KAS International Reports 04/2011

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KASINTERNATIONAL REPORTS4|11

ISSN 0177-7521Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.Volume 27

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Editor:Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

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EDITORIAL

FROm CLImATE ECOnOmY TO GREEn ECOnOmYChristian Hübner

FROm KYOTO TO DuRbAn – ThE EuROpEAn unIOn’s CLImATE pOLICYCéline-Agathe Caro / Christiane Rüth

EmERGInG pOwERs: ThE IbsA sTATEs As pARTnERs AnD LEADERs In A FuTuRE GLObAL CLImATE ChAnGE REGImERomy Chevallier

InDOnEsIA’s ROLE In InTERnATIOnAL CLImATE pOLICY: FInAnCIAL InCEnTIvEs TO pREsERvE ThE RAInFOREsT – An EFFECTIvE mODEL? Marc Frings

CLImATE pOLICY In ThE pEOpLE’s REpubLIC OF ChInA – GROunDwORK FOR susTAInAbLE GROwTh?Andreas Dittrich

hARmOnY As A nATIOnAL mIssIOn – sInGApORE’s wAY OF DEALInG wITh ImmIGRATIOn AnD InTEGRATIOnPaul Linnarz

pOsT-ELECTIOn sLOvAKIA: ThE FIRsT hALF-YEAR OF ThE CEnTER-RIGhT GOvERnmEnTGrigorij Mesežnikov

4 KAs InTERnATIOnAL REpORTs 4|2011

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

participants at the global climate conference held in Cancún (mexico) at the end of last year once again failed to agree on a binding treaty on climate protection. however, some important steps were taken towards a global climate agreement, such as the approval of the two degree target. but it remains to be seen whether this will be enough to reach an agreement at the climate conference to be held later this year in Durban (south Africa). The dangerous consequences of global climate change make it all the more important for negotiations to be brought quickly to a successful conclusion.

It is now a matter of great urgency that an international climate protection treaty should be put into effect without delay. For this to happen, participants will need to learn from what happened with the Kyoto protocol. This means that all industrialised nations will have to play their part in reducing harmful greenhouse gas emissions, and the usA is no exception. It will of course be necessary to take into account the state of economic development in the various emerging nations and to consider the character of individual developing countries. however, it is not acceptable for countries such as China and India to try to avoid their responsibilities. China recently announced that environ-mental pollution represents a serious threat to its future development, so it is to be hoped that this assessment will be reflected in future negotiations on climate protection. It will be necessary to replace the economic instruments which were used in the past but which proved to be largely ineffective. we should however welcome any economic instruments that encourage voluntary steps towards climate protection.

5KAs InTERnATIOnAL REpORTs4|2011

The European union is taking the lead on climate protection issues and is currently setting the international standard, especially in light of the tactical manoeuvrings and sometimes open opposition to an international climate treaty.

what is now required is a binding and consistent regulatory framework for environmental and climate protection. but this framework must also safeguard individual economic freedoms and so ensure that individual societies can protect the environment and the climate for future genera-tions while at the same time creating prosperity.

Environmental and climate protection is therefore not just a regulatory issue. It is also first and foremost a responsi-bility to protect the whole of creation.

Dr. Gerhard wahlersDeputy secretary-General

[email protected]


In 1992 the largest environmental conference of the un, the united nations Conference on Environment and Deve- lopment (unCED), also called “Earth summit”, was held in Rio de Janeiro. The focus of the conference was the need for a new paradigm for sustainable social development, to stop the unabated overstraining of natural resources. As a result, the concept of sustainability gained worldwide popularity, and a flood of new ideas and approaches from various scientific disciplines penetrated the global society. however, viewed in retrospect, the popularity of the sustainability paradigm also led to the fact that the term was used more and more inflationary and nowadays is hardly ever associated with its original meaning. Among the outcomes of the conference are the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreement (unFCCC), the united nations Convention to Combat Desertification agreement (unCCD), and the Convention on biological Diversity agreement (CbD).

In its wake, the Convention for Climate protection in particular emerged to catch the media’s attention the most and to be an annually recurring valve for disputes in the global environmental protection. The reasons for this until today lie in the anxieties about possible restrictions concerning the economy through a mandatory reduction of climate-damaging greenhouse gas emissions.1 Looking at the actual reductions of harmful CO2 emissions reveals that to date only sporadic global progress has been made

1 | Environmentally harmful emissions include, amongst others, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluro- carbons (hFC’s). In literature, they usually converted into CO2-equivalents, so that in the following they will only be referred to as CO2 emissions.

FROm CLImATE ECONOmY TO GREEN ECONOmY

Christian Hübner

Christian hübner is Coordinator for En-vironmental, Climate and Energy Issues in the European and International Coope-ration Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung in berlin.


The terms “Green Economy” and “Green Growth” are heard more and more frequently, and could potentially replace the expression “sustainability”.

and that as of yet, it has not been managed to reduce the absolute CO2 emissions. The opposite is actually the case, the CO2 emissions are rising, particularly through the increasing energy demands of the newly industrialised countries.

In light of this, it appears that the debate about a sustainable resource-efficient development increasingly focuses on the issue of de-carbonisation, that is the de-coupling of economic development from the CO2 emissions. In this context, the terms “Green Economy” and “Green Growth” are heard more and more frequently, and could potentially replace the expression “sustainability”.2 There is good reason that in 2012 another conference, again in Rio de Janeiro, will look back at 20 years of the Rio Decla-ration and put the issue of sustainable development – this time under the term “Green Economy” – into focus. A key question in this debate will be which experiences, while dealing with climate change, were gained so far and how they can be used for a “Green Economy”.

CLImATE ChANGE AND COSTS

Climate change is an extremely complex phenomenon that threatens the livelihood of humankind. Tangible consequences can be observed through, amongst others, extreme weather events, rising sea levels and melting glaciers. Listed as deciding factors for the climate change are the use of fossil fuels such as oil or natural gas, the industrialised agriculture and the changing land use. According to the Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change – IpCC, 2007, it is considered very likely, that the anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the second half of the 20th Century will cause observed global temperature increases. These developments are supported by more recent research findings. It is expected that the sea level rises significantly, the Arctic sea ice is shrinking rapidly

2 | The united nations Environment programme defines Green Economy as “one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.” unEp, 2011, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication – A Synthesis for Policy Makers, http://unep.org/ greeneconomy (accessed march 7, 2011).


and glaciers are melting faster than they previously were expected to be.3

The problem with society perceiving climate change as a political responsibility is that, due to the complexity of the phenomenon, the actual consequences that are to be expected cannot be concluded with absolute certainty. statistically speaking, “very likely” means “only” 90 per cent. science’s attempts to counter this uncertainty include the identification of sensitive elements of the climate system, which when irreversibly damaged can result in disasters. This is also the goal of the frequently cited Two-Degree-Target in the climate debate, officially acknowledged in last year’s climate change conference in Cancún, mexico. If the average global temperature rises by more than two degrees, there is the risk that some of the more sensitive elements of the earth system could collapse

and unforeseeable consequences may occur. such sensitive elements are for example the Greenland ice shield, which, if it melted, would result in a global rise of the sea level by seven meters.4 Therefore, the debate over the necessity to avoid a dangerous

climate change culminated in the question of what actions should be taken, considering the possible enormous and unforeseeable damage to the earth system.

At this point, economists try to present courses for action by calculating the potential costs of the climate change. In general, they use the Gross Domestic product (GDp), which serves as an indicator of the prosperity of a society. A reduction of the GDp verifiably linked to the climate change would thus result in a lessened prosperity. There are different approaches to calculating such GDps. One approach could be that economists fall back on scientific patterns, which depict the effects of the climate change as a model and then add the observed effects through prices.

3 | Cf. Ian Allison et al., The Copenhagen Diagnosis, 2009: Updating the world on the Latest Climate Science (sydney: The university of new south wales Climate Change Research Centre CCRC 2009).4 | Ottmar Edenhofer, hermann Lotze-Campen, Johannes wallacher, michael Reder (eds.), Global, aber gerecht: Klimawandel bekämpfen, Entwicklung ermöglichen, 1st edition, beck, 2010, 94.

The debate over the necessity to avoid a dangerous climate change culmina-ted in the question of what actions should be taken, considering the unforeseeable damage to the earth system.


To receive a reasonable calculation, the assumption must be made on the costs the climate change will have caused in a hundred years. These costs must then be scaled down to the present-day.

In greatly simplified terms, this can be done by resorting to values, predicted by the climate induced sea-level rise and calculating respective costs for the building of dykes or by observing the impact of the climate change on food crops. potential yield reduction can be calculated based on market prices and be used as costs of climate change. Another is provided by the opportunity to statistically measure the influence of the climate on the income of the population. Thereby, scientific modelling is no longer necessary. both approaches have their methodological advantages and disadvantages that, in a calculation, need to be evaluated.5

The differences in the calculation of the costs are mainly due to the high uncertainty of scientific modelling and the sometimes very risky assumptions of economists. The focus of this controversy is the assumptions about the calculations of the damages of climate change. namely, this would require the availability of the knowledge about the value future climate-change damage would have for us today. philosophers and economists like to clash at this point. Thus, the effects of climate change are indeed already visible, but the major damage will occur in the coming one hundred years. Therefore, to receive a reasonable present-day calcu-lation, the assumption must be made on the costs the climate change will have caused in a hundred years. The (discounted) costs, scaled down to the present-day, would then be included in the calculation. The problem now lies in the selection of the discount factor, meaning the factor with which to calculate the future costs onto the present-day costs. Depending on that factor, the current costs can be either very low or very high. behind this, is an ethical issue: what costs do and should we impose on future generations by present actions or inaction?

5 | At an increase in average global temperature of 2.5 degrees nordhaus (2006) calculated costs of 0.9 per cent of the global GDp. stern (2006) assumes a GDp decline of between 5 and 20 per cent, depending on projections. The difference in the calculations shows the difficulties in using such results. Cf. william D. nordhaus, “Geography and macroeconomics: new Data and new Findings”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 103 (10): 3510-3517, 2006; nicholas stern et al., Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2006).


To emphasise the more people-orienta-ted view of ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem services was developed. It includes goods and services provided by nature that cannot be traded.

In addition to the studies that take a direct approach at calculating the costs of climate change such as for the building of dykes, calculations, asking for the value of biodiversity, health of the entire ecosystem are increas-ingly becoming the focus. here, immediate monetary assessments are particularly difficult. while environmental economists have started very early to calculate monetary values for individual environmental goods, such as the sea or clean air, which are subject to no proprietary regula-tions, holistic considerations in connection with scientific modelling had a much longer road to travel. The American economist bob Costanza caused quite a stir as the first

trying to calculate the economic value of ecosystems worldwide.6 Costanza came up with 33 trillion dollars per year, twice the value of the worldwide gross national product back then, which was 18 trillion u.s. dollars. To emphasise the more people-orientated

view of ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem services was developed. In the broadest sense, this means goods and services provided by nature that cannot be traded in any market.

The “millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report” (2005) of the united nations structured the ecosystem services in supply-, regulatory-, cultural- and support services.7 Coral reefs are often named a prominent example of such services, particularly threatened by climate change. Almost half of the world’s people live in coastal areas and therefore are in a direct or indirect relationship to the reefs, which are of fundamental importance for all coastal ecosystems. Ecosystem services provided to the people by an intact coastal ecosystem are food and raw materials (supply services), climate control and the balancing of extreme weather events (regulatory services), and tourism (cultural services).

6 | Robert Costanza et al., “The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital”, in: Nature 387, may 15, 1997, 253-260.7 | millennium Ecosystem Assessment (mEA), Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis (washington, D.C.: Island press, 2005).


Ecosystem services are brought to-gether with the concept of “ecological infrastructure” of which the protection is absolutely necessary. It includes all natural and human-made ecosystems.

In terms of adaptation to climate change, ecosystem services are increasingly brought together with the concept of “ecological infrastructure” of which the protection is absolutely necessary. The ecological infra-structure includes all natural and human-made ecosystems, such as fresh water supply, climate-regulating systems (forests, wetlands, rivers), soil conservation (forests, pastures), natural disaster prevention (coral reefs, mangrove forests) or cultural landscapes. Their stability ensures that climate fluctuations can be better absorbed.

