LABOR2 Digests

8/13/2019 LABOR2 Digests

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Allied Free Workers' Union

vs.

Compana Maritima

(1967)

FACTS

MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business.

AFWU is duly registered legitimate labor organization with 225 members.

MARITIMA and AFWU entered contract of service.

AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal for a collective

bargaining agreement.

No reply was made by MARITIMA.

AFWU instituted proceedings in the Industrial Court praying that it be

certifiedas the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the bargaining unit

composed of all the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work in

connection with MARITIMA's vessels in Iligan City.

MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of employer-employee relationship

between the parties.

MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT

because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had

adversely affected its business.

MARITIMA found itself charged before the Industrial Court of unfair labor

practices under Sec. 4(a), (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Rep. Act No. 875.

ISSUES

Under the CONTRACT , was MARITIMA the "employer" and AFWU

and/or its members the "employees" with respect to one another? (this is

for purposes of determining employer liability under ULP)

Is a certification election proper?

RULE


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1. there is no legal impediment for a union to be an "employer".

2. the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and

its "employees". Where neither party is an "employer" nor an "employee"of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is

no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right.

APPLICATION

1. AFWU was an independent contractor. And an independent contractor

is not an "employee".

Both were based on the"cabo" system. Under both, (1) the union was anindependent contractor which engaged the services of its members as

laborers; (2) the charges against the consignees and owners of cargoes

were made directly by the union; and (3) the laborers were paid on union

payrolls and MARITIMA had nothing to do with the preparation of the

same.

The union members who were hired by the union to perform arrastre and

stevedoring work on respondents' vessels at Iligan port were being

supervised and controlled by the general foreman of the petitioner unionor by any union assistant or capataz responsible for the execution of the

labor CONTRACT

2. Neither is there any direct employment relationship between

MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate individual contracts

with MARITIMA.In fact, the court a quo found that it was AFWU that hired

them. Their only possible connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU

which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly be in a

better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.

3. it is AFWU itself who is the "employer" of those laborers.

4. AFWU appears to be more of a distinct and completely autonomous

business group or association. Its organizational structure and

operational system is no different from other commercial entities on the

same line. It even has its own bill collectors and trucking facilities. And

that it really is engaged in business is shown by the fact that it had

arrastre and stevedoring contracts with other shipping firms in Iligan City.


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5. the real reason for the termination of the CONTRACT was AFWU's

inefficient service.

6. There being no employer-employee relationship between the parties

disputants, there is neither a "duty to bargain collectively" to speak of.And there being no such duty, to hold certification elections would be

pointless. There is no reason to select a representative to negotiate

when there can be no negotiations in the first place.

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Producers Bank of the Philippines

vs.NLRC

(1998)

FACTS

Prefatorily, at the time the instant controversy started, petitioner was

placed by the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral

ng Pilipinas) under a conservator for the purpose of protecting its assets.It appears that when the private respondents sought the implementation

of Section 1, Article XI of the CBA regarding the retirement plan and

Section 4, Article X thereof, pertaining to uniform allowance, the acting

conservator of the petitioner expressed her objection to such plan,

resulting in an impasse between the petitioner bank and the private

respondent union. The deadlock continued for at least six months when

the private respondent, to resolve the issue, decided to file a case

against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and for flagrant violation of

the CBA provisions.

As stated earlier, the Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondent's

complaint, on this premise:

"Considering that the Bank is under conservatorship program under

which the bank is under the rule of a conservator, the latter is under no

compulsion to implement the resolutions issued by the LMRC. If he

finds that the enforcement of the resolutions would not redound for the

best interest of the Bank in accordance with the conservatorship


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program, he may not be faulted by such inaction or action."

ISSUE

WON the conservator can rescind the CBA during conservatorship? No.

WON the retiring employees have no personality to file complaint

because there is no more employer-employee relationship? No.

RULE

1. while admittedly, the Central Bank law gives vast and far-reaching

powers to the conservator of a bank, it must be pointed out that such

powers must be related to the '(preservation of)' the assets of the banks,(the reorganization of) the management thereof and (the restoration of)

its viability.' Such powers, enormous and extensive as they are, cannot

extend to the post-facto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise

they would infringe against the non-impairment clause of the

Constitution. If the legislature itself cannot revoke an existing valid

contract, how can it delegate such non-existent powers to the

conservator under Section 28-A of said law?

