KLEMM Medicine and Moral Virtue in the Expositio Problematum Aristotelis of Peter of Abano

8/12/2019 KLEMM Medicine and Moral Virtue in the Expositio Problematum Aristotelis of Peter of Abano

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MEDICINE AND MORAL VIRTUE IN THE EXPOSITIOPROBLEMATUM ARISTOTELISOF PETER OF ABANO

MATTHEW KLEMM*

University of Nebraska, Kearney

Abstract

This paper examines a set of questions concerning moralia in Peter of AbanosExpositioProblematum (1310) and shows that its author takes a naturalistic ap-

proach, heavily reliant on medical doctrine, to propose that not only the lowervirtues, but also those dependent on the rational soul, are closely tied to physiological states. For the irrational soul, this close connection with the body is notsurprising. However, in the case of the rational virtues, the dependence on thebody is more unusual and offers a significant example of Peters application ofmedical doctrine beyond the established bounds of the discipline. His is a verydifferent approach to human virtue than that of his contemporaries, and it blursthe distinction between moral virtue and natural virtue throughout his exposition

At the same time, this commentary offers insight into Peters broader position onthe soul.

Peter of Abanos readers often remark on his ambitious andeven presumptuous naturalism, which transcends the establishedbounds for a medicus.1 His analyses of medical concepts areunusually philosophical and thorough.2 He is willing to offer

* I am grateful to the De Wulf-Mansion Centre at K.U. Leuven, which suppliedfinancial support for this research through the programPhilosophy between Text andTradition: Petrus de Abano and the Reception of Aristotles Problematain the Middle Ages(Fund for Scientific ResearchFlanders, Grant G.0142.04), and to the GladysKrieble Delmas Foundation. I also thank Pieter De Leemans, Guy Guldentops,Craig Martin, Nancy Struever, and this journals anonymous referees for theirhelpful comments.

1

For Peters biography see: L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and ExperimentaScience, v. II (New York, 1923), 874-939 and E. Paschetto, Pietro dAbano, medico efilosofo (Florence 1984) 19 34 which includes references to Peters writings and


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the EXPOSITIOPROBLEMATUMof peter of abano 303

natural interpretations of issues usually left to theology and evento confront theologians directly, especially in his impassioneddefenses of astrology.3 Other lines of investigation into Peters

thought have been inspired by his alleged role in the origins ofPaduan Averroism, and look at his contributions to philosophi-cal methodology and his doctrine on the intellective soul, areasthat have been closely associated with Averroism. Even whilethese particular charges of Averroism have been dispelled, Pe-ters unusually rich treatments of these subjects have remainedareas of continuing interest. Concerning the methods of natural

philosophy, Peter maintained an appropriately practical doctrinefor a medicus, emphasizing not only the discovery of universalknowledge (scientia), but the application of this knowledge incontingent events.4On the soul, his doctrines have proven unu-sually difficult to pin down, with a confusing array of suggestionsspanning the range of available theories.5 Whatever the precise

Pietro dAbano and Taddeo Alderotti: Two Models of Medical Culture,Medioevo11 (1985), 139-162.

3 Peter often refers derisively to theologians who criticise astrology, callingthem divini hypocriti. See: G. Federici Vescovini, Peter of Abano and astrol-ogy, Astrology, Science and Society: Historical Essays, ed. P. Curry (Woodbridge1987), 19-39 and her introduction toPietro dAbano. Trattati di astronomia: Lucidatordubitabilium astronomiae, De motu octavae sphaerae e altre opere (Padua, 1992). J

Cadden finds Peters analysis of homosexuality to be quite bold: Nothing Natu-ral is Shameful: Vestiges of a Debate about Sex and Science in a Group of Late-Medieval MSS, Speculum 76 (2000), 66-89. D. Jacquart observes that Peter did notseem to let the condemnations of 1277 affect his positions: Moses, Galen and

Jacques Despars: Religious Orthodoxy as a Path to Unorthodox Medical Views,in P. Biller and J. Ziegler, eds., Religion and Medicine in the Middle Ages (York2001), 35-45, at 40-1.

4 See: J.H. Randall, Jr., The Development of Scientific Method in the Schoolof Padua, Journal of the History of Ideas 1 (1940), 177-206, repr. in The School of

Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); W. Wallace, Circularityand the Paduan Regressus: From Pietro dAbano to Galileo Galilei, Vivarium, 33(1995) 76 97; G Federici Vescovini La medicine synthse dart et de science


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nature of his doctrine, it is certain that his thoughts did not passwithout conflict. He was investigated by a Dominican inquisitionin Paris for allegedly maintaining the materialist position that

the intellective soul is brought about from the potency of mat-ter, among other suspect ideas.6 Adding difficulty to interpret-ing his work is that his scholarly output is itself unusual. Althoughmany of his topics are common to other scholastic discourse, hecommented on none of the standard works of medicine or natu-ral philosophy and left no treatises on typical subjects. Instead,he integrated his philosophy into the medical context of the

Conciliator (completed 1310), the encyclopedic work for whichhe is best known.7 This characteristic makes his philosophicaldiscourse difficult to compare with that of his contemporarieson specific doctrinal points and perhaps explains why his doc-trines have been described on the basis of relatively brief ex-cerpts from the Conciliator.8

This paper seeks to clarify our understanding of Peters natu-

ralism and his use of medical doctrine by examining his exten-sive comments to four sections of questions about moral philosophy

6 Conciliator (Venice, 1565), reprint (Padua, 1985), diff. 48, ppt. 3: Et ideoapparet hic erroneus intellectus Jacobitarum me persequentium tamquam posue-rim animam intellectivam de potentia educi materiae, cum aliis mihi 54 ascriptis

erroribus. A quorum manibus gratia dei et apostolica mediante laudabiliter evasi.Peter does not mention other errors specifically, but in diff. 9, ppt. 4, in thecontext of a discussion of astrology, Peter refers to accusations that he had beenderogating divine wisdom, again adding that he had been saved by apostolicintervention. In addition, Thomas of Strasburg, the only known fourteenth-cen-tury witness to the charges against Peter, reports in his Sentences Commentary thatPeter had derided divine miracles by giving a naturalistic explanation of Lazarusbeing raised from the dead. See: Nardi, Intorno alle dottrine filosofiche di PietrodAbano, 21-3, for a discussion of Thomas of Strasburgs claim, and J. Monfasani,

Aristotelians, Platonists, and the Missing Ockhamists: Philosophical Liberty inPre-Reformation Italy, Renaissance Quarterly, 46 (1993), 247-276 for the largercontext of the charges against Peter On the investigations against Peter specifi


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from his Expositio ProblematumAristotelis, a commentary on a col-lection of pseudo-Aristotelian problems. Without presenting asystematic moral theory or psychology, his explanations to these

eclectic questions nevertheless provide a picture of the way physi-ology interacts with moral psychology in Peters thought, whileat the same time offering us broader insight into his doctrine onthe soul. What is revealed in this commentary is that not onlythe lower virtues, but also those dependent on the highest ra-tional faculties are closely tied to physiological states. Moral andintellectual virtue (or vice) closely coincide with the bodys physical

balance. Though there were rich medical traditions concernedwith the mutual passions shared by the body and soul and withthe physical causes of psychological disorders, Peters ambitionto move physiology to the heart of his moral analysis is notable.9

