SPRING 2002

Colombia 2002

The images coming out of Colombia are graphic: violence, guerrillas,

paramilitaries, drug lords and displaced peasants. A decades-long

insurgency has escalated sharply during the 1990’s, fueled by funds from

the emergent drug trade. The bloody conflict poses a seemingly intractable set of

challenges for Colombia, the region and, increasingly, the United States.

In an ongoing effort to understand the issues confronting contemporary

Colombia, the Center for Latin American Studies sponsored a five-part spring

series, “Colombia 2002,” designed to bring distinguished scholars, policy makers,

and public intellectuals with distinct perspectives and expertise to Berkeley.

CENTER FOR

Latin American StudiesU N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A , B E R K E L E Y

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This spring the Center for Latin AmericanStudies (CLAS) probed the conflict inColombia, its historical roots and contem-

porary prospects in a series called “Colombia2002.” Professor Charles Bergquist (Universityof Washington), Colombian writer AlfredoMolano, and Professor Mary Roldán (CornellUniversity), all examined issues informing thepresent traumas.

The series also sought to go beyond theconflict. Enrique Peñalosa, the former mayor ofBogotá, explored humanizing Third World citiesand Professor Marco Palacios, the formerrector of the National University, examined thepower of Colombian economists. Finally, weintroduce a new “Viewpoint” series in this issuewith an opinion piece on Colombia by RobertCollier, a foreign-affairs columnist and reporterat the San Francisco Chronicle who has coveredLatin America extensively.

CLAS was also pleased to introduce anew series entitled “Neighbors in a New Era” onthe realities and possibilities of the U.S.-Mexicorelationship. Democratic transformation inMexico and the emergence of the Latino vote inthe U.S. are transforming politics on both sidesof the border, and increasingly what happens

politically in Mexico influences U.S. politics andthe other way around. We began a dialogue,reported on in this issue, that includedProfessors Denise Dresser and Sergio Aguayo,two prominent Mexican scholars and publicintellectuals, and Antonio Villaraigosa, thespeaker emeritus of the California Assembly andan important U.S. political actor.

Professor Rosemary Joyce reports onher research with Professor Christine Hastorf on“Cacao in Mesoamerica: The History andEconomic Impact of Chocolate.” Professor Joyceis the recepient of a National ScienceFoundation grant that grew out of a CLASpilot faculty research award.

Finally, CLAS is pleased to announcethe inauguration of the Mário de Andrade Chairin Brazilian Culture, named in honor of thenoted Brazilian modernist poet. The chair willcontribute in major ways to an already vibrantprogram on Brazilian art, literature, and musicat Berkeley.

Harley ShaikenChair

Letter from the Chair

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Colombia 2002 The U.S. and Mexico: Neighbors in a New Era

Peasants, Land, and Violence: Links between Colombia’s Guerrillas and Drug TraffickingThe Left and Paradoxes of Colombian History

If the Truth Be Told … What are the Consequences?La Violencia in Historical Perspective

Enrique Peñalosa:A Vision for BogotaCacao in Mesoamerica:The History and Economic Impact of Chocolate

The Inauguration of the Mário de Andrade Chair In Brazilian Culture Psychology and Law:The Chilean Reconciliation

Human Rights Leader Evaluates Fox AdministrationSebastião Salgado: On Photography and Globalization

Towards a New Third World City VIEWPOINT: U.S on a Steep Slope in Colombia

Insi

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ChairHarley Shaiken

Vice ChairTeresa Stojkov

EditorsRoselyn Y. Hsueh

Rachael Post

Design and LayoutGeof Oppenheimer

PhotographyAP Photo-WWP

Stefan CohenLina Katz

Jelani MahiriBeatriz Manz

Laura MerwinStephen SharnoffEnrique Peñalosa

Annette Rubado-MejiaRus Sheptak

ContributingWriters

Charles BergquistChris Cardona

Lydia ChávezMimi Chakarova

Robert CollierRoselyn Y. Hsueh

Alexandra HuneeusRosemary JoyceBenedito Nunes

Rachael PostMary Roldán

Amy RossAnnelise Wunderlich

The CLAS Newsletteris published three times

a year by the Centerfor Latin American

Studies,The Universityof California, Berkeley,

CA 94720-2312.

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Front cover photo:Children stand behind

a line of police whilethe Chilean national

soccer team visits LaPlaya school in

Barranquilla, Colombia.

The U.S. and Mexico:Neighbors in a New EraBy Lydia Chávez

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In the first of a series of public conversations,two Mexican academics and a U.S. Latinopolitical leader engaged over the possibilities

offered by Mexican President Vicente Fox’sinsistence on a new era in U.S. - Mexico relations.

“We are in the middle of a fundamentaltransformation in the way we Mexicans see theUnited States, how we perceive the U.S. and howwe have decided finally to defend our interestswith a different and more assertive attitude,” saidSergio Aguayo, a founding member of theMexican Academy of Human Rights and aprofessor at the Center for International

Relations at El Colegio de México.“The United States treated

Mexico with disdain and indiffer-ence in the 19th Century and thentook us for granted, and that isover,” he said. “It is not going to bepossible to take Mexico for granted,for good or for bad.”

Denise Dresser, a columnist forReforma and Proceso in Mexico Citywho also teaches in the politicalscience department at InstitutoTecnológico Autónomo de México,and Antonio R. Villaraigosa,California Assembly SpeakerEmeritus and former Los Angelesmayoral candidate, agreed.

However, it quickly becameclear that domestic politics in theUnited States complicated Fox’sefforts.

The conversation, “The U.S.and Mexico: Neighbors in a NewEra,” is part of a larger effort by theCenter for Latin American Studiesto contribute to the debate on U.S.-Mexico affairs by asking prominentMexican and U.S. academics,officials and public intellectuals toconsider the shape and character ofa new policy. To that end, theCenter invited Dresser and Aguayoto teach month-long seminars atBerkeley.

The panel on April 12 was one of severaldiscussions—private and public—in whichU.S.-Mexico relations have been addressed.

“This is a new program that the Centerwill be sponsoring to explore the U.S.-Mexicanrelationship—where it is today and where itmight be able to go in a way that improves therelationship and improves the lives of people onboth sides of the border,” said Harley Shaiken,the chair of the Center.

In a sense, the discussions have flirtedwith a central question that Foreign MinisterJorge Castañeda described in a private

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A Mexican-builtChrysler PT Cruiserparked on ReformaAvenue in Mexico City’sfinancial district.

Colombian journalist Alfredo Molanooffered a sociologically rich set ofexplanations for the peculiar

intransigence of Colombia’s guerrillaorganizations and their connection to drugtrafficking. Molano’s presentation, given at theCenter for Latin American Studies on March 7,centered on peasants: their involvement in landinvasions, their displacement by armed conflict,and their interaction with guerrillas. Althoughhis assessment of the current situation was notoptimistic, he did provide valuable insights intothe social, political, and economic sources of theongoing conflict.

Molano approaches history as ajournalist—collecting testimonies from partici-pants in the conflict, whether peasants orguerrillas. He has focused on two major themes:colonización (colonialization) of land invasionsby peasant squatters, and desplazamiento interno(internal displacement) of citizens by armedconflict. The connections between these twophenomena, forged by violence, are at the cruxof his argument.

To account for these linkages, Molanopointed to the thwarting of agrarian reform. Heemphasized the 1930’s, a period in which theLiberal Party government undertook a broadseries of reforms, including agrarian reform. TheConservative Party abruptly halted theseinitiatives in 1946, a year that Molano identifiedas the start of the civil conflict known as laViolencia (the Violence). At first, this conflict waspartisan; the Conservatives and Liberals foughtan undeclared war through private armedgroups.

As the conflict spread, it evolved from apolitical to a social struggle. By 1956, purely par-tisan groups had been shut down, but non-party groups continued fighting over accessto economic resources. Under military dicta-tor Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the state declared waron the guerrillas. During this period, the guerril-las were an amalgam of many different armedgroups, including combatants who had beeninvolved in the struggle over agrarian reform andcolonización. As state forces gained the upperhand, the guerrillas retreated to the easternplains region and began recruiting moreformer colonos (peasant squatters) into theirranks. The conflict between the state and theguerrillas became intimately connected with thestruggle between landowners and peasants. Twonew opposition groups emerged: colonos andguerrillas.

Rojas Pinilla was deposed in 1957, andthe Liberal and Conservative parties reached anagreement to end partisan conflict. Despite thissettlement at the national level, peasantorganizations in the countryside did not

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Peasants, Land, and Violence: Linksbetween Colombia’s Guerrillasand Drug TraffickingBy Chris Cardona

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As the crisis inC o l o m b i aescalates, it is

important to standback and place thecurrent situation inhistorical perspec-tive. What I wouldl ike to do, i nparticular, is examinesome of the para-doxes of Colombianhistory as they affectthe Colombian left.I will do this in partby comparing severalhistorical develop-ments in Colombiato those of otherLatin Americancountries.

The firstparadox is this: thesame country thatconfronts such apowerful leftistguerrilla movementtoday—a guerrillamovement so strongthat it threatens the integrity of the Colombiannation itself—has had historically one of theweakest lefts in the hemisphere. Moreover,the terms of this paradox are related. Becausethe Colombian left was so weak historically, itdeveloped the strategies and tactics—and theintransigence at the negotiating table—that arethe hallmarks of the Colombian guerrilla today.

Colombian political parties of the left,indeed third parties in general, have never beenable to crack the political monopoly of the twotraditional Colombian political parties, theLiberals and the Conservatives. Unique amongthe major nations of Latin America, Colombiastill has two important political parties, bothof them formed in the middle of the 19thcentury. Throughout the 20th century, even invery recent times, the left has typically garneredonly a tiny percentage (less than five percent) ofthe vote in presidential elections.