Obviously, therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power torevoke contracts that are, under existing law, deemed to be defective -

i.e., void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the conservator

merely takes the place of a bank's board of directors. What the said

board cannot do - such as repudiating a contract validly entered into

under the doctrine of implied authority - the conservator cannot do either.

Ineluctably, his power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate

valid obligations of the Bank. His authority would be only to bring court

actions to assail such contracts - as he has already done so in the

instant case. A contrary understanding of the law would simply not bepermitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To rule

otherwise would be to enable a failing bank to become solvent, at the

expense of third parties, by simply getting the conservator to unilaterally

revoke all previous dealings which had one way or another come to be

considered unfavorable to the Bank, yielding nothing to perfected

contractual rights nor vested interests of the third parties who had dealt

with the Bank."

2. Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer


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and the employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees

to sever his employment with the former.

the retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment

status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, sincethese must be protected as though there had been no interruption of

service. It must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of

the employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom

constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services rendered,

as well as an effective inducement for remaining with the corporation.

APPLICATION

1. conservator had no authority whatsoever to disallow theimplementation of Article XI, Section 1 and Article X, Section 4 of the

CBA

2. Non-impairment clause

3. Jurisdiction by estoppel

4. When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement

benefits be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but weremerely demanding that their rights, as embodied in the CBA, be

recognized. Thus, when an employee has retired but his benefits under the law

or the CBA have not yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting

his claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection of the Labor Code,

one of which is the protection of the labor union.

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PAL

vs.

PALEA

(1967)

FACTS

PAL dismissed its above named four (4) employees, who are member ofthe Philippine Air Lines Employees Association hereinafter referred to


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as PALEA and that on July 13, 1954, the CIR en banc passed

resolution, in Case No. 465-V thereof, directing the reinstatement of said

employess "to their former or equivalent position in the company, with

back wages from the date of their reinstatement, and without prejudice to

their seniority or other rights and privileges.

employees were reinstated and subsequently their backwages,

computed at the rate of their compensation at the time of the

aforementioned dismissal, less the wages and salaries earned by them

elsewhere during the lay-off period, were paid to them. The employees

objected to this deductionand the CIR sustained them, in a Resolution

dated May 22, 1960, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, on July

26, 1960, in G.R. No. L-15544. Soon later, or on November 10, 1960, the

PALEA moved for the execution of the CIR resolution of July 13, 1954, as

regards the "other rights and privileges" therein mentioned, referring,

more specifically to: (1) Christmas bonus from 1950 to 1958; (2)

accumulated sick leave; (3) transportation allowance during lay-off

period; and (4) accumulated free trip passes, both domestic and

international.

ISSUES

WON the employees, during the layoff period, are entitled to these

benefits?

RULE

Republic Steel Corp. vs. NLRB: upon reinstatement the employees were to

be treated in matters involving seniority and continuity of employment as

though they had not been absent from work, and hence the reinstated

employees were entitled to the benefits of the employer's vacation plan

for the year in which they were reinstated and subsequent years upon

the basis of continuity of service computed as though they had been

actually at during the entire period from the date of strike to the date of

reinstatement.

APPLICATION

1. entitled to the Christmas bonus that PAL had given to all of its

employees during said period, for said bonus, having been paidregularly, has become part of the compensation of the employees


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2. With transportation allowance & sick leave privileges

3. No free trip passes: for the employees had no absolute right thereto,

even if they had actually rendered services during the lay-off period. The

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ALPAP

vs.

CIR

FACTS

ISSUES

RULE

1. "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any

union or association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the

purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers

concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the

condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of

a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular

employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace

Act is clearly on the pourposes for which a union or association of

employees established rather than that membership therein should be

limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under

Section 2(h) of R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a

legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization,

whether or not employed by the employer or employeewhom herepresents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can

exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate

relation of employer and employee.

APPLICATION

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Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc.


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vs.

Calleja

(1992)

FACTS

a group of deck officers organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc.,

(CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC). The same group registered the

organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamen's

Association of the Philippines (SAPI).

