Kuziemko et al. (2015), 'How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution'.pdf

7252019 Kuziemko et al (2015) How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistributionpdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullkuziemko-et-al-2015-how-elastic-are-preferences-for-redistributionpdf 166

American Economic Review 2015 105(4) 1478ndash1508httpdxdoiorg101257aer20130360

How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution

Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments dagger

By I983148983161983137983150983137 K983157983162983145983141983149983147983151 M983145983139983144983137983141983148 I N983151983154983156983151983150 E983149983149983137983150983157983141983148 S983137983141983162

983137983150983140 S983156983141983142983137983150983145983141 S983156983137983150983156983139983144983141983158983137

We analyze randomized online survey experiments providing inter-active customized information on US income inequality the linkbetween top income tax rates and economic growth and the estatetax The treatment has large effects on views about inequality but onlyslightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences An exception is

the estate taxmdashinforming respondents of the small share of decedentswho pay it doubles support for it The small effects for all other pol-icies can be partially explained by respondentsrsquo low trust in govern-ment and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the

public policies meant to address them ( JEL D31 D72 H23 H24)

The past several decades have seen a large increase in income concentration in theUnited States While the top 1 percent of families captured 90 percent of total pre-tax income in 1970 that share rose to 224 percent by 20121 More recent work hasdocumented a corresponding trend for wealth concentration the top 01 percent shareof wealth has grown from 8 percent in the mid-1970s to 22 percent in 2012 (Saez andZucman 2014) These trends have not gone unnoticed at least by some The OccupyWall Street movement popularized the term ldquothe 1 percentrdquo Recently President

Obama has called ldquoa dangerous and growing inequalityrdquo the ldquodefining challenge ofour timerdquo a sentiment echoed by the CEO of Goldman Sachs who told an interviewerthat ldquotoo much of the GDP of the country has gone to too few of the peoplerdquo2

There is a large theoretical literature on the link between inequality and redistribu-tion The most widely used median-voter model predicts that a widening gap betweenthe average and the median income should lead to an increase in redistribution as



1479KUZIEMKO ET AL HOW ELASTIC ARE PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTIONVOL 105 NO 4

By contrast top income tax rates as well as inheritance tax rates have fallen in theUnited States during this period3 While for institutional reasons the policy viewsof the majority might be ignored by policymakers (Bartels 2009) even more chal-lenging to the modelrsquos predictions is that survey respondents themselves show noincreased demand for redistribution since the 1970s4 If anything the General Social

Survey shows that there has been a slight decrease in stated support for redistribu-tion in the United States since the 1970s even among those who self-identify ashaving below average income (see Figure 1) These trends have led commentatorsto suggest that US residents simply do not care about rising inequality5

There are alternative explanations Americans may be unaware of the extent orgrowth of inequality (see Kluegel and Smith 1986 and Norton and Ariely 2011)

35

4

45

5

55

G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d r e d

u c e i n c o m e d i f f e r e n c e s (

1 minus 7 )

1980 1990 2000 2010

All respondents Self-identified below average income

F983145983143983157983154983141 1 T983144983141 G983151983158983141983154983150983149983141983150983156 S983144983151983157983148983140 R983141983140983157983139983141 I983150983139983151983149983141 D983145983142983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155 (Scale from 1ndash7 GSS )

Notes This figure depicts responses since 1978 in the US General Social Survey (GSS) on whether the governmentshould reduce income differences The empty diamond series is for all respondents while the full circle series is forrespondents with below average income Regression fits are depicted for each series The graph uses the eqwlth vari-able from the GSS (though subtracts it from 8 so that it is increasing in support for redistribution)



1480 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2015

these explanations We conduct a series of randomized survey experiments using

Amazonrsquos Mechanical Turk (mTurk ) mTurk is a rapidly growing online platformthat can be used to carry out social and survey experiments (see Horton Rand andZeckhauser 2011 and Paolacci Chandler and Ipeirotis 2010) In our initial set ofexperiments comprising just over 4000 respondents one-half of respondents wererandomized into an ldquoomnibusrdquo treatment providing interactive personalized infor-mation on US income inequality the historical correlation between top income taxrates and economic growth and the incidence of the estate tax Both control and

treatment groups then reported their views on inequality redistributive policies andgovernment more generally We then conducted follow-up experiments with about6000 new respondents to analyze potential mechanisms behind the initial resultsfor a total of approximately 10000 respondents7

Our treatments exploit the flexibility of the mTurk platform to include severalfeatures that heighten the salience of the information we present First some ofthe information we present is customized For example we ask individuals their

household income allowing us to show them their place in the income distributionas well as their counterfactual income level had aggregate income growth since1980 been distributed more equally (so as to leave inequality unchanged) In otherparts of the survey we customize information based on respondentsrsquo own householdcomposition8 Second some of the information is interactivemdashfor example our sur-vey allows respondents to enter different household income levels and the softwaresurvey application provides the corresponding percentile so that the income distri-bution can be transparently explored

The initial survey experiment provides several findings we believe to be novelrelative to existing literature the first part of the paper provides a descriptive analy-sis of these results First we find that respondentsrsquo concern about inequality is veryelastic to information for example the treatment increases the share agreeing thatinequality is a ldquovery serious problemrdquo by over 35 percent Put differently the treat-

ment effect is equal to roughly 36 percent of the gap between self-identified liberalsand self-identified conservatives on this question By contrast while there are someeffects on policy preferences such as top income tax rates the minimum wage andfood stamps (always in the ldquoexpectedrdquo direction) they are small and often insignif-icant despite the large sample size

The only exception is the estate tax we find that providing information on the




The second half of the paper explores the mechanisms behind the large estate

tax effects and the muted response for any other policy outcome Of course otherexplanations may exist and as such we do not view our attempts to tease out themechanisms behind the main results as definitive Consistent with past work wefind that respondents are wildly misinformed about the share of decedents subject tothe estate tax which appears to account for the large effects We further show thatthe estate tax effect remains strong even when we take steps to decrease the salienceand emotional content of the information provided further proof that more informa-

tion on this issue has large effectsWe test three potential explanations for the small effects for other policies limited

trust in government an overly ldquoclinicalrdquo presentation of information and respon-dentsrsquo inability to connect their concerns on a given issue with the public policiesmeant to address it

The first potential explanation is that distrust in government inhibits respondentsfrom translating concern for inequality into support for redistribution by the gov-

ernment Several results from the original survey experiment point in this direc-tion First our initial treatment significantly decreases trust in government Whenreminded of the extent of inequality (which even control group respondents view asa problem) those in the treatment group appear to at least partially blame the gov-ernment perhaps thinking that if politicians ldquolet things get this badrdquo they cannot betrusted to fix it Second beyond any treatment effect the level of government trustamong our sample of mTurk respondents is very low over 89 percent agree thatldquoPoliticians in Washington work to enrich themselves and their largest campaigncontributors instead of working for the benefit of the majority of citizensrdquo with47 percent ldquostronglyrdquo agreeing It is thus perhaps not surprising that even when thetreatment increases respondentsrsquo concern with inequality they remain reluctant toincrease support for government redistributive policies

In a follow-up survey experiment we provide direct evidence for the effect of

trust in government on respondentsrsquo policy preferences We first asked a small pilotgroup to answer open-ended questions on their views of government the main themethat emerges is that politicians are believed to work to enrich themselves and theirwealthiest campaign donors We then used these answers to develop ldquoprimesrdquo (egasking respondentsrsquo opinions about lobbyists or the Wall Street bailout) that signifi-cantly lowered trust in government without significantly changing views about the




Besides distrust muting the policy effects of our treatment we explore two other

potential explanations for the small effects in the original survey experiment AsBrader (2005) and others argue policy preferences might respond more to emo-tional than factual appeals We thus develop a treatmentmdashagain interactive andcustomizedmdashdesigned to evoke empathy for households at the poverty line Just asin the initial survey experiment the treatment significantly increases respondentsrsquotendency to view inequality and poverty as ldquoserious problemsrdquo but has almost noeffect on policy preferences

We find more support for a third explanation the idea in Bartels (2005) that thepublic fails to connect concern for inequality with actual public policy measures Totest this idea we repeat much of the information in the ldquoemotional appealrdquo treat-ment but then show respondents concretely the resources provided to such fami-lies through government programs including the minimum wage and food stampsTherefore the treatment directly connects poverty and inequality with policiesmeant to address them Emphasizing this connection appears important treatment

respondents significantly increase their support for the minimum wage as well asmost of the poverty-alleviation programs that we survey We view this result aspotentially complementary to the trust results given the low baseline levels of trustit appears to be the case that policy preferences can only be moved if respondentsare explicitly reminded of efficacious examples of government intervention

We believe our findings make several contributions to the understanding of howindividuals formmdashand changemdashtheir redistributive preferences Compared to mostinformational interventions that merely provide a fixed set of facts to respondentsour informational treatments were interactive and customizedmdashwhile perhapsnot providing a strict upper bound on the effects of information on preferencesour results do suggest that most policy preferences are hard to move This findingechoes Luttmer and Singhal (2011) that redistributive preferences may have ldquocul-turalrdquo determinants that are very stable over time

Our results also highlight the potential role of mistrust of government in limit-ing the publicrsquos enthusiasm for policies they would otherwise appear to support asubject that has garnered limited attention in the economics literature An exceptionis Sapienza and Zingales (2013) who find that a major reason respondents supportauto fuel standards over a gasoline-tax-and-rebate scheme is not because they mis-understand the incidence of fuel standards but because they simply do not trust the




Luttmer 2001) Singhal (2008) uses OECD survey data to show that people do not

necessarily favor low tax rates at income levels close to theirs suggesting that redis-tributive preferences are not completely determined by self-interest

As in our paper some researchers have estimated the effects of randomizedinformational treatments on policy preferences10 The evidence from these effortsis mixed Sides (2011) finds that providing information on the very small numberof individuals affected by the estate tax drastically decreases support for its repealresults that we replicate with our data Cruces Perez-Truglia and Tetaz (2013) find

that showing poor individuals their actual place in the income distribution increasestheir support for policies that target poverty as most overestimate their income Onthe other hand Kuklinski et al (2003) find that providing (accurate) information onthe demographic composition of welfare recipients and the share of the federal bud-get dedicated to welfare payments has no effect on respondentsrsquo preferences despitethe fact that their initial beliefs are wildly incorrect11 We examine a wide variety ofredistributive policy outcomes indeed we find that the responsiveness of views on

the estate tax appears to be an outlier and other outcomes suggest a far more modesteffect of information on redistributive preferences

As noted our research is part of a small but growing set of papers using onlineplatforms Researchers have used these platformsmdashmost often mTurkmdashto haverespondents play public goods games (eg Rand and Nowak 2011 Suri and Watts2010) interact in online labor markets (Amir Rand and Gal 2012 Horton Randand Zeckhauser 2011) or simply answer non-experimental survey questions onviews about policy and social preferences (Weinzierl 2012 Saez and Stantcheva2013) We summarize our experience conducting survey experiments on mTurkin the online methodological Appendix which we hope can be of use to futureresearchers utilizing this platform

The paper proceeds as follows Section I introduces the initial survey instrumentand data collection procedures Section II describes the data Section III presents the

main results of the survey experiment In Section IV we explore mechanisms behindthe large effects of information on views about the estate tax and why most othereffects were so limited reporting methods and results from four follow-up surveyexperiments Finally in Section V we suggest directions for future work and offerconcluding thoughts All our online surveys data and programs are available in theonline Appendix




typical demographic questions as well as political leanings (ii) randomized treat-

ment providing information on inequality and tax policy (shown solely to the treat-ment group) and (iii) questions on views on inequality tax and transfer policiesand government more generally12

A Data Collection

Surveys were openly posted on mTurk with a description stating that the survey

paid $150 for approximately 15 minutes ie a $6 hourly wage Respondents werefree to drop out any time or take up to one hour to answer all questions As a com-parison the average effective wage on mTurk according to Amazon is around $480per hour and most tasks on mTurk are short (less than one hour)13

Several steps were taken to ensure the validity of the results First there are manyforeign workers on mTurk especially from Asia In addition to requiring respon-dents to confirm their US residency on the consent form we also had Amazon show

the survey only to workers who had US addresses Second to further discourageforeign workers we tried to launch our surveys during East Coast daylight hours(and to reduce heterogeneity only on workdays) Third to exclude robots onlyworkers with a past completion rate of at least 90 percent were allowed to take thesurvey Fourth as our survey comprises many rounds we screen out workers whohad participated in a previous round of the survey Fifth respondents were told thatpayment would be contingent on completing the survey and providing a passwordvisible only at completion Finally to discourage respondents from skipping mind-lessly through the pages pop-up windows with an encouragement to answer allquestions appeared as prompts whenever a question was left blank

B The Omnibus Information Treatment

In general the goal of the information treatments was to provide a large ldquoshockrdquoto individualsrsquo knowledge about inequality and redistributive policies rather than toprovide a PhD-level nuanced discussion about say the underlying causes of inequal-ity or the trade-off between equality and efficiency Hence some of the treatments wedisplay will seem overly simplified to an economics audience but it should be kept inmind that our goal in the initial experiment is to test whether any treatment can move




distributionmdashthey were asked to find the median and the ninetieth and ninety-ninth

percentiles and were encouraged to ldquoplay aroundrdquo with the application OnlineAppendix Figure 2 presents a screen shot14

