIFMD nur begrenzt geschmälert bzw. betroffen

sein. Wenn wir uns nun aber auf der Fondsebene bewegen, dann spielen die erhöhten

Fondskosten für die Umstellung in die Investorenrendite hinein. Diese Kosten werden

steigen, wobei man auch hier abwarten muss, wie stark die jeweiligen steigen. Es gibt

dies bezüglich Schätzungen. Allerdings darf man Economies of Scale auch nicht

vernachlässigen. Die Industrie wird standardisierter und industrialisierter, wird auch ein

Stück professionalisiert (das heißt nicht, dass es bis jetzt nicht professionell war).

Standards werden eingeführt und durch Skaleneffekte bleibt es abzuwarten, wie sich

Kosten langfristig entwickeln werden.


39

PS: Was für Auswirkungen hat das Asset Stripping Gesetz auf das Geschäftsmodell

von PE Fonds?

CN: Eine Umwandlung des grundlegenden Geschäftsmodells wird es ganz sicher nicht

geben. Die Provision of Asset Stripping ist hauptsächlich von einigen Negativbeispielen

getrieben, die es in der Industrie natürlich gab und weiterhin gibt. Letzten Endes ist das

Geschäftsmodell von Private Equity Fonds langfristig, wir sprechen von 8 bis 10 Jahren,

in ein Unternehmen zu investieren (unterstützt durch Leverage) und durch operative

Maßnahmen auf Unternehmensebene das Unternehmen attraktiver zu gestalten in dem

die Gewinnmarge bzw. die Gewinne erhöht werden. Demnach wird die Asset Stripping

Regulierung den Handlungsspielraum von private Equity Häusern ein wenig einschränken

aber es wird nicht zu einer fundamentalen Umwandlung des Geschäftsmodells kommen.

PS: Was sind die gravierendsten Einschnitte für ein Asset Manager? Was muss er

ab sofort berücksichtigen?

CN: Er betritt ein komplett neues Feld. Der AIFM ist zum ersten Mal wirklich reguliert.

Dabei kann er gewisse Aufgaben delegieren, wie zum Beispiel entweder das

Risikomanagement oder das Portfoliomanagement; aber nur unter gewissen

Vorschriften. Er befindet sich in einer komplett anderen Situation als vorher. Für ihn ist die

Umstellung am größten, da er von allen Aspekten betroffen ist durch seine zentrale Rolle

in der Regulierung. Den größte Impact werden die Mindestkapitalanforderungen,

Reporting- und Bewertungspflichten mit sich bringen.

PS: Inwieweit unterscheiden sich die Risikomanagementsysteme von einem Private

Equity Fonds von einem normalen Investmentfonds?

CN: Man kann die beiden nicht vergleichen. Bei Private Equity zum Beispiel sprechen wir

von Beteiligungen, bei denen der Fondsmanager mit seinem Team auch auf der

operativen Ebene sehr aktiv ist, wodurch ganz andere (unternehmerische) Risiken

berücksichtigt werden müssen. Bei einem normalen Investmentfonds dagegen beschäftigt

man sich hauptsächlich mit der Volatilität und Korrelation der Investitionen.

PS: Glauben Sie, dass eine neue Blase durch die Möglichkeit der Abtretung der

Haftung entstehen könnte?


40

CN: Man muss sicherlich abwarten, inwieweit Fonds die Möglichkeit der

Haftungsverlagerung nutzen werden, um diese Frage beantworten zu können. Ich

persönlich schätze das Risiko als relativ begrenzt ein. Aber natürlich stellt sich diese

Frage auf diversen Ebenen: bspw. auf der Ebene der Depotbanken, die auch Haftung

übernehmen. Welche Depotbank ist noch bereit, diese Funktion zu übernehmen? Es wird

sicher einige Banken geben, die das nicht für Private Equity Fonds machen werden,

wegen der erweiterten Haftung und da tritt auch wieder die Frage auf, inwieweit gibt es

dort eine Blase oder eine Marktkonzentration, die zu systemischen Risiken führen könnte

auf Ebene der Depotbanken. Das alles muss man abwarten. Ich glaube, dass die Haftung

auf die Sicherung doch limitiert bleibt, und vermute, dass genügend Depotbanken diesen

Schritt gehen werden, so dass so dass sich Marktrisiken in dieser Hinsicht in Grenzen

halten sollten.

PS: Inwieweit ist der Vertrieb von der AIFMD betroffen?

CN: Sobald ein AIFM den EU-Vermarktungspass hat, sollten seine Möglichkeiten zum

Vertrieb der Fondsanteile positiv und vereinfacht sein. Dies war ja eine klare Ausage der

AIFMD. Zu bedenken gilt hierbei, dass Investoren für Alternative Investment Fonds keine

Retail-Investoren sind, sondern professionelle / institutionelle / informierte Anleger, die in

der Regel im Rahmen spezifischer Road-Shows angesprochen werden. Der faktische

Nutzen des EU-Vermarktungspass in AI-Bereich kann hinterfragt werden. Die

Vermarktung wird jedoch in jedem Fall konstant oder besser.