On 10 June 1987, respondent CSAI filed its Answer/Position Paperalleging that the complainant union and CSAI are one and the same

union; that Dominica C. Nacua and Atty. Prospero Paradilla who

represented the union had been expelled as members/officers as of

November 1984 for lawful causes; and, that its set of officers headed by

Manuel Gabayoyo has the lawful right to the remittance and custody of

the corporate funds (otherwise known as union does) in question

pursuant to the resolution of the SEC dated 22 April 1987.

ISSUES

who is entitled to the collection and custody of the union dues? Cebu

Seamen's Association headed by Gabayoyo or Seamen's Association of

the Philippines headed by Nacua.

RULE

It is the registration of the organization with the BLR are not with the

SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights andprivileges granted under the Labor Code.

APPLICATION

1. CSAI, the corporation was already inoperational before the

controversy in this case arose.

2. Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the labor group by virtue of his

having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI.


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3. the so-called set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo was

conducted under the supervision of the SEC, presumably in accordance

with its constitution and by-laws as well as the articles of incorporation of

respondent CSAI, and the Corporation Code. That had been so precisely

on the honest belief of the participants therein that they were acting intheir capacity as members of the said corporation. That being the case,

the aforementioned set of officers is of the respondent corporation and

not of the complainant union. It follows, then, that any proceedings, and

actions taken by said set of officers can not, in any manner, affect the

union and its members.

4. Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was

elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private

respondent Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo

Machacon and petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of

discontentment with the leadership of Nacua. This break-away group

revived the moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution

expelling Nacua from association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in

February, 1987, it held its own election of officers supervised by the

Securities and Exchange Commission. It also filed a case of estafa

against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p. 52, Rollo).

The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being

a member, has however, not affected her membership with the labor

union. In fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-

elected as the president of the labor union. In this connections, We

cannot agree with the contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already

expelled from the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the

corporation do not bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot

claim leadership of the labor group by virtue of his having been electedas a president of the dormant corporation CSAI.

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Nestle

vs.

NLRC

(1991)


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FACTS

to hold in abeyance the cancellation of their car loans and payments of

the monthly amortizations thereon pending the resolution of theircomplaints for illegal dismissal.

The private respondents were employed by the petitioner either as sales

representatives or medical representatives. By reason of the nature of

their work they were each allowed to avail of the company's car loan

policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a

car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from

his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until

it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents availed ofthe petitioner's car loan policy.

On September 14, 1987, private respondents Nuez, Villanueva, Villena

and Armas were dismissed from the service for having participated in an

illegal strike. On December 26, 1987, respondents Kua and Solidum

were also dismissed for certain irregularities. All the private respondents

filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the

NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld the

legality of their dismissal. They appealed to the NLRC where theirappeals are still pending.

ISSUES

WON the NLRC may issue a writ of injunction against the enforcement of

the car loan?

RULE

(1) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matters concerning terms

or conditions of employment or the association or representation of

persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the

terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the

disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

APPLICATION

1. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdictionby issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the


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civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements

and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those

agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall

have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan

agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligationsof the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil

action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

2. The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private

respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of

their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to the

company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding

accountabilities to the company are matters related to the

enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not dependent

on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be

issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of

the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their

outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it,

to return the cars assigned to them.

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San Miguel

vs.

Bersamira

(1990)

FACTS

Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts formerchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite (Annexes K and I,

SanMig's Comment, respectively). These companies are independent

contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE). SanMig entered into those contracts to maintain its competitive

position and in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business

expansion and diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was

expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the

contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were tobe deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no


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employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers,

on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the

Union, for brevity) is the duly authorized representative of the monthlypaid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June

1989 (Annex A, SanMig's Comment). Section 1 of their CBA specifically

provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and

workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the

scope of this Agreement."

In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union

advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed upfor union membership and sought the regularization of their employment

with SMC. The Union alleged that this group of employees, while

appearing to be contractual workers supposedly independent

contractors, have been continuously working for SanMig for a period

ranging from six (6) months to fifteen (15) years and that their work is

neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities

necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it

was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It

was then demanded that the employment status of these workers be

regularized.

On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any

favorable response from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for

unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting (Annex D,

Petition).