He brings a distinctively medical perspective to these moralproblems, reevaluating dominant philosophical or theologicalapproaches to virtue with an approach that is at once more

material and more attentive to the need for practical interven-tion. As with so many other aspects of his thought, here Peterexhibits his tendency to propose medical philosophy as analternative perspective on philosophical issues of his time. Basedon his material understanding of virtue, it is clear that the Galenicmaxim he frequently quotes in the Conciliator, Whoever wishesto heal the soul, should first heal the body must be taken quite

literally.10

Text and Commentary

The Expositio is one of Peters most significant works, equal inlength to the better known Conciliator, and written over the same

period:11

Peter started the commentary in Paris, probably in the


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1290s, and completed it in Padua in 1310, with perhaps a jour-ney to Constantinople in between.12 As the first Latin commen-tary on this text, it became highly influential for the future

appropriation of the Problemata.13 Peter took an ambitious ap-proach to this project, as is exhibited in the remarkably thor-ough exposition of the text and in his assessment of its philosphicalmeritsnot to mention the erudition he felt was required for itsexposition.14 Peters arguments about the significance of the

the De Wulf-Mansion Centre at K.U. Leuven. The text of particule27-29 used inthis paper is the provisional text for the edition of those sections being preparedby T. Swaenepoel and myself. Text cited from other sections is taken from thefirst edition (Mantua, 1475) with corrections based on the consultation of MSSCesena B. Malatesiana XXIV.Dext.2; Nrnberg SB Cent.III.38; and Paris BN 6541Peters commentary is printed in several early editions, which are listed in A. Blair,The Problemata as a Natural Philosophical Genre, in A. Grafton and N. Siraisieds.,Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe (CambridgeMA, 2000), 171-203. On Peters commentary see: N. Siraisi, The Expositio Proble

matum Aristotelis of Peter of Abano,Isis61 (1970), 321-339; G. Federici Vescovini,Lexpositio succinta Problematum Aristotelis de Pierre dAbano, in P. De Lee-mans and M. Goyens, eds., Aristotles Problemata in Different Times and Tongues(forthcoming, Leuven, 2006), 43-56; C. Burnett, Hearing and Music in Book XIof Pietro dAbanosExpositio Problematum Aristotelis, in N. van Deusen, ed., Tradition and Ecstasy: The Agony of the Fourteenth Century (Ottawa, 1997), 153-90L. Olivieri,Pietro dAbano e il pensiero neolatino: filosofia, scienza e ricerca dellAristotele

greco tra secoli xiii e xiv(Padua, 1988).12 Peter states in the prologue that he traveled to Constantinople to learn

Greek, after he had already been compiling the Expositio for a long time. Thissuggests that, if this trip took place, it happened between his time in Paris andPadua, much later than is usually proposed. See: G. Coucke, P. De Leemans, andM. Klemm, In hoc libro inveniuntur fere totius philosophie sermones: An Analysis, Criti-cal Edition, and Translation of the Prologue of the Expositio Problematumof Peterof Abano, forthcoming.

13 TheProblematacirculated in Paris soon after c. 1260, when it was translatedalmost in its entirety by Bartholomew of Messina (this translation stops in themiddle of section 37 of 38). The text remained without a commentary until Peter

used it as the basis for hisExpositio. Peters commentary was minimally altered byJean of Jandun after 1315 and was the basis a generation later for an abridgement

ib d W l B l d F h l i d b E d


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material found in the Problemata are grounded in his defense ofits Aristotelian authorship.15 On this basis he dismisses the no-tion that the Problemata is merely a medical text, saying that

some (unnamed) people employ the medical categories of naturals,non-naturals, and contra-naturals to divide its 38 sections (or

particule).16 This medical classification, he replies, is inappropri-ate because Aristotle does not use the term natural in such a

way.17Nor does it sufficiently reflect the depth of its philosophi-cal material, which is a compilation of discourses on every branchof philosophy, with the exception of grammar and metaphys-

ics.18 Peter proposes an alternative three-fold division: 1) medi-cal science and the physical nature of man, sections 1-14; 2) theseven liberal arts, sections 15-19; and 3) problems about naturalentities both composite and simple in sections 20-38, which alsoinclude the questions about moralia in sections 27-30.19 Peter

15 Expositio, Prologue: Efficiens siquidem huius scientie fuit Aristotiles peri-pateticus, filius Nicomachi, sapientissimus Grecorum, qui secundum Averroymdignius mereretur dici divinus quam humanus. Neque est quod hic liber nonfuerit Aristotelis sicut abstrahunt quidam mendaciter abnegantes, cum de ipso insecundo Metaurorum ac in plerisque locis Parvorum Naturalium et libris Ani-malium faciat multotiens mentionem, ac in hiis quidem derelicta hoc operecompleantur. On the wider tradition of problem literature, which includes othercollections that circulated under Aristotles name, see: Blair, The Problemataas aGenre; B. Lawn, The Salernitan Questions: An Introduction to the History of Medievaland Renaissance Problem Literature (Oxford, 1963); A. Blair, Authorship in thePopular Problemata Aristotelis,Early Science and Medicine4 (1999), 189-227.

16 Expositio, Prologue: Dividitur autem hic liber in tres partes secundum quos-dam: primo enim determinat problemata rerum existentium contra naturam,secundo naturalium, tertio eorum que sunt non naturalia. As it is used in thisclassification, natural means something innate to the human body; thus every-thing outside of the body is a non-natural or contra-natural, however naturalit might be from a philosophical perspective. On this division see: Ottosson, Scho-lastic Medicine and Philosophy, 253-6.

17 Expositio, Prologue: Amplius verba medicorum proponentes non videntur


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argues that this structure, in particular the decision to beginwith medical questions, is purposeful and reflects Aristotlesepistemology:20 medical problems are fundamental in the pro-

duction of human knowledge because their subjectknowledgeof manis most necessary for our existence and most suited tohuman intellectual abilities.21 Certainly Peters discovery of acoherent structure contrasts with the impressions of most ob-servers who remark the eclectic, disorderly, and unsystematicnature of the text.22The defense of the order and authoritativeorigin of the text has the effect of both enhancing its philo-

sophical value and signalling that the problems will not be treatedas strange and wondrous phenomena, but will be reduced toprinciples. Indeed, irrespective of how bizarre the problems mightbe, Peter proves to possess the scholastic ability to explain justabout anything, imposing order through an array of interpretivetools.

With the logic of the text established, Peter defines the con-

tent of each section with reference to the Aristotelian corpus.For this reason the vocabulary of virtue employed in the Expositiois familiar from other scholastic literature inspired by Aristotlesethical and psychological works. Virtues, according to this ter-minology, are habits of regulating our actions and passions (oremotions) in an excellent manner, defined as the mean betweentwo vices marked by excess and insufficiency. Through the pos-

session of the virtuous habits we are able to overcome the pas-sions that inspire vice and to achieve happiness, the final goal ofethics. The habits are divided into the irrational and rational,following this division in the soul, but must all correspond insome way to a rational principle to be truly virtuous. In the

20

This epistemology more accurately reflects Peters own, which he describesin the Conciliator, Diff. 8. On Peters epistemology, see the studies cited in note 321 Expositio Prologue: Scias quoque incepisse Aristotelem tractare questiones


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Problemata, sections 27-30 progress from the lower to the highervirtues. The irrational virtues are represented by the commondivision between the irascible (aggressive) habit of courage in

section 27 and the concupiscible (desiring) habits of conti-nence and temperance in section 28. These are followed by asection about justice and the rational habits, including prudence,intellect, and wisdom.

