Crim procedureManila Railroad Company v. Attorney- General et alG.R. NO. L-6891; March 8, 1912

*Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; while the venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of parties.*

Carson, J.

Facts: Defendant was a tenant of a large tract of land belonging to the Insular Government and known as the Hacienda de los Frailes, and that such tenant and by virtue of a waiver by the Government of its claim to compensation in his favor, he is entitled to compensation for the value of the mejoras (improvements) on the land held by him as tenant and condemned in favor of the plaintiff company. The mejoras (improvements) on the tract of land in question consisted largely of plants and trees, such as naranjitos, abacas, platanos, and trees of many other varieties. Defendant questions the value of certain mejoras which are alleged to have been either destroyed or used by the agents and employees of the plaintiff company. Plaintiffs also claim the value of certain improvements destroyed by fire alleged to have been caused by agents and employees of plaintiffIn addition to the mejoras there was a claim for P400, for money which defendant claimed he paid out in clearing and preparing for cultivation certain tracts of the land which where thereafter occupied and appropriated by the plaintiff company. The plaintiff's contention is that the amount of damages awarded is grossly excessive and unjust and that the amount awarded in the report of the commissioners should have been reduced.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable for the damages caused by the fire.

Held: No. The item of damages, which relates to the destruction of improvements on lands adjoining the condemned lands and which is alleged to have been caused by fire, was not, a proper item for the consideration of the commissioners. The land on which the mejoras (improvements) alleged to have been destroyed by fire were located, was not property taken and used by the plaintiff company for the construction of its railway line. If the plaintiff is liable for this item of damages such liability cannot be enforced in these proceedings. No part of the damages which are alleged to have resulted form the negligent or willful acts of the agents of the company in setting fire to the mejoras (improvements) on lands adjoining the lands actually condemned should have been considered or allowed in these proceedings.

G.R. No. 76119 April 10, 1989

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., AND MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners  vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ESTHER NOBLES BANS, Presiding Judge, Branch LXXI, Zambales and Olongapo City, and ADRIAN S. DELA PAZ, respondents.

 PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment or set aside of the decision ** of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on September 4, 1986 dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari; and its resolution of September 26, 1985 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Adrian dela Paz is a holder of Letters Patent No. 14132 issued by the Patent Office on February 27, 1981 for his alleged invention, Coco-diesel fuel for diesel engines and its manufacture. On March 7, 1983 private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch LXII, for infringement of patent with prayer for payment of reasonable compensation and for damages herein petitioners Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Caltex (Phil.), Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., and Petrophil Corporation (Rollo, p. 31). There was no mention in the complaint of the amount of damages being claimed but private respondent alleged, among others, that the conservative estimate of the combined gross sales of defendants (petitioners herein and Petrophil Corporation) of plaintiffs (private respondents herein) invention is P934,213,780.00 annually computed at the rate of 20 million barrels (volume) being yearly sold by the marketing arms of defendants at the price of P2.938 per liter (Rollo, p. 35). In the hearing of November 13, 1984 private respondent estimated the yearly royalty due him from defendants (petitioners herein and Petrophil Corporation) to be P236,572,350.00 (Rono, p. 39).

During the hearing of February 19,1985, petitioners discovered that private respondent paid only as filing fee the amount of P252.00 based on his claim for attomey's fees in the amount of P200,000.00. Petitioners orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct filing fee (Rollo, p. 14). The parties filed their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 50) with the Solicitor General filing a separate memorandum (Rollo, p. 45) for defendant Petrophil Corporation.

On July 11, 1985, the Regional Trial Court *** issued an order denying the motion to dismiss but ordering private respondent to pay the additional docket fee in the amount of P945,636.90 computed at P4.00 per P1,000.00 in excess of the first P150,000.00 based on the amount of P236,572,350.00 which private respondent explicitly averred in his testimony of November 13, 1984 as the amount he seeks to recover (Rollo, p. 54).

On July 31, 1985, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the trial court requiring him to pay an additional docket fee (Rollo, p. 54) which was opposed by petitioners (Rollo, p. 66) and Petrophil Corporation (Rollo, p. 59). Acting on the motion, on October 30,1985 the trial court issued an order allowing private respondent to pay the required additional docket fee after the prosecution of the case, to be deducted from whatever judgment in damages shall be awarded by the Court (Rollo, p. 70). The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners (Rollo, p. 77) and Petrophil Corporation (Reno, p. 86) were denied by the trial court in its order of November 18,1985 (Rollo, p. 92).

On November 14, 1986, petitioners elevated the case to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari, under the provisions of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to annul and set aside the orders dated October 30,1985 and November 18, 1985 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch LXXII, with prayer for a restraining order/ preliminary injunction (Rollo, p. 93). Respondent Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit in its decision promulgated on September 4, 1986 (Rollo, p. 168). The motion for reconsideration of the decision, filed by petitioners (Rollo, p. 171) was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986 (Rollo, p. 320).

Instant petition was filed with the Court on November 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 11). The Second Division of this Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for in a resolution dated November 17,1986 (Rollo, p. 180), which was issued on November 18,1986, restraining the Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch LXXI her agents, representatives, and/or any person or persons, acting upon her orders or in her stead, from further proceeding with its Civil Case No. 45- 0-83, entitled "Adrian dela Paz v. Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al." (Rollo, p. 181).

On December 2, 1986, private respondent filed a letter with the Court addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Ranjo, praying for the lifting of the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 18,1986 (Reno, p. 198.)

Private respondent filed his comment on the petition on December 15, 1986 (Rollo, p. 187); petitioners filed their reply to comment on January 2, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194). In accordance with the Resolution of the Court, dated January 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 197) private respondent filed his rejoinder on February 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 236).