On 30 January 1989, the Union again filed a second notice of strike forunfair labor practice (Annex F, Petition).

ISSUES

The focal issue for determination is whether or not respondent Court

correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and properly

issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the resolution of that

question, is the matter of whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in

connection with, or relates to a labor dispute. An affirmative answerwould bring the case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor


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tribunals to the exclusion of the regular Courts.

RULE

While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationshipexists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of

Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist

"regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship

of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided

the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of

employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put

differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not

negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the

proximate relation of employer and employee.

APPLICATION

1. what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees

contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into

the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working

relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure

and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms

are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labordispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who

have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective

bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground

that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those

workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA.

Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of

negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the

injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent suchrepresentation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope

of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is

directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by

the NCMB-DOLE

2. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's

contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting

and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be

said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workersof Lipercon and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of


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the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the

strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer

to hire strangers outside the working unit; those are issues the

resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's

cause's of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with thoseissues.

3. The claim of SanMig that the action below is for damages under

Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code would not suffice to keep the

case within the jurisdictional boundaries of regular Courts. That claim for

damages is interwoven with a labor dispute existing between the parties

and would have to be ventilated before the administrative machinery

established for the expeditious settlement of those disputes. To allow the

action filed below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is

obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice

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FACTS

ISSUES

RULE

APPLICATION

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National Union of Bank Employees

vs.Minister of Labor

(1981)

FACTS

Union filed a petition for certification election.

During hearing for the petition, Union was required to submit payroll ofemployees.


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Employer agreed to release payroll upon issuance of the registration

certificate of the local union, from the Ministry of Labor.

However, despite receiving a copy of the registration certificate,employer still refused to produce the payroll and list of rank and file

employees.

The Med-Arbiter ruled to proceed with the certification election.

The employer filed a motion to suspend the proceeding on the ground

that there is a pending proceeding for the cancellation of the registration of the

union for allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities in violation of

the laws, i.e. THE CONDUCT OF ILLEGAL STRIKES.

Union files petition for mandamus to compel Minister of Labor, Bureau of

Labor Relations, and Producers Bank of the Philippinesto conduct a

certification election.

ISSUES

WON it is proper to order a certification election despite the pendency of

the petition to cancel union's certificate of registration?

RATIO

Unless there is an order of cancellation which is final the union's

certificate of registration remains and its legal personality intact. It is

entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by law, including the right to

represent its members and employees in a bargaining unit for collective

bargaining purposes including participation in a representation

proceeding. This is especially true where the grounds for thecancellation of its union certificate do not appear indubitable.

The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific

constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine

Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies

purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right more

pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically

declares that the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-

organization ,collective bargaining, security of tenure and just andhumane conditions of work. Such constitutional guarantees should not


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be lightly taken much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the

freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or

members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the

association itself.

The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the petition for

cancellation of the registration certificate of herein petitioner union is not

a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of the petition

for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union founded on the

alleged illegal strikes staged by the leaders and members of the intervenor union

and petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a certification election,

because there is no order directing such cancellation(cf. Dairy Queen

Products Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial

Relations, et al. No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said Dairy Queen case,

one of the issues raised was whether the lower court erred and

concomitantly committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the

fact that therein respondent union's permit and license have been

cancelled by the then Department of Labor and therefore could not be

certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank

and file employees of therein petitioner company.

While the rationale of the decision was principally rested on thesubsequent rescission of the decision ordering the cancellation of the

registration certificate of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal

personality and an the rights and privileges accorded by law to a

legitimate organization, this Court likewise declared: "There is no

showing, however, that when the respondent court issued the order

dated December 8, 1971, certifying the Dairy Queen Employees

Association CCLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of

all regular rank and file employees of the Dairy Queen Products

Company of the Philippines, Inc., for purposes of collective bargainingwith respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and

conditions for appointment, the order of cancellation of the registration

certificate of the Dairy Queen Employees Association-CC-1,U had

become final" 78 SCRA 444-445. supra, emphasis supplied).

It may be worthy to note also that the petition for cancellation of

petitioner union's registration certificate based on the alleged illegal

strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was

evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification


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electionconsidering that the same was apparently filed only after the

October 18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the

holding of a certification election.

Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of the registrationcertificate of petitioner union has not yet been finally resolved, there is

another factthat militates against the stand of private respondent Bank,

the liberal approach observed by this Court as to matters of certification

election. In a recent case, Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU

Local vs. Hon. Carmelo C. Noriel, et al. (No. 51005, May 26, 1981),

"[T]he Court resolves to grant the petition (for mandamus) in line with the

liberal approach consistently adhered to by this Court in matters of

certification election. The whole democratic process is geared towards

the determination of representation, not only in government but in other

sectors as well, by election. Thus, the Court has declared its

commitment to the view that a certification election is crucial to the

institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to the principle

of majority rule as one ' of the basic concepts of a democratic policy"

(National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 610).

Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College vs. Noriel, et al. (L-

48347, Oct. 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497, 498), this Court citing a longcatena of cases ruled:

... The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime

manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the

relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to

terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor,

however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that

they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be

discerned how crucial is a certification election. So our decisions fromthe earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone

Workers Union to the latest, Philippine Communications, Electronics &

Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations,

had made clear. The same principle was again given expression in

language equally emphatic in the subsequent case of Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations:

'Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the

significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining

process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which


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labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a

fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in

an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their

choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of

industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise,management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.' That is to

accord respect to the policy of the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the

holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive

and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent

the workers in a collective bargaining unit (emphasis supplied).

It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the Labor Code,

cancellation of registration certificate may be imposed on the following

instances:

(a) Violation of Articles 234, 238, 239 and 240 of the Code;

(b) Failure to comply with Article 237 of the Code;

(c) Violation of any of the provisions of Article 242 of the Code; and

(d) Any violation of the provisions of this Book.

The aforementioned provisions should be read in relation to Article 273,

Chapter IV, Title VIII which explicitly provides:

Art. 273. Penalties. (a) Violation of any provision of this Title shall be

punished by a fine of One Thousand Pesos [P l, 000.00] to Ten

Thousand Pesos [P 10, 000.00] and/or imprisonment of one (1) year to

five (5) years.

(b) Any person violating any provision of this Title shall be dealt with in

accordance with General Order No. 2-A and General Order No. 49.

(c) Violation of this Title by any legitimate labor organization shall be

grounds for disciplinary action including, but not limited to, thecancellation of its registration permit.

x x x x x x x x x

(emphasis supplied).

From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise convinced that as it

can be gleaned from said provisions, cancellation of the registration

certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of the Labor

Code.


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Certainly, the penalty imposable should be commensurateto the nature or

gravity of the Legal activities conducted and to the number of members

and leaders of the union staging the illegal strike.

As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel:"The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific

constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine

Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies for

purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right is more

pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically

declares that the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-

organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and

humane conditions of work. Such constitutional guarantees should not be

lightly taken much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of

association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not

easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself" (p.

8, Annex "J"; p. 66, rec.).

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union

vs.

Confesor

(2004)

FACTS

Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human Resource Manager, suggested to the

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Unions President Eddie L.

Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE, be excluded

from the Unions negotiating panel.

Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior to the

commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and

suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Unions negotiating panel, and

that during the first meeting, Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a

family affair.

ISSUES


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whether or not the Union was able to substantiate itsclaim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arisingfrom the latters alleged interference with its choice

of negotiator

RULE

1.it is not necessary that there be direct evidence thatany employee was in fact intimidated or coerced bystatements of threats of the employer if there is areasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the

employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

2.if an employer interferes in the selection of itsnegotiators or coerces the Union to eclude from itspanel of negotiators a representative of the Union! andif it can be inferred that the employer adopted the saidact to yield adverse effects on the free eercise to rightto self-organization or on the right to collectivebargaining of the employees! U"# under $rticle %&'(a)in connection with $rticle %&* of the "abor +ode iscommitted.

APPLICATION

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that

the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct

from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such actto yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-

organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially

considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of

the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that

the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel.

The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining

process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the

negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August

16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.


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It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The

accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the

economic provisions became heated and the parties had become

frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities.

As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result,suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with

unintended meanings.[49] Such is what appears to have happened in

this case.

