USON vs. DEL ROSARIO

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino. The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

Inheritance vs Succession (Art. 776)G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Facts:In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed, acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note.Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate.

Ruling:

No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.

Atty. Ferrer vs Sps. Diaz

Facts:Reina Commandante borrowed money from Atty. Ferrer to finance a business venture. To secure the loan, she signed an instrument entitled, Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) involving a property of her parents, who were both still alive at the time of the execution of the instrument. Ferre then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and caused the same to be annotated on the transfer certificate of title of said property in order to protect my (his) interest over said property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent manner without my (his) knowledge and consent, for the owner's duplicate title was not surrendered to me.

Unfortunately, Reinas business venture failed and she ended up reneging on her obligation.

Meanwhile, the same property was sold by Reina to Sps.Pangan by virtue of a special power of attorney executed by Reinas parents. The couple immediately took possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon after however, they were surprised to learn of the adverse claim upon being informed by Ferrer. They asserted that the annotation of Ferrer's adverse claim on the TCT cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which Ferrer's adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property.

Issue: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another by a future heir while her parents are still living valid?Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewisw valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant?

Yes. The Supreme Court stressed that Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened; (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

Being an expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Reina in favor of Ferrer is not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

On the validity and effectivity of petitioner/lender's adverse claim, Section 70 of PD 1529 provides that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Reina's invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon Ferrer, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner's adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and necessarily be cancelled.

It is clear that both Reina and Ferrer relied on Reinas future inheritance from her parents to secure her loan from Ferrer. They signed an instrument for Reina to relinquish a property that she had yet to inherit, anchored merely on the expectancy that upon the death of her parents some of their properties would be passed on to her anyway.

G.R. No. 179859 IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,vs.ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO,FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.

Facts: Basilio Santiago contracted three marriages and bore heirs from three wives.After Basilio died testate on September 16 1973, his daughter by his 2nd marriage, petitioner Ma Pilar filed before the regional trial court of Bulacan a petition for the probate of Basilios will. The will was admitted to Probate by branch 10 of the RTC and Pilar was appointed as executrix.

Oppositors heirs of the first marriage filed a complaint in intervention which was denied by the RTC stating their decision of final accounting of the will. Oppositors filed a complaint for completion of legitime and maintained that they were preterited by Basilios will because their legitime was reduced

RTC Branch 17 decided the completion of legitime in favor of oppositors. On appeal the CA annulled the decision of the RTC holding the oppositors in favor of the oppositors

In the interregnum respondenr heirs of the second marriage filed for a motion for termination of administration for transfer of names and title to legatees

Oppositors states that the executrix Clemente and Pilar should have ceased as administrators as the 20 year period have lapsedOpposing the motion of the heirs of the first marriage, petitioners argued that with the approval of the final accounting, partition and distribution in accordance with the will, the case has been closed and terminated stating that Res Judicata shall apply

Issue: WON Res Judicata shall apply and shall it estop the proceedings

Ruling: The Principle of Res Judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminated only after and until the final distribution of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the testator

G.R. No. 151153 December 10, 2007SPOUSES CHARLITO COJA and ANNIE MESA COJA,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF FELICIANO AQUILLO, SR., namely: QUINCIANO VICTOR, SR., LORNA A. VICTOR, ANTONIO VICTOR, QUINCIANO A. VICTOR, JR., SUSANA A. VICTOR, CLARA AQUILLO, CARMENCITA AQUILLO, AGAPITO AQUILLO, NOEL AQUILLO, ADONIS AQUILLO, FELICIANO AQUILLO, JR., RONALD AQUILLO and ALDRIN AQUILLO,respondents.

FACTS:

Luz Aquillo Victor (hereafter Luz) and Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. (hereafter Feliciano Jr.), both deceased, were the legitimate children of the late spouses Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. (hereafter Feliciano Sr.) and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo (hereafter Lorenza).During their marriage, Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza acquired a 120-square meter lot located at Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, upon which they built their conjugal home. After the death of Lorenza, Feliciano Sr. cohabited with Paz Lachica and lived at the aforesaid house and her heirs failed to partition their hereditary shares in their inheritance.