Despite the familiarity of this moral vocabulary, the questionsin the Problemata are very different from the preoccupations inthe faculties of arts and theology at Paris.23 In fact, without the

benefit of Peters arguments, it would not be obvious that theyare about moral philosophy at all. The dominant issues of thetime, notably the debate about the primacy of the will or intel-lect in motivation, are hardly represented in the questions.24

There is rarely a distinction made between actions that havenatural or physiological causes, actions that are completed outof habit, and those that are rationally chosen and willed. In

short, the role of intention (in the modern sense), a matter ofconsiderable importance to Peters contemporaries, is muted inthe naturalistic approach of the text and commentary. For themedieval commentators on Aristotle, that an action is in some

way willed defines it as moral rather than natural.25 Yet, thisgeneric distinction is rarely acknowledged in Peters Expositio;only the final goal of achieving happiness through the perfec-

tion of the virtues remains intact. It is difficult to characterizethe problems from these sections, but their starting point is typi-cally the physical signs and symptoms which accompany varioustypes of virtuous and vicious emotion and behavior. The analysisof these questions in the Aristotelian text is generally not what

we would call moral or psychological, but rather implicates materialand efficient causes in the body. Because of this characteristic of

the Problemata, common to the genre of problem literature as a


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whole, it can justifiably be asked whether Peter is simply follow-ing the spirit of his text or whether we are actually hearingPeters voice. While this question can be asked of any commen-

tary, in this case it can be satisfactorially answered by close atten-tion to the text. Peters rich descriptions of every element ofeach question offer many opportunities to gauge his opinion.The frequent doubts, digressions, and clarifications are particu-larly useful for identifying Peters own point of view. Throughthese and more subtle means, he does not hesitate to steer theinterpretation in a specific direction. For this reason, even when

Peter simply echoes or minimally amplifies the position of thetext (as is frequently the case in the examples from particula27),it is fair to assume that he generally agrees with the position.The numerous instances where Peter misunderstands difficultpassages are instructive as well, because they often reveal hisassumptions and expectations about the meaning of the text.26

Even if one considers the physiological bent of the Problemata

and the numerous available loci within the Aristotelian corpusfor the physiology of human motivation, Peters approach tomoral virtue in theExpositiois unusually attentive to the materialconditions necessary for virtuous behavior and reliant on medi-cal doctrine for this approach. Moral psychology is examined asit is manifested in the physical state of the body and governedby physiological laws. Peters insistence that these are moral

questions signals that this is a very different approach to humanvirtue than that of his contemporaries, blurring the distinctionbetween moral virtue and natural virtue throughout the com-mentary.

Particula 27: Irascible Virtue

Why do the fearful tremble? Is it because of cooling? For theirh t i l ki d i t t d th t i l th


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which open the section about the irascible virtue of courage(fortitudo)are apt representatives of the material here, in whichsuch symptoms of fear (timor) are the subject of seven of the

eleven questions.28 To the trembling and loose bowels of thefearful, other symptoms are added in subsequent problems: peoplein a state of fear are sometimes thirsty (27.2); their pulse is weakand sputtering (27.3); their faces turn pale (27.3); their voicesquiver, and their lower lip and hands tremble (27.6 and 27.7);they emit coller (bile) in their urine and their testicles contract(27.7 and 27.11), and the truly terrified may even emit semen

(27.11). The courageous, on the other hand, frequently are lov-ers of wine (27.4), who are also sometimes extremely thirsty andtremble, but for different reasons than the fearful (27.3).

This list of the symptoms of fear and courage function as thesigns that lead to their natural causes, which are provided by thephysiological theory of the bodys complexionthe balance ofthe four primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, and drywhich was

the primary tool for explaining the bodys natural change.29Petersexplanations, guided by those in the Aristotelian text, rely onthe fluctuation in the intensity of these qualities. Further elabo-ration is supplied by medical doctrine about the movement ofthe humors and spirits through which the qualities are trans-ferred.30Based on this physiology, fear is the result of the move-

tionem? Deficit enim calidum et contrahitur; propter quod et ventres solvunturmultis.

28 Expositio, 27.1: Determinat igitur primo problemata circa habitum mo-ralem, qui est fortitudo vel audacia et eius oppositum, puta timor. Fortitudo enim

virtus est, illa vero vitium (Ethicorum tertio).... Est autem fortitudo, de qua sermovirtus per quam activi sunt bonorum operum in periculis ut lex precipit et legi

obsequentes, rhetoricorum primo. Audacia vero et timor contrarium. Ipse tamenid notat motu interveniente de partibus extrinsecis ad intrinseca sicut audaciamagis econtra Vel fortitudo est virtus irascibilis non facile obstupescibilis a timori


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ment of heat from the exterior parts of the body to the interior;recklessness (audacia) is caused by the opposite movement, asthe heat expands outward from the heart to the exterior of the

body.31 Courage is also the result of the expansion of heat, butpresumably to a lesser extent. He refines these general defini-tions in the explanation of each symptom.

The trembling of the timentesoccurs mostly in the extremitiesand the surface of the body because the heat abandons theseparts first, leaving the afflicted person unable to control theaffected parts, as when someone strains to raise (sublevare) his

hands while suffering a bad disposition.32 This trembling hap-pens first and most severely in the lower lip and hands becausethey have the least amount of blood of all the parts of the body(with the exception of the eyes).33The paleness in the face andtrembling of the voice are caused by the loss of heat, spirits andblood from the upper parts of the bodys surface, extremitiesand chest.34The (involuntary) loosening of the bowels indicates

that the sudden contraction of heat can be more precisely lo-cated in the lower part of the torso, heating and loosening thatarea.35The thirst of the fearful is also explained by the location

31 Expositio, 27.1: Solvit, dicens causam [timoris] esse propter infrigidationempartium que sunt exterius, calido ab eis separato et ad inferiora intrinseca con-

festim contracta. And again: 27.1 Audacia vero et timor contrarium. Ipse tamenid notat motu interveniente de partibus extrinsecis ad intrinseca sicut audaciamagis econtra.

32 Expositio, 27.1: Proponit igitur primo, dicens quare timentes membra suanon possunt regere et quietare, sed passionem incurrunt que dicitur tremor, inquo est motus non naturalis causatus ex natura membrorum conanti sublevareet prava dispositione ipsius subprimere.

33 Expositio, 27.7: Assignat causam quare labium et manus contremescuntdicens id esse quia labium inferius et manus sunt mobilissima post oculos, cum

sint musculosiora, quasi nihil participant sanguine respectu aliarum partiuminteriorum, quo quis defenditur a rigore propter calidum. Quantum enim mem-b d i t t h b t d lid (C l i i ) it i it


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of the heat inside: despite the exterior cooling, part of the inte-rior is hot, thus the sensation of thirst arises, even if it is notproperly thirst.36 The thirst of brave people however is much

stronger. This is because the heat is not only much greater inthe brave, but the heat collects further up in the torso aroundthe heart, causing the blood and spirits to boil up.37The differ-ence in the pulse in anger and in fear also indicates the activityof the heat. In fear, the pulse sputters like a fire lacking venti-lation while in anger the heat around the heart is amply venti-lated and increases.38

Problem 27.3 compares anger (ira) and joy (gaudium) to fearand courage, further clarifying the irascible movement of heatin the body, and asking why, when the heat collects inside inangry people, they become more hot and excessively bold (audaces),but the opposite happens in fear.39Referring to GalensDe accidentiet morbo, Peter first clarifies the difference between these pas-sions, noting that it is not exactly correct to say that the heat and

moisture are collected inside in anger, rather this is partly true,but at the same time the heat is sent outward. The outwardtendency of anger is manifested by an appetite for vengeance;

36 Expositio, 27.2: Solvit primo quasi distinctione, dicens ad motivum quodfrigiditas et caliditas in eis non sunt secundum eundem locum sed diversum, quia

frigiditas est in superficie. Caliditas vero circa interiora conculcata quare calefacitin loco ubi est. 27.3: non proprie sitis, dicens quod licet timentibus accidataliqualis esiccatio superficialis sanguine confugiente introrsum. Non tamen di-cendum proprie sitis.