The study “The Economics of Ecology and biodiversity” (TEEb), initiated by Germany under its G8 presidency in 2007 together with the European Commission, calcu-lated the total value of the ecosystem services, currently provided by protected zones worldwide, to be 4.4 to 5.2 billion u.s. dollars per year.8 In addition, the investment was calculated, which would be needed to maintain a global protected area with 15 per cent of global land area and 30 per cent of the sea surface with a value of 5.000 billion u.s. dollars. For this, a total of 45 billion u.s. dollars would be required. This ratio makes clear that it may well be worthwhile for humankind to invest in environmental protection. Estimating a monetary value to ecosystems and biodiversity, in addition to the previously mentioned methodological difficulties, see discounting, leads to another ethical question: should biodiversity or health have a price?

scientific and economic studies on the consequences of climate change are therefore associated with a conside-rable uncertainty. The monetisation of the climate change poses additional significant ethical questions that could cast doubt on the calculated costs potentially being used as a basis for political action. however, these studies can be quite advantageous insofar that the problem of climate change is perceived more strongly in the public.

8 | TEEb (2008), “The Economics of Ecosystems and biodiversity: An Interim Report,” European Commission, brussels, http://teebweb.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=u2fmsQowJf0% 3d&tabid=1278&language=en-us and http://www.bmu.de/ english/nature/convention_on_biological_diversity/doc/45527 (accessed march 23, 2011).


An optimal tax rate would have to cor-respond to the actual damage cost of a ton of CO2 emissions, in order for the tax mechanism to work efficiently.

CLImATE ECONOmICS

From an economic point of view, climate change also is a problem of unresolved property rights of the atmosphere. ultimately, it belongs to everyone – or no one. Conse-quently, it is overloaded with emissions, without potential companies having to justify negative consequences. In economic theory, emissions are therefore described as not internalised, that means not priced-in side effects (exter-nalities), which can emerge from economic activities, and thus are not included in the cost decisions of a company. however, if environmentally harmful emissions had to be paid for, then companies would have an incentive for its reduction as these costs could reduce their profits.

In this context, the so-called pigovian tax is mentioned repeatedly.9 According to that, as a measure to avoid climate change, the cost for a ton of emitted CO2 could be calculated and imposed as tax on the emitting party, e.g.

an energy company. As a consequence, the company would have higher costs and thus an incentive for the avoidance of harmful CO2 emissions. The problem with this is that an optimal tax rate would have to correspond

to the actual damage cost of a ton of CO2 emissions, in order for the tax mechanism to work efficiently. however, as previously shown, the exact calculation of such costs of climate change is virtually impossible. In this context, the well-known climate economist Richard Tol rightly called the climate change the “mother of all externalities: larger, more complex and more uncertain than any other environ-mental problem”.10

Currently asserting itself as an alternative, is the idea of the economist Ronald Coase. Thereupon, CO2 emissions can be incorporated into a company’s decision-making process without taxes. The principle is relatively simple: The state establishes a specific maximum limit of emissions, which in an ideal case prevents a dangerous climate change.

9 | The pigovian tax is named after the English economist Arthur Cecil pigou.10 | R.s.J. Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 2/2009, 29-51.


A global emissions trading system should be pursued, including preferably all CO2 intensive companies worldwide. The chances for this are not bad at all.

Certificates for these emissions are then distributed or companies can bid to obtain them and with it, the right to emit. If a party wants to emit more than his or her certif-icate permits, he or she can purchase additional certificates from other market participants. Consequently, those who reduce their emissions, for example, by developing low-CO2 technologies, will be rewarded with the profit from the sale of leftover emission. The climate-damaging CO2 emissions will then be avoided, where it is best possible. In addition, the state can limit itself to having a framework-setting role and leave the companies as much scope as possible. here, however, the biggest problem of an emission-trading scheme manifests itself. The system can only help to avoid climate change if it includes all the possible companies that emit environmentally harmful gases. If this is not the case, then a shift from industries outside the ETs takes place (leakage problem) – to where companies do not have to buy certificates, and therefore have lower costs. In Europe, which has the world’s largest emissions trading scheme, this problem is always criticised as a unilateral location disadvantage. From a regulatory perspective on avoiding the climate change, a global emissions trading system should therefore be pursued, including preferably all CO2 intensive companies worldwide. The chances for this are not bad at all, considering China’s recent efforts.

besides the framework-setting capacity of the state to avoid climate change, states increasingly fall back onto sectored methods on a national level. In the classical application, this mainly concerns the energy sector and in the recent climate policy primarily the ecosystem services.

ENERGY

up to now, finite energy resources such as oil and coal, used for the production of energy, release a large amount of harmful CO2 emissions. For the combating of climate change through a modified energy supply, there is a variety of technological possibilities, including, for example, the option to separate climate-damaging CO2 emissions when using coal (CCs-Carbon Capture storage). It is also conceivable to make greater use of uranium, which serves as a basic material for the production of


In recent years, the proportion of re-newable energies in the electricity consumption significantly increased in Germany. In Europe alone, 19 countries enacted a similar funding structure.

nuclear power. Alternatively, even more renewable energy sources such as wind power, hydropower, geothermal, biomass or solar energy can be used. Energy efficiency, for example, through modernisation of old power plants or building renovation provides another attractive approach of reducing CO2 emissions.

Against the background of climate change from an economic perspective, only energy sources and measures should be used that have the highest efficiency, meaning that they are least costly. The economic efficiency can for example be calculated using the CO2 abatement costs, that is the value, which expresses how expensive it is to reduce a ton of CO2 emissions.

next to climate protection, states also have additional goals in the energy sector, such as a sustainable energy supply, jobs, and furtherance of technology. In the bundling of multiple objectives, renewable energies (RE) worldwide are of particular importance. In the u.s., brazil, Europe, and China they are increasingly encouraged.

The “German model” for the promotion of RE is anchored in the Renewable Energy sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG). According to this, the legislators have imple-mented a statutory purchase obligation and minimum purchase prices for RE produced from biomass, wind or sun (fit-in-tariff). The price difference between the more expensive RE’s and the conventional finite energy sources are passed on to consumers as an additional cost to their

electricity bill, which is why the power costs rises for the consumers as more electricity is supplied by renewable sources. In recent years, the proportion of renewable energies in the electricity consumption significantly increased in Germany. Through this, exten-

sive investments in research and development of RE were made possible, which would not otherwise have been made. since then, the EEG has been found to be an export hit. In Europe alone, 19 countries already have a similar funding structure.

besides the price-based EEG, there is the quantity-based quota system with certificates, which is used, for example,


The quantity-based quota system with certificates does not promote any spe-cific technology. Ultimately, those RE’s will gain the upper hand that can be made available at the lowest prices.

in England. This basically works like the previously described emission trading system. The law regulates how much energy from renewable sources will be incorpo-rated into the electricity grid. After that, certificates for electricity from renewable energy sources are issued. In that case, businesses specialised in feeding electricity into the grid have to prove that they, according to the quota, have a suffi-cient number of certificates. These certifi-cates can then be traded on a market. Thus, there is competition for the best possible production of electricity from renewable energy sources. The advantage of this model is that it is an incentive for innovation, but does not promote any specific technology. ultimately, those RE’s will gain the upper hand that can be made available at the lowest prices.

In principle both ways are suitable to support the use of RE with the goal of a sustainable energy supply. In regard to the primary aim of advancing the climate protection, the interaction with other methods have to be taken into consideration. In Europe specifically, it becomes evident that the simultaneous existence of the European emissions trading system and the EEG, but also the quota system, can override the goal of reducing the CO2 emissions. CO2 emissions prevented at national level through the EEG or the quota system in light of the fixed quota of the European emissions trading system are now increasingly being emitted in other countries. national schemes to promote RE’s can thus nullify international efforts.

ECOSYSTEm SERvICES

Climate change as a global phenomenon affects virtually every ecosystem on earth. This has consequences that we only slowly begin to understand. Considered reliable knowledge is that the previously mentioned ecosystem services play an important role in preventing and adapting to the impacts of the climate change.

From an economic perspective, the problem is that many ecosystem services, as well as climate change, have no price that could serve as an incentive for their protection. This is why the damage to the ecosystem through climate


If entrepreneurs decide on a species of tree that stores as much CO2 as possi-ble and grow these as a monoculture, this would be at the expense of the biodiversity.

change or other environmental pollution hardly ever filters into the economic decision-making process. nevertheless, there is already a variety of economic tools, which pursue the goal of creating markets for ecosystem services. Currently, there is a particular interest in the economic redevelopment of forest ecosystems. Increased forest cultivation could remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Recent calculations assume that the preservation of forests could prevent greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn corre-spond to climate change damages in the amount of 3.7 trillion u.s. dollars.11

politics therefore try to create an economic incentive to protect forests through so-called REDD mechanisms (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-dation) which should be a particularly attractive alternative for developing countries. Objective of these mechanisms is to reduce deforestation, by industrial nations providing money for the protection and development of forests. here, however, other societal goals could be affected. Therefore,

it is entirely possible with the aim to store CO2 for the protection of the environment to operate focused forest cultivation. but then, entrepreneurs would decide on a species of tree that stores as much CO2 as possible and

would grow these as a monoculture. such monocultures, though, would be at the expense of the biodiversity, which is essential for nature’s resilience to climate fluctuations. more recent approaches (REDD+) take criteria coupled to financing for the protection of biodiversity into account, but how this could be implemented remains to be seen. In addition, the main problems in implementing the REDD mechanisms lie in the control and administrative imple-mentation of such projects on site. In the end, paid forest protection also must be controlled.

Another economic approach and probably the most developed for the protection of ecosystem services is currently being implemented in the Eu. Therein, mainly farmers have the primary responsibility for the preservation of

11 | TEEb (2010), “The Economics of Ecosystems and biodiversity: mainstreaming the Economics of nature,” European Commis- sion, brussels, cf. http://teebweb.org (accessed march 23, 2011).


The importance of environmental pro-tection will play a central role in the negotiations on the design of a com-mon agricultural policy in the EU.

ecosystems. They are offered to receive additional funding, if they change their agricultural working processes to be more in accordance with environmental and climate protection (less fertiliser, less tillage, etc.). In the specialist literature, this approach is also referred to as “payments for Ecosystem services”. Thus, farmers ultimately receive an additional source of income, by acting as a provider of environmental and climate protection. The importance of environmental protection and thus the protection of the ecosystem services will play a central role in the upcoming negotiations this year on the design of a common agricultural policy in the Eu. nevertheless, it must also be differentiated again, whether the state only wants to protect the climate or whether it wants to promote biodi-versity, cultural landscape or sustainable energy. payments made to farmers should be orientated on that, accordingly. here again emerges the dilemma between climate and biodiversity protection. Thus, the increased cultivation of biomass as a renewable energy source actually contributes to the climate protection and is displacing fossil fuels. The consequences, though, are monocultures to the detriment of biodiversity. In addition, the growing of biomass also displaces the food production so that climate protection, food supply security and biodiversity protection as social objectives can be in opposition of each other. Even though the Eu has tried to address this problem through the coupling of payments to the compliance with sustainability criteria, success depends entirely on the ability to control it.

Another way to protect the ecosystem services is achievable through their legal allocation. Of particular interest are the results of the 10th Conference of the signatory states of the Convention on biological Diversity (CbD) in nagoya, Japan 2010. There, the so-called Abs-protocol to regulate access to genetic resources and the fair sharing of profits for the use of natural resources was agreed upon. The background here is the objective to fairly share the profits, for example for the development of drugs or for breeding. For the economy, this results in a more secure framework, which can guarantee property rights to developing countries for their genetic resources (such as plants with medicinal properties) and legal certainty to industrialised countries for future transactions.


