INSTITUTION OF HEIRS

Ureta v Ureta, Sept. 14, 2011 Institution based on a false cause Austria v Reyes (reviewer) Kinds of Institution Vda de Kilayko v Tengco VDA. DE KILAYKO v TENGCO NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. FACTS - Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The probate court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. - Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to them, and ordered the Register of Deeds to effect the corresponding

transfer of properties. - Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament. The heirs executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership

over the inherited land. - Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. Rodolfo and Amelo Lizareswere appointed joint administrators of her intestate estate. - On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in pars. 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the testate

estateproceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed amo

ng others that a substituteadministrator be appointed. - The intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion, alleging that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. - The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings. - Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares. - The joint administrators filed the present petition. Petitioners contend, among others, that the claim of petitioners over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners claim that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs. ISSUES 1. WON the independent action for reconveyance

should prosper 2. WON petitioners are the conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares HELD 1. NO Ratio A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

Reasoning - Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.-

The facts show that the petitioners recognized the

decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.- Moreover, when petitioners. moved for the reopening of the testate estateproceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.- The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a

decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 2. NO Ratio When a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should diea second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art.859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. Reasoning

- Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to bevalid, had not been satisfied. The allegation of the joint administrators thatparagraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as

providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.- In this

case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, theproperties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under thecircumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS Fideicommisary Palacios v Ramirez (reviewer) Crisologo v Singson (book, p. 231) LEGACIES AND DEVISES Fernandez v Dimagiba FACTS Isamela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI of Iloilo

a petition to probate the 1930 will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes instituting her as the sole heir of the decedents estate. Petitioners, Fernandez et al opposed the probated and claimed to be the intestate heirs of the decedent. OPPOSITION to probate were based on:

forgery, vice of consent, estoppel by laches of Dimagiba and implied revocation of the will. The implied revocation was alleged because

according to Petitioners, majority of the estate was sold in 1943-1944, thus revoking the 1930 will instituting Dimagiba as sole heir. Note however that the SC set aside these conveyances in an unpublished case already. (Also, mejo stupid yun ground kasi yun 1940s sale, si Dimagiba din yun buyer/reciepient nung properties sold, so paano magkakaroon ng implied revocation?!) CFI: allowed the probate of the will and deferred resolving the issues of estoppel and revocation until such time that the proceeding involves determination of the intrinsic validity of the will. Petitioners insist that the issue of estoppel and revocation should have been resolved during the

probate of the will, thus after receiving further evidence, the CFI decided that the will unaffected and unrevoked by the subsequent sales. Both decisions were (admission for probate of

the will and absence of implied revoc/estoppel) separately appealable because the latter is independent of the former, but Petitioners belatedly filed their appeal to the allowance for probate, thus the order became final and unappealable. Petitioners appealed to the CA (re: denial of

revocation and estoppel); CA affirmed CFI decision since no legal revocation resulted from the sales,

since the sale was made in favor of the legatee

Dimagiba. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944 RULING: The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: (1) . . . . (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase; If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy. True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes

that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not

expressing his real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest. In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered. ***NO. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor

of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.- But even

if Art 957 were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution BELEN v BPI NATURE A p p e a l f r o m a n o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f M a n i l a d e n y i n g appellant's petition FACTS- Benigno Diaz (DIAZ) executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On November 7, 1944, he died and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila.- The proceedings for the administration of the estate of DIAZ were closed in1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. - Filomena Diaz (FILOMENA) then died in 1954, leaving two legit imate children, MILAGROS, married, with 7 legit imate children, and ONESIMA, single.