The second part focused not on the current distribution but a counterfactualrespondents entered their current income and were then shown what they ldquowouldhave maderdquo had economic growth since 1980 been evenly shared across the incomedistribution (ie had the level of inequality stayed the same as in 1980) Of coursethis exercise abstracts away from the trade-off between efficiency (economic

growth) and equality that would certainly exist at very high levels of taxation Theinteractive application allowed them to find this counterfactual value for any pointof the current income distribution Online Appendix Figure 4 presents a screen shot

The third part of the treatment focused on redistributive policies To emphasizethat higher income taxes on the well-off need not always lead to slower economicgrowth we presented respondents a figure showing that at least as a raw correlationeconomic growth measured by average real pre-tax income per family from tax

return data has been slower during periods with low top tax rates (1913ndash1933 and1980ndash2010) than with high top tax rates (1933ndash1980) Online Appendix Figure 3presents a screen shot Similarly we also presented a slide on the estate tax empha-sizing that it currently only affects the largest 01 percent of estates and that it favorsintergenerational mobility Online Appendix Figure 4 shows a screen shot

Readers can directly experience these informational treatments online at thelink below15 We describe the additional treatments in the follow-up surveys inSection IV

II Data

A Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows characteristics of the sample who completed the omnibus treat-ment survey rounds (we discuss attrition below) We compare these summary sta-tistics to a nationally representative sample of US adults contacted by a ColumbiaBroadcasting Company (CBS) poll in 2011 which we choose both because it wasconducted around the same time as our surveys and asks very similar questions16 We also compare it to a more representative (though far more expensive) online




Our sample is younger more educated and has fewer minorities It is more lib-eral with a higher fraction reporting having supported President Obama in the 2008presidential election18

Table 2 shows summary statistics on demographic and policy views for self-re-ported liberals (column 1) and conservatives (column 2) from our control group(so that responses are not contaminated by the information treatment) as well asthe entire control group (column 3) As expected conservatives are older morewhite and more likely to be married They prefer lower taxes on the rich and aless generous safety net Such contrasts are useful to scale the magnitude of our

effects We will often discuss treatment effects both in absolute terms and as apercentage of the liberal-versus-conservative differences reported in Table 2 Forconvenience we refer to this difference as the ldquopolitical gaprdquo for a given outcomevariable

B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137

mTurk sample CBS election poll American Life Panel

(1) (2) (3)

Male 0428 0476 0417Age 3541 4899 4894White (non-Hispanic) 0778 0739 0676Black 00756 0116 0109Hispanic 00444 00983 0180Other racialethnic group 00759 00209 00410

Employed (full or part) 0465 0587 0557Unemployed 0123 0104 0103Married 0397 0594 0608Has college degree 0433 0318 0309Voted for Obama 0675 0555 0559Political views conservatives (1) to liberals (3)

2176 1586

Observations 3741 808 1002

Notes This table displays summary statistics from our mTurk omnibus surveys in column 1 along with (weighted)

averages based on a 2011 CBS news survey in column 2 and RANDrsquos online American Life Panel (ALP) in col-umn 3 We are grateful to Ray Fisman for providing us with summary statistics from the ALP



1487 KUZIEMKO ET AL HOW ELASTIC ARE PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTIONVOL 105 NO 4

the control group Therefore a key concern is differential attrition between those

assigned to the treatment versus control arms As the final row of Table 2 showsattrition is higher among the treatment group (20 percent versus 9 percent for thecontrol group)19

Importantly however conditional on finishing the survey assignment to treatmentappears randomly assigned That is while the treatment induces attrition overall itdoes not induce certain groups to differentially quit the survey more than others

T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155

Liberals Conservatives All

(1) (2) (3)

Male 0407 0472 0422Age 32618 39823 35557White 0752 0838 0776Black 0090 0063 0085Hispanic 0039 0027 0037Asian 0090 0053 0078Married 0302 0543 0402Has college degree 0462 0455 0430Unemployed 0140 0076 0121Not in labor force 0093 0208 0144Voted for Obama in 2008 0914 0303 0674Inequality has increased 0836 0615 0738Inequality is a very serious problem 0414 0129 0285Top tax rate 34181 23996 30205Increase millionaire tax 0904 0452 0740Increase estate tax 0254 0080 0171

Increase min wage 0822 0496 0690Support food stamps 0850 0446 0686Support EITC 0722 0418 0611Trust government 0171 0148 0158Scope of government is broad 3552 2349 3076Said would petition for higher income taxes

(early rounds only)0288 0118 0238

Send petition for high estate tax 0305 0141 0234Plan to vote Democrat 2012 0800 0182 0529Observations 821 475 1976

Notes This table displays summary statistics based on control respondents from the omnibus surveys stratified byself-reported liberal versus conservative status (on a five-point scale very liberal liberal moderate conservativevery conservative) Column 1 is for liberals (less than 3 on the scale) while column 2 is for conservatives (more than3 on the scale) Column 3 shows summary statistics for the entire control group including the ldquocenter of the roadrdquorespondents The complete wording of these survey questions is reported in the online Appendix




point-estimates have opposite signs it does not seem that say minorities systemat-ically attrit from the sample if they are assigned to the treatment

While we will control for these covariates as well as perform additionalchecks of attrition in the analysis that follows it is reassuring to see that con-ditional on finishing the survey there does not appear to be a discernible patternin the types of respondents assigned to treatment We are quite fortunate in thisregard as one might have expected that groups predisposed against reading aboutinequalitymdashperhaps conservatives or wealthier peoplemdashwould have been ldquoturnedoffrdquo by the treatment and differentially attritted The follow-up surveys discussedin Sections IV have essentially zero differential attrition by treatment status (seeonline Appendix Table 3) most likely because the treatments in the follow-up sur-veys are much shorter (making the treatment and control arms of the survey muchcloser in length)

T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value

Voted for Obama in 2008 0003 0856Age minus0001 0479Liberal policy view 0002 0751Household income 0005 0109Married minus0013 0434Education minus0003 0575Male 0013 0447

Black minus0066 0031Hispanic 0091 0021Native minus0043 0201Employed full time minus0012 0502Unemployed 0015 0539Not in labor force 0021 0376Student minus0027 0235

Notes For each row the coefficient and p -value are from regressions of the form Assigned to treatmen t ir = α + β Covariat e i + δr + ϵir where Covariate is listed to the left

in the row and δr are survey round fixed effects Those tests are used to detect selective attri-tion (as treatment respondents are approximately ten percentage points less likely to completethe omnibus survey than are control respondents see online Appendix Table 3) If we regresstreatment status jointly on all covariates and survey round fixed effects we obtain a p-value for

joint significance of 012




fixed effects while even-numbered columns include standard controls (essentiallythose listed in Table 3)21

Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the treatment is associated with a 10-percent-age-point (or 36 percent) increase in the share agreeing that inequality is a ldquovery seri-

ousrdquo problem Similarly dividing the point-estimate by the ldquopolitical gaprdquo (ie theliberal-conservative control group difference for the outcome variable) suggests thatthe treatment effect is equal to 36 percent of the political gap on this question (equalto 38 points in Table 2) While a convenient scaling dividing by the political gap ishardly a perfect metricmdashwhile political views are highly predictive of many of ouroutcomes this tendency varies and therefore some questions have larger political gapsthan others We thus report both the absolute and scaled effects for all regressionsAdding covariates in column 2 has no effect on the estimated treatment effect

The effects on the outcome ldquodid inequality increase since 1980rdquo are presented incolumns 3 and 4 and are even larger both in absolute percentage points and when scaledby the political gap (54 percent of the conservative-liberal difference) likely becausethe informational treatment presented information directly related to the question

T983137983138983148983141 4mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983152983145983150983145983151983150983155 983137983138983151983157983156 I983150983141983153983157983137983148983145983156983161(ldquoFirst-Stagerdquo outcomes)

Inequality very serious Inequality increased Rich deserving

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Treated 0102 0104 0119 0120 minus00500 minus00526[00154] [00144] [00130] [00128] [00119] [00114]

Control mean 0285 0285 0738 0738 0180 0180Scaled effect 0357 0365 0539 0540 0173 0182

Covariates No Yes No Yes No YesObservations 3703 3703 3704 3704 3690 3690

Notes The three outcome variables are binary indicator variables coded as one if the respondent says that ldquoinequal-ity is a very serious problemrdquo ldquoinequality has increasedrdquo and ldquothe rich are deserving of their incomerdquo respectivelyAll regressions have round fixed effects even those labeled as including ldquonordquo covariates Controls for covariatesfurther include all variables in the randomization table (Table 3) plus state-of-residence fixed effects ldquoScaledeffectrdquo is the coefficient on Treated divided by the difference between control group liberals and conservatives Therow ldquoControl meanrdquo reports the mean of the outcome variable for the entire control group

Significant at the 1 percent level

Significant at the 5 percent level Significant at the 10 percent level




Overall our omnibus treatment generated a very strong ldquofirst stagerdquo significantlyshifting views about inequality and its increase in recent decades

B Views on Public Policy

Table 5 presents results for questions related to income and estate taxation Thefirst two columns report results from the two questions on income taxationmdashacontinuous variable asking respondents to choose an ideal average tax rate for therichest 1 percent and a categorical variable asking them whether taxes on million-aires should be raisedmdashshow statistically significant effects of the treatment inthe ldquoexpectedrdquo direction22 However these magnitudes are small equal to about10 percent of the liberal-conservative gap in both cases For example the treatmentincreases the preferred top 1 percent average tax rate by 093 percentage pointswhereas the gap between liberals and conservatives on this question is slightly over10 percentage points (see Table 2) Hence we can rule out an effect on the tax ratefor the top 1 percent larger than 20 percent of the liberal conservative gap

T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155

Top rate $1M tax Estate Petition Min wage Trust Scope Dem 2012

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]

Control mean 3021 0740 0171 0234 0690 0158 3076 0529Scaled effect 00914 0111 2043 0394 00995 1250 0110 00246Observations 3741 3704 3673 3060 3690 3702 3704 3703

Notes ldquoTop raterdquo is continuous (respondentsrsquo preferred average tax rate (in percent) on the richest 1 percent)ldquoScoperdquo is also continuous (a 1ndash5 variable increasing in the preferred scope of government activities) All other vari-ables are binary ldquo$1M taxrdquo and ldquoEstaterdquo indicate the respondent wants income taxes on millionaires and the estatetax to increase respectively ldquoPetitionrdquo indicates she would write her Senator to increase the estate tax ldquoMin wagerdquoindicates support for increasing the minimum wage ldquoTrustrdquo indicates trust in government and ldquoDem 2012rdquo indicatesthe respondent plans to vote for the Democrat (Obama) in the 2012 presidential election ldquoCovariatesrdquo and ldquoscaledeffectsrdquo are as specified in the notes to Table 4 The row ldquoControl meanrdquo reports the mean of the outcome variable inthe control group All regressions in this and subsequent tables include control variables as defined in Table 4

Significant at the 1 percent level Significant at the 5 percent level Significant at the 10 percent level




tax treatment matter (a purely clinical information treatment with no emotional com-

ponent increases support by 50 percent instead of more than doubling it)A common critique of survey experiments that find large effects on opinion isthat one cannot know how these effects impact actual behavior We try to partiallybridge this gap by asking individuals whether they would send a petition to their USsenator asking either to raise or lower the estate tax We provided a link to senatorsrsquoe-mails and also provided sample messages both for and against raising estate taxesWe then asked if the respondent would send a petition for higher taxes a petition

against higher taxes or nothing at allWe report these results in column 4 The treatment significantly increases the pro-

pensity of respondents to say they would petition their US senator to raise the estatetax (though not surprisingly this effect is smaller than the pure opinion questionsuggesting attenuation from belief to action) Naturally we recognize that we musttake respondentsrsquo word that they will send the e-mail and thus this outcome is notas concrete as for example knowing with certainty how they would vote in the next

election At the very least this result confirms the strong effect of the treatment onviews about the estate tax As mentioned we probe later on the robustness of thisresult and offer some thoughts on why it is so different from the income tax Fornow we merely note that these large results serve to dismiss a potential explanationof why the income tax results were so smallmdashthat there is something inherent in themTurk experience that mutes respondentsrsquo policy responses

While so far we have focused on policies that affect the well-off we also asked a

series of questions about policies that impact the bottom of the income distributionWhile the treatment induces significant but small (less than 10 percent of the politi-cal gap) effects for the minimum wage (column 5) it induces no significant increasein support for food stamps or the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (results reportedin online Appendix Table 4)23 The results thus suggest a contrast between directtransfer policies such as the EITC and food stamps and indirect transfer policiessuch as the minimum wage a theme that will also emerge in some of the follow-upwork discussed in the next section24

C Views of Government and Political Involvement

Columns 6 8 of Table 5 reports results on the effect of the treatment on opinions




in the opposite direction to the other outcomes in that it makes respondents take

the more conservativemdashand less trustingmdashview on this question26

Note also thatconsistent with the trends noted in the introduction the control group has a verylow level of trust in governmentmdashonly about 16 percent are trusting of governmentby our definitionmdashand that the contrast of liberals and conservatives about trustinggovernment is fairly small (17 versus 145 percent see Table 2) The low baselinelevel of trust in the control group suggests that the treatment effect we observe mightin fact understate the true effect experienced by the treatment group as their ability

to express an even lower opinion of government is limited by floor effectsThe second question assesses respondentsrsquo preferred scope of government

ldquoNext think more broadly about the purpose of government Where would you rateyourself on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means you think the government should doonly those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions and5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can totry and improve the lives of its citizensrdquo27 Intriguingly the treatment significantly

moves people toward wanting a more active government (column 7 of Table 5)Providing information about the growth of inequality and the ability of the govern-ment to raise taxes and redistribute have complicated effects on views of govern-ment It appears to make respondents see more areas of society where governmentintervention may be needed but simultaneously make them trust government lessWe return to these results linking trust in government to preferences on governmentscope in Section IV