This paradox can be illustrated in adifferent and striking way by comparing income

distribution and electoral support for the left inColombia and in Brazil today. Income distribu-tion in recent years is more regressive inColombia and Brazil than in other major LatinAmerican countries. Yet the degree of supportfor labor candidates currently running forpresident in the two countries could hardly bemore distinct. In Brazil, José Ignacio da Silva,“Lula,” the candidate of the Labor Party (PT), iscurrently leading all contenders in the polls. Incontrast, in Colombia Luis Eduardo “Lucho”Garzón, the former head of the largest laborfederation, is near the end of the pack of a half-dozen presidential candidates. He currently hasthe support of less than 2 percent of prospectivevoters. Garzón is one of the most intelligentcandidates and effective speakers the Colombianleft has ever placed before the voters. He hastaken enlightened and sensible positions on thequestions of drugs, peace, and social reform.Garzón’s platform is a reasoned, moderatealternative to the neo-liberalism of the other

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The Left and Paradoxes of Colombian HistoryBy Charles Bergquist

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The founder and com-mander of the FARC,Manuel Marulanda,arrives under escort atthe ceremony for theBoliviarian Movement, anew clandestine politicalparty for the rebels, out-side of San Vicente delCaguan.

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Truth commissions are appearing all overthe world. While there has been consider-able debate concerning the nature and

meaning of such commissions, the consensus isthat the phenomena are on the rise. Who has thepower to determine the truth about the past?How will this “truth” about past atrocitiesinfluence power relations in the future? Whatdoes it mean to have such discussions relegated(and possibly confined) to the space of a truthcommission?

To explore these questions, I observedthe experiences of truth commissions inGuatemala and South Africa for my dissertationin geography at UC Berkeley (“The Body of theTruth,” 1999). Clearly, the unique circumstancesof each nation's conflict influenced theexperiences of each truth commission. Yet bothshared two key features common to the genre:the commissions were established following aperiod of bitter violence, and during a negotiatedpolitical transition. First, in each case the truthcommissions arose out of demands to address ahistory of intense violence, and thesystematic violation of human rights.

Furthermore, the reality of thisviolence had been systematically denied. Inboth Guatemala and South Africa, thenature of the violence contributed topressures to investigate, discuss, andacknowledge the details of the repression.The nature of the repression provokeddemands for an official re-presentation of ahistory that had been ignored, denied orcovered-up. For example, in Latin America,the principle of “the right to the truth” wasa response to practices of repression such aslos desaparecidos (the disappeared), extra-judicial assassinations, and other forms ofviolence that have been called deniableforms of repression.

Agents of the state, suspected asthe perpetrators of these crimes, operatedwithin the security of state-sponsoredimpunity, and investigations and prosecu-tions were rare. Ignacio Martin-Baro, aprominent social psychologist and Jesuit inEl Salvador, wrote in 1989 (shortly beforehis assassination by the military) that the

power of this particular form of terror was thestate’s ability to deny that such crimes werehappening while simultaneously making theentire society aware that it could kill withimpunity. Establishing the truth becameimportant, precisely because the regime was ableto carry out its terror by lying, presentingdistortions of the truth or covering upimportant information.

Secondly, in both Guatemala and SouthAfrica, the truth commissions emerged within anegotiated political transition. The negotiatedtransition involves compromise and accommo-dation; the particular equation reached innegotiations is predicated on the balance ofpower between the parties to the negotiations.For example, in South Africa, the negotiationprocess that led to the dismantling of apartheidand the institution of a more inclusive electoraldemocracy was preoccupied with concernsregarding the fate of those conducting thenegotiations. The National Party clearly fearedthat majority rule would bring civil and criminal

If the Truth Be Told . . .By Amy Ross

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K’iche’ woman and children.

procedures against itsmembers; its leadership arguedthat members of the securityforces would refuse to cooperatewith and thereby threaten theprocess if they thought thatsuch a transition would resultin jail sentences. The AfricanNational Congress eventuallyaccepted amnesty as a part ofthe truth commission processin order to placate members ofthe security forces otherwisecapable of obstructing thetransition.

The important point isthat though each of the truthcommissions were mandated to address the suf-fering caused by the violence, it is the balance ofpower among those negotiating the transitionthat dictates the terms under which such com-missions operate. Although established in thename of “the victims,” both the Guatemalanand South African truth commissions weredesigned by the protagonists in the conflict—parties more interested in amnesty than truth. Itis this tension that shaped the experiences of theGuatemalan and South African truth commis-sions. Even as other arenas, like battlefields, arepacified through peace treaties, many of theproblems that gave rise to the conflict remain indispute. Truth commissions are therefore sites ofstruggle.

The practices of these two truthcommissions were quite distinct. In SouthAfrica, the process was extraordinarily open forpublic consumption and participation. TheSouth African Truth and ReconciliationCommission (1996-2002) conducted publichearings throughout the country, making thefront page on a regular basis, and provokingcomment from many areas of the politicalspectrum. In addition to witnessing the publicperformance of participants providing testimony,for my research, I interviewed scores of peopleabout what that experience meant to them. Staffmembers and commissioners were also availableand eager to be interviewed. Moreover, a crew ofjournalists covered the truth commission on a

regular basis.In contrast to the South African

experience, in Guatemala the Commission toClarify the Human Rights Violations and OtherActs of Violence that Have Caused the Sufferingof the Guatemalan Population (1997-1999) wasan extremely closed affair. From its conception,through its term in operation, through thewriting of the final report, the Guatemalan truthcommission was shrouded in secrecy. Staffmembers were required to sign an oath of secrecy,swearing that they would refrain fromdiscussing any information relating to the workof the truth commission. The Guatemalan presswas equally in the dark, and rarely publishedreports concerning the truth commission. Theseobstacles existed within the already dangerousterrain of conducting social research inGuatemala. To even broach the subject of theviolence and its meanings, much less to raise thequestion of responsibility, was venturing intodangerous terrain.

Yet even in circumstances in which thetruth commission, as mandated, appearsincredibly weak, and the internal situation inthe country seems to preclude an extensivetruth-telling project, it is important to rememberthat many surprises can occur. In South Africa,poet Antjie Krog writes, “The vocabularyaround the Truth Commissions has changedfrom phase to phase, but the word that turns up

What are the Consequences?

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A monument commemo-rates those who died inthe armed conflict inNebaj, Quiché inGuatemala.

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In recent years, Colombia has achievedinternational notoriety for the highesthomicide and internal displacement rates in

the world. It is also known as the largest singlesource of narcotics smuggled into the UnitedStates, and host to the Western Hemisphere’soldest guerrilla insurgency. The emergence ofarmed leftist revolutionary groups in the 1960’sand narco-trafficking in the 1970’s marked thebeginning of what most analysts call Colombia’scontemporary violence. The spread of illicitorganizations dedicated to processing andcommercializing marijuana, cocaine and heroin,along with the leftist insurgency, have madeColombian violence more acute during the lasttwo decades. The roots of persistent conflict,however, may be traced back to an earlier phe-nomenon known as la Violencia (the Violence)

which took place between 1946 and 1966.As a result of la Violencia, an estimated

200,000 Colombians died. Over two millionmore Colombians either migrated or wereforcibly displaced from their homes. The majoritynever returned. The impact of la Violencia wasso great that it provoked Colombia’s only 20thcentury military coup, and led to anunprecedented agreement between the Liberaland Conservative parties to alternate control ofthe presidency and share political power fornearly 20 years.

On the surface, linking la Violencia withColombia’s current drug-fueled and armedviolence of the right and left may seem unsub-stantiated. Mid-century conflict has been

La Violencia in HistoricalPerspective:Implications for an Analysis of theContemporary Conflict in ColombiaBy Mary Roldán

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Nidia Rojas and her son,refugees from Colombia’s

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For a man from a war-ravaged place likeColombia, Enrique Peñalosa is surprisinglycheerful. The former mayor of Bogotá said

he did not come to Berkeley to talk aboutColombia’s bloodshed or booming narcoticstrade. Instead, he wanted to talk about the dan-gers of driving on sidewalks.

“In my country, we are just learningthat sidewalks are relatives of parks—not pass-ing lanes for cars,” Peñalosa said, earning laughsamong the some 200 people who crowded intothe Doe Library for his presentation titled“Towards a More Socially and EnvironmentallySustainable Third World City” on April 8.Peñalosa enthusiastically described his efforts toinspire more pedestrians in this city of nearlyseven million perched high atop the Andes.“God made us walking animals,” he said, aspart of the “Colombia 2002” series sponsored bythe Center for Latin American Studies. “We needto walk to be happy.”

Keeping Bogotá’s sidewalks clear oftraffic is just one part of Peñalosa’s ambitiousvision for a new kind of Third World metropolis.This vision could well propel him to candidacyin Colombia’s next presidential election—apossibility that he will neither confirm nordeny. But whether his talk at Berkeleypreviewed future campaign promises or not, thetall, silver-haired Peñalosa articulated his ideaswith the grace of a skilled politician.

While serving as Bogotá’s mayor from

1998 until December 2000 Peñalosa spearheadeda dramatic makeover for one of the world’s moredangerous cities. He ordered the constructionof over 70 miles of bicycle paths, more than1,000 parks, restricted car use during rush hours,and modernized the bus system. He broughtelectricity, water and schools to the city’s poorestneighborhoods, and planted more than 100,000trees.

And he did not stop at mere physicalimprovements. Among the many accomplish-ments listed on his curriculum vitae, Peñalosasaid he “[l]ed the transformation of a city’sattitude from one of negativist hopelessness toone of pride and hope.”