Petitioners filed on March 2, 1987 their comment on private respondents letter of December 2, 1986 (Rollo, p. 258) in accordance with the Resolution of the Court of March 4, 1987 (Rollo, p. 234).

On March 30, 1987, the Court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition; and (b) to dispense with the memoranda of the parties. In the same resolution the Court considered the case submitted for deliberation (Rollo, p. 261).

Meantime, on February 9, 1987 Judge Esther Nobles Bans inhibited herself voluntarily from further hearing the case due to an alleged verified letter- complaint of private respondent to the Chief Justice for her disqualification/inhibition (Rollo, p. 366) and the case was re-raffled to Branch LXXIII of the Regional Trail Court of Olongapo City, presided over by Judge Alicia L. Santos (Rollo, p. 365).

The given issues of the petition are as follows:

I. Whether or not the trial court can defer the payment of the filing fee till after judgment although the plaintiff (herein private respondent) who is not

a pauper-litigant, could state the amount of damages claimed when he filed his complaint; and

II. Whether or not Section 5, paragraph A, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is applicable to the case at bar.

The main issue in this case is whether or not a party can file a complaint without specifying the amount of damages he is claiming and as a result defer the payment of the proper fees until after trial on the merits, in accordance with the appraisal of the Court.

Under paragraph B No. 11 of the Interim Rules of Court, . . . If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

In the case at bar, private respondent deliberately omitted stating any amount of damages (except attorney's fees), although the same could have been estimated at the filing of the complaint since he already knew the figures of the alleged sales of the petitioner oil companies including the Petrophil, lending credence to petitioners' claim that such omission is deliberate for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the correct fees (Rollo, p. 19).

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Rule applicable to this case is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Concededly, that particular Section 5(a) envisions two kinds of claims, such as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable which fall under the first paragraph thereof and (2) those which could not be immediately ascertained as to the exact amount and which fall under the third paragraph of the same section.

The first paragraph of said section specifies the amount to be paid corresponding to the sum claimed, exclusive of interest, of the value of the property in litigation, or the value of the estate. Under this paragraph, obviously fall claims capable of exact pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, the third paragraph covers claims where the exact amount has to be finally determined by the Court. The third paragraph of the same section provides:

In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be observed that the above provision clearly contemplates an initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved. Conversely, nowhere can a justification be found to convert such payment to something akin to a contingent fee which would depend on the result of the case. Under the circumstances, the Court would stand to lose the filing fees should the party be later adjudged to be not entitled to any claim at all.

Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipments, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours used in handling of each case. The payment of said fees therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken, without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.

In the case at bar, only the amount of P252.00 based on the claim of attorney's fees was paid but such is but a part of his enormous claim for royalties/reasonable compensation, which was not estimated and the corresponding filing fees were left unpaid.

At issue in the trial court, was respondent judge's Order dated July 11, 1985 order private respondent to pay the additional docket fee in the amount of P945,636.90, but upon motion, the Court reconsidered its Order and allowed the plaintiff (private respondent herein) to pay the same after the prosecution of the instant case to be deducted from whatever judgment in damages shall be awarded by the Court.

Relative thereto, there is merit in petitioners' claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or more than what is later proved. If what is proved is less than what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is the difference in the fee and not the whole amount.

Such interpretation would give meaning to the provisions of subject Rule and would implement instead of defeat its objectives.

Corollary thereto, the third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141 which states that:

The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the pauper-litigant.

cannot be applied to the case at bar because said provision specifically refers to pauper-litigants, and nowhere in the records was it shown that private respondent is litigating as a pauper and therefore exempted from the payment of court fees.

Neither is the provision under Section 1 of Rule 111 applicable. The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111 which provides for the institution of criminal and civil actions, reads:

Where the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court where the criminal case is filed. In all other cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the Court shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no

payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court.

The instant case is not a criminal action with the civil action for the recovery of civil liability impliedly instituted with it. On the contrary it is a purely civil action for the recovery of a sum of money in the form of reasonable compensation or royalty payments and/or damages.

Finally, in a similar case, although the trial court was held to have acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the payment of insufficient fees, the Court ruled that the proceedings in the Civil Case may be resumed, after an of the lawful fees shall have been paid. Magaspi v. Ramolete, 115 SCRA 205 [19821).

The Magaspi ruling was overturned in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) which held that non-payment of the correct docket fee was jurisdictional.

Subsequently however, the Manchester doctrine was relaxed in San Insurance Office Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion (G.R. Nos. 79937-38), promulgated February 13,1989, where the Court en banc, thru Mr. Justice Emilio Gancayco, laid down the following rules:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until, and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said hen and assess and collect the additional fee.

Private respondent's right of free access to the courts is not denied by the correct application of the provisions of Rule 141, Section 5(a) in the instant case, because he

has a remedy under the same Rule, where he can apply for the privilege to litigate his case as pauper if he is so entitled.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (2) the order of respondent Judge dated July 11, 1985 is REINSTATED; (3) the case is REMANDED to the trial court; (4) the proceedings in Civil Case No. 45-0-88 are ordered RESUMED upon payment of all lawful fees (as assessed by the Clerk of Court of said Court) by private respondent or upon exemption from payment thereof upon proper application to litigate as pauper; and (5) the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 18,1986 will be deemed LIFTED should Order No. 4 be complied with.

G.R. No. L-17850           November 28, 1964 JOSE MALIMIT, protestant-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO, protestee-appellee.