Finally as shown in column 8 the treatment has almost no effect on respon-dentsrsquo planned voting choice for the 2012 presidential elections (recall that theomnibus-treatment surveys were completed before the November 2012 election)There is at best a marginal effect in the direction of supporting President ObamaThis result is consistent with the relatively mild policy effects overall The treatmentmay simultaneously make individuals want the more redistributive policies of theDemocratic party and distrust the party in power (the Democrats under Obama atleast in the executive branch and the Senate)28

D Robustness Checks

Persistence of Effects Before mTurk recontacting survey respondents was




The evidence from the few papers that do test persistence is not encouraging

Luskin Fishkin and Jowell (2002) find that even the immediate effects of anextreme interventionmdashin which British participants spent a weekend with expertswith the goal of debunking misconceptions about crime and prison policymdashdo notpersist ten months later Indeed in a similarly intense intervention focused on issuesrelated to campaign finance Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that their resultsdissipate within ten days While not a survey experiment per se Gerber et al (2011) use variation in the location of campaign television advertising to show that per-

suasive effects are strong the week the ad airs but have little persistence beyond thefirst week Perhaps closest to our methodology Lecheler and Vreese (2011) sampleDutch respondents to test for the effect of informational treatments on opinionsabout economic aid to Bulgaria and Romania while the treatment effect persistedafter one week it was insignificant after two

The flexibility of the mTurk platform offers the possibility of resurveying partici-pants months after the original survey In the third round of the omnibus survey we

attempted to recontact respondents one month after taking the survey Out of 1039respondents who completed the original survey 145 (14 percent) completed thefollow-up survey The follow-up survey asked most of the outcome questions in theoriginal survey but did not include the informational treatment

With a relatively low take-up rate a concern is that follow-up respondents aredifferentially selected Online Appendix Table 7 suggests that while some selec-tion takes place (by age marital status and employment status) the most important

variables in terms of predicting preferences (support of Obama and overall liberal-versus-conservative policy views) show no differential selection into the follow-upsample Nor does initial treatment status predict take-up and thus we have a roughlyequal number of control and treatment observations in the follow-up sample

We compare the original results for these 145 observations to their responses onemonth later for selected outcomes in Table 6 and for all other outcomes in onlineAppendix Tables 8 and 9 As only some outcomes show a substantial initial treat-ment effect for the N = 145 subsample it is not feasible to have meaningful testsof persistence for all outcomes

Columns 1 and 2 show that our most robust outcome result from the original sur-veymdashsupport for increasing the estate taxmdashis strongly persistent In absolute terms58 percent of the effect size remains one month later more than doubling the share




treatment effects for the subsample We thus relegate the follow-up results for allthese outcomes to online Appendix Tables 8 and 9

Overall the follow-up analysis shows once again that the estate tax emerges asthe policy most robustly and significantly affected by our omnibus treatment

Bounding the Effects of Differential AttritionmdashWhile we showed in Table 3 that

conditional on finishing the survey assignment to the treatment appears as good asrandom here we further probe the potential effects of attrition To conduct a bound-ing exercise we assume either that (i) attriters would have all had the average ldquolib-eralrdquo view for each outcome or (ii) they would have had the average ldquoconservativerdquoview for each outcome Given that attrition does not actually vary by political views(see online Appendix Table 2) but outcome values vary substantially by politicalviews (see Table 2) this test should provide generous upper bounds on the potentialeffects of attrition The results in online Appendix Table 10 shows that no signsflip for any of our main outcome variables under either the conservative (columnslabeled ldquoCrdquo) or liberal (columns labeled ldquoLrdquo) attrition assumptions

Next we examine how the level of differential attrition affects our results doour results only hold in survey rounds with high differential attrition between the

T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment

Inequality veryserious

First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0337 0195 0259 0364 minus0122 minus00691 000833 0102[00953] [00910] [0207] [0200] [00611] [00582] [00809] [00770]

Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145

Notes All outcomes and terms are as defined in Tables 4 and 5 For each dependent variable column ldquoFirstrdquo is theresult from the first survey while column ldquoFollow-uprdquo is the result from the follow-up survey one month after theinitial survey We use a more limited set of control variables given the small sample size All regressions are run onthe subsample of respondents who entirely completed the follow up survey





Appendix Table 3) The fact that these follow-up surveys largely confirm our omni-

bus treatment results provides further reassurance that differential attrition is notdriving our results

Robustness Across RoundsmdashAs our rounds took place at different dates with dif-ferent stories dominating the news cycle we might worry that the treatment effectsare being driven by a single round We verified that dropping rounds one by one doesnot change the sign or significance of the main results

Survey FatiguemdashFinally ldquosurvey fatiguerdquo would not seem to explain our resultsFor example the question ldquois inequality a serious problemrdquo comes before top taxrates which precedes the estate tax question our strongest effect Therefore there isno monotonic relationship between the strength of the treatment effect and the orderof the outcome variables

Experimenter Demand EffectsmdashA potential bias that is more difficult to measureis differential experimenter demand effectsmdashperhaps it is the case that a variablesuch as ldquoinequality is a serious problemrdquo is more susceptible to demand effectsthan concrete policy questions such as ldquopreferred top income tax ratesrdquo An indirecttest is to examine gender differences by outcome variable as women appear morelikely to give the ldquodesiredrdquo answer (see eg Bernardi 2006 Dalton and Ortegren2011 and citations therein) We find very small gender differences overall and no

pattern whereby they are larger for women for the ldquofirst-stagerdquo outcomes (resultsavailable upon request) Recent work argues that demand effects are likely mutedwith Internet surveys (see eg Kreuter Presser and Tourangeau 2008 and GelderBretveld and Roeleveld 2010)

IV Understanding Our Results with Follow-up Surveys

The follow-up surveys share the following structure While we repeated mostof the outcome questions used in the omnibus surveys there are some differences(based on input from referees and others) For example we ask respondents toreport whether ldquopoverty is a serious problemrdquo as well as rank ldquoprivate charityrdquo andldquoeducationrdquo in a list of tools to address inequality (so as to gauge whether respon




outcomes are reported in the online Appendix for each treatment Importantly in this

section we use data solely from the follow-up surveys because the control groupsin the omnibus survey and the follow-up surveys are not directly comparable andbecause the wording of some of the questions has changed

Section A explores why the estate tax appears to be an anomaly first verifyingthat the effect is robust to changes in presentation and then measuring the pure infor-mational impact of our treatment Section B explores potential mechanisms for whymost other policies are more impervious to informational interventions

A Why Are Views about the Estate Tax So Elastic to Information

In this section we present two types of follow-up analysis on the estate tax Firstwe verify whether the estate tax treatment effectmdashan outlier among the policy out-comes analyzed in the previous sectionmdashis truly robust After showing that it with-stands several significant modifications of the treatment we then present evidence

as to why this effect is so strong Our view is that misinformation about the estatetax is far greater than for the other policies we surveyed such that the informationaltreatment has an especially large impact32

Verifying the Large Estate Tax EffectsmdashRecall that the omnibus treatmentincludes not only information about the incidence of the estate tax but several othercomponents as well (eg the interactive feature showing respondentsrsquo place in the

income distribution among the others we described in Section I) To gauge thesensitivity of the estate tax effect to this additional information we redid the experi-ment with a treatment that only included the slide on the estate tax Furthermore theoriginal estate tax treatment shows a picture of a mansion and notes that the estatetax can help ldquolevel the playing fieldrdquo (see online Appendix Figure 4) We thus for-mulated a treatment that decreased the emotional impact of the estate tax treatmentand that only mentions the incidence in dry factual terms (see online AppendixFigure 6) We call the first version the ldquoemotional estate tax treatmentrdquo and the sec-ond the ldquoneutral estate tax treatmentrdquo Again neither of these treatments containsthe other non-estate-tax components of the omnibus treatment

Table 7 displays results for the key outcome variables In contrast to the omni-bus treatment the ldquoemotionalrdquo estate tax treatment has no effect on views about




treatmentrdquo is nearly as large as that of the omnibus treatment (0289 versus 0357)

The ldquoneutralrdquo effect is smaller (0109) though both in absolute and scaled termsswamps any policy effect (excluding the estate tax itself ) associated with the omni-bus treatment Recall that the omnibus treatment provided extensive interactive andpersonalized information on income inequality and income tax rates and typicallyproduced scaled effects on the income tax outcomes of 10 percent The ldquoneutralrdquoestate tax treatment consisted of a total of four sentences but nonetheless produceda scaled effect on the estate tax four times as large (408 percent of the liberal-conservative gap) This stark contrast highlights how much more elastic to infor-mation views about the estate tax are than those about the income tax and otherpolicies

As shown in column 5 both treatments make respondents more likely to saythey will petition their senator (scaled effects greater than 0 2) but this effect is not

T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161

Inequalityvery serious

Inequalityincreased Deserving

Estatetax Petition Trust

Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Treated (emotional) 00381 minus000239 minus00247 0289 00313 minus00164 0316[00258] [00243] [00206] [00258] [00208] [00205] [00263]

Treated (neutral) 00511 minus00501 minus00244 0109 00239 minus000558 0375[00259] [00244] [00206] [00259] [00209] [00205] [00264]

Control mean 0307 0771 0174 0210 0132 0153 0120Scaled emotional effect 0118 0011 0098 1085 0265 0235 3386Scaled neutral effect 0159 0223 0097 0408 0202 0080 4014 p-value 0612 0049 0991 0000 0722 0598 0026Observations 1777 1777 1777 1777 1762 1756 1773

Notes The ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment repeats the estate tax slide from the omnibus treatment but eliminates the rest ofthe treatment The ldquoneutralrdquo treatment is a version of the ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment that attempts to remove any fram-ing effects or emotional appeals to focus solely on the information The outcomes in columns 1ndash6 are as defined

in Tables 4 and 5 (ldquoDeservingrdquo is the abbreviation for ldquothe rich are deserving of their incomerdquo) ldquoEstate tax corrrdquoindicates that the respondent chose the correct multiple-choice outcome for a question asking what share of peoplewho die are subject to the estate tax p-value is the p-value of the test that the coefficients on the treated ldquoemotionalrdquoand the treated ldquoneutralrdquo are the same





estate tax is very salient to respondentsmdashin 2010 Gallup respondents named avert-

ing an increase in the estate tax as their top priority for the lame-duck session ofCongress above extending unemployment benefits and the Bush income tax cuts34 Moreover there were no more ldquomissingrdquo responses on the estate tax question thanon other policy questions in the control group further evidence that the estate tax isnot an obscure issue to respondents in our sample

A more promising explanation is that while respondents may view the estatetax as a salient issue they may hold misinformed views on the topic Indeed as

documented by Slemrod (2006) 82 percent of respondents favor estate tax repealbut 49 percent of respondents believe that most families have to pay it compared to31 percent who believe only a few families have to pay and 20 percent who admitto not knowing In contrast the public appears much better informed about policiessuch as the minimum wage or the individual income tax35 As a result providingbasic information on how the current federal estate tax is limited to the very wealth-iest families might serve as a large informational shock

We directly tested this hypothesis by adding a question on the incidence of theestate tax to the follow-up surveys Respondents were asked to choose the share ofdecedents subject to the estate tax from among the following percentage optionsless then 1 1 10 20 40 60 and 100 percent If anything the greater detail offeredfor choices below 20 percent would seem to tip off respondents that the answer isa small number but only 12 percent of control group respondents answered cor-rectly (random guessing would be correct 14 percent of the time) and accuracy

varied substantially by political orientation (16 percent of liberals versus 6 percentof conservatives)

Column 7 of Table 7 shows the effect of the two estate tax treatments on respon-dentsrsquo likelihood to choose the correct response Both treatments roughly triplethe likelihood of answering correctly strongly suggesting that information is a keymechanism behind the large effects of the omnibus treatment36 Importantly misin-formation is not a sufficient condition for an informational treatment to have largeeffects As noted earlier Kuklinski et al (2003) found that correcting substantiallymisinformed views on welfare was not sufficient to change respondentsrsquo supportthough perhaps the lack of elasticity is due to the racial stereotypes the world ldquowel-farerdquo brings to mind (Gilens 1996) The estate tax may be one of a few issues onwhich voters are highly misinformed but their ignorance is not linked to racial or




B Exploring the Limited Treatment Effects on Policy Preferences

We explore three potential explanations for why the omnibus treatment had smallpolicy-preference effects (aside from the estate tax) Of course other explanationsmay exist so one should not view our analysis of the mechanisms behind the policyldquonon-resultsrdquo as definitive or exhaustive

Does Government Distrust Explain Limited Treatment Effectsmdash As documented

in Section III the omnibus treatment significantly reduces trust in government Itis perhaps not surprising that an informational treatment emphasizing a dramaticincrease in income inequality would lower respondentsrsquo view of government Butto our knowledge it remains an open question whether lowering trust in governmenthas a causal effect on policy preferences This question has perhaps never been morerelevant in the US context given that Americansrsquo trust in government is at histori-cally low levels as noted in the introduction