At times during the talk, Peñalosa cameacross as a municipal Robin Hood, contestingtraditional notions of land use. Take, for example,the exclusive country club in one of Bogotá’stonier neighborhoods that Peñalosa sought toconvert into an open access park. Or the publicbicycle paths he wants to run through thegardens of the rich. He called these proposals“urban land reform,” and the controversy theyprovoke “the ideological debate of our time.”

As is the case all over the developingworld, Bogotá has grown dramatically in recentyears as job-hungry peasants stream in from thecountryside. High-density expansion isPeñalosa’s antidote to U.S.-style suburbansprawl. In Bogotá, which would be 20 times as

Enrique Peñalosa:A Vision for BogotáBy Annelise Wunderlich

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Left: A TransMilenio busstation in Bogotá.

Right: Car-free day inBogotá.

large as Atlanta if it had the same number ofpeople per hectare, restricting car use is aquestion of survival, Peñalosa said. He imaginesa city of wide promenades, where the classes canmingle peacefully on foot as they go about theirbusiness—a place where money does not deter-mine the quality of life. “If we define our valueby income alone, we are condemning ourselvesto be losers for the next 500 years,” he said.“Happiness is what it should be all about.”

Although Peñalosa belongs to theLiberal party and leans to the left on issues ofpublic space, he advocates a strong centralgovernment, and stricter law enforcement. Partof Colombia’s violence is due, he believes, to thepublic’s lax attitude towards rules.

Peñalosa’s critics accuse him ofauthoritarianism—a label he challenges. Theorderly, green urban environment he envisionswill promote democracy and protect the poorestpeople, he said. Law-abiding places likeDenmark and Sweden are his inspiration, butin order to reach their level of sophistication,he said, the Colombian government must firstgain legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

When asked about his strategy forcoping with the estimated two million peopledisplaced by the war, Peñalosa called thosenumbers “exaggerated.” He said most of therural migrants flood to cities like Bogotá insearch of economic opportunity, not becausethey are fleeing violence. Peñalosa also did notaddress the issue of rural poverty. While headmitted that internal refugees are a problem,he did not mention specific plans to help them.“We have to treat all displaced people in thesame way,” he said.

Ultimately, it is the city—not thecountryside—that lies at the heart of

Peñalosa’s plan to rebuild Colombia. A citywhere people are no longer afraid or resentfulof their neighbors, and where class differencesare minimized by generous public space andeco-friendly transportation.

Peñalosa is determined to remainupbeat about his country’s future. “Urbanreform is the most urgent —and the easiest tomake happen,” he said. “There is nothing moreimportant than building schools, roads andparks.”

Annelise Wunderlich is a graduate student in jour-nalism and Latin American studies.

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historically understood as a widespreadphenomenon with no radical social objectives. Itwas catalyzed by a partisan struggle over statecontrol by members of Colombia’s twotraditional parties. But a more in-depthexamination of the growth of violence between1946 and 1953 in the northwestern Colombianstate of Antioquia suggests that la Violencia hasimportant implications for understandingColombia’s current crisis.

Of the Colombian regions hardest hit

by violence between 1946 and 1957,Antioquia—at the time Colombia’s wealthiestand most populous region—ranked third inthe total number of violent deaths registerednationally. Historians believe la Violencia inAntioquia was the most severe in the coffeeproducing towns of the southwest and involvedpeasants who targeted political oppositionmembers for extermination. But previously

La Violencia in Historical Perspectivecontinued from page 8

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Enrique Peñalosa in front of the Haas School of

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untapped statistical and archival data—publicorder reports, government communiques, theprivate correspondence of regional and localofficials, and interviews with participants andsurvivors—all paint a more complex picture ofregional violence.

Early episodes of violence resulted invery few casualties. During the first phase from1946 to 1949, sporadic violence mainly occurredin “core” towns—communities that were denselypopulated, centrally located and integratedeconomically and politically. Disputes arose overeither electoral fraud and intimidation or outof political appointments and state-determinedpatronage hiring. In most core towns—eventhose with a Liberal majority or where theLiberal opposition controlled public offices—officers of the regional Conservative governmentresponded to partisan violence with negotiationrather than repression. In fact, the inhabitants ofmany core towns actively opposed attempts—often made by non-local political appointees orselective regional extremists—to promote partisanviolence. They did this partly out of a localtradition of bipartisan cooperation, and partlyto prevent possible repercussions of violence onthe local economy.

Core town residents shared commoncharacteristics that enabled them to deploynon-violent means to pressure the regional stateto stop violence. They had democratic mecha-nisms to express political dissent, such as popu-larly elected town councils and locally paid andappointed public order officers. They had atradition of negotiating power with the regionalstate, either directly or through mediation byimportant private producer associations like theFederation of Coffee Growers. Core inhabitantsalso were bound by bonds of kinship, sharedeconomic interests and common cultural values.They perceived themselves as “white,”hardworking,legitimately married, religiously devout andpolitically conservative—regardless of theirpolitical affiliation. The relationship betweencitizens and the regional state in coreAntioqueño towns was reciprocal, but unequal.This bargain made it possible to use negotiationinstead of force to impede the severity andspread of la Violencia.

In 1949, 75 percent of deaths officiallyregistered by the governor’s office that listedviolence as the cause of death occurred in core

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towns. By 1950, however, the pattern shifted.Official violence-related deaths numbered in thehundreds and were concentrated in towns locat-ed in the furthest southwest. Half of the morethan 4,000 people killed by violence registeredby the governor's office between 1949 and May1953, were killed in just five municipalities:Dabeiba, Puerto Berrío, Urrao, Cañasgordas andRemedios—all located on Antioquia’s periphery.With the exception of the highly populatedsouthwest, all of these areas with high casualtieswere the least populated in Antioquia.

Like core areas, peripheral areas andtheir inhabitants also shared cultural practicesand distinct ethnic or racial identities.Compared to core inhabitants, who representedthemselves and were seen by the regional elite inpositive terms, peripheral residents embodieddissidence, rebellion, licentiousness, barbarityand laziness in official discourse. The periphery,unlike the core, was colonized largely bymigrants from other Colombian regions or bygroups perceived to be racially inferior to theAntioqueño-held “white” ideal.

Towns in the periphery experiencedexplosive growth in the decade before laViolencia. The bulk of Antioquia’s extractiveindustries—logging, gold mining and oilproduction—and its capital-intensive

product i o n — c a t t l e r a n c h i n g a n dcommercial agricultural production—wereconcentrated in peripheral towns. Antioquia’sonly access to the Caribbean Sea and to the portsof Colombia’s strategic lifeline—the MagdalenaRiver—were located in peripheral areas likeUrabá and the middle Magdalena Valley. Despitethe periphery’s extraordinary strategic andeconomic value, the government had investedvery little to improve the lives or win the loyaltyof local inhabitants. Periphery residents viewedregional authorities as representatives of acolonial power that exercised its power byforced imposition and repression rather thannegotiated consensus.

Violence on the periphery took theform of armed bands, some organized bymembers of the Liberal party, others mobilizedby local Conservative extremists. The twocontenders rarely met state forces—police, armyand customs officers—in direct confrontation,preying instead on civilians, especially workersand poor settlers. Outside the core, certainsectors of the regional government spearheadedviolence to achieve political control over histori-cally uncooperative and politically left-leaningpopulations. They deployed the police and

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As I write, Kirsten Tripplett, a UC Berkeleypostdoctoral researcher, collects botanicalsamples from cacao plants in Mexico.

Tripplett is doing research for a program thatshe, Professor Christine Hastorf, and I proposedto the National Science Foundation (NSF), todevelop ways to identify direct evidence ofcultivation of cacao, the botanical source ofchocolate, in archaeological sites. After furthercollecting in Belize and Honduras, Tripplett willwork in the McCown ArchaeobotanyLaboratory that Professor Hastorf directs,experimenting with the samples she hascollected and simulating the effects of cacaoprocessing and discard in ancient settlements.She will produce a reference collection forcomparison to fragmentary plant remainsrecovered from archaeological sites like PuertoEscondido, Honduras, where my ongoingexcavation project is exploring the possibilitythat cacao production was a specialization asearly as 1000 B.C.

Why this interest in the early history of cacao?When archaeologist Rene Millon titled his 1955doctoral dissertation, “When Money Grew onTrees,” he captured the European fascinationwith the use of cacao as a standard of value foreconomic exchange in pre-Hispanic CentralAmerica. The idea of currency that could becultivated raised questions researchers havestruggled to address for decades. Cacao has beencredited with a central role in pre-Hispanicsocieties, in the negotiation of social relationsthrough marriage, the maintenance of politicalhierarchies marked by privileged consumptionof cacao by elites, and in the performance ofrituals from the household to the polity. Earlycolonial descriptions of the place of cacao in the

economy of the Mexica (or Aztec) tribute statehave been used as models for understandingmuch earlier economies in Mexico, Guatemala,Belize, Honduras and El Salvador. Thesemodern countries occupy territory where theplant, whose closest relatives are from northernSouth America, was cultivated and consumed inthe 16th century A.D., when Spanish observersdescribed cacao as a form of currency critical tolong-distance trade.

Despite the centrality of cacao in models ofpre-Columbian economies, actual evidence forits use prior to the period of Spanishcolonization has been limited. Artistic represen-tations of trees with wrinkled pods growingdirectly from the trunk, a diagnostic of cacao,have been identified in a few places inGuatemala, Belize, and Mexico dating to theClassic period (between 250 and 1000 A.D.),when Maya city states flourished in the samearea. Modeled ceramic cacao pods and seeds,some so realistic they were originally mistakenfor preserved plant remains, were recovered insites of the same age in western Honduras andon the Pacific coast of Guatemala. Jars of foamybrown liquid depicted in historical manuscriptsfrom Oaxaca, dating from 1000 to 1500 A.D.,have been tentatively identified as cacaobeverages. And some historical linguists havesuggested that the word cacao itself spreadaround 1000 B.C. from a proposed originalcenter of cultivation for the plant on theMexican Gulf Coast.

