LawsandPowersintheFrameofNature

StathisPsillos1

Tillaphilosopher,atlast,arose,whoseems,fromthehappiestreasoning,tohavealsodeterminedthelawsandforces,bywhichtherevolutionsoftheplanetsaregovernedanddirected.DavidHume(FirstEnquiry,sectionI,14)

1.IntroductionWithintheAristotelianframeworkofnaturalphilosophy,whichwasdominantuntiltheemergenceofthemechanicalphilosophy,activity,motionandchangeinnatureweretakentobegroundedinpowerfulsubstances.Fromtheseventeenthcenturyon,thisviewstartedtorecedeinfavourofaconceptionofnatureasgovernedbygenerallawsofnatureandofmotioninparticular.Thisnewconceptionwasintroduced,almostsingle-handedly,byReneDescartesbutitspreadquickly.2Partofthemotivationwasathoroughcritiqueofthewidespreadviewthat,whenitcomestonaturalbodies,theypossessactiveandpassivepowersinvirtueofwhichtheyinteractwitheachother.Naturalpowersweretakentobenecessity-enforcersinthattheywere,inandofthemselves,principlesofnecessitation:giventhepowerofXtoΦ,XmustΦwhentheappropriatecircumstancesarise.Hence,powerswereregularity–enforcers:theyaccountedfortheregularitythereisintheworld. Thenewconceptionoflawsemergedasanalternativetopowers.Corporealsubstanceswerewidelytakentobepassiveandinert.Hence,activity,motionandchangecouldnotarisefromwithinapowerfulmatter.Theyhadtobeimposedonmatterfromwithoutandthismeantthattherewasneedfornewprinciplesofconnection,viz.,principleswhichdeterminedthewayspiecesofmattermoveandcollidewitheachother.Lawsofnaturewerebroadlytakentobetherequiredprinciplesofconnection.Thisverymovewasitselfbasedonathoroughreconceptualisationoftheveryideaofnaturallaw.Thenotionwaswidelyapplicabletorationalbeingsonly,sincethedominantthoughtwasthatonlyrationalbeingscanobeythelaw.AfterDescartes,theconceptoflawwaswidelytakentoapplytoallbeings;andinparticulartopassivecorporealsubstances.3 Thenewprinciplesofconnection—lawsofnature—retainedakeyfeatureofthepowers-basedaccountofactivityinnature,viz.,necessity.Theyweremeanttoholdbynecessity,thoughtwhatkindofnecessitythisiswasverymuchindispute.Theywerealsomeanttonecessitatethebehaviourofthings:thingshad

1 DeptofPhilosophyandHistoryofScience,UniversityofAthens,Greece;andRotmanInstituteofPhilosophy,UniversityofWesternOntario,Canada.psillos@phs.uoa.gr2Thereisimportanthistoricalworkconcerningtheoriginsoftheconceptoflawofnature.ForathoroughdiscussionandsupportoftheclaimthatDescartesshouldbecreditedwithinitiatingthemodernconception,seeHenry(2004).3Hobbesresistedthistrendandrefrainedfromextendingnaturallawstonon-rationalbeings.FormoreonthisseeGoudarouli&Psillos(forthcoming).

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toobeythelawsthatgovernedtheirbehaviour.Butifthereisnopowerinmatter,howdoesmatteractonmatter?Broadlyspeaking,therearetwooptionsavailable,giventhepassivityofmatter.ThefirstisthatmatterexistsbutGodistheonlymotiveforce(thisisthelinefollowedbyMalebrancheandcametobeknownasOccasionalism).Theotheristodenytheexistenceofmatteraltogether(sincethereisnothingforittodo)andtoclaimthatGodisthedirectcauseofallideasinminds(thisleadstoBerkeley’sidealism).Onbothoptions,lawsplayakeyrole:theyreplacepowersandprovidethemissingconnectionsbetweendistinctexistences.Theaimofthispaperistorevisitthemajorargumentsoftheseventeenth

centurydebateconcerninglawsandpowers.Itsprimarypointsaretwo.First,thoughthedominantconceptionofnaturewassuchthattherewasnoroomforpowerinbodies,theveryideathatlawsgovernthebehaviourof(bitsof)matterinmotionbroughtwithitthefollowingissue,whichcameundersharpfocusintheworkofLeibniz:howpossiblycanpassivematter,devoidofpower,obeylaws?ThoughLeibniz’sanswerwastore-introducepowers,tworadicallydifferentconceptualisationsoftherelationbetweenlawsandpowersbecameavailableafterhim.Humedeniedpowersaltogether,whereasNewtonthoughtthattointroduceapoweristointroducealaw.Thesecondmainpointwillbethatthoughlawsweremeanttoreplacepowers,therealdilemmaendedupbeingnotlawsvspowers,butrathernecessityvsnon-necessityinnature.Toexploit,anexpressionusedbyNewton,thequestionwas:whatistheplaceofnecessityintheframeofnature?2.AgainstLaws;AgainstPowersForMediaevalthinkers,naturalagencywasfundamentalandexplicableintermsofthepowersofthenaturalagentsthemselves.God,however,wastakentobetheauthoroftheorderoftheworldanditsorderingtoanend.So,thoughthereisorderintheworldandinthissenseGodistheDivineorder-maker,Hedoesnotpositlawsofnatureoverandabovetheactivenaturesofnaturalthings.Insofarasthereistalkof‘lawsofnature’,thisisametaphoricalextensionoftheconceptfromtherealmoffreeagentstonature.4 OnecanseethiskindofapproachveryclearlyintheworkofthelateMedievalthinkerFranciscoSuarez.AccordingtoThomasAquinas(Summa,I-IIq.90art.1):“Law(lex)isacertainruleandmeasureinaccordancewithwhichoneisinducedtoactorisrestrainedfromacting”(Suarez1612,7)Thusput,Suareznotes,thedefinitionoflawis“toobroadandgeneral”preciselybecauseitallowsthatitisapplicabletonon-sentientbeings,since“everythinghasitsownruleandmeasure,inaccordancewithwhichitoperatesandisinducedtoactorinrestrainedtherefrom”.ForSuarez,however,laws,strictlyspeaking,requirerationalagency.Alawissomethingthathastobe(andcanbe)obeyed(executed)andthiscanonlybesatisfiedbyrationalcreatures.Inthissense,theclaimthatnon-sentientbeingsobeylawswouldamounttotheclaimthattheyactaccordingtothetheirnaturalpowers.Indeed,insofarasthismetaphoricalsenseoflawisused,itcanonlyrefertotheorderlyactionofnaturalbodies“inaccordancewiththeinclinationsimpartedtothembytheAuthorofNature”(1944,22).Seenthatway,talkofnaturallawsistalkaboutnaturalpowers.It

4ThispointhasbeenrecentlystressedbyMarilynMcCordAdams(2013).

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capturesthenaturalnecessitythereisinnatureanditistothisnaturalnecessitythatcanbe“metaphoricallygiventhenameoflaw”(ibid.).Note,inaddition,thatiftalkoflawsofnatureistalkaboutpowers,thereare

asmany‘lawsofnature’astherearepowers—alawforeachpowerinnature.Lawsofnature,then,playnorolewhatsoeverasunifiers.Still,ifthismetaphoricaluseismade,theremustbealaw-makerwhogovernsthethingsthat‘obeythelaw’.AsSuarezputit,insofarasnon-rationalbeingsaresaidtoobeyalaw,theyare“inneedofasuperiorgoverningmind”(…)“andthusfromeverystandpoint,lawmustberelatedtomind”.Insum,then,talkoflawsismetaphoricalanditspropercontentconcernsnaturalnecessitieswhicharegroundedinthenaturalinclinationsofthingsimpartedonthembythelaw-maker.Theemergenceofmechanicalnaturalphilosophyintheseventeenthcentury

broughtwithitawaragainst(natural)powers.Quaasuigeneriscategorythatexplainsorgroundsmotionandchangeinnature,powercameunderheavyfire.Herearethemainargumentsagainstpowers.5Theconnectionproblem:howarepowersconnected?HowisitthatXhavingthepowertoΦandYhavingthepowertobeΦ-ed(twodistinctexistences)interacttogiverisetoaneffect?AccordingtoDescartes,thepowerofXtoΦisnotsuigenerisbutshouldbeunderstoodintermsofmatterinmotion.AllthereistoexplainhowXactsonYisactionbycontactofthepartsofXonthepartsofY.InhisLeMonde,DescartesobjectedtothemedievalAristotelianviewthatfirehasthe(suigeneris)powertoburnwoodthatallthereistotheactionoffireonwoodcanandshouldbeunderstoodintermsoftheviolentandincessantmotionofthepartsoffire:

When[fire]burnswoodorothersimilarmaterialwecanseewithoureyesthatitmovesthesmallpartsofthewood,separatingthemfromoneanother,therebytransformingthefinerpartsintofire,air,andsmoke,andleavingthelargerpartsasashes.Someoneelsemayifhewishesimaginethe‘form’offire,the‘quality’ofheat,andthe‘action’ofburningtobeverydifferentthingsinthewood.Formyownpart,IamafraidofgoingastrayifIsupposetheretobeinthewoodanythingmorethanwhatIseemustnecessarilybethere,soIamsatisfiedtoconfinemyselftoconceivingthemotionofitsparts.Foryoumayposit‘fire’and‘heat’inthewood,andmakeitburnasmuchasyouplease:butifyoudonotsupposeinadditionthatsomeofitspartsmoveaboutanddetachthemselvesfromtheirneighbours,Icannotimagineitundergoinganyalterationorchange(1998,6).

Ineffect,Descartes’spointisthatevenifpowerswereposited,theywouldfailtoexplain,inandofthemselves,changeinnature;theproperexplanationwouldrequirereferencetotheactionofthepartsofthebodiesthatbearthe‘activepower’onthepartsofthebodiesthatbearthe‘passivepower’.Butthisverymovewouldmakepowersredundant,sincealltheactionwouldbeduetothemotionofthepartsofbodies. Thiskindofargumentagainstpowersisdirectedprimarilyagainstviewingpowersassuigeneris.Powerisnotaspecifickindofcauseofmotion/change,distinctforeachkindofmotion/change.Allmotion/changeinnatureshouldbeunderstoodasbeingofthesamekind,viz.,theresultofactionbycontactbetweenthepartsofmatter.Objectingtotheviewthatpowersaresuigeneris5Forfurtherinsightfuldiscussion,seeOtt(2009,chapter5).