To test the causal effect of trust in government on policy preferences we devised atreatment that lowers trust but does not affect views on other factors that might affectpolicy preferences This task is not easymdashas we saw with the omnibus treatmentinformation about inequality reduces trust in government but also increases concernabout inequality meaning the omnibus treatment effects on the policy outcomes arethe joint effect of increasing concern about inequality (which we hypothesize wouldincrease support for government action) and reducing trust in government (which

we hypothesize would decrease it)We began by collecting a small pilot study ( N asymp 150) on mTurk where we asked

people to answer our basic trust question (how often they can trust the government todo what is right) but then to explain why they answered the way they did Note thatthey answer this question directly after answering the demographic questions andare thus not being primed to think about inequality There is no ldquotreatmentrdquo in thispilotmdashwe are merely asking people to explain their opinion The pilot group castlight into why trust in government is currently so low Respondents feel politiciansare out to enrich themselves and their wealthiest donors ldquoMoneyrdquo ldquocorporationsrdquoand ldquospecial interestsrdquo are some of the most commonly used words and phrases inthese answers as online Appendix Figure 7 shows The detailed descriptions givenby respondents allowed us to develop primes we thought could lower trust in gov




respondentsrsquo stated trust in government by 58 percentage points in absolute terms or178 times the liberal-conservative gap on this question This effect is slightly largerthan the effect of the omnibus treatment (roughly 11 times the liberal-conservativegap) not surprising given that the goal of this treatment was to lower trust As wesaw with the omnibus treatment respondents appear to separate how much they

trust the government with what they view as its proper scope as the treatment has noeffect on that outcome (column 2) The treatment makes them more likely to viewthe government as wasteful but the effect is not significant (column 3)

Columns 4ndash6 suggest that we were largely successful in devising a treatment thatisolates the effect of trust at least with respect to our standard questions on incomeinequality and poverty There is a marginal effect of the treatment in increasing con-cern about inequality but no effect on the sense inequality has increased or the sense

that poverty is a problem The results from the omnibus treatment suggest that ifanything the uptick in concern about inequality should have a mildly positive effecton treatment respondentsrsquo tendency to support redistributive policies As such itwould mask the effects of decreasing trust in government on support for redistribu-tive policies which we hypothesize to be negative

T983137983138983148983141 8mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 ldquoF983145983154983155983156-S983156983137983143983141rdquo V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155

Trust Scope EfficientInequality very

seriousInequalityincreased

Poverty versusserious

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Treated minus00582 00236 minus00278 00547 00119 minus000257[00203] [00688] [00346] [00311] [00289] [00313]

Control mean 0125 3031 1423 0343 0755 0383Scaled trust effect 1730 00170 0109 0182 0341 000828Observations 899 899 898 899 899 899

Notes The negative trust prime treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that made respondentsreflect on aspects of government they dislike For outcomes ldquoEfficientrdquo is taken from a 1ndash3 scale of how muchrespondents think the government wastes money (we ldquofliprdquo it so that it is increasing with perceived government effi-ciency) ldquoPoverty very seriousrdquo is an indicator variable for whether the respondent views poverty as a very seriousproblem All other outcomes are as defined previously





support) Column 8 shows the treatment causes respondents to elevate a nongovern-mental solution to inequalitymdashprivate charity which as noted at the beginning ofthe Section is generally preferred by more conservative respondents

DiscussionmdashDecreasing respondentsrsquo trust in government appears to have astrong negative effect on support for direct government transfers As further sup-

port for the trust mechanism the treatment has no effect on support for the min-imum wage which is an indirect transfer that does not involve the governmentreceiving and redistributing tax dollars Recall also that the omnibus treatment failedto increase support for direct transfer programs (the EITC and food stamps) butdid increase support for the minimum wage As Table 9 shows that support for theminimum wage appears unaffected by changes in trust trust emerges as a plausiblemediating variable that can explain the pattern of results for the omnibus treatment

Emotional versus Factual Appealsmdash There is a long psychology literature thatsuggests that for many issues emotional appeals produce larger changes in atti-tudes than more factual presentations37 Indeed the estate tax follow-up experimentdescribed in Section IVA showed that the neutral treatment had a smaller effect than

T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155

$1M tax Estate tax Petition Min wage Aid poor Food stamps Housing Private charity(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated minus00421 minus000168 minus00602 minus000428 minus0139 minus0153 minus0163 0187[00275] [00266] [00236] [00902] [00616] [00673] [00614] [00791]

Control mean 0722 0204 0174 2673 2675 2454 2581 1800Scaled trust effect 00949 000728 0580 000531 0128 0119 0133 0169Observations 899 895 899 899 899 899 899 850

Notes The negative trust prime treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that made respondents reflect on aspects

of government they dislike Outcome variables are defined as follows ldquoMin wagerdquo is a 0ndash4 categorical variable increasing in sup-port for the minimum wage (0 indicates most opposition and 4 indicates most support) ldquoFood stampsrdquo is a 0ndash4 categorical vari-able increasing in support for food stamps ldquoAid poorrdquo is a 0ndash4 categorical variable increasing in support for programs that aid poorhouseholds ldquoHousingrdquo is a 0ndash4 categorical variable increasing in support for funding public housing programs ldquoPrivate charityrdquois an indicator of where (among a list of five policy approaches) the respondent puts ldquoprivate charityrdquo as a preferred method foraddressing inequality (the variable increases with relative support for private charity) All other outcomes are as defined previously





The values X 1 X 2 and X 3 were interactively matched to the household compositionthat the respondent earlier gave in the demographic module at the start of the surveyThe respondent then entered dollar amounts for monthly rent utilities transporta-tion food and expenses related to children We then showed them how the budgetthey devised compared with the income at the poverty line (based on the respon-dentsrsquo household size) emphasizing to them that the budget did not even includeitems such as health care clothing furniture and costs related to schooling (see the

online Appendix for a complete description of the treatment and online AppendixFigure 9 for a screenshot)38 The slides with this information also included photosof low income families

ResultsmdashOverall the results track very closely to those from the original omni-bus treatment We obtain large ldquofirst-stagerdquo effects on concern for poverty andinequality but little movement on policy preferences

Table 10 presents the key outcomes The treatment has significant effects on con-cern about inequality (column 1) and not surprisingly large effects on whetherpoverty is a serious problem (equal to over 30 percent of the political gap for thisoutcome)39 However just like the omnibus treatment this follow-up ldquoemotionalrdquotreatment has limited effect on policy preferences Of the four poverty policy ques

T983137983138983148983141 10mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 ldquoE983149983151983156983145983151983150983137983148rdquo T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]

Control mean 0337 0775 0296 2546 2559 1832 2539 0124Scaled poverty effect 0221 0225 0257 00449 00714 00866 00291 00931Observation 1002 1001 799 799 799 799 799 1002

Notes The ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living in poverty Respondentswere told about poverty rates and filled out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city Respondents were thenshown how their minimum budget compared to the poverty line All outcomes are as defined previously ldquoMin wagerdquo ldquoAid poorrdquoldquoFood stampsrdquo ldquoHousingrdquo are all categorical 0ndash4 and increasing in support as in Table 9 The lower number of observations in col-umns 3ndash7 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smaller wave (sample of 200)





DiscussionmdashAs readers can verify by taking the surveys themselves the omni-bus treatment and this ldquoemotionalrdquo follow-up are very different in spirit The omni-bus treatment focused largely on the top 1 percent and was more factual in naturewhereas the follow-up treatment focused on the disadvantaged and sought to createempathy both with our ldquoput yourselves in their shoesrdquo exercise as well as photo-graphs of low income families

Despite these stark differences the results are very similar It is relatively easyfor treatments to affect how much individuals are ldquoconcernedrdquo with any issue but

much harder to increase their support for policies that would seem directly related toaddressing said issues Our final follow-up survey attempts to make the connectionto policy measures more explicit

Connecting ldquoConcernsrdquo with Policy Measuresmdash Bartels (2005 p 16) docu-ments the seemingly odd result that even though the individuals in his 2002 samplewere worried about inequality and aware that the tax cuts proposed by the Bush

administration in 2001 favored the wealthy they still supported them by a large mar-gin He concludes that ldquoAmericans support tax cuts not because they are indifferentto economic inequality but because they largely fail to connect inequality and pub-lic policyrdquo

We directly test this notionmdashthat respondents do not connect their ldquoconcernsrdquowith policies meant to address themmdashin our final follow-up survey In this versionwe largely repeat the low income ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment described in Section IIB but

also add slides showing how current government programs help these householdsFirst after entering in the expenses in the budget exercise the treatment describesa family earning one full-time full-year minimum-wage income making a salientconnection between the level of the minimum wage and family income at the bot-tom of the income distribution Second respondents are told that ldquoThe food stampsprogram helps many low income families such as those earning only one minimumwage It provides $150month per person to help with food expensesrdquo Hence the

connection between poverty and a government program is made explicit OnlineAppendix Figure 10 provides a screenshot

ResultsmdashWe repeat the results for the key outcome variables in Table 11 Theldquofirst stagerdquo effects of this treatment are smaller and not significant It is not surpris




money to Washington to pay for these policies the effects on income and estatetaxes for the well-off are mixed (see online Appendix Tables 19 and 20)

However it does appear that the interaction of the empathic portrayal of lowincome families along with information emphasizing the efficacy of a transferprogram has a meaningful effect on the policies respondents support Column 7suggests that in contrast to the trust treatment this treatment reduces the relativeattractiveness of the nongovernmental solution to inequality private charity Finally

column 8 shows that there is no significant effect of the treatment on trust in govern-ment though the point estimate is negative

DiscussionmdashWhile this treatment indeed moved policy preferences it is worthnoting its highly explicit nature After completing an exercise where they contem-plated the budget constraints of a low income family respondents were shownin concrete terms how a government program helps such a household make ends

meet Even then while support for many poverty-related programs significantlyincreased the largest effect remains the minimum wage an indirect transfer pro-gram Moreover the treatment does not have a consistent effect in terms of inducingtreatment participants to desire higher taxes (even if only on the wealthy) to pay forthese programs

T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Policy treatment 00405 minus000637 0323 0133 0313 0176 minus0137 minus00325[00279] [00272] [00949] [00638] [00970] [00636] [00709] [00207]

Control mean 0343 0326 2546 2559 1832 2539 2025 0149Scaled policy effect 0108 00196 0310 00811 0153 0129 00740 0654Observations 1111 1111 806 806 806 806 1068 1111

Notes The policy treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living on a minimum wage Respondentsfilled out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city Respondents were then shown how their minimum bud-get compared to the minimum wage and how food stamps add $150 per personmonth to the budget of such a family All outcomesare as defined previously ldquoMin wagerdquo ldquoAid poorrdquo ldquoFood stampsrdquo ldquoHousingrdquo are all categorical 0ndash4 and increasing in support asin Table 9 The lower number of observations in columns 3ndash7 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smallerwave (sample of 300)





Amazonrsquos Mechanical Turk to conduct a series of survey experiments to extensivelyexplore this hypothesis

Our results suggest that generally greater information can increase respondentsrsquosense of concern about an issue but not necessarily their support for policies thatmight ameliorate it Information about income inequality and poverty has only alimited (and typically statistically insignificant) tendency to increase support forhigher income taxes on the well-off or transfer programs for the disadvantaged

We present evidence that extreme distrust of government appears to explain part

of this null effect First trust in government is very low in our sample as it cur-rently is among Americans more generally Second many of our treatments appearto further reduce this already low level of trust Third and most novel relative tothe literature we show that decreasing trust has a causal effect on diminishing sup-port for redistribution We develop a prime that reduces trust in government withoutsignificantly moving respondentsrsquo concern for inequality and poverty respondentsexposed to this prime significantly reduce their support for programs that involve

the government directly redistributing tax dollars while increasing their support fornongovernmental solutions such as private charity

Only when we explicitly show individuals the concrete effects of governmentpoverty policies do we observe consistent statistically significant increases in sup-port for such policies41 Even so such effects are small and are largest for indirecttransfer programs such as the minimum wage that do not involve the governmentcollecting and redistributing tax dollars

Future work might further probe the connection between government trust andpolicy preferences Underlying mistrust might help to explain the reluctance to sup-port policies that would seem to be in the majorityrsquos self-interest Relatedly distrustcould explain why minimum wage increases typically enjoy 70ndash80 percent supportin surveys Many economists assume that respondents simply misunderstand theincidence of the minimum wage Instead it might be the case that they view theminimum wage as imperfect but better than other redistributive policies that involve

sending money to Washington DC42 In future work it would be valuable to testwhether treatments that increase trust in the government also increase support forredistributive policies

As we extensively document the estate tax is the exception to the generallysmall effects of information on policy even a four sentence description providing




burns the money it collects Therefore low levels of trust in government may notinhibit support for the estate tax as much as for other policies where efficiency isa more salient goal Independent of the origin of the treatment effect the largeelasticity of support for the estate tax in response to basic information that we andpast work have documented is highly policy-relevant given the recent rise in inher-itance flows in many developed countries43

Randomized online surveys are a powerful and convenient tool for studying theeffects of information treatments on attitudes and behaviors one we imagine can

be used to extend the results we have documented The tool is powerful because itcan reach large samples of US residents (in the thousands) at fairly low cost ($1ndash$2 per respondent) It is convenient because using widely available software onlinesurveys are now very easy to design Hence it becomes more feasible to exploremechanisms behind results For example we were able to easily design companionexperiments to test mechanisms potentially underlying the effects in our originalomnibus treatment Therefore in contrast to field experiments which are very costly

to set up and replicate online survey experiments lend themselves naturally to con-ducting series of experiments where results from an initial experiment lead to newexperiments to cast light on potential mechanisms