If at all, the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be

construed as part of the normal relations and innocent communications,

which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Heritage Hotel Manila

vs.

Pinag-isang Galing at Lakas (PIGLAS)

(2009)

FACTS

Company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was required to submit

the names of all its members comprising at least 20 percent of the

employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it submitted named only

100 members notwithstanding that the signature and attendance sheets

reflected a membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the

company, amounted to material misrepresentation that warranted the

cancellation of the unions registration.

ISSUE No. 1

Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application

for union registration?

RULE

1. The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and

misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge anddeserves close scrutiny. It is serious because once such charge is


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Reyes

vs.

Trajano

(1992)

FACTS

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1

TUEU-OLALIA 95

NO UNION 1

SPOILED 1CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They

were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an

agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election

conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote

"because they are not members of any union and refused to participate

in the previous certification elections."

The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusionof their votes. They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it

"was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of

the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It

contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest

the results of the election," because "they are not members of either

contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on

religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ."

ISSUE

Whether the competing unions may challenge the right to vote of non-

union members who voted for "no union" during certification of election

on the ground of religious beliefs?

RULE

1. the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate

or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join,


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affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein.

The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the

right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that

just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so

also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. Thefact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union

does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such

membership.

2. Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus

Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO

UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative

right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or

resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently

coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be

represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted

provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his

cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear

acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may

outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the

employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union

in which case, no union can represent the employees in collectivebargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by

considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point,

and may not be inquired into at all.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of

the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining

unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the

affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of

the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wishto be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected,

and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of

the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding

wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The

minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in

collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable

occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results

will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to

impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union


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certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon

the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-

organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of

self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor

organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join orassist any labor union.

3. In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate

bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255

of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated

or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining

unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit

for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all

aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by

the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all

rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial

interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code

makes no distinction as to their employment for certification election. The

law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to

be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit".

APPLICATION

1. That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in

the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also

in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the

employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO

UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit

in its negative aspect.

The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to votebecause they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union"

"but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious

grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization" and "hence,

not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive

bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule

nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor

organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the

plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all

bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members


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of a labor organization or not.

2.Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right

to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification

elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do notallow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade

acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes

forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in

past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon

these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised

their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely

abused the same.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pan-American World Airways

vs.

Pan-American Employees Assoc.

(1960)

FACTS

The situation thus presented is the validity of the return to work order

insofar as five union officers are affected, petitioner airline firm rather

insistent on their being excluded arguing that since the strike called by

them was illegal, and that in any event there was enough ground for

dismissal, there was present a factor which might make them "lose all

their incentive and motivation for doing their work properly" and which

would furnish them "the opportunity to cause grave and irreparable injury

to petitioner."

To be more specific, the apprehension entertained by petitioner was in

the petition expressed by it thus: "The five officers of the union consist of

three (3) Passenger Traffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who

in the course of their duties could cause mix-ups in the reservation and

accommodation of passengers which could result in very many suits for

damages against airline.

Petitioner would attempt to remove the sting from its objection to have


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the union officers return to work by offering to depositthe salaries of the

five officers with respondent Court to be paid to them, coupled with what

it considered to be a generous concession that if their right to return to

work be not recognized, there would be no need for refund.

ISSUES

This is a review of the non-exclusion of 5 union officials in the return to

work order for illegal strike?

RULE

1.For it is the basic premise under which a regime of collective

bargaining was instituted by the Industrial Peace Act that through theprocess of industrial democracy, with both union and management

equally deserving of public trust, labor problems could be susceptible of

the just solution and industrial peace attained. Implicit in such a concept

is the confidence that must be displayed by management in the sense of

responsibility of union officials to assure that the two indispensable elements in

industry and production could-work side by side, attending to the problems of

each without neglecting the common welfare that binds them together.

2. The moment management displays what in this case appears to begrave but unwarranted distrustin the union officials discharging their

functions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the

collective bargaining process itself is called into question.

3. It would have been different if there were a rational basis for such fears.

APPLICATION

1. The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much lessone clear and present, is to be expected from their return to work.