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principlesofmotion,Descartesnoted:“ThePhilosophersalsopositmanymotionswhichtheybelievecanoccurwithoutanybody’schangingplace,suchasthosetheycallmotusadformam,motusadcalorem,motusadquantitatem(motionwithrespecttoform,motionwithrespecttoheat,motionwithrespecttoquantity)andcountlessothers”(1998,26).Butheadded:“Iknowofnomotionotherthanthatwhichiseasiertoconceiveofthanthelinesofgeometers,bywhichbodiespassfromoneplacetoanotherandsuccessivelyoccupyallthespacesinbetween”(1998,27).Hence,allmotionshouldbeunderstoodunivocallyaslocalmotion,andifasenseofpowerisstilloperativeitcanatbestbeseenasthepowerofmattertobemoved(mobility). ForDescartes,then,therearenosui-generispowersinnature.Tounderstandallchangeinnatureitisenoughtoconceivethemotionsofthepartsofmatter—subjecttouniversallaws,asweshallseeinthenextsection.Speakingagainagainsttheallegedsuigenerispoweroffiretoburn,Descartes(1998,8)noted:

Onceweappreciatethatthepartsoftheflamemoveinthisway,andthattounderstandhowtheflamehasthepowertoconsumethewoodandtoburnit,itisenoughtoconceiveoftheirmotions,Iaskyoutoconsiderwhetherthisisnotalsosufficientforustounderstandhowtheflameprovidesuswithheatandlight.Forifthisisthecase,theflamewillneedpossessnootherquality,andweshallbeabletosaythatitisthismotionalonethatiscallednow‘heat’andnow‘light’,accordingtothedifferenteffectsitproduces.

Theoccultnessproblem:Thisisaversionoftheconnectionproblemabove.Butitisworthtreatingitseparatelybecausetheemphasisisshiftedtotheclaimthat,inprinciple,thereisnounderstandingofhowapowerbringsaboutitseffect.InalettertoRegiusinJanuary1642,Descartes(1991,208-9)noted:

Butnonaturalactionatallcanbeexplainedbythesesubstantialforms,sincetheirdefendersadmitthattheyareoccultandthattheydonotunderstandthemthemselves.Iftheysaythatsomeactionproceedsfromasubstantialform,itisasiftheysaidthatitproceedsfromsomethingtheydonotunderstand;whichexplainsnothing.Sotheseformsarenottobeintroducedtoexplainthecausesofnaturalactions.

Wemaycallthis,theexplanatoryimpotenceargument.Substantialformswereindividuatingprinciplesthatoncejoinedwithspecificparcelsofprimemattermadethemintosubstanceswithaspecificcausalprofile.So,forinstance,thesubstantialformsofhardbodieswasdifferentfromthesubstantialformoffluidbodiesandthisprimitivedifferenceexplainedtheirdifferentpowers.ButforDescartesnoexplanationofthedifferenceistherebyachieved:thedifferenceissimplypositedasaprimitivefact.Forhim,theonlydifferencebetweenhardbodiesandfluidbodiesis“thatthepartsoftheonecanbeseparatedfromthewholemuchmoreeasilythanthoseoftheother”(1998,10).Thisissupposedtoamounttoagenuineexplanationofwhytherearetwodistinctkindsofqualities—hardnessandfluidity—thedifferencebeinggroundedinthemicro-partsofbodiesandtheirmotions.Insteadoftakingthesequalitiesasprimitive,Descartesexplainsthembyshowingthattheyaredifferentspeciesofmotionoftheparticlesofmatter.Hereishowheputit:

Ifyoufinditstrangethat,inexplainingtheseelements,Idonotusethequalitiescalled‘heat’,‘cold’,‘moistness’,and‘dryness’,asthePhilosophersdo,Ishallsaythatthesequalitiesappeartometobethemselvesinneedofexplanation.Indeed,unlessIammistaken,notonlythesefourqualitiesbutallothersaswell,includingeventheformsof

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inanimatebodies,canbeexplainedwithouttheneedtosupposeanythingintheirmatterotherthanmotion,size,shape,andarrangementofitsparts(1998,18).

Thedirectednessproblem:howcanaphysicalqualitybedirectedtoanother?Thiswas,inmanyways,themorepuzzlingfeatureofpowers.Medieval-Aristotelianpowerswereendowedwithesse-ad.Thiswassupposedtoshowhow“onethingreceivessomethingfromanotherorconfersitupontheother”(Aquinas)withoutthequalitiesofeachthingbeingsharedbytheother.Butthepuzzlewaspreciselyhowaqualitycanbeintrinsictoasubjectand‘bear’onanother.ForDescartes,thisrelatednesscanonlybeafeatureofmindsandtheircontent:onlymindscanbedirectedtowardsanything.Hence,eithermattershouldbeendowedwithmindsortherecanbenosuchthinginmatteras‘beingdirectedtoaneffect’.ThefirsthornispreciselytheoneDescartesdismissedbywhatcametobeknownas‘thelittlesoulsargument’.InalettertoMersenne,(26April1643)henoted:

Idonotsupposethereareinnatureanyrealqualities,whichareattachedtosubstances,like somany little souls to their bodies, and which are separable from them by divinepower. Motion, and all the other modifications of substance which are called qualities,havenogreaterreality,inmyview,thaniscommonlyattributedbyphilosopherstoshape,whichtheycallonlyamodeandnotarealquality(1991,216).

Thereferencehereistothemedievalideathatqualitiescanexistindependentlyofsubstances.Butwhat’sinterestingisthatDescartestakesitthatthesequalitieswereendowedwithdirectednessasiftheyweresoul-likeentities.AsheexplainedinalettertoPrincessElizabeth,21May1643,realqualitieswereconceivedbymeansofnotionsthatwereused“forthepurposeofknowingthesoul”(1991,219).Gravity,oneofDescartes’sfavouriteexamples,isacaseinpoint.Descartesnotedthatinsteadoftakingtheviewthatheavinessisakindofmotionwhichis“producedbyarealcontactbetweentwosurfaces”(1991,219),hismedievalpredecessors,startingfromthe“innerexperience”ofhowthesouloperatesonbodies,tookitthatheavinessisarealquality“ofwhichallweknowisthatithasthepowertomovethebodythatpossessesittowardsthecentreoftheearth”(1991,219),therebywronglyattributingtoitsoul-likeattributes.Speakingcriticallyofhisformerselfinthesixthsetofreplieshenotedthathetoousedtoascribetogravitysomekindofdirectedpowertocarrybodiestowardsthecentreoftheearth“asifithadsomeknowledgeofthecentre”.Buthechangedhismindwhenherealisedthatthiswastantamounttoapplyingmind-likepropertiestogravity;forthisdirectedness“surelycouldnothappenwithoutknowledge,andtherecanbenoknowledgeexceptinamind”(1984,298).Themotiveforceproblem:Howcanabodymoveitselforanotherbody?ThisquestionwasthrownintosharpreliefbyNicolasMalebranchewhoconcludedthattheonlymotivepoweris(in)God.AccordingtoawidelyacceptedaccountofGod’saction,Godcontinuouslyannihilatesandre-createseverythingthereis.WhenGodwillsabodyAtocometoexistence,hewillsittobeinaspecificspaceaataspecifictimet.How,then,Malebrancheasks,canthebodyAmovefrompointatoanotherpointballbyitself?Orhowcanitbemovedbythe‘power’ofanotherbodyB?Ineithercase(self-motionormotion-by-other)therequired

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powerwould‘supersede’thepowerofGod,whowilledbodyAtobeinpointa.SincenothingcansupersedeGod’spower,onlyGodhasthepowertomoveabody.Malebrancheconcludedthat“thereisacontradictioninsayingthatonebodycanmoveanother”,since“nopower,howevervastitmaybeimaginedtobe,cansurpassorevenequalthepowerofGod”;“nopowercantransport[abody]whitherGoddoesnottransportit,norfixorkeepitwhereGoddoesnotfixorkeepit,ifitisGodalonewhoadaptstheefficacyofHisactionstotheineffectiveactionsofHiscreations”(DialoguesonMetaphysics7,X;1923,189).Argumentssuchastheabovecastconsiderabledoubtontheideathatmatter

ispowerful.Butifthereisnopowerinmatter,whatoptionsareavailable?Lawsofnaturereplacedpowersasprinciplesofconnectionbetweendistinctexistences.Butlawsdidnotreplacenecessity.Instead,theycapturedthenecessitythatwastakentobegroundedinpowers.Buthowdolawsacquiretheirnecessityandwhatkindofnecessityisthis?63.CartesianLawsInDescartes’sPrincipia,whichappearedin1644,Godistheprimarycauseofallmotion.Butlawsofnaturebecomethemselvestheparticularcauses“bywhichindividualpartsofmatteracquiremovementswhichtheydidnotpreviouslyhave”(PartII,36;1982,58).Theyaccountforchangesofstatesofmotionofbodies:“therulesorlawsofnature(…)arethesecondaryandparticularcausesofthediversemovementswhichwenoticeinindividualbodies”(PartII,37;1982,59).Butwhatdoesthatmean?Howcanlawsbesecondarycauses?ToanswerthisquestionletusfirsttakealookatDescartes’sthreelawsof

motion.IntheCartesianpictureofthings,Godcreatedmatterinmotionandrest“andnowmaintainsinthesumtotalofmatter,byHisnormalparticipation,thesamequantityofmotionandrestasHeplacedinitatthattime”(PartII,36;1982,58).Throughouthiswork,thisisafundamentalidea:theconservationofthetotalquantityofmotionplacedinnaturebyGodinitially.Thisisnotalaw—itisagoverningprinciple.ItfollowsdirectlyfromtheimmutabilityofGod.Infact,itcanbesaidthatthisPrincipleofConservationoftheQuantityofMotion(PCQM)issimplyafacetofGod.7NotethatGodmightnothavechosentoputmatterinmotion.Hence,PCQMdependsonGod’sWillinthesensethatHewilledtosetmatterinmotion.Butgiventhisvolition,PCQMismetaphysicallynecessary.Godbeingimmutable,PCQMhastoholdisallpossibleworldsinwhichmatterisinmotion. ThethreefundamentallawsofnaturearegroundedinPCQM,thatisintheimmutabilityofGod.Theyarepartofthefabricoftheworld.Givenhiswilltosetmatterinmotion,PCQMandthefundamentallawsareaconstitutivepartofnature:theyfollowfromhisimmutability.Everythingthathappensinnatureissubjecttothem.Motion,inotherwords,isregulatedbyGodvialaws,subjecttoanoverallPCQM.Descartessays:“becauseGodmovedthepartsofmatterin

6ForlackofspaceIdonotdiscussDescartes’saccountoflawsandpowerinLeMonde.SufficeittosaythatitisarguablethatDescarteschangedhispositioninmovingfromLeMondetohismatureworkPrincipia.Brieflyput,inLeMondelawsplayacausalrole,butmatteriscausallyactivetoo.Forfurtherdiscussion,andforwhatItakeittobetherightaccountofthetransitionfromLeMondetoPrincipia,seeOtt(2009,55ff).7ForsomesimilarthoughtsseeGarber(2013).