Such flexibility will allow researchers to gain a more nuanced understanding ofredistributive preferences While projections are by nature uncertain the US gov-ernment is expected to face a long-run fiscal imbalance largely due to the agingof the population and rising health care costs44 European countries face similar

challenges The distributional effects of any future fiscal rebalancingmdashraising taxescutting spending or bothmdashwill depend in large part on votersrsquo redistributive prefer-ences how strongly they hold them and whether and how they act on them As suchthese questions are of first-order importance in public economics We believe thatthe methodology we employed in this paper can be used in future research to betterunderstand how individualsrsquo redistributive preferences are formed and shaped

REFERENCES

Alesina Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos 2005 ldquoFairness and Redistributionrdquo American Eco-nomic Review 95 (4) 960ndash80

Alesina Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara 2005 ldquoPreferences for Redistribution in the Land of Oppor-tunitiesrdquo Journal of Public Economics 89 (5ndash6) 897ndash931




Beacutenabou Roland and Efe A Ok 2001 ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution ThePOUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2) 447ndash87

Bernardi Richard A 2006 ldquoAssociations between Hofstedes Cultural Constructs and Social Desir-ability Response Biasrdquo Journal of Business Ethics 65 (1) 43ndash53Brader Ted 2005 ldquoStriking a Responsive Chord How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by

Appealing to Emotionsrdquo American Journal of Political Science 49 (2) 388ndash405Corneo Giacomo and Hans Peter Gruumlner 2000 ldquoSocial Limits to Redistributionrdquo American Eco-

nomic Review 90 (5) 1491ndash1507Corneo Giacomo and Hans Peter Gruumlner 2002 ldquoIndividual Preferences for Political Redistributionrdquo

Journal of Public Economics 83 (1) 83ndash107Cruces Guillermo Ricardo Perez-Truglia and Martin Tetaz 2013 ldquoBiased Perceptions of Income

Distribution and Preferences for Redistribution Evidence from a Survey Experimentrdquo Journal ofPublic Economics 98 100ndash12

Dalton Derek and Marc Ortegren 2011 ldquoGender Differences in Ethics Research The Importance ofControlling for the Social Desirability Response Biasrdquo Journal of Business Ethics 103 (1) 73ndash93

Druckman James N and Kjersten R Nelson 2003 ldquoFraming and Deliberation How Citizensrsquo Con-versations Limit Elite Influencerdquo American Journal of Political Science 47 (4) 729ndash45

Edwards Kari 1990 ldquoThe Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Changerdquo Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 (2) 202ndash16

Fong Christina M 2001 ldquoSocial Preferences Self-Interest and the Demand for Redistributionrdquo Jour-

nal of Public Economics 82 (2) 225ndash46Fujii Edwin T and Clifford B Hawley 1988 ldquoOn the Accuracy of Tax Perceptionsrdquo Review of Eco-

nomics and Statistics 70 (2) 344ndash47Gaines Brian J James H Kuklinski and Paul J Quirk 2007 ldquoThe Logic of the Survey Experiment

Reexaminedrdquo Political Analysis 15 (1) 1ndash20Gelder Marleen M H J van Reini W Bretveld and Nel Roeleveld 2010 ldquoWeb-Based Question-

naires The Future in Epidemiologyrdquo American Journal of Epidemiology 172 (11) 1292ndash98Gerber Alan S James G Gimpel Donald P Green and Daron R Shaw 2011 ldquoHow Large and

Long-Lasting are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads Results from a Randomized

Field Experimentrdquo American Political Science Review 105 (1) 135ndash50Gilens Martin 1996 ldquolsquoRace Codingrsquo and White Opposition to Welfarerdquo American Political Science

Review 90 (3) 593ndash604Guillaud Elvire 2013 ldquoPreferences for Redistribution An Empirical Analysis over 33 Countriesrdquo

Journal of Economic Inequality 11 (1) 57ndash78Horton John J David G Rand and Richard J Zeckhauser 2011 ldquoThe Online Laboratory Conduct-

ing Experiments in a Real Labor Marketrdquo Experimental Economics 14 (3) 399ndash425Hoxby Caroline and Sarah Turner 2013 ldquoExpanding College Opportunities for High-Achieving

Low Income Studentsrdquo Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 12-014

Huddy Leonie and Anna H Gunnthorsdottir 2000 ldquoThe Persuasive Effects of Emotive Visual Imag-ery Superficial Manipulation or the Product of Passionate Reasonrdquo Political Psychology 21 (4)745ndash78

Kenworthy Lane and Leslie McCall 2008 ldquoInequality Public Opinion and RedistributionrdquoSocio-Economic Review 6 (1) 35ndash68

Kluegel James R and Eliot R Smith 1986 Beliefs about Inequality Americansrsquo Views of What Is andk ldi d G




Luskin Robert C James S Fishkin and Roger Jowell 2002 ldquoConsidered Opinions DeliberativePolling in Britainrdquo British Journal of Political Science 32 (3) 455ndash87

Luttmer Erzo F P 2001 ldquoGroup Loyalty and the Taste for Redistributionrdquo Journal of Political Econ-omy 109 (3) 500ndash528Luttmer Erzo F P and Monica Singhal 2011 ldquoCulture Context and the Taste for Redistributionrdquo

American Economic Journal Economic Policy 3 (1) 157ndash79Margalit Yotam 2013 ldquoExplaining Social Policy Preferences Evidence from the Great Recessionrdquo

American Political Science Review 107 (1) 80ndash103McCaffery Edward J and Jonathan Baron 2006 ldquoThinking about Taxrdquo Psychology Public Policy

and Law 12 (1) 106ndash35McCall Leslie and Lane Kenworthy 2009 ldquoAmericansrsquo Social Policy Preferences in the Era of Rising

Inequalityrdquo Perspectives on Politics 7 (3) 459ndash84Meltzer Allan H and Scott F Richard 1981 ldquoA Rational Theory of the Size of Governmentrdquo Journalof Political Economy 89 (5) 914ndash27

Norton Michael I and Dan Ariely 2011 ldquoBuilding a Better America One Wealth Quintile at a TimerdquoPerspectives on Psychological Science 6 (1) 9ndash12

Paolacci Gabriele Jesse Chandler and Panagiotis Ipeirotis 2010 ldquoRunning Experiments on AmazonMechanical Turkrdquo Judgment and Decision Making 5 (5) 411ndash19

Piketty Thomas 1995 ldquoSocial Mobility and Redistributive Politicsrdquo Quarterly Journal of Econom-ics 110 (3) 551ndash84

Piketty Thomas 2014 Capital in the Twenty-First Century Cambridge MA Harvard UniversityPressPiketty Thomas and Emmanuel Saez 2003 ldquoIncome Inequality in the United States 1913ndash1998rdquo

Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1) 1ndash41Piketty Thomas Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva 2014 ldquoOptimal Taxation of Top Labor

Incomes A Tale of Three Elasticitiesrdquo American Economic Journal Economic Policy 6 (1) 230ndash71Rand David G and Martin A Nowak 2011 ldquoThe Evolution of Antisocial Punishment in Optional

Public Goods Gamesrdquo Nature Communications 2 434Rosselli Francine John J Skelly and Diane M Mackie 1995 ldquoProcessing Rational and Emotional

Messages The Cognitive and Affective Mediation of Persuasionrdquo Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology 31 (2) 163ndash90

Saez Emmanuel and Stefanie Stantcheva 2013 ldquoGeneralized Social Marginal Welfare Weights forOptimal Tax Theoryrdquo National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18835

Saez Emmanuel and Gabriel Zucman 2014 ldquoWealth Inequality in the United States since 1913 Evi-dence from Capitalized Income Tax Datardquo National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper20625

Sapienza Paola and Luigi Zingales 2013 ldquoEconomic Experts versus Average Americansrdquo American Economic Review 103 (3) 636ndash42

Savani Krishna and Aneeta Rattan 2012 ldquoA Choice Mind-Set Increases the Acceptance and Main-tenance of Wealth Inequalityrdquo Psychological Science 23 (7) 796ndash804

Senik Claudia 2009 ldquoIncome Distribution and Subjective Happiness A Surveyrdquo Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development Social Employment and Migration Working Paper 96

Sides John 2011 ldquoStories Science and Public Opinions about the Estate Taxrdquo httphomegwuedu~jsidesestatetaxpdf (accessed February 19 2015)



Web Appendix of

How Elastic are Preferences for RedistributionEvidence from Randomized Survey Experiments

By Ilyana Kuziemko Michael I Norton Emmanuel Saez andStefanie Stantcheva

A Detailed Description of the Experiment

A1 Omnibus Treatment Description

This Section describes in detail the omnibus experiment The omnibus treatment experimentwas carried out in 4 separate rounds from January 2011 to August 2012 The structure of the experiment was as follows(1) Background socio-economic questions including age gender race marital status chil-dren state of residence education household income work status whether the respondent

considers himself conservative or liberal on economic policy voting choice in 2008 presiden-tial election(2) Randomized treatment showing information on inequality the estate tax and tax policyshown solely to the treatment group Those treatments are illustrated through screenshotsin appendix Figures 1 2 3 and 4(3) Set of questions on inequality taxes and transfers policy views and 2012 voting plansThose questions are listed in detail after the screenshots

Surveys were openly posted on mTurk and their description stated that they would pay$150 for approximately 15 minutes of survey time ie a $6 hourly wage People were freeto drop out any time or take up to one hour to answer all questions

Round 3 was conducted with CT Marketing Group instead of mTurk at a cost of $5 perrespondent The survey software remained exactly the same

The link to this survey is httpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn

List of all Outcome Questions

Note Sentences in italic were not seen by the respondents Bold fonts are just labels for eachsection Sentences in normal font are exactly as they appeared in the survey Text in bracketrepresents the answer choices given to respondents Text in curly brackets are explanatory



3 As you may know there have been proposals recently to decrease the federal deficitby raising income taxes on millionaires Do you think income taxes on millionaires shouldbe increased stay the same or decreased [IncreasedStay the sameDecreased]

4 The Federal Estate tax (also known as the Death Tax) is a tax imposed on the transferof wealth from a deceased person to his or her heirs Do you think the Federal Estate taxshould be decreased left as is or increased [DecreasedLeft as isIncreased]

First stage questions on knowledge and perceptions of inequality

5 Do you think annual economic growth was faster in the period 1980-2010 than in theperiod 1933-1980 [Faster in 1980-2011The same in both periodsFaster in 1933-1980]

6 Do you think inequality is a serious problem in America [Not a problem at allAsmall problemA problemA serious problemA very serious problem]7 Do you think income inequality in the US has increased or decreased in recent decades

[DecreasedStayed the sameIncreased]8 Are you satisfied with your current income [Very satisfiedSomewhat satisfiedNot

too satisfiedNot at all satisfied]9 Do you think that the very high earners in our society deserve their high incomes

[Most of the timeSometimesRarely]

10 Which statement do you agree with most [A ldquoOnersquos income and position in societyis mostly the result of onersquos individual effortrdquo BldquoOnersquos income and position in society is toa large extent the outcome of elements outside of onersquos control (for example including butnot limited to family background luck health issues etc)rdquo]

Political Outcomes

11 Which party do you plan to support in the 2012 presidential elections [Demo-craticRepublicanOtherNone] note the surveys were carried out before the 2012 elec-tions

12 How much of the time do you think you can trust government in Washington to dowhat is right [Just about alwaysMost of the time Only some of the time Never]

13 Next think more broadly about the purpose of government Where would you rateyourself on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means you think the government should do only thosethings necessary to provide the most basic government functions and 5 means you think thegovernment should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its

citizens [12345]14 What do you think the most important goal of the federal income tax should be [Raise

money for infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges Raise money for universal socialservices such as Social Security and Medicare Raise money from the wealthiest citizens tosupport programs that aid low-income citizens such as Medicaid and Food Stamps)]



18 In the next month do you plan to donate any money to an organization that supportsthose in need [YesNo]

19 In the past month have you donated any money to an organization that supportsthose in need [YesNo]

20 In the next month do you plan to donate some of your time to an organization thatsupports those in need [YesNo]

21 In the past month have you donated some of your time to an organization thatsupports those in need [YesNo]

Real Outcome Petition for Estate Tax

22 Writing to the Senators of your state gives you an opportunity to influence taxationpolicy Few citizens email their elected officials therefore Senators and their staff take suchemails from their constituents very seriously If you would like to write to your Senator go tothe official US Senate list and click on your Senatorrsquos contact webpage Two sample lettersare provided below one asking for higher estate taxes on the rich one asking not to increaseestate taxes on the rich Feel free to cut-and-paste and edit the text before sending it to yourSenator Most Senatorsrsquo websites ask for your name and address to avoid spam We are notable to record what you write on the external (Senatorrsquos) website so your letter and private

information are kept fully confidentialFor the purpose of our survey we would just like to know from you I sent or will send an

email to my Senator asking for higher estate taxes on the rich I sent or will send an emailto my Senator asking to not increase estate taxes on the rich I do not want to email mySenator

Sample letter for higher estate taxes on the rich Dear Senator In the coming monthsas you debate the federal budget one of the priorities for Congress should be raising estate

taxes on the wealthiest Americans so that they pay their fair share to fund governmentprograms and help solve our federal budget deficit problem

Sample letter for not increasing estate taxes on the rich Dear Senator In the comingmonths as you debate the federal budget one of the priorities for Congress should be keepingestate taxes on the wealthiest Americans low The government should not punish people whoare financially successful or well-off

[I sent or will send an email to my Senator asking for higher estate taxes on the richIsent or will send an email to my Senator asking to not increase estate taxes on the richI donot want to email my Senator]