G.R. No. L-17851           November 28, 1964 JOSE MALIMIT, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Jose Malimit and Esteban Degamo were opposing candidates for mayor, where is Vicente Acain ran for vice Mayor, of Carmen, Agusan, in the general elections held on November 10, 1959. On the 16th of said month the municipal board of canvassers, by a vote of five to three, proclaimed Malimit as mayor-elect but suspended the canvass and corresponding proclamation in relation to the position of vice-mayor, at the request of Acain who claimed that the election returns for two precincts had been tampered with. As the three members of the board of canvassers who voted against the proclamation of Malimit refused to sign the certificate of canvass on the ground that the municipal treasurer's copy of the election returns for precinct No. 6 had been tampered with by making it appear therein that Malimit had obtained 139 instead of 39 votes, the matter was submitted to the Commission on Elections who, on November 24, 1959, nullified the canvass and proclamation made on November 16, and authorized its representative in Agusan to appoint substitutes for the five members of the board of canvassers who voted in favor thereof.

On December 3, 1959, Malimit filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul the above-mentioned resolution of the Commission on Elections and prevent its enforcement, but the same was dismissed for lack of merit.

After a recanvass of the votes for mayor and vice-mayor, the reconstituted board of canvassers, on December 7, 1959, proclaimed Degamo and Palarea as mayor and vice-mayor elect by 1,012 and 944 votes, respectively, as against their closest opponents, Malimit and Acain, who obtained 957 and 483 votes, respectively.

On December 14, 1959 Malimit instituted quo warranto proceedings, against Degamo in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The complaint was later amended to include the office of the vice-mayor (Special Case No. 97), and on December 21, 1959 Malimit also filed an election protest against Degamo in the same court (Election Case No. 16).

On January 4, 1960 Malimit and Acain filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction with Us (G.R. No. L-16445) to annul the proclamation of Degamo and Palarca and prohibit them from assuming office. On May 23, 1960, We dismissed the petition holding that "upon the filing of the aforementioned petition for a writ of quo warranto and election protest on December 17 and 28, 1959, respectively, the Court of First Instance of Agusan acquired exclusive authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of Degamo and the validity of the proclamation made by the municipal board of canvassers on December 7, 1959," and that "We cannot, upon the authority of the petition herein filed on January 4, 1960, determine said question without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of said court of first instance, which is the duty of this body, as the highest Court of the land, not only to respect, but, also to uphold."

On October 8, 1960, the Court of First Instance of Agusan, after a preliminary hearing, issued a resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto mentioned heretofore for having been filed out of time and for lack of jurisdiction, the pertinent portions thereof reading as follows:

After a careful examination of the record of the case, the court finds that on December 14, 1959, Jose Malimit, thru Counsel, mailed to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Agusan one copy of a petition for quo warranto against Esteban Degamo on the ground that the latter was not eligible for the Office of Mayor of Carmen, Agusan, for lack of residence. This letter was received by the Clerk of Court on December 17, 1959. Jose Malimit's counsel in the preliminary hearing manifested that a money order for the amount of P16.00 to cover the docketing fee was enclosed in the envelope containing the petition but this is contradicted by Official Receipt 177450 which shows that the amount of P16.00 was actually received on January 5, 1960, the date when said official receipt was issued.

On January 7, 1960, according to the note of the docket clerk written at the bottom of the petition, said petition was brought to the attention of the Court for the first time and forthwith an order was issued requiring respondent Esteban Degamo to answer the petition within five days from receipt of said order which shall be served upon the latter by the Sheriff.

For failure to pay the sheriff's fees, the order of the Court of January 7, 1960 was not served upon the respondent immediately. Not until March 14, 1960 when the fee was paid that the sheriff transmitted said order to the Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan, for service upon the respondent. This is more than two months from the date of its issuance by the Court.

On June 3, 1960, without leave of Court, the original petition was amended. The amended petition included two quo warrantos, one for the office of Mayor and the other for Vice-Mayor. The consolidation of these twoquo warrantos  in one single case is, in the opinion of the Court, improper, following the spirit of section 174 of the Revised Election Code which provides that each contest shall refer exclusively to one office. Granting, however, that this consolidation is legal, still the amended petition could no longer confer jurisdiction upon the Court because it was filed out of time, to be exact nearly six months after the proclamation of the respondents as mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen.

In fact, even the original quo warranto  for the office of mayor was filed out of time. The proclamation of Esteban Degamo as mayor took place on December 7, 1959 and although the petition for quo warrantowas mailed on December 14, 1959 to the Clerk of Court and under the Rules, the date of mailing is considered the date of filing, yet for lack of docketing fee and extra copy of the petition, said petition was only docketed January 7, 1960 one month after the proclamation of respondent Esteban Degamo. The petition was considered only filed on the date the docketing fee was paid.

Under section 173 of the Revised Election Code, a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one week after proclamation and shall be decided within thirty days from the filing of the complaint. From the records, it is evident that both the original petition and the amended petition for quo warranto were filed out of time and the period of thirty days for hearing and decision has long expired thru the inaction of the petitioner.

The court likewise dismissed the election case of Malimit against Degamo for failure on the part of the former to prosecute his case, and for lack of jurisdiction.

We agree with the trial court that the quo warranto proceeding was commenced after the expiration of the period of one week after proclamation provided therefor by law (Section 173, Revised Election Code). True, the original petition was mailed and addressed to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Agusan on December 14, 1959, but it is likewise true that the required docket fees were paid only on January 5, 1960. This latter date must be deemed to be the real date of filing of the aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed. Before the payment of the docket fees, the case is not deemed duly registered and docketed (Lazaro vs. Endencia, 57 Phil. 552; In the matter of the petition for citizenship of Jimmy Lee, G.R. No. L-15027, January 31, 1964).

It not being disputed that the proclamation of Degamo as mayor-elect was made on December 7, 1959, it is clear that the petition for quo warranto was filed out of time.