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diversewayswhenHefirstcreatedthem,andstillmaintainsallthismatterexactlyasitwasatitscreation,andsubjecttothesamelawasatthattime;Healsoalwaysmaintainsinitanequalquantityofmotion”(PartII,36;1982,58).Thencomethethreelaws. Thefirstlaw:“thateachthing,asfarasisinitspower,alwaysremainsinthesamestate;andthatconsequently,whenitisoncemoved,italwayscontinuestomove”(PartII,37;1982,59). ForDescartesmotionandrest(lackofmotion)aretwodistinctstatesofmatter.Rest(changeofstateofmotiontoRest)requiresexternalagency(collision).Nothingmovesfrombeinginmotiontobeinginlackofmotion(Rest)“byvirtueofitsownnature”becausethiswouldmeanthatitwouldmove“towarditsoppositeoritsowndestruction”.Thisisthejustificationofthefirstlaw.Descartesnotesthatthislaw“resultsfromtheimmutabilityandsimplicityoftheoperationbywhichGodmaintainsmovementinmatter”(PartII,39;1982,60).What’simportanttoaddhereisthatDescartesexplicitlydeniesthatbodiesareendowedwithtendenciesorcapacitiestochangetheirstateofmotion“byvirtueoftheirownnature”(PartII,37;1982,59).Thesecondlaw:“thatallmovementis,ofitself,alongstraightlines;and

consequently,bodieswhicharemovinginacirclealwaystendtomoveawayfromthecenterofthecirclewhichtheyaredescribing”(PartII,39;1982,60).Thislawcapturestheideathatcircularmotionis“forced”or“constrained

motion”:itisdeviationfromthestraightpathduetotheencounterofotherbodiesorduetotherigidconnectionsamongthepartsofabody(asinthemotionofawheel).Descartes’sjustificationisbaseddirectlyontheimmutabilityofGodandthesimplicityofhisoperations.Thislawtoo,hesays,“liketheprecedingone,resultsfromtheimmutabilityandsimplicityoftheoperationbywhichGodmaintainsmovementinmatter”(PartII,39;1982,60).TheappealtoimmutabilityofGodisessentialbecauseGodmaintainsmotioninmatterasitisateverysinglemoment.Hemaintainsmovementinmatter“preciselyasitisattheverymomentatwhichHeismaintainingit,andnotasitmayperhapshavebeenatsomeearliertime”(PartII,39;1982,60).Butthemotionateachinstant(ormoment)isalongastraightline.Though“nomovementisaccomplishedinaninstant”,Descartesconsidersitobviousthat“everymovingbody,atanygivenmomentinthecourseofitsmovement,isinclinedtocontinuethatmovementinsomedirectioninastraightline,andneverinacurvedone”(PartII,39;1982,60).Simplicity,however,isimportant,becausemotionalongastraightlineissimplerthancurvilinearmotion.Fromthislaw,Descartessays,itfollowsthat“anybodywhichismovinginacircleconstantlytendstomove[directly]awayfromthecenterofthecirclewhichitisdescribing”.Hence,thecentrifugaltendencyofarotatingstoneintheslingisgroundedinthesecondlaw. Thethirdlaw:“thatabody,uponcomingincontactwithastrongerone,losesnoneofitsmotion;butthat,uponcomingincontactwithaweakerone,itlosesasmuchasittransferstothatweakerbody”. DescartesprovesthethirdlawbyappealingtotheimmutabilityofGod.Inthecreation,Godgavemotiontoparticlesandcausedsomeofthemtocollidewithother.Becauseheisimmutable,heconservesmotioninparticles;hencethetotalquantityofmotion,includingthiswhichistransferredfromoneparticletoanother,remainsthesame:“innowmaintainingtheworldbythesameactionandwiththesamelawswithwhichHecreatedit,Heconservesmotion;not

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alwayscontainedinthesamepartsofmatter,buttransferredfromsomepartstoothersdependingonthewaysinwhichtheycomeincontact”(PartII,42;1982,62).Howthenarelawsthe“secondaryandparticularcausesofthediverse

movementswhichwenoticeinindividualbodies”(PartII,37;1982,59)?Giventhatbodiesweresetinvariousstatesofmotioninthebeginning,lawscause(i.e.,determine)theirsubsequentstates.WhydoesXmoveinastraightline?Becauseitisalawthatitmustkeepmoving(itwon’tchangeitsstateofmotion)untilsomethingstopsit(Firstlaw).Inthissense,thelawisacauseofthemovementofX,sinceitdictates(determines)itsmotion.Similarly,whydoesXstopmoving?(orwhydoesXchangeitsstateofmotion?)BecauseitisalawthatXmustchangeitsstateofmotionifitcollideswithanotherbodyY.Hence,changeofthestateofmotionofXisalaw-governedcollisionwithanotherbodyY(Thirdlaw).Finally,whydoesXmoveinacurvedpath?Notbecause“itisinclinedtoanycircularmovement”;butbecauseitisalawthatmotionalongcurvedpathABisforcedmotion,thatisitconsistsinadeviationfromthestraightline(Secondlaw).ItisstrikingthatinthePrincipia,thereisnoreferencetothedispositionsof

matterascausesofthemotionofthebodiesalongsidethelawsofnature.8Tobesure,Descartesdoestalkaboutaffections,buthestatesclearlythatalldispositions[omniumaffectionum]ofmatterariseoutofthemovementsofitsparts;hencetherearenosuigeneris(non-mechanical)dispositions(cf.PartII,23;(1982,50).Heexplicitlystatesthatwhenheusesexpressionssuchas“striving[conatus]ofinanimateobjectstowardmotion”,hedoesnotattributeanythoughtorintentiontothem;hesimplymeans“thattheyaresosituated,andsourgedtomove[admotumincitatos],thattheywillinfactrecedeiftheyarenotrestrainedbyanyothercause”(partIII,56;1982,112).AndinIV.199,hesumsuphisviewbysayingthatallnaturalphenomenaare“nothingotherthan,certaindispositions[dispositiones]ofsize,figure,andmotion{ofbodies}”(1982,282).SothereisnoreasontothinkthatforDescartesthereferencestodispositions,affectionsandthelikeinthePrincipiaarenothingotherthanthe(passive)mechanicalqualitiesofthecorpusclesofmatter.InfactinPrincipia,forcesandgenericpowersofmatterarefullyreplacedby

laws.9InacharacteristicpassageinII.43,Descartesstatesthat“theforceofeachbodytodriveortoresistconsists”inthebody’sobeyingthefirstlawofmotion—8InLeMondeDescartesnotesthatthoughwhenitcomestorectilinearmotion,itisfullydeterminedbythefirsttwolawsandGod’sconservationofthingsthewaytheyare,inthecaseofcircularmotion,anextraexplanatoryprincipleisrequired,viz.,thedispositionsofmatter.Thisexplainswhythoughthepartsofabodytendtomoveinstraightline,thebodyasawholemovesinacircle.Hereishowheputit(1998,30):“Accordingtothisrule[thethirdlawofmotion],then,wemustsaythatGodaloneistheauthorofallthemotionsintheworldinsofarastheyexistandinsofarastheyarestraight,butthatitisthevariousdispositionsofmatterthatrenderthemotionsirregularandcurved.Likewise,thetheologiansteachusthatGodisalsotheauthorofallouractions,insofarastheyexistandinsofarastheyhavesomegoodness,butthatitisthevariousdispositionsofourwillsthatcanrenderthemevil”.9HereIaminagreementwithGarber(1992,298)whotakesthelinethatCartesianforcesarenothingbutwaysoftalkingabouthowGodactsonbodiesinalawfulway.But,asitwillbecomeclearlateron,IaddtoGarber’saccountthat,strictlyspeaking,Descartesreplacesforceswithlawsinthesensethatthereisnothingmoretothecontentofforce-talkthanwhateverisinvolvedinthelaw-governedmotionofbodies.FormoreonthevariousaccountsofforceinDescartesseeGarber(1992,chapter9),Ayers(1996)andOtt(2009,chapter8).

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period(1982,63).Descartessaysthatthe“forceofeachbodytoactagainstanotherortoresisttheactionofthatotherconsists”(…)“inthesinglefactthateachthingstrives,asfarasisinitspower,toremaininthesamestate,inaccordancewiththefirstlawstatedabove”(op.cit.).Forcesofactionorresistancearereplacedbylaw-likebehaviour.HereisasummaryofthemainfeaturesofCartesianlaws.

Lawsaredifference-makers:allphenomenainnaturearecounterfactuallydependentonlaws.Ifthelawshadbeendifferent(perimpossibile),theworldwouldhavebeendifferent.Lawsarecounterfactuallyrobust:Nomatterwhattheinitialarrangementofparticlesinmotion,thelawsaresuchthattheeffectwouldbethesame.Whicheffect?Theworldasweknowit.Lawsaremetaphysicallynecessary:Godagitatedthedifferentpartsofmatterindiverseways,butthenHe“didnomorethansustainnatureinHisusualmannerleavingittoactaccordingtothelawsHehasestablished”.Theselawsaresuchthat“evenifGodhadcreatedmanyworlds,therecouldbenotbeanyinwhichtheycouldhavefailedtobeobserved”(1998,31).Lawsareimmanent:theydirectlyfollowfromGod’simmutability.Lawsarecausalprinciples:themotionofthevariousbodiesintheworldhappenbecauseofthemandnotsimplyaccordingtothem.Thepassivityofmatter,however,createdapotentialtensionintheCartesian

system:Howarelawsexecutedbymatter?Ifmatterisinertandlacksanymotorforce,howisitthatpiecesofmatteraresubjectedtothecausalactionoflaws?Descartesisclearthatbodieshave“noinnatetendencytomotion”(PartIII,26;1982,94).Nordotheyhaveany“tendencytowardsrest”(PartII,37;1982,59).Allactionisbycontactandrequiresamover.Hethereforeputsforwardsevenrulesbyvirtueofwhichthecollisionofbodiesisregulated.Thoughtheseruleswerehavebenfoundwanting,therelevantpointhereis

thatDescartesintroducesthemasruleswhich“determinetowhatextentthemovementofeachbodyischangedbycomingincontactwithotherbodies”(partII,45;1982,64).Thiswaytoformulatethetaskisfullyconsistentwiththeclaimthatmatterispassiveandhencethatrules(laws)determinehow(thequantityof)motionisredistributedamongthecollidingbodies.ButinshowinghowtheserulesapplytocontactsamongmovingbodiesDescartesstatedthat“itisonlynecessarytocalculatehowmuchforcetomoveortoresistmovementthereisineachbody;andtoacceptasacertaintythattheonewhichisthestrongerwillalwaysproduceitseffect”(PartII,45;1982,64).Hence,itisnotclear,tosaytheleast,thatDescarteshasacoherentviewabouthowmatteriscapabletoactonmatterandbeacteduponbymatter.InalattertoMore(August1649),Descartesnotedthatacreatedsubstancecanhavethepowertomoveabody;butthisisamodeofthecreatedsubstanceconferredonitbyGod(cf.1991,381).Stillcanmotionbetransferredfromonebodytoanother?Ifmotionisamodeofthethingmoved(asitcertainlyis),thenitcannotsincenomodecanbetransferredfromonebodytoanother.Butaswehavealreadyseen,Descartesrepeatedlytalksasifmotionisbeingtransferredfromonebodytoanotherbecauseofthelawsofmotion.InPrincipia(II,25;1982,51)Descartesdefinedmotionas

thetranslationofonepartofmatterorofonebody,fromthevicinityofthosebodies

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immediatelycontiguoustoitandconsideredasatrest,intothevicinityof[some]others.(…)Ialsosaythatitisatranslation,nottheforceoractionwhichtransfers[nonvimvelactionemquaetransfert],inordertoshowthatthismotionisalwaysinthemovingbodyandnotinthethingwhichmovesit(becauseitisnotusualtodistinguishbetweenthesetwowithsufficientcare);andinordertoshowthatitisonlyamode[ofthemovingbody],andnotasubstance,justasshapeisamodeofthethingshaped,andrest,ofthethingwhichisatrest.