A2 Estate Tax Experiment Description

The follow up estate tax experiment was conducted in March 2014 on a sample of 1800



Note Sentences in italic were not seen by the respondents Bold fonts are just labels for eachsection Sentences in normal font are exactly as they appeared in the survey

1 Choose the tax rate on the top 1 next 9 next 40 and bottom 50 (see screenshot)[Slider with continuous percentage choices 0-100 for each of the four income groups]

2 Do you think income inequality in the United States has increased or decreased since1980 [DecreasedStayed the sameIncreased]

3 Do you think inequality is a serious problem in America [Not a problem at allAsmall problemA problemA serious problemA very serious problem]

4 The Federal Estate Tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of wealth from a deceased per-son to his or her heirs What percentage of people who die have to pay the Federal Estate tax

If you donrsquot know just give your best guess [Less than 1110204060100]5 Do you think poverty is a serious problem in America [Not a problem at allA small

problemA problemA serious problemA very serious problem]6 Do you think that the very high earners in our society deserve their high incomes

[Most of the timeSometimesRarely]7 Do you think the federal estate tax should be decreased left as is or increased (Recall

that the federal estate tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of wealth from a deceased person

to his or her heirs) [DecreasedLeft as isIncreased]8 As you may know there have been proposals recently to decrease the federal deficitby raising income taxes on millionaires Do you think income taxes on millionaires shouldbe increased stay the same or decreased[IncreasedStay the sameDecreased]

9 Which of the tools below do you consider the best to address inequality in the UnitedStates Please drag and drop the items to the box on the right and rank them in yourpreferred order Your preferred method for addressing inequality should be at the top yourleast preferred one at the bottom [Education Policies Private Charity Progressive Taxes

Government Transfers (eg food stamps Medicaid) Government regulation (eg minwage caps on top compensation)]

10 Should the federal government increase or decrease spending on aid to the poor[Significantly increaseSlightly increaseKeep at current levelSlightly decreaseSignificantlydecrease]

11 The federal minimum wage is currently $725 per hour Do you think it should bedecreased stay the same or increased [Significantly increasedSlightly increasedStay the

sameSlightly decreasedSignificantly decreased]12 Should the federal government increase or decrease its spending on public housing forlow income families [Significantly increase Slightly increaseKeep at current levelSlightlydecreaseSignificantly decrease]

13 Should the federal government increase or decrease its spending on food stamps(F d t id fi i l i t f f d h i t f ili d i di id l ith



17 Next think more broadly about the purpose of government Where would you rateyourself on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means you think the government should do only thosethings necessary to provide the most basic government functions and 5 means you think thegovernment should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of itscitizens [12345]

18 Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxeswaste some of it or donrsquot waste very much of itrdquo [Waste a lot of money we pay intaxesWaste some of the money we pay in taxesDonrsquot waste much of the money we pay intaxes]

19 How do you feel about the following statement ldquoCurrently the federal government is

very effective in limiting fraud waste and abuse in the programs it administersrdquo [StronglyagreeAgreeDisagreeStrongly disagree]

20 How do you feel about the following statement ldquoPoliticians in Washington work toenrich themselves and their largest campaign contributors instead of working for the benefitof the majority of citizensrdquo [Strongly agreeAgreeDisagreeStrongly disagree]

A3 Emotional Poverty Experiment

The emotional poverty treatment was conducted in March 2014 on a sample of 1200 respon-dents Respondents were first as usual asked for their demographic information Dependingon their answers to the questions about their marital status and whether they have childrenliving with them they were redirected to a specific customized branch They were thenrandomized into treatment and control group The treatment group saw information aboutpoverty that was adapted to their family situation without knowing that the informationwas actually customized Each respondent estimated the basic expenses that a family of the

configuration of his own family (living where the respondent lives) would have to incur forrent utilities transportation to work food and depending on the family situation expensesfor children Appendix Figure 9 shows the screenshot where respondents were asked to es-timate the minimal budget of a family similar to theirs Between this page and the nextthe program computed the total expenses estimated If those were above the actual povertythreshold for the family the next page told respondents that given their estimates the familywould fall short by such and such amount If the total was below the poverty threshold the

next page told respondents that given their estimates the family would only be left withsuch and such amount for all other expensesThe link to the survey is httpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_1B8MczKSMIvWaqxThe outcome questions were the same as in section A2 except that the question about

how many people pay the estate tax was not asked Instead the following three questionsdd d



3 How many workers in the US earn the minimum wage If you donrsquot know just giveyour best guess [2 million 6 million 10 million]

A4 Policy Experiment

The policy experiment was conducted in March 2014 on a sample of 1300 respondents Re-spondents were randomized into a control group or a treatment group The treatment groupwas again redirected to a customized branch depending on their answers to the questionsabout their marital status and whether they had children living with them In the treatmentscreens they were asked about and shown information about a family whose configuration

was similar to theirs First respondents were asked to estimate the minimum expenses neces-sary for a family earning the minimum wage for rent utilities transportation to work foodand if applicable children expenses That screen is shown in appendix Figure 10 Betweenthis page and the next the program computed the total expenses implied and informed therespondents either of the shortfall that the family living on a single minimum wage wouldhave to face or the surplus that would be left over if they had to incur the expenses asestimated by the respondent That second screen also showed information about the foodstamps program informing respondents that ldquoThe Food Stamps program helps many lowincome families such as those earning only one minimum wage It provides $150month perperson to help with food expensesrdquo

The link to the experiment is httpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_1B8MczKSMIvWaqxThe outcome questions were exactly the same as in section A3

A5 Trust Experiment

The trust treatment was conducted in March 2014 on a sample of 1000 respondents Thetreatment showed people information about how the United States is ranked in terms of corruption among a list of countries of similar income and development levels (the UnitedStates is ranked in the worst group of countries given income and development levels) asshown in appendix Figure 8

The link to this survey is in httpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_bgEuJfl1Y3UreKhRespondents in the treatment group were asked questions designed to elicit negative

reactions regarding the government The full list of questions were1 What is your view of the ldquoWall Street bailoutrdquo the legislation signed into law byPresident Bush in 2008 whereby the federal government lent $700 billion to banks and otherfinancial institutions that faced bankruptcy [Strongly support this legislationSupport thislegislationOppose this legislationStrongly oppose this legislation]

2 Because of a recent Supreme Court decision for the first time in decades there are now



4 How much confidence do you have in the federal governmentrsquos administering of eco-nomic and military aid to foreign countries (which totals over $50 billion annually) [A greatdeal of confidenceSome confidenceLittle confidenceNo confidence]


The outcome questions were the same as in section A2 except that we did not ask anyof the knowledge questions about poverty rates child poverty rates minimum wage earnersor how many people pay the estate tax

A6 List of all constructed variables

Below we provide a full definition of all variables used in the tables In brackets we providethe coding of the variable

bull ldquoIneq vsrdquo (or ldquoIneq v seriousrdquo) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent repliesthat ldquoinequality is a very serious problemrdquo [01]

bull ldquoIneq incrdquo (or ldquoIneq increasedrdquo) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondentreplies that inequality has increased since 1980 [01]

bull ldquoDeservingrdquo (or ldquoRich deservingrdquo) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondentbelieves that the rich are deserving of their income ldquomost of the timerdquo [01]

bull ldquoTop taxrdquo (or ldquoTop tax raterdquo) is the chosen average tax rate on the richest one percent[0 to 100]

bull ldquoMill taxrdquo (or ldquoIncrease Mill Taxrdquo) is an indicator variable for whether the respondentwants to increase the income tax on millionaires [01]

bull ldquoEstate taxrdquo (or ldquoIncrease Estate Taxrdquo) is an indicator variable for whether the re-spondent wants to increase the estate tax [01]

bull ldquoPetitionrdquo is an indicator variable for whether the respondent wants to send a petition

to her State Senator to increase the estate tax [01]bull ldquoMin wagerdquo in the omnibus treatment indicates support for increasing the minimum

wage [01]

bull ldquoMin wagerdquo in the follow up surveys indicates the strength of the support for increasing



bull ldquoFood stampsrdquo in the omnibus indicates support for expanding the food stamps pro-gram [01]

bull ldquoFood stampsrdquo in the followup surveys indicates the strength of the support for ex-panding the food stamps program [01234 increasing in support]

bull ldquoEITCrdquo indicators support for expanding funding for the EITC [01]

bull ldquoTrustrdquo or (ldquoTrust govtrdquo) is an indicator variable for whether the respondent believesthe government can be trusted [01]

bull ldquoScoperdquo (or ldquoGovt scoperdquo) is a categorical variable indicating how active the govern-ment should be in redistributing income [12345 5 being the broadest scope of government]

bull ldquoDem 2012rdquo indicates that the respondent plans to vote for the Democrat (Obama) inthe 2012 Presidential election [01]

bull ldquoDem 2014rdquo indicates that the respondent plans to vote for the Democrat in the 2014Congressional election [01]

bull ldquoTaxes redistrrdquo indicates that the respondent thinks that the role of income taxes isto redistribute income (as opposed to just financing infrastructure) [01]

bull ldquoGrowthrdquo indicates that the respondentrsquos reply to the question of whether growth washigher in 1933-1980 than in 1980-200 was correct [01]

bull ldquoTax 1950rdquo indicates that the resppndentrsquos reply to the question whether top income

taxes were higher in the 1950s than today was correct [01]

bull ldquoSatisfiedrdquo indicates whether the respondent is satisfied with his current income [01]

bull ldquoMoney charityrdquo is a dummy variable for whether the respondent plans to give moneyto charity in the next month [01]

bull ldquoMoney givenrdquo indicates whether he has already given money in the past month [01]

bull ldquoTime charityrdquo is a dummy variable for whether the respondent plans to give time tocharity in the next month [01]

bull ldquoTime givenrdquo indicates whether he has already given time in the past month [01]

bull ldquoIncome mostly result of effortrdquo is a binary variable indicating that the respondent



bull ldquoCharitiesrdquo refers to the ranking (from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest ranking) that re-spondents attribute to private charities as a means to redistribute income [12345]

bull ldquoEduc polrdquo refers to the ranking (from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest ranking)that respondents attribute to education policies as a means to redistribute income[12345]

bull ldquoNo wasterdquo takes values from 1 to 3 with 1 representing that the government is wastinga lot of tax revenue and 3 indicating that the government is not wasting much taxrevenue at all [123]

B Methodological issues related to online survey experiments

In this section we share what we have learned through our experience with these mTurk sur-vey experiments to highlight both the advantages and disadvantages of using online surveysfor research as well as provide advice for future researchers

The most obvious advantage is the ease and speed of gathering relatively large samplesAt a per-survey price of $150 it typically took at most five or six days to gather a sample of

1000 US residents and samples of 300-400 could usually be gathered within 24 hours Animportant piece of advice for future researchers studying American domestic policy questionsis to ask mTurk to limit the sample to US residents (Amazon documents this informationfor tax purposes) In pilot surveys we conducted before becoming aware of this problem overforty percent of our respondents turned out to have non-US IP addresses (likely an evergreater share were foreign residents since respondents can connect through remote serversand appear to be in the US) Launching surveys at night (during the workday in Asia)

exacerbates this problem

B1 How representative is the mTurk sample

As noted earlier respondents to our surveys are not representative of the US populationHowever this lack of representativeness does not appear substantially worse than in othersurveys For example the mTurk sample is about 13 years younger and 13 percentage pointsmore likely to have a college degree than the representative sample of US adults in our

national CBS sample (see Table 1) But that same CBS poll we use as a basis for comparisonis itself weighted The raw CBS sample is about nine years older than the weighted sampleand like our mTurk sample about 13 percentage points more likely to have a college degreeIt under-represents Hispanics to the same extent as our sample and is even worse than oursample in terms of the under-representation of men As such while the mTurk sample is not



B2 How serious is attrition in the mTurk sample

As noted earlier for the omnibus treatment we have an overall attrition rate (the share of

respondents who start but do not finish the survey) of 22 percent a 21 percent rate for theCT Marketing Group survey and a 22 percent rate for the mTurk surveys In fact whenwe compare surveys 4 and 5mdashwhich were in the field at the same time with the former onmTurk and the latter on CT Marketing Groupmdashattrition is actually lower on mTurk EvenGallup has an attrition rate of nine percent on its 15-minute Daily Poll1 Given that oursurvey requires people to read through informational treatments we suspect that a pureopinion survey conducted on mTurk would have a lower attrition rate

The omnibus survey has differential attrition between treatment and control probablybecause of the relatively long length of the treatment (respondents had to scroll through6 treatment pages in the omnibus survey) Importantly the follow-up surveys do not havesuch differential attrition because the treatment was much shorter (2 pages at most) so thatthere was no noticeable length difference between the treatment and control group

A related point is that researchers using this methodology should ask background ques-tions first In settings with little to no attrition background questions can ideally be askedat the very end to avoid priming but given the importance of assessing non-random attri-

tion it may be preferable for online survey experiments to ask demographic and backgroundquestions at the outset

B3 How many unique observations can one collect on mTurk

Although the exact number of workers registered on mTurk is not publicly reported thepool is thought to be quite large approximately 500000