With respect to the election protest mentioned heretofore, the record discloses that the same was dismissed not for lack of jurisdiction — as appellant claims in his third assignment of error — but due to his failure to prosecute the case (Order of the lower court of July 18, 1960). Consequently, appellant's contention in this regard is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

MAGASPI VS RAMOLETE

115 SCRA 193 – Remedial Law – Rule 141 – Payment of Docket Fees

Civil Procedure – Pleadings – Amendments

In September 1970, Mario Magaspi et al filed a civil complaint against The Shell Co. of the

Philippines (Shell) for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages.

Magaspi paid Php 60.00 for docket fees.

Shell then filed a motion requesting the court to direct Magaspi to pay the correct docket fees. The

court then ordered the Clerk of Court to make the appropriate computation. The Clerk of Court made

the following summary in computing the docket fee:

Assessed value of the real estate in dispute: Php 17,280.00

Moral damages claimed: Php 500,000.00

Attorney’s Fees claimed: Php 25,000.00

Rentals due: Php 890,633.24

TOTAL: Php 1,657,913.24

Pursuant to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the docket fee for said amount claimed is Php 3,164.00

plus Php 2.00 for Legal Research fee.

The trial court then ordered Magaspi to pay recomputed docket fee minus the Php 60.00 Magaspi

already paid.

Instead of paying Php 3,104.00, Magaspi filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. In the

amended complaint, Magaspi lowered their claims for attorney’s fees, moral damages, and rentals

due.

Shell then filed a motion requesting the court to order Magaspi et al to pay the correct docket fees

and that said docket fees should be computed based on the original complaint and not on the

amendment complaint.

Eventually, RTC Judge Jose Ramolote ruled that the complaint is deemed to have never been filed

because the proper docket fee was not paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is deemed to have never been filed due to nonpayment of the

correct amount of docket fees.

HELD: No. The rule is, a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the

actual date of its filing in court. In this case, the case filed by Magaspi is already deemed filed

because in fact, they already paid the docket fees, albeit the wrong amount. Accordingly, the trial

court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and

regular.

Magaspi must however pay the correct amount of the docket fees and such correct amount should

already be based on the amended complaint and not on the original complaint. When a pleading is

amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned.

MANCHESTER

149 SCRA 562 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Payment of Docket Fees – Claimed

Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings 

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation

against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in

favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of

payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to

P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not

reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00

only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is

primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court

ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to

amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim

for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A

case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the

actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original

complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original

complaint duly filed which can be amended. So the any subsequent proceeding taken in

consideration of the amended complaint is void.

Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not

merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the

complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is

capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body

of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the

payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the

future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers

and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only

in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in

the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this

requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the

record.

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati, for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner SIOL, and including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, the paymentof actual, compensatory, moral, 

exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought saidamount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos(P5,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Case was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant. The Court En banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case directing the judges to reassess the docket fees and requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion. Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

HELD: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency.

ERIBERTO M. SUSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DAVID S. ODILAO, JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 126749. August 21, 1997]

PADILLA, J.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 37311 which dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the order of the RTC (Branch 6) Cebu City which denied his motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not a party litigant, whose complaint has been dismissed by RTC due to improper venue, can seek an authorization from the SC thru the Deputy Court Administrator to re-file his complaint in the court of proper venue without payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Facts: Nov. 15, 1993, private respondent Odilao filed a P5.15 million civil suit for damages against petitioner Suson before the RTC of San Juan (Branch 26), Southern Leyte. Private Respondent claimed that petitioner made false and groundless accusations of graft and corruption against him before the Office of the Ombudsman, and thereafter caused their publication in a Cebu-based local daily under the headline ODILAO SUED FOR GRAFT. According to private respondent, Susons machinations had cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon his person which besmirched his reputation and caused him to suffer moral shock and social humiliation.

Private respondent paid the sum of P25,600.00 in docket fees to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 26) of Southern Leyte covered by Official Receipts Nos. 1937304 in the amount ofP15,450.00 and 1030112 in the amount of P10,150.00, both dated Nov 15, 1993.[2]

Dec. 17, 1993, petitioner Suson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of private respondent Odilao on the ground of improper venue, alleging therein that Odilao resides in Talisay, Cebu and not in Himonganan, Southern Leyte. Finding merit in petitioner’s arguments in his motion to dismiss, the lower court (RTC Southern Leyte) granted petitioners aforesaid motion on May 24, 1994.

Thereafter, private respondent went to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City to re-file the same complaint (except the statement of his actual residence) that was dismissed by the RTC (Branch 26) of Southern Leyte. Private respondent avers that upon showing the official receipts as proof of payment of the docket fees in the RTC of Southern Leyte (Branch 26) to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6), the latter advised his counsel to file a formal request with this Court, thru the Court Administrator, for an authority to apply the payment for docket fees previously made to the RTC (Branch 26), Southern Leyte to the docket fees to be paid to the RTC Cebu City (Branch 6).

June 20, 1994, private respondent, thru counsel, wrote a letter addressed to the SC Court Administrator, requesting for an authorization to consider the filing fees previously paid to the RTC (Branch 26) of San Juan, Southern Leyte as payment for the filing fees to be paid in the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6) where the case was to be re-filed.

July 12, 1994, SC Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis sent a reply to private respondents counsel stating that “In connection with your letter of 20 June 1994 relative to Civil Case No. R-417, please be informed that you can re(-)file the case at the RTC Cebu City and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid at RTC, Branch 26 San Juan, Southern Leyte.”