These indirect indications of a history of the use of cacao are too scattered to allowresearchers to say where cacao was grown, how

Cacao in Mesoamerica:The History and Economic Impact of Chocolateby Rosemary Joyce

CONTINUED ON PAGE 19

Photos from thecollections of theInstituto Hondureño deAntropología e Historiaand the Museo de SanPedro Sulo in Honduras:A spouted jar dating toca. 700-300 B.C. in theshape of an early cacaoserving vessel; aHonduran figurine datingto ca. 1100-900 B.C., thetime period RosemaryJoyce and her teamhypothesize cacaocultivation began; and avase from the UluaValley, dating to 750-850A.D. with scenes of visi-tors being served cacaodrinks.

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On April 30th, 2002 the Center for Latin American Studies and the

Brazilian Ministry of Culture proudly inaugurated the Mário de Andrade

Chair in Brazilian Culture with a celebration of art, literature and music

from Brazil. Benedito Nunes, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the

Universidade Federal do Pará, delivered a lecture on Poesia e filosofia,

followed by a selection of music by Heitor Villa Lobos. The event honors

the work of Brazilian modernist poet, Mário de Andrade.

Professor Nunes is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at UC Berkeley this semester.

InspirationSão Paulo: tumult of my life…

My loves are flowers made from the original…

Harlequinate!… Diamond tights… Gray and gold…

Light and mist… Oven and warm winter…

Subtle refinements without scandals, without jealousy…

Perfumes from Paris … Arys!

Lyrical slaps in the Trianon… Cotton field!

São Paulo! tumult of my life…

Gallicism crying in the wilderness of America!

– Mário de Andrade

Skyline of São Paulo, Brazil.

Photo by Jelani Mahiri.

Where even at the height of

summer there were storms of

wind and cold like unto the

harshest winter.

-Fra. Luis de Sousa

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Benedito Nunes standsamong the tall eucalyp-tus trees on campus.

Our flight from the mouth of the AmazonRiver in Belém, Pará in the extreme northof Brazil to Berkeley, Calif. took 17

hours. My wife and I flew from the 12th to the13th of January; it was as if we had begun to goaround the world. Was it worth it?

After being here for almost fourmonths and weighing the fatiguing trip withwhat the university has had to offer, I believe itwas well worth the journey for the followingreasons: the wonderful reception to my classes;the polemic character of those classes; the richin te l l e c t u a lsharing withstudents andfellow profes-sors; and, lastbut not least,the enchantingbeauty of thecampus.

I teach anundergraduateclass aboutthe Brazilianshort prosewriter andnovelist Clarice Lispector, whose work isappreciated internationally and translatedextensively into English, and whose texts continueto awaken intense interest. The pleasure thisclass gives me is repeated in my graduateseminar on modernist Brazilian poets—thoseof the caliber of Carlos Drummond de Andrade,Manuel Bandeira, Cecilia Meireles, MuriloMendes, Jorge de Lima, João Cabral de MeloNeto and Mário Faustino. Not all of them arewell known in the United States, but each iscomparable to the best poets of the Englishlanguage. We have appreciated and discussedthese Brazilian poets in the healthy environmentof controversy that fills both my undergraduateand graduate seminars.

The ambiance of these encounters isalways filled with the exchange of ideas anddialogue between students and professors—or,amongst professors, because some of mycolleagues have given me the immense honor ofparticipating in my seminars. In them, I am notso much a master as an older colleague whosuggests paths and concepts to my listeners. Thefruitful community that has formed among usmakes up for the long journey that preceded ourmeeting.

I believe this enjoyable community willbe transformed, later, when the impressions of

the momentdissipate intothe material ofmemory, andbecome aneternal source ofremembrance.Perception ismomentary; inmemory wereclaim themoments wehave lived andthey constituteour cumulativepast.

Beyond the memories and intellectualinterchange, the constant stream of dailyimpressions of Berkeley will also remain withme, like a Technicolor film – the place of allplaces, where the forests, the grandiose and agedtrees, and the scented eucalyptus seem to havearisen in tandem with the buildings of variousdepartments.

Memories are like people, the poetRainer Maria Rilke once wrote – I alreadyvisualize the memories of Berkeley I will keep,and they also watch me as I remember them.

Benedito NunesBerkeley 2002

Translated by Annette Rubado-Mejía

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Memories of Berkeley

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As a psychologist, Elizabeth Lira admittedshe was baffled at first by human rightslawyers, with their arcane and sometimes

contradictory legal arguments. The niceties ofstatutes of limitations and when they expire ordiscussions of whether amnesty applies to actsor to individuals seemed less pressing than themost painful question left by the Pinochetregime: what happened to those whodisappeared? And why did these lawyers wastetheir time arguing before the very judges whohad deliberately ignored thousands of claims ofhuman rights violations filed during thedictatorship?

But it was the slow, impersonal route oflaw that finally ushered in Chile's post-regimereconciliation, Lira explained during her visitMarch 4 at the Center for Latin AmericanStudies. In 1998, eight years into democracyand a quarter century after the regime's crimesbegan, General Augusto Pinochet was detainedin London. While the media followed each step

of Pinochet's drawn-out international legalsaga, a monumental change quietly took placein Chile. Judges reversed themselves and slowlybegan to investigate cases of disappearancesduring the regime from 1973-1990.

The value of the human rights lawyers'legalese suddenly became apparent: by adoptingtheir arguments, Chile's judges were able toopen over 500 cases in recent years. Regardlessof the legal fate of Pinochet, these cases willcontinue for several years. Together the nationaland international criminal investigations havespawned a process of rethinking the past,making public official information that hadpreviously been denied, and providinginformation about the fate of some of losdesaparecidos (the disappeared). Reconciliationbegan through the adversarial medium of law.

For Chile, it was a first. Lira andhistorian Brian Loveman have devoted the pastseveral years to writing the history of reconcili-ation in Chile by studying past political

conflicts as a way to understand how Chilecould overcome its current divisions. In the

past, they found, amnesties held fast, andconflicts were not resolved so much asforgotten. But as any psychologist willexplain, this is not a way to overcomeconflict or trauma. Lira and Lovemanfound that the same conflicts flared upagain a few years later or in the next gener-ation of politicians.

For Lira, amnesties block resolution byhiding responsibility. Criminal investiga-tions, in contrast, allow people to distin-guish levels of responsibility, bringingnuance to an otherwise black-and-whitepicture. Only then does reconciliationbecome possible. Today Chileans are ableto see that it was not the army at large thatwas brutally violent against civiliansunder the regime, but rather a few peoplewho were involved in planning, organizing,and executing the violence.

Lira's current work details the historyof political conflict and reconciliation inChile, focusing on the recent resurgence of

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An opponent of Pinochetholds a sign that reads

“Trial to Pinochet.”

Psychology and Law:The Chilean Reconciliation

By Alexandra Huneeus

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A Vicente Fox campaignposter graces a street inMexico Cityduring the 2000 presidential campaign.

Human Rights Leader EvaluatesFox Administration By Rachael Post

“While the Fox Administration is makingstrides in foreign policy, it continuesto fall short on keeping campaign

promises, particularly concerning security,corruption and human rights,” said SergioAguayo, professor at El Colegio de México and aleading expert on human rights in Mexico.Aguayo spent the month of April at CLASteaching a special seminar on Mexico’s transi-tion to democracy.

“Although Fox has promised to wipeout the excesses of the old regime, his adminis-tration has not,” Aguayo said as part of his talktitled “Mexico at the Crossroads: An Evaluationof the Fox Administration.” Aguayo spoke theday after Mexico’s Foreign Minister JorgeCastañeda visited San Francisco in place ofPresident Fox, whose travel abroad, in anunprecedented move, had been blocked by theMexican Senate.

Aguayo cautioned that “regime changeis going to take much longer than expected.”Although Mexico may have undergone a changein government with the Fox Administration, ithas yet to undergo a change in regime, heexplained during his talk.

“Mexico’s authoritarian regime was oneof the most sophisticated, shrewd and ruthlessregimes in the 20th century,” said Aguayo, whohas a Ph.D. in international relations from JohnHopkins University. In fact, he maintained thatMexico’s old regime was widely admired byother authoritarian states around the world.

After 71 years of rule, the PRI(Institutional Revolutionary Party) still showssigns of staying-power, remaining the largestparty in Congress and maintaining a number ofsignificant governorships. “As a candidate, Foxsaid he was going to kick the PRI out of LosPinos [the Mexican White House],” Aguayoexplained, “But he never said he was going todestroy the PRI as a concept.” Aguayo, like otherMexican political analysts, predicts that the PRIcould regain the presidency in 2006.

Yet Mexico has by no means remainedstagnant. In Fox’s 2000 presidential campaign he“understood that the key word was ‘change’because we Mexicans wanted change,” Aguayosaid. From the beginning of his presidency,change was in the air. His inauguration dayexemplified this. Fox started the day with earlymass at the Basilica of the Virgin of Guadalupe

(a controversial move), followed by breakfastwith street children in one of Mexico City’stougher neighborhoods. Then he went toCongress for his inauguration, and the squarewas filled with housewives, indios and panistas,all representing a new Mexico.

To form his new cabinet, Fox hiredheadhunters “to chase the best and the brightest,”Aguayo said. “Fox received 11,000 applicationsto join his administration.” In the NationalAuditorium, Fox announced his new cabinetand said he would show results in 100 days, aconcept he borrowed from U.S. presidentFranklin Roosevelt, Aguayo explained.