CONCLUSIONS

we already live with a human-induced climate change. since we can only make uncertain statements about the impact, we should actually be restricted in our alternative courses of action. nevertheless, at present there are a sheer unmanageable number of initiatives, which try, with the help of economical approaches, to reduce environmentally harmful CO2 emissions, among them the emissions trading system of the Eu, the German Federal Government’s EEG and the REDD-mechanisms in emerging and developing countries. ultimately, it turns out, that this variety of methods could in fact undermine the actual objective of avoiding dangerous climate change. Furthermore, some tools particularly take into account those, that contribute to the ecosystem services and not to the various inter- actions between climate change, the biodiversity protection and the food supply security. In emerging and developing countries, there is also a significant control problem, which puts the legitimacy of such methods into question.

politics, whose aim is the prevention of the global climate change, should therefore go down two routes. Firstly, a global emissions trading system should be pursued that includes all CO2 producing industries. There can be no exceptions. Also, national methods, which could override this mechanism, must be avoided. secondly, increased consideration should be given to how it would be possible to implement unified markets for ecosystem services, especially in emerging and developing countries. An example for this could well be the European approach, in which landowners act as a provider of climate protection. The legal basis could be an extended Abs-protocol covering all ecosystem services from a property rights perspective.

For the “Green Economy”, whose aim among other is to decarbonise the economy, the introduction of new methods is not fundamentally necessary. Instead, a unified and consistent enforcement of a globally binding regulatory framework should be put in the foreground.


Dr. Céline-Agathe Caro is Coordinator for European policy in the political Dialogue and Analysis Team of the Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung in berlin.

Christiane Rüth studied European studies and Adminis- tration at the univer-sity of bremen and the university of Leiden (netherlands). From september 2010 to march 2011 she has been supporting the Foreign, security and Euro-pean policy Team in berlin.

“Climate” and “policy” – less than fifty years ago, these two words were never heard in combination. but at least since June 1992, when about a hundred heads of state and government leaders from all over the world came together at the “Earth summit” in Rio de Janeiro, the climate has featured on the developed nations’ political agenda. And over the last 20 years, international efforts to fight climate change have intensified in view of the global challenges being faced in the areas of food, migration and security. Europe has claimed a leading role in the talks since the beginning.

At the “Earth summit”, more than 150 countries signed up to a Framework Convention on Climate Change. This officially recognises the global character of climate change and the need for international cooperation in this area. It also highlights the role of human activity in relation to global warming and sets itself the goal of stabilising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in order to prevent dangerous man-made climate change.1

This political step taken on an international level is to some extent based on the findings of the world Climate Council, an international forum of scientists who have been observing and assessing climate change since 1988.2 In its last report in 2007 the Council stated that “most of the increase in

1 | Cf. un Framework Convention on Climate Change, Item 2 (new York, 1992). Text available at: http://unfccc.int/ essential_background/convention/background/items/ 2853.php (accessed February 2, 2011).2 | The official name of the world Climate Council is the “Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change”, IpCC.

FROm KYOTO TO DURbAN – ThE EUROPEAN UNION’S CLImATE POLICY

Céline-Agathe Caro / Christiane Rüth


between 1906 and 2005 average tem-peratures rose worldwide by 0.74 degrees Celsius. This trend has been accelerating drastically over the last 50 years.

the average global temperature which has been observed since the mid-20th century (…) is very probably due to the observed man-made increase in levels of greenhouse gases”.3 The Council also believes there are clear signs of global warming, as evidenced by the increase in global air and sea temperatures, the melting of ice in the Arctic,

the more frequent periods of drought and extreme heat, the greater intensity of tropical hurricanes and the rise in sea levels worldwide. According to the report, between 1906 and 2005 average temperatures rose world-

wide by 0.74 degrees Celsius. This trend has been accelerating drastically over the last 50 years. It is feared that if temperatures continue to rise there may be negative, even disastrous consequences not only for eco-systems and water resources, but also for human health, agriculture, forestry, industry and society as a whole.

This is why many climate scientists are urging that the rise in average global temperatures should reach no more than two degrees Celsius higher than the pre-industrial era. This has also been set as a clear political goal. At the Eu summit in early 2005, European heads of state and government leaders recognised the need for this limit of two degrees in order to meet the overall targets of the un Framework Convention on Climate Change.4

TARGETS AND FUNDING FOR ENvIRONmENTAL POLICIES

The Eu’s main goal in the fight against climate change is to change lifestyles and consumer habits within its member states without affecting their prosperity. Innovation in this area should lead to sustainable growth and high employment levels. The Eu Commission has even talked about a “new industrial revolution”.5 This should have the

3 | Cf. Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change IpCC, “Climate Change 2007 – summary for policymakers”, Fourth Status Report of the IPCC (AR4) (bern/vienna/ berlin, september 2007), 10.4 | Cf. Eu Council, meeting of the European Council, brussels, march 22/23, 2005, “schlussfolgerungen des vorsitzes,” 7619/1/05 REv 1, COnCL 1, 15-16.5 | Cf. European Commission “Kommission legt integriertes Energie- und Klimapaket zur Emissionsminderung im 21. Jahrhundert vor”, press release, January 10, 2007.


The system of “burden sharing” means that the emission-reduction obligations are distributed among EU members in relation to their economic power.

double effect of halting climate change but also improving air quality, increasing energy security and strengthening the Eu’s competitiveness through the development of green technologies. so an ambitious climate policy should benefit the Eu’s interests, both economically and industrially. moreover, the long-term costs of this should be much less than the costs of dealing with uncontrolled global warming on a worldwide scale.

As large amounts of greenhouse emissions are caused by the production and consumption of energy, the European union’s energy policy plays a crucial role when it comes to hitting climate targets. Carbon dioxide emissions are to be reduced, mainly by increasing energy efficiency, limiting industrial and vehicle emissions, reducing the use of fossil fuels and diversifying energy sources, such as the further development of renewable energies.

ThE KYOTO PROCESS

The 1997 Kyoto protocol has up till now been the most important instrument of international climate policy. by signing the protocol, the developed countries have pledged to reduce their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 per cent compared to the 1990 level between 2008 and 2012. In order to hit this target, the 15 Eu member states at that time were faced with reducing their emissions by a total of 8 per cent. The system of “burden sharing” means that the emission-reduction obligations are distributed among Eu members in relation to their economic power. so, for example, Germany has to reduce its greenhouse emissions by 21 per cent by 2012, while portugal is allowed to increase its emissions by 27 per cent. The new Eu member states which have joined since 2004 have set their own targets within the framework of the Kyoto protocol.

In order to meet the targets set by the Kyoto protocol, in June 2000 the European Commission launched the European Climate Change programme (ECCp). This programme has the aim of supplementing the domestic efforts of Eu countries with European strategies. The main outcome of this programme is the Eu Emissions Trading


It is already clear that the EU will meet its Kyoto Protocol targets. The 15 EU countries have in fact managed to re-duce their emissions by 14 per cent compared to 1990.

system which was introduced in January 2005 for carbon dioxide emissions (CO2). This is the first multinational emissions trading system in the world. It is designed to achieve emission reductions at the lowest possible cost. Throughout Europe, around 11,000 industrial enterprises and energy companies are currently involved in the

scheme. Together, these companies are responsible for around 50 per cent of the Eu’s CO2 emissions. From 2012 the airline industry will also be brought into the Emissions Tra- ding system.

It is already clear that the Eu will meet its Kyoto protocol targets. The 15 Eu countries have in fact managed to reduce their emissions by 14 per cent compared to 1990. The ten new Eu members have also either hit or exceeded their targets, so the Eu-27 should have no problem in meeting their obligations. Only Austria and Italy are having problems meeting their targets, but this will have little impact on the overall Eu result.6

ThE EU’S “3 x 20” ENERGY TARGETS

In 2007 Europe’s political leaders made another joint commitment in the area of climate policy. In the framework of the European Council in march 2007, during Germany’s Eu presidency, they agreed to an Eu Commission proposal dated January 2007 which set out new climate protection goals for the Eu. This agreement, known as the “20-20-20” or “3 x 20”, comprises commitments by the Eu to reduce its total energy consumption by 20 per cent through increased energy efficiency, to reduce its total carbon emissions by 20 per cent and to increase the overall share of renewable energy in total Eu energy to 20 per cent. These targets are to be achieved by 2020. The share of biofuels should also increase to 10 per cent. Like the Kyoto protocol targets, the contribution of each Eu country is to be based on its economic capability and emissions levels in order to meet the overall target.

6 | Cf. “Eu schafft Kyoto-Ziel: Österreich am weitesten weg”, Kleine Zeitung, October 12, 2010, http://kleinezeitung.at/ nachrichten/chronik/2514576 (accessed February 2, 2011).


These ambitious goals are the first compulsory targets to be set anywhere in the world for the time after the expiry of the Kyoto Agreement in 2012. In this way the Eu is affirming its desire to actively pursue the goal of limiting global warming levels to two degrees and to continue to play a leading role in international climate protection. In order to ramp up global talks, the European Council approved the Eu’s goal to reduce greenhouse gases by 30 per cent compared to 1990 by the year 2020, “as long as other developed nations commit to similar emission reduc-tions and the fast-growing emerging nations accept their responsibilities and make an appropriate contribution”.7

ThE CLImATE SUmmITS IN bALI AND POzNAN

In December 2007 the 13th un Climate Change Conference was held in bali, along with the 3rd meeting of the parties to the Kyoto protocol. The goal of the conference was to set goals for the negotiations and a timetable for the successor to the Kyoto protocol, which expires in 2012. The conference culminated in the adoption of the “bali Action plan” and the “bali Road map”. In this way the parties agreed to conduct parallel talks until the 2009 Copenhagen Climate summit on the specific commitments and contributions of all countries to reduce emissions and on how to fund them until 2012 and beyond.

The “bali Action plan” was aimed at all parties to the climate convention, which included the usA.8 It stipulated that all the developed nations should be set similar targets, but no concrete figures were set for emission reductions. Instead, a reduction of 25 to 40 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990 was set for developed nations. For the first time, devel-oping countries also made a commitment to take specific steps to combat climate change.9

7 | Cf. Eu Council, meeting of the European Council, brussels, march 8/9, 2007, “schlussfolgerungen des vorsitzes,” 7224/1/07 REv 1, COnCL 1, 12.8 | however, the usA did not ratify the Kyoto Agreement, despite signing up to it. In 2001 washington completely withdrew from the Kyoto process.9 | Cf. Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear safety, “13. vertragsstaatenkonferenz der Klima- rahmenkonvention und 3. vertragsstaatenkonferenz des Kyoto- protokolls,” http://www.bmu.de/klimaschutz/internationale_ klimapolitik/13_klimakonferenz/doc/40146 (accessed Febru- ary 3, 2011).


Progress was made in Poznan, in particular the establishment of a fund to give financial assistance to develo-ping countries in adapting to climate change.

The aim of the 14th un Climate Change Conference, encompassing the 4th meeting of the parties to the Kyoto protocol held in December 2008 in poznan, poland, was to

advance negotiations on the successor to the Kyoto protocol and make progress towards the 2009 Copenhagen Climate summit. progress was made, in particular the estab-lishment of a fund to give financial assistance

to developing countries in adapting to climate change. This included setting up its decision-making structures, finances and procedures for awarding funds. And with an eye to Copenhagen, it was agreed to establish an international safeguard for countries which are particularly affected by climate change.10 In this way it managed to meet the official prerequisites for the Copenhagen Agreement. In poznan the Eu again stressed its commitment to the two-degree target and the desire to reduce its emissions by 30 per cent compared to 1990 by 2020, the most ambitious industrial target of any of the participants.11

ThE EU ENERGY AND CLImATE PACKAGE

In January 2008 the European Commission presented a package of measures designed to coordinate the individual mechanisms of European climate policy and the 20-20-20 targets. France’s Eu presidency which began in July 2008 set energy policy as one of its top priorities. In October the European parliament approved the energy and climate package and a final version was agreed by the European Council at the Eu summit in December 2008, in parallel to the climate conference in poznan.

The main focus of the energy and climate package is on the future form of the Eu emissions trading system. In the run-up to the agreement there was a lot of debate in Europe about how emission permits could be awarded to industries which are very energy-intensive or which are particularly reliant on exports. Companies threatened to relocate their operations to non-Eu countries if they had to buy all their emission permits at auction. The Eu was determined to avoid this, as it would inevitably lead to

10 | Cf. Christoph bals, Klimazug im “Tal des Todes” zwischen Posen und Kopenhagen (berlin: Germanwatch, 2009), 4 et seq.11 | Ibid., 9.


by 2020 renewable energies must make a 20 per cent contribution to electricity and heat production, with a parallel 20 per cent drop in overall energy consumption.

increases in emissions (due to “carbon leakage”), so a compromise was found whereby certain industries were made exempt from the auction system.