Appendix 2: Interview mit Frau Eickermann und Herrn Matthias am 21. Juli 2014

(Frau Eickermann ist seit über zwanzig Jahren für PwC und Vorgänger-Gesellschaften im

Immobilien-Asset-Management tätig. Seit 2002 berät sie als Partnerin mit ihrem Team bei

Wachstums- und Konsolidierungsstrategien, Performanceoptimierungen und dem

Management der Chancen und Risiken. Herr Matthias ist seit 4 Jahren bei PwC und ist

spezialisiert auf Risikomanagement)

SE: Susanne Eickermann: JM: Johannes Matthias; PS: Patrick Schulz

PS: Die AIFMD ist eine Managerregulierung im Gegensatz zu den anderen

nationalen Gesetzen, die bis jetzt hauptsächlich Produktregulierungen waren, ist


41

dieser Ansatz der Managerregulierung der richtige Ansatz um die Alternative

Investment Fonds Industrie zu regulieren?

SE: Bisher hat das Investmentgesetz schon Einfluss darauf genommen; inwieweit

Kapitalanlagegesellschaften zu organisieren und zu managen sind. Dadurch war es kein

reiner Produktansatz gewesen, sondern hat auch bisher schon Managementkomponenten

gehabt. Dort wurden schon Compliance und Risikomanagement Thematiken

angesprochen. Der Fokus des KAGBs liegt eher auf der Ausweitung der Regelungen auf

alle Marktteilnehmer, nicht nur auf die der offenen und der Spezialfonds; sondern

zusätzlich auch auf die Manager der geschlossenen Fonds.

Der Ansatz ist durchaus sinnvoll, dass in einem Gesamtmarkt alle Marktteilnehmer ein

gewisser Standard abgerungen wird, um in solche Produkte zu investieren. Damit das

Hauptziel der Richtlinie, das systemische Risiko in den Griff zu bekommen und den Markt

und die Marktteilnehmer zu schützen, erreicht werden kann.

PS: Durch die AIFM Regulierung entsteht für manche unregulierten Fonds ein

gewisser Wettbewerbsnachteil auf dem globalen Markt. Wie groß schätzen Sie

diesen Nachteil aufgrund der regulatorischen Eingriffe ein?

SE: Um die Auswirkung auf die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu verstehen, sollte man sich

zunächst die regionale Ebene anschauen. Im regionalen Wettbewerb stehen hier sicher

Deutschland und Luxemburg als zwei relevante Fondsstandorte sich gegenüber.

Eigentlich sollte man meinen, dass wir durch eine europäische Regulierung keine

Unterschiede mehr haben, da die Märkte jetzt nach dem gleichen Maßstab arbeiten

müssen und da es keine indirekten Vorteile einer Luxemburger Fondsplattform mehr gibt.

Trotz dieser Vereinheitlichung bestehen immer noch indirekte Vor- und Nachteile, sodass

die Vorteile der Luxemburger Fondsplattform zum Beispiel aufgrund ihrer

Vehikelangebote auch nach wie vor weiter bestehen werden. Dafür haben Luxemburger

mit anderen Herausforderungen zu kämpfen wie zum mit den Anforderungen an den

Manager, da die Briefkastenfunktion nicht mehr akzeptiert wird. Das wird sicherlich auch

Kosten in Anspruch nehmen bzw. zu Personalverschiebung führen. In anderen

europäischen Ländern wie Italien zum Beispiel existierten bereits umfassende

Regulierungen für geschlossene Fonds; wodurch die neuen regulatorischen Anpassungen

eher geringer ausfallen werden als anders wo. Die Auswirkung für Manager

geschlossener Fonds wird in Deutschland sicherlich am stärksten sein, weil Deutschland

der größte europäische Markt ist. Auf globaler Ebene wird eher ein Vorteil als ein Nachteil

aus der Regulierung entstehen. Durch die Regulierung erhalten alle registrierten Fonds


42

die Erlaubnis, in den europäischen Märkten ihre Produkte zu vertreiben (ähnlich wie bei

den UCITS). Das ist sicherlich eine große Vermarktungschance. Allerdings wird die

momentan wenig in den Vordergrund gestellt.

Man muss zusätzlich noch sagen, dass das was die regulierten Fondshäuser bis jetzt an

für Regulierungen ausgegeben haben, um den Regulierungsansprüchen zu entsprechen,

das müssen jetzt die geschlossenen Fondshäuser in Form von Projekten nachholen. Das

ist ein gewisser einmaliger Kostenbeitrag, der da zu leisten ist, um einmal auf diesen

Stand zu kommen. Wer weiterhin mitspielen will, muss demnach zahlen. Das ist

zumindest der einmalige Projektaufwand. Da die Produkte gleich zu managen sind, sollte

daraus auf der Produktebene dann kein Nachteil entstehen.