On February 27, 1960, while Lorenza was cohabiting with Feliciano Sr., Paz Lachica purchased a 192-square meter lot from the heirs of Juan Rivas of which, 40.10 square meters were sold to Isabel L. de Real leaving her with only 151.9 square meters.

On July 7, 1965, or two (2) days before he died, Feliciano Sr. married Paz Lachica.8After Feliciano Sr. died, his heirs also failed to partition among themselves their hereditary shares in their inheritance.

On December 18, 1986, Paz Lachica and herein petitioners, Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale16wherein the former sold the 336-square meter parcel of land.

Sometime in 1987, Charlito Coja filed an application for the issuance of title with the RTC.Luz, being one of the heirs of Feliciano Sr., opposed the application for registration.Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the application. The OSG alleged, among other things, that the applicant or his predecessors-in- interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject land within the period required by law. During the pendency of the case, Luz died. She was substituted by her spouse, Quinciano Victor, Sr., and her children, Lorna, Antonio, Quinciano Jr., and Susana.

On November 3, 1989, respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and ownership with damages against the petitioners and Paz Lachica.Respondents claimed that they are the true and lawful heirs of the Spouses Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza; that Paz Lachica refused to deliver the property to its rightful owners despite repeated demands; that Paz Lachica appropriated the subject property to herself; that Paz Lachica sold the property to the Spouses Coja; and that the Spouses Coja failed to deliver the subject property to the rightful heirs despite repeated demands.In their Answer, defendants therein alleged that Paz Lachica acquired the subject property before her marriage to Feliciano Sr. and that she had been in actual and physical possession of the same for more than fifteen (15) years before she sold the property to the Spouses Coja; that they acquired the property by purchasing it from Paz Lachica; that they are buyers in good faith and for value; and that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Paz Lachica and, therefore, plaintiffs therein have no right and interest over the same.

RTC ruled in favor of the defendants-applicants declaring the defendants-applicants spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa, the absolute owner of the land subject of the application. The RTC opined that since the land in question is registered in the name of Paz Lachica alone, it is assumed that it is not part of the conjugal partnership properties of Feliciano Sr., and Lorenza, for if it was their conjugal property, it should have been registered in their names. As such, when the Spouses Coja purchased the property from Paz Lachica, they were of the honest belief that the latter was the true and lawful owner. Likewise, on the basis of the evidence adduced, the RTC held that defendants-applicants possess good title proper for registration and confirmation. Aggrieved, plaintiffs-oppositors appealed from the decision to the CA, and Ca ruled that the sale of the property by Paz Lachica to Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja insofar as the shares of appellants is (sic) concerned is NULLIFIED;

The CA concluded that the property with an area of 120 square meters, is the conjugal property of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza having been acquired during their marriage. Under the law, upon the death of Lorenza, one-half of said property, or 60 square meters, was transmitted to her heirs, namely Feliciano Sr., Feliciano Jr., and Luz, at 20 square meters each, while the remaining one-half pertained to Feliciano Sr. alone as his share in the conjugal property. Upon the death of Feliciano Sr., his rights over the property, consisting of his inheritance from his wife and his share in the conjugal partnership, or a total of 80 square meters, were transmitted to his heirs, Feliciano Jr., Luz, and his widow, Paz Lachica. Thus, Paz Lachica is entitled to only 26.6666 square meters and the heirs of Feliciano Jr. and Luz are entitled to the remaining 93.3333 square meters of the subject property. Therefore, Paz Lachica had no authority to sell their portions of the property.

Applicants-appellees therein filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied hence, this petition.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT SPOUSES COJAS ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE LAND.

RULING:NO.

It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion. As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. A co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property.In fine, judicial or extrajudicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the subject 120-square meter property.

Under Article 996 of the Civil Code, upon the death of Lorenza Mangarin, one-half of said property, or 60 square meters, is transmitted to her heirs, namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., and Luz Aquillo, at 20 square meters each, while the remaining one-half is transmitted to Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. Upon the death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., his rights over the property, consisting of the 20 square meter-inheritance from his late wife and his 60 square meter-share in the conjugal partnership, or a total of 80 square meters were transmitted to his heirs, namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and his widow, Paz Lachica. The surviving spouse is entitled to the same share as that of the legitimate children, to the portion of one-third each or 26.6666 square meters each. Thus, as a result of the death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., a regime of co-ownership exists among Feliciano, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and Paz Lachica, with respect to the undivided 80 square meters.