Thereafter, private respondent presented the letter-reply of Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis to the clerk of court of the RTC (Branch 6) of Cebu City upon re-filing his complaint. On the basis of the aforesaid letter-reply, the clerk of court docketed private respondent’s complaint as Civil Case 16336 without requiring private respondent to pay anew the prescribed docket fees.

Sept 13, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 16336 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. Petitioner argued that private respondent did not pay (even) a single centavo of the   P 25,000.00 filing fee; hence, the court (RTC of Cebu City, Branch 6) did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Sept. 16,1994, the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6), presided over by Judge Loreto D. de la Victoria, issued an order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The court held that:

When said plaintiff re(-)filed the same case with this Court, he asked permission from the Supreme Court, through the Court Administrator, for authority to apply the filing fees paid by him (plaintiff) in the RTC of San Juan, Southern Leyte, for the filing fees in the instant case. Said request was granted by the Court Administrator. The validity of the authority given by the Deputy Administrator regarding the application of the filing fees in this case cannot be questioned before this forum. Indeed the Court finds it to be in keeping with justice and equity and the spirit of liberality in construing the Rules. In fact there is no prohibition in that direction. It should be stated here that P25,000.00 filing fee paid by the plaintiff in the RTC of San Juan, Southern Leyte, is no picayune (pety, worthless) amount for one to do away with, and sense of fairness demands that plaintiff be allowed to apply the same in the filing of this case.

As mentioned earlier, petitioner elevated Judge de la Victorias order for review on certiorari to the Court of Appeals which agreed with the trial courts dispositions. The Court of Appeals reasoned that:

To require respondent Suson to pay anew the docket fee of P25, 600.00 in its totality that he has already paid when he filed the case that was earlier dismissed on the ground of improper venue, for him to re-file the same case in the proper court is to unduly exact from him a premium on his constitutional right to free access to the courts for redress of a wrong (Section 11, Article III, 1987 Constitution). The real issue here is not whether the Deputy Court Administrator is empowered to allow the filing of a case in a court without paying the required docket fee. It is whether respondent Odilao may re-file in another Court the case that was dismissed on the ground of improper venue without having to pay again the docket fee of P25,600 that he has paid in the earlier case. Said issue is resolved in the affirmative in favor of the respondent Odilao.[7]

In his present petition, petitioner contends that to relieve Odilao from paying the docket fee in the Cebu Court by just presenting the receipts issued by the Leyte Court would be tantamount to a withdrawal of the docket fee paid to the Leyte Court.  In legal contemplation, the Leyte Court had acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. P-417 upon payment of the prescribed docket fee(s) and its order dismissing the case due to improper venue was a final disposition of the case pursuant to the exercise of said jurisdiction.

Petitioner further contends that the case later filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 6) by private respondent is a distinct and separate case from that of

the Leyte court as it has a new docket number (CEB-16336) although the allegations therein are entirely the same as Civil Case No. P-417 filed in the RTC of Southern Leyte (Branch 26).

In his comment, private respondent Odilao contends that it is incorrect for petitioner to insist that Odilao failed to pay the required filing fees. He (Odilao) was not granted an exemption from the payment of filing fees by Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis but merely an authority to apply the filing fees he paid in Civil Case No. P-417 filed in RTC Southern Leyte (Branch 26) as payment for filing fees of the same case re-filed in the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6).

In Pilipinas Shell Petrolium Corp. v. CA,[8] we had occasion to rule that:

Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc. computed as to man hours used in handling each case. The payment of said fees therefore cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.

In the case of Lee v. Republic (10 SCRA 65), Nalimit v. Degamo (12 SCRA 450) and Mogaspi v. Ramolete (115 SCRA 193), we ruled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. In 1987, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA (149 SCRA 564) we further refined the principle, as we ruled, that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, and in order to curb the unethical practice of misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the correct filing fee, we laid down the rule that henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of the damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Two (2) years later, Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion[9] affirmed the basic principle laid down in Manchester but reduced its stringency somewhat by providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were not specified would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect was not necessarily fatal or irremediable as the plaintiff could, on motion, be granted a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the requisite filing fees, unless in the meantime, the period of limitation of the right of action was completed.[10] In that case, the Court en banc laid down the following rules:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The

court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It should be stressed, however, that the aforementioned cases all involved under-assessment of the docket fees and from the Courts pronouncements in Sun Insurance, it can be argued that while payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case if the non-payment is not beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

In the case at bar, in the strict sense, private respondents complaint cannot be deemed to have been re-filed in the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6) because it was not orginally filed in the same court but in the RTC of Southern Leyte (Branch 26). Thus, when private respondents complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16336 by the clerk of court of the RTC Cebu City (Branch 6), it became an entirely separate case from Civil Case No. P-417 that was dismissed by the RTC of Leyte due to improper venue. As far as Civil Case No. P-417 is concerned, while undoubtedly the order of dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits of the case, the order, nevertheless, is a final order. This means that when private respondent did not appeal therefrom, the order became final and executory for all legal intents and purposes. From a procedural point of view, therefore, to re-file the case before the same court would be an obvious faux pas. As a remedial measure, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed due to improper venue can still file another complaint, but this time in the court of proper venue. Note, however, that the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of proper venue did not stop the running of the prescriptive period within which to file his complaint in the court of proper venue. Theoretically, the plaintiff may decide to file a complaint containing substantially the same allegations and prayer as the previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to amend the same and pray for a different relief. In this case, the principle remains unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue) will only acquire jurisdiction over the case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee thereon.

Article III, Sec 11 of the 1987 Constitution states that Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. It is for this reason that under Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court, pauper-litigants are exempted from the payment of court fees, which includes the filing fee in instituting a complaint. Nonetheless, the rule provides that the legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the pauper-litigant.