- On March 19, 1958, ONESIMA f il ed a petition in Special ProceedingsNo.9 2 2 6 , c o n t en d i n g t h a t t h e a m o u n t t h a t w o u l d h a v e a p p e r t a i n e d to FILOMENA under the codicil should now be divided equally between herself and MILAGROS, as the surviving children, to the exclusion of the 7 legitimate children of MILAGROS. - The court denied this petition. It said that after due consideration of the petition filed by ONESIMA. The share of FILOMENA from the codicil does not and should not form part of her estate. The aforesaid share of should be

d i s t r i b u t e d n o t o n l y b e t w e en h e r c h i l d re n b u t a l s o am o n g h e r o t h e r legitimate descendants which also includes her grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant andnot yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a descendant. -From this order ONESIMA appealed to this Court. She contends that the

t e r m " sus descendeintes legitimos, " a s u

s e d i n t h e c o d i c i l , s h o u l d b e interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee FILOMENA, which are the two daughters. ISSUE WON the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all the living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a class or only to the descendants nearest in degree HELD NO- In her argument, FILOMENA invokes Art. 959 of the CC, which says: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. However, the argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him based on the ratio legis that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest. - Obviously, this does not apply where the beneficiaries are relat ives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator . There is no logicalreason in this case to presume

that the testator intended to refer to the r u l e s o f i n t e s t a c y , f o r h e p r e c i s e l y m a de a t e s t am e n t a n d p r o v i d e d substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relat ives of the legatee to those more distant, since hee n v i s a g e s a l l o f t h e m i n a g r o u p , a n d o n l y a s m e r e s u b s t i t u t e s f o r a preferred beneficiary. - The result of applying the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959 is that the inheritance would be limited to her children excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who in the

same clause 10 of his codicil speaks of his grandchildren indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. - We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita. So that the original legacy to FILOMENA should be

equally divided among her surviving children and

grandchidren. Disposition T h e o r d e r a p pe a l e d f r o m i s a f f i r m e d , wi t h c o s t s t o t h e appellant. VILLANUEVA vs. BRANOCO FACTS: Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses Branoco to recover a parcel of land. The former claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo byway of donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property, and ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. The trial court rejected Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa Which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer. On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses appeal and set aside the trial court's ruling. it held that the deed

of donation is one of inter vivos. In his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription,having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is a donation or a devise? RULING; It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be

reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling their revocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.

Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over

the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it. Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [ inter vivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection"

for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding. Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice. Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property

to Rodriguez in1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. AsVere's successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner

LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

Who are the intestate heirs Rosales v Rosales (inulit) Order and share in the intestate succession De Los SANTOS vs. De La CRUZ FACTS: Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter. RULING: Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the latter by right of representation. Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance. BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD Facts: Ofelia Hernando Bagunu (collateral relative of the fifth civil degree) moved to intervene in a special

proceeding for the interstate proceeding of the Estate

of Augusto H. Piedad. Ofelia assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad (collateral relative of the third civil degree) contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. Issues: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? Held: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. (see art. 962) In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or

sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. Petition denied. Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte v. Court of Appeals Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of

Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza an Ursula tubil. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Benedicto is thus the nephew of Justa byher half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow anddaughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte.Primitiva was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon.Domingo andJustas father, Arnaldo, were brothers. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of

consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva

Arnalso Uriarte. The other petitioners are grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Gregorio Arnaldo, the brother of Primitiva. Bendicto brought this action for partition of a 2.7 hectare land left by Justa. The land had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Benedicto claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could only claim one-half of the 0.5 hectare land, which Justa had inherited from her parents.On the other hand, the heirs of Pascasio, who substituted Pascasio upon his death during the pendency of the case, denied that they were mere tenants of Justa and claimed that the entire land was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great grand uncle. Two-thirds of the land was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and the remaining one-third to Juan. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that, in her lifetime, Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that Benedicto did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property. Issue: Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962, CC?

Held: Given the fact that 0.5 hectare of the land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectare of the 0.5 hectare land as her father Juans share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectare. In addition, Justa inherited her mother Ursulas share consisting of 0.25 hectare. Plus the 2.2 hectares, which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.575-hectare land was inherited by Benedicto as Justas nearest surviving relative. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and Benedicto. Bendicto is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. Therefore, he is Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives thedecedent. That Benedicto is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the full of half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors. Right of representation Teotico v Del Val (inulit)

Diaz v. IAC Nature: Petition for Review Doctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate family Facts: Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felix berta.