All other sectors of industry were told that, as of 2027 at the latest, emission permits will only be auctioned and no longer given out free-of-charge. The aim is to reduce industry emissions by 20 per cent compared to 2005 by 2020. A new phase of emissions trading will commence in 2013, in which the number of permits will be gradually reduced. Rising prices should then offer companies an incentive to stop auctioning permits but instead to invest in greener and lower-emission technologies.

The emissions trading system encompasses around 50 per cent of all greenhouse gases emitted in the Eu. Other sectors such as agriculture or small industrial operators have an overall emissions reduction target of 10 per cent by 2020. On top of this, different countries have set their own domestic targets. In addition, for the first time binding targets have been set for the use of renewable energies: by 2020 renewable energies must make a 20 per cent contribution to electricity and heat production, with a parallel 20 per cent drop in overall energy consumption.

breaches of the energy and climate package may lead to the European Court imposing legal sanctions, so it has more “teeth” than previous international agreements. It also constitutes a document which the Eu can use as a basis for future international climate talks. Above all, the energy and climate package proves that climate policy has become a central theme in the Eu, being afforded high priority even when times are hard. The Eu now has to face up to the challenge of meeting its 20-20-20 targets. The emissions trading system, with its new phase starting in 2013, will play a critical role in this respect.


China, India and the USA in particular were not keen to commit to binding agreements. The EU had found the outcome particularly disappointing.

COPENhAGEN

The 15th united nations Climate Change Conference and the 5th meeting of the parties to the Kyoto protocol took place on December 7 and 8, 2009 in Copenhagen, one year on from poznan and the approval of the European energy and climate package. In line with the “bali Action plan”, negotiations on international climate protection plans for the period after 2012 should have been concluded in Copenhagen. however, after some difficult negotiating the conference ended with nothing more than a political agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord”, which covered certain core elements of future climate policy.

In this Accord, the vast majority of countries confirmed that average global temperatures should not be allowed to increase by more than two degrees Celsius. but the conference failed to provide any binding international agree-ments or any kind of instrument to allow this two-degree

target to be met. The Copenhagen Accord is not a legally-binding agreement but just a political declaration which is “acknowledged” by the party states.12

During the talks, China, India and the usA in particular were not keen to commit to binding agreements. The Eu had had high hopes of the climate summit and so found the outcome particularly disappointing. The president of the European Council, herman van Rompuy, said at the end of February 2010 that Europe had been left sitting in the corridor while the usA and China struck their own deal. “we were excluded from the crucial deal between the usA and the four major developing countries.”13 by this he meant brazil, India, China and south Africa.

so the Copenhagen Accord clearly lagged behind the goals set by Germany and the Eu. Earlier there had also been

12 | Cf. Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear safety, “un-Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen – 7. bis 18. Dezember 2009,” http://www.bmu.de/15_ klimakonferenz/doc/44133 (accessed February 3, 2011).13 | Cf. address by hermann van Rompuy, president of the Euro- pean Council to the Collège d’Europe, bruges, February 25, 2010, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf (accessed February 3, 2011).


The EU is a trailblazer and role model when it comes to climate policy and is the driver of international climate protection.

discussions within the Eu about their joint position: the Eu member states were not in agreement about issues such as the financial assistance to be given by the developed nations to poorer countries. Even before the summit, Germany, France and Italy refused to ratify an Eu “offer of funding” which was championed by britain, Austria and the scandinavian countries. From 2020 the developed countries will be required to provide a total amount of 100 billion Euro per year. The decision was postponed on how much of this total the Eu would fund and how the financial burden would be distributed among its member states.14

Even though the climate summit ended without any binding agreement, it should be stressed that the Accord contains major core elements of climate policy. The German government has called it a first step towards a new agreement for the post-2012 period and would like to implement it without delay. In addition, many developed and developing countries have inserted voluntary goals and actions for the reduction of emissions into the Copenhagen Accord’s appendices. The Eu has reiterated its target of 20 per cent fewer emissions than 1990 by 2020 and is even prepared to raise this figure to 30 per cent if other developed nations will commit to similar targets.

It was also agreed in Copenhagen that talks on future climate policy under the Framework Climate Convention and the Kyoto protocol should be continued until the next climate conference in Cancún. so even though it was not possible to conclude a new agreement, the Copenhagen Climate Conference was not fruitless. It brought forth new initiatives which now have to be started. The Eu is still a trailblazer and role model when it comes to climate policy and is the driver of international climate protection. It can also prove that converting to a low-emissions, green economy is both technically possible and economically advantageous.15

14 | Cf. “Der Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen. Die streitpunkte der Eu,” Frankfurter Rundschau, October 30, 2009, http://fr-online.de/ wissenschaft/klimawandel/die-streitpunkte-der-eu/-/ 1473244/2695124/-/ (accessed February 3, 2011).15 | Cf. German federal government scientific advisor on global environmental changes, Klimapolitik nach Kopenhagen. Auf drei Ebenen zum Erfolg (April 2010), 7.


Germany’s Environment minister Rött-gen promised immediate federal fun-ding to the tune of at least 350 million Euro for the prevention of deforestation in developing countries.

CLImATE TALKS AT PETERSbERG

At the climate conference in Copenhagen, German Chan- cellor Angela merkel announced that Germany would host

an Environment ministers’ conference in summer 2010. In view of the fact that mexico would be hosting the next climate conference from november 29 to December 10, 2010, the 2010 Environment ministers’ conference was jointly chaired by German Environment minister norbert Röttgen and his mexican colleague Rafael Elvira Quesasa at the petersberg in bonn. The aim of the meeting was to agree a political position before the next round of talks of the un Climate secretariat which were due to be held from may 31 to June 11, 2010, also in bonn.16

Along with the steps to be taken before the next climate summit in Cancún, other points for discussion were the goals of a post-Kyoto agreement, funding for international climate protection, development of emissions trading and how to slow rainforest destruction in developing countries. The Environment ministers of 43 countries came together,

with climate protection initiatives being presented which showed how developed and developing nations can work together on climate change. Germany’s Environment minister norbert Röttgen promised immediate federal funding to the tune of at least 350

million Euro for the prevention of deforestation in developing countries. he also announced a further ten million Euro contribution to the Adaptation Fund to support emerging nations particularly affected by climate change. And in view of the upcoming climate conference in Cancún, all the ministers once again expressed their support for the two-degree target.17

16 | Cf. Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear safety, “Kurzinformation: petersberger Klimadia- log,” April 23, 2010, http://www.bmu.de/petersberger_ konferenz/doc/45912 (accessed February 4, 2011).17 | Cf. Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear safety, “Röttgen: neuer schwung für die internati- onalen Klimaverhandlungen,” may 4, 2010, http://www.bmu.de/ pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilungen/pm/45967 (accessed February 4, 2011).


Germany has set itself the goal of re-ducing its greenhouse gases by 40 per cent by 2020, but it has not yet set an energy efficiency target.

EUROPE 2020

In 2010 the Eu continued their efforts in the sphere of European energy and climate policy. As the Lisbon strategy expired in 2010, the European Council adopted a successor

strategy, “Europe 2020”: a new European strategy for employment and growth. Its aim is to encourage a greener economy which uses fewer resources and is more competitive. up to now the Eu has played a leading role in the area of green technologies, and would like to maintain and extend this role. In this way Europe can use resources even more effectively and the Eu can become more competitive.18

part of the strategy is to take over the Eu’s “20-20-20” climate and energy package which came into force in 2009. The idea behind this is that an economy which uses fewer resources has financial advantages. so the European Commission has calculated savings of 60 billion Euro by 2020 on oil and gas imports. Achieving the goal of using 20 per cent renewable energy by 2020 could result in 600,000 new jobs. And if on top of this the Eu’s 20 per cent increased energy efficiency target is met, this could mean more than a million new jobs.19

The Europe 2020 goals will be driven forward by seven European Commission flagship initiatives. The “Resource-Efficient Europe” initiative in particular contains important points such as the Commission’s plans to create a single European electricity grid and smart grids. It also plans to draw up an action plan on energy efficiency and specifically encourage electric mobility. Every member state has to present its domestic targets and planned actions in support of these plans. Germany has set itself the goal of reducing its greenhouse gases by 40 per cent compared to 1990 by 2020, but it has not yet set an energy efficiency target. It is expected that all national programmes will be

18 | Cf. European Commission, “mitteilung der Kommission: Europa 2020 – Eine strategie für intelligentes, nachhaltiges und inte- gratives wachstum,” march 3, 2010, 17, http://ec.europa.eu/ eu2020/pdf/COmpLET%20%20DE%20sG-2010-80021-06- 00-DE-TRA-00.pdf (accessed February 4, 2011).19 | Ibid., 18.


most politicians had low expectations of the conference in Cancún after the lack of concrete results in Copenhagen. José manuel barroso also did not anticipate any legally binding agreement.

announced by spring 2011, at which time Germany will also have to present its specific target figures.20

In november 2010 the European Commission made a call for proposals to its member states for the world’s biggest funding programme for demonstration projects to reduce CO2 emissions and promote renewable energy technolo-gies. This initiative, called “nER-300”, will be financed by the sale of 300 million emissions permits with a value of 4.5 billion Euro. It will fund at least eight projects for carbon capture and storage and 34 projects for innovative renewable energy technologies.

CANCúN

The united nations Climate Change Conference took place in Cancún, mexico from november 29 to December 10, 2010, and encompassed the 6th meeting of the parties to

the Kyoto protocol. most politicians had low expectations of the conference after the lack of concrete results in Copenhagen. Connie hedegaard, Eu Commissioner for Climate Action since February 2010, said that she did not expect an agreement to be made on a

Kyoto successor until 2011. The president of the European Commission, José manuel barroso, also did not anticipate any legally binding agreement to come out of Cancún.21

In the run-up to the conference the Eu Council formulated its goals for Cancún. The Eu wanted specific actions on emission reduction, adaptation to climate change and deforestation. This groundwork strengthened the Eu’s negotiating position because it allowed it to push for concrete and realistic actions during the talks. before the summit began the Eu also announced its willingness to extend the term of the Kyoto protocol. After some tough negotiations the international community reached an agreement which – unlike the Kyoto protocol – also included the usA, China and other emerging and developing

20 | Cf. Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear safety, Strategie Europa 2020 (september 2010), http://www.bmu.de/europa_und_umwelt/europa_2020/doc/ 6424 (accessed February 4, 2011).21 | Cf. Christian hübner, Vor dem Klimagipfel in Cancún (berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung e.v., 2010), 8.


As deforestation is responsible for more than 15 per cent of annual greenhouse gas emissions, an agreement was made on forest protection.

countries. The two-degree target was officially recognised by more than 190 participating countries, providing a basis for a successor to the Kyoto protocol. nGOs considered the acceptance of the two-degree target to be a step in the right direction towards a new climate change treaty. between 2013 and 2015 there will even be an appraisal of how the targets can be adapted to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

In Cancún bolivia demanded that the international community should agree to a maximum global warming level of 1.1 degrees Celsius. The summit almost collapsed in the face of bolivia’s refusal to accept the joint agreement. bolivia has announced that it will bring the Cancún agreement before the International Court in The hague.

First and foremost, the Kyoto protocol must be carried through. The developed countries want to reduce their emissions by 20 to 40 per cent by 2020; however more specific targets for emissions reduction will not be set until the Climate Conference in Durban, south Africa, in 2011. The usA, China and the developing countries are also required to declare their reduction targets in the framework of an agreement. It was also agreed to set up a climate fund with an initial 30 billion dollars p.a., rising to 100 billion dollars p.a. from 2020. The funds will be managed by the world bank and used to link climate change with the fight against poverty.

As deforestation is responsible for more than 15 per cent of annual greenhouse gas emissions, an agreement was made on forest protection under the banner “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD+). under the terms of this agreement, the developed nations will provide finance to help developing countries protect their forests. This would also partic-ularly include the interests of indigenous people and the maintenance of biodiversity. It is to be decided in Durban in 2011 how this scheme will be funded, whether through the public purse or as part of an emissions trading system.


The main goal which the EU member states set themselves was to achieve the internal energy market by 2014. It would include combining gas and electricity networks and setting joint technical standards.