PS: Dadurch entsteht aber auch eine gewisse Hemmschwelle für kleinere und

mittlere Fonds weiterhin mitzuspielen, oder?

SE: Es besteht grundsätzlich noch die Möglichkeit in diesem Geschäft mitzumachen und

sich nicht der Regulierung zu unterziehen, in dem man sich einer Master KVG zur Hilfe

nimmt. Ein geschlossenes Fondshaus, das seine Kompetenzen im Bezug auf Alternatives

wie Flugzeuge, Schiffe etc. im Finden von Assets, deren Strukturierung oder deren

Verpackung hat, können sich einfach einer Master KVG bedienen. Dieses Konzept wurde

in der Vergangenheit schon von einigen Fondshäusern gemacht und wird wohl auch in

Zukunft so gemacht werden, um regulatorische Ansprüche zu erfüllen. Demnach muss

nicht jeder, der in diesem Markt mitspielen will eine KVG sein. Das hängt sehr stark davon

ab, aus welchem Kompetenzumfeld die jeweiligen Unternehmen kommen.

PS: Was ist die größte strategische Herausforderung für Alternative Investment

Fonds?

SE: Die größte Herausforderung besteht darin, sich für die Zukunft geeignet aufzustellen.

Das gilt nicht nur für die geschlossenen Fondshäuser, sondern auch für die Etablierten.

Das ist dadurch begründet, dass die geschlossenen Fondshäuser natürlich gewisse

Ansprüche an den Markt haben, um die Fondsadministration zu bedienen, Technologie zu

bedienen, um Compliance, Reporting angemessen bedienen zu können. Diesbezüglich

positioniert sich der Markt gerade neu. Service Provider, die bis jetzt nur Einzelleistungen

angeboten haben, werden größere Pakete auflegen, um geschlossenen Fondshäusern

ein Großteil der Aufgaben abzunehmen. Demnach ergibt sich als strategische


43

Herausforderung, den optimalen Mix aus Kunden und Produkten zu finden (aus

Eigenleistung und Netzwerk).

PS: Sollte jedes Fondshaus seine Wertschöpfungskette und sein Business Modell

überprüfen?

SE: Ja auf jeden Fall. Die Herausforderung für die Geschäftsmodelle ist Effizienz,

Flexibilität und ein qualifiziertes Risikomanagement aufzusetzen.

PS: Was fassen sie alles unter qualifiziertes Risikomanagement?

JM: Zunächst ist erst einmal zu differenzieren zwischen quantitativen und qualitativen

Faktoren, wenn wir gerade von Nachteilen sprechen. In der Initialphase, entstehen

Projektkosten, um überhaupt erst einmal die Konformität zu gewährleisten bevor man sich

für eine AIFM Lizenz erwirbt. Langfristige Kosten im ongoing process sind die dann die

Systeminstandhaltungskosten. Hier ist es ganz entscheidend zu differenzieren zwischen

der offenen und der geschlossenen Welt. In der offenen Welt sind die neuen Regelungen

gar nicht so neu, wogegen für die geschlossene Welt dieses qualitative

Risikomanagement eine ganz große Hürde darstellt. Sie müssen neue Strukturen

implementieren, sie brauchen neue Teams, neue Mitarbeiter, die bis auf die

Geschäftsführung unabhängig sind. Auch für Bewertungsverfahren oder

Reportingprozesse und Auslagerung werden neue Mitarbeiter gebraucht. Die offene

Fondswelt hat im Ongoing process gar nicht mal so viele neue Kosten im

Risikomanagement als die der geschlossenen Fonds. Beide müssen sich Know How

aneignen, sich personell verstärken in den Bereichen des Risikomanagements, um

Risikomanagementprozesse, -strategien zu definieren und denen einen systematischen

Prozess zu hinterlegen.

PS: In wieweit schmälert die neue Regulierung das Renditepotenzial von Hedge

Fonds und Private Equity Firmen

JM: Genau das tut sie eigentlich nicht. Nirgends in der Anforderung steht, dass hohe

Risiken nicht eingegangen werden können. Hedge Fonds und Private Equity können so

hohe Risiken eingehen wie sie wollen aber müssen das transparente Verhältnis von

Risiko zu Rendite wahren und darstellen. Das heißt, sie müssen irgendwie mit Zahlen

darstellen, welche Risiken sie eingehen und das der regulatorischen Aufsicht und den


44

Investoren gegenüber anzeigen und erklären können. Wenn man dann noch ein wenig

über den Tellerrand hinausschaut zu den UCITS Fonds, findet man eine bessere

Einteilung. Dort spricht man von Risikoklassen (1 bis 7). Diese werden darauf

ausgehangen, wie volatil die Produkte innerhalb eines Jahres sind. Demnach können

Hedge Fonds Schwankungen von 25% haben, solange man es plausibel begründen kann

und sie den Investoren und der Aufsichtsbehörde angezeigt werden. Das einzige was

gedeckelt wurde, sind die Leverage Effekte. Damit ist nicht Leverage als

Fremdkapitalposition zu sehen, sondern aus einer makroökonomischen Perspektive.