1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Petitioners Anselma and Felix berta as guardians of their minor children file for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court

declaring her as the sole heir of Simona Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? Felisa Ruling: The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to the intestate estate of his le

gitimate mother Simonabecause of the barrier

provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code o Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate. Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists: o In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family. o An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. ABELLANA DE BACAYO vs. FERRARIS

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action. ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt concur with the children of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by the latter. RULING:

As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the

nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art. 975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code. CORPUS v CORPUS NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI FACTS -Teodoro R. Yangco, the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (the widow of Tomas Corpus) died in Manila on April 20, 1939 -Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) hishalf brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4)

Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died inOctober, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. -His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the CFI of Manila, and the decree of probate was affirmed by the SC-Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will-Said project of partition was approved by the probate court -Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of LuisR. Yangco appealed to the SC, but these were dismissed after the legatees

and the appellants entered into compromise agreements-Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. -On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.

-On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir

of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. -The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. -Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos ISSUE WON Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco, thus giving Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate HELD -The trial court found that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child andnot a legitimate child through the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children.

-On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus arepresumed to be legitimate.-Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. - Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.-Article 943 of the old Civil code "prohibits all successory reciprocity

mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" -The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

-That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate

child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. -The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment -Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." -Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. DELGADO vs. RUSTIA FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo

Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These

children, never legally adopted by the couple, were

what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. ISSUES: Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado? Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation? Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia? RULING: The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it

cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are

no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates. ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION Descending Direct Line Estate of a legitimate decedent

Illegitimate descendants Corpus v Corpus (inulit) LEONARDO v CA FACTS -Francisca Reyes died intestate. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and Silvestra,and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo (Sotero), the son of her daughter, Pascuala, who predeceased her. Sotero and Silvestra both died. -Cresenciano Leonardo (Cresenciano), claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint

for ownership of properties seeking judgment, among others, to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with the other remaining heir Maria -Maria asserted exclusive ownership saying that Cresenciano is an illegitimate child who CANT succeed by right of representation. TC ruled in his favor. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE WON Cresenciano is an heir in the inheritance in question HELD NO. Other than his bare allegation, Cresenciano did not submit any durable evidences howing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. SC safely concluded that Cresenciano failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. EVEN IF its true that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero, Still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the CA, he was born outside wedlock and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, Cresenciano would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code) Diaz v IAC (inulit) MANUEL vs. FERRER FACTS:

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name. He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCTNo. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self- Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the

unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now

covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought thedeclaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are intestate heirs of the decedent RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. Under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the

illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. Where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to theformer's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her

natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. The order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article1014 Bolonos vs. Bernarte

Considering that Roman died on August 9,

1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on succession,

then the law in force, should apply, particularly Articles

979 and 980, viz.

Art. 979. Legitimate

children and their descendants

succeed the parents and other

ascendants, without distinction as to

sex or age, and even if they should

come from different marriages. x x x.

Art. 980. The children of

the deceased shall always inherit

from him in their own right, dividing

the inheritance in equal shares.

Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-

P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman, seven

(7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from

his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As

there was no partition among Romans children, the lot

was owned by them in common. And inasmuch as

Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her

aliquot share to Cresencia, the transfer stands as valid

and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to

petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavias share

in the property that she acquired by virtue of the

notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-

P. Therefore, the restitution of the property in excess of

that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.

Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with

respect to the operative facts and the credibility of

witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate

court, are accorded the highest degree of deference and

respect by this Court, except when: (1) the findings of a

trial court are grounded entirely on speculations,

surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference

from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in

the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go

beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain

relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify

a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of

facts; and (6) the findings of fact are conclusions

without mention of the specific evidence on which they

are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or

are contradicted by evidence on record.[24] Notably,

none of these exceptions is attendant in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition

is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30,

2007 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the

Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 84452

are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Estate of an illegitimate decedent

Illegitimate children and descendants

Diaz v IAC (inulit)

DE LA PUERTA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.

Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.

1

The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively.

2

Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court.

3 Alfredo subsequently died,

leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4

On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted.

5 However, the decision was appealed by

Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case

6

On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta.

7 At the hearing on her motion,

Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.

On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same.

8

On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court,

9 which is now in turn being

challenged in this petition before us.

