Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 197539 June 2, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO,Accused.RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO,Accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, which affirmed the Joint Decision2dated January 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Paraaque City, Branch 195, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0122 to 30, finding accused-appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino guilty of the crimes of ( 1) illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995;" and (2) estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, but modified the penalties imposed upon appellant for said crimes.In an Information dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-0122, Angelita I. Daud (Daud), Hanelita M. Gallemit (Hanelita), and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:That on or about or sometime during the period from February 5, 2001 to August 2001, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to complainantsMarcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio,without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage.3Eight more Informations, all dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123 to 03-0130, charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman (De Guzman), Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena (Decena), Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio (Poserio), respectively.The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0123 alleged:That on or about covering the period from February 2001 up to March 2001, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully and feloniously defraud Marcelo de Guzman y Ignacio pertinent to his overseas job employment if he would deliver to them the amount ofP545,000.00 by means of other similar deceit knowing it to be false and only made to induce the aforementioned complainant to give and deliver the said amount ofP545,000.00 and accused once in possession of the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply and misappropriate the said amount to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said MARCELODE GUZMAN y IGNACIO in the aforementioned amount.4The seven other Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124 to 03-0130 were similarly worded as the aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the private complainant and the amount purportedly collected from him/her, to wit:Docket No.Private ComplainantAmount Collected

Crim. Case No. 03-01245Evangeline I. Relox,P25,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01256Marcelo E. RayoP45,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01267Brigada A. RayoP28,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01278Gina T. DecenaP70,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01289Nenita F. PolicarpioP50,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-012910Myrna S. CrisostomoP24,500.00

Crim. Case No. 03-013011Francisco S. PoserioP70,000.00

Only appellant was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and remained at large.The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of the nine criminal cases ensued.The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Certification dated September 19, 2002 stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy, with address at India St., Don Bosco, Paraaque City, set up and operated by appellant and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.12Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it. The presentation of a POEA representative was dispensed with after the defense admitted the due execution and genuineness of the POEA Certification dated September 19, 2002.13Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellants testimony.After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in violation of Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and hereby sentences him to a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Marcelo De Guzman y Ignacio the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) plus twelve percent (12%) interest from the date of the filing of the Information on February 3, 2003, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127,the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit; and(4) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months as minimum to twelve (12) years and two (2) months as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay costs of suit.(5) Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124, 03-0125, 03-0126, 03-0128, and 03-0129, for failure to prosecute, are hereby ordered Dismissed, as against accused Roderick Gallemit.Considering that accused ANGELITA I. DAUD and HANELITA M. GALLEMIT remain at large for more than six (6) months since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer, the cases against them are hereby ordered ARCHIVED pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92. Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them.14Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration by the RTC in an Order15dated April 3, 2007, appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals summarized the private complainants testimonies against appellant, viz:Marcelo de Guzman[(De Guzman)], a dentist by profession with a clinic in Bulacan, testified that sometime in January 2001, he was introduced by his patient Modesta Marqueda to her cousin, accused [Daud]. [Daud] encouraged [De Guzman] to apply for work abroad and convinced him that she would be able to send him to Korea. To prove to [De Guzman] that she was capable of sending workers abroad, [Daud] invited him to visit her office located at Taft Avenue, Manila.A month later, [De Guzman] and his cousins Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Myrna Crisostomo, Francisco Poserio, Evangeline Relox, [Decena] and Nenita Policarpio, wentto see [Daud] at the Jemimah International Manpower Services, located at Taft Avenue, Manila where the latter was then working as a liaison officer. The group was shown job orders and photos of [Daud] with Korean employees to prove that she was indeed sending workers abroad. It was at this office that [De Guzman] first met [appellant] and [Hanelita].Meanwhile, [Daud], together with [Hanelita] and [appellant], put up their own business named Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy Corporation in their residence at No. 4 Sta. Maria Apartment, India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City.Having been convinced by the documents shown to him at the Taft Avenue office, [De Guzman] paid [Daud] the amount ofP35,000[.]00 as initial payment for his placement fee at the latters office and residence in Paraaque City on February 2, 2001. On February 5, 2001, [De Guzman] gave [Daud] the amount ofP15,000[.]00 which was witnessed by Hanelita. He gave anotherP15,000.00 on February 22, 2001. However, he lost the original receipts.On March 3, 6 and 7, 2001, [De Guzman] again gave [Daud] x x x different amounts consisting ofP35,000.00,P30,000.00 andP15,000.00, respectively, at her office in Paraaque City (Exhibits "A" to "C"). In [De Guzman]s presence, [Daud] counted the money, issued receipts therefor as "processing fees of Nike applicants", affixed her signature after signing the receipts in the name of "Nimfa Min". [Daud] explained to him that "Nimfa Min" was her contact who happened to be the wife of a Korean national. [De Guzman] trusted [Daud] and accepted her explanation. Whenever he gave his payment to [Daud], it was in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant] but he did not require the two to sign as witnesses because he trusted them as they were members of the same family. [De Guzman] was told by [Daud] and [appellant] that he and his group would be leaving in two weeks time.