The 120 square meters less the hereditary share of Paz Lachica which is 26.6666 square meters, or the 93.3333 square meters of the property belong to the appellants, being the heirs of the late Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. and Luz Aquillo. Considering that Paz Lachica owns only 26.6666 square meters of the 120-square meter property and the remaining 93.3333-square meter portion thereof is owned by the respondents, the former could only validly sell the portion which rightfully belonged to her. However, considering that Paz Lachica, the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Coja, was a co-owner of the subject 120-square meter property; and considering further that partition of the property is wanting, this Court is precluded from directing the Spouses Coja to return specific portions of the property to respondents.

In re: Will of Rev Abadia Enriquez vs. AbadiaFACTS:Fr Abadia executed a document purportedly his Last Will and Testament (Exhibit A). He died Jan 14, 1943, and left properties estimated at Php8kOne of the legatees, Enriquez, filed a petition for its probate before CFI Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who would inherit had there been no will, opposed.Two of the 3 witnesses already died. The remaining witness testified that in his presence and the other 2 co-witnesses, Fr Abadia wrote out in long hand in Spanish said will; that Fr Abad spoke and understood.; that he signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the 3folios and numbered the same with Arabic numerals; all this in the presence of the 3 attesting witnesses who signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause I his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.CFI Cebu declared said document as a holographic will and was admitted to probate.It was in the handwriting of the testatorAt the time of execution, and at the time of testators death, holographic wills were not permitted by law.At the time case was decided, New Civil Code already in force, allowing holographic wills. The trial court also the controlling factor, which is the intention of the testator, overrides any defect in formOppositors appeal involved questions of law, thus certified to the Supreme CourtISSUE: WON Fr Abadias holographic will maybe admitted to probate

HELD:Order appealed from is reversed. Exhibit A is denied probate.The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is madeFrom the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements ofexecution of wills which would invalidate such a willAlthough the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.At the time that the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages ofthe first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

JIMENEZ vs. FERNANDEZFacts: Fermin Jimenez owned the 2, 932 sqm lot in Pangasinan. He has two sons, Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. Fortunato predeceased his father leaving his daughter Sulpicia. So when Fermin died, the land was registered in the name of Sulpicia and Carlos (niece and uncle) in equal shares, pro indiviso. On 28 February 1933, OCT #50933 was issued in their names, co-equal. And on 9 July 1936, Carlos died leaving his illegitimate daughter Melecia Cayabyab AKA Melecia Jimenez. She then took possession of the eastern portion of property, which is the land in question, 436sqm, in which she later sold to Cagampan. Cagampan then contracted with Grado who executed a contract of Exchange of Real Properties, whereby the former transferred said 436sqm to Grado. On the other hand, Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property of his uncle upon manifestation that she is the only heir of Carlos. So, TCT #82275 was issued in Sulpicias name alone, covering the entire land (2,932sqm). Later on, she and her husband instituted an action for recovery of the land in questioned which is in possession of Grado.Issue: WON Melecia has a right over the property in question, being an illegitimate daughter.Ruling: No, she has no right. Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court.In the case at bar, Carlos died on 9 July 1936 way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Hence, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)The court also said that Melecia could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria, the mother of Melecia. Consequently, Melecia was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights pertaining to Carlos estate, and there can be no question that she could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Cagampan the land in question.

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO as Administrator v. ANDRE BRIMOG.R. No. L-22595 | November 1, 1927Digest:Facts: Juan Miciano, filed a scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national. The latter died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, . requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.Issue:1. Re: execution of the Will, which law shall govern, Philippine or Turkish Law?2. Re: Condition, is it void? Can Andre Brimo acquire the legacy appointed to him?Ruling:1. Turkish Law. Article 10, CC (now Article 16, NCC) provides that, Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found2. Void because the condition imposed is that they must respect the will to be executed in accordance with Philippine laws, which is void as mentioned above. Therefore, Andre Brimo is entitled to the legacy. Article 792, CC (now Article 873, NCC) provides that, Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator should otherwise provide.