Inthiscriticalpassage,hedistinguishedclearlybetweenmotionastranslation

(i.e.,changeofrelativeplace]andmotionasforceoractionwhichistransferredfromonebodytoanother.ButinmanyotherplacesinthePrincipiaDescartestalksfreelyofthe‘transference’onmotion(seee.g.,II,40&42).AcharitablereadingofDescarteswouldbethis.Strictlyspeaking,thereisnotransferofmotionbetweenbodies(though,looselyspeakingtheircollisionscanbedescribedasifthereweretransfer).Still,whenbodiescollidewitheachother,thequantitiesofmotiontheyalreadypossessarere-distributedamongthemaccordingtotherelevantlaws(andalwaysinlinewiththeoverarchingprinciplePCQM).Thelawsthenarethe(particularandsecondary)causes(difference-makers)ofthere-distributionofparticularquantitiesofmotion,sincewithoutthemtherewouldbenofactofthematterastowhatwouldhappenedinthecollision.4.OccasionalistLawsTheoccasionalistreactiontoDescarteswasbasedonthethoughtthatifmatteristrulyinertandlackingofanymotivepower,thentheonlyreal(anddirect)causeshouldbeGodhimself.ForMalebranche,wehavenoconceptionofpowerofsecondarythings.Iftheonlymotivepoweris(in)God,howdoesGodactonmatter?Theanswerisclear:vialaws.Godactsvialawsbecausehisactionisuniformandsimple;it“link(s)togetherthepartswhichcomposetheworld”andmakestheworldknowable(1923,190).Hence,lawsarewilledbyGod.LawsareprinciplesbymeansofwhichGodactsinnatureandestablishesitsuniformity—whichisafacetofitsperfection.ForMalebranche,Godsubmitstolawsnotbyabsolutenecessitybutbydesire

(TreatiseonNatureandGrace(TNG),XXI;1992,119).Beingomnipotent,Godcouldhavecreatedaninfinityofpossibleworlds.Hence,therecouldhavebeenalaw-less(disorderly)world.ButGoddidnotdesiretocreatesuchaworld;hence,hedidnotwillit.Godcreatedanorderlyworld,governedbythesimplestlawssinceHeacts“alwaysbythesimplestways”(TNG,XVII;1992,118).Infact,ofallthepossible(law-governed)worlds,hewilledtocreate“thatworldwhichcouldhavebeenproducedandpreservedbythesimplestlaws,andwhichoughttobethemostperfectwithrespecttothesimplicityofthewaysnecessarytoitsproductionortoitsconservation”.(TNG,XIII;1992,116)Soperfectionisafunctionofthesimplicityofthewaystheworldcouldhavebeencreatedandconserved.Ashesayslateron:“ifhehadbeenable(byequallysimpleways)tomakeandtopreserveamoreperfectworld,hewouldneverhaveestablishedthoselaws”(TNG,XXII;1992,120).UnlikeCartesianlaws,Malebrancheanlawsarenotgroundedinthe

immutabilityofGodbutinhisWilland,inparticular,inhiswaysofacting.HealwaysactsinthesimplestwaysandHealwaysacts(inthenaturalorder)withgenerallaws(volitions).Godwillscertainlaws“becauseoftheirfruitfulness”.

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(TNG,XIX;1992,119)Whatthenarethelawsofnature?TheyareGod’sgeneralvolitions.Theyare

hisdecrees.Assuch,thelawsofnaturearenotmetaphysicallynecessary.Thedecrees(laws)ofGodareonlyexhypothesisnecessary.Hence,thequestion‘CanGodchangethelaws?’admitsofapositiveanswer.LikeDescartes,MalebranchethoughtthatGodcouldhavenotsetmatterinmotion(ifhehadwishednottoproduceanythingnewintheworld).Butinaddition,Godmightwillthattheactuallawsofmotionchange(if,forinstance,hewillstocreateincorruptiblebodies). Thoughlawscouldbedifferent(orcouldchange,ifGodwilledit),theyareconstantandimmutableandtheyholdeverywhereandeverywhen.Hecouldn’tbemoreexplicit:“Thelawsofnatureareconstantandimmutable;theyaregeneralforalltimesandforallplaces”(TNGXVIII;1992,118).Infact,itistheveryconstancyandimmutabilityoflawsthatexplainswhyinnaturethereareunwanted(orundesirable)effects—e.g.haildestroysaharvestoramalformedbabyisborn.ForMalebranche,itisnotthatGodwilled,withaparticularvolitiontheseparticulareffectstohappen.Rather,theseeffectsarethe“necessaryconsequences”ofthelawsofcommunicationofmotionhehadinitiallyestablished(TNG,XVIII;1992,118).Goddesiresthat“allofhiscreaturesshouldbeperfect”(op.cit.);Butheactsbygenerallawswhichheforeseestobethemostfecund(cf.TNG,XXII;1992,119).Thesearealsothesimplestlaws.PreciselybecauseGodactsinthesimplestways,itwouldbe“unworthyofhiswisdomtomultiplyhiswillsinordertostopcertainparticulardisorders”.Hence,simpleandgenerallaws‘cover’everythingthathappensinnature,withinthenatural(i.e.,notmiraculous)order. Thetwofundamentallawsofnaturearelawsofmotion:TheFirstLaw:“thatmovedbodiestendtocontinuetheirmotioninastraight

line”;(TNG,XV;1992,117) TheSecondLaw:“thatwhentwobodiescollide,theirmotionisdistributedbothinproportiontotheirsize,suchthattheymustafterwardsmoveatanequalspeed”(TNG,XV;1992,117).Accordingtothesecondlaw,whathappensincollisionsisthere-distribution

ofmotion“inproportiontotheirsize”.AsMalebranchenotedthislawisnotobservedinexperience;buthenotedthatitisatruelawholdinginthe“invisible”bodies”(TNG,XVI;1992,117). InDialoguesonMetaphysics(Dialogue7,XI),thefirstlawofmotionwasjustifiedonthegroundsthatthestraightlineisthesimplestandshortestline.Whenitcomestothesecondlaw,henotedthatthoughthereischangeofdirection,thereisconservationofthe“quantityofthemovingforce”(1923,191).Thesetwoprinciplesconstitute“thegenerallawsofthecommunicationofmovementsinaccordancewithwhichGodactsincessantly”(op.cit)(cf.alsoResearche,ElucidationXV;1997,664). Malebrancheanlawsofnatureare“efficacious”;10inparticular,itisbecauseoftheefficacyofthesecondlaw(governingimpact)thatdiversityinmatterisproduced:thediversitythereisinmatteriscounterfactuallydependentonthesecondlawofmotion.Butmorethanthis,bothlawsarethecauseofallmotion:“Thesetwolawsarethecauseofallthemotionswhichcausethatvarietyof

10AsRobertMerrihewAdams(2013,75)aptlyputit,Malebrancheanlaws“have‘oomph’”.

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formswhichweadmireinnature”(TNG,XV;1992,115).Theyare“necessarytotheproductionandthepreservationoftheearth,andofallthestarsthatareintheheavens”(op.cit.).Whateverhappensinnature(barringGod’smiraculousintervention)isthenecessaryconsequenceofthelawsofmotion.Buthowarelawsexecutedbymatter?ForMalebranche,theyarenot!God

himselfexecutesthelaws.Thelawsarethedivinedecreesthemselves,whichgroundtheregularity.Thelawsareprinciplesofconnection(“indissolublebondsofunion”)betweennaturalthings(distinctexistences).AsheputitinDialogue7,XIII(1923,195):“thedivinedecreesaretheindissolublebondsofunionbetweenthevariouspartsoftheuniverseandofthemarvelousnetworkofallthesubordinatecauses”.AsMalebranchestressed,thetwobasicprinciplesofwhatcametobeknown

asoccasionalismarethese:1. Bodieslackmotorforce.2. Godactsonnatureviagenerallaws.Hereishowheputit:

thesetwoprinciples,ofwhichIamconvinced,thatnonebuttheCreatorofbodiescanbetheirmover,andthatGodcommunicatesHispowertousonlythroughtheestablishmentofcertaingenerallaws,therealisationofwhichwedeterminethroughourvariousmodifications(Dialogues,7,XIV;1923,196).

Sincematterisimpotenttoexecutethelaws,theymustbe‘executed’byGod;yet,asisexplicitlystatedintheforegoingpassage,thelawsare‘realised’invariousnatural(i.e.,occasional)causes(viatheirmodifications).Inthisscheme,thereisnoroomforconnectingentitieslikepowers/activequalities.ThelinkbetweenGod(astheonlypower)andtheregularitythereisinnatureislaws—thatisGod’sdecreeswhicharedirectlyrealisedinnaturalbodiesandtheirmotions(cf.Dialogues7,XIII;1923,195).Hence,lawsbeingthe“indissolublebondsofunionbetweenthevariouspartsoftheuniverse”areexecutedbyGodandarerealisedinnaturalbodiesandtheirregularbehaviour. HowarelawsexecutedbyGod?WhenHere-createsabodyinmotion,Hemakesitmovealwaysinastraightlineaccordingtothefirstlaw,i.e.,thesubsequentre-creationsshouldbeinaccordancetothefirstlaw.ThisisGod’sgeneralvolition.Buttherearecollisions.Again,thelawofcollisionsdeterminesthatthere-createdbodieswillbesuchthatthereisacertainre-distributionofmotionamongthem.InacollisionbetweenbodyXandbodyY,XisnotthecauseofthemotionofY.Xcommunicates“nothingofitsown”toY.Yet,thereisalaw-governedre-distributionofmotionbetweenXandY.Godactsaccordingtoalawwhichcausesthere-distributionofmotion.HencethoughallcommunicationsofmotionareexecutedbyGod,theyareexecutedbyagenerallaw.Theactionofnaturalcausesconsists“onlyinthemotorforceactivatingthem”,i.e.,God(Researche,ElucidationXV;1997,662).DoesthatmeanthatGodcommunicateshispowertobodies?Notquite!Godhasmadethemodificationsofbodiestheoccasionalcausesofhisaction—whichislaw-governed(cf.1997,225).ThereisanongoingdebateamongMalebranche’sscholarsaboutthecontent

oflawsofnature—aretheygeneralvolitionsor(sumsof)particularvolitions?11

11SeePessin2001;Ott2009,chapter11;Nadler2011;RobertMerrihewAdams2013forarepresentativesample.