Zusammenfassen kann man sagen, dass es keine Dezimierung von Risiken gibt, sondern

Transparenz und Darstellung verstärkt wurden, die quantitative erfasst werden müssen,

um für Dritte nachvollziehbar zu sein.

PS: Ist das Aufsetzen eines Risikomanagementsystems, die größte operative

Herausforderung?

JM: Ja, besonders bei geschlossenen Fonds. Bei offenen Fonds ist es eher das Reporting

aufgrund der großen Vielfalt an Produkten.

PS: Glauben Sie, dass es in der Zukunft noch straffere Regulierungen geben wird,

oder wird es nur noch Anpassungen geben?

JM: Gerade im Risikomanagement sehen wir jetzt schon, dass die ESMA das

federführend in Europa vorantreibt und Kommentaren veröffentlicht hinsichtlich

Risikomanagementsystem (was Risikoprofil, Risikobewertung und -funktion angeht). Was

lokale Aufsichtsbehörden angeht, geht man davon aus, dass diese den Gürtel in Zukunft

noch enger schnallen werden und weitere Verschärfungen veranlassen (gerade was die

quantitative Welt angeht wie zum Beispiel die Berechnung von Kennzahlen,

Risikostrategie, Risikoprofile oder Risikobewertung)

SE: Im Bereich Compliance werden noch 80 weitere Detailverordnungen erwartet, und da

kann man frohen Mutes sagen „da wird noch was kommen“

PS: Inwiefern werden Alternative Investment Fondsmanager vom Outsourcing

Gebrauch machen?


45

SE: Der Outsourcing Ansatz wird sehr intensiv sein. Alles was annähernd eine

Commodity ist wird outgesourced. Das KAGB beschreibt ja heute schon nur zwei

Kernaufgaben nämlich Portfolioverwaltung und Risikomanagement als Kernaufgaben des

Managers. Daraus ergibt sich für mich, dass alles andere Beiwerk ist und wenn das

irgendwo günstiger eingekauft werden kann dann wird das auch extern zugekauft. Gerade

Technologie, und Ähnliches wird Teil einer Fondsadministration sein die Daten

bereitstellen, da wird kein Fondshaus dies bzgl. sich hinsetzten und das versucht, selber

aufzusetzen.

PS: Werden sich Fondshäuser eher für interne oder externe KVGs entscheiden?

SE: Es kommt auf die ganz auf die Struktur drauf an. Stellen Sie sich vor sie haben 1,000

Fonds und jeder Fonds selber müsste einen internen AIFM stellen und dann in dieser

Struktur zwei Geschäftsführern beschäftigen, die darauf minimale Zeit verwenden. Das ist

undenkbar. Kumuliert sind dann natürlich schnell die Schwellenwerte erreicht, wodurch

sie überlegen müssen welche Funktionen sie wieder benötigen. Der Großteil wird von

daher eher einen externen Manager haben. Alles andere, was auf einen internen

Manager hinweist, ist wahrscheinlich eher ein Teil einer Umgehungsstrategie, um

Schwellenwerte nicht zu erreichen.

PS: Wo sehen sie weitere Stolpersteine für AIFMs?

SE: Was sicher noch einmal eine Herausforderung sein wird, ist das Thema Bewertung

und die Compliance im Rahmen der Bewertungsprozesse, wie zum Beispiel für An- und

Verkauf getrennte Bewerter zu haben. Je nach Auslagerung ist die Frage wie offene

Immobilienfonds die tägliche Anteilspreisung angehen. Das sind eher so kleinere und sehr

spezifische Einzelfragen, die man nicht so einfach aufzählen kann.

JM: Im Endeffekt ergeben sich einige Stolpersteine entlang der ganzen Infrastruktur um

Effizienz und Flexibilität sicherzustellen und um langfristig wettbewerbsfähig zu bleiben.

Das Thema ist gerade im Bereich der geschlossenen Fonds ausschlaggebend.