Llorente vs CAFacts: The deceased Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted US Navy serviceman from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. Sometime in 1937, 1937, Lorenzo married Paula Llorente (petitioner) in the Philippines. Thereafter, Lorenzo left for the United States while Paula stayed in Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo acquired US citizenship. After the Philippine liberation from America in 1945, he came home to the Philippines only to discover that his wife Paula was pregnant and living in with his brother Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo went back to the United States and obtained a divorce decree against Paula in the California court, which decree became final in 1952. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente (respondent) in Manila and their 25 year union produced three offsprings. Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.Lorenzo executed a last will and testament wherein he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. He appointed Alicia as the administratrix of his estate.Lorenzo filed a petition to probate the will but Lorenzo died before the proceedings could be terminated. Paula intervened and sought to be appointed as the administratrix over Lorenzo's estate contending that she was Lorenzo's surviving spouse and the various property were acquired during their marriage.The lower court granted in favor of paula finding that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo was void and inapplicable in the Philippines, thus his marriage to Alicia is void and making Paula the legal surviving spouse.Held:Nationality Principle 1. The Civil Code clearly provides:Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status , condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions , shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.Foreign Laws 2. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.3. The trial court declared that American law follows the 'domiciliary theory' hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo's will.4. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.Validity of Foreign Divorce 5. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. the court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.6. In Quita v. Court of Appeals, it was held that once proven that a party was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable. (divorce recognized in Philippines provided valid according to national law of divorcing spouse)7. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.Validity of Will 8. Lorenzo was already a US citizen at the time he executed his will up to the time of his death. He was not covered by Philippine laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."9. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.10. As to extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

JULIANA BAGTAS vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO G.R. No. L-6801. March 14, 1912. TRENT,J.:

FACTS: 1. Testator, Pioquinto Paguio, 14 years prior to his death suffered from a left-sided paralysis: impaired hearing, loss of speech, facial paralysis with drooling of saliva. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well. He indicated his wishes to his wife and to other family members thru medium of signs. The testator died on the 28 September 1909. 2. The testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the 4 subscribing witnesses Agustin-, Anacleto-, and Pedro- Paguios, and Florentino Ramos.; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.3. Admitting to probate was his last will and testament which purports to have been executed in Pilar, Bataan, on 19 April 1908. It was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, his widow, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter. Opponents questioned the testators mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. ISSUE: Whether the testator was in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was with the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.RULING: Yes. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. It was stated that the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack thereof. The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . Affirmed.

G.R. No. 122880 FELIX AZUELA,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLOFACTS: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.The will, consisting of two (2) pages.The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo, who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner.Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate,the RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10Hence, the present petition ISSUES : WON the failure to state the number of pages used in the will renders the will a nugatory. HELD : In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious;the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty."16 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a merejurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong10ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.It might be possible to construe the averment as ajurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. Ajuratis that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42Ordinarily, the language of thejuratshould avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses. Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as ajurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.43The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806.A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. ValmonteFacts: Placido toiled and live for a long time in US until he finally reached his retirement. 1980, he finally came home to stay in the Phil. for good and lived in the house and lot located in Makati which he owned in common with his sister(deceased) and titled in their names. Feb. 05, 1982, at the age of 80, he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old and a little more than 2 years of wedding bliss he died. He executed a will and testament written in English consisting 2pages dated June 15, 1983 and acknowledged only August 09, 1983 in which he gave devise and bequeath his wife Josefina all his real and personal properties and appoint her as sole executrix of his last will and testament. The allowance to probate of the will was opposed by Leticia V. Ortega challenging the validity of the will and mental capacity of the testator because the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. His physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberration and senility and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud, or trick and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. Lower court ruled in favor of Leticia which disallowed the allowance to probate. Josefina was able to testified and proved the validity of the will and mental capacity of the testator and her statement was corroborated by the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and admitted the will of Placido Valmonte. Hence, this appeal.Issue:1. WON the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.1. WON the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud, or trickery and that he never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.1. WON Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.Held: The petition has no merit.1. The fact that the public policy favors the probate of the will does not necessary mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed.