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AsMalebrancheexplains,whenGodactswithaparticularvolition,heactswithouttheoccasionalcause,e.g.,whenIfeelpainwithoutbeingprickedbyapin.Orwhenabody“beginstomoveitselfwithoutbeingstruckbyanother,orwithoutanychangeinthewillofminds,orinanyothercreaturethatdeterminestheefficacyofsomegenerallaws,IsaythenthatGodmovesthisbodybyaparticularwill”(TNG,IllustrationII;1992,195).Butwhathappenswhenaballstrikesanother?HowdoesGodact?Malebranche’sansweristhatGodmovesthesecondballbyageneralvolition(agenerallaw).Theballismoved“inconsequenceofthegeneralandefficaciouslawsofthecommunication”(cf.alsoTNG,IllustrationI;1992,195).SoitseemscorrecttosaythatMalebrancheanlawsaregeneralvolitions.Malebrancheanlawsofnaturearenotmetaphysicallynecessary.Butarethey

contingent?Theyarenot.Aswehaveseen,Godsubmitshimselftolawsnotoutofabsolutenecessitybutoutofhiswillforthegood.Malebranchealsostressesthat,toputitinmodernjargon,regularitydoesnotimplycausation;necessityisalsoneeded.Hence,“OnlyinthewisdomofGoddoweseeeternal,immutable,andnecessarytruths.NowhereelsebutinthiswisdomdoweseetheorderthatGodHimselfisconstrainedtofollow(Recherche;Elucidation10;1997,615-6).InafamouspassageinhisLarecherchédelaverite,Malebranchemakesclearthatwecanconceiveofabsolute(metaphysical)necessityonlybetweenthewillofGodandsomethinghappeningbecauseofthis:

AtruecauseasIunderstanditisonesuchthatthemindperceivesanecessaryconnectionbetweenitanditseffect.Nowthemindperceivesanecessaryconnectionbetweenthewillofaninfinitebeinganditseffect.Therefore,itisonlyGodwhoisthetruecauseandwhotrulyhasthepowertomovebodies(1997,450).

Sincethereisnoperceptionbythemindofnecessaryconnectionsbetweennatural(oroccasional)causesandnatural(oroccasional)effects,thesearenotrealcauses.Foranynaturalcause,itisconceivablewithoutcontradictionthatitcanoccurwithoutitseffect.Andofcourse,Godcanmakeithappenthatthatitdoesoccurwithoutits(natural)effect.OnlyinthecaseofGod’swillisitimpossibleforustoconceiveofitwithoutatthesametimeconceivingwhateveritwillstohappen.But,barringmiraculousinterventions,naturalcausesinvariablyprecedetheirnaturaleffectsinvirtueofGod’sgeneralvolitions,akalawsofnature.Hence,theregularitythereisinnature(invirtueofwhichitispredictableandknowable)isgroundedin(inthesenseofbeingtheeffectof)thelawsofnature.Thelawisnottheregularityitself,butitistheprinciple(God’sgeneralvolition)whichgroundstheregularity. Theoccasionalcausedoesnotact—thoughitmightseemtousthatitdoes.Itisthelawthatiscausallyefficacious:“Abodymovesimmediatelyafterhavingbeenstruck:thecollisionofthebodiesistheactionoftheoccasionalcause;thusthisbodymovesbyageneralwill”(op.cit.).Occasionalcausesandtheconcomitantregularityisasignthattheeffectdoesnothave“somethingsingularaboutit”.Hence,thepresenceofanoccasionalcauseissign(“mark”)thatthereisactionbythegeneralvolitionofGod(IllustrationVIII).Hence,regularity(occasional‘causation’)isa‘mark’forthepresenceofalawbymeansofwhichGodacts.BeingthedecreesofGod,lawsholdwithsomekindofnecessity.Recallthe

verytitleofMalebranche’sTreatise:OntheNecessityofGeneralLawsofNature.

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Whatkindofnecessityisthis?Itisnaturalorhypotheticalnecessity.Eventhoughthenaturalnecessityofthelawscannotpossiblyberationallyinferredfromtheobservationoftheinvariableconjunctionofnaturalcausesandnaturaleffects,itcanbeconceivedifwereflectonthewayGodacts.Thelawsofnaturearecertainlypartofthefabricofnature;hence,thereisnecessityinnature;thoughthisnecessityisnotlocatedorgroundedinbodies“bythemselves”;norcanitinferredbyexperienceandfromtheregularitythereisinnature.12 5.BerkeleyonLawsThatlawsarenaturallynecessaryisaviewthat,perhapssurprisingly,canbeattributedtoBerkeleytoo.ForBerkeley,allcausationisanactionofthewillofaspirit.Hence,onlyGodandminds(spirits)canbe(efficient)causes.Ideasarepassiveandinert(Principles§25;2008,92).Thoughitisfalsetoclaimthatideasarethe“effectsofpowersresultingfromtheconfiguration,number,motion,andsizeofcorpuscles”,ideasmustnonethelesshaveacause“whereontheydepend,andwhichproducesandchangesthem”(Principles§26;2008,92).Thesecanonlybeincorporealsubstances(i.e.,mindsquaactivesubstances).Godexcites(andcauses)ideasinusbymeansoflawsofnature.Thisclaimis

groundedinthefactthatideashave“admirableconnexions”andregularity;theycome“inaregulartrainorseries”(Principles§30).Sotheorderandregularityintheco-occurrenceandsuccessionofideassuggestthattheyarecausedinusbyaWillwhichactsinanorderlyandregularway.AsBerkeleyputit:“Thesetofrulesorestablishedmethods,whereinthemindwedependonexcitesinustheideasofsense,arecalledthe‘lawsofnature’;andthesewelearnbyexperience,whichteachesusthatsuchandsuchideasareattendedwithsuchandsuchotherideasintheordinarycourseofthings”(Principles§30;2008,94).LawsofnaturestemfromGod’sWill.TheyareexpressionsofGod’sWilltoact

inaregularway:“(T)hisconsistentuniformworking,whichsoevidentlydisplaysthegoodnessandwisdomofthatgoverningspiritwhosewillconstitutesthelawsofnature”(§32;2008,94).Butunlikeallofhispredecessors,Berkeleytookitthatlawsofnatureareknownbyobservationandempiricalstudy.Theyarenotknownapriori.TheyarenotinferredbyreferencetothesimplicityofGod’sactionsorhisimmutability.Theydoreflecthisgoodnessandwisdomincreatingtheworld,buttheycanonlybeknownaposteriori.Inparticular,lawsarenotdiscoveredaprioribylookingfor“necessaryconnectionsamongideas”.Thereisnothingintheideaoffirethatnecessarilyimpliesthatitwarmsus.Theregularitythereisintheworldisdiscoveredempirically“onlybytheobservationofthesettledlawsofnature”(§31;2008,94).Thankstothelawsofnature,ideasareconnectedtoeachother(e.g.,theideaoffireandtheideathatitwarmsus)eventhoughonemaybeconceivedwithouttheotherwithoutfallingintocontradiction. Inacertainsense,Berkeleypushedthecaseforoccasionalismtoitsextremes.Malebrancheanoccasionalismkeptmatterbutdivesteditfromanycausalpowerorefficacy.Hence,therearenocorporealcauses.Withoutnamingit,Berkeley(Principles§53)notedthatoccasionalismgotitrightinclaimingthat“amongst

12HereIaminessentialagreementwithRobertAdamswhostressesthatforMalebranchethereisnecessitationincausationinthefollowingsense:occasionalcausesare“partofhowGod’sgeneralvolitions,asefficaciouslawsofnature,necessitateparticulareffects”(2013,77).

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alltheobjectsofsense,therewasnonewhichhadanypoweroractivityincludedinit,andthatbyconsequencethiswaslikewisetrueofwhateverbodiestheysupposedtoexistwithoutthemind”(2008,103).Buthethoughtthatthefurthersupposition,viz.,thatthereis“aninnumerablemultitudeofcreatedbeings,which(…)arenotcapableofproducinganyoneeffectinnature”is“unaccountableandextravagant”,thoughpossible. IfBerkeleyfoundinoccasionalismnoargumentforthephilosophicalcategoryofmater,hefoundinitanunderstandingofhowGodactsintheworld:vialawsofnature.Inthissense,lawsofnaturearekeytoBerkeley’snaturalphilosophy.Asheputit(Principles§62;2008,107):

Therearecertaingenerallawsthatrunthroughthewholechainofnaturaleffects.Thesearelearnedbytheobservationandstudyofnature,andarebymenappliedaswelltotheframingartificialthingsfortheuseandornamentoflifeastotheexplainingthevariousphenomena:whichexplicationconsistsonlyinshowingtheconformityanyparticularphenomenonhastothegenerallawsofnatureor,whichisthesamething,indiscoveringtheuniformitythereisintheproductionofnaturaleffects,aswillbeevidenttowhoevershallattendtotheseveralinstances,whereinphilosopherspretendtoaccountforappearances.

Thisrichpassagesuggeststhefollowingaboutlaws:

a) Laws“runthrough”thewholechainofnaturaleffects.Hence,lawscoverallnaturaleffects(thewholechainofeventsinnature).Thiscoveringshouldnotbeseenas‘governing’butas‘runningthrough’—laws‘permeate’naturalphenomena;theimbuenaturalphenomena.

b) Theselaws,asnotedalready,arediscoveredaposteriori;theyarelearnedbyobservationandempiricalstudyofnature.

c) Explanationinnaturalphilosophyisshowingthatparticularphenomenaconformtoagenerallaw;thatis,thattheyare‘permeated’byalaw.Hence,explanationcanbeseenasnomologicalsubsumption.

d) The‘production’ofnaturaleffectsisnothingmorethantheirlaw-basedexplanation—thatis,theirpermeationbylaws.