46

List of References

Anson, Mark Handbook of Alternative Assets, New York, John Wiley &

Sons Inc., 2002, cites as: Anson, Handbook of Alternative

Assets

BaFin Merkblatt - Hinweise zur Bereichsausnahme für

Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaften, 23.07.2013, Retrieved

from:

https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/M

erkblatt/mb_130723_ausnahme_kapitalverwaltungsgesellsch

aften.html (Date: 22.07.2014), cited as: BaFin, KWG

exemption

BaFin Häufige Fragen zum Thema Auslagerung gemäß § 36

KAGB, Bonn/Frankfurt, 10. July 2013 (last change: 12. Mai

2014), Retrieved from:

http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/FA

Q/faq_kagb_36_auslagerung_130710.html;jsessionid=A5430

6E657D91ED63872002CA41241CE.1_cid298?nn=2798666#

doc4064466bodyText11 (Date: 18.07.2014), cited as: BaFin,

Questions regarding (Outsourcing) §36 KAGB, Question 1

Baums, Theodor Risiko und Risikosteuerung im Aktienrecht, ZGR 2011, 218–

274, cited as: Baums, ZGR 2011, 218–274

Bearing Point Große Veränderungen im Asset Management, White Paper

2012, Retrieved from: http://www.bearingpoint.com/de-

de/download/0705_WP_DE_AIFM_final_web(1).pdf (Date:

12.07.2014), cited as: Bearing Point, White Paper - Asset

Management

Binder, Jens-Hinrich Vorstandshandeln zwischen öffentlichem und

Verbandsinteresse: Pflichten- und Kompetenzkollisionen im

Spannungsfeld von Bankaufsichts- und Gesellschaftsrecht;

ZGR 2013, 760-801, cited as: Binder, ZGR 2013, 760-801


47

Bundestagsdrucksachen Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im

Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), 13/9712, 28.01.1998, cited

as: BT Druck, 13/9712

Bundestagsdrucksachen Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts

(Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz - BilMoG,16/10067,

30.07.2008, cited as: BT Druck, 16/10067

Bürkle, Jürgen Corporate Compliance - Pflicht oder Kür für den Vorstand der

AG?, Betriebs-Berater, 2005, p. 565, cited as: Bürkle, BB

2005, p. 565

Bürkle, Jürgen Corporate Compliance als Standard guter

Unternehmensführung des Deutschen Corporate

Governance Kodex, Betriebs-Berater, 2007, p. 1797ff, cited

as: Bürkle, BB 2007, p. 1797ff

BVAI Was sind Alternative Investments? Retrieved from:

http://www.bvai.de/alternative-investments/was-sind-

alternative-investments.html (Date: 30.06.2014), cited as:

BVAI, definition of Alternative Investments

BVI BVI Investmentstatistik: Gesamtüberblick, 31.05.2014,

Retrieved from:

http://www.bvi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Statistik/Pressefassu

ng1405.pdf (10.07.2014), cited as: BVI, Investmentstatistik

2014

BVI Das Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch, Retrieved from:

http://www.bvi.de/regulierung/kapitalanlagegesetzbuch/

(03.07.2014), cited as: BVI, das Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch

BVI Verwahrstellenstatistik - Statistik über in Deutschland aktive

Verwahrstellen, BVI website, Decemeber 2013, Retrieved

from: http://www.bvi.de/statistik/verwahrstellen/ (Date:

05.07.2014), cited as: BVI, Verwahrstellenstatistik 2013

Chew, Donald H. Corporate Risk Management, Columbia University Press,


48

2008, cited as: Chew, Corporate Risk Management

Christ, Margaret H.;

Emett, Scott A.;

Summers, Scott L.;

Wood, David

The Effects of Preventive and Detective Controls on

Employee Performance and Motivation, Contemporary

Accounting Research, Summer2012, Vol. 29 Issue 2, p. 432-

452, cited as: Christ et al., Effects of Preventive and

Detective Controls on Employee Performance and Motivation

Citi OpenInvestor New risks for hedge funds, Regulatory Spotlight, September,

2012, Retrieved from:

http://www.citi.com/sfs/docs/CTS_Risk_Articles_HedgeRisk.p

df (22.07.2014), cited as: Citi OpenInvestor, New risks for

hedge funds

Cumming, Douglas;

Haß, Lars Helge;

Schweizer, Denis

Strategic Asset Allocation and the Role of Alternative

Investments, SSRN Working Paper, 2012, Retrieved from:

http://efmaefm.org/0EFMSYMPOSIUM/Toronto-

2011/papers/Schweizer.pdf (Date: 07.07.2014), cited as:

Cuming / Haß / Schweizer, Strategic Asset Allocation

Dornseifer / Jesch /

Klebeck / Tollmann

AIFM -Richtlinie: Richtlinie 2011/61/EU über die Verwalter

alternativer Investmentfonds mit Bezügen zum KAGB-E

Kommentar, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2013, cited as: Editor, in

D/J/K/T, AIFM-RL, Art 1 Rn. 1

Dornseifer, Frank Raus aus Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative

Investments, Börsen-Zeitung, 13.05.2014, No. 90, page B 18,

Retrieved from: https://www.boersen-

zeitung.de/index.php?li=1&artid=2014090808&titel=Raus-

aus-Staatsanleihen-und-Aktien,-rein-in-Alternative-

Investments (5.07.2014), cited as: Dornseifer, Raus aus

Staatsanleihen und Aktien, rein in Alternative Investments

Drechsler, Carola;

Krag, Moritz

Informationszugangsgesetz Schleswig-Holstein (ISZG-SH),A

16 SH, May 2013, Praxis der Kommunalverwaltung, Cited as:

Drechsler/ Karg ,IZG-SH, A 16 SH, § 2, 3.6 Kosten-Nutzen-

Analyse und wirtschaftliche Analysen


49

Dreher, Meinrad Festschrift für Uwe Hüffer zum 70. Geburtstag, C.H. Beck,

Munich, 2010, p. 161 - 178, cited as: Dreher, FS Hüffer, p.

161 – 178

Dreher, Meinrad Kartellrechtscompliance: Voraussetzungen und Rechtsfolgen

unternehmens- oder verbandsinterner Maßnahmen zur

Einhaltung des Kartellrechts, ZWeR 2004, p. 75 -106, cited

as: Dreher, ZWeR 2004, p.74, 79

EFAMA Trends in the European Investment Fund Industry in the first

Quarter of 2014, Quarterly Statistical Release, May 2014,

Retrieved from:

http://www.efama.org/statistics/SitePages/European%20Quar

terly%20Statistical%20Release.aspx (07.07.2014), cited as:

EFAMA, Quarterly Statistical Release Q1/2014

Eickermann, Susanne;

Matthias, Johannes

Interview with Patrick Schulz about economic consequences

of the AIFMD 21.06.2014, available in the Appendix, cited as.

Eickermann/Matthias, Interview about economic impact of the

AIFMD

Ernst & Young The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive -

European Commission adopts Level 2 Regulation,

Quicknews special alert, February 2013, Retrieved

from:http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/European_

Commission_adopts_Level_2_regulation/$File/1301-

1009425_Quicknews_special_alert_final.pdf (Date:

13.07.2014), cited as: Ernst & Young, AIFMD - EU

Commission adopts Level 2 Regulation

European Commission Alternative Investments - Directive on Alternative Investment

Fund Managers, Retrieved from

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_in

vestments/index_en.htm (Date: 22.07.22014), cited as:

European Commission, Website - alternative investments


50

European Commission Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers

(‘AIFMD’): Frequently Asked Questions1, MEMO/10/572,

11.11.2010, Brussels, Retrieved from:

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-572_en.htm

(Date: 22.07.2014), cited as: European Commission, AIFMD

- Frequently asked questions

Financial Conduct Authority

(FCA)

Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD),

published on the 27.05.2014, Retrieved from:

http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-

markets/aifmd (Date: 17.06.2014), cited as: FCA, website –

AIFMD

Fleischer, Holger Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts, C.H. Beck, 2006, Munich,

cited as: Editor, in Fleischer, VorstandsR-HdB, § 19 Rn. 8

Fleischer, Holger Fleischer, Kartellrechtsverstöße und Vorstandsrecht,

Betriebs-Berater, 2008, p. 1070 - 1072; cited as: Fleischer,

BB 2008, p. 1070 – 1072

Fleischer, Holger Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen

Unternehmensverbund, CCZ, 2008, p. 1 -6, cited as:

Fleischer, CCZ, 2008, p. 1 – 6

Grundmann, Stefan;

Mülbert, Peter O.

Corporate Governance – Europäische Perspektiven, ZGR

2/2001, p. 215-224, cited as: Grundmann/Mülbert, ZGR

2001, p. 215-224

Grützner, Thomas;

Jakob, Alexander

Compliance von A-Z, 1. Edition, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2010,

Cited as: Grützner/Jakob, Compliance von A-Z, Vier-Augen-

Prinzip

GSK Stockmann + Kollegen

Rechtsanwälte

Company website, Retrieved from: http://www.aifm-

directive.de/node/11 (Date: 22.07.2014), cited as: GSK


51

Stockmann + Kollegen, company website

GSK Stockmann + Kollegen

Rechtsanwälte

Level 2 - regulatory and implementing technical standards,

Retrieved from: http://www.aifm-directive.de/node/118, Cited

as: GSK Stockmann + Kollegen, Level II Regulations

Hauschka, Christoph E. Corporate Compliance: Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung

im Unternehmen, C.H.Beck, Munich, 2010, cited as: Editor, in

Hauschka, Corporate Compliance, § 8 Rn. 6

Hilton, Max Challenges in risk management, Professional Investor

Magazine, Winter 2012, Retrieved from:

http://www.aima.org/en/education/aimajournal/past-

articles/index.cfm/jid/A2EE7BED-892F-4543-

A8DEE33DAE738F58 (Date. 19.07.2014), cited as: Hilton,

Challenges in Risk Management

Jirasakuldech, Benjamas;

Dudney, Donna;

Zorn, Thomas;

Geppert, John

Financial disclosure, investor protection and stock market

behavior: an international comparison, Review of Quantitative

Finance & Accounting. Aug2011, Vol. 37 Issue 2, p181-205.