Private respondent, therefore, has as much free access to the courts to seek redress of a wrong because there is no law or rule that prevents him from going to court to file his complaint. But, the rule provides that he must pay the prescribed docket fee

because he is neither a pauper-litigant nor a person expressly exempt by the Rules of Court from payment thereof.

Consequently, the Deputy Court Administrator committed an error when he stated in his letter reply to private respondents counsel that he can re-file the complaint in the RTC Cebu City (Branch 6) and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid in the RTC Branch 26, San Jose, Southern Leyte.

There is no way for the OCA letter to be misinterpreted by Odilaos counsel because the tenor of the letter of Odilao to the OCA dated 20 June 1994 clearly stressed that he was requesting for an authorization (from the OCA) to apply the filing fees he paid in Civil Case No. P-417 to cover the filing fees in a case he intends to file with the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6). In fact, both the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 6) and the Court of Appeals held the opinion that this procedural remedy can be obtained from the Office of the Deputy Court Administrator.

As early as 26 February 1991, the Court en banc had issued a resolution[11] containing guidelines on the duties and functions of the Office of the Court Administrator. As a general rule, the Court acts through the Court Administrator in the exercise of its administrative functions. The resolution clearly classified the work attended to by the OCA, either on its responsibility or with the approval of the Court en banc. It is clear that the OCA has neither the power nor the authority to exempt any party not otherwise exempt under the law or under the Rules of Court in the payment of the prescribed docket fees. The principles laid down by this Court in Manchester and in Sun Insurance were formulated en banc, no less than the Constitution mandates that no doctrine or principle laid down by the court in a decision en banc may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. To now exempt or otherwise authorize private respondent Odilao not to pay the prescribed filing fees would not only be in derogation of this principle but also of the general rule in pleadings, practice and procedure that the mistake of counsel binds his client.

In fine, the Court will not allow the office of the Court Administrator to be unduly burdened in futuro with similar letter-requests from litigants for an exemption in the payment of the prescribed docket fees or in private respondents language, for an authorization to apply the docket fees paid in a dismissed case to cover the docket fees once the case is re-filed in the court of proper venue. In other words, the Court Administrator cannot grant any relief or remedial measure which is beyond his powers and functions. It may be noteworthy to mention here that even in the Supreme Court, there are numerous instances when a litigant has had to re-file a petition previously dismissed by Court due to a technicality (violation of a pertinent Circular), and in these instances, the litigant is required to pay the prescribed docket fee and not apply to the re-filed case the docket fees paid in the earlier dismissed case.

Coming back to the case at bar, and pursuant to the rules laid down by this Court in Sun Insurance, we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case private respondent did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee. His counsel simply strayed away from the rules to explore the possibility of an extra legal remedy. Since his case has already been docketed as Civil Case No. 16336 in the RTC Branch 6 Cebu City, the procedural remedy of paying the prescribed docket fees is still

available to him provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet set in.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC (Branch 6) Cebu City is hereby ordered to require private respondent to pay the prescribed docket fees in Civil Case No. 16336 as a condition precedent for further hearing the case, after ascertaining at the earliest date practicable from the records that private respondents complaint has not been barred by prescription at the time it was filed in said court.

G.R. No. 104209 November 16, 1993

PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEMA) et. al. petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, respondents. The Solicitor General for respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is a provision of the Supplemental Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971 (Productivity Incentives Act of 1990), jointly promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, excluding from the coverage of said Act the employees of the Philippine National Bank ("PNB"), Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP"), Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"), Social Security System ("SSS") and Government Service and Insurance System ("GSIS").

Republic Act No. 6971 was signed into law on 22 November 1990 by then President Corazon C. Aquino. It took effect on 9 December 1990.

Section 3 of the law states: Coverage.— This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or without, existing and duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including government owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions. It shall cover employees and workers including casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees.

The same Act empowers the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance, "after due notice and hearing" to "jointly promulgate and issue within six (6) months from the effectivity of (the) Act such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out (its) provisions" (Sec. 6, R.A. 6971)

June 03, 1991, the then Labor Secretary Ruben D. Torres and Finance Secretary Jesus P. Estanislao promulgated the Rules Implementing Republic Act. No. 6971. The Rules took effect on 18 June 1991.

Forthwith, petitioner organizations requested their respective employers to constitute and convene a Labor-Management Committee (LMC) to discuss and adopt a Productivity Incentives Program (PIP). In the meantime, productivity bonuses were distributed by the PNB, DBP, LBP, SSS and GSIS.  3

Dec. 24, 1991, Secretary Estanislao sent the following memorandum to all heads of government financial institutions (GFI's):

To : GFI HeadsFrom : Jesus P. EstanislaoOn : Productivity Incentive Award

1. The President has asked me to remind all the GFI heads about our agreement to desist from making any further payments/moves regarding productivity incentives until such time as DOLE/DOF can issue clarificatory guidelines.

2. In view of the move of the SSS, the President has authorized me to indicate that GFI's may have a choice on granting productivity incentives under the new law or the traditional PIA (productivity incentive award), provided  the terms and conditions of either choice are exactly the same.

3. She has also instructed me to coordinate with DOLE and the immediate issuance of a possible clarificatory guideline.

In accordance with this memorandum, PNB Executive Vice-President Domingo A. Santiago, Jr., sent a letter to petitioner Philnabank Employees Association, through its President Jerry P. Tan, advising the latter that in view of the Estanislao memorandum, PNB was "constrained to wait for the issuance of the said clarificatory guidelines". 5

Allegedly without due notice and hearing, Secretary Estanislao and Secretary Torres subsequently issued the Supplemental Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971, clarifying or amending the previously promulgated rules because "the coverage of the GOCCs (government owned and controlled corporations) performing proprietary functions would require harmonization with present definitions, concepts, strategies, policies and thrusts involving the rationalization of the government corporate sector." Paragraph (a), Section 1, Rule II, of the Rules was thereby modified.

