CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD COFACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop.

1. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim.

2. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.

3. It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.

These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.

Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.

LA MALLORCA V. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: Plaintiffs husband and wife (Spouses Beltran), together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca bus.

1. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded.

2. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed. 

3. Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400.

4. La Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated. 

ISSUE: WON the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle

HELD: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost

diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained. 

NECESITO V. PARASRELATED LAW: Civil Code: ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for the all the circumstances.

FACTS: Severina Garces and her son Precillano Necesito boarded a passenger truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines driven by Francisco Bandonell.

1. The truck entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right.

2. The driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. Garces died due to drowning while Necesito suffered injuries.

3. Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 were filed with the Tarlac CFI against the carrier. The carrier pleaded that the accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver Bandonell.

4. The trial court found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road and that accident was due to the fracture of the truck’s right steering knuckle which could not be known by the carrier. Thus, it dismissed the complaints holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous events.

ISSUE: WON the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law

HELD: Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. Carrier’s liability rests upon negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. CA AND SAMSONFACTS: December 1950, Samson complained to PAL through its authorized official about the slow reaction

and poor judgment of Captain Bustamante. Notwithstanding said complaint, defendant allowed the pilot to continue flying.

1. January 8, 1951: Jesus V. Samson flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, with Captain Bustamante as commanding pilot of a PAL C-47 plane

2. On attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Captain Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the Samson to avert an accident, the airplane crash landed beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick front windshield of the airplane causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and abrasions on the forehead with intense pain

3. instead of expert and proper medical treatment called for by the nature and severity of his injuries, PAL simply referred him to a company physician, a general medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior injuries without examining the severe brain concussion 

4. Several days after the accident, PAL called back the Samson to active duty as co-pilot, and was never given any examination

5. he had been having periodic dizzy spells and had been suffering from general debility andnervousness 

6. December 21, 1953:  he was discharged due to his physical disabilityCFI: PAL to pay the Samson

a. P1988,000.00 as unearned income or damages

b. P50,000.00 for moral damagesc. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees d. P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation

7. CA: modified entitled to the legal rate of interest n unearned income

ISSUE: WON PAL was negligent and was liable

HELD: YES. affirmed with slight modification in that the correct amount of compensatory damages is P204,000.00

Even the doctors presented by PAL admit vital facts about the brain injury. Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes admits that due to the incident, the plaintiff continuously complained of his fainting spells, dizziness and headache everytime he flew as a co-pilot and everytime he went to the clinic no less than 25 times

We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent court to PAL for having allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on January 8, 1951 to be correct

Bustamante was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx (nose)

The fact that the complaint was not in writing does not detract anything from the seriousness thereof, considering that a miscalculation would not only cause the death of the crew but also of the passengers.One month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. The plane hit outside the airstrip. In

another instance, the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not Samson warned him. 

At least, the law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.

PAL would want to tie Samson to the report he signed about the crash-landing. The report was prepared by his pilot and because the latter pleaded that he had a family too and would have nowhere to go if he lost his job, Samson’s compassion would not upturn the truth about the crash-landing

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that

they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Article 2205 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines “damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury."

Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee’s own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee’s lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker’s intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker.Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil Code govern when interest shall be computed. 

The correct amount of compensatory damages upon which legal interest shall accrue from the filing of the

complaint is P204,000.00 as herein computed and not P198,000.00

BRINAS V. PEOPLE FACTS: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon. 

1. They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted “Lusacan, Lusacan!” 

2. The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other.

3. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death. 

4. A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the decision. 

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was negligent

HELD: No. There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from the findings. 

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This

is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.

ISAAC V. AL AMMEN TRANPORT COFACTS: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur.

1. One of the buses which Ammen Transportation was operating is Bus 31. On 31 May 1951, Cesar

L. Isaac boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which Isaac’s left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus.

2. Isaac was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood transfusion to save his life. After 4 days, he was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he underwent treatment for 3 months. He was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed there for another 2 months.

3. For these services, he incurred expenses amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by Ammen Transporation.

4. As an aftermath, Isaac brought an action against Ammen Transportation for damages alleging that the collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by Ammen Transportation and that Ammen Transporation incurred in culpa contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport Isaac safely to his destination.

5. Ammen Transportation set up as special defense that the injury suffered by Isaac was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by its driver and to the contributory negligence of Isaac himself.

6. The court after trial found that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and not to that of the driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did everything he could to avoid the same but that notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to avoid it.

7. As a consequence, the court dismissed the complaint, with costs against Isaac. Isaac appealed.

1. Article 1733 NCCArticle 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.”

2. Article 1755 NCCArticle 1755 of the Civil Code provides that “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.”

3. Article 1756 NCCArticle 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed

extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”

4. Rationale for extraordinary diligence requirement for a common carrierThe Code Commission, in justifying this extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, said “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances. This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury. “

5. Principles governing liability of a common carrierFrom the legal provisions, the following restatement of the principles governing the liability of a common carrier can be made: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.

6. Facts; Bus running at moderate speed, swerved to avoid reckless pick-up carHerein, Bus 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate speed because it had just stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay. The pick-up car was at full speed and was running outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver could not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.

7. Coolness and accuracy of judgment required in ordinary circumstances cannot be expected in sudden emergency; Acts of a prudent man in situation doneWhile the position taken by Isaac, i.e. that the driver of the bus should have stopped the bus to allow the other vehicle to pass rather than squeezing between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel, appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe in a given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however cannot always be expected from one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not given enough time to take the proper course of action as he should under ordinary circumstances. One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care and

precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that as ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a sudden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to exempt the carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that “where a carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he is not held to the same degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company, liable. Considering all the circumstances, the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and this relieves the transport company from liability under the law.