German Chancellor Angela merkel and Environment minister norbert Röttgen judged the Cancún Accord to be a success and a sign that the un process was working. however, Röttgen urged that the Eu should set a binding target of a 30 per cent reduction in emissions by 2020. merkel called the results of the conference a step along the path to a successor agreement to Kyoto. Even Green-peace said the outcome was a hopeful sign. nevertheless, environmental groups such as nAbu were critical of the fact that the usA, Japan, Canada, Australia and China had hindered the setting of more concrete goals.22

The challenge is now to make the right preparations for the Climate Conference in south Africa in 2011. This means that countries have to decide how much they can reduce their emissions and how much they are prepared to pay for this. The Eu has already held an energy summit on February 4, 2011.

EU ENERGY SUmmIT

At the meeting of the European Council, which was also called the Eu Energy summit, the main focus was on

how to boost sustainable growth which would create jobs and meet the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. The main goal which the 27 member states set themselves was to achieve the internal energy market by 2014, which would include combining

gas and electricity networks, setting joint technical standards for electric vehicles and developing smart grids and meters. Investment in energy efficiency should also increase the Eu’s competitiveness, enhance its energy security and help achieve sustainability with minimum outlay. It was once again emphasised that it is crucial to meet the target of 20 per cent more energy efficiency by 2020. In order to hit this target, the Council will review the European Commission’s new Action plan for Energy Efficiency and if necessary expand it by adding further

22 | Cf. “Klimakonferenz: In den Jubel mischt sich Jammer,” Focus Online, December 11, 2010, http://www.focus.de/ wissen/wissenschaft/klima/weltklimakonferenz-2010/ klimakonferenz-in-den-jubel-mischt-sich-jammer_aid_ 580806 (accessed February 5, 2011).


The European Council advocated dra-wing up a “Roadmap for a low carbon economy 2050” in order to follow the recommendations of the World Climate Council.

points.23 particular emphasis will be placed on investments in renewable energy sources and safe and sustainable low- carbon technologies.

In its conclusions, the European Council advocated drawing up a “Roadmap for a low carbon economy 2050” in order to follow the recommendations of the world Climate Council. According to its estimates, the developed countries will need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 80 to 90 per cent compared to 1990 by 2050 – something which will require a “revolution in energy systems”.24

OUTLOOK

The goal of reducing emissions by 80 to 90 per cent by 2050 presents the world with an enormous challenge for the future, as the Kyoto protocol only covers the first five per cent of this target. The Eu has traditionally been a trailblazer in the area of climate policy, but in order to live up to this reputation and make an effective contribution to the fight against global warming it still has several hurdles to overcome.

The Eu must continue to set itself ambitious goals which give companies in Europe a real incentive to innovate and invest in green technologies. The financial and economic crisis has led to a reduction in greenhouse emissions amongst the industry sectors involved in the emissions trading scheme. but in turn the price for emissions permits has dropped so low that there is currently little incentive for companies to invest in green jobs and technologies. The Eu needs to adapt its emissions reduction targets to reflect these changes and set itself the goal of reducing emissions

23 | In november 2010 Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger presented a 10-year plan for the Eu’s energy policy. In it he warned that the Eu would not be able to hit its energy-saving targets without using nuclear energy. see: “Eu: Energiegipfel über das neue Zeitalter – Teil 2”, Greenmag, January 12, 2011, http://greenmag.de/magazin/meldung/datum/2011/01/12/ alles-fuer-sonne-wind-wasser-und-atom-1.html (accessed February 5, 2011).24 | Cf. Eu Council, meeting of the European Council, brussels, February 4, 2011, “schlussfolgerungen,” EuCO 2/11, CO EuR 2 COnCL 1, 1-6.


If the EU succeeds in showing that it is possible to convert to a green eco-nomy without loss of prosperity it will also benefit from its position in econo-mic terms.

by 30 per cent by 2020. This would cost very little more than the previous 20 per cent target25, but would boost

the Eu’s credibility in international climate talks and put the European economy in a good position for the future. At the moment the Eu is the market leader in green technologies. If it succeeds in showing the

international community that it is possible to convert to a green economy without loss of prosperity it will also benefit hugely from its position in economic terms.

Yet even if the Eu achieves all its targets, it still has to rely on the support of the international community. Climate change can only be effectively combated if the biggest polluters – particularly the usA, China and India – are willing to reduce their emissions. The next chance for an international agreement will be at the un Climate Conference in Durban in December 2011. until then, every country must accept to make concessions in order to make it possible to agree on a successor to the Kyoto protocol.

previous climate summits have shown that small steps are of particular importance when it comes to interna-tional climate negotiations. most participants travelled to the Copenhagen summit with high hopes, but the Eu left the conference disappointed that the usA, China, India and some other countries were not willing to share the Europeans’ ambitious goals. most participants then travelled to Cancún with low expectations but with specific proposals for small steps forward. This led to a joint agreement which was supported by all the participating countries.

As trailblazer in climate policy, the Eu has to continue to pursue ambitious goals but must also be aware that climate change is not afforded the same importance in other countries. In order to encourage countries like the

25 | Estimates suggest that an increase to 30 per cent would only cost an extra 11 billion Euro compared to the original 20 per cent figure. This represents less than 0.1 per cent of the Eu’s economic output. And the cost of delaying is high: the Inter- national Energie Agency (IEA) estimates that delays in investing in low-carbon energy sources worlwide incurs annual costs of 300 to 400 billion Euro. see: “30 prozent weniger Emissionen bis 2020,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 15, 2010, http://faz.net/-01d9g0 (accessed February 8, 2011).


usA to get on board, the Eu will have to be willing to make compromises. On an international level, Europe needs to be seen as a role model, not as a teacher. If it manages this, then more important progress may be made in Durban in the fight against climate change. but it remains to be seen whether this will be sufficient to succeed in limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius in the long-term.

paper finished on February 11, 2011. The article has been translated from the German.


1

The global challenge of climate change is well beyond the capacity of any one country or region to tackle alone. Given the magnitude and scale of what is required in response to its impacts, collective action from the developed and developing world is the only way forward. India, brazil and south Africa, the so-called IbsA states, are becoming increasingly significant global actors and strategic partners in global environmental governance. As a result of important changes in the global geo-political landscape and their growing political and economic importance, there is a need to recognize the important contribution of these countries towards a more equitable global climate change regime. As these countries have tremendous domestic challenges to deal with, it is interesting to explore new areas of engagement between traditional actors and new partners on issues of international concern.

IbsA member states share similar challenges of dealing simultaneously with energy security, climate change and socio-economic development. These common policy issues have become key pillars around which these governments seek potential allies and appropriate forums of dialogue with key southern partners. IbsA’s cooperation on the mitigation agenda is particularly timely and significant

1 | A version of this paper was originally prepared for “new directions in the ‘south’? Assessing the Importance and Consequences of the India-brazil-south Africa Dialogue Forum (IbsA) to International Relations”, IupERJ, June 23-24, 2008, Rio de Janeiro, brazil. within this chapter, the author has also referred to work she has completed within a sAIIA publication called Climate Change and Trade (in the process of being published).

EmERGING POWERSThE IbSA STATES AS PARTNERS AND LEADERS IN A FUTURE GLObAL CLImATE ChANGE REGImE 1

Romy Chevallier

Romy Chevallier issenior Researcher for the Governance of Africa’s Resources programme at the south African Institute of International Affairs (sAIIA) in Johannes-burg.


given that the second phase of the Kyoto protocol is currently being negotiated, with the next round of talks on the bali Roadmap to take place in Durban in December 2011. The next phase will entail penalties for the non- compliance of mitigation actions by big emitters. In this regard, large developing economies are faced with significant mitigation and development challenges. It is thus important and particularly timely to strengthen and extend the dialogue and partnership among fossil-fuel producing and consuming countries.

beyond the climate mitigation agenda, it is important to consider the role of IbsA in influencing the adaptation agenda. Given that developing countries will be the most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change and its variability2, it is essential that they engage proactively in this debate, seeking methods of increased resilience and financing for their own societies but also of their respective regions. This vulnerability is a function of the interaction between socio-economic challenges that face all devel-oping countries: endemic poverty; the reliance of sectors that are susceptible to climate fluctuations, the limited access to capital and global markets; poor governance; ecosystem degradation; complex disaster and conflicts; and rapid urbanisation and over-population – all of which will undermine a communities’ ability to adapt to climate change, and increase the risk of impoverishment.3 These shared economic, developmental and security implica-tions have therefore generated a perceptible shift in the way that decision-makers in the south are talking about climate change, as well as in the way they are beginning to cooperate at a myriad of levels.

2 | 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the un’s Intergovern- mental panel on Climate Change (IpCC) and unDp, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, human Development Report, 2007/08 (new York: palgrave macmillan, 2007) 18–19.3 | boko, niang, nyong, vogel, Githeko et al., Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IpCC. Cambridge university press, Cambridge.

beyond the climate mitigation agenda, it is important to consider the role of IbSA in influencing the adaptation agenda. It is essential that they engage proactively in this debate.


IbSA AND ThE REDUCTION OF GREENhOUSE GASES: FORGING A COmmON SOUThERN POSITION

The mitigation of greenhouse gases (GhG) presents a common challenge to all emerging southern economies whose energy profiles are predominantly made up of cheap coal-based energy. Developing countries “have a substantial role to play in GhG emission reductions, as future emissions are likely to be dominated by the growth in developing countries”.4 In the current round of climate change negotiations there is increasing pressure on non-Annex I5 polluters to initiate their own mitigation strategies and to participate actively and responsibly in the post 2012 climate change regime. however, considering the immediate development challenges that all developing countries face, constrained economic growth (by reducing their dependence on cheap coal) will present an additional burden to these countries.

It is also important that developing countries forge a common position on climate change to ensure that the un Framework Convention on Climate Change (unFCCC) negotiations in December seek some form of resolve – a new multilateral agreement that is equitable and repre-sents the development concerns of the developing world. Emphasis should therefore be placed on the following key issues: deeper cuts in GhG emissions in the north; international support of development through additional finance; the adequate transfer of technology and capacity building; deforestation and incentive mechanisms for best practice; and the paying for those having to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. A common southern position on these issues would give the developing world more leverage in the negotiations to encourage ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ from that of the historical emitters in the north. Coordinated positions in the form of an alliance (IbsA, bAsIC or other) and further unilateral

4 | professor winkler from south Africa’s Energy Research Centre, quoted after Tyrer, “Rough Road: south Africa’s path on the steep and rocky road to Copenhagen”, Engineering News, February 2009, 20-26.5 | ‘non-Annex countries’ is a classification by the unFCCC that refers to countries in the developing world that due to immediate development and socio-economic constraints do not have legal obligations to reduce GhG emissions in this Kyoto period (2008-2012).


The IbSA countries should collaborate on ways and means to reduce overall carbon emissions by highlighting the potential economic benefits of a green economy.

and voluntary commitments by large developing economies would encourage a more ambitious global agreement6 and put further pressure on the united states, Canada, Japan, and Australia, and hold other big GhG emitters to account.

Developing countries collaboration on climate change can also exist at numerous levels beyond a commitment at the multilateral level. Large developing economies should show leadership nationally and in their regions, and continue unabated with innovative approaches to protect themselves and the global environment. It is essential, for example, that IbsA countries improve the accuracy and availability of their scientific projections and relevant data. It is essential that they understand their vulnerabilities and prepare for the impacts of climate change. These countries should also collaborate on ways and means to reduce overall carbon emissions by highlighting the potential economic benefits of a green economy.

COOPERATION TO FURThER ImPROvE CLImATE PROJECTIONS AND PREDICTIONS

Developing countries have been ill-prepared and slow at developing effective ‘early warning’ systems and response measures to the impacts of climate change. Cooperation in the development of more substantial climate data and analysis capabilities is essential to project climate variability and to analyse its potential impact on vulnerable sectors. Data collection and analysis can be done at a national level with the assistance of international partners – for example in the construction of meteorological stations and in the training of human resources in this capacity, or at an inter-national level through the cooperation on the provision of scientific data and climate information.