Jan 7, 1992, under the letterhead, "Kapatiran Ng Manggagawa Sa GFI" (KAMAGFI), PEMA President Jerry P. Tan sent Secretary Torres and Secretary Estanislao a letter contesting the amendatory rule and giving them forty-eight (48) hours within which "to recall and revoke" the same. He also informed the heads of the two departments that the supplemental rules were creating "serious demoralization(s)" among the officers and employees of the GFIs and that failure to revoke the recall the Supplemental Rules "would mean drastic legal actions and massive concerted activities" on the part of the GFI employees. 6 KAMAGFI also addressed an open letter, dated 09 January 1992, of similar tenor to the President of the Philippines, Secretary Estanislao, Secretary Torres, Senate President Neptali Gonzales, Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr., Senator Teofisto Guingona, and Congressmen Felicito Payumo and Alberto Veloso. 7 On January 10, 1992, the matter was referred by the Office of the President to Secretary Torres. 8

On 09 March 1992, the instant petition for certiorari was filed.

The petitioners contend that by promulgating the Supplemental Rules, the respondents have "overstepped the bounds of their rule-making authority by   amending   the coverage of the Act as provided in Section 3 thereof." Arguing that Republic Act No. 6971 has been intended by the lawmakers to cover government-owned and controlled corporations which are performing proprietary functions, without qualifications, the petitioners assert that the respondents have "arrogated upon themselves the power not only to make law, but also to unmake it by adopting rules inconsistent with and contrary to the clear intention and the end sought to be attained by the Act." 9The petitioners conclude that the respondents have thus gravely based their discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The respondents, through the Solicitor general, contest the herein petition as being both an improper remedy, considering that the respondents "did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the GFI employees," and precipitate, since the petitioners' recourse should have first been administratively pursued with the Civil Service Commission." 10

The instant petition for certiorari cannot be granted.

Firstly, the respondent department secretaries, in promulgating the questioned rule did so in accordance with the mandate of Republic Act No. 6971. Concededly, in the process, neither did said respondents act in any  judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor did they arrogate unto themselves any such performance of judicial or quasi-judicialprerogative. A petition for certiorari  is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65, of the revised Rules of Court is explicit on this matter; viz:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.

Thirdly, while this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration by the court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

Fourthly, even in cases, where this Court is conferred with primary jurisdiction, starting with the case of Santiago vs. Vasquez et al., 12 we have stressed, thus —

. . . We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of the petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original and concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Finally, the principal issue raised by the petitioners, i.e., whether or not the government financial institutions herein involved (but which have not even been impleaded) are embraced by the phrase "government-owned and controlled corporations   performing   proprietary functions" in the context of Republic Act 6971, is itself not necessarily a mere question of law, that, for certain can totally discard a factual assessment of the respective operations of said institutions and the degree that such operations interrelate, as the case may be, to their governmental or proprietary functions. This Court has said, more than once, that it is not an initial evaluator of facts. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-4845 December 24, 1952

L. G. MARQUEZ and Z. GUTIERREZ LORA, plaintiffs. L. G. Marquez, plaintiff-appellant, vs.FRANCISCO VARELA and CARMEN VARELA, defendants-appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of manila dismissing the complaint as to plaintiff L.G. Marquez. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows : that plaintiff Gutierrez Lora was authorized by defendants to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila, and having meet his co-plaintiff L. G. Marquez, a real estate broker, both of them agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's property; that they found a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and terms, but that thereafter defendants, without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the sale and execute the necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence plaintiffs failed to receive the commission which they were entitled to receive. The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint as to L. G . Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against defendants , and this motion having been granted, plaintiff L. G. Marquez has prosecuted this appeal.

The complaint was dismissed on the alleged ground that it states no cause of action against the defendants. Is this objection to the complaint justified? The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action" (37 Words and Phrases, 642), but in the law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 189, page 170.)

It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered the service alleged in the complaint, would have a right to be paid compensation for the service he rendered jointly with Marquez. He acted as a broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for his services. (Article 277, Code of Commerce: Henry vs. Velasco, 34 Phil. 587; Perez de Tagle vs. Luzon Surety Co, 38 Off. Gaz. 1213). There is no prohibition in law against the employment of a companion to look for a buyer; neither is it against public policy. Neither was there even any implied understanding between Lora and the defendants that no part of the compensation to which Lora would be entitled to receive could be paid to any companion or helper of Lora. Marquez's right to compensation can not, therefore, be disputed under the operative facts set forth in the complaint.

The next issue is, is there a cause of action in favor of Marquez against the defendants? From the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that there is a primary right in favor of Marquez (to be paid for his services even through Lora only) and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendants (to pay for said services). Since (as alleged) defendants refuse to comply with their duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal right by an action in court. The complaint in the case at bar, therefore, contains both the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined which constitute the cause of action in the legal sense as used in Code Pleading (Pomeroy, Code Remedies, section 347), and the cause of action is full and complete.

Objection to the complaint, however, is not that Marquez has no right to share in the compensation to be paid Lora, whom defendants had directly engaged, but that Marquez can not join in this action and enforce therein his rights directly against the defendants, evidently because defendants never dealt with Marquez, directly or indirectly, or, in other words, that both Marquez and his services were not known to dismiss show that such in fact was the objection:

This paragraph clearly shows that the authority to sell was only given to plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora and not to the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. Attention is respectfully called to the word "plaintiff" used in said paragraph III and expressed in singular form to the exclusion of the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. If the plaintiff L. G. Marquez had worked at all for the sale of the property at the instance of an invitation of his co- plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora, we maintain that his action if there is any is against his co-plaintiff and not against the defendants herein.