The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.

Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962.

To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was legally married.

10

Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the community.

11

In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:

. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and education; . . .

12

This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify reversal.

13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the

conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)

the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:

Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar.

The cases 14

cited by the petitioner are not exactly in

point because they involve situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.

Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's estate.

15

The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not.

Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:

The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights

(Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.

16

This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows:

Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta?

A She is my daughter.

17

Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?

According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation.

18

xxx xxx xxx

The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.

19

Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.

But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20

this Court declared:

. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.

The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

21 thus:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than

recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.

22

Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:

If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred.

23

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate

24 and cannot be considered in the probate of

Dominga Revuelta's Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Suntay vs Suntay G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998

Facts: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao on July 9, 1958. Out of this marriage, three children were born. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel filed a

criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children

who were living with their mother. From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,

1967) the patient was already out of the

hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment. It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if

the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong. Issues: Is there ground for annulment?

Are the children borne within a valid

marriage prior to annulment legitimate? Held: There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a

declaration of nullity of the marriage: That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. A voidable marriage, is considered valid

and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the

law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same

status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. Note: Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children

conceived or born of the subsequent

marriage under Article 53 shall likewise

be legitimate.

Surviving Spouse

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

PEDRO SANTILLON CLAROSANTILLON,

PETITIONERSV.PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U.

MIRANDA AND ROSARIO CORRALES,

RESPONDENTSG.R. No. L-19281 30 June 1965

FACTS:

Pedro Santillon died without testament, leaving one son,

Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. Claro Santillon filed

a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said

petition was entered by

the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Mir

anda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a)

that the properties enumerated in the petition were all

conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda

claimed to be her exclusive properties; and (b) that Perfecta

Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of

her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in

the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario. Claro filed

a motion to declare share of heirs to resolve the conflicting

claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights

in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he

insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal

properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining

1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him.

Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides

her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the

New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In

other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance,

while Perfecta claimed 1/2.The trial court held that in the

intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the

surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share

and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro

Santillon.

ISSUE:

What provision of the Civil Code must properly apply?

RULING:

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on

Testamentary Succession; whereas Art.996 comes under

the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being

the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to

support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892

merely fixes

the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof,

the legitime of children intestate succession. While it

may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal

shares that a child and a spouse should get when

they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of

shares that such child and spouse are entitled to

when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the

pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply,i.e.,

Art. 996.The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be

premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996speaks of

"Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only

one "child"; consequently Art. 892

(and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial

construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust orunfair

because, whereas in

testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only

(Art. 892), she would get in intestate .It is a maxim

of statutory construction that words in plural include the

singular.

So Art. 996 could orshould be read (and so applied) : "If

the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the

surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child."

Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on

theground that "child" is not included in "children," the

consequences would be tremendous.

Unfairness of Art. 996

.

Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate

succession, where there is only one child of the marriage,

the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-

fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child

gets one-half,

and the widow or widower one-half . Unfair orinequitable,

they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate

succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth."

She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to

each of thespouses to decide (by testament, whether his or

her only child shall get more than his or her survivor)

BICOMONG v. ALMANZA

FACTS:

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June

8, 1859. Of this marriage there wereborn three children

namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and

Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas diedahead of her

husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic

remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were

born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic.

Simeon Bagsic diedsometime in 1901. Silvestra

Glorioso also died.Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939

leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir.

Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by

the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino andPetra

Tolentino.Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving

her are her heirs, the plaintiffs GaudencioBicomong,

Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio

Bicomong. Of the children of thesecond marriage, Maura

Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her

husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other

daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her

daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the

present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza

diedleaving behind her husband, the defendant herein

Engracio Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza.The

subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265

concerns the one-half undividedshare of Maura Bagsic

which she inherited from her mother. Three sets of

plaintiffs filed the complaint onDecember 1, 1959, namely:

(a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the

Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco

Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First

Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the

defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for

therecovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by

Maura Bagsic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Articles 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New

Civil Code are applicable in this case.