[De Guzman] and his companions were instructed to appear before the Korean Embassy and were promised that they would be able to leave on March 11, 2001 as trainee workers in Korea where they would earn a monthly salary of US$400, overtime pay, with benefits of free board and lodging and 30-day leave within a year. De Guzmans group were shown photocopies of their passport and stamped visas for Korea. However, they were not given their working permits and job contracts.When their departure date was getting near, [Daud] postponed it thrice. Eventually, [De Guzman] asked from accused [Daud] a photocopy of his passport with a stamped Korean Visa. Upon inquiry with the Korean Embassy, [De Guzman] was told that it was fake. He proceeded to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and verified the registration of Green Pastures Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation. The POEA informed them that it was not registered with the POEA and gave[De Guzman] a certification to the effect that the said agency was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad (Exhibit D).Embarrassed because of the money given by his cousins, [De Guzman] verbally asked [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] to return the money. They promised him that they would settle the matter but they failed to return the money. x x x.Gina Decena, for her part testified that sometime in January 2001, she was introduced by her cousin, Maricel Rayo, to accused [Daud], [Hanelita] and [appellant], at the Makati Medical Towers where Maricel had her medical examination. [Decena] again met the three accused at their office at No. 4 Sta. Maria Apartment, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City when Maricel obtained a copy of her medical certificate. They enticed [Decena] to apply at their agency by showing her job orders that offered $400 [a] month salary, 150% overtime pay, free board and lodging as well as photographs of prospective Korean employers. [Appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order. The three accused assured [Decena] that they had already sent several applicants for employment abroad. Convinced, [Decena] and her husband Marcelo Rayo applied at their agency. They were instructed to undergo medical examination, to attend a Korean Language seminar, and to payP70,000.00 processing fee.Thus, on February 15, 2001, [Decena] and her husband each gave accused [Daud] the amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fees. During trial, [Decena] presented her receipt forP35,000.00 which was received and signed by [Daud].Thereafter, the couple were told to wait for two weeks for the processing of their visas. As two weeks have passed and nothing happened to their applications, [Decena] and her husband went to the POEA to verify the status of the agency. They were informed to the effect that said agency was not licensed to send workers abroad. [Decena] and her husband went back to the agency and tried to look for the accused but they were all gone. They later came to know, through [De Guzman], that [appellant] was apprehended. She identified her sworn statement in court.Sometime in January 2001, Francisco Poserio [(Poserio)] was brought along by his cousin [De Guzman] to No. 4 Sta. Maria Apt., India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. While thereat, [De Guzman] introduced [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] as the owners of Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy and that they were sending workers to Korea. The three accused encouraged [Poserio] to apply for work in Korea where he could get a job which offered a monthly salary of US$400 with free meals and housing, 150% pay on overtime work and vacation leave of thirty (30) days in a two-year contract. To convince [Poserio] that they can send workers to Korea, they showed him job orders from Hyundai Group and Nike requiring workers for Korea, a copy of a Korean visa of one of their job applicants, and photos of [Daud] in Korea with a Korean national who would be [Poserio]s prospective employer if he applied with their agency. Further, he would be able to earn back his placement fee in three months work.Enticed, [Poserio] mortgaged his property to get funds for his job application. [Daud] and Hanelita informed him to undergo a medical examination and seminar and even gave him a referral. On January 27, 2001, he gave his passport, medical examination result, seminar result and certification for employment. He was then told to payP100,000.00 as processing fee for his job application. On March 3, 2001, he gave his down payment ofP25,000.00 to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant]. He was told to wait for two weeks for the processing of his papers. On July 2001, he was informed that additional amount was needed to process his papers. Thus, on July 5, 2001, he gaveP45,000.00 as additional payment to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita. He was again told to wait for another three weeks. He was even promised that they would return his money if he would notbe sent abroad. A year after his payment, [Poserio] was still not able to leave the country. Upon verification with the POEA, he and the other job applicants discovered that the said agency was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. He talked over the phone with the accused and demanded the return of his money. When they failed to return his money, he filed a complaint with the Paraaque police.All three complainants positively identified [appellant] in court.16(Citations omitted.)The Court of Appeals similarly provided a gist of appellants testimony, thus:Roderick Gallemit[(appellant)] denied owning the agency, undertaking any recruitment act or receiving any amount from the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the receipts. He admitted that he is married to co-accused [Hanelita] and that co-accused [Daud] is his mother-in-law.He knew private complainants [De Guzman] and [Poserio] who were introduced to him by [Daud] who was then working as a liaison officer at Jemimah International Manpower Services located in Taft Avenue, Manila. [Appellant] denied knowing the other complainants. He was just brought along by [Daud] since he was also one of the job seekers applying at the Jemimah International Manpower Services where [Daud] worked. [Daud] told him that private complainant [De Guzman] is her business partner. [Poserio] was one of those applying for a job abroad and [De Guzman] would refer them to [Daud]. Thus, [De Guzman] frequented their apartment in Paraaque.He admitted that, from February 2001 to August 2001, he had been staying at the apartment in India Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City he shared with his wife Hanelita, their child and his mother-in-law [Daud]. He and his wife were not employed since they were applying for a job abroad. His siblings help him out by sending him money for his job application. He was aware that his mother-in-law [Daud] was a recruiter and owned an agency named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel and Tours which she operated in the same apartment.He claimed that [Daud] has only one employee, a certain Badjong, who processed documents. At first he did not apply with [Daud] because her business was still new. He applied with her when she convinced him that she could process his passport and papers to Korea.He denied he was present when the complainants gave their payments to [Daud]. He insisted that he was not involved with [Daud]s business and that he was always out of the house as he would often go to Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings. x x x.17(Citations omitted.)In its Decision dated March 18, 2011,the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by the RTC, but modified the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa. The appellate