8. Isaac guilty of contributory negligenceHerein, when Isaac boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great damage. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is the case with the other passengers. It is to be noted that Isaac was the

only victim of the collision. It is apparent that Isaac is guilty of contributory negligence.

9. No recovery due to negligence by passengerAlthough contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier of its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code), this is a circumstance which further militates against the position taken by Isaac in this case. It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained.

BATANGAS TRANSPORT CO V. CAGUIMBALFACTS: Caguimbal who was a paying pasenger of Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO) bus died when the bus of the Biñan Transportation Company (Binan) which was coming from the opposite direction and a calesa managed by Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan bus met an accident. 

1. A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop

2. At this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Biñan bus was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa;

3. Without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed;

4. The second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered

damages for the repair of its damaged portion.As a consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal and Tolentino died, apart from others who were injured. 

5. The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Biñan and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Biñan and Ilagan. 

6. CFI dismissed the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to sue Biñan and Ilagan. CA reversed said decision and rendered judgment for Caguimbal. BTCO appealed to SC. 

Issue: Whether BTCO is liable to pay damages for failure to exercise extraordinary diligence? 

Held: YES. BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. 

The recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which resulted in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Biñan bus, he overtook Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough

therefor, in view of which the Biñan bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa. 

Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary diligence must be exercised by the driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers. 

The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the BTCO bus driver drove partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen to it — had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" — that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Biñan bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus driver whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence

for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. 

In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.

BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181 (1957)FACTS: Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after midnight.

1. While the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus.

2. Ten men came to help. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside.

3. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover damages from Mariano Medina.

4. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers

HELD: The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.

Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate

legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court holds that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is

driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

NOCUM V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COFACTS: Herminio L. Nocum, a passenger in Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.’s Bus 120, which was then making a trip

within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.

1. Nocum filed a case against Laguna Tayabas Bus for damages. The CFI of Batangas (Civil Case 834) sentenced Laguna Tayabas to pay Nocum the sum of P1,351.00 for actual damages and P500.00 as attorney’s fees, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint plus costs.

2. Laguna Tayabas appealed.

1. Article 1733 NCCArticle 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

2. Article 1755 NCCArticle 1755 of the Civil Code provides that “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.3. Article 1756 NCCArticle 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”

4. Article 1733 NCC not too exacting; Carrier not mandated to require opening of baggageBefore the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it, since its “opening was folded and tied with abaca.” According to the judge of the lower court, “if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.” Even it that may be true, the law does not require as much. Article 1733 is not as unbending, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be “according to all the circumstances of each case.” “In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.”

5. Passengers presumed that a passenger that will not take with him anything dangerousWhile it is true the passengers of Laguna Tayabas’ bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its

passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own.

6. Right to privacyNot to be lightly considered be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellanies, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties. Withal, what must be importantly considered is not so much the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.

7. Proper understanding of the service manual issued by Laguna Tayabas

When there are sufficient indications that the representations of the passenger regarding the nature ofhis baggage may not be true, in the interest of the common safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger. It is in this sense that the service manual issued by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. to its conductors must be understood.

8. Resort to decisions of foreign jurisdiction similar to the present oneDecisions in other jurisdictions evidently because of the paucity of local precedents squarely in point, emphasize that there is need for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the passenger’s baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common carrier’s employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of the common carrier’s liability in cases similar to the present one.

9. Principle controlling servants of the carrier; Clark vs. LouisvilleThe principle that must control the servants of the carrier in a case is correctly stated in the opinion in the case of Clarke v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (20 Ky L. Rep. 839, 49 S.W. 1120). In that case Clarke was a passenger on the defendant’s train. Another passenger took a quantity of gasoline into the same coach in which Clarke was riding. It ignited and exploded, by reason of which he was severely injured. The trial court peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the

defendant. In the opinion, affirming the judgment, it is said: ‘It may be stated briefly, in assuming the liability of a railroad to its passengers for injury done by another passenger, only where the conduct of this passenger had been such before the injury as to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to believe that there was reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger to the other passengers, and in that case asserting it to be the duty of the conductor of the railroad train to use all reasonable means to prevent such injury, and if he neglects this reasonable duty, and injury is done, that then the company is responsible; that otherwise the railroad is not responsible.

10. Principle controlling servants of the carrier; Gulf vs. Shields as cited in Clark vs. Louisville“The opinion quotes with approval from the case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. vs. Shields, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 652, 29 S. W. 652, in which case the plaintiff was injured by alcohol which had been carried upon the train by another passenger. In the opinion in that case it is said: ‘It was but a short period of time after the alcohol was spilt when it was set on fire and the accident occurred, and it was not shown that appellant’s employees knew that the jug contained alcohol. In fact, it is not shown that the conductor or any other employee knew that Harris had a jug with him until it fell out of the sack, though the conductor had collected his fare, and doubtless knew that he had the sack on the seat with him. It cannot be successfully denied that Harris had the right as a passenger to carry baggage on the train, and that he had a right to carry it in a sack if he chose to do so. We think it is equally clear that, in the absence of some intimation or circumstance indicating that the sack contained

something dangerous to other passengers, it was not the duty of appellant’s conductor or any other employee to open the sack and examine its contents. [Quinn v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 8 Ky. 231, 32 S. W. 742; Wood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 703, 42 S. W. 349; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1049, 96 S. W. 898; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Renfro, 142 Ky. 590, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)133, 135 S. W. 266]