According to the CsIR’s project on natural Resources and the Environment (south Africa), Australia is the only country in the southern hemisphere to have developed a coupled global climate model, that is, a model that can be

6 | “G8 Climate scorecards 2009,” Commissioned by Allianz and wwF, July 2009, authors included: hohne, Eisbrenner, hagemann and moltmann.


used to predict global climate change. Australia is therefore also the only country to have contributed such predictions to the Assessment Report 4 (AR4) of the un’s Intergovern-mental panel on Climate Change (IpCC), and been part of the broader debate on climate variability in the southern hemisphere. All other countries in the geographical south depend on the north to provide them with global climate change predictions. more active involvement by southern hemisphere oceanographers, climatologists, terrestrial ecologists and modellers in coupled model development is critically needed, in order to improve the simulations of southern hemisphere circulation dynamics.

There is an urgent need for developing countries to collectively establish centres of expertise and best practice in this regard. brazil and south Africa have recently made

progress in developing coupled climate models capable of making projections of global change. This raw data and sufficient knowledge gathering and generation would substantially add to the process of understanding the science of climate change, making climate predictions more accurate and relevant to their respective regions.

COOPERATION ON A CLImATE mITIGATION AGENDA

The biggest emitters of carbon dioxide in absolute terms are located not only in the rich world but also in rapidly emerging economies. According to the 2008 International Energy Outlook, emerging countries are now producing more than 50 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions (2007 figure).7 Rapid economic growth, a large manufac-turing sector and a rapidly expanding population have resulted in China overtaking the usA as the biggest polluter.8 brazil and India have also leapt up the emission

7 | In 2030 carbon dioxide emissions from China and India combined are projected to account for 34 per cent of total world emissions, with China alone responsible for 28 per cent of the world total. Energy Information Administration of the u.s. Department of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008, washington, D.C., June 2008, http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ 0484(2008).pdf (accessed march 8, 2011).8 | Euromonitor: Energy Information Administration of the u.s. Department of Energy, December 2010, http://euromonitor. com/mapping_global_pollution_The_worlds_biggest_polluters (accessed march 8, 2011).

brazil and South Africa have recently made progress in developing coupled climate models capable of making pro-jections of global change.


IbSA member states and China have insisted on climate equity in the UNFCCC negotiations. India and China support an “equal per-capita basis with accoun-ting for historical responsibility”.

ranks as their economies have continued to grow. These statistics prove that large polluting developing economies have a global responsibility to reduce their emissions and find ethical, sustainable and equitable solutions.

however, it must be noted that these figures do not accu- rately reflect the inverse relationship between the responsibility for climate change and the vulnerability to its effects. They do not take account, for example, of the historical contribution of GhG emissions by developed countries, nor do they take into account the current level of development, economic growth, population or industrialisation by developing countries9. It is understandable therefore that the IbsA member states and China have insisted on climate equity in the unFCCC negotiations. India and China support an “equal per-capita basis with accounting for historical respon-sibility” in the international negotiations. south Africa, with one of the highest emissions per capita ratios in the developing countries, insists more on national Appropriate mitigation Actions (nAmAs) – taking developing countries economic and development levels into account.

stringent mitigation commitments are often seen in tension with development priorities, as the majority of emissions from the developing world are derived from the energy and transport sectors, both of which are essential to sustain national economic development. Electricity produced from fossil fuels (such as coal, which is found in relative abundance in many African and Asian countries) produces high GhG emissions, but provides power at a comparatively low cost.10 south Africa’s most profitable sectors are, for example, highly carbon-intensive, and 90 per cent of its electricity production is from coal. Changing south

9 | The now developed countries emitted three times as much fossil-fuel CO2 between 1850 and 2002 as did the now developing countries (baumert, herzog et al., 2005). Developed countries have reached their targets of development and industrialisation without carbon constraints. Developing countries need the space to develop to meet the basic needs of their populations.10 | The current level of proven coal reserves worldwide stands at roughly 850 billion tonnes, about 50 billion of which occur in Africa. Coal is much more widely distributed geographically than any other fossil fuel.


Efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate variability should be presented as complementary to the broader econo-mic agendas of developing countries.

Africa’s development path to one that is more carbon-efficient would be extremely costly, and present numerous challenges in the security of short-term electricity supply.

This apparent conflict between the needs of addressing climate change and fostering development objectives therefore presents a dilemma for democratic governance throughout the developing world, as the body politic in each country will have to agree to pay hefty initial costs for mitigation and adaptation programmes, with a view to reaping long-term gains. This will require leaders to

look beyond electoral cycles and educate their communities – particularly those most vulnerable. It is thus imperative that efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate variability should be presented as complementary to

the broader economic agendas of developing countries, and that they should not be seen as impeding wider development objectives. As the Institute of Development studies reasons, “if climate change policies are to have any chance of achieving the political support from leaders necessary for implementation, climate policies will have to be ‘development-led’”.11

For these reasons and others it is important for developing countries to look for areas of cooperation on climate change that promotes economic development. They therefore need to take advantage of the economic opportunities apparent in a path towards a low carbon trajectory. This would mean collectively investing in the research and development of clean energy projects through the transfer of renewable sources of energy and clean technologies.

DEvELOPING COUNTRIES COLLAbORATION ON AN ADAPTATION AGENDA

Irrelevant of the negotiated outcomes that succeed the Kyoto protocol, all countries will need to adapt to the changes that a global warming climate will force on them. mitigation efforts cannot exist alone and must be comple-mented by adaptation measures. Adaptation refers to the various means used to address the vulnerability of

11 | Institute for Development studies, “Climate change adaptation”, IDS In-Focus, 2, november 2007.


Even the most conservative figures estimate a loss of 0-3 per cent of glo-bal gross domestic product annually by the time the temperature has risen 2-3 degrees Celsius.

developing countries to climatic changes and its associated effects, both in the present and the future.12 As noted earlier, particularly within the LDC context, a country’s vulnerability depends not only on climate variability itself, but also on its government’s ability to increase efficiency in the usage of natural resources and energy supplies. Financial, technical and institutional support and capacity-building are often needed to assist poor nations to switch to more sustainable development pathways. while cost estimates are rudimentary and subject to uncertainty in the cases of individual countries, even the most conservative figures estimate a loss of 0-3 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDp) annually by the time the temperature has risen 2-3 degrees Celsius.13 According to the Stern Review, inaction – that is, not taking any steps towards adaptation – could cost up to five trillion u.s. Dollar globally. stern further predicts that the losses incurred if high-emission countries continue with a ‘business as usual’ approach could reach 5-20 per cent of world GDp annually.14

Developing countries (particularly the small Island and Least Developed Countries) are the most vulnerable to these impacts, and most of them are already facing climate-related stresses, such as an increase in water scarcity and vector-borne diseases, an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather conditions, unpredictability in rainfall and a decrease in crop yields. As a result, all developing countries will need to build the capacity of their national and regional governments to address these climate risks, by inter alia, ensuring better water management, promoting agricultural development and developing more effective disaster management and early warning systems. sharing knowledge on best practice adaptation strategies can be crucial for urban planning and the construction of climate-resilient infrastructure.

12 | Romy Chevallier, “Integrating adaptation into development strategies: The southern African perspective in Climate and Development,” Earthscan, vol. 2, Issue 2, 2010, 191-193.13 | John Llewellyn, The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities, Lehman brothers, February 2007, http://lehman.com/press/pdf_2007/ThebusinessOfClimate Change.pdf (accessed march 8, 2011).14 | nicholas stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (London, Cambridge, 2006).


The international response to climate change adaptation has thus far fallen short on all fronts. Several financing mechanisms have been created but only limited amounts have been paid out.

Effective adaptation of the kind required is costly and involves not only significant investment in research, awareness-raising and capacity-building, but practical measures such as the ‘climate-proofing’ of infrastructure projects. Adaptation therefore requires substantial and predictable financial support from partners to help meet the additional costs. According to a ‘guesstimate’ by the un Development programme’s (unDp) human Develop- ment Report, poor countries may need as much as 86 billion u.s. Dollar a year in additional financing by 2015 to help them adapt to the consequences of climate change.15 The report also states that in the same period “at least 44 billion u.s. Dollar will be required annually for the climate-

proofing of development investments”.16 This adds to the financial and human burden on the already strained resources of developing economies. The international response to climate change adaptation has thus far fallen short on all fronts. several dedicated multi-

lateral financing mechanisms have been created but only limited amounts have been paid out by these mechanisms.

To date, IbsA has been vocal on the urgency of this matter and the inadequate response thus far from the north. It is important that they remain engaged in this regard and that they collectively call for improved commitments by developed nations to move the debate beyond rhetoric, and instead set out specific obligations on the donor community and stringent time frames for implementation in recipient countries. IbsA could lead the discussion on adaptation financing by voluntarily making a financial contribution to the Adaptation Fund (which essentially contributes to the development in their respective regions). IbsA could also potentially use its existing Development Fund to highlight areas of co-benefit – while pursuing development-related projects. It will deal with issues related to climate adaptation.

15 | unDp, n. 2, 194. 16 | Ibid., “summary”, 25; these are 2005 figures.


many countries in Africa are dependent on fossil fuels. They can gain tremendous experience from participating in cooperative alliances with industria-lised countries.

source: unFCCC website. nationally appropriate mitigation actionsof developing country parties. 2010. http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php (accessed march 8, 2011)

KEY DEvELOPING COUNTRIES AND ThEIR FUTURE ROLE A GLObAL CLImATE ChANGE REGImE

Despite the common challenge of climate change, countries act and react to the negotiations primarily from a national standpoint. It would be naïve to expect countries to be driven by anything less than domestic stakeholders, national interests and local realities. Therefore in order to make progress in coalitions of climate change and to advance the global agenda in this regard, it is perhaps practical to focus on the less contentious issues and to make progress first on “low-hanging fruit” areas. Common positions can be forged at a myriad of levels, on a number of issues, to show tangible and concrete effort towards achieving a common goal, while gathering momentum. many countries in Africa, for example, are still dependent on fossil fuels for their primary source of their electricity supply. These countries can gain tremendous experience from participating in cooperative alliances with industrialised countries, especially when attempting to reform their energy policies through renewable energy and carbon efficient technologies. Large developing countries have also shown initiative and demonstrated progress towards a low-carbon future, fast becoming important

Table 1voluntary pledges to the Copenhagen Accord by countries

India 20-25 per cent reduction in carbon intensity

(carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDp) by

2020 in comparison to 2005 levels

south Africa Reduce emissions by 34 per cent and 42 per cent

below b.A.u for 2020 and 2025 respectively

(conditional of funding)

brazil Reduce emissions by 39 per cent by 2020

compared with b.A.u


manufacturers of renewable energy technologies. Devel-oping countries have also inscribed voluntary emission reduction commitments (Table 1) and are in the process of developing national plans to implement mitigation actions, including further renewable energy targets (Table 2).

source: Renewables 2007: Global status Report and REn21: RE policy network for 21st Century (2007)

India

with 17 per cent of the world’s population, India contributes only 4.6 per cent of the world’s GhG emissions and its per capita emissions of 1.5 tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent are far below the word average. however, in absolute terms India is the fourth largest emitter and emissions are quickly increasing to rapid economic growth, population expansion and urbanisation.17 Coal is the mainstay of India’s energy economy, and coal-based power plants account for two-thirds of the total electric generation installed capacity of 135,000 mw. In 2003-2004 coal accounted for 62 per cent of India’s share of energy production, while oil accounted for only 36 per cent.18

17 | wwF Report 2010, Emerging Economies: How the developing world is starting a new era of climate change leadership, november 2010, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/emerging_ economies_report_nov_2010.pdf (accessed march 25, 2011).18 | Climate brief 2, India’s Climate Change policy and Trade Concerns: Issues, barriers and solutions, Centre for Trade and Development.

Table 2Renewable energy targets implemented in selected developing countries

Country Renewable Target Progress

India 10 per cent of power generation by 2012

On track to meet or exceed RE target, having already achieved 8 per cent in 2009

brazil maintain 46 per cent by 2020 maintain this share

China 10 per cent by 2010 and 15 per cent by 2020

by 2006 having achieved 8 per cent of its pri-mary energy production from RE. now scaling up wind and solar to meet these goals


The Indian government has been proactive in terms of using market mechanisms and incentive schemes to encourage independent power producers to feed on to the national grid.

