Latin-America and the G-77 before COP-15: Opportunities, positions and the impacts of

climate chage

Sjur Kasa, PhD, Senior Research Fellow, CICERO, University of Oslo

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Presentation overview

• CICERO

• G77 and developing countries in climate negotiations, traditional positions

• New developments; B(R)ICs emerging, new concerns for the impacts of climate change

• Changing developing country positions around Bali meeting (2007)

• Current deadlock: Economic problems in the North and demands from the South

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First a little about CICERO…

• An independent research center associated with the University of Oslo

• Founded in 1990 by the Norwegian government as a private foundation under the University of Oslo

• Twofold mandate: – conduct research, and – provide information about issues of climate change

• Research Council of Norway/EU main source of funding

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Interdisciplinary research in four areas

1. Scientific basis

2. Mitigation and costs

3. Impacts, vulnerability and adaptation

4. International agreements and policy instruments

A staff of 70 people, mainly funded by project funding from EU, Norwegian Research Council

Crossdisciplinary: Natural science, economics, social science

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And now to the topic…the group of developing countries (G77) in the climate negotiations• Established during first UNCTAD (1964)

• Main organization for developing countries in the UN system, loosely organized

• Leadership circulated between Latin-America, Africa, Asia (presently Sudan)

• China is ”associated member”, hence the concept ”G77 and China.”

• Today: More than 130 countries

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G77 – a heterogeneous group

• AOSIS – 39 low lying island states very vulnerable to climate change (sea-level rise)

• Least developed countries (mainly poor countries in Africa, Asia)

• OPEC

• Large and rapidly growing developing countries: Brazil, South-Africa, China, India (G20)

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Very important for emissions of greenhouse gases (now 50%!)

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But of course low per capita emissions (industrial/energy)

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Traditional positions in the climate negotiations• Article 3.1 in UNFCCC: ”Common but differentiated

responsibilities”

• Means: The industrial countries must accept strong commitments and pay for mitigation and adaptation in the South.

• Traditionally trong resistance to commitments by developing countries

• Strongest proponent in Latin-America: Brazil (Argentina and Mexico more cooperative)

• No obligations under Kyoto, but reporting and CDM participation.

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New development 1: B(R)IC growing more important• In G77, China, India and Brazil emerge as major

world powers during the 2000s.

• Sustaining increasingly independent policies, less emphasis on extracting aid and benefits from the North, more focused on trade, financial flows and market access (G20)

• Recently: Brazil, China and India have better public finances and less damage from the current devastating financial crisis.

• Increasingly aware of vulnerability to climate change and benefits from cuts-supported Bali Plan

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Strongest warming will emerge in the South (”bus. as usual” 2090-2099)

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Increasing worries over climate impacts - Cline: Agriculture 2080

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Loss of productive potential in agriculture 2080 (Cline, 2007)

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Latin-America: Agriculture in Brazil 2020(Pinto, UNICAMP, 2008) Best temperature scencario

21 % less land for soya

29% fall in soya exports

Decline in production of rice, coffee, beans, manioc, maize

And:

Dramatic increases of drought and poverty in North-East

Cuts in hydropower production

But also:

Increase in bioethanol productivity (CO2-fertilization)

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Biosystems and social systems perspectives on vulnerability in L-Amerca• Major problems in the Amazon region (Jones et al.,

Nature Geoscience, 2009):

- 2 degrees warming – 20-40% of the Amazon rain forest goes

- 3-4 degrees warming – 75-85% of the forest destroyed

- comes in addition to other drivers of deforestation

- massive consequences for global climate and regional ecosystems and agriculture

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One crucial social vulnerability: Inequality in Latin America

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But also enormous potential benefits: Biofuels

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Global biofuel potentials 2050 (FAO, 2008)

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Other BRICs also vulnerable

India – uniquely vulnerable in agriculture, also vulnerable to glacier melting in the Himalayas,

China – perhaps less vulnerable than India, but very concerned about agriculture and sea-level rise as well as glacier melting in the Himalayas. Massive drought in North China 2009.

LDCs – large impacts and often low adaptive capacity to climate change due to poverty

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Reasons to be optimistic: BRICs climate plans and targets• China 2007: Climate action plan:

- better energy efficiency

- 15% of all energy use renewable in 2020, also more nuclear energy (seeking leadership in clear energy technologies, e.g. solar)

- adaptation in agriculture; e.g. new rice species

- adaptation in coastal areas

- afforestation/reforestation

- recently also moving towards carbon efficiency targets!!

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Brazil – moving in a (much) more cooperative direction

• Brazil 2008: Climate plan with a promise to achieve 80% cuts in Amazonian deforestation.

- Lula now pondering MMA proposal of 40% cuts in emissions by 2020. To be reached by using more biofuels, forest planting for charcoal and better farming practices (50%) and cutting emissions from deforestation (50%)

- Weaker resistance from Itamaraty and Ministry of Science and Tech., Ministry of the Environment stronger, strong civil society

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Even India…

• 2008 Plan: ”National missions”

- strong solar energy development

- increasing energy efficiency

- increasing water efficiency

- protecting the Himalayas

- afforestation

- sustainable agriculture: Resilient crops, agricultural practices

- more research

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However, the demands on the North remain

• G77 demand: Credible, rapid and strong emissions cuts in the North (at least 40% by 2020)

• Funding for adaptation and mitigation measures in the South

(Adaptation fund to be filled by CDM-tax and donations almost empty in spite of promises, Bali: USD 80 billion/year needed)

• Transfer of energy and other technologies.

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EU losing its leadership in climate policy, US still vague

• Last EU-meeting on climate: Half-hearted promises on funding for developing country mitigation/adaptation (20% cuts in 2020)

• US more progressive under Obama, but clearly not willing to pay what developing countries want, mired in health reform politics and crisis (and – Senate Plan: Only 20% cuts in 2020)

• The financial crisis and ageing population is looming: Making Eastern- & Southern Europe as well as coal-dependent US states concerned

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Emerging crisis in the negotiations?

• Barcelona, November 3, the ”Africa Group” of G77 threatens to retreat from the negotiations, protesting against weak promises on cutting emissions and failure to live up to Kyoto, sympathy from other developing countries.

• However, also some progress on technology transfer and adaptation funding mechanisms as well as REDD.

• Most likely not a deal in Copenhagen, perhaps next year?