court decreed:WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and of Estafa is AFFIRMED with modification with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa, to wit:(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.In all other respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.18Hence, appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors which he raised before the Court of Appeals:ITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF LARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.IITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ESTAFADESPITE THE ABSENCE [OF] THE ELEMENT OF DECEIT.Illegal recruitment in large scaleAppellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove that he gave private complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that they were convinced to part with their money. Any encouragement or promise of employment abroad was solely made by Daud. Appellant points out that it was only his alleged presence at the time private complainants were making their payments to Daud that led said private complainants to believe that appellant participated in the recruitment scheme.The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the appellee, insists that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused in engaging in illegal recruitment activities, specifically performing the following acts: (1) Appellant, together with his co-accused, owned and operated Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation; (2) Appellant, together with his co-accused, encouraged private complainants to apply for jobs abroad with their agency, promising private complainants salary of US$400.00, 150% overtime pay, and free board and lodging; (3) Appellant, together with his co-accused, assured private complainants that they could leave for Korea within a short period after paying their placement fees; and (4) Appellant was present everytime private complainants made payments to his co-accused Daud. In addition, private complainants De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio positively identified and pointed to appellant in court as one of the persons who recruited them for work abroad.19Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.20Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defined illegal recruitment as follows:SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:x x x x(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of"recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.21Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that all the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are present in the case at bar. As the Court of Appeals discussed in detail:First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide Tours and Consultancy" nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. This was established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment activity, as in this case, unlawful or criminal.Second, despite not having such authority, appellant, along with his co-accused, nevertheless engaged in recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from them various amounts as placement fees. This is substantiated by the respective testimonies of the three private complainants who fell victim to their illegal activities. Marcelo de Guzman testified that appellant was physically present during the time that he and his companions were being shown job orders and while he was paying for the fees for himself and in behalf of his companions. Francisco Poserio testified that appellant was one of those who apprised him of job benefits and tried to convince him to apply for overseas employment through their agency. Gina Decena mentioned that [appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order.We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the offense. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Conspiracy exists where the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in committing the crime.The testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently corroborative of each other to be less than credible. It would be contrary to human nature and experience for several persons to conspire and accuse appellant of a crime and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and vindicate the frustration of their dreams to work abroad if all he did was just to reside in the same apartment where his mother-in-law [Daud] operated her recruitment agency. It is in this light that We find any inconsistencies that accused-appellant harps on in the tesimonines of the complainants to be inconsequential. What is important is that they have positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who enticed them to part with their money in exchange for promised jobs abroad.The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the Supreme Court is committed when, among other things, a person, who without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment. This is what obtains in this case.Contrary to appellants mistaken notion, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.Considering the evidence on record, We agree with the trial court that accused-appellant engaged in recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large scale. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In this case, three complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment.22(Citations omitted.)The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that they personally met appellant; that they knew appellant was associated with Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy; and that appellant had performed recruitment activities such as promising employment abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing copies of job orders. The private complainants testimonies are consistent and corroborate one another on material points, such as the amount of the placement fees asked, and the purported country of destination and nature of work.It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant himself received the placement fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the finding of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among appellant and his co-accused Hanelita and Daud, appellants wife and mother-in-law, respectively. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.23It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.24Between the categorical statements of the private complainants, on the one hand, and the bare denial of appellant, on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.25Furthermore, without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. After all, the doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies, are entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same, an opportunity not equally open to the appellate court. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels us to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.26This is more true if the findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.27Given the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of appellant for illegal recruitment in a large scale, which constitutes economic sabotage. The penalty of life imprisonment and the fine ofP500,000.00, imposed upon appellant for the said offense by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is in accord with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, which provides:Sec. 7. Penalties.(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. (Emphasis ours.)EstafaWe likewise affirm the conviction of appellant for three counts of estafa committed against the private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130, based on the very same evidence that proved appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment.It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. As we explained in People v. Cortez and Yabut28:In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. (Citations omitted.)Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:x x x x2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.29Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the absence of proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private complainants.We are not persuaded. As we had previously discussed herein, private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for employment. Decena testified that appellant gave her a copy of the purported job order for Korea, while Poserio avowed that appellant encouraged him to apply for work abroad. Daud, appellants fellow conspirator, accepted placement fees from private complainants, even issuing receipts for some; instructed private complainants to undergo medical examination; and took private complainants passports. The representations made by appellant and his co-accused to private complainants were actually false and fraudulent, not only because they were not duly authorized to undertake recruitment for overseas employment, but also because there were no actual jobs waiting for private complainants in Korea and private complainants never had a chance to leave for work abroad.Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed by appellant proving that he received money from private complainants.We disagree once more with appellant. We reiterate that when conspiracy has been established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. All three private complainants testified that they paid placement fees to Daud, who issued receipts for some amounts either in her name or in the name of one "Nimfa Min." Moreover, the payment of placement fees to illegal recruiters is not evidenced by receipts alone; it can also be established by testimonies of witnesses. In People v. Pabalan,30we held:Although not all of the amounts testified to by complainants were covered by receipts, the fact that there were no receipts for some of the amounts delivered to him does not mean that appellant did not accept or receive such payments. This Court has ruled in several cases that the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentations of receipts in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses. (Citation omitted.)Again, there is no cogent reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130. Thus, we sustain appellants conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code.The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation.1wphi1Per Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is overP12,000.00 but not exceedingP22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 8 years). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).31Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123,03-127, and 03-0130 were correctly fixed by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, at 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional.The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud exceedsP12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., one year for everyP10,000.00 in excess ofP22,000.00) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.32In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-127, and 03-0130, the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The Court of Appeals fixed the maximum term at 8 years.But then, since private complainants were defrauded in the amounts exceedingP22,000.00, incremental penalty shall be imposed upon appellant, determined as follows:1wphi1Criminal CaseNo. (PrivateComplainant)AmountDefraudedDifference AfterSubtractingP22,000.00Quotient AfterDividing byP10,000.00IncrementalPenalty33

03-0123 (De Guzman)P80,000.00P58,000.005.85 years

03-0127 (Decena)P35,000.00P13,000.001.31 year

03-130 (Poserio)P70,000.00P48,000.004.84 years

The incremental penalty shall be added to the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals in imposing the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. 03-0123at thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal; in Criminal Case No. 03-0127 at nine (9) years of prision mayor; and in Criminal Case No. 03-0130 at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.Lastly, it is still incumbent upon appellant to indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to him and his conspirators, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, which, in this case, shall be deemed as the same day the Informations were filed against appellant, until the said amounts are fully paid.34WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, to read as follows:1. In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.000.00);2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen years (13) of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Marcelo I. De Guzman in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid;3. In Criminal Case No. 03-0127, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal C ode, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four(4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum, ordered to indemnify private complainant Gina T. Decena in the amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid; and4. In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Francisco S. Poserio in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid.SO ORDERED

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS:Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD:There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.

[G.R. No. 138193.March 5, 2003]OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and FERMIN F. GUERRERO,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition for certiorari should be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Furthermore, unilateral decisions to alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to coastwise shipping will not affect the validity of an existing employment contract validly executed. Workers should not be prejudiced by actions done solely by employers without the formers consent or participation.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50667. The assailed Resolutions dismissed a Petition filed in the CA, challenging an adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The first Resolution disposed as follows:We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition.[2]The second Resolution[3]denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant the sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE and 65/100 [US dollars] (US$11,359.65) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing complainants unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance, vacation leave pay and termination pay.[4]The FactsThis case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. The Complaint was for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay. The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:[Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel M/V [Princess] Hoa as a Master Mariner for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under the said contract, his basic monthly salary isUS$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance, US$321.00 fixed overtime, US$89 vacation leave pay per month for x x x 44 hours f] work per week. He boarded the vessel on July 21, 1994 and complied faithfully with the duties assigned to him.[Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with M/V Princess Hoa, he was not paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime in January 1995 because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost seven (7) months, i.e. from July 1994 to January 1995, despite the services he rendered, no compensation or remuneration was ever paid to him. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay.[Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an American company which owns M/V Princess Hoa, then a foreign registered vessel, appointed x x x Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager particularly to negotiate, transact and deal with any third persons, entities or corporations in the planning of crewing selection or determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, [Petitioner] OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with x x x PC-SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents of crew members of M/VPrincess Hoa. The initial plan of the [s]hip-owner was to use the vessel in the overseas trade, particularly the East Asian Growth Area. Thereafter, the contract of [private respondent] was processed before the POEA on September 20, 1994.OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel. Instead of using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus, the crewmembers hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the shipowner in the coastwise trade. Considering that the M/V Princess Hoa was a foreign registered vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the shipowner converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 28, 1994 by way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co. (PCSLC). To do this, the shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its management agreement with x x x PC-SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of termination dated September 20, 1994. In the same letter of termination, the ship owner stated that it has bareboat chartered out the vessel to said [PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry. Consequently, x x x PC-SASCO terminated its crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated December 5, 1994. Because of the bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent conversion to Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the termination of the management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of contract ensued whereby PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent owner/employer of the crew.As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of complainants wages. x x x.[5]Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision[6]in favor of Private Respondent Guerrero. Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services, Co. (PC-SASCO), were ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and allowances, accrued fixed overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The Decision held that there was a constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had not been paid his salary for seven months. It also dismissed petitioners contention that there was a novation of the employment contract.On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LAs Decision, with a modification as to the amount of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition[7]to set aside the NLRC judgment. The petition was dismissed, because petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, petitioner had attached to its Petition, not a duplicate original or a certified true copy of the LAs Decision, but a mere machine copy thereof. Further, it had not indicated the actual address of Private Respondent Fermin F. Guerrero.[8]Hence, this Petition.[9]The IssuesIn its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it required as attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another Decision which is not-the subject of the said Petition?2. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it disregarded the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?3. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it did not consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as Notice to Guerrero himself?[10]The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally, petitioner has complied with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Additionally and in the interest of speedy justice, this Court will also resolve the substantive issue brought before the CA: did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?The Courts RulingWhile petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be decided on the merits in favor of private respondent.Procedural Issue:Compliance with the Rules of CourtPetitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.[11]Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified true copy of the LAs Decision to its Petition forCertiorarichallenging the NLRC judgment?Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and prohibition, petitions need to be accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of thequestionedjudgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to it may be mere machine copies thereof.[12]Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under Rule 45 and in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be certified is the copy of thequestionedjudgment, final order or resolution.[13]Since the LAs Decision was not the questioned ruling, it did not have to be certified. What had to be certified was the NLRC Decision. And indeed it was.As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by petitioner that Guerrero could be served with process care of his counsel was substantial compliance with the Rules.This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not required, provided that the party is represented by counsel.[14]This rule is founded on considerations of fair play, inasmuch as an attorney of record is engaged precisely because a party does not feel competent to deal with the intricacies of law and procedure.[15]Both jurisprudence[16]and the basics of procedure[17]provide that when a party has appeared through counsel, service is to be made upon the latter, unless the court specifically orders that it be upon the party.We also note that from the inception of the case at the LAs office, all pleadings addressed to private respondent had always been sent to his counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note that private respondent, who was employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The service of pleadings and other court processes upon him personally would have been futile, as he would not have been around to receive them.This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously observe the Rules, they should not be overly strict about procedural lapses that do not impair the proper administration of justice.[18]Rather, procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[19]Substantive Issue:Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid SalariesIt is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of unpaid salaries and other monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight of private respondent and, indeed, of workers in general who are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from them. Such recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case is now on its ninth year since its inception at the LAs office. Its remand to the CA will only unduly delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial justice,[20]this Court will decide the case on the merits based upon the records of the case, particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping Philippines Petition before the CA.On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring Private Respondent Guerrero as master mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas, his employment contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner contends that using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to another principal had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not persuaded.As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), petitioner was the legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO.[21]As such, it was allowed to select, recruit, hire and deploy seamen on board the vesselM/V Princess Hoa,which was managed by its principal, PC-SASCO.[22]It was in this capacity that petitioner hired private respondent as master mariner. They then executed and agreed upon an employment contract.An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (c) cause of the obligation.[23]Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent Guerrero complied with his obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board the vessel. Contrary to petitioners contention, the contract had an object, which was the rendition of service by private respondent on board the vessel. The non-deployment of the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the perfected employment contract. After all, the decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was made by petitioner only and did not bear the written conformity of private respondent. A contract cannot be novated by the will of only one party.[24]The claim of petitioner that it processed the contract of private respondent with the POEA only after he had started working is also without merit. Petitioner cannot use its own misfeasance to defeat his claim.Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal,[25]PC-SASCO, for private respondents claim.This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations.[26]Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.[27]The fact that petitioner and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the former of its liability. The reason for this ruling was given by this Court inCatan National Labor Relations Commission,[28]which we reproduce in part as follows:This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the, employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.[29]WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are herebySET ASIDE,and the September 10, 1998 NLRC DecisionREINSTATEDandAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONAMELIA J. DELOS SANTOS,Petitioner,- versus -JEBSEN MARITIME, INC.,Respondent.G.R. No. 154185Present:PANGANIBAN,J., ChairmanSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA,JJ.Promulgated:November 22, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NGARCIA,J.:Petitioner Amelia J. Delos Santos seeks in this petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the decision and resolution dated 21 March 2002[1]and 03 July 2002[2], respectively, of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. SP No. 62229.From the petition and its annexes, the respondents comment thereto, and the parties respective memoranda, the Court gathers the following factual antecedents:On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen Maritime, Inc., for and in behalf of Aboitiz Shipping Co. (Aboitiz Shipping, for short), hired petitioners husband, Gil R. Delos Santos (hereinafter, Delos Santos) as third engineer of MVWild Iris. The corresponding contract of employment, as approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), was for a fixed period of one (1) month and for a specific undertaking of conducting said vessel to and from Japan. It quoted Delos Santos basic monthly salary and other monetary benefits in US currency. Under POEA rules, all employers and principals are required to adopt the POEA - standard employment contract (POEA-SEC) without prejudice to their adoption of terms and conditions over and above the minimum prescribed by that agency.[3]On the vessels return to the Philippines a month after, Delos Santos remained on board, respondent having opted to retain his services while the vessel underwent repairs in Cebu. After its repair, MVWild Iris,this time renamed/registered as MVSuper RoRo 100, sailed within domestic waters, having been meanwhile issued by the Maritime Industry Authority a Certificate of Vessel Registry and a permit to engage in coastwise trade on the Manila-Cebu-Manila-Zamboanga-General Santos-Manila route.[4]During this period of employment, Delos Santos was paid by and received from respondent his salary in Philippine peso thru a payroll-deposit arrangement with the Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank.[5]Some five months into the vessels inter-island voyages, Delos Santos experienced episodes of chest pain, numbness and body weakness which eventually left him temporarily paralyzed. On 17 February 1996, he was brought to theManila Doctors Hospitala duly accredited hospital of respondent - where he underwent a spinal column operation. Respondent shouldered all operation-related expenses, inclusive of his post operation confinement.As narrated in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the following events next transpired:1. After his discharge from the Manila Doctors, Delos Santos was made to undergo physical therapy sessions at the same hospital, which compelled the Batangas-based Delos Santoses to rent a room near the hospital at P3,000.00 a month;2. Delos Santos underwent a second spinal operation at the non-accreditedLourdes Hospitalat the cost of P119, 536.00; and3. AfterLourdes, Delos Santos was confined in a clinic in San Juan, Batangas where P20,000.00 in hospitalization expenses was incurred.It would appear that the spouses Delos Santos paid all the expenses attendant the second spinal operation as well as for the subsequent medical treatment. Petitioners demand for reimbursement of these expenses was rejected by respondent for the reason that all the sickness benefits of Delos Santos under the Social Security System (SSS) Law had already been paid.Thus, on 25 January 1997, petitioner filed a complaint[6]with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondent and Aboitiz Shipping for recovery of disability benefits, and sick wage allowance and reimbursement of hospital and medical expenses. She also sought payment of moral damages and attorneys fees.After due proceedings, the labor arbiter rendered, on 08 January 1999,[7]judgment finding for petitioner and ordering respondent and Aboitiz Shipping to jointly and severally pay the former the following:(1)P119,536.01, representing reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses;(2)P9,000, representing reasonable cost of board and lodging;(3)P500,000, representing moral damages;(4)US$60,000, representing disability benefits corresponding to Total Permanent Disability;(5)US$2,452, representing Sick Wage allowance;(6)P62,853.60, representing attorneys fees; and,(7)US$6,245.20, also representing attorneys fees.On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision[8]dated 29 August 2000, modified that of the labor arbiter, as follows:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the extent that respondents Jebsen Maritime, Inc., and Aboitiz Shipping Company are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Gil delos Santos through Amelia delos Santos the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of US DOLLARS SIXTY THOUSAND (US$60,000.00) and US DOLLARS TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRD (sic) FIFTY TWO (US$2,452.00) representing total disability compensation benefits and sickness wages, and the amount of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND EGHT (sic) HUNDRED FOUR AND 87/100 PHILIPPINE PESOS (P103,804.87) representing reimbursement of surgical, medical and hospital expenses, plus the equivalent of five percent (5%) of the aggregate award as and for attorneys fees.All other dispositions are SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Like the labor arbiter, the NLRC predicated its ruling mainly on the theory that the POEA-approved contract of employment continued to govern Delos Santos employment when he contracted his illness. In specific terms, the NLRC states that the same contract was still effective when Delos Santos fell ill, thus entitling him to the payment of disability and like benefits provided in and required under the POEA-SEC.Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per NLRC Resolution[9]of 31 October 2000, respondent went to the Court of Appeals on a petition forcertiorari, thereat docketed asCA-G.R. No. 62229, imputing on the NLRC grave abuse of discretion. In its petition, respondent scored the NLRC for, among other things, extending the application of the expired POEA-approved employment contract beyond the one-month limit stipulated therein.On 21 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment[10], modifying the NLRCs decision by deleting altogether the award of disability compensation benefits, sickness wages and attorneys fees, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated August 29, 2000 and the Resolution of October 31, 2000 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that the disability compensation benefits of US$60,000.00 and the sickness wages of US$2,452.00 are hereby deleted, without prejudice to claiming the same from the proper government agency. The award of attorneys fees is likewise deleted.In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion per its resolution of 03 July 2002.[11]Hence, petitioners present recourse on the grounds that the Court of Appeals seriously erred:[12]IIN DELETING THE AWARD OF US$60,000.00 REPRESENTING THE MAXIMUM DISABILITY BENEFITS APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS HAS NOT YET BEEN TERMINATED, IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AND SECTION 18 (A), POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.(B) THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS ACCIDENT HAS NOT YET EXPIRED BECAUSE IT WAS MUTUALLY EXTENDED BY THE PARTIES WHEN DELOS SANTOS WAS NOT SIGNED OFF AND REPATRIATED PRIOR TO SAID ACCIDENT.IIIN CONCLUDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUATION OF DELOS SANTOS EMPLOYMENT ON BOARD THE SAME VESSEL AND UNDER THE SAME CONTRACT, IT IS THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, THAT SHALL GOVERN HIS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS.IIIIN DELETING THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2,452.00.(A) THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALOWANCE (sic) SINCE PAYMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM SICK LEAVE BENEFIT IS INDEPENDENT, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE SICKNESS ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.The petition is devoid of merit.As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties.[13]An employment with a period is generally valid, unless the term was purposely intended to circumvent the employees right to his security of tenure.[14]Absent a covering specific agreement and unless otherwise provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all employees in the private sector shall be governed by the Labor Code[15]and such rules and regulations as may be issued by the Department of Labor and Employment and such agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of the Code.The differing conclusions arrived at by the NLRC, finding for the herein petitioner, and the Court of Appeals, siding in part with the herein respondent, on Delos Santos entitlement to disability benefits and sickness allowance are veritably attributable to the question of applicability, under the premises, of the POEA-SEC. The principal issue to be resolved here, therefore, boils down to: which, between the POEA-SEC and the Labor Code, governs the employer-employee relationship between Delos Santos and respondent after MVWild Iris,as later renamedSuper RoRo 100,returned to the country from its one-month conduction voyage to and from Japan.The Court of Appeals ruled against the governing applicability of the POEA-SEC and, on that basis, deleted the NLRCs award of US$60,000.00 and US$2,452.00 by way of disability benefits and sickness allowance, respectively. An excerpt of the appellate courts explanation:xxx Both parties do not dispute the existence of the POEA approved contract signed by the parties. The said contract is the law between the contracting parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals, good policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the contracting parties(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001). The contract in question is for a duration of one (1) month. Being a valid contract between Delos Santos and the [respondent], the provisions thereof, specifically with respect to the one (1) month period of employment has the force of law between them(D.M. Consunji vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116572, December 18, 2000). Perforce, the said contract has already expired and is no longer in effect.The fact that Delos Santos continued to work in the same vessel which sailed within Philippine waters does not mean that the POEA standard employment contract continues to be enforced between the parties. The employment of Delos Santos is within the Philippines, and not on a foreign shore. As correctly pointed out by [respondent], the provisions of the Labor Code shall govern their employer-employee relationship. xxx. (Words in bracket added.)The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for two (2) main reasons. First, we the start with something elementary,i.e., POEA was created primarily to undertake a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices.[16]And to ensure that overseas workers, including seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, are amply protected, the POEA is authorized to formulate employment standards in accordance with welfare objectives of the overseas employment program.[17]Given this consideration, the Court is at a loss to understand why the POEA-SEC should be made to continue to apply to domestic employment, as here, involving a Filipino seaman on board an inter-island vessel.Just as basic as the first reason is the fact that Delos Santos POEA-approved employment contract was for a definite term of one (1) month only, doubtless fixed to coincide with the pre-determined one-month long Philippines-Japan-Philippines conduction-voyage run. After the lapse of the said period, his employment under the POEA-approved contract may be deemed asfunctus oficioand Delos Santos employment pursuant thereto considered automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired contract.[18]This is as it should be. For, as we have held in the landmark case ofMillares v. National Labor Relations Commission:[19]From the foregoing cases, it is clear thatseafarers areconsideredcontractual employees.Their employment is governed by the contracts they signevery time they are rehiredand their employment is terminated when the contract expires.Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 [of the Labor Code] whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking . . . We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitutestare decisiswith respect to the employment status of seafarers. (Underscoring and words in bracket added)Petitioners posture, citing Section 2 (A)[20]in relation to Section 18[21]of the POEA-SEC about the POEA approved contract still subsistingsinceDelos Santoswasnever signed off from the vessel and repatriated to Manila, the point of hire, is untenable. With the view we have of things, Delos Santos is deemed to have been signed off when he acceded to a new employment arrangement offered by the respondent. A seaman need not physically disembarked from a vessel at the expiration of his employment contract to have such contract considered terminated. And the repatriation aspect of the contract assumes significance only where the vessel remains in a foreign port. For, repatriation presupposes a return to ones country of origin or citizenship.