Godactsvialawsatalllevels.Andbecauseofthis,heproduces(literallythis

time,sinceHe’sanefficientcause)anyeffect“accordingtothestandingmechanicallawsofnature”(op.cit.).AsBerkeleyrepeatedlystresses,thisisnotanecessarytruth—itisnot“absolutelynecessary”forGodtoproduceanyeffectbymechanicalprinciples.Yet,themetaphysicalcontingencyofthe‘clockworkofnature’doesnotdetractfromthefactthatGodwillstoact“agreeablytotherulesofmechanism”.Infact,giventhatBerkeleydoeswanttoaccommodatemechanism(theclockworkofnature)withinhisphilosophy,hefurtherarguesthatalthoughGodcouldproduceanythinghewantedwithoutanymechanism,the‘clockworkofnature’isthewayGodhaschosentoproduceeffectsinnatureinaregularandorderlyway.Hence,themechanicallawsofnatureareconditionallyornaturallynecessary,viz.necessary“totheproducing[ofaneffect]accordingtothestandingmechanicallawsofnature”. InDeMotu,inwhichBerkeleymakesanattempttoexplainhisnaturalphilosophywithoutexplicitlydenyingthatthereismatter,heexpresseshisfirmviewthat“(R)egardingbodywemayboldlydeclareasestablishedfactthatitisnottheprincipleofmotion”(2008,250).Headdsthatwhatweknowaboutthe

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body(whatiscontainedintheideaofbody—“extension,solidity,andfigure”)isnotaprincipleofmotion.Andin§24hedismissesthattheremightbesomethingunknowninbodywhichisthisprincipleofmotion,becausewehavenoideaofit.Lawsofnature,then,‘replace’internalprinciplesofmotionofbodies.In

scienceitisenoughtostatetruetheoremsaboutthemotionofthebodies,irrespectiveofwhatmightormightnotcausethesemotions.Thesetruetheoremsare“therulesandlawsofmotion”andthe“theoremsdeducedfromthem”,(regulis&legibusmotuum,simulactheoremataindededucta).Andtheselaws“remainunshaken,solongassensibleeffectsandreasoningbasedonthemaregranted”(2008,252).Thereislittledoubt,however,thateventhoughlawsarediscoverableaposteriori,theyholdwithnaturalnecessityandpermeatetheactualbehaviourofthings.6.LeibnizonLawsandPowersMalebranchedidadopttheprincipleoftheconservationoftotalquantityofmotion.InDialogueX,(1923,267),henoted:“Inaword,Godhaschosenthesimplestlawonthebasisoftheuniqueprinciplethatthestrongershallconquertheweaker;and,subjecttothiscondition,thatthereshallalwaysbeintheworldthesamequantityofmotion”.ButheneverfollowedtheCartesiancourseoftryingtogroundthelawsofmotiononthisprincipleandtheimmutabilityofGod.Hedidattribute“movingforce”toGodandclaimedthatGodacts“alwayswiththesameefficacyorthesamequantityofmovingforce”(Dialogue7;1923,191).Thetotalquantityofmovingforceisconserved,sinceasMalebrancheputit,God“neverchangesthequantityofthemovingforcewhichanimatesmatter”(op.cit). Asiswellknown,aprincipleddisagreementbetweentheCartesiansandLeibnizconcernedwhatexactlyisconservedduringimpact.Alreadyin1686,LeibniznotedthatthereisagreatdifferencebetweentheconceptofthequantityofmotionandtheconceptofquantityofmotiveforceandthatDescarteswasmistakeninholdingthemtobeequivalent.ThismistakeledDescartes,Leibnizargued,to“toassertthatGodconservesthesamequantityofmotionintheworld”(1989,296).ButthisbasicCartesianprinciplePCQMwasnotcorrect,asLeibnizconclusivelydemonstrated.Whatisconservedisthetotalquantityofvisviva,whichistheproductofmasstimesthesquareofthevelocityofabody.AsLeibnizputit,whatisconservedisthe“totalforceandthetotaldirection”.Wewillnotgointothedetailsofthispresently.WhatisimportantforourpurposesisthatLeibnizpresentsthisprinciple—theconservationofthequantityofforce—asasubordinatelawofnature(DiscourseonMetaphysics,§17). Thefundamentallawofnatureisalawoforder.TheworldisorderlyandregularandforLeibniz“nomatterhowGodmighthavecreatedtheworld,itwouldalwayshavebeenregularandinacertaingeneralOrder”(Discourse§6;1989,306).Hence,thisfundamentallawismetaphysicallynecessary.Butthemostorderlyworldcouldhavebeenthemostcomplexone.LeibniznotesthatGodchosetocreatethemostperfectworld,whereperfectionisafunctionoftwofactors—simplicityandstrength.Asheputit:“ButGodhaschosenthatworldwhichisthemostperfect,thatistosay,whichisatthesametimethesimplestinitshypothesesandtherichestinphenomena”(op.cit.).Sothesimplestworldisatthesametimethemostcomprehensiveworld. Thisworldisstructuredbysubordinatelaws.TheseareGod’sgeneral

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volitions.Theygoverneverythingwithoutexceptions:“ForthemostgeneralofGod’slaws,whichrulesthewholesequenceoftheuniverse,iswithoutexception”(Discourse§7;1989,307).Thelawoftheconservationofthequantityofforceisthechiefsubordinatelawofnature.ItisgroundeddirectlyinGodinthatitisGodwho“alwaysconservesbyrulethesameforce”(Discourse§17;1989,314).Elsewhere(1989,499),hecallstheLawofconservationofquantityofforce“thefoundationofthelawsofnature”implyingthatamongthesubordinatelawsthereisahierarchyoflaws,withPCQFbeingatthebottom. Butwhatisforceoractivepower?Leibniztakesittobeanon-mechanicalquality,whichisnecessaryforexplainingthebehaviourofthings.Itisnon-mechanicalinthesensethatitisnotoneofthebasicmechanicalcategoriesofCartesianism,viz.,extension,figureandmotion.It’snotgeometricalanditisattributedtonaturalbodiesoverandabovetheirmechanicalaffections.Infact,giventhatthebasiclawofnatureistheconservationofthequantityofforce,Leibnizarguesthatinfindingthe“truelawsofnatureandtherulesofmotion”,wehavetogobeyondmechanicsandphysicstometaphysics(Discourse§18;1989,315).Wehavetoascertaintheforces(thatisthe“immediatecauses”ofmotionsandchangesinnature).Forcesare“morereal”thantheireffects(changesinmotion)andbecauseforcesare“differentfromsize,figure,andmotion”,wecanconcludethat“noteverythingwhichisconceivedinabodyconsistssolelyinextensionanditsmodifications”(op.cit.).Leibniztooktheneedtoappealtoforcestovindicatethemedieval-Aristotelianviewthatbodieshaveactiveandpassivepowers,whicharenotmechanicallyexplicableandgrounded.Rather,they“pertaintocertainformsorindivisiblenatures”ofcorporealsubstances(op.cit.).Thekeycharacteristicofforces,whicharedirectly“implanted”tocorporealbodies“bytheCreator”,isthatbybeingsubjectedtoforces,bodiesareendowed“withconatus,attaining[their]fulleffectunless[theyare]impededbyacontraryconatus”(1989,440).Thisforceisinthe“bodiesthemselves”and“itconstitute(s)theinmostnatureofthebody,sinceitisthecharacterofsubstancetoact”(1989,435).Restoringforcesorpowersasbeinginherentinbodieswasanimportant

breakwithCartesianism.Matterisnotpassivebutactive.ButLeibnizadoptedtheideathatthemotionsofpiecesofmatterissubjecttonaturallaws,whichareestablishedbyGod.Thoughnotmetaphysicallynecessary,thelawsarefarfrom“arbitrary”.GodhaschosenthembutasLeibnizputit,“Godhasbeenledtosetinmotionthelawswhichareobservedinnaturethroughdeterminedprinciplesofwisdomandbyreasonsoforder”(1989,500).Inthissense,wecansaythatlawsofnatureareconditionallyornaturallynecessaryinthatgivenGod’sdemandforsimplicityandstrength(i.e.,perfection)inanorderlyworld,theseparticularlawshadtobechosen.InalettertoMalebranche(June22/July21679),heputthispointthus:“WemustalsosaythatGodmakesthemaximumofthingshecan,andwhatobligeshimtoseeksimplelawsispreciselythenecessitytofindplaceforasmanythingsascanbeputtogether;ifhemadeuseofotherlaws,itwouldbeliketryingtomakeabuildingwithroundstones,whichmakeuslosemorespacethantheyoccupy”(1989,211).Hisgeneralreactiontooccasionalismrevealshisviewsabouttherelation

betweenlawandpower.Hischiefpointisthatthoughoccasionalistsarerightindenyingthatthereisinteractionamongbodies,andinparticular,indenyingthedirectinfluxtheoryaccordingtowhichacauseiswhatflowsintotheeffect

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(hencethatsomethingflowsbetweentwodistinctsubstances),theyarewronginplacingallactioninGod,therebyturninghimintoaDeusexMachina.Occasionalism,forLeibniz,introduces“akindofcontinuousmiracle”(1989,338).Itis“asifGodasaruleinterferedinsomeotherwaythanbypreservingeachsubstanceinitscourseandinthelawsestablishedforit”(op.cit.).ThoughhisdiagnosisofhowGodactsaccordingtooccasionalismmightwellbewrong,sinceforMalebrancheatleastGodneednotactbyanythingotherthanhisgeneralvolition,Leibnizpointstoagenuineproblemwithoccasionalism,viz.,thatlawsareexecuteddirectlybyGodhimselfandnotbynaturalbodies.SoLeibniztookitthatacompleteunderstandingoftheworkingsofnaturerequiresbothlawsofnatureandpowerfulsubstances.HeidentifiedakeyproblemforbothCartesianismandoccasionalism.IcallitLeibniz’sproblem:Howcanpassivematter‘obey’laws?Howarelawsexecutedifmatterdoesnothavewhatittakestheexecutethem?InhisreplytoBayle’scriticismin1698,Leibnizstressedthateventhough

generallawsaredecreesofGod,theyareinneed“ofanaturalmeansofcarrying[them]out”;hence,“allthathappensmustalsobeexplainedthroughthenaturewhichGodgivestothings”(1989,494).Inhis‘OntheNatureitself,orontheInherentForceandActionsofCreatedThings”,(1698),Leibnizgavethefollowingargumentfortheneedtomakebodiespowerfulandcausallyefficacious.LawsarecertainlyGod’sdecrees;butforbodiestobeabletoexecutethelawsinthefuture,somethingmusthavebeen“impresseduponcreatures”byGodwhichmakesthemcapabletoactaccordingtothelaw.Forotherwisetherearenonecessaryconnectionsbetweencausesandeffects;thecommand(God’slaw)iseithernotbindingatfuturemomentsor“itmustalwaysberenewedinthefuture”.Thecommand(thelaw),whichwassetinthebeginningoftime,isbindingnowandinthefutureonlyif“thelawsetupbyGoddoesinfactleavesomevestigeofhimexpressedinThings”.Andthisimpliesthat“thereisacertainefficacyresidinginthings”;(andcreaturesingeneral).Itisthisefficacywhichmakesthem“capableoffulfillingthewillofhimwhocommandedthem”.Thisefficacyispartoftheirnatureandit’saforce“fromwhichtheseriesofphenomenafollowsaccordingtotheprescriptionofthefirstcommand”(cf.1989,501).Leibniz’sargumentimpliesthatbothlawsandinherentpowersarerequired

fortheexplanationofnaturalphenomena.Butpowersareindividuatedindependentlyoflaws;theyarepresupposedfortheexistenceofnecessaryconnectionsinnatureinthesensethatpowersarerequiredforthingstoobeylawsandforthelawstobebinding.InhislettertoHartsoeker(Hanover,10February1711),Leibnizmakesclearthatitisnotenoughfortheidentificationofapowertostatealawthatitobeys(orsimplythatthereislaw);whatisalsorequiredisthespecificationofthemechanismbymeansofwhichthispoweracts.Themechanismis,clearly,ontopofthelawandgivenindependentlyofit.Withoutthemechanismthepoweris“anunreasonableoccultquality”.Hesays:

Thustheancientsandthemoderns,whoownthatgravityisanoccultquality,areintheright,iftheymeanbyitthatthereisacertainmechanismunknowntothem,wherebyallbodiestendtowardsthecenteroftheearth.Butiftheymeanthatthethingisperformedwithoutanymechanismbyasimpleprimitivequality,orbyalawofGod,whoproducesthateffectwithoutusinganyintelligiblemeans,itisanunreasonableoccultquality,andso

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veryoccult,thatitisimpossibleitshouldeverbeclear,thoughanangel,orGodhimself,shouldundertaketoexplainit(inNewton2004,112).