37 Expositio, 27.4: Solvit primo assignans causam quesiti, dicens id esse quiailli qui sunt fortes animosi sunt calidi. Huiusmodi autem caliditas existit maximecirca pectus in concavitate cordis in quibus sanguis ebullit et spiritus. Circa quemlocum videtur timor adesse, cum infrigidatio quedam occurerit. Quare in ti-mentibus calidum minus permanet circa cor. Ymo infrigidatio ad ipsum ascendit

cum in timore calidum non solum coadunetur interius in ipso corde, ymo inferiustendat magis sub diafragmate, ut apparebit in sequenti. Sic itaque tantum habi-

d f i i lidi h b h i


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meanwhile the heat retained inside around the heart acts as anatural defence mechanism, protecting the heart.40For this rea-son, he notes, nobody dies from an overabundance of anger, as

they can from fear and joy when the heat abandons the heartin fear it moves lower and in joy it gets dispersed everywhere.41

The differences in the movement of the heat defines each ofthese passions.

These physiological explanations may not seem particularlymoral, especially since most of these passions and resultingactions are done without choice, as Peter often points out. The

essentially physiological and irrational causes of these actionsare emphasized in problem 27.10, which compares the irasciblemovement of heat in the body to the movement of an animal,acting solely by an impulse to pursue or flee and without rea-son.42The involuntary nature of this behavior is a point of con-tinual emphasis in Peters commentary, even when it is notmentioned in the text. In 27.9, the question asks why it is thatthe fearful are silent while those in pain cry out, since fear seemsto be a type of pain.43 The difference results from the fact that

40 Expositio, 27.3: Dicendum quod in ira calidum et humidum partim emit-titur extra et partim retinetur. Emittitur quidem ut appareat appetitus vindicte,

secundum vero partem retinetur circa cor ut id tanquam a re defendatur summasi expediat. Scit enim natura rebellionem habere foras quare conservat sibi cali-dum defensivum multum circa cor.

41 Expositio, 27.3: Et ideo nunquam aliquis mortuus est ex ira (quinto DeAccidenti). In timore vero calor tantum emittitur intra propter deiectionem quamtimet ab exterioribus omnifariam, sed in gaudio totaliter foras. Natura enim totase ad extra expandit cum non sentiat impugnatorem et plures iam mortui suntpusilanimes ex timore ac gaudio. He adds later in the same problem that inspir-ing anger in people who are near death because of cold is a good way to revive

them, according to Haly Abbas: Et ideo possunt seipsos reviviscere cum fuerintinfrigidati et quasi extinctioni propinqui, et per consequens concitari vehementer


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that this is not because they are afraid, but that their courageand the impending battle have created a disturbing inequalityin their bodies complexions. Misunderstanding the text slightly,

Peter assumes that the soldiers are afraid, but not so much thatthey are stupefied, so they bludgeon themselves to heat the bloodand spirits in their bodies and thereby make themselves brave.Far from being a distinctively human reaction, he notes that thisbehavior is also found in lions, who use their tails for the samepurpose.48

Although it is not mentioned by Peter, it is interesting to compare

Aristotles comments in Nicomachean Ethics, 3 to the effect thatcourage caused by physiology cannot truly be called the moral

virtue of courage.49But Peter does not make a moral distinctionbetween physiology and rational choice as causal agents here,nor is it clear that he would ever make such a distinction. Com-plexion for Peter is both the immediate environment of actionand potential for action shared by the body and soul and the

instrument through which action is brought about. Courageappears in this commentary as a kind of habituation of the bodyand maintenance of the qualities, specifically a healthy amountof heat, presumably produced more by regimen and physicalmanipulation than by rational consideration.

Particula 28: Concupiscible Virtue

The short particula 28 continues the virtues of the sensitive soulwith eight questions on the concupiscible virtues and vices oftemperance, intemperance, continence, and incontinence,50

where again the physiological causes of desire are prominent.

48 Expositio 27 3: Licet timorem aliquem incurrant non tamen stupefiunt et


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Peter gives the standard Aristotelian definitions of these moralterms, clarifying that continence and temperance are distincthabits,but that only temperance is a true virtue, a definition that

seems to ignore the condemnation of 1277, when this meaningof continence was censured.51 Continence falls short of virtuebecause a continent person still suffers the passion of desire forillicit pleasures, but resists;52 a temperate person, however, is soconstituted that such pleasures have become undesirable.53 In-continence and intemperance mirror these definitions: for theincontinent, reason has forbidden illicit behavior, but he is unable

to resist passiononce the weakness subsides he feels remorseand there is still hope for such a person to be cured.54 Theintemperate is almost completely beyond cure because he is fullydirected toward the wrong actions.55The five senses are the mainfocus of these questions because the corporeal desires governedby concupiscible habits are sensual, especially sensual pleasuresrelated to touch and taste, which is why we call people inconti-

nent and intemperate especially in regard to these two senses.56

51 Quod continentia non est essentialiter virtus, is item 168 in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, eds. (Paris, 1889-91),I: 543-55. Aquinas also used continence in this manner prior to 1277, e.g. SummaTheologiae II-II. 155. 1, resp. For Aristotles definitions see: Nicomachean EthicsBook 7 and 1146a10-16 in particular.

52 Expositio, 28.1: Continentia vero est habitus concupiscibilis, secundumquam retinet ratione concupiscentiam moventem ad pravas fruitiones delecta-tionum.

53 Expositio, 28.1: temperantia sit virtus concupiscibilis secundum quaminappetibiles fiunt circa fruitiones pravarum delectationum.

54 Expositio, 28.1: Incontinentia vero est malitia concupiscibilis secundumquam eligunt pravas delectationes prohibente rationali. Cuius siquidem operaprohibente rationali fruitiones delectabilium eligere et suspicare melius esse nonparticipare ipsis, participare autem nihilominus scire oportere operari bona et

conferentia, recedere autem propter delectationes ab ipsis. Consequitur autemincontinentie mollities, penitudo, et sanatio.55 E p iti 28 1 I t ti t liti i ibili d


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Peters tone is more judgmental and moralistic than in the pre-vious section, repeatedly indicating his contempt for the indis-cretions of touch and taste as well as his insistence on the

importance of sensual virtue for human perfection.57 The sensi-tive soul, when properly ordered and enjoyed, is the means tohuman virtue, but it is through lust (the pleasure of touch) andgluttony (taste) that we are most like beasts, who share ourenjoyment of touch and taste alone among the senses.58 Thepleasures of these senses are insidious because they so thoroughlypreclude the use of the rational faculties: Desire concerning

[touch and taste] is among other things which greatly obscureand disturb the reason. For the whole man is made bestial, sincehe is less obedient to reason than even the irascible.59

Like the irascible vices, the desires of touch and taste havephysical causes, produced by excess and deficiency in the quali-ties. Thus thirst is the dual desire for cooling and humidity,caused by the opposite state in the body, and also a desire for

nutrition. Desire for food is less powerful.60The cause of sexual

maxime secundum hos duos sensus puta tactum et gustum? In addition to thequestions about the senses, this section also includes a question about inordinatelaughter (28.8), which Peter misinterprets in a rather humorous manner, andanother about why people who are habitually intemperate become ill when theysuddenly adopt a more moderate regimen (28.1), which is an opportunity for Pe-

ter to explain the principle that habit becomes a second nature.57 E.g.,Expositio, 28.2: Et ideo aut soli hii, aut maxime inter ceteros, suntvituperosi et abhominabiles. Et propterea non inmerito nequeuntes resisteredelectationibus, que per eos, sed potius captivati, vincuntur ab eis, vituperamusnon parum dicentes: Quomodo dimittitis vos vinci a tam pravis delectationibusadeo momentaneis? Quod ut ad multum ostendit, penitentia et abhominatiosubsequentes. Unde incontinentes vocamus et luxuriosos, eo quod vincantur abhuiusmodi delectationibus pravis bestialibus. The contempt is also registered in28.3, and 28.7.