25p., cited as: Jirasakuldech et al., Financial disclosure

Jochims, Dörte Privatanleger sollen soviel zahlen wie die Profis,

Handelsblatt, 02.01.2014; Retrieved from:

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/fonds/nachrichten/gesc

hlossene-fonds-privatanleger-sollen-soviel-zahlen-wie-die-

profis/9264500.html (Date: 15.07.2014), cited as: Jochims,

Privatanleger sollen soviel zahlen wie die Profis

Kajüter, Peter Risikomanagement als Controllingaufgabe im Rahmen der

Corporate Governance, Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, 2009,

cited as: Kajüter, in Wagenhofer, Risikomanagement als

Controllingaufgabe, p.109ff

Klinz, Wolf AIFM Debatte, Parliamentary speeches, 10.11.2010,

Brussels, Retrieved from: http://www.wolf-

klinz.de/index.php/nachrichten-details-reden/items/aifm-

debatte.html (Date. 15.07.2014), cited as: Klinz,


52

parliamentary speech about AIFMD

Kort, Michael Risikomanagement nach dem

Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, ZGR 2010, 440-471,

cited as: Kort, ZGR 2010, 440-471

KPMG AIFMD - Richtlinie für Verwalter alternativer Investmentfonds,

Retrieved from:

http://www.kpmg.com/de/de/themen/regulierung/seiten/aifmd.

aspx (Date:25.06.2014), cited as: KPMG, AIFMD - Richtlinie

für Verwalter alternativer Investmentfonds

Linklaters AIFM Directive - Overview, Linklaters website, Retrieved

from:http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/20100218/Pages/

Index.aspx (Date: 22.07.2014), cited as: Linklaters, AIFM

Directive

Loyens Loeff Investment Management & Funds Practice, AIFMD Client

Memorandum, April 2012, Retrieved from:

http://www.loyensloeff.com/nl-

NL/Documents/Nieuws/Publicaties/Brochures/AIFMD_Client_

Memorandum_April_2012.PDF, cited as: Loyens Loeff,

AIFMD Client Memorandum

Markowitz, Harry Portfolio Selection, The Journal of Finance, Volume 7, Issue

1, pages 77–91, March 1952, cited as: Markowitz, Portfolio

Selection

Marston, Richard Portfolio Design: A Modern Approach to Asset Allocation,

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011, cited as: Marston, Portfolio

Design

McKinsey & Company The Mainstreaming of Alternative Investments: Fueling the

Next Wave of Growth in Asset Management, Financial

Service Practice Report 2012, Retrieved from:

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/how_alt


53

ernative_investments_are_going_mainstream (Date:

25.06.2014), cited as: McKinsey, Mainstreaming of

Alternative Investments

Möllers / Kloyer Das neue Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch: Tagung vom 14./15.

Juni 2013 in Augsburg, C.H. Beck, cited as: Editor, in Möllers

/ Kloyer, das neue KAGB, Rn. 1

Morgan Stanley Introduction to Alternative Investments Q1, 2011, Company

Report, Retrieved from:

http://www.morganstanleyfa.com/public/projectfiles/2dfe5906-

8a8b-49c9-b761-fb0a3a3de7a8.pdf (Date: 25.06.2014) cited

as: Morgan Stanley, Introduction to Alternative Investments

Nell-Breuning, Carmen Interview with Patrick Schulz about economic consequences

of the AIFMD 10.06.2014, available in the Appendix, cited as.

Nell-Breuning, Interview about economic consequences of

the AIFMD

OLG Celle Judgment of 28.05.2008 - 9 U 184/07, WM2008, 1745, 1756,

cited as: OLG Celle, WM2008, 1745, 1756

PricewaterhouseCoopers

(PwC)

KAGB fordert die Manager von Alternativen Fonds heraus,

published at company's website, Retrieved from:

http://www.pwc.de/de/finanzdienstleistungen/aifmd-neue-

herausforderungen-im-asset-management.jhtml (Date:

01.07.2014), cited as: PricewaterhouseCoopers (Pwc),

company website

Raiser, Thomas;

Veil, Rüdiger

Recht der Kapitalgesellschaften: Ein Handbuch für Praxis

und Wissenschaft, Verlag Fran Vahlen, Munich, 2010, cited

as: Raiser/Veil, Kapitalgesellschaften § 14 Rn. 65

Roggenbuck, Harald Grundsätze der Unabhängigkeit sowie Funktionstrennung, in

Hopt/Wohlmannstetter, Handbuch Corporate Governance

von Banken, 1. Edition , Vahlen / C.H. Beck, 2011, cited as:

Editor, in Hopt/Wohlmannstetter, Handbuch Corporate


54

Governance von Banken, p. 627 – 651

Romba, Eric Die AIFM-Richtlinie – Zeitenwende am Fondsmarkt?