Art. 839 of the Civil Code provides cases that probate should be disallowed:1. If formalities required have not been complied with1. If the testator was insane or mentally incapable of making a will at the time of execution.1. Will was executed through force or under duress, or under the influence of fear or threat.1. If it was procured by undue and improper pressure of influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person.1. If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud.1. If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.In this case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind.1. Existence of fraud in the execution of a will. Petitioner does not dispute the observance of the formalities in the execution of the will but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. She alleges that the respondent conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. UNFORTUNATELY, no evidence of fraud ever presented by the petitioner. The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document BECAUSE the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.The will must be subscribed by the testator and the 3 or more credible witnesses as well who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Both must acknowledge the will before notary public.1. Capacity to make a will. Art. 799 Civil Code gives the following guidelines that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows:1. The nature of the estate to be disposed of1. The proper object of the testators bounty1. The character of the testamentary actNoted: Despite of the testators advance age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even its locations and as to proper object of his bounty it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.To constitute a sound and disposing mind it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary capacity does not necessary require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. So long as he knows what he is going to do and how or to whom he will dispose his property.PETITION DENIED. CA assailed decisions are affirmed. Cost against petitioner.

JABONETA vs. GUSTILOG.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906

FACTS:In 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances will in question;Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, Iloilo, he ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room,Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.In these proceedings probate was denied the last will and testament of the deceased, because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another witness, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.ISSUE:Whether or not the will and testament of Macario Jaboneta may be admitted to probate?RULING:Yes.The true test of presence of the testator and of the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, they had chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of each signature.CANEDA VS. CA222 SCRA 781Facts: on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament at his before three attesting witnesses. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer in the preparation of that last will. Four months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero". On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. In the course of the hearing petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein. On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors. On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero. Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. CA affirmed that of the trial court, and ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code.Issue: whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.Held: An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same.It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved.Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them.Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses.It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.31In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidencealiundewould result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.67WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192916 October 11, 2010MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ,Petitioner,vs.DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY,Respondents.FACTS:Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.1Manuel accepted the donation.In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicentes nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicentes intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuels petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale.2The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision.3The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.ISSUE:Whether the deed of donation mortis causa was validly executed?RULING:The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,4"otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect."5Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written.lavvphilThe exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino6and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,7cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.81avvphi1Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuels petition for review on certiorari.

Acknowledgment of Wills (Art. 806)Garcia vs. GatchalianG.R. L-20357November 25, 1967

FACTS:

Gregorio Gatchalian who is a widower of 71 years of age and with no forced heirs instituted Pedro Garcia as sole heir. After Gatchalian died in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal on March 15, 1967, Garcia filed a petition for the probate of the will with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay opposed the petition on the ground that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be his will and that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will.

After due trial, the court rendered a decision finding the will to be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New Civil Code that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

An examination of the document shows that the same was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.

ISSUE:Whether the will may be probated without the instrumental witnesses acknowledging the same before a notary public?

HELD:Art. 806 of the New Civil Code:Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.Compliance with the requirement contained in the above provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity. As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.

Cruz v. VillasorG.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Facts:The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valente Cruz. However, the Agapita Cruz, the petitoner and surviving spouse opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.The witll had three witnesses namely: Deogracias Jamaloas, Francisco Paares and Angel Teves Jr.. Teves was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCCHELD: NO.The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.Had the will had 4 witnesses it can be allowed since in essence there are only 3 witnesses but if there are only 3 witnesses and one of whom was the notary public, then in truth and in fact there were only 2 witnesses. As such it fails to comply with the requirements of the law.