58

Expositio, 28.2: Solvit, dicens causam esse propter delectationes que fiuntin hiis sensibus, nobis et animalibus communes, quantumcumque imperfectiscum omnibus animalibus necessario hii duo insint sensus


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desire is only invoked without being fully explained in thisparticula(probably because it is discussed in much greater detail inparticula4), when he mentions the tendency of adolescents to be espe-

cially stimulated to sex, because they are most molested byconcupiscent passions.61 It is clear from Peters tone throughoutthis section that these physiological explanations do not miti-gate Peters judgment of the depravity of bestial pleasures of lustand gluttony.62

If excessive pleasure in touch and taste is especially reprehen-sible, on the other hand appropriate enjoyment of the three

higher senses is essential to the development of the distinctivelyhuman virtues.63Borrowing a hierarchy of the senses from Galen,Peter explains that touch and taste (even when used virtuously)produce only our mere existence (esse); smell, hearing and sight,on the other hand, are productive of the virtues which give us

well-being (bene esse).64 They should not only be used, but en-

corpus. Cibus autem nutrit solummodo. Necessarior igitur potus; difficilius itaqueabstinetur ab eo. 28.7 specifies the physical location of the desire for food:delectatio circa cibum, quidam habent eam magis in lingue superiori pellicula,propter multam eius sensibilitatem. Alii vero non solum in ea, sed amplius pertotum guttur. Which is further specified as the spatium cum os aperitur et lin-gua deorsum plicatur, quod apparet ante foramina epiglotis et isofagi cum parteetiam ipsius aliquali

61

Expositio, 28.4: Iuvenes enim a concupiscentiis maxime molestantur.Stimulantur namque ad venerea maxime.62 Cadden discusses this issue more fully concerning Peters natural explana-

tion of homosexuality in Nothing Natural is Shameful.63 Expositio, 28.7: Nosce etiam quod potest alia causa dari quare animalium

alia sensibus ceteris a tactu et gustu non gaudent nisi per accidens: quia cumhomo sit sapientissimum animalium et prudentissimum (Politicorum primo etsecundo De Anima) indiguit instrumentis quibus posset sapientiam et prudentiamexercere. Huiusmodi autem sunt visus, auditus et odoratus, ut apparet De Sensu

et Sensato.64 Expositio, 28.7: Nota quod circa tactum contingit potissime delectari, con-sequenter circa gustum deinde odoratum postea auditum et tandem circa visum


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joyed, because their enjoyment is fundamental for acquiringprudence and wisdom and the other higher virtues. Animals,Peter explains, do not take pleasure in sight, smell, or hearing

(except accidentally), because they have no rational virtues todevelop. As more noble creatures than the other animals, hu-mans ought to order their lives toward higher virtues, since it isespecially contemptible for a noble creature to partake in lessnoble virtues.65

Peters argument for the necessity of the appropriate sensualhabits as the basis for rational virtue has a polemical tone on

occasion. Notably, this thesis is not explicit in the Aristoteliantext, but is only brought forth in the commentary. It is a themeechoed in the Conciliator, where Peter occasionally refers deri-sively to the thesis that human perfection is only achieved in apure intellectual state abstracted from the senses.66In response,he frequently cites the Aristotelian maxim that nothing is in theintellect that was not first in the senses, stressing the depend-

ence of the intellect on the sensual soul.67At the same time, hisfocus on the habituation of the base desires as the path to virtuedistinguishes Peters approach from his contemporaries, espe-cially among those who place moral virtue in the perseveranceof the will over passion. Our inability to resist these passionscombined with the necessity of doing so points to a role for thephysician in moral development, as the higher virtues arise from

physical balance.68 This theme becomes more evident in thefollowing sections, where the higher virtues are treated.

Particula 29: Justice

Prefacing the problems of particula 29, Peter defines a unusual

taxonomy of justice in an effort to incorporate the medical cat-egory of natural justice, the most temperate physical balance


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virtues of the rational soul, again unusual, since Aristotle hadcounted it among the moral virtues.69As is often the case whenPeter varies from Aristotle, he does not advertise his divergence.

To defend these strange divisions, Peter is forced to rely on arather tortured use of authorities. He first gives a common defi-nition from Justinian that justice is a constant and enduring

will, distributing its law to each person.70 Will, he adds, con-sists of right reason, hence its inclusion among the rational

virtues.71Next, Peter divides justice into two types: (quasi)-natu-ral and positive, the distinction commonly used for law (ius).72

As evidence for these two types, he is only able to conjure asingle passage from [pseudo]-Seneca, which vaguely implies acategory of natural justice.73 Otherwise the authorities are si-lent because these categories were not used for justice. Aristotlealso defines two types of justice: a general sense in which it isidentical with the excellent use of all other virtue, and a particu-lar sense in which it is a virtue moderating various types of social

interaction, further subdivided into distributive and communitivejustice.74Peter identifies Aristotles particular meaning of justice

69 Expositio, 29.1: Determinatis problematibus, que circa appetitum sensitivumconsistunt, nunc magis ea, que circa rationalem, ut iusticiam primo. Secundocirca prudentiam, intellectum et sapientiam sequenti particula [30]. AlthoughPeter seems to back away from this classification at the beginning of particula30

See: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.70 Expositio, 29.1: Est namque constans et perpetua voluntas, ius suum uni-cuique tribuens. This definition comes from the Institutes of Justinian, but wascommonly quoted without attribution, e.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2.2, 58, 1

71 Expositio, 29.1: Voluntas vero in ratione propria constat. Peter is eithersimply defending his inclusion of justice among the rational virtues, or perhapshe mentions both will and reason to avoid taking a side in this debate.

72 Expositio, 29.1: Videtur autem iustitia duplex: una quidem naturalis quasi,altera vero positiva.

73

Expositio, 29.1: Quod indicat Seneca, De Verborum Copia: Iustitia est na-ture tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa et est divina lex et vincu-l i t ti h


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with his own category of positive justice, implying that Aristo-tles general meaning of justice is identical with his own natu-ral, although this is left unstated. These categories are not used

by Aristotle or his commentators. Otherwise Peters further sub-divisions of the particular meaning of justice are exactly as theyappear in the Nicomachean Ethics.75Because the general sense of

justice encompasses the other virtues, it is also closely related tothe concupiscible and irascible virtues. Ideally justice guides theselower actions, but as we saw in the previous section, it is thepassions in the body and lower parts of the soul that most inter-

fere with reason. The effect is that Peters approach to justice inthis commentary is quite physiological, again focusing on quali-tative balance in the body and the habits of the lower levels ofthe soul as a prerequisite for possessing the virtue of justice.