[22]In the case at bar, however, there can be quibbling that MVWild Irisreturned to the port of Cebu with Delos Santos on board. Parenthetically, while the parties are agreed that their underlying contract was executed in the country, the records do not indicate what city or province of the Philippines is the specific point of hire. While petitioner says it is Manila, she did not bother to attach to her petition a copy of the contract of employment in question.Petitioner next submits, echoing the NLRCs holding, that the POEA-approved contract remained in full force and effect even after the expiry thereof owing to the interplay of the following circumstances: 1) Delos Santos, after such contract expiration, did not conclude another contract of employment with respondent, but was asked to remain and work on board the same vessel just the same; and 2) If the parties intended their employer-employee relationship to be under the aegis of a new contract, such intention should have been embodied in a new agreement.Contract extension or continuation by mutual consent appears to be petitioners thesis.We are not persuaded.The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed him to remain on board the vessel cannot plausibly be interpreted, in context, as evidencing an intention on its part to continue with the POEA-SEC. In the practical viewpoint, there could have been no sense in consenting to renewal since the rationale for the execution of the POEA-approved contract had already been served and achieved.At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that respondent consented to contract extension under the same terms and conditions prevailing when the original contract expired. Stated a bit differently, there are compelling reasons to believe that respondent retained the services of the acceding Delos Santos, as the Court of Appeals aptly observed, but under domestic terms and conditions. We refer first to the reduced salary of Delos Santos payable in Philippine peso[23]which, significantly enough, he received without so much of a protest. As respondent stated in itsComment,without any controverting response from petitioner, Delos Santos, for the period ending October 31, 1995, was drawing a salary at the rate ofP8,475.00 a month, whereas the compensation package stipulated under the POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613 basic monthly salary and a US$184 fixed monthly overtime pay. And secondly, MVSuper RoRo 100was no longer engaged in foreign trading as it was no longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it does not make sense why a seafarer of goodwill or a manning agency of the same disposition would insist on being regulated by an overseas employment agency under its standard employment contract, which governs employment of Filipino seamen on board ocean-going vessels.[24]Petitioners submission about the parties not having entered into another employment contract after the expiration of the POEA-approved employment contract,ergo,the extension of the expired agreement, is flawed by the logic holding it together. For, it presupposes that an agreement to do or to give does not bind, unless it is embodied in a written instrument. It is elementary, however, that, save in very rare instances where certain formal requisites go into its validity, a contract, to be valid and binding between the parties, need not be in writing. A contract is perfected when the contracting minds agree on the object and cause thereof.[25]And, as earlier discussed, several circumstantialindiciatendedtoprove that a new arrangement under domestic terms was agreed upon by the principal players to govern the employment of Delos Santos after the return of MVWild Iristo the country to engage in coastwise trading.Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the decision subject of review of the petitioners claim for maximum disability benefits and sickness allowance is legally correct. As it were, Delos Santos right to such benefits is predicated on the continued enforceability of POEA-SEC when he contracted his illness, which, needless to stress, was not the case.Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorneys fees, the NLRC having failed to explain petitioners entitlement thereto. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorneys fee remains the exception rather than the rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate court, that it is necessary for the trial court, the NLRC in this case, to make express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision.[26]The matter of attorneys fees cannot be touched once and only in thefalloof the decision, else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.[27]In the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.[28]They are not awarded every time a party wins a suit.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDand the assailedDecision and Resolution of the Court of AppealsAFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007PAUL V. SANTIAGO,petitioner,vs.CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the manning agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid reason but whose POEA-approved employment contract provides that the employer-employee relationship shall commence only upon the seafarers actual departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to relief?This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V. Santiago (petitioner) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.1Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years.2On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4 February 1998, the contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondents Vice President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV Seaspread," which reads:I received a phone call today from the wife of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their identity gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if allowed to depart will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.We do not want this to happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus in Japan.Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother when he was applying he behaved like a Saint but in his heart he was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will send his replacement.Kindly advise.3To this message the captain of "MSV Seaspread" replied:Many thanks for your advice concerning P. Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to return to Seaspread.4On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date.Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd.5The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all amounting to US$7, 209.00.The labor arbiter held respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29 January 1999 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby Ordered to pay complainant actual damages in the amount of US$7,209.00 plus 10% attorney's fees, payable in Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.All the other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.6On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorneys fees should be dismissed.7On the other hand, the NLRC found respondents decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative.8The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this wise:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated January 29, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION by VACATING the award of actual damages and attorneys fees as well as excluding Pacifico Fernandez as party respondent.SO ORDERED.9Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision but his motion was denied for lack of merit.10He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.In its Decision11dated 16 October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an ambiguity in the NLRCs Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiters Decision, because by the very modification introduced by the Commission (vacati