G.R no. 74695Alvarado vs. Gaviola

Brigido Alvarado executed a holographic will and then later on executed notarial will revising the holographic will to indicate that his son Cesar Alvarado was to be disinherited. The will was read aloud by Brigidos lawyer in front of the witnesses and the notary public who read the will silently.The will was presented for probate and J. Gaviola decided to honor the notarial will.Cesar sought to reverse the decision on the basis that Brigido was to be considered a bind testator and the formalities of the law, under Article 808 of the Civil Code was not followed to the letter. Issue: Whether or not the notarial will is valid based on Article 808.Ruling: The notarial will is valid. While testator Brigido may be considered as blind, the spirit of the law was upheld.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND,respondents.FACTS:On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's (Annie sand) holographic will.Theyalleged that atthe time ofits execution, she wasof sound and disposingmind,not actingunderduress, fraud or undue influence, and was inevery respect capacitated to dispose ofher estate by will.Thiswasopposedonthegroundsthat:neitherthetestament'sbodynorthesignaturethereinwasindecedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was like wise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.The trial court having found that the holographic will in question waswritten entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix admitted the probate, however on appeal with CA this was reversed and the petition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC which read, as follows: Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in disallowing the probate of the will based on the provisions ofArt Art 813 and Art 814?RULING:The Court said it is erroneous for the CA to say that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law and held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will.The Court cited:Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed inany of the following cases:(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or ofsome other person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instruments hould be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or ofsome other person;(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a willThus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts ofthe decedent. In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally handwritten by the testator himself,as provided under Article810 of the New Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand ofthe testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. AreadingofArticle813 ofthe NewCivilCodeshowsthatitsrequirement affectsthe validityofthe dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

ROSA K. KALAW vs. HJ BENJAMIN RELOVA (PJ/CFI, Batangas Br. VI, Lipa City) and GREGORIO K. KALAW G.R. No. L-40207. September 28, 1984. MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:

FACTS: 1. Natividad K. Kalaw executed a holographic will which reads in full as follows: My Last Will and TestamentIn the name of God, Amen.I, Natividad K. Kalaw, Filipino 63 years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.It is my will that I'll be buried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.2. Originally, she named Rosa K. Kalaw as the sole heir but she eventually changed it by crossing out Rosas name and replacing it with Gregorio K. Kalaw. However, she failed to properly authenticate such alteration with her full signature. 3. GREGORIO filed a petition for the probate of her holographic will which ROSA opposed. The holographic was even examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and confirmed that the original writings and those of the alterations were written by the same person. ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.4. Judge Relova denied the probate on the will. GREGORIOs motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that Art. 814 being, clear and explicit, requires no necessity for interpretation. 5. ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari.ISSUE: Whether the original unalteredtext, after subsequent alterations and insertions but lack authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.RULING: No.Ordinarily, when anumberof erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.The ruling inVelasco, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. It is necessary that the changes does not substantially affect or alter the mode or the express will of the testator expressed in the document. Dismissed.

MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.1982-12-07 | G.R. No. L-58509Facts:On January 11, 1977, Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla.Ground: The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect. Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.The court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. "that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original."Issue: Whether a holographic will which was lost or can not be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.Held: YES.If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

UY KIAO ENG VS. NIXON LEEFacts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

Codoy vs CalugayG.R. No.123486August 12,1999

FACTS:

The deceased Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal executed a holographic will on August 30, 1978.Respondents Calugay, Salcedo and Patigas are devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased. They filed with the RTC of Misamis a petition for probate of the will of Matilde who died on 16 January 1990. Petitioners Eugenia Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the probate stating that the holographic will was a forgery and the same was illegible. Respondents however contend that the deceased was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will and that nofraud or undue influence andduress happened and thatthe will was written voluntarily.

They presented six witnesses with various documentary evidence. Petitioners on their part filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. All the 6 witnesses that respondents presented expressed familiarity with the deceaseds signature. But there was no mention ofthe fact that there were witnesses at the time Matilde executed the will. The lower court denied the probate.

On appeal, respondents again reiterated the testimony of the witnesses Augusto, Generosa, Matilde Binanay,Teresita, Fiscal Waga, and Evangeline. The CA sustained the authenticity of the holographic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code aremandatory?

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that it is mandatory. Article 811 provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is thegenuine signature of the testator. The word shall connotes a mandatory order.Fiscal Waga one of the witnesses expressed doubts as to the signature of the deceased. Evangeline,on her part, testified that as towhy she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth.She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note orsign a document. In Matildes testimony, she saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants.She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign adocument or write a note. Furthermore, in her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children ofthe deceased. The will was also not found in the possession of the deceased when she died. Such actions putin issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of MatildeSeo Vda. de Ramonal.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different.The court could not be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

G.R. No. L-20234December 23, 1964PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.Facts:1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954. 3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid?RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. The final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.)The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

Qualifications/Disqualifications (Arts. 820-821)G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,respondents.Facts:

Private respond