Peter invokes the idea of natural justice to explain Problem29.6, which asks why it is that man is the most unjust of animalsdespite his education.76He observes that justice, taken strictly as

a rational power, cannot properly be attributed to other animalswho lack reason; they possess it only by a certain similarity. Butusing the medical notion of natural justice, it is possible to makethis comparison. He defines it as the ideal complexion whichenables a creature to accomplish all the actions appropriate foritself.77

It is possible to say that the natural justice I previously mentioned [29.1],

is in other animals. When they have the quantities and qualities of the ele-ments sufficient for accomplishing their activities, they are called ad iustitiam according to Galen and Haly Abbas. (But Avicenna only posits thecomplexion of justice in the human race).78

untarium. Et istius adhuc quoddam occultum, ut furtum, mechia, veneficium, acfalsum testimonium et alterum violentum vel manifestum, ut verberatio, vincu-lum, mors, rapina, etcetera.

75 See Nichomachean Ethics, 30b30-31a9.76 Problemata, 29.6 [this is problem 29.7 in early editions of this text as well as


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This natural notion of justice helps dissolve the problem. If jus-tice is conceived as the proper use of every available naturalfaculty, human justice requires the use of reason. Yet humans

are constantly prevented from the use of their reason by sensi-tive and bestial passions. In fact, paradoxically it is the posses-sion of higher faculties that ensures that the will and reason willoften be corrupted: the mere thought of illicit pleasures cannotbe accomplished without injusticei.e. passions and physicalimbalance.79 Even though humanity as a genus participates inreason and justice, it is nevertheless unjust because it does not

use them often.80 Animals, being more likely to perform theirproper tasks, are more just by this definition. Peters use of themedical notion of the just complexion again blurs the distinc-tion between the virtues of humans and those of animals, andhence the virtues of the rational soul and those of the sensitivesoul (also possessed by animals).

One result of Peters physiological approach to justice is that

he often misses the distinction between different causes of mo-tivation when it is made in the Aristotelian text. This seems tobe the case in problem 29.12, where the text considers why adefendant should have an advantage over an accuser in court.The crucial distinction in the text of the question is between anoffence inspired by passion, as many crimes are, and an offencecommitted with prior intent, which a false accusation always is

according to the text. Intent makes the false accusation a greaterinjustice than the act inspired by passion. Peter fails to see thisas the crucial distinction (in an admittedly difficult text), andinstead explains that unjust accusations often arise from passionperverting the reason. Anger, lust, and even love pervert thetruth of human judgment, apparently inspiring poorly judgedaccusations.81


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Peter similarly misses the distinction in the commentary toproblem 29.9, another text which he struggles to understandbecause of the compressed translation. Peter paraphrases this

question as Why, if a sick person associates with a healthy per-son, or a weak person with a strong person, or a worse person

with a better person, the one is not caused to be like the other,i.e. that person in whom these qualities exist, namely healthy,strong, and good?82Peter explains that the vices (sickness, weak-ness, timidity, and wickedness) exist in a state of mutation andchange. For their subjects do not quietly possess them, but they

always change, until they corrupt them, since their existence isvery distant from the mean, which is the root of virtue.83 Thevirtues are different, because they are permanent and inalter-able.84Peter fails to recognize the distinction probably intendedin the question between physical virtues, such as health, whichcannot be transferred by mere social contact, and the virtues ofthe soul, which can be learned from social interaction with vir-

tuous people. Instead the distinction he proposes is betweenthe balance and dispassion of the virtuous habits and the muta-bility and passion of the vices. With this he offers a physicalexplanation for why the virtues cannot be learned: a balancedhabit does not transfer its qualities to another, thus destroyingits own balance.85 Peter goes on to criticize the efficacy of ab-stract precepts for instilling moral virtue.86 Moral philosophy is

ut apparet in actu venereo; vel propter amorem, quia amor et odium pervertunthominis iudicii veritatem (in Centiloquio).

82 Expositio, 29.9 [29.10]: Quare si quis infirmantium copuletur sano autdebili forti vel deterior meliori, non propter hoc redditur unusquisque talisqualis ille cui hec non sunt: puta sanus, fortis, et bonus? Quod ostendit, dicensquod habitus acquiritur infirmo, debili vel pravo si coniungatur temperato vel

sano, iusto sive forti et bono.83 Expositio, 29.9 [29.10]: Solvit, dicens causam fore quia quedam horum sintopposita predictorum habentium ut infirmitas debilitas sive timiditas et malicia


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misguided because it attempts to teach moral doctrine directly,when in fact virtue is acquired by the slow development of natu-ral virtue and habituation of the body through actions.87

Although Peter does not distinguish the source of motivationin the case of just actions (reason, habituation, qualities), theexistence of physical passion is important for the evaluation ofsome particular vicious actions, playing a large role in determin-ing moral praise and blame. As in earlier particulae, the qualita-tive state of the body is the cause of desire; by understandingthis physiology, we are in a better position to evaluate unjust

action. Thus in problem 28.4 (even if Peter simply follows histext here), the relative moral value of justice and continence isinformed by physiology: youths are praised for being continent,

while the old are praised for being just, because the young aremore stimulated to sexual pleasure.88Praise and blame are givenaccording to what desires are molesting us the most, and desireis determined by what excesses or defects are present in the

body at any point. A more specific example is in 29.12, whichasks why a defendant in court wins if the votes are equally di-

vided.89 Here, Peter argues that the physical symptoms of fearshould be an important factor for the way justice is rendered inthe courtroom; so the defendant, who is more afraid, is right tohave an advantage. Terrified defendants are apt to forget things

malus non redditur bonus et timidus fortis etiam inquiescendo a pravis, vel etiamusi ratione studiosa audiendo. Immo se oportet in illis exercere, quoniam exfrequenti bene agere fimus boni, sicut ex frequenti citarizare citariste (secundoEthicorum). Si enim solum admonitiones audiret, et cum hoc etiam disceret, nonoperans iam scientiam moralem naturalem constituens quod negatum est. Se-cundo, Ethicorum: non enim eorum negotium est contemplationis gratia utsciamus quid est virtus, sed ut boni efficiamur.

87 This criticism of dogmatic moral philosophy is echoed in the ConciliatorDiff 3, ppt. 3: in [moralia] doceantur mores et virtutes directe naturales. Ac-


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and not represent themselves properly due to their passion.90

Commenting further (on a text he again does not understandvery well), Peter remarks that if someone is accused of a serious

crime, it is justifiable if they do not present themselves in court.In this case, fear of torture is an understandable reason not toappear in court:91 The judge should take the nature, actions,and habits into account and consider whether passion has un-dermined the defendants ability to reasonably defend himself.92

Another example of this is problem 29.13 (yet another prob-lem with which Peter has some trouble), which asks why the

penalty is worse for theft from a public place than from a privatehouse.93 Peters discussion of this law is again based on physiol-ogy. It seems, he suggests, that the penalty for public theft oughtto be less than for private, because the temptation is greater,and where there is greater temptation, the crime is more under-standable and the punishment should be reduced.94For the same

90 Expositio; 29.12 [29.13]: Id declarat in timidis, dicens quod si aliquis con-sideret in reos timidos multociens inveniet, quod multa derelinquuntur in dictissuis probationibus, que oporteret eos dicere aut oppinari esse pro ipsis, queobmittunt exterminati timore et agonia quam patiuntur, quia rei secundum pluri-mum semper sunt in maioribus periculis et agonibus valde quam actores. Propterquod, si cum hoc, quod derelinquunt proferre vel exterminare propter timoremin eorum subsidium et cum hoc accusationes eorum adequantur et numeri tes-tium et signa probationibus actoris tunc est manifestum iudicanti, qui ad nullam

partium contradictionis debet inclinari, ut apparet primo De Anima et expri-mitur Primo Prima. Nullum igitur debet latere quod, si rei non derelinquerentcirca probationes ipsorum, obmittentes que sunt necessaria, quod mox iudi-caretur pro eis contra actorem. Non tamen propter hoc, etiam si iudex sciat, quodobmittunt, que deberent dicere, habet omnino pro eis iudicare, quia is debetiudicare secundum allegata, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Sed locoistius dat dilationes et deliberationes ad considerandum, que habent dicere etrespondere contra accusatorem.