“One year later his approval rate hasdropped by 24 points [from 70 to 46 percent],”Aguayo said. How did this happen?

Fox entered Los Pinos riding high in

popularity, but the expectations he raised wereeven higher. And the forces for change quicklystalled.

“One of the most difficult decisions forany new administration in a country movingfrom authoritarianism to democracy is what todo with the security apparatus,” he said.

Security repeatedly topped the list ofpriorities of Mexicans in opinion polls. Someargued for dismantling CISEN (Center forInvestigation and National Security), the spynetwork that covers the country, he said.

The Fox administration has onlyskimmed the surface of this problem. Shortlyafter he became president, a story came out inthe press that intelligence police had spied on all

the presidential candidates, including Fox. Foxresponded by creating a commission to examinethe practice. Months later it presented a shortand “very superficial report,” Aguayo said.

A number of other events quicklyproved that the Fox Administration was ill-equipped to make bold decisions or maneuverthrough the messy process of forming politicalalliances with opposition members.

“Disorder was one clear sign comingfrom Fox’s cabinet,” he said. One day Foxcriticized the PRI, the next he praised them. Hefelt he could not afford to antagonize the oldregime, so he shifted to appeasing the PRI,Aguayo said.

And that meant, for example, that notruth commission was created to look intocorruption and past human rights offenses. In

April of last year, Aguayoand other human rightsleaders p r e s e n t e d aproposal for a truthcommission to Fox, whoput off making adecision to support it formonths. Such a commis-sion was seen as a threatto s o m e P R I mem-bers, who would run therisk of being indicted orplaced under the scrutinyof the international com-munity, he explained. Inthe end, Fox chose to

appease his opponents and “the truth commis-sion was forgotten,” Aguayo said, although thepresident did appoint a special prosecutor.

D e s p i te t h e o bv i o u s p o l i t i c a ldisappointments and blunders that havecharacterized the change in administration,other sectors in Mexico refuse to be left behind.

“Mexican society is moving very activelyand aggressively,” Aguayo said. “Perhaps it wasgood that Vicente Fox was not such an activepresident because it makes us understand thatsociety can become an important actor in thetransition.”

Rachael Post is a graduate student in journalismand Latin American studies.

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Professors Harley Shaikenand Sergio Aguayo,

CLAS visiting scholarEnrique de la Garza,

and LAS graduate student Andrew Paxman.

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Cacao in Mesoamericacontinued from page 13

and where it circulated, and (despite historicallinguistic arguments) when and where it wasfirst cultivated. Botanical remains identifiable asfragments of cacao wood, pods, and seeds haverarely been identified. The strongest evidence ofactual use of cacao up until now has come fromchemical analyses of dried residues in potteryvessels preserved intact in graves. These analysesshow that the material in these pots containedchemicals limited to the genus Theobroma, towhich cacao belongs. Residue analyses haveconfirmed consumption of cacao as early as 600B.C. in Belize. My excavation projectco-director, Professor John Henderson ofCornell University, and I are collaborating withspecialists to see if residues can be detected in

the pieces of broken pottery that are much morecommonly available in archaeological sites.

But from an economic perspective, consump-tion is only half of the story, so even if residueanalysis turns out to be more widely useful, westill need other evidence for cultivation of thecrop. Cacao served as a form of currencybecause the dried seeds could circulate far fromtheir source of origin. Contrary to the image ofgrowing your own plants invoked by Millon,cacao plants do not thrive everywhere innorthern Central America. They requireconditions best met in hot, humid lowlands, likethe lower Ulua River Valley in northernHonduras, where I work. Converted in the 20thcentury to large-scale production of bananas

CONTINUED ON PAGE 27

Colombia 2002continued from page 1

Taken as a whole, the lectures exploreboth the roots of the contemporary trauma andother challenges Colombia faces unrelated tothe violence.

Charles Bergquist, history professor atthe University of Washington, spoke on “TheLeft and the Paradoxes of Modern ColombianHistory.” He focused on a particularlyintriguing paradox: the same country that isconvulsed by a potent guerrilla movementtoday historically has had one of the weakestlefts in the Americas.

Alfredo Molano, an exiled Colombianwriter and social critic, utilized the format of anopen conversation to address the peculiarintransigence of Colombia’s guerrillaorganizations, their connection to drugtrafficking and the role of peasants in agrarianreform and armed conflict.

Mary Roldán, a historian at CornellUniversity, examined “La Violencia in HistoricalPerspective: Implications for an Analysis of theContemporary Conflict in Colombia.” She

looked at the role that class, ethnicity andculture played in the state’s response to conflictduring la Violencia (1946-1953) in thenorthwestern state of Antioquia.

Enrique Peñalosa, the former mayor ofBogotá (1998-2001) addressed the issuesconfronting major urban areas like Bogotáindependent of the violence wracking thecountry. In his talk,“Towards a More Sociallyand Environmentally Sustainable Third WorldCity,” he shared his vision of creating anenvironment where public spaces meet theneeds of citizens and make them proud to beliving in Bogotá.

Marco Palacios, former rector of theLa Universidad Nacional and now a professorat El Colegio de México, spoke on “Knowledge isPower: the Case of Colombian Economists.”(Because Professor Palacios spoke after presstime, an analysis of his talk and other relatedmaterial is on the Center’s Web site atwww.clas.berkeley.edu/clas.

Sebastião Salgado. I had heard the namemany times. I had seen it underneathphotographs that remained embedded in

my memory for years: images of history, imagesof raw skin, sweat and blood. They were photo-graphs that I held up for my students as proofthat it is possible to become one with your work,to make it happen. Yesterday, the name that I hadheard and seen so many times transformed itselfinto a warm handshake and a smile. SebastiãoSalgado sat in my office and I had so much to saythat nothing came out. I wanted to ask him howand why he has devoted 35 years of his life todocumentary photography and activism. Whyhe paints, in shades of gray, the human conditionof globalization. I wanted to ask him how hemanages to shoot 200 rolls of film in twentydays. I wanted to know about those shoeboxes at

home that contain 300,000 work printsinstead of soft leather and laces. Butmost importantly, I wanted to knowabout the 300 photographs in fourgalleries on display at the Berkeley ArtMuseum and UC Berkeley’s GraduateSchool of Journalism.

I first saw “Migrations:Humanity in Transition” in New York’sInternational Center for Photography. Itried to absorb it, but couldn’t. Ireturned the next day and still felt Ineeded more time to comprehend theprofound meaning of Salgado’s work.Fortunately for those of us in the BayArea, the exhibit at UC Berkeley’s ArtMuseum was on display from January16 until March 24, 2002. “Migrations:Humanity in Transition” and “TheChildren” tell the story of those wholeave behind everything they know insearch of a better life, work and safety.Salgado spent seven years on themigrations project and two years onresearch and preparation. Nine monthsout of the year he photographed 43countries in Africa, Europe, Asia andthe Americas. When a student askedhim, “How do you connect with thesepeople?” Salgado answered, “If youbecome a documentary photographer,

it’s a way of life. You can’t be indifferent in yourlife. You must understand the story of thesepeople. You must act along with humanitarianorganizations. In the end, you write, you photo-graph, you film… It’s your own ideology. In theend, photography is nothing more than a mirrorof the society in which you live. An image needsno translation.”

Salgado recently turned fifty-eight. Hewas born on a farm in Brazil. He had sevensisters. Later on he studied economics. Heunderstands better than most that there is aprice to be paid for each release of the shutter.

On Feb. 11, Salgado spoke to a diverseaudience on campus as part of the AvenaliLecture series. “I met many people crossing the

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A girl at a center fororphans from the tribes of

Southern Bihar in BiharState, India. Photo by

Sebastião Salgado.

Sebastião Salgado:On Photography and GlobalizationBy Mimi Chakarova

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border of Guatemala and Mexico,” he said.“Whyare you going to the United States? What are youexpecting? ‘Well, we want work, to get a smallhouse. A car.’”

Migration has always existed, but asSalgado points out, never on the scale that itdoes now. Most listeners that night weresurprised that Salgado spoke little of photography.Instead he addressed the audience by posingquestions about the reality of today’s world.“How can we live in a society that’s a society forall?” he asked. “We must open our minds andhave a discussion, a dialogue. We must act. Wemust work together. We must protect allpeople.”

Later in a conversation with OrvilleSchell, dean of the Graduate School ofJournalism, Salgado was asked if he had becomemore or less hopeful in the last ten to fifteenyears.“I’ve become less hopeful,” was the answer.“There are very few Third World countrieswhere the second trip is better than the first. ButI am not giving up hope. Photography for me isa universal language. It’s the reason. Peopleallow you to come inside their lives. They accept

you. It’s very powerful. To freeze this moment—a fraction of a second. You understand thedistress of these people. These pictures are notobjects. They speak of history. But the photo-graphs alone are nothing.” “So what is theanswer?” asked Schell. “That’s the question.What’s the answer?” Salgado replied, smiling atthe audience.

But Salgado’s work is living proof ofhow one person’s efforts as a creative humanbeing can sustain change. In 1998, he and hiswife, Lélia Wanick Salgado, created InstitutoTerra, a non-profit organization that promotesthe reforestation of Bulcão Farm, a 1,600-acreprivate property in Brazil. Salgado’s hope is thatreforestation will reduce rural poverty andglobal warming, and increase biodiversity.Salgado is currently working on a photographybook on Ecuador. “I hope these photographsthat are out there can help build a new society.We can achieve a much more human globaliza-tion,” Salgado said.

Mimi Chakarova is a photography lecturer atthe Graduate School of Journalism.