However the pool available for any given survey experiment is more limited First work-ers select into tasks voluntarily choosing among types of tasks As a result the pool of workers interested in survey experiments is more limited Indeed survey experiments aretypically longer than a standard task on mTurk and might require more attention Secondwe filter workers based on past ratings this is to avoid careless workers who consistentlydo not complete tasks properly and have been rated negatively by previous amazon mTurkrequesters (ie employers on mTurk) Third the pool of registered workers is not online allthe time Many workers could be working for a few weeks then switch to another occupa-

tion and potentially come back later or only work during some times of the year monthor week Finally there is competition between tasks Many tasks are posted simultaneouslyon the platform and workers have to search for each individual task Large sample surveyexperiments sometimes fall lower in the list and are less visible to workers (although oneway to make it more visible and which we employ is to stop and relaunch the survey several



previous one we easily get a large sample very quickly However when we repeatedly launchexperiments one after the other the rate at which we get workers slows down

To mitigate the constraint of being unable to reach a sufficiently large sample of workersresearchers can do all of the following a) leave sufficient times between survey dates b)pay sufficiently high wages to make the tasks competitive relative to others c) keep surveytime short d) choose more generic titles for the task such as ldquoOpinion Surveyrdquo rather thanldquoAcademic Research Survey in Economicsrdquo However researchers should be warned thateven after taking these steps survey samples are not unlimited in mTurk and if ldquofreshrdquorespondents are needed for each survey date a large share of respondents clicking on the taskwill be screened out (or will need to be dropped ex-post based on repeated mTurk worker

IDs)



Appendix Figure 1 Inequality Component ldquoWhere are you in the income distributionrdquo

Notes This interactive slider allows people to explore the income distribution in the US and to

determine their position in it Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn



Appendix Figure 2 Inequality component ldquoWhere would you have been in the incomedistributionrdquo

Notes This interactive slider shows the ldquocounterfactualrdquo household income had income growthbeen shared equally since 1980 Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn





Appendix Figure 4 Showing information about the estate tax

Notes Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn



Appendix Figure 5 Preferred tax rates outcome




Appendix Figure 6 Neutral information about the estate tax

The Federal Estate Tax applies when a deceased person leaves more than $5 million in wealth to his or her heirs

Wealth left to a spouse or charitable organizations is exempt from estate tax

Only 1 person out of 1000 is wealthy enough to face the estate tax

Average Americans have far less than $5 million in wealth when they die so the estate tax does not affect them and they

can pass on their property to their children tax-free

Notes Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_0vOecp2MDPBpInb



Appendix Figure 7 A word cloud based on open-ended responses to the question ldquoHow muchof the time can you trust the government in Washington to do what is rightrdquo

Notes Based on the pilot group survey on mTurk described in Section 42



Appendix Figure 8 Negative information about corruption in the US

Each year the non-partisan organization Transparency International rates countries based on the

amount of government corruption When the US is compared to countries with similar levels of

income and development how do you think it ranks

The best 6 Better than average Worse than average The worst 6

Page Break

These are the actual results from the report

Notes Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV bgEuJfl1Y3UreKh



Appendix Figure 9 Customized information about poverty

Think about a family of four with two parents working full time at low pay and two kids

What would be the minimal monthly expenses that such a family would have to make to afford living in

your city

Please enter numbers only with no $ sign and no commas eg 1000

Rent

Utilities (electric heatingcablephone)

Car payment + car insurance + gasto go to work

Food

Child care while working

Notes Available online at



Appendix Figure 10 Customized information about policies

Think about a family of four with one parent working full time at the minimum wage and two kids

What would be the minimal monthly expenses that such a family would have to make to a fford living

where you live


Rent

Utilities (electric heating

cablephone)

Transportation (public transit fare

andor car payments insurance

gas

)

Food

Expenses related to children

Notes Available online athttpshbsqualtricscomSESID=SV_1B8MczKSMIvWaqx



Appendix Table 1 Share of treatment respondents correctly answering basic comprehension

questions

(1)Percent that answered correctly

Pct of households earn less than 386000 0866Pct of households earn less than 108000 0855Pct of households earn less than 33800 0838

Household now making 386000 would be making 0484Household now making 108000 would be making 0414Household now making 33800 would be making 0395

Observations 2417

Notes This table displays the percent of respondents who answered the comprehension questionscorrectly during the treatment (see the treatment screenshots in the Appendix for the completewording and outlay of these questions)

Appendix Table 2 Ability of covariates to predict whether respondents finish the survey

Variable Coeff P-val

Voted for Obama in 2008 0014 0227Age -0003 0000Liberal policy view 0002 0676Household income 0001 0449Married 0008 0480Education -0001 0724Male 0018 0105Black -0006 0765

Hispanic 0072 0007Native -0011 0624Employed full time -0008 0483Unemployed 0024 0145Not in labor force -0 029 0 055



Appendix Table 3 Attrition by survey round

Survey Attrition Obs (Completed)Control Treatment Differential

Omnibus 009 021 011 4045Estate Tax 006 003 -003 1760Trust 003 002 -001 901Poverty 003 002 -001 1003Policy 006 004 -002 1114

Notes Note that the attrition numbers count those respondents who started and continued longenough to be at least assigned a treatment status Respondents could drop out before being assignedto treatment for a variety of reasons including that they were not US citizens (albeit US residents)or did not agree with the consent form



Appendix Table 4 Effect of omnibus treatment on all outcomes part 1

Ineq vs Ineq inc Deserving Top tax Mill tax Estate tax Petition Min wage Food stamps EITC Trust Scope

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Treated 0104lowastlowastlowast 0120lowastlowastlowast -00526lowastlowastlowast 0931lowast 00502lowastlowastlowast 0357lowastlowastlowast 00648lowastlowastlowast 00325lowastlowast 00149 00212 -00292lowastlowast 0132lowastlowastlowast

[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]

Control mean 0285 0738 0180 3021 0740 0171 0234 0690 0686 0611 0158 3076Scaled Effect 0365 0540 0182 00914 0111 2043 0394 00995 00369 00698 1250 0110Obs 3703 3704 3690 3741 3704 3673 3060 3690 3690 3690 3702 3704

Notes The first three outcome variables are binary indicator variables coded as one if the respondent says that ldquoinequality is a very seriousproblemrdquo ldquoinequality has increasedrdquo and ldquothe rich are deserving of their incomerdquo respectively ldquoTop raterdquo is continuous (respondentsrsquopreferred average tax rate on the richest one percent) ldquoMill taxrdquo and ldquoEstaterdquo indicate the respondent wants income taxes on millionairesand the estate tax to increase respectively ldquoPetitionrdquo indicates she would write her Senator to increase the estate tax ldquoMin wagerdquo ldquoFoodstrdquo and ldquoEITCrdquo indicate support for increasing the minimum wage and funding for SNAP and EITC respectively ldquoTrustrdquo indicatestrust in government and ldquoScoperdquo indicates the respondent favors a broad range of interventions by the government (1-5 categoricalvariable) ldquoCovariatesrdquo and ldquoscaled effectsrdquo are as specified in the notes to Table 4 The row ldquoControl meanrdquo reports the mean of theoutcome variable in the control group lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

2 4




Dem 2012 Taxes redistr Growth Tax 1950 Satisfied Money charity Money given Time charity Time given

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Treated 00152 00396lowastlowastlowast 0137lowastlowastlowast 0131lowastlowastlowast -00266 000717 000565 000188 -000655[00125] [00132] [00160] [00158] [00264] [00157] [00158] [00160] [00157]

Control mean 0529 0199 0437 0556 2881 0559 0523 0480 0378Scaled Effect 00246 0314 0946 0927 0102 0167 00823 00219 0255Obs 3703 3700 3696 3619 3690 3681 3683 3684 3684

Notes ldquoDem 2012rdquo indicates the respondent plans to vote for the Democrat (Obama) in the 2012 Presidential election ldquoTaxes redistrrdquoindicates that the respondent thinks the role of income taxes is to redistribute income ldquoGrowthrdquo indicates that the respondent correctlyreplied to the question of whether growth was higher in 1933-1980 than in 1980-2000 ldquoTax 1950rdquo indicates that the respondent correctlyreplied to the question whether top income taxes were higher in the 1950s than today ldquoSatisfiedrdquo indicates whether the respondent issatisfied with his current income ldquoMoney charityrdquo (respectively ldquoTime charityrdquo) is a dummy variable for whether the respondent plansto give money (respectively time) to charity in the next month and ldquoMoney givenrdquo (respectively ldquoTime givenrdquo) indicates whether hehas already given money (respectively time) in the past month ldquoCovariatesrdquo and ldquoscaled effectsrdquo are as specified in the notes to Table4 The row ldquoControl meanrdquo reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control group lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

2 5




Income due to effort Tax on top 1 Tax on next 9 Tax on next 40 Tax on Bottom 50 Top 1 tax - Bottom 50 tax(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Treated -00571lowastlowastlowast 0931lowast -0311 -0593lowast 0304 0628[00152] [0549] [0380] [0341] [0442] [0428]

Control mean 0419 3021 1760 1071 1893 1128Scaled Effect 0156 00914 0195 0232 00531 0140Obs 3689 3741 3740 3721 3741 3741

Notes ldquoIncome due to effortrdquo is a binary variable indicating that the respondent believes that onersquos income is mostly the result of onersquosown effort ldquoTax on top lsquordquo ldquoTax on next 9rdquo rdquoTax on next 40 rdquo and rdquoTax on Bottom 50rdquo are the respondentrsquos chosen tax rates forrespectively people in the 99th percentile 90th to 99th percentile in the 50th to 90th percentile and in the Bottom half of the incomedistribution ldquoTop 1 tax - Bottom 50 taxrdquo is the tax differential between the preferred tax on the top 1 and that on the Bottom 50ldquoCovariatesrdquo and ldquoscaled effectsrdquo are as specified in the notes to Table 4 The row ldquoControl meanrdquo reports the mean of the outcomevariable in the control group lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

2 6



Appendix Table 7 Selection into the follow-up

Variable Coefficient P-value

Voted for Obama in 2008 -0001 0957Age 0002 0029

Liberal policy view -0011 0285Household income 0006 0101Married 0056 0014Education 0007 0389Male -0009 0677Black 0041 0348Hispanic 0079 0177Native -0059 0216

Employed full time 0003 0897Unemployed 0004 0901Not in labor force 0080 0038Student -0064 0020

Notes For each row the coefficient and p-value are from regressions of the formFollowupir = α + βCovariatei + ir where Covariate is listed to the left in the row Those testsare used to detect selection into the follow-up survey



Appendix Table 8 Effect of omnibus treatment one month later

Ineq v serious Ineq inc Rich deserving Top tax rate

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up

Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144

Notes All outcomes are as defined previously For each dependent variable Col ldquoFirstrdquo is the result from the first survey while ColldquoFollow-uprdquo is the result from the follow-up survey All regressions include our standard controls lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

Appendix Table 9 Effect of omnibus treatment one month later (cont)

Mill tax Estate tax Trust gov Govt scope


Treated -000817 00273 0337lowastlowastlowast 0195lowastlowast -0122lowastlowast -00691 0259 0364lowast

[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8



Appendix Table 10 Bounding effects of attrition (using ldquoliberalrdquo and ldquoconservativerdquo valuesfor outcomes)

Ineq v serious Increase Mill Tax Increase Estate Tax Trust Gov(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)C L C L C L C L

Treated 00666lowastlowastlowast 00980lowastlowastlowast 000915 00503lowastlowastlowast 0284lowastlowastlowast 0310lowastlowastlowast -00232lowastlowast -00221lowastlowast

[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546

Notes All outcomes are as defined previously No controls are included For each dependent variableCol C assumes that all attritors gave the average answer among those who label themselves asconservative or very conservative Col L assumes that all attritors would have given the averageanswer among those who label themselves as liberal or very liberal lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

A di T bl 11 Vi i li d f hi h d l i i d i h ib



Appendix Table 11 Views on inequality and taxes for high- and low-attrition rounds in the omnibus surveys

Ineq v serious Ineq increased Rich deserving Top tax rate Increase Mill Tax Estate tax

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

Treated 00794lowastlowastlowast 0117lowastlowastlowast 00849lowastlowastlowast 0138lowastlowastlowast -000327 -00672lowastlowastlowast 0155 2003lowastlowastlowast 00183 00555lowastlowastlowast 0421lowastlowastlowast 0365lowastlowastlowast

[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]

Control mean 0276 0289 0767 0780 0160 0180 3440 2888 0794 0754 0179 0178Scaled Effect 0278 0387 0475 0615 00118 0209 00131 0203 00487 0108 1761 2396Differential attrition Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low HighObs 1260 1635 1260 1636 1254 1631 1271 1650 1260 1636 1250 1626

Notes All outcomes are as defined previously ldquoDifferential attritionrdquo separates observations according to whether they were in ldquoLowrdquodifferential attrition round (round 4) or in ldquoHighrdquo differential attrition rounds (rounds 1 2 and 3) Otherwise all terminology followsthat in previous tables lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

Appendix Table 12 Opinions on other policies and views of government for high- and low-attrition rounds in the omnibussurveys

Min wage EITC Food stamps Trust gov Scope

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Treated 000695 00408lowast -00199 00260 00203 00197 -00630lowastlowastlowast 0000987 00576 0248lowastlowastlowast

[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]

Control mean 0708 0706 0683 0589 0710 0702 0181 0133 3140 2997Scaled Effect 00227 0129 00679 00808 00490 00451 5724 00311 00441 0195Differential attrition Low High Low High Low High Low High Low HighObs 1254 1631 1254 1631 1254 1631 1259 1635 1260 1636

Notes See previous table lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

3 0



Appendix Table 13 Effect of estate-tax-only treatments on outcome variables

Ineq vs Ineq inc Estate corr Pov vs Deserving Top tax Mill tax Estate Petition Charities Educ pol