RULING:

Yes. The said provisions are applicable to the admitted

facts of the case. In the absence of descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003of

the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall

succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing

that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her

husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is

succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the

daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children

of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in

accordance with the provision of Article 975 of the same

Code. By virtue of said decision, the aforementioned

nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in theirown

right. In Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo, the

Supreme Court held that nephews and niecesalone do not inherit by right of representation (that is

per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters

of the deceased.

Under the same provision, Article 975, which makes no

qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the

maternal or paternal line and without preference as to

whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or

half-blood, the sole niece of whole blood does not exclude

the ten nephews and nieces of half-blood. The only

difference in their right of succession is provided in Article

1008 NCCP, in relation to Article 1006 of the same Code,

which provisions in effect, entitle the sole niece of full

blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of

half-blood.

Abellana v Borromeo (inulit)

Partition

Legasto vs. Verzosa

A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his

property, but he must first make a will with all the

formalities provided for by law. And it could not be

otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator;

when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter

vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily

refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs.

A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos

is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the

word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish

between one who freely donates his property in life and

one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his

death.

Fajardo vs. Fajardo

There are only two ways in which said partition could

have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by will. In

either case there were formalities which must be

followed. If the partition was made by an act inter vivos,

it should have been reduced in writing in a public

instrument, because it was a conveyance of real estate.

If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should

have been observed.

Tuason vs. Tuason Jr.

Where heirs contracted with a third person to develop

their co-owned lot, with the stipulation that the co-

ownership shall subsist until all the lots have been sold,

is not a violation of Art. 400, and is only a mere incident

to the main object of the partnership, which is to

dissolve the co-ownership.

Chavez vs. IAC

Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two

options in making a partition of his estate; either by an

act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a

partition by will, it is imperative that such partition

must be executed in accordance with the provisions of

the law on wills; however, when a person makes the

partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such

partition may even be oral or written, and need not be

in the form of a will, provided that the partition does

not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. (RFB:

This ruling should not be used as it raises eyebrows

very high. It gives a partition an irrevocable character

and allows a conveyance of the compulsory heirs of

their legitimes even during their lifetimes.) ALSUA-BETTS v CA

NATURE

Appeal by certiorari

FACTS

- On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua,Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Cloti lde Samson, and Amparo Alsua deB u e n v i a j e , e n t e r e d i n t o a d u l y n o t a r iz e d a g r e e m e n t , Escritura de ParticionExtrajudicial , over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesusand Doa Florentina. - On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separatelyexecuted their respective holographic wills, the provisions of which

were in conformityand in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949. - On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On Feb. 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate. - Doa Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic and instructed his attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Will a n d T e s t a m e n t o f D o n J e s u s e x e c u t e d o n N o v . 1 4 , 1 9 5 9 c o n t a i n e d a n e x p r e s s revocation of his holographic wig of Jan. 5, 1955 and the codici l of Aug.14, 1956; a statement requiring that al l of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond. - Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petit ioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrixnamed in the will of Nov. 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the CFI Albay and was docketed as. Oppositions thereto werefiled by respondents Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. CFI allowed the the probate of thewill of Don Jesus Alsua. CA reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null andvoid the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants-petitioners, topay damages to the plaintiffs-private respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WON CA erred in denying the probate of the will

HELD

YES- CA erred in denying probate to the wil l of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; i terred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was c o n t r a c t u a l l y b o u n d b y t h e p r o v i s i o n s th e r e o f a n d h e n c e c o u l d n o t r e v o k e h i s participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new wil l with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation intervivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.

- Upon careful examination of the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doa Tinay, there was no indication whatsoever that Doa Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her sharein the conjugal assets. - Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partit ion of N o v e m b e r 2 5 , 1 9 4 9 a n d h a d i n f a c t c o n f o r m e d t o s a i d P a r t i t i o n b y m a k i n g a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Doa Tinay, which CA sustained. However SC ruled that Don Jesus was not forever bound therebyfor his previous holographic wil l and codici l as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civi l Code is clear: "A wil l may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic wil l and codici l previously made. This would sti l l hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated -The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of inthe contested wil l belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may bediamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose. - If he now favored Francesca more, as clai