91 Expositio; 29.12 [29.13]: Nosce quod, si aliquis non representat se in iudicio

propter timorem tormentorum, carcerum, et huisumodi, ordinavit legislator, utnon in tantum puniatur, sicut si presentati fuerint contra eos, manifeste pro-b d f d


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peccatum. Sed ille, qui furatur in loco communi, minus peccat eo, qui furatur inproprio. Quod probatur, quia ubi maior datur occasio peccandi, ibi debet minorpena infigi, ut apparuiut quarto precedenti [particule].

95 Expositio; 29.13 [29.14]: Nam si adolescens puniatur, minori debet puniripena quam senex. See also problem 28.4.

96 Expositio; 29.13 [29.14]: ad probationem respondendum, quod, licet inloco communi prima fronte maior videatur esse causa et inclinatio ad peccandum,non tamen secundum veritatem. Considerando ulterius penam mortis, quam latorlegis instituit, si quis in hoc deprehendatur ingenians se in modum nature ad

excessum uniuscuiusque.97 Expositio; 29.13 [29.14]: Et confirmatur, quia dicunt deum non fuisse mi-t ti L if i t i d h i i i ill ll t

reason we dont punish youths as much as old men, who are notso impelled by their passions.95However, the great temptation tosteal from a public place is exactly the justification for the death

penalty: just as nature balances one excess with another, thedesire to steal is quickly cooled by consideration of the harshpenalty.96 Dispassionate crime is always a greater transgression.This explains why they say God did not forgive Lucifers sin asHe does that of a man or a woman: Lucifer had no externalcause to inspire passion.97

Particula 30: Intellect

Particula30 concludes this set of questions with the rational habitsof scientia, ars, prudence, intellect, and wisdom, of which I willfocus on the intellect. The common interpretation of Aristotles

Nicomachean Ethicsamong philosophers at this time was to under-

stand intellectual virtue to be the highest possible human per-fection and happinessthe final goal of ethical inquiry.98 Peteroften refers to this conception of mans highest goal, even if he

was critical of what he regarded as exclusive focus on the intel-lect to the neglect of the lower virtues.99 Because, among medi-


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quod felicitas est triplex: Quedam est vera, que extat in nobili operatione, putaintellectiva, respectu nobilis obiecti, ut intelligibilis, que est vere hominis propria

operatio, secundum quam est quid divinum. (De quo Ethicorum, 10).100 Expositio, 30.4 [also 30.4 in early modern editions, but 30.5 in moderneditions]: Ipsa [anima intellectiva] enim non dependet a corpore saltem quan-

eval scholars the intellect was normally taken to have no corpo-real component, we might expect there to be a less explicitconnection between physiology and intellectual virtue than for

the virtues in the previous sections. And indeed, Peter states thatthe intellect (by which he probably means the agent intellect)does not depend on the body for its essence.100 Despite thisobligatory pronouncement about the ontological status of theintellective soul, the remainder of Peters comments show a greatsensitivity to the connection between physiology and rational

virtue when it comes to its actuality and operation. By making a

series of additions and qualifications, Peter consistently directsthe interpretation of the text to suggest instead not only a closeconnection between physical and intellectual development, butalso that intellectual virtue arises out of the virtues of the irra-tional soul and a temperate physical balance.

The most significant discussion of the development of intel-lectual virtue occurs in problem 30.4 [30.5], one of the two

questions which Peter judges to be about the intellect per se.101

The original text asks why it is that we have a greater intellectualcapacity when we are old, but that we learn faster when we are

young, a text which could easily be interpreted to distance theoptimal use of the intellect from the healthier physical qualitiespossessed by younger people.102 His interpretation begins whenhe rephrases the question: he comments that by the old (senes),

Aristotle means prima senectus, a period Peter places immedi-ately after youth, when bodily passions have calmed, and notsecunda senectus, when the senses and imagination have startedto deteriorate.103With this distinction, the time of greatest intel-


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naturalis et in nobis non mox advenit a principio perfectus et actualis, sed tem-pore accidit precedente, puta in senectute prima, cum vires corporee incipiantquiescere intellectualisque vigere. Non autem in senectute secunda in qua etiamintellectus debilitatur.

104 Peter seems to have created this age sub-division specifically to exposit thisproblem. At any rate, I have not found its use elsewhere. See: Paschetto, Pietro

dAbano, 204-13, on Peters discussion of age and E. Sears, The Ages of Man: Medi-eval Interpretations of the Life Cycle (Princeton, 1986) for a survey of medievalthought on life periods

lectual capacity is made to coincide with the healthy operationof the lower virtues, when the body has attained its most bal-anced complexion. Although Peter is not more specific in this

commentary, only saying that Aristotle distinguished two periodsof life, differentia 19 of the Conciliator explains that the mosttemperate complexion is reached around age 35, which is pre-sumably what he has in mind herefar from what most of usconsider old.104 It is at that age that our senses work best andthat we are most prudent. Far from being a minor distinction,this definition of senectus is an example of Peters consistent

association of a temperate physical complexion with the opera-tion of the rational virtues. This association is also clear in thefamous question about the connection between all types of great-ness and a melancholic complexion which opens this particula.105

Here, Peter severely qualifies the thesis in the Aristotelian textthat excellence occurs in conjunction with a melancholic imbal-anceinstead a temperate nature is more appropriate for the

use of reason. He notes that the physiological extremes pro-duced by black bile result in a variety of passions more akin tothe irascible and brutal concupiscible excesses discussed in theearlier sections of the Problemata.106 True melancholics cannotreason and cannot conduct themselves well. Rather, the type ofmelancholy that causes excellence in science and art is not anexcess, but is closer to a temperate balance, still within the lati-


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107

Expositio, 30.1: Ostendit quales mores et actus fiant in illis, in quibuscaliditas non est omnino excedens, sed redducta ad quoddam temperamentumdicens in quibuscunque caliditas non est adeo excedens, sicut in predictis, sedreducta est quasi ad medium temperamentum aliquod (italics added). KlibanskyPanofsky, and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, 119, also observe the distinction Petercreates between two types of melancholy.

108 Expositio, 30.1: Dicendum quod Aristoteles nititur declarere quod melan-colici, cum naturaliter superhabundat colera nigranon tamen superfluece-teros preexcellunt in scientiis, et universaliter in omnibus artibus et actibus.

109

Conciliator, Diff. 20.110 Problemata, 30.4 [30.5]: Quia deus instrumenta in nobis ipsis dedit duo inquo utimur exterioribus instrumentis: corpori quidem manum; anime autem

tude of health.107 This, Peter claims, is what Aristotle meant tosay.108 He discusses this same issue in the Conciliator where ingreater detail he refutes the notion that melancholy, or an im-

balance of any kind, could be the best for the health of eitherbody or soul.109 From his medical perspective, in which diseaseis defined by imbalanced passion, Peter seems to find the notionthat the highest virtues could be best achieved through a stateof passionate extremewhether old age or melancholyto beunappealing.