India has made progress towards climate-friendly measures, particularly in the area of renewable energy and clean coal technology. Today, India has the fourth largest installed wind capacity in the world, currently producing 7,000 mw of wind energy.19 In 2009, renewable energy power accounted for more than 8 per cent of the total power generation capacity in India.20 The Indian government has also been seen to be proactive in terms of using market mechanisms and incentive schemes to encourage independent power producers to feed on to the national grid. The necessary regulatory policies have been put in place to facilitate this movement and encourage the reduction of India’s energy intensity by 20 per cent per unit of GDp between 2007-2008 and 2016-2017 as stated in the 11th Five Year plan (2006-2012). In mid 2008 India also adopted an ambitious national Action plan on Climate Change (nApCC) on mitigation, adaptation and strategic knowledge integration.21

however, like south Africa, India’s government is deter-mined that its national climate and energy-related policies are to have no adverse impact on its GDp growth. India still experiences severe developmental challenges with approximately 55 per cent of India’s population still without access to commercial energy (600 million people) and 70 per cent of the Indian population still cook with traditional biomass.22 It is expected that economic growth will bring a transition to these sources of household energy and that as a result India’s emissions from power generation are expected to increase six-fold by 2030 23 as India’s service sector expands substantially.

19 | “India: Addressing Energy security and Climate Change,” ministry of Environment and Forests and ministry of power bureau of Energy Efficiency, Government of India, 10/2007.20 | wwF Report 2010, n. 16.21 | prasad and Kochhner, “Climate change and India – some major issues and policy implications,” Department of Economic Affairs and ministry of Finance, Government of India, working paper no. 2/2009-DEA, march 2009.22 | E. somanathan, “what do we expect from an international climate agreement? A perspective from a low-income country,” December 2008, Discussion paper 08-27, 11, The harvard project on International Climate Agreements, harvard Kennedy school, Indian statistical Institute.23 | “melting Asia-China, India and climate change,” The Economist (u.s.), June 5, 2008.


brazil argues that a country’s respon-sibility for climate change is closely related to the historical contributions to the global temperature increase.

brazil

brazil’s energy sector contributes little to the country’s GhG emissions, with low emissions intensity for electricity generation due to the extensive use of hydropower. Three-quarters of its emissions result from deforestation and unsustainable land use – as agricultural frontiers expand mainly in the Amazon region. Land use is this regard is mainly for large soybean plantations and cattle rearing. brazil’s emissions from raising cattle are also substantial. As a result, energy emissions per person are relatively low (1.8 per cent in 2004).24

brazil maintains that annual emissions should not be seen as a proxy for a country’s responsibility for climate

change. This responsibility, it argues, is more closely related to the historical contributions of economies to the global temperature increase – since CO2 remains in the atmos-phere for more than one century on average.

As a result, in international negotiations, brazil has refused to accept emission targets before the middle of the century.

nevertheless, brazil has developed a national plan for Climate Change (pnmC) in December 2008 as well as an impressive track record in the renewable energies sector. According to brazil’s ministry of mines and Energy, 46 per cent of brazil’s primary energy is generated from renewable sources. In 2002, the brazilian Congress approved a law aiming to establish a compulsory market for renewable energy. The programme called pROInFA helps independent power producers feed power from renewables into the national electricity grid (including electricity-generating capacity based on biomass, small hydro power plants and wind power). This coupled with president Lula’s incen-tives to increase the attractiveness of private investment in hydropower-gene ration, has resulted in 85 per cent of brazil’s electricity generation from hydropower.25 brazil’s

24 | however, brazil’s industrial emissions are relatively carbon intensive – as iron and steel, cement, aluminum, chemical, petrochemical, pulp and paper, transportation are its main contributing sectors and they are heavily reliant on fossil fuels.25 | International Energy Outlook 2010, u.s. Energy Information Administration, http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/electricity.html (accessed march 25, 2011).


Emissions from energy supply and use constitute by far the largest part of South Africa’s total emissions. Coal is the backbone of the country’s economy.

national Ethanol programme has also become the largest commercial application of biomass for producing and using energy in the world. This programme demonstrates the feasibility of large-scale ethanol production from sugarcane in producing automotive fuels.26

brazil, home to one of the greatest ecosystems and forests (carbon sink) of the planet, has established a multi-agency program to combat the deforestation of the Amazon using a satellite monitoring system. From 2005-2007 this resulted in a 52 per cent reduction of the rate of deforestation.27 brazil has also adopted a national plan for the prevention and Combat of Deforestation which aims to reduce defores-tation in the Amazon region by 70 per cent by 2017.28

South Africa

south Africa is the 13th largest carbon dioxide emitter globally (from energy related CO2) with emissions per capita ratio only slightly below industrialised countries, and well above the developing country average. Emissions from energy supply and use constitute by far the largest part of south Africa’s total emissions (91 per cent) – 40 per cent of these emissions accounted for by electricity generation from Eskom’s coal-fired stations.29 Coal is the backbone of the economy of south African, the fourth largest coal producer in the world.

26 | La Rovere and pereira, “brazil and Climate Change: a country profile,” Policy Briefs, science and Development network, February 14, 2007, http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/ brazil-climate-change-a-country-profile.html (accessed march 18, 2011).27 | This forms part of a speech “Climate Change as a Global Challenge” delivered by the Director-General of the Depart- ment of the Environment and special Themes of the ministry of External Relation, minister machado, Embassy of brazil in London. ‘Climate Change policy’, August 2007.28 | It must be noted that the deforestation is not a priority for other IbsA countries. while forests make up 57.2 per cent of brazil’s total land, they only make up 21.2 per cent of China’s total land, 22.8 per cent of India’s, 33.7 per cent of mexico’s and 7.6 per cent of south Africa’s (FOA, 2006, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005, Rome).29 | Eskom, Annual Report 2008, http://financialresults.co.za/ eskom_ar2008/ar_2008/downloads/eskom_ar2008.pdf (accessed march 25, 2011).


south Africa has produced a Long-Term mitigation scenario’s response (LTms), initiated in 2006, aimed to formulate a long-term climate policy for south Africa and an appropriate framework for climate action, based on the most effective mitigation options available. This study resulted in various scenarios and strategic options for south Africa, and also considered mitigation potentials and cost-effectiveness of different interventions. In July 2008, south Africa’s cabinet considered the outputs of the LTms work and adopted a national Climate Framework laying out the government’s vision, strategic direction and framework for long-term climate policy. The framework commits the government to a “peak, plateau and decline” trajectory for the country’s future GhG emissions: an emissions peaking between 2020/25, then stabilising for a decade, before declining in absolute terms towards mid-century (peak, plateau and decline).30 This would include, for example, a change in south Africa’s fuel mix as three quarters of south African fuel is dependent on coal.31 Its energy mix is currently being debated within its Integrated Resource plan (IRp II).

Despite these ambitious strategies south Africa places its national poverty reduction strategies as its major concern. For the foreseeable future, at least, south Africa will remain dependant on coal-based electricity. Approximately 27 per cent of its population is still without access to modern energy, and the majority of its emissions are from sectors that are essential to sustain its economic growth and reduce poverty levels. south Africa also supplies electricity to many of its neighbouring countries.

SOUTh-SOUTh COOPERATION IN ADvANCED RESEARCh, SCIENCE AND TEChNOLOGY

At the recent Energy ministers meeting in may 2009, the Energy ministers of the G8 and G13 issued a Joint statement as part of their new International partnership of

30 | Romy Chevallier, “south Africa’s Dilemma: Reconciling Energy- Climate Challenges with Global Climate Responsibilities,” chapter 6 in: Climate Change and Trade: The Challenges for Southern Africa, sAIIA, 2010.31 | This culminated in the 2nd national Climate Change summit of march 2009, with a hope that the LTms will be translated into a white paper in november 2009.


“both China and India have become major producers of renewable sources of energy, so it’s not a matter of technology being in the North.” (Yvo de boer)

Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IpEEC) that calls for “accel-erating the demonstration, development and deployment of low-emission energy technologies, including renewable energy sources, smart grid systems and energy storage, refurbishment of power generating facilities and cogene-ration, sustainable mobility and low-emission transport vehicles, advancing demonstration of carbon capture and storage (CCs) and nuclear energy”.32 There was a further call for the ‘coordination of efforts in research, development, demonstration and deployment of these low emissions technologies, enabling effective sharing of knowledge on key technologies’, and particularly the promotion of the increased use of renewables. This would include, for example, ‘improving the policy and regulatory framework to boost investment in renewable energies, while promoting their deployment and diffusion throughout all countries’.

Yvo de boer, former executive secretary of the unFCCC, says that getting technology transfer policies right must be one of the central planks of a new international climate policy. he mentions CCs in this regard – particularly for countries with a reliance on coal.33 he also mentions the increased use of renewables but says that we need to design mechanisms that make joint research and development between rich and poor countries possible: “both China and India have become major producers of renewable sources of energy, so it’s not a matter of technology being in the north. It’s more a matter of finding affordable ways for developing countries to get access to that technology.”34

One must be aware, however, that there are substantial economic, social and political hurdles to overcome with the introduction, transfer and dissemination of technology in

32 | Joint statement by the G8 Energy ministers, the European Energy Commissioner, the Energy ministers of brazil, China, Egypt, India, Korea, mexico, saudi Arabia, and south Africa. session I, Italy, may 2009.33 | “Carbon Capture and storage bulletin: A summary of the high-level conference on fighting climate change with carbon capture and storage,” published by the International Institute for sustainable Development, vol. 163, no. 1, June 1, 2009.34 | Interview of Yvo de boer conducted by science and Develop- ment network, December 1, 2008.


If South Africa reaches 15 per cent generating capacity from renewable energy, it will create 34,000 direct jobs by 2020.

the developing world. These include the lack of technical capacity to utilise introduced technologies, lack of appro-priate laws and regulations, defective administrative struc-tures, and insufficiently developed market conditions.35 Also, those that own the technology need to be protected by appropriate intellectual property rights. An international arbitration or insurance scheme must be set up in the IbsA countries in order to guarantee technology holders’ their rights.

SEIzING OPPORTUNITIES FROm ThE GLObAL TRANSITION TO A LOW CARbON ECONOmY

In order to promote the participation of various stake-holders, particularly in the developing world, it is imperative to emphasise the economic opportunities offered by mitigation and adaptation projects, for example by emphasising the profitability of the environmental goods and services industry (which includes renewable resources and energy-efficient technology), as well as through Clean Development mechanism projects. southern leaders and businesspeople are largely unaware that this industry is worth approximately 600 billion u.s. Dollar globally, and is growing at a rapid rate. Also, its strong potential for

job creation generally outperforms that of traditional energy and carbon-intensive industries. Clean technology is positioned to become the fifth largest sector in terms of job creation and investment.36 In Germany,

for example, wind farms are estimated to have created 40,000 jobs. It has also been estimated that if south Africa reaches 15 per cent generating capacity from renewable energy, it will create 34,000 direct jobs by 2020. while generating 5,700 mw of solar photovoltaic power would create 680 full-time jobs and 8,800 construction jobs.

The International Energy Agency estimates that about 45 trillion u.s. Dollar will be needed to develop and deploy

35 | “Energy efficiency, technology and climate change: The Japa- nese experience,” chapter 8 in “Climate Change negotiations: Can Asia change the game?”, Loh, stevenson and Tay (eds.), Civic Exchange 2008.36 | L. Tyrer, “Rough Road: south Africa’s path on the steep and rocky road to Copenhagen,” Engineering News, February 20- 26, 2009, 84.


Investments need to be targeted to areas of under-funded ICT research, in fields such as agricultural production, environmental management and pub-lic health.

new, clean technologies between now and 2050. Although the number of cleaner and more energy-efficient coal-fired generation plants and the retirement of fuel sources using older technologies has accelerated over the past few years, especially in the developed world, much more needs to be done to promote the rapid diffusion of technology. This would make existing sources of renewable energy economically viable, and a more feasible option for the developing world.

Genuine cooperative technology transfer between developing countries is therefore essential. Investments need to be targeted to areas of under-funded ICT research, in fields such as agricultural production, environmental management and public health. One important goal of strengthening the scientific and technology policy in developing countries is the generation of new goods and services that can improve carbon reduction. stimulating the low carbon technology industry is one way to achieve commercialization of research and development.37

In 2006 IbsA countries established a joint IbsA science and Technology Fund in which each member state allocated one million u.s. Dollar for collaborative activities.38 To date, activities have included a limited number of research fields: medical and pharmaceutical research (especially in hIv, malaria and tuberculosis); nanotechnology, biotechnology and oceanography. some of these research areas clearly already overlap with climate change priorities and could provide a co-benefit approach to environmental sustain-ability more broadly. however, funding could specifically be dedicated to research on low-carbon technologies and renewables.