Management, Marktregulierungen und Zukunft

geschlossener und offener Fonds, Heuer Dialog, Retrieved

from: http://www.heuer-dialog.de/n10254 (Date 05.07.2014),

cited as: Romba, Zeitwende am Fondsmarkt

Romeike, Frank Lexikon Risiko-Management (Bank Verlag Köln 2004), cited

as: Romeike, Lexikon Risiko Management

Saenger, Ingo; Lenkaitis,

Karlheinz; Seckmann,

Gerhard

Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, 2. Edition, Nomos, Baden

Baden, 2011, cited as: Peschke, in Saenger et. al, Handels

und Gesellschaftsrecht, § 8, Rn. 777

Schmidt, Bernd Compliance in Kapitalgesellschaften, Nomos

Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 2010, cited as: Schmidt,

Compliance in Kapitalgesellschaften

Schneider, Uwe H. Compliance als Aufgabe der Unternehmensleitung, ZIP,

2003, p. 645ff, cited as: Schneider, ZIP, 2003, 645ff

Spindler, Gerald Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz,4. Auflage 2014,

C.H. Beck, cited as: Spindler, Münch Komm AktG, §91 Rn.

15

State Street Risk Awareness Increased Sharply Since Financial Crisis

Says EIU Study, Press Release, May 2013; Retrieved from:

http://www.statestreet.com/wps/portal/internet/corporate/hom

e/aboutstatestreet/newsmedia/pressreleases/pressreleasedet

ail/!ut/p/c4/RY1Li8JAEIR_i4eccuiOibOTY3bBKIJvQXMZOjNt

HEwmYgYX_73xAVKXKuqjCgro5ehmK_K2dVTDHgqh5rs1yt

8oQ7nMEacziePRahyjGMIBip9vv5ivRN9P17M4nyDmEWyfi7

p1np1fkj_BIcB_3dS2VM3Zq-5EVzbqAwRo7M12r-

eQnAmvXL3DBwg76zlA3TYXcvewowCrui174GmNSCPNEp

OjTFGPTMqSzVFQkiZIImbYsFN_GVzOVMpsMHgAdhLerw!!

/ (Date: 21.07.2014), cited as: State Street, Increase of Risk


55

Awareness

Summit Declaration The Global Plan of Recovery and Reform 2 April 2009, G-20

Summit Declaration, London, 2009, Retrieved from:

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/

Breg/G8G20/Anlagen/G20-erklaerung-london-

en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (Date: 20.07.2014), cited

as: Summit Declaration, London (2009)

VC-Magazin BAI: Alternative Investments feste Größe bei Investoren,

published on the 12.09.2013, Retrieved from http://www.vc-

magazin.de/news/maerkte-zahlen/item/2395-bai-alternative-

investments-feste-gr%C3%B6%C3%9Fe-bei-investoren

(Date: 15.07.2014), cited as: VC-Magazin, BAI Investor

Survey

Veil, Rüdiger European Capital Markets Law, Hart publishing, Oxford,

2013,p. 431 - 473 cited as: Veil, European Capital Markets

Law § 28 Rn. 1

Veneziani, Vince The Real Story Of How George Soros Shorted The Pound,

Etching His Name Into Financial History Forever, published in

the Business Insider on the 04.06.2014, Retrieved from:

http://www.businessinsider.com/how-george-soros-shorted-

the-pound-etching-his-name-into-financial-history-forever-

2010-6, cited as: Venezaini, the story about George Soros

Weber-Rey, Daniela Ausstrahlung des Aufsichtsrechts (insbesondere für Banken

und Versicherungen) auf das Aktienrecht - oder die Infiltration

von Regelungssätzen?, ZGR 2010, 543-590, cited as Weber-

Rey, ZGR 2010, 543-590

Wundenberg, Malte Compliance und die prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über

Bankengruppen, Mohr Siebeck; 1st Edition, 2012, p. 118ff,

cited as: Wundenberg, Compliance und prinzipiengeleitete

Aufsicht über Bankengruppen


56

Yale Investment Office 2013 The Yale Endowment, Retrieved from:

http://investments.yale.edu/images/documents/Yale_Endow

ment_13.pdf (25.06.2014) cited as: Yale Investment Office,

Report 2013

Zuckerman, Gregory The Greatest Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of

How John Paulson Defied Wall Street and Made Financial

History, Crown Business; Reprint edition (December 7,

2010), cited as: Zuckerman, the Greatest Trade Ever