To show how the intellect can be so dependant on physical

virtue, Peter clarifies how intellect should be taken in problem30.4. The text of the problem states that the hands and intellectare natural instruments, given to us by God.110 Peter explainsthat by natural, Aristotle means that this intellect is both in-nate and physical. As in the case of natural justice, the naturalalways implies physical for Peter. It is not to be identified withthe habit later acquired by doctrine or what Averroes describes

as the separated intellect, which has no corporeal act.111 Nordoes the fact that it is innate and given by God mean that it doesnot require a material disposition. The intellect is only acceptedby a suitable physical complexion; it often happens that the materiallacks such an appropriate state and is unable to receive it.112 It


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cipiunt materie. Sed susceptibilia aliquando sunt carentia dispositione susci-piendi ea. A proposition similar to this in Diff. 71 of the Conciliator, that theintellectual soul is only received by suitable material, is what Nardi posits as thesource for the accusation that Peter held that the intellectual soul emerges fromthe potency of matter. Nardi absolves Peter of this, based on that text, saying 1)that Peter is not speaking of the intellect there, but of the virtus informativa, and2) that this virtusdoes not arise solely from the potency of matter, but is given by

God. Here in Expositio 30.4, however, it is clear that Peter is talking about theintellect and not the virtus informativa. The necessary role of material in the proc-ess also seems to justify the claim of the Dominican investigators. Peter wouldhappily agree that everything is ultimately caused by God, but this does not pre-clude more proximate and necessary causes.

113 Expositio, 30.4 [30.5]: Dico autem intellectum quo anima opinatur et sapitPrimum tamen magis seriei coaptat subsequenti. Et quia dixerat intellectum huncnobis naturaliter coniungi, assignant differentiam inter ipsum et scientias et artes,dicens scientiam ac artes quaecumque sint. Ille fiunt ex his que in nobis existunt

huismodi aut intellectus vigore. Quoniam rebus existentibus, scientie et artes nonseipsas produxerunt inesse, immo ab intellectu causante.114 Expositio 30 4 [30 5]: Per intellectum siquidem naturalem audio huius

is through the perfection of the potency of this intellect that weare able opine and know, and through which science and artand other rational virtues are attained.113 It is the innate faculty

of understanding principles and our natural tendency towardacquiring such knowledge.114 His definition of the intellect as anatural organ once again finds correspondence in the Concili-ator, where he states that rational, or human, virtue is a perfec-tion of the organic body, attending to universals.115If Peter had

wanted to equate the intellect in the text of the Problematawitha physical component of intellect, he could have easily identified

it with imagination, which was more commonly accepted as thecorporeal component of rational thought. But he is quite clearthat he does not have the imagination in mind, since he lists itas another possible definition.116

Peter makes the dependance of this intellect on complexionexplicit with another addition of his own. Where Aristotle states


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that the hands and intellect were given to us by God as naturalorgans for attaining the virtues, Peter comments that complex-ion should be added to these because of its importance: With

these two instruments [i.e. hands and the intellect], he [i.e.God] also gives a third, namely complexion, in virtue of whichthe foresaid two function (although the hands are more relianton physical qualites).117Even if Peter does not stray so far fromorthodoxy as to call the intellect a material entity per se, as anatural organ, the intellect requires an specific qualitative bal-ance for its use, a more refined balance than can be found in

any other creature.

Conclusions

Peter of Abanos Expositio displays an approach to the virtuesthat regards physiology as the primary field through which the

actions and passions shared by the body and soul are to beinvestigated and explained. Namely, the bodys complexion is anefficient cause of actions and habits, a sign of passions, and anindicator of potential activity. For the irrational soul, this closeconnection with the body is not surprising. However, in the caseof the rational soul, the dependance on the body is more unu-sual and offers an example of Peters application of medical

doctrine beyond the usual bounds of medicine. Inherent in Petersphysiological approach is his refusal to regard the distinctionbetween willed and unwilled action as either primary or espe-cially useful for the analysis of action. His lack of interest in thisdistinction is clear where the text of the Problemata appears tobeg such an analysis. To problem 30.11, Why does man espe-cially think one thing and do another? Peter gives only a cur-

sory commentary.118

This issue is central to the discussion inBook 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, about the failure displayed by


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medieval discussion.119 Instead, he erases the difficult by observ-ing that, in any event, most people do not have an intellectcapable of right reason; to the contrary, people are impelled by

their passions in both their reasoning and their actions.120Com-plex psychological discussions about the failure of the will orintellect have no place here. In fact, throughout the Expositio,the text cited from theNicomachean Ethicsand other ethical worksis limited to providing structure and defining terms. Peter neverraises points which might challenge his own physiological per-spective, proving himself a selective reader of his sources. Points

of contest and doubt have a physiological basis and originatealmost entirely from medical works.121

This understanding of moral philosophy is a deliberate andcomprehensive revision of the domain of ethical inquiry, restor-ing the animality and sensuality lacking in most scholastic analy-ses of action through his emphasis on the sensitive soul. Theeffect of this perspective is to blur the distinction between the

natural and moral orders, an approach to human action that wasone of the primary concerns about medical philosophy for sometheologians, namely that the actions of the soul could be natu-rally determined. If there is no distinctive human agent capableof acting outside of the natural order, actions would lose theirmorality.122 The opposite seems to be the case in Peters com-mentary. Instead, even the most mundane aspects of human

existence have the potential to become moralized: diet, regi-men, and indeed any activity that affects the bodys qualitativebalance become critical for virtuous behavior. Certainly the psy-chological determinism suggested in this commentary should beadded to the list of suspect doctrines that may have contributedto Peters troubles with the Inquisition.

119 For medieval discussion of this issue see: R. Saarinen, Weakness of the Will inMedieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan (Leiden 1994)


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What does Peters commentary tell us about his psychologyand, more specifically, about the intellect? Ferrari claims that heis an Averroist, a claim which is thoroughly and justifiably dis-

missed by Nardi.123 Nardi recognizes that the only known accu-sation against Peter (that the intellective soul is derived frommatter) instead suggests that Peter holds the theory of either

Alexander of Aphrodisias or Galen. Examining Peters positionon the generation of the intellective soul, Nardi finds neither ofthese materialist possibilities to be accurate, arguing that Petersthesis is that the intellectual soul is divinely infused (with celes-

tial bodies acting as intermediaries) into material that is espe-cially refined and prepared for its acceptance. He finds this positionto be identical with that of Aquinas.124More recently, Hasse surveysa wider range of the souls faculties from the Conciliator, andconcludes that in naming the parts of the intellect, Peter adoptsa four-fold division taken from Avicenna.125 Finally, we have

Vescovini, who states (without citing any specific text) that Peteradheres to an Alexandrian position on the intellect.126

At the risk of further confusing the issue, I would argue thatPeters approach to psychology bears the greatest similarity tothat of Galen. Peters object, at least in this part of the Expositio,is not to define the essence or precise ontology of the soul,

which all of the suggestions above attempt to identify in his

work. It is a pragmatic approach to the soul that takes advantageof the physiology as far as it will go, but is unwilling to deter-mine something which lies beyond the scope of a naturalisticexplanation. It so happens that he believes, like Galen, that naturalexplanations can explain a great deal. Of course, Peter wouldnever openly make the heretical claim that complexion is iden-tical with the soul, the typical accusation against Galen.127 But

tellingly, Peter defends Galen at length against this charge in the


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128 Conciliator, Diff. 17, ppt. 2 and ppt. 3.

Conciliator, saying that Galen should not be taken as discussingthe essence of the soul, but the immediate and organic causes ofthe souls actions. The essence of the soul lies beyond the scope

of his discipline.128 This defense of Galens doctrine at the veryleast shows Peters sympathies and suggests how Peters workshould be interpreted.


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Documents

KLEMM Medicine and Moral Virtue in the Expositio Problematum Aristotelis of Peter of Abano