Sebastião Salgadocontinued from previous page

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presidential candidates, including the leader inthe Colombian polls, Liberal Alvaro Uribe, whocurrently has the support of about 40 percent ofperspective voters. To be sure, there are manyreasons for the different success of these twolabor candidates in the two countries, butGarzón’s poor showing is consistent with theextremely limited appeal of left-wing parties andcandidates in Colombia throughout the 20thcentury.

The explanation of the weakness of theColombian left is of paramount politicalsignificance today. The left itself, particularly theguerrilla left, attributes its electoral failings torepression, a repression it contends is particularand congenital to the Colombian state since thetime of independence. The left has pointed tothe deadly fate of the Patriotic Union (UP)party. UP was formed by the largest Colombianguerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC), following the so-called peaceaccords signed with the government of BelisarioBetancourt in 1984. In subsequent years,hundreds of UP members were killed by right-

wing forces. What the guerrilla left fails toacknowledge, however, is that the truce it signedwith the government never resulted in a cease-fire. The FARC’s simultaneous pursuit of armedstruggle and peaceful electoral politics duringthese years made the UP particularly vulnerableto state and private repression.

But the weakness of the left in earlierdecades is more revealing and calls out morestrongly for an explanation. Both theCommunist Party and the Reformist Party(UNIR), founded by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, wereforced by electoral failure to ally themselves ormeld with the Liberal Party in the 1930’s. As aLiberal, Gaitán became the most popularpolitician in Colombian history and his death atthe hand of an obscure assassin in 1948unleashed what was known as la Violencia,the partisan warfare between Liberals andConservatives that convulsed the nation for adecade. The left, particularly Marxists, havetried to interpret la Violencia as an abortedsocial revolution. But while economic and

The Left and Paradoxes of Colombian Historycontinued from page 5

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disappear. In Molano’s view, it was theunresolved status of agrarian reform and thestruggle over land distribution that led tocontinuing instability in the countryside, evenafter the formal cessation of partisan hostilities.Exacerbating this instability, growingunemployment in the 1960’s led to an increasein land invasions and the development of anational peasant movement. The latterculminated in a 1977 national strike. The stateresponded to the strike with repression. Thismilitary action pushed organized peasants outof the lowland areas they had invaded and intothe mountains, including the Sierra Nevadarange. It was these desplazados (displacedpeasants) who discovered the marijuana trade inthe Sierra Nevada at the end of the 1970s.

This discovery, in combination with theongoing links between the colonos and desplazadosand the guerrillas, set the stage for thetransformation of the guerrilla movement bythe drug trade in the 1980’s. Marijuana, and

later coca, was an unusually high-yield crop; forthe first time, the work of peasants generatedreal income. Colonos gained access to consump-tion, and became, in Molano’s terms, addicted toit. Guerrillas, who had previously set up a systemof “taxing” local peasants, saw their “tax”revenues increase dramatically as the drug tradeflourished.

This growing mutual interest betweenpeasants and guerrillas in the success of drugtrafficking contributed to a fundamental shift inthe priorities of the guerrillas during the 1980’s.

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conversation with California educators aboutCalifornia - Mexico relations: “Either there is aspecial relationship or there is not.”

And if there is, he said, it meanscooperating to greater degrees and in ways thatinitially are likely to make both parties slightly illat ease.

Mexico is clearly ready to test thepossibilities.

Unlike former Mexican leaders,President Fox went to Washington in earlySeptember with a message and, Dresser said, amarriage proposal: “Think different.”

That meant moving beyond the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement to a “trueNorth American identity patterned on theEuropean Union,” she said.

To get there, she added, Castañeda hadin hand the talking points of a prenuptialagreement, including amnesty for Mexicans

already living in the United States; the negotiationof a guest workers program; and bilateral bordercooperation.

Not only was Mexico willing to be moreaggressive, it correctly assumed that PresidentBush, a Texas Republican well aware of the needto court the American Latino vote, would bemore receptive.

Villaraigosa credited the growingpolitical power of the Latino community for thischange. “Two years ago under a Democraticpresident, all of the dialogue around U.S.-Mexico relations centered on drug enforcementand Mexico’s failure to address drug interdictionissues,” he said. “Neither party is talking aboutthat anymore.”

In 10 to 15 years, Villaraigosa said, theAmerican Latino community will have the sameimpact on U.S. - Mexico relations, “as you seeJews having on U.S.-Israeli relations.”

The U.S. and Mexico: Neighbors in a New Eracontinued from page 3

CONTINUED ON PAGE 24

Alfredo Molano.

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paramilitary forces to remove locally electedauthorities from office and recalcitrantpopulations from strategic areas.

Armed Liberal groups or guerrillasemerged, in turn, to resist the increasingnumber of official and paramilitary forces. By1952, so-called partisan-motivated violence gaveway to armed groups that waged violenceindiscriminately. Their main goal was torearrange and control local labor and distribu-tion markets, and enforce private forms ofjustice for competing economic and politicalbosses. In parts of western and easternAntioquia where violence proved most severe,state agents or paramilitary groups, which weretacitly endorsed and supported by parts of theregional government, became the primaryinstigators of local disorder.

Violence in contemporary andmid-century Colombia, although difficult tosummarize and compare, both share somesalient features. Antioquia continues to be afocal point of violent struggle in Colombia, andthe towns that suffered most severely between1950 and 1953 continue to be the region’s mostviolent today. The main victims of violencecontinue to be unarmed civilians who are stillseen as inherently rebellious, uncooperative andpolitically radical because they belong to“inferior” racial or ethnic groups, or have a longtradition of political militancy and participationin leftist unions and organizations.

Most of the recorded human rightsviolations against victims today and during laViolencia continue to be perpetrated by privately

organized, right wing paramilitary groups.Areas of endemic violence have had unresolvedconflicts over highly concentrated resources andland for decades. Struggles over territorial accessand control continue to be severe. In most cases,during la Violencia and now, the state’s role inviolence has been complex and is not simplylimited to the state’s absence or lack of legitimacy.Instead, multiple competing and overlapping“states” existed and continue to exist inColombia. Where mutual obligations and rightsunderwrote the relationship between citizensand the state, the latter enjoyed legitimacy andpartisan conflict rarely evolved. The state didnot enjoy legitimacy, in contrast, where localpopulations perceived the state solely as acolonial or repressive force. This is also truewhere there were few or no local democraticmechanisms or traditions of power negotiationsthat did not involve violence.

Finally, both during la Violencia andnow, simple analyses that attribute violence toeither partisan hatred, narcotics trafficking orguerrilla terrorism fail to capture the complexityof violence. Furthermore, such analyses threatento obscure the true victims and longstandingcauses of conflict. A peaceful resolution inColombia is not possible without taking intoaccount the long-term role of the state in pro-moting or failing to impede violence—a vio-lence that has deep roots in local dissatisfactionand rebellion.

Mary Roldán is a professor of history at CornellUniversity.

La Violencia in Historical Perspectivecontinued from page 12

The main guerrilla organization’s attempt tofield a political party was murderously repressedby right-wing paramilitaries. The end of theCold War undermined Communist ideologicalcommitments. As the political optiondiminished, further militarization became moreattractive. Revenue from the drug trade fueledan arms race with the government, generating avicious cycle of delegitimation. As ideologicalcommitments faded and financial incentivesgrew, the central issue of contention with thegovernment shifted from agrarian reform to the

role of the military and its sponsorship ofright-wing paramilitary groups. However, this isthe one issue the government will not—orcannot—negotiate. Similarly, the guerrillas willnot consider surrendering their weaponswithout fundamental changes in the military.

“Unfortunately, I think we have a lot ofwar to make before we get to a point where thetwo sides can be sincere about their interests,”Molano said.

Chris Cardona is a Ph.D. student in the politicalscience department.

Peasants, Land, and Violence: Links between Colombia’sGuerrillas and Drug Trafficking

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While U.S. Jews have been closelyaligned with Israeli interests, however, U.S.Latino and Mexican government interests some-times clash. September 11 stalled any newaccord with Mexico, but it’s clear that whennegotiations resume, they will be complicatedby these differences.

The proposed guest worker program isa case in point. Dresser said that this wasprobably the only concrete proposal the BushAdministration was likely to succeed in pushingforward. The guest worker program satisfies theRepublican Party’s business interests to providelow-cost labor and the Mexican interests toprovide any jobs at all.

It is precisely, however, the programthat many Latino politicians dislike. “There iswithout question a very strong bias amongLatino leadership against a guest workerprogram,” Villaraigosa said. “I don’t know howthey make a program like that work in a way thatit respects the rights of workers to organize.”

Mexicans coming in on any guest workerprogram would compete head-on with Latinosalready in the United States.

Amnesty for Mexican immigrantsalready in the United States, a program the right

wing of the Republican Party hates, has a betterchance, Villaraigosa said. “I think we will revisitthat issue and sooner than people think, ” hesaid. “I think there is a lot of momentum andsupport for an amnesty or regularization.”

Although he acknowledged that there isstill a strong nativist and anti-immigrant bent in

the right wing of Republican Party, he said, “atthe end of the day, both Republicans andDemocrats are going to be supportive ofregularization.” Latino leaders, he said, wouldplay an important role in what that policy willlook like.

Maybe, but disagreements betweenLatino leaders and Mexican leaders slowprogress, Dresser said. “The Fox Administrationperceived the importance of the Latino commu-nity and that is why when he first came intooffice he said, ‘I am going to be the president ofall Mexicans,’ and so on but I think he and thosearound him perceive many Latinos as a commu-nity to be catered to and seduced, but not to belistened to,” she said. “If you speak to manyLatino leaders they will tell you that they havenot been listened to in this debate and that theyhave been underestimated and under-appreciated.”

“Well put,” said Villaraigosa, whomaintained that the two groups still had muchmore in common than not.