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

Treated (Emotional) 00381 -000239 0316lowastlowastlowast 00224 -00247 1595 000123 0289lowastlowastlowast 00313 00421 -00319[00258] [00243] [00263] [00274] [00206] [1121] [00243] [00258] [00208] [00699] [00755]

Treated (Neutral) 00511lowastlowast -00501lowastlowast 0375lowastlowastlowast 00191 -00244 2280lowastlowast -000456 0109lowastlowastlowast 00239 -00214 00157[00259] [00244] [00264] [00276] [00206] [1124] [00244] [00259] [00209] [00701] [00757]

Control mean 0307 0771 0120 0285 0174 3367 0717 0210 0132 1945 3611Scaled Emot Effect 0118 00106 3386 00858 00984 0142 000251 1085 0265 00329 00524Scaled Neutral Effect 0159 0223 4014 00732 00974 0202 000934 0408 0202 00167 00257Obs 1777 1777 1773 1508 1777 1785 1764 1777 1762 1709 1732

Notes The ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment repeats the estate tax slide from the omnibus treatment but eliminates the rest of the treatment Theldquoneutralrdquo treatment is a version of the ldquoemotionalrdquo estate tax treatment that attempts to remove any framing effects All outcomes aredefined as previously ldquoCharitiesrdquo and ldquoEduc polrdquo refer to the ranking (from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest ranking) that respondentsattribute to private charities and education policies as means to redistribute income The lower number of observations in column 4 isdue to the fact that this question was not asked in one smaller wave (sample of 300) lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

3 1



Appendix Table 14 Effect of estate-tax-only treatment on outcome variables (cont)

Min wage Aid Food stamps Housing Trust Govt scope No waste Dem 2014

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated (Emotional) 00529 0109 00982 0236lowastlowastlowast -00164 00172 -00281 00344[00865] [00837] [00861] [00824] [00205] [00585] [00303] [00213]

Treated (Neutral) -00838 00273 00628 0127 -000558 00259 -00587lowast -000310[00870] [00842] [00866] [00829] [00205] [00587] [00303] [00213]

Control mean 2608 2130 1797 1927 0153 3074 1456 0470Scaled Emot Effect 00913 00624 00534 0140 0235 00150 00896 00490Scaled Neutral Effect 0145 00156 00341 00755 00803 00225 0187 000441Obs 1495 1495 1495 1495 1756 1756 1754 1756

Notes See above ldquoNo wasterdquo takes values from 1 to 3 with 1 representing that the government is wasting a lot of tax revenue and 3that the government is not wasting much tax revenue at all Note that the only statistically significant effect for a poverty-relatedoutcome is for increased public housing We speculate that this effect is due to seeing the picture of the mansion in the ldquoemotionalrdquoestate tax treatment (but not in the neutral treatment) The lower number of observations in columns 1-4 is due to the fact that thesequestions were not asked in one smaller wave (sample of 300) lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

3 2



Appendix Table 15 Effect of trust treatment on outcome variables

Ineq v ser Ineq inc Pov v ser Deserving Top tax Mill tax Estate Petition

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00547lowast 00119 -000257 -00555lowastlowast 0490 -00421 -000168 -00602lowastlowast

[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174

Scaled Trust Effect 0182 0341 000828 0204 00452 00949 000728 0580Obs 899 899 899 899 898 899 895 899

Notes The negative trust prime treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that made respondents reflect on aspects of government they dislike All terms are defined as previously lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

Appendix Table 16 Effect of trust treatment on outcome variables (cont)

Min wage Aid Food st Housing Trust Active No waste Dem 2014 Charity Educ pol

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Treated -000428 -0139lowastlowast -0153lowastlowast -0163lowastlowastlowast -00582lowastlowastlowast 00236 -00278 -00462lowast 0187lowastlowast 00615[00902] [00616] [00673] [00614] [00203] [00688] [00346] [00258] [00791] [00885]

Control mean 2673 2675 2454 2581 0125 3031 1423 0479 1800 3732Scaled Trust Effect 000531 0128 0119 0133 1730 00170 0109 00686 0169 0265Obs 899 899 899 899 899 899 898 899 850 874

Notes See above lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

3 3



Appendix Table 17 Effect of ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment on outcome variables

Ineq v ser Ineq inc Pov corr Childpov corr Min wage corr Pov vs Deserving Top tax Mill tax Estate Petition

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

Treated 00783lowastlowastlowast 00410 0258lowastlowastlowast -00717lowastlowast 00676lowastlowast 00885lowastlowastlowast -00131 0484 00316 00149 -00000573[00292] [00258] [00314] [00298] [00341] [00313] [00228] [1268] [00256] [00274] [00252]

Control mean 0337 0775 0442 0363 0302 0296 0173 3447 0728 0276 0184Scaled Poverty Effect 0221 0225 1754 1522 1105 0257 00413 00357 00589 00440 0000390

Obs 1002 1001 999 994 799 799 1002 1002 1001 999 1002Notes The ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living in poverty Respondents weretold about poverty rates and had to fill out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city Respondents were then shownhow their minimum budget compared to the poverty line All outcomes are as defined previously The lower number of observations incolumns 5 and 6 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smaller wave (sample of 200) lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

Appendix Table 18 Effect of ldquoemotionalrdquo treatment on outcome variables (cont)

Min wage Aid Food st Housing Trust Scope No waste Dem 2014 Charity Educ pol

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Treated 00469 0117lowast 0177lowast 00397 -000979 00537 -00655lowast 00120 00608 -0145lowast

[00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211] [00626] [00334] [00234] [00715] [00831]Control mean 2546 2559 1832 2539 0124 3098 1420 0488 1929 3723Scaled Poverty Effect 00449 00714 00866 00291 00931 00352 0210 00181 00333 0204Obs 799 799 799 799 1002 1002 1002 1002 963 981


3 4

A di T bl 19 Eff t f li t t t t i bl



Appendix Table 19 Effect of policy treatment on outcome variables


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

Treated 00405 00206 00353 00369 0228lowastlowastlowast -000637 -000219 2023lowast 00311 -00217 -00222[00279] [00263] [00306] [00302] [00300] [00272] [00219] [1209] [00240] [00258] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0744 0415 0365 0355 0326 0180 3379 0713 0269 0187Scaled Policy Effect 0108 00892 0909 1056 7237 00196 000695 0140 00536 00642 0131

Obs 1111 1111 1105 1107 1110 1111 1111 1111 1110 1110 1111Notes The policy treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living on a minimum wage Respondentshad to fill out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city Respondents were then shown how their minimumbudget compared to the minimum wage and how food stamps adds $150 per personmonth to the budget of such a family All outcomesare as defined previously lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

Appendix Table 20 Effect of policy treatment on outcome variables (cont)


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Treated 0323lowastlowastlowast 0133lowastlowast 0313lowastlowastlowast 0176lowastlowastlowast -00325 00569 -00428 00248 -0137lowast -0117[00949] [00638] [00970] [00636] [00207] [00613] [00308] [00223] [00709] [00797]

Control mean 2546 2559 1832 2539 0149 3097 1394 0484 2025 3699Scaled Policy Effect 0310 00811 0153 0129 0654 00362 0125 00354 00740 0186Obs 806 806 806 806 1111 1111 1111 1111 1068 1085

Notes See above The lower number of observations in columns 1-4 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smallerwave (sample of 300) lowast p lt 01lowastlowast p lt 005lowastlowastlowast p lt 001

3 5




By contrast top income tax rates as well as inheritance tax rates have fallen in theUnited States during this period3 While for institutional reasons the policy viewsof the majority might be ignored by policymakers (Bartels 2009) even more chal-lenging to the modelrsquos predictions is that survey respondents themselves show noincreased demand for redistribution since the 1970s4 If anything the General Social

Survey shows that there has been a slight decrease in stated support for redistribu-tion in the United States since the 1970s even among those who self-identify ashaving below average income (see Figure 1) These trends have led commentatorsto suggest that US residents simply do not care about rising inequality5

There are alternative explanations Americans may be unaware of the extent orgrowth of inequality (see Kluegel and Smith 1986 and Norton and Ariely 2011)

35

4

45

5

55

G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d r e d

u c e i n c o m e d i f f e r e n c e s (

1 minus 7 )

1980 1990 2000 2010

All respondents Self-identified below average income

F983145983143983157983154983141 1 T983144983141 G983151983158983141983154983150983149983141983150983156 S983144983151983157983148983140 R983141983140983157983139983141 I983150983139983151983149983141 D983145983142983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155 (Scale from 1ndash7 GSS )

Notes This figure depicts responses since 1978 in the US General Social Survey (GSS) on whether the governmentshould reduce income differences The empty diamond series is for all respondents while the full circle series is forrespondents with below average income Regression fits are depicted for each series The graph uses the eqwlth vari-able from the GSS (though subtracts it from 8 so that it is increasing in support for redistribution)
















































A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5
















































A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





































A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5


























A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5

















A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






A Data Collection

















II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5











II Data









B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5







B Survey Attrition

T983137983138983148983141 1mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983137983150983140 C983151983149983152983137983154983145983155983151983150 983156983151 O983156983144983141983154 P983151983148983148983145983150983143 983137983150983140 O983150983148983145983150983141 D983137983156983137


(1) (2) (3)



2176 1586










T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5







T983137983138983148983141 2mdashS983157983149983149983137983154983161 S983156983137983156983145983155983156983145983139983155 983142983151983154 983156983144983141 C983151983150983156983154983151983148 G983154983151983157983152 S983152983148983145983156 983138983161 L983145983138983141983154983137983148983155 983137983150983140 C983151983150983155983141983154983158983137983156983145983158983141983155


(1) (2) (3)











T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






T983137983138983148983141 3mdashA983138983145983148983145983156983161 983151983142 C983151983158983137983154983145983137983156983141983155 983156983151 P983154983141983140983145983139983156 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 S983156983137983156983157983155C983151983150983140983145983156983145983151983150983137983148 983151983150 F983145983150983145983155983144983145983150983143 983156983144983141 S983157983154983158983141983161

Coefficient P-value















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5







T983137983138983148983141 5mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 O983149983150983145983138983157983155 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 P983151983148983145983139983161 P983154983141983142983141983154983141983150983139983141983155


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 0931 00502 0357 00648 00325 minus00292 0132 00152[0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00115] [00339] [00125]


























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5























D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5











D Robustness Checks






















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





















T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5









T983137983138983148983141 6mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 F983151983148983148983151983159-U983152 S983157983154983158983141983161 O983150983141 M983151983150983156983144 L983137983156983141983154

Increaseestate tax

Governmentscope

Trustgovernment




Control mean 0180 0179 2995 2910 0122 0128 0283 0218

Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
































T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






























T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5



















T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5







T983137983138983148983141 7mdashR983141983155983157983148983156983155 983142983154983151983149 983156983144983141 E983155983156983137983156983141 T983137983160 S983157983154983158983141983161




Estate taxcorr

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5








T983137983138983148983141 9mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 N983141983143983137983156983145983158983141 T983154983157983155983156 P983154983145983149983141 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155
















Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5










Inequalityincreased

Poverty veryserious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Treated 00783 00410 00885 00469 0117 0177 00397 minus000979[00292] [00258] [00313] [00989] [00665] [0101] [00670] [00211]
























T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





















T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5









T983137983138983148983141 11mdashE983142983142983141983139983156 983151983142 P983151983148983145983139983161 T983154983141983137983156983149983141983150983156 983151983150 O983157983156983139983151983149983141 V983137983154983145983137983138983148983141983155


Povertyvery serious

Minwage

Aidpoor

Foodstamps Housing

Privatecharity

Trustgovernment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


























REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






















REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5










REFERENCES






















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








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Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5




















































Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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where you live


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Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5


























Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5



Web Appendix of























Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5












Political Outcomes



























































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






















































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






































A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5




















A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5








A5 Trust Experiment




















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








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Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5
















wage [01]


















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






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Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5

















































IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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gas

)

Food






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Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






























IDs)








































Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5

















IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





IDs)








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5








































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5



































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5































Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





























Page Break








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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5

























Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





















Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


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cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5












Page Break








your city


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Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5








Page Break








your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






your city


Rent



Food








where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






where you live


Rent


cablephone)



gas

)

Food






questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5




questions




Observations 2417
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00144] [00128] [00114] [0549] [00126] [00140] [00156] [00141] [00141] [00151] [00115] [00339]



2 4





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




2 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5








2 6














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5














Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






Treated 000833 0102 00732 -00160 00589 00195 2440 2674[00809] [00770] [00716] [00786] [00799] [00785] [3602] [3547]

Control mean 0283 0218 0785 0756 0166 0128 3286 3076Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 144 144






[00801] [00803] [00953] [00910] [00611] [00582] [0207] [0200]Control mean 0758 0782 0180 0179 0122 0128 2995 2910Obs 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145


2 8






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5






[00129] [00128] [00120] [00117] [00122] [00121] [000970] [000970]

Control mean 0267 0293 0709 0743 0170 0192 0159 0159Obs 4547 4547 4546 4546 4519 4519 4546 4546







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)


[00248] [00219] [00222] [00176] [00199] [00169] [1031] [0716] [00210] [00187] [00247] [00212]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


[00244] [00210] [00257] [00230] [00240] [00210] [00205] [00169] [00579] [00494]



3 0





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





3 1





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





3 2





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)


[00311] [00289] [00313] [00239] [1326] [00275] [00266] [00236]

Control mean 0343 0755 0383 0185 3470 0722 0204 0174





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 4






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




3 5

Documents

Kuziemko et al. (2015), 'How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution'.pdf