Thebottomlineisthatquadivinecommands,lawsarebindingonlyifbodies

arecapableoffollowingthemnecessarily—andthisisgroundedintheir“impressednature”.Fundamentally,theirimpressednature(“thesubstanceofthingsitself”,asLeibnizputit),“consistsintheforceofactingandbeingactedupon”(1989,502).Thisis“aprimitivemotiveforce”,whichis“superadded”toextensionandmassandgroundsmotionandaction.Forreasonwhichwecannotgointohere,Leibnizidentifiesthisprimitiveforcewithasoulorsubstantialform.7.HumeandNewtononLawsandNecessityRecently,therehasbeenconsiderablecontroversyaboutwhatHumethoughtaboutnecessity.Thetrendistointerprethisascepticalrealist,whilethetraditionalviewwasthathewasadenialist.ForreasonsthatIcannotgointonow,Ithinkthatthetraditionalviewisessentiallycorrect:Humedeniedthatthereisanypowerinnature;hencehedeniedthatthereisanynecessityinnature(seemy2003,chapter1foradiscussion).Humedidnotdenythattherearelawsofnature.However,theselawsdonotgovern;norisitthecasethatworldlythingsobeythem,inanyinterestingsense.Lawsarejusttheregularitiesthemselvesandnothingmore.Reflectingonthequestionofnecessitythatthelawsofmotionallegedlyhave,Humesaid:

Thedegreeanddirectionofeverymotionis,bythelawsofnature,prescribedwithsuchexactness,thatalivingcreaturemayassoonarisefromtheshockoftwobodies,asmotion,inanyotherdegreeordirectionthanwhatisactuallyproducedbyit.Wouldwe,therefore,formajustandpreciseideaofnecessity,wemustconsiderwhencethatideaarises,whenweapplyittotheoperationofbodies(Enquiry,SectionVIII,PartI,82).

Theideaofnecessity,whichofcourseHumeneverdoubtedthatwepossessandthatitispartofthecommonunderstandingofcausation,isaprojectionofthehumanmindonnature,whichisconditionedbytheexistenceofuniformityandregularityonnature:

Ouridea,therefore,ofnecessityandcausationarisesentirelyfromtheuniformity,observableintheoperationsofnature;wheresimilarobjectsareconstantlyconjoinedtogether,andthemindisdeterminedbycustomtoinfertheonefromtheappearanceoftheother.Thesetwocircumstancesformthewholeofthatnecessity,whichweascribetomatter.Beyondtheconstantconjunctionofsimilarobjects,andtheconsequentinferencefromonetotheother,wehavenonotionofanynecessity,orconnexion(Enquiry,SectionVIII,PartI,82).

Newton’sattitude,whichofcourseprecededHume’s,wasquitedifferent.13OnmyreadingofNewton,thereispowerinnaturebutpowersandlawsaremutuallydetermined—tointroduceapoweristointroducealaw.Interestingly,Newtondidallowthatthereisnecessityinnature;butthisnecessityis,fromanempirical-scientificpointofview,ineffable. TosubstantiatethepointthatforNewtonpowersandlawsaremutuallydetermined,weshouldbrieflycomparehimwithDescartes.InDefinitionIIIof

13MyunderstandingonNewtonhasbeeninfluencedbylongdiscussionswithRobertDiSalle.

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thePrincipia,Newtonintroducesthepower(vis)ofmatterofresistingacceleration(changeofstateofmotion)bymeansofalaw.Hesays:“Inherentforceofmatter(visinsita)isthepowerofresistingbywhicheverybody,sofarasitisable(quantuminseest),perseveresinitsstateeitherofrestingorofmovinguniformlystraightforward”(2004,60).Let’scomparethiswithNewton’sfirstlawofmotion:“Everybodyperseveresinitsstateofbeingatrestorofmovinguniformlystraightforward,exceptinsofarasitiscompelledtochangeitsstatebyforcesimpressed”(2004,45).TheDefinitiondefinesapowerabodyhasintrinsically,viz.,thepowertopersevereinitsstateofmotion(i.e.,thepowertoresistchangesinitsstateofmotion),bystatingthelawitobeysquantuminseest.14Inthestatementofthefirstlaw,ontheotherhand,Newtondescribesthelawabodyobeysbystatingwhathappenstoabodyiftheintrinsicpowertopersevereinitsstateofmotionistheonlyonethatispresentandacting.i.e.,ifthebodyisquantuminseest.Thedefinitionhasthedirectionfromthepowertothelaw;thelawhasthedirectionfromthelawtothepower.Awaytocombinethetwowouldbethefollowing:Everybodyobeysthefirstlawofmotion(itperseveresinitsstateofbeingatrestorofmovinguniformlystraightforward)ifandonlyitsvisinsitaistheonlypoweractingonthebody.Inthissense,apowerisdefinedbythelawthebodythathasitobeys;andconversely,alawstateswhatabodydoesinvirtueofapoweritpossesses.15 Descartes,bycontrast,simplystatedthelaw:“thateachthing,asfarasisinitspower(quantuminseest),alwaysremainsinthesamestate;andthatconsequently,whenitisoncemoved,italwayscontinuestomove”(II,37;1982,59).Inhiscase,aswehavealreadynoted,thereisnopowertobedefined;thelawsimplyreplacesthepower.Intrinsically.i.e.,quantuminseest,thebodyobeysthelaw(italwaysremainsinthesamestateofmotion). InthePrefacetothesecondeditionofthePrincipiain1713,whichwaswrittenbyRogerCotesundertheclosesupervisionofNewton,CotescarefullydistinguishedNewton’sviewsfromthoseoftheAristoteliansaswellasfromthoseoftheCartesians.ThechiefpointmadeagainsttheAristotelianswasthattheypositedsuigenerispowersandthiswasredundantandnon-explanatory.Coteswrote:

Therehavebeenthosewhohaveendowedtheindividualspeciesofthingswithspecificoccultqualities,onwhich–theyhavethenalleged–theoperationsofindividualbodiesdependinsomeunknownway.ThewholeofScholasticdoctrinederivedfromAristotleandthePeripateticsisbasedonthis.Althoughtheyaffirmthatindividualeffectsarisefromthespecificnaturesofbodies,theydonottellusthecausesofthosenatures,andthereforetheytellusnothing(2004,43).

Notethecomplaintaboutthe“unknownway”onwhichtheoperationsofbodiespossessingacertainpowerdepend.Newton’semphasisonlawsindefiningpowerswasmeant,amongotherthings,tocapture,andhencetoexplain,howpowersact:theyactvialaws;better:tointroduceapoweristointroducethelawthatthingsthatpossessitobey.Thereisnoexplanatorygaphere.Nounknown14FormoreontheimportanceofQuantuminSeEstseeI.BernardCohen(1964).15AsGeorgeSmith(2002,151)nicelyputit:“Thelawcharacterizingaforcefromaphysicalpointofviewgivesits“physicalproportions”andassignsittoa“physicalspecies.”Twoforcesareofthesamephysicalspeciesonlyiftheyarecharacterisedbythesamelaw”.

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modusoperandi. ButCotesgoesontocriticisetheCartesianwaytoo.Asiswell-known,hischiefpointagainsttheCartesiansintheprefacewasthattheyrecoursetounfoundedhypothesesandspeculationsaboutthemechanicalcausesofthephenomena.IttranspireshoweverthatCotes’srealcomplaintwasthattheydoallthisinordertoavoidtheAristotelianpitfallofpowers.Theytrytorectifythesuigenerisandnon-explanatorynatureofAristotelianpowersbyavoidingpowersaltogetherandbyappealing,instead,tomechanicalhypothesesaboutmatterinmotion.HereishowCotesputsthepointwhenitcomestowhatCartesianssayaboutgravity:

Foreithertheywillsaythatgravityisnotapropertyofallbodies–whichcannotbemaintained–ortheywillassertthatgravityispreternaturalonthegroundsthatitdoesnotarisefromotheraffectionsofbodiesandthusnotfrommechanicalcauses.Certainlythereareprimaryaffectionsofbodies,andsincetheyareprimary,theydonotdependonothers(2004,51).