Meanwhile as Mexicans and Latinoswait for U.S.-Mexico relations to re-emerge as apriority in Washington, it is the FoxAdministration that is suffering most, the pan-elists said.

“ M e x i c o ’ spresident gambledon improvedrelations with theU.S.,” said Dresser.“And he is nowbeginning to incursignificant politicalcosts for havingdone so. Oppositionpoliticians inMexico are arguingthat the presidentshould have knownbetter than to placehis bets on an

unreliable neighbor to the north. They arebeginning to say it’s been too much pain and toolittle gain; that the Fox vision is just anothermirage.”

While not disagreeing, Aguayo offered aslightly different assessment. The revolution in

The U.S. and Mexico: Neighbors in a New Eracontinued from page 22

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The Left and Paradoxes of Colombian Historycontinued from page 21

social tensions lay beneath the surface, mostparticipants in la Violencia professed traditionalpartisan political aims. The struggle itself wasbrought to an end in 1958 when Liberal andConservative leaders converged on the formulaof sharing power equally under an arrangementknown as the National Front. Eligible votersturned out in high numbers during the firstelections held under the National Front. Whiledissatisfaction with the National Front grewover time, many voters registered theirdisillusionment or boredom by abstaining fromvoting in subsequent elections. The left neverbenefitted from these attitudes.

Reasons for the weakness of the left areclosely related to a second paradox, which is thenature of Colombian economic development.The Colombian economy revealed an exceeding-ly poor record of export-oriented growth duringthe 19th century. In 1910, even after the rise ofthe coffee economy in the late 1800’s and thefirst decade of the 20th century, Colombia hadone of the lowest rates of exports per capita ofall Latin American nations. After that, coffee-paced development allowed Colombia to buildone of the most consistent and impressiverecords of economic growth and industrialdevelopment in Latin America during the 20thcentury. The coffee economy was owned byColombians, and most of the coffee was grownon small and medium-sized, producer-owned

farms. During the 1930’s and 1940’s the numberof these farms grew and their share of nationalcoffee production increased. This outcome wasnot primarily a result of collective protest orleftist organization, (although that did happenin exceptional regions, particularly in south-western Cundinamarca and northern Tolima,where the agrarian movement that became theFARC was born). Rather, the democratizationof coffee production was mainly the result ofindividual efforts, sanctioned by the twotraditional parties, and rewarded in the capitalistmarketplace.

During the years of the Violence, a lotof land changed hands, especially in the coffeezone, but research indicates that the structure ofland ownership barely changed. During the1930’s and 1940’s, the classic era of Latin Americanimport-substitution industrialization, theColombian economy,paced by coffee exports, showedone of the most impressive developmental records inall of Latin America. Then, during the entiresecond half of the 20th century, the Colombianeconomy turned in a record of steady andimpressive growth virtually unmatched in LatinAmerica. Inflation was kept under control, thecountry largely avoided the debt trap of the1980’s, and it was able to put off radicalneo-liberal reform measures until the 1990’s.

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Colombian economic success through-out the entire 20th century simply and power-fully explains the hegemony of liberal thoughtand liberal economic and social policieschampioned by the two traditional parties.These liberal policies were unsuccessfullychallenged by third parties of the left, or of theauthoritarian or populist right, throughout thecentury.

Focusing on the political and economicparadoxes in Colombia and what they mean forthe Colombian left help deepen understandingof the current crisis, including the politicalisolation and intransigence of the Colombianleft. The historical context undercuts the mainrationale advanced by guerrillas for the violentinsurgency it has mounted against theColombian state in recent decades. TheColombian left has been weak historically notbecause of some special aptitude or vocation onthe part of the Colombian elite for repression. Ithas been weak because the historical experienceof most Colombians limited the appeal of the left.

Those who support a peaceful,democratic resolution to the Colombian crisismust not only oppose current U.S. policy,especially drug policy, toward Colombia. Theymust work to improve the protection of humanrights in Colombia and encourage peacenegotiations based on meaningful economic,social, and political reform. They must take ahard look at the left’s rationale for insurgency. Itis time democrats in the United States, inEurope, and elsewhere join with the vast majorityof Colombians to demand that the guerrillasenter into an effective ceasefire agreementimmediately and begin meaningful negotiationsfor peace.

Charles Bergquist is a professor of Latin Americanhistory at the University of Washington.

The Left and Paradoxes of Colombian Historycontinued from previous page

The U.S. and Mexico: Neighbors in a New Eracontinued from page 24

how Mexicans view their role in the world, hesaid, would have far greater long-term effect onU.S.-Mexico relations than any temporary set-backs or policy failures. The new attitude,he said in a discussion later in the month, is“very complicated.” “It’s how we are going toincorporate the U.S. in our ethos. It goes verydeep.”

And Dresser agreed that over the longrun, a new paradigm would prevail: “Despitethe waffling that’s taking place north of the RioGrande and the wiggling south of it, I think ulti-mately greater convergence and integration,whether it’s negotiated or not, between the twogovernments is here to stay.”

Lydia Chávez is a professor of journalism at UCBerkeley.

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most often is 'underestimated.’” In Guatemala,the truth commission produced a far strongerreport than its creators anticipated, includingits legal analysis of a finding of genocide. Whatremains to be seen is whether the informationcollected by the Guatemalan truth commissionwill strengthen the rule of law and destroy theimpunity that the perpetrators have enjoyed.

As the experiences in Guatemala andSouth Africa demonstrate, truth commissionshave complex powers and identities. Theestablishment of a particular truth commissionarises out of the unique circumstances of eachnation’s conflict and its negotiated resolution.Once established, these truth commissions aresubjected to the struggles within sectors of societystriving to control the truth commission, andmake it respond to certain interests. However,what both South Africa and Guatemalademonstrate is that these truth commissions cantake on a life of their own, despite the politics oftheir birth. Truth commissions, rather thanrepresenting the last word on the history ofviolence, are sites of struggle in which areas ofconflict continue to assert force.

I have often been asked my opinion ofwhat an “ideal” truth commission would looklike. After nearly eight years working on thistopic, I confess that I have failed to come up witha good answer. After all, truth commissions onlyarise in circumstances in which tremendouspain and violence have occurred, and whereserious constraints on the remedies available tothose who have suffered exist. Imagining a

“perfect” or ideal-type truth commission isimpossible precisely because the very need for atruth commission indicates a world of circum-stances far from any ideal.

In both Guatemala and South Africa,people went to the truth commissions with amultitude of motives. But the persons andcommunities most affected by the violencewanted more than simply a place to tell theirstories. They wanted their words to matter.

Over and over, I heard this from victimsof violence. The telling of the story, in and ofitself, fails to satisfy. The words must translateinto material changes in life circumstances. Weneed help, people told me. We need a house,they told me in South Africa. We need land, theysaid in Guatemala. And everywhere: We need thebones, even just a few, something that we canbury so that a loved one may rest in peace.

But these needs and others of thecommunities most affected by the violence haveyet to be met, even though both truth commis-sions claimed to be “victim-friendly.” If theresults of the truth commissions in Guatemalaand South Africa translate into concreteimprovements in the lives of survivors, andtransformations in the structures of power thatcaused the violence, then perhaps we will see thepower of the truth. Otherwise, we will see thetruth about power.

Amy Ross is a professor of geography at theUniversity of Georgia and 1999 graduate of thedoctoral program in geography at UC Berkeley.

If the Truth Be Told . . .What are the Consequences?continued from page 7

and sugar, this fertile, 800-square mile valley wasnoted in the 16th century A.D. as a prime cacaoproducing area. The high esteem expressed forUlua Valley cacao led my colleagues and I toidentify cacao production as a possible specialtyof residents of early Ulua villages like PuertoEscondido (dating to before 1500 B.C.), withunexpected evidence of weal th and long-distance connections to other early societies inMexico.

Like coffee and wine, the taste of cacao is

influenced by geographic conditions and skillsin the processing of plant products. The Frenchconcept of terroir, used in talking aboutvineyards, provides a useful analogy. Terroirencompasses the unique features of a localproduction area: not only soil, microgeography,and microclimate, but also features of the localproduction tradition, including use of specificcultivars and craft skills of cultivation, andapproaches to processing of grapes to produce

CONTINUED ON PAGE 29

Cacao in Mesoamericacontinued from page 19

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The task for all of us involved in creating

environments where many generations

will live is not simply to create a city that

functions efficiently. It is to create an environment

where the majority of people will be as happy as

possible. Happiness is difficult to define and

impossible to measure; but let us not forget that

it is what all our efforts, collective or individual,

are about. Over the last 40 years, the

natural environment became an issue of deep

concern to all societies. Curiously, a similar

interest in the human environment has not yet

arisen. There is much more clarity in our time as

to what the ideal environment is for a happy

gorilla or a happy whale, than what the

ideal environment is for a happy child. We are

far from having a shared vision of an ideal

human env ironment , much less the

transportation system for it.

Transport differs from all other

problems developing societies face, because it

gets worse rather than better with economic

development. While sanitation, education and

all other challenges improve with economic

growth, transport gets worse. Transport is also at

the core of a different, more appropriate model

that could and should be implemented by Third

World cities. More than a socio-political model,

the model I will describe is a model for a different

way of living in cities, but it has profound social

and economic implications. If we are truly

committed to social justice, environmental

sustainability, and economic growth, we need to

espouse a city model different from the one the

world has pursued over the last century and up

to now.

Enrique Peñalosa, former mayor of Bogotá.Excerpt from “Urban Transport and UrbanDevelopment: A Different Model.”

The old model of urban development.

Children at a new school playground.

Jiménz Avenue in Bogotá.

The new model of development.