Necessarily, the union officials have the right to feel offended by the fact

that, while they will be paid their salaries in the meanwhile they would

not be considered as fit persons to perform the duties pertaining to the

positions held by them. Far from being generous such an offer could

rightfully, be considered insulting.

2. The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to

the right of self-organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory


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recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of

their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would

be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their

behalf and to bargain for them.

3.If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented demand, the

laborers in this particular union would thus be confronted with the sad

spectacle of the leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible,

possibly even constituting a menace to the operations of the enterprise.

That is an indictment of the gravest character, devoid of any factual

basis.

4. The fact that they would be paid but not be allowed to work is, to

repeat, to add to the infamy that would thus attach to them necessarily,but to respondent union equally.

5.such an unwarranted demand, the effect of which would have been to

deprive effectively the rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who should

represent them.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------

Union of Supervisors (RB) -- NATU

vs.

Secretary of Labor and Republic Bank

(1981)

FACTS

Employer is Republic Bank.

Provident Fund was established pursuant to CBA.

Administration of fund is left to 5-man committee in the Board of Trustees

of the Bank.

The fund is supposed to be managed by a Board of Trustees composed

of five (5) members, of which three (3), including the chairman, are

supposed to be designated by the bank president, and the other two arethe presidents of the Republic Bank Union of Supervisors and of the


29/37

Republic Bank Employees' Union.

Norberto Luna is president of Union for supervisors. He was fund

administrator.

at the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the RB Provident Fund, Mr. de

Vera proposed a reorganization of the fund in order to carry out the

instruction of the (respondent's) Board of Directors, which wants to have

control of the fund so as to tie it up with the Investment Money Market

Operations of the bank (p. 296, NLRC rec.). Mr. Luna vehemently

objected to this, saying that the Provident Fund does not belong to the

respondent bank but to the officers and employees. A heated discussion

followed. The reorganization move was carried by a 3 to 2 vote, with all

management-appointed trustees voting for it. To protect the interests ofthe fund, Mr. Luna moved that a trust agreement be executed between

the trustees on the one hand and the members of the provident fund on

the other, and that the trustees should execute a bond. It was during the

ensuing discussion that Mr. Luna allegedly uttered the libelous remarks

as follows:

The basis of my apprehension is that if management wig run the RB I

feel that the management of the RB are experts in distressing the RB

and it's a known fact that for the past 10 years the RB has been in

distress for which there is no reason why the RB should be controlled by

management. Furthermore, the latest that Mr. de Vera is harping on is

that he has good intentions. The present Board of Trustees decided

against giving out a loan to Mr. de Vera who was considered a poor

credit risk. Now how can we expect a person who cannot be given a

loan and who will now have a say in the PF I don't think the PF will allow

that.

xxx xxx xxx

As I have said before the personal standing of a trustee is very important

so that if a man has a very poor standing and crooked (sic) at that he will

be very bad for the interest of the PF. I repeat that the trustees had in the

past denied a loan application of Mr. de Vera for the reason that his

salary is under garnishment and for a man to be appointed as trustee

when his records show that his salary was under garnishment, definitely,

the intention of the RB is to appoint unscrupulous people (pp. 300-301,


30/37

NLRC rec.).

Then Board appointed a new administrator.

The 2 representatives of the unions walked out.

ISSUE

WON this constitutes ULP? Yes.

RULE

In Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R.(21 SCRA 226 [1967] cited with approval

in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine

Blooming Mills, Inc., 51 SCRA 189 [1973], involving the same bank

where eight (8) union officials were dismissed for having written and

published a patently libelous letter against the bank President, WE held:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the

respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities

when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for

they were engaged in concerted activity,in the exercise of their right of self-

organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ... ). This is the view of some

members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in

protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of

their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace

Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective

bargaining be contemplated (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

APPLICATION

1. There is evidentiary doubt as to the truth that Luna uttered the libelous

remarks because the records are under control of the opposing party.

2. Assuming the libelous remarks were indeed uttered, the

communication is privileged.