As far as the defendant are concerned in this case, plaintiff L. G. Marquez is not only a stranger in this case but also unknown to the defendants; and if he had worked at all for the sale of the defendants' share and participation in the parcels of lands referred to in the complaint, the same was made not only at his own look-out, risk and responsibility but also with no authority whatsoever. (Record on Appeal, pages 16, 17)

The principle underlying defendants' objection is one of substantive law, recognized under common law, where no one could sue for a breach of a contract who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to be brought only in the name of the one holding the legal title. The requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract.

Sec. 234. Plaintiffs in Action ex Contractu. — When an action of contract concerns only the original parties to the instrument, it is not difficult to determine who should be the plaintiff. Obviously the one seeking to enforce it is the real party in interest. At common law no one could sue for the breach of contract who was not a party thereto. Hence an action on contract, whether express or implied, was required to be brought in the name of the one who held the legal interest. This requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. . . . (Phillips, Code Pleading, page 226.)

Sec. 235. Privity of Contract. — When necessary. — It was a rule of the common law that before one may complain of another for breach of contract, there must be some direct contractual relation, or privity, between them; and this, with only a few exceptions, is a requirement of the law today. . . . (Phillips, code Pleading, page 227.)

At common law, in order that two or more persons may join in an action upon a contract, there must be community of interest between them; that is, they must be parties to the contract and jointly interested in therein. (47 . C. J. 54) lawphil.net

Persons subsequently admitted to the benefit of a contract, without the privity or assent of the promisor, can not join in a suit on the contract. (47 C.J., 55)

But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure. Our original code of civil Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the code of Civil Procedure of California, and this in turn was based upon the Code of Civil procedure of New York adopted in that stated in 1948. Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in the states of the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs". (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 251, page 247.) In New York and California interest in the subject matter, or in any relief growing out of the same transaction or series of transactions is sufficient to allow joinder. (Ibid, footnote 10a. page 247.)

Under the former Code of civil procedure "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," and "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs, " and " if any person having an interest and in obtaining the relief demanded refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be made a defendant and the fact of his

interest and refusal to join to be stated in the complaint." ( Section 114, Act 190) The principle underlying the rule is that all persons having a material interest under the substantive law should be made parties, as distinguished from that of the common law which allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party to be opposed to the other. Phillips, Code Pleading, 2d ed. section 228, page 216.)

The above principles have not been changed by the reforms in the rules in 1940 and 1941. The action is still to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Under section 6 of Rule 3, "All persons in whom . . . any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction . . . is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, . . . join as plaintiffs . . . where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs . . . may arise in the action; Plaintiff Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls under the above rule. He is entitled to be paid his commission out of the very contract of agency between Lora and the defendants; Lora and he acted jointly in rendering services to defendants under Lora's contract, and the same questions of law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not require the existence of privity of contract between Marquez and the defendants as required under the common law; all that they demand is that Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in the broker's commission to be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the absence of privity of contract between him and the defendants.

We find, therefore, that the complaint of Marquez was improperly dismissed. The order of dismissal is hereby reversed, with costs against defendants.

Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

 

 [G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARSON TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant. 

C. W O’Brien, for Appellant. 

Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee. 

SYLLABUS

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; PUBLICATION; EDITOR, AUTHOR, PROPRIETOR, MANAGER. — Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) provides a punishment only for the "author, editor, or proprietor," for the publication of a libel in a newspaper. In the present case no person was represented to be either the "author, the editor, or

the proprietor" of the newspaper in which the alleged libel was published. The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." There was not a word of proof showing that as "manager" he was the author of the article published or the editor or the proprietor of the newspaper. The "manager" of a newspaper may be the author of the articles published or the editor or the publisher of the newspaper. His exact relation to the newspaper or publication is a matter of proof. He can not avoid responsibility as the "author, editor, or

proprietor" by using some other term or word, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper or publication can not avoid responsibility by simply calling himself the "manager" or "printer." He can not wear the toga of "author, editor, or proprietor"

and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible

party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination.

D E C I S I O N

JOHNSON, J. :

This was an action for criminal libel. 

The complaint alleged: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper’s issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows. : jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT. 

"‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O’Donnell fire solved and papers served. 

"‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company. 

"‘The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance. 

"‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire. 

"‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success. 

"‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O’Donnell on April 4. 

"‘The case in question is a sensational one to say .he least, and the court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud. 

"‘On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O’Donnell was destroyed by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co. 

"‘The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the agents of the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the records. 

"‘Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. Then there was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned. 

"‘Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause. 

"‘The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in the house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in a certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners. 

"‘Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and asked for a

statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts. 

"‘The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, gave the owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance. 

"‘Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff. 

"‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the west of Scotland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records. 

"‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home.’

"That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners,’ by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law." cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the alleged libel. 

"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.’

"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was libelous per se. 

"Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was no malice. 

"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo. 

"Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of error. 

In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries." cralaw virtua1aw library

It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."cralaw virtua1aw library

By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It

would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable. 

In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that — "No person is represented to be either the ’author, editor, or proprietor.’" That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by a series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof upon that question. Either because he had no proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not a difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, be held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may denominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word "manager" with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the "manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the ’’manager" of a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word "manager." Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his powers and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be dependent upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution in a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling himself the "manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title which he has assumed, which is important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author or editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than that they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination. 

For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court

must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.