Towards a New Third World City

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Pinochet-era cases.To a lawyer whatm i g h t s e e m achallenging legalp h e n o m e n o nbecomes, in Lira'shands, a psychosocialportrait of a trauma-tized nation slowlyapproaching resolu-tion. Law for her is notabout punishment ordeterrence, nor doesshe stress questions ofimpunity and the ruleof law. Rather, theregime-era caseshave provided a sitefor processing trauma.The law has the virtuethat it moves so slowlyand technically that ittends to fall beneaththe radar of mainstreampolitics. Even as cases are a site of ongoingreconciliation, they are not the focus of debate.Such a quiet, thorough manner of reconcilia-tion befits legalistic Chile, where even themilitary dictator usurped power in the name of“restoring legality,” Lira explained.

Furthermore, law does not aim atvengeance or bringing down the mighty, Lirasaid, for that is not the Chilean way. True pun-ishment comes from God. “Dios castiga, pero noa palos (God punishes, but with mercy),” shesaid. Take for example, the way the once-famous Pinochet trials slowly faded out ofpublic view. By now it is difficult to remember

his actual legal status. In fact, he has beenindicted and declared mentally unfit for trial,and his case stands sobreseido temporalmente(temporarily suspended). The upshot is that hewill not be tried and punished, but at the sametime, he is no longer a public figure. Indeed, assoon as he makes a cogent public comment,lawyers will rush in to argue that he is no longermentally unfit, reactivating the cases againsthim. Either Pinochet plays the court-imposedrole of dementia, or he faces trial. This, Lirasaid, is the perfect Chilean resolution.

Alexandra Huneeus is a Ph.D. student in theProgram for Jurisprudence and Social Policy.

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Psychology and Law: The Chilean Reconciliationcontinued from page 16

wine. Processing of cacao involves a sequenceof steps carried out prior to consumption,beginning with harvesting pods, then fermentingthe pulp and seeds, extracting, drying, and toastingthe seeds. Differences in practices at any step caninfluence the final results, as they do with wineor coffee. Native people in the 16th century A.D.expressed strong opinions about the quality ofcacao from different areas. Throughout itshistory of use, it is likely that cacao from different

regions varied in perceived quality, creatingconditions for a regional system of exchange. Toestablish that this was the case, we need to beable to identify both production and consump-tion. With our current NSF-funded project, weare taking the first steps to systematicallyaddress that goal.

Rosemary Joyce is a professor of archeology atUC Berkeley.

A supporter of AugustoPinochet holds a figurineof the former Chileandictator.

Cacao in Mesoamericacontinued from page 27

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As slippery slopes go, Colombia’s is gettingsteeper and steeper, and the United Statesis barreling down it faster and faster. There

appear to be few obstacles to a major U.S.military involvement in Colombia’s complicatedbloodletting.

The Bush administration and Congresshave made a historic shift, jettisoning narcoticsas the axis of Colombia policy and replacing itwith terrorism.

In recent months, while Americanpublic attention is focused on the Mideast andthe Afghan war, an apparent consensus hasformed between the White House and CapitolHill to cast aside the central, decade-long fictionof U.S. involvement in Colombia – the claim thatAmerican aid is only for fighting drug trafficking,not for helping the government’s war against theleftist guerrillas. Under this policy, U.S. weaponsand military advisers were used against therebels only incidentally, whenever they over-lapped with drug operations. This distinctionwas largely a fiction, but an important one. Now,however, it has collapsed completely. The UnitedStates is planning to become directly involved inarming and training Colombian armed forcesfor combat against the guerrillas – theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) or the National Liberation Army (ELN).

Congress has appropriated $490 millionin military and economic aid for the currentfiscal year, and the Bush administration made an“emergency” request in March for another $35million in military aid. For fiscal year 2003, $435million is requested, including $98 million tohelp protect the Cano Limón pipeline used byOccidental Petroleum Corp and frequentlybombed by the guerrillas. The administration isrequesting authority from Congress todramatically increase intelligence sharing withthe Colombian military, ranging from interceptsof guerrilla communications to satellite photosof rebel formations.

The U.S. policy switch has two mainreasons, which need to be examined separately.

The drug war’s failure

Despite the $1.7 billion given by theUnited States to Colombia over the past twoyears in drug-fighting aid, coca cultivation isbooming. According to CIA estimates, total cocacultivation in Colombia increased from 136,000to 170,000 hectares in 2001.

In part, this failure is because thecampaign to encourage coca farmers to switch togrowing legal crops has failed pitifully. Forexample, a classified study by the U.S. Agency forInternational Development that was recentlyleaked to the Los Angeles Times found that inPutumayo state, the heart of the coca region,only a small percentage of the farmers whosigned agreements to switch crops have actuallydone so.

The Colombian government hadpromised to pay the 38,000 farmers who signedthe pacts as much as $1,000 each to help themgrow other crops. In part, the problem wasincompetent bureaucracy — as of early April,only 9,500 had been paid. But the problem alsois that the program was designed without takinginto consideration that the Putumayo’s thinjungle soils are virtually worthless for growinganything but coca. Put simply, farmers earnmuch more growing coca than they wouldgrazing cattle or growing hearts of palm – two ofthe prescribed alternatives. As a result, the U.S.government has quietly decided to abandoncrop-substitution campaign, switching the $52million in annual funding to infrastructureprojects and social spending in Putumayo.

Many critics, including Europeangovernments, say that to make a crop-substitutionprogram work, there will have to be a cease-firebetween government and guerrillas, and lotsmore money will have to be ponied up.

The FARC, in a little-noticed proposalin 1999, offered to completely eradicate cocacultivation in a large area of Caqueta and Metaprovinces – but the plan included a price tag of$200 million. Some anti-drug experts say theFARC proposal, which included detailed plansfor local development, was serious and merited

VIEWPOINT: U.S on a SteepSlope in Colombiaby Robert Collier

31

further discussion. These experts point out thatthe seemingly outlandish price tag may simplybe a market-based approximation of the vastsums that will be needed to turn poverty-stricken peasants away from drugs. However, theplan was ignored by the Colombian and U.S.governments and was quickly forgotten bynearly all concerned.

TerrorismAfter the Sept. 11 attacks in New York

and Washington, politicians in Washington andBogotá alike wrapped themselves in the waragainst terrorism. In April, for example, thechairman of the House International RelationsCommittee, Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., calledColombia “a potential breeding ground forinternational terror equaled perhaps only byAfghanistan.” The same month, ColombianPresident Andrés Pastrana got an enthusiasticresponse in Washington by casting his countryas a Latin American beachhead in the global waron terror.

However, this rhetoric appearsmisplaced. Certainly, the FARC and ELN havepoor human-rights records, especially theirpractice of kidnapping civilians for ransom andtheir assassinations of national politicians andlocal priests. For these reasons, the two rebelgroups are on the State Department’s list offoreign terrorist organizations. However, there isno evidence that either group has been involvedin attacks outside Colombia’s borders, and mostexperts believe that neither organization is likelyto do so.

Human-rights organizations in bothcountries accuse the two governments ofturning a blind eye to Colombia’s most violentband of killers, the rightist paramilitary UnitedSelf-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).Although the AUC also is on the StateDepartment’s terrorist list, and the Colombiangovernment claims to be combatting the groupas assiduously as the leftist rebels, human-rightsorganizations have long documented tightclandestine links between the paramilitaries andthe Colombian army. Despite U.S. diplomaticpressure on Bogotá leaders to clean up their act,these tight links continue unabated – as doesAmerican aid to the Colombian military.Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies’ Colombiaefforts appear focused exclusively on the FARC,giving short shrift to the AUC’s mass killingsand its tight links to cocaine trafficking.

In Congress, many lawmakers areconcerned that the United States is turning ablind eye to the paramilitaries. In March, forexample, Sens. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., and EdwardM. Kennedy, D-Ma., wrote to Secretary of StateColin Powell to demand a tougher line, includingthe firing of three Colombian generals forcollaborating with the AUC. Here, however, isthe “certification” trap. In recent years, Leahy,Kennedy and others have focused on makingsure any Colombia aid includes clauses requiringthe administration to “certify” that theColombian military is making progress incleaning up its miserable human-rights record.Last year’s aid bill included such a clause; thecurrent Bush administration request doesn’t; thecritics will fight (and probably succeed) ininserting one this year.

Yet the value of these clauses is debat-able. In Colombia as with the 1980s conflict in ElSalvador, the State Department has provenadept at certifying that its local military proxieshave good human-rights records despiteabundant evidence to the contrary.

In all, the U.S. military gamble onColombia lurches forward, apparentlyunstoppable. Congress is likely to approve theadministration’s request for expanded militaryaid and the removal of the restrictions onfighting guerrillas.

Bloodshed, not crop substitution orpeace, seems to be the only outlook for years tocome. Peace talks with the FARC have collapsed.The leading candidate in the May presidentialelections, Alvaro Uribe, is calling for full-fledgedcounterinsurgency war. Is it Vietnam or ElSalvador all over again? Americans will haveplenty of time to decide, and Colombians willhave plenty of time to bleed.

Robert Collier is a foreign-affairs columnist and reporter at theSan Francisco Chronicle. A former editorial writer, he also spent sevenyears as roving foreign correspondent for the Chronicle, covering LatinAmerica, immigration and trade policy. Prior to joining the Chronicle in1991, he spent 1987-1990 as a free-lance correspondent in CentralAmerica, covering the region's civil wars and transition to democracy.

Center for Latin American StudiesUniversity of California, Berkeley2334 Bowditch StreetBerkeley, CA 94720-2312clas@uclink4.berkeley.eduTel: 510-642-2088

Lichens of Baja California: The Fringe of the Sonoran DesertPhotos by Sylvia and Stephen Sharnoff now on exhibit at the Center for Latin American Studies

April to October 2002

www.clas.berkeley.edu/clas