3. His protests could even be treated as union activity by the Industrial

Peace Act, which assures the employees' right "to self-organization and

to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing and toengage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining


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and other mutual aid and protection ... " (Sec. 3, Rep. Act 875). This is

so because Luna's membership in the PF Board of Trustees was by

virtue of his being president of the RB Union of Supervisors. The

Provident Fund was itself created as a result of the union's collective

bargaining agreement with the bank. Luna was therefore acting out hisrole as protector of his constituents when he voiced out his apprehension

and protests over the plan of management. It matters not that he acted

singly or individually. What is important is that he had been selected by

the supervisors of respondent bank to be their president and

representative in the PF Board of Trustees. His actuations as such

should therefore be considered as legitimate exercise of the employees'

right to self-organization and as an activity for their mutual aid and

protection, aside from being privileged communication protected by the

constitutional guarantee on free speech. His remarks were in defense of

the interest of the Provident Fund, part of which comes from the

contribution of the rank and file employees. Moreover, his remarks had

factual basis. As heretofore stated, the Central Bank took over the

management of the respondent Republic Bank because it became

distressed due to mismanagement. And his remarks were addressed to

the Board of Trustee which has jurisdiction over the matter.

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank'sconduct, Identified as an interferencewith the employees' right of self-

organization, or as a retaliatory actionand/or as a refusal to bargain

collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and

intendment of section 4(e) of the Industrial Peace Act.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------

FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundationvs.

Trajano

(1987)

FACTS

Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation

Foundation union filed a similar petition for certification election with the


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Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied by the

MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that

the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore,

its employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article

244 of the Labor Code; that foundation union filed a petition for certiorariwith the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-49771) assailing the

constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code; that pending resolution

of the aforesaid petition, or on May 1, 1980, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70

was enacted amendingArticle 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even

employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and

organize labor unions of their choice; and that in the exercise of such

right, foundation union filed another petition for certification election with

the Ministry of Labor and Employment (NCR-LRD-N-2-050-86).

ISSUE

whether or not respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in

granting the petition for certification election, despite the pendency of a

similar petition before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 49771) which

involves the same parties for the same cause?

No.

RULE

1. Art. 244 Labor Code on "Coverage":

there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical

institutions(as herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or

join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining.

2. Rule on res judicata

APPLICATION

1. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by

law for calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent

upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to

ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees (

2. any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certioraripending before the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-49771) will not constitute


33/37

res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration,

for while in the former, the foundation union questioned the constitutionality of

Article 244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the latter, the foundation

union invokes the same article as already amended.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------

Victoriano

vs.

Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

(1974)

FACTS

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of

the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the

employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as

Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the

Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which

had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a

closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment

for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was

renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its

amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a

condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization

is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,

Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to

paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as

follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious

sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor

organization".


34/37

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its

members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation

to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he

reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union

wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separateAppellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from

the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn

notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve

a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be

constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to

file an action for injunction

ISSUES

Validity of R.A. 3350 on the religious exception clause.

RULE

1.the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any

union.

2. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have

the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labororganizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective

bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of

collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.

3.Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as

Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to

form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not

be abridged.

4. CLOSED SHOP PROVISION. The right to refrain from joining labor

organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Actis,

however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from

joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an

employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer

may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the

employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of

the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of theIndustrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,


35/37

provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an

employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or

any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage

membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not

precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization torequire as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor

organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore,

of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No.

3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be

employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the

collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join

the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

5. EXCEPTIONS TO CLOSED SHOP.To that all-embracing coverage of the

closed shop arrangement,Republic Act No. 3350introduced an exception,

when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the

following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious

sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious

sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when

said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that inspite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects

cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole

ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.

6. NON-IMPAIRMENT.Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can

be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of

the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are

reasonable.

7. NON-ESTABLISHMENT.

8. religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right

9. Discriminatory legislation: favors some sects

10.Against social justice

APPLICATION


36/37

1. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the

constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and

reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from

affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and

the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions.

2. Impairment of obligation of contract is REASONABLE. Religious

freedom.

3. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and

temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal.

4. The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in

favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members fromaffiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees

against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and

relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by

eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment,

which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the

people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society.

5. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or

exercise the right of resigning from the labor union he is exemptedfrom the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may

have entered into.

6. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,

rests on substantial distinctions.

7. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after

the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join

labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of themeans of livelihood.

8. Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is precisely

what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,

irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.


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Documents

LABOR2 Digests