Hence,thepricethattheCartesianwayoutcomeswithiseitheradenialthatgravityisauniversalpropertyofbodiesorthatgravityisamysteriousproperty(power)ofthingssinceitisnotexplainedandgroundedmechanically(i.e.,bymeansofalaw-obeyingconfigurationofmatterinmotion).WhenthenCotesstatesthatthereare“primaryaffectionsofbodies”,andthatbeingprimary,theseaffections(gravitybeingoneofthem)“donotdependonothers”,hecarvesoutpreciselythemiddleroadthatNewtonsuggested,viz.,tointroduceaprimaryaffectionofmatterwhichisneitheroccult(astheAristotelianswouldhaveit)normysterious(astheCartesianswouldhaveit)onewouldhavetointroduceitbymeansofthelawitobeys,evenifthislawwasnotmechanical.ItakeitthenthatCotes’sandNewton’sviamediawastokeepbothpowers(againsttheCartesians)andlaws(againsttheAristotelians)buttoclaimthattheyareintroducedhand-in-hand—especiallywhenitcomestotheprimary(andhencenot-further-reducible)powersofmatter. Cotesmakesthispoint(fairly)clearlywhenhetalksaboutgravitybeingsuchaprimaryaffection:“Amongtheprimaryqualitiesofallbodiesuniversally,eithergravitywillhaveaplace,orextension,mobility,andimpenetrabilitywillnot.Andthenatureofthingseitherwillbecorrectlyexplainedbythegravityofbodiesorwillnotbecorrectlyexplainedbytheextension,mobility,andimpenetrabilityofbodies”(2004,50).Gravityisnotanoccultpower(eventhoughwemaynotknowitscause)because,asNewtonputitintheGeneralScholium,“itisenoughthatgravityreallyexistsandactsaccordingtothelawsthatwehavesetforthandissufficienttoexplainallthemotionsoftheheavenlybodiesandofoursea”(2004,92). Hence,theNewtonianmethod,asexplainedbyCotesisaviamedia:“Fromcertainselectedphenomenatheydeducebyanalysistheforcesofnatureandthesimplerlawsofthoseforces,fromwhichtheythengivetheconstitutionoftherestofthephenomenabysynthesis”(emphasisadded)(2004,44). Newton,asiswellknown,didallowthattheremightbeanunknowncauseofgravity.Sohemightbetakentohaveallowedthattheremightbewaystoidentifypowersindependentlyofthelawstheyobey.Buthewasadamantthatthiskindofindependentidentification,ifpossibleatall,shouldnotbetakenasarequirementforalegitimateappealpowers;specifyingthelawthattheyobeyis

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enoughforscientificpurposes.InanunsentletterwrittencircaMay1712totheeditoroftheMemoirsofLiterature,NewtonreferredexplicitlytoLeibniz’slettertoHartsoeker,andstressedthatitisnotnecessaryfortheintroductionofapower—suchasgravity—tospecifyanythingotherthanthelawitobeys;noextrarequirementsshouldbeimposed,andinparticularnorequirementforamechanicalgrounding.Hesaid:

Andthereforeifanymanshouldsaythatbodiesattractoneanotherbyapowerwhosecauseisunknowntous,orbyapowerseatedintheframeofnaturebythewillofGod,orbyapowerseatedinasubstanceinwhichbodiesmoveandfloatwithoutresistanceandwhichhasthereforenovisinertiaebutactsbyotherlawsthanthosethataremechanical:Iknownotwhyheshouldbesaidtointroducemiraclesandoccultqualitiesandfictionsintotheworld(2004,116).

ThereishardlyanyneedtorelatehereNewton’sthreelawsofmotion.16What’simportanttonoteisthatforNewtontheselawswerenotmetaphysicallynecessary.AsCotesputit:

Itistheprovinceoftruephilosophytoderivethenaturesofthingsfromcausesthattrulyexist,andtoseekthoselawsbywhichthesupremeartificerwilledtoestablishthismostbeautifulorderoftheworld,notthoselawsbywhichhecouldhave,haditsopleasedhim(2004,52).

Thereislittledoubtthatlawsrequiredalaw-makerandthiswasGod.But,forNewton,significantlyandunlikeDescartes,Godcouldhaveestablisheddifferentlaws.Hence,thelawsaremetaphysicallycontingent;theycouldbedifferentfromwhattheyare.Thetaskthenofnaturalphilosophyistodiscovertheactuallawsofnature—theonesGoddidestablish.ThekeypointhereisthatsinceGodcouldhaveestablishedotherlaws,findingtheactuallawscannotamatterofaprioritheorising(asDescartessuggested)butofabroadlyempiricalinvestigation.Indeed,Cotessays:

Fromthissource[God’sperfectlyfreewill],then,haveallthelawsthatarecalledlawsofnaturecome,inwhichmanytracesofthehighestwisdomandcounselcertainlyappear,butnotracesofnecessity.Accordinglyweshouldnotseektheselawsbyusinguntrustworthyconjectures,butlearnthembyobservingandexperimenting(2004,57).

Howcanitbethattherearenotracesofnecessityinthelawsofnature?Iflawsweremetaphysicallynecessarytherewouldbeknownapriori;henceindependentlyofexperience.ButforNewtonandCotestherecannotbeaprioriknowledgeoflawsofnature,sincethelawsarefreechoicesofGod.AndiflawswheremetaphysicallynecessarytheywouldnotthefreechoiceofGod.Hencethereisadilemma:eithertheclaimisthatlawsholdwithmetaphysicalnecessity,butthenthiswouldnotmakethelawsthefreechoiceoftheauthoroftheuniverse;ortheclaimisthatGodwasfreeinthechoiceoflaws,butthentheycannotbeknownapriori.ThefirsthornistakenbyDescartes;thesecondbyNewton.Cotesputsthepointthus:

Hewhoisconfidentthathecantrulyfindtheprinciplesofphysics,andthelawsofthings,

16ForsomeinsightfulpointsconcerningmathematicalandphysicalcharacterisationsofforcesbyNewton,seeJaniak(2007).Therelevantliteratureis,ofcourse,vast.

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byrelyingonlyontheforceofhismindandtheinternallightofhisreasonshouldmaintaineitherthattheworldhasexistedfromnecessityandfollowsthesaidlawsfromthesamenecessity,orthatalthoughtheorderofnaturewasconstitutedbythewillofGod,neverthelessacreatureassmallandinsignificantasheishasaclearunderstandingofthewaythingsshouldbe(2004,57).

Partofthepointisthatknowingthelawsofnatureaprioriwouldbepossibleonlyontwoconditions:eitheriftherecouldbeonlyonewaythelawscouldbe;andhencethelawsweremetaphysicallynecessary;or,shouldthelawsbemetaphysicallycontingent,ifthehumanmindhadthecapacitytolatchontothemindependentlyofexperience.BothconditionsaredeniedbyNewton.Sotothequestion:‘Whatmakesthelawslaws,ultimately?’Newton’sansweris:thewillofGod.GiventhatthelawsaregroundeddirectlyinthewillofGod,theycannotbutbeinsomesensenecessary:onceGodwillsthem,theycannotbutholdandgovernthebehaviourofthings.Buythisisnotmetaphysicalnecessitybutconditionalornaturalnecessity.Inthissense,forNewtontherearenaturallynecessaryconnectionsinnature,expressedbythefundamentallawsofnature,buttheonlywaytofindthemoutisempirically(andhencefallibly).Newtonthen,unlikeHume,takesittobethecasethatlawsarenotmere

regularities;however,hetakesitthattheycanbeknownonlyas(mathematicallycharacterised)regularities.Thisleadstoadrasticreconceptualisationoflawsofnatureasprimarilymathematicalprincipleswhichcharacterisethebasicstructureoftheworldandplaceconstraintsontheexplanationanddescriptionofnaturalprocesses,butareknownempiricallyandnotapriori.InhisunsentlettertoCotes,inMarch1713,Newtonnoted:

IlikeyourdesignofaddingsomethingmoreparticularlyconcerningthemannerofphilosophizingmadeuseofinthePrincipiaandwhereinitdiffersfromthemethodofothers,viz.bydeducingthingsmathematicallyfromprinciplesderivedfromphenomenabyinduction.Theseprinciplesarethethreelawsofmotion.Andtheselawsinbeingdeducedfromphenomenabyinductionandbackedwithreasonandthethreegeneralrulesofphilosophizingaredistinguishedfromhypothesesandconsideredasaxioms.Uponthesearefoundedallthepropositionsinthefirstandsecondbook.Andthesepropositionsareinthethirdbookappliedtothemotionsoftheheavenlybodies(2004,109-110).

8.ConcludingthoughtsDuringtheseventeenthcentury,thereisaclearshiftfrompowersasregularityenforcerstolawsasregularity-enforcers.Medievalpowersyieldedabottom-upnecessity:lawsweremetaphorsfornaturallynecessaryconnectionsamongpowerfulsubstances.Butduringtheseventeenthcentury,lawsreplacednaturalpowersasprinciplesofconnection.Lawsyieldatop-downnecessity.Theyderivetheirnecessityfromalaw-giverandtheydeterminehowthingsmustbehaveintheworld;thatis,theygroundandexplaintheregularpatternsthereareintheworld.Laws,inthissense,are‘behind’theregularitythereisintheworldandgroundit. Aswehaveseen,however,lawskeptakeyfeatureofpowers:theyimposednecessaryconnectionsinnature,thoughtherewasashiftinhowexactlynecessitywasconceived.Cartesianlawsholdwithmetaphysicalnecessity;notsofortherestofthethinkersweexamined:lawsholdwithnaturalnecessityandimposepatternsofnaturallynecessaryconnectionsinnature.

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Theshiftfrompowerstolawscamewithatension,whichwasaccentuatedbythefactthatmatterwastakentobeinertandcausallyinactive.Thistensioniscapturedbythefollowingtwoquestions:Howcanthingsobeylawsiftheydonothavethepowertodoso?Howcanapowerlessmatterexecutethelaws?Lawsaresupposedtogovernthebehaviourofthings;thingsinsomesense

obeythemandhenceexecutethem.ButasLeibnizforcefullyargued,formattertobecapableofexecutingalaw,mattermusthavesuitablepowers.WithLeibnizpowersre-enterthestageasthatinvirtueofwhichbodiesaresubjecttolawsandabletoexecute/obeythelaws.Lawsthenseemtorequirepowerstoenforcenecessaryconnectionsintheworld.Buthowdoobjectsacquiretheirpowers?ForLeibniz,aswehaveseen,powersareidentifiedindependentlyoflaws.Buttwootheranswerstothisquestionbecameavailable.OnewasHume’s,

andtheotherwasNewton’s.ForHume,therearenopowers.Thelawsofnatureareregularities.ForNewton,powersandlawsentertheworldhand-in-hand,asitwere.UnlikeHume,Newtonwasfarfromacceptingthatthereisnonaturalnecessity.Still,ofthisnecessitynothingcanbeknownexceptwhateverisgiventousas(mathematicallycharacterised)regularities.Ifthereisnaturalnecessityinnature,(Newtonthinksthereis),itcanneverbefoundout.Butlet’scompareNewtonwithHumeoncemore:IfGodisleftoutofthe

picture,andifnaturalnecessitycannotbeotherwisegroundedin(theindependentlyposited)naturesorpowersallweareleftwithareregularitieswhichcanbeknownonlyas(mathematicallycharacterised)regularities(andneverquanaturalnecessities).These,plausibly,arethelawsofnatureforbothHumeandNewton.AcknowledgementIwouldliketothankLydiaPattonandWalterOttfortheirimmensepatienceandencouragement.Walter’sworkhasbeenagreatsourceofinspirationandideas.ManyoftheideasexpressedinthispaperwereextensivelydiscussedwithRobertDiSalleandStavrosIoannidis,whomIthankwholeheartedly.EarlierversionsofthispaperwerepresentedinaninvitedtalkattheRotmanInstituteofPhilosophy-EngagingScienceinJune1016;aspartofasymposium(inabsentia)intheHoPoSConferenceinMinneapolisinJune2016;andintheinauguralConferenceofthePOND-PhilosophyofSciencearoundtheMediterraneaninJerusaleminSeptember2016.Mythanksgotoseveralmembersoftheaudiencesforcommentsandquestions.ReferencesAdams,RobertMerrihew.2013.‘Malebranche’sCausalConcepts’.InEricWatkins

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