A further example of ‘seizing opportunities’ is provided by the Clean Development mechanism (CDm), which was established by the unFCCC to channel finance to renewable energy initiatives in developing countries. CDm projects are designed to earn carbon credits for investors who reduce

37 | Juma, Gitta, Disenso and bruce. “Forging new technology alliances: the role of south south cooperation”, 2005, 59.38 | Cf. The India-brazil-south Africa Dialogue Forum, IbsA Trilateral Official website, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org (accessed march 25, 2011).


carbon emissions in developing countries. This credit scheme stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions while simultaneously giving industrialised countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission limitation targets (as stipulated in the Kyoto protocol). It also offers developing countries that host CDms the oppor-tunity to seek private and public sector investment, build capacity and capability, and gain experience in areas such as the transfer of technology.

The high emission levels in all IbsA member states, and other developing economies, make them attractive candidate countries for CDm projects, which could move the energy sector into lower emissions intensity and encourage technology transfer.39

According to the unFCCC, in 2010, there were 2,453 registered CDm project activities globally. Of these, China accounts for 41 per cent, India 22 per cent, brazil seven per cent, and mexico five per cent.40 It can therefore be said that China, India, brazil and mexico are the leading host countries for CDm projects with a combined share of 75 per cent of the total project pipeline. If one analyses the list of top 20 developing countries in terms of number of hosting CDm projects, south Africa is the only country from the African continent represented on the list. Africa in its entirety only hosts two per cent of all CDm projects. One of the reasons for this is that CDm project cycles are complex and require extensive knowledge on project design and formulation, validation, registration, project financing, monitoring, verification and certification. because India and China have made substantial progress in this regard they could assist south Africa and the African continent more broadly, with technical expertise and capacity building experience – to realise similar opportunities from this flexible mechanism.41

39 | According to the brazilian Embassy in London, “it was brazil that took the initiative to introduce the CDm as part of the Kyoto protocol”.40 | Clean Development mechanism, united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unFCCC)’s Executive board Annual Report, 2010, “Registered project activities by host party and region”.41 | European union sixth Framework programme. The potential of Transferring and Implementing sustainable Energy Techno- logies through the Clean Development mechanism of the Kyoto protocol: CDm state of play, november 2008.


The distribution of projects among host countries is largely determined by the potential for (large-scale) GhG emission reductions at relatively low costs.

Critics of the CDm note that it is not in the interest of the environment to grant CDms to large developing countries with a particular stage of economic development. For example, cuts in emissions due to current CDm projects contribute, albeit a small amount, to China’s energy-saving goals, but does not decrease its coal emissions and reliance. with China and India, which together host 90 per cent of the entire global CDm wind energy project pipeline42, improving the geographical distribution is also on the agenda. It has also been shown that in some countries a few technologies are clearly dominant (e.g. hydro, wind power and ‘energy efficiency own generation’ in China; biomass energy and wind energy in India; landfill gas capture in brazil), whereas these technologies are lagging behind in other countries. Generally, it is assumed that the distribution of projects among host countries is largely determined by the potential for (large-scale) GhG emission reductions at relatively low costs and by how smoothly a country’s CDm institutional procedures function. Clearly countries with smooth DnA procedures and efficient project activities are more attractive to do CDm business with.43

WESTERN PARTNERS CANNOT bE ExCLUDED

A successful global climate change regime post-2012 is dependant on the inclusion of all big emitters and all those experiencing climate change impacts. In terms of global mitigation action, political clout and developing country collaboration is necessary to take up more stringent mitigation commitments.

The importance of north-south partnerships cannot be ignored as the developed world’s initial experience on promoting energy efficiency can provide valuable background for countries attempting to reform their energy policies.44 many technologies based on resource endowments of developing countries (e.g. biomass) do not yet exist, or are too expensive. Collaborative research and development

42 | European union’s sixth Framework programme, “CDm state of play,” EnTTRAns, november 2008.43 | Ibid.44 | Juma, Gitta, Disenso and bruce, “Forging new technology alliances: the role of south south cooperation,” 2005, 59.


IbSA countries’ “development plans” under a conventional, fossil-fuel ener-gy path must be deviated from a ‘busi-ness as Usual’ approach.

(R&D) between developing and developed country R&D institutions is necessary to address this gap.

CONCLUSION

The IbsA member states face similar challenges when it comes to their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, the challenge of addressing mitigation while ensuring economic development (especially considering the drivers for energy demand are economic growth, population growth and technological changes), as well as re-focusing their industrial policy and investment strategy on low- and zero-carbon sectors of the economy – while at the same time retaining their competitiveness in the global economy. The question then is how IbsA countries

redefine their competitive advantage from attracting energy-intensive sectors on the basis of cheap but dirty electricity, to building a new advantage around climate-friendly technologies and systems. In order for this

to be successfully achieved, IbsA countries’ “development plans” under a conventional, fossil-fuel energy path must be deviated from a ‘business as usual’ approach. however, this needs to be done without jeopardizing the growth trajectories of countries still dealing with substantial devel-opment challenges. A practical example is how member states prevent deforestation in the light of extreme poverty and limited land usage, or how individual countries expand their energy mix to include more energy efficient technologies, in light of an abundance of cheap coal.

The IbsA dialogue pillar on climate change could focus on sectors in which developing countries would see significant benefits from emissions cuts, such as in the energy conservation of building, transport and industry, technical progress in agriculture and reforestation. There should also be more substantial research and development on the potential economic scenarios of transferring from cheaper fossil fuels to low-carbon/carbon-neutral energy sources. Cooperation on practical projects would also be advan-tageous in order to initiate momentum between IbsA member countries – at all levels – including the buy-in from local communities. This could involve, for example, replacing traditional stoves in African and Asian countries


India’s disaster relief actions are a model others can follow. India has also made headway in the renewables sector, particularly on wind and solar energy.

with low-soot varieties that do not pose health and environmental risks. studies in India have shown that new stoves cost around 20 u.s. Dollar to make and produce 90 per cent less soot.45

IbsA members have all made progress on particular areas of climate change and energy policy and should therefore lead the discussion and technical expertise in this regard. brazil, for example, has made headway on the promotion of renewable energy sources for fuel mix with ethanol, which has great potential to grow and be transferred to others with a similar emissions profile. 46 brazil also has large hydro energy sources which is a model that can be studied by south African and India. It has also made headway in terms of reducing deforestation and preserving its indigenous rainforests. India’s disaster relief actions are a model others can follow. India has also made headway in the renewables sector, particularly on wind and solar energy. south Africa on the other hand is vocal on adaptation and has taken the lead in its region in producing economic scenarios for a low-carbon trajectory. It also has been proactive on research and development of CCs technologies, as well as in gathering climate data for the southern hemisphere through the development of a coupled global climate model.

Other arenas of potential cooperation between develo ping countries are in building and implementing CDm projects. The key lies in building capacity in host countries to design and implement effective CDm project, and in improving rules and incentives for developed countries to invest in key sectors and regions. China and India have seen exponential growth in CDm projects since 2005, and their experience clearly indicates that capacity building is the

45 | “Climate salvation from low-soot stoves?”, International Herald Tribune, April 17, 2009.46 | however, it is important to note that brazil’s bio-fuel industry is not necessary applicable to India or south Africa – brazil, for example, can support a viable bio-fuel industry without taxpayer subsidies. In contrast, most others countries cannot. According to Runnalls from the International Institute for sustainable Development ‘bio-fuels are not the answer’ (may 2009) bio-fuels require subsidies of between 50-70 cents per litre to replace a litre of fossil fuel, almost as much as the cost of a litre of regular gasoline.


key to jumpstarting CDm projects and that extensive investment is important in realizing CDm benefits. These experiences are key to south Africa (and its broader region), as well as to brazil.

Despite access to the actual technology, developing countries need to invest in the access to skills, know-how and capital that can help them use, reproduce and adapt to clean technologies. This would mean that dialogue should extend beyond researchers and government officials to include engineers, technical experts, and representa-tives from commercial firms in the private sector. more collaboration is needed at all levels, and scientists must work more closely with utilities, steelmakers, and others to ensure that design meshes with function.

Another area of potential IbsA cooperation is on the adaptation agenda. IbsA states are still grappling to understand the full impact of climate change on their communities and therefore need to undertake vulnera-bility assessments at the national and regional level, as well as to promote evidence-based analysis and research. however this could also be done as a collective study, showing the vulnerability of poor nations. There is also a lack of exchange of information on disaster preparedness and extreme events between southern countries, as well as a lack of exchange of meteorological data and climate information. IbsA countries need to cooperate further on this, by attracting focused financial resources in this regard and in sharing information and data.

The unFCCC negotiations provide IbsA with a perfect opportunity for mutual consultation in climate change. IbsA (whether alone of through the bAsIC alliance) needs to make use of their political weight and collective position to push certain key issues in the negotiations forward (including the two-track approach), for the developing world in general, but most specifically for the LCD’s in their respective regions. south Africa’s role as the Chair of the Conference of parties meeting also presents various opportunities for Africa and the developing world at large.


marc Frings is a Trainee at the Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung’s Jakarta office.

INDONESIA’S ROLE IN INTER-NATIONAL CLImATE POLICYFINANCIAL INCENTIvES TO PRESERvE ThE RAINFOREST – AN EFFECTIvE mODEL?

Marc Frings

In 1986 the united nations General Assembly (un) passed a resolution on the “right to development”.1 It reads like the developing world’s reaction to the mandatory catalogue of human rights which had previously been canonised by the industrialised nations. It emphasises the collective dimension of these “third-generation human rights” which are meant to be bolstered by this resolution. For the first time, peace, security and the environment became the focus of international debate on the topic of development. The international community’s struggle to agree on a successor to the Kyoto protocol (which came into force in 1997 and expires in 2012) demonstrates the complexities involved in bringing to life the principle of solidarity outlined in the right to development declaration. Does the right to increased well-being as set out in Article 2 III of the resolution contradict international commitments in the area of climate change?

The example of Indonesia throws light on the political, social and legal challenges which are faced by developing and emerging countries which have to take their right to devel-opment seriously in order to meet demographic forecasts but which also want to play their part in protecting the environment. Faced with these challenges, Indonesia has become one of the main supporters of the REDD initiative over the last few years.

1 | In the text of the resolution, “development” is defined as a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process” (un-GA Res A/41/128).


In Indonesia 80 to 85 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions are a result of deforestation or the destruction of peatland.

AN ENvIRONmENTAL SINNER WhO IS OFTEN OvERLOOKED

when it comes to the question of who are the world’s worst environmental sinners, the finger is usually pointed accu- singly at the usA and China, countries which are accelerating global warming by respectively churning out 5.95 and 5.06 billion tonnes of greenhouse gases every year. but in third place, although some way behind, comes Indonesia. This south-east Asian archipelago with more than 17,000 islands and 240 million people releases 2.05 billion tonnes of greenhouse gases every year. so two emerging nations – China and Indonesia – are high on the list of countries which are chiefly responsible for climate change. what leverage can now be used to persuade countries which are in the process of modernising to play their part in the fight against global warming? It is illuminating in this respect to compare the causes of greenhouse gas emissions in

Germany and Indonesia. In Germany 81 per cent of greenhouse gases are due to energy-related emissions, followed by emissions from industrial processes (10 per cent) and agriculture (5 per cent).2 In Indonesia on the

other hand 80 to 85 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions are a result of deforestation or the destruction of peatland.3 Although by comparison emissions from industry, vehicles or energy seem low,4 over the past few years the country has achieved breathtaking rates of economic growth, with

2 | German Federal Environmental Agency (ed.), “presseinforma- tion nr. 13/2010. Treibhausgasemissionen in 2009 um 8,4 prozent gesunken,” 3, http://umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info- presse/2010/pdf/pd10-013_treibhausgasemissionen_grafiken. pdf (accessed February 14, 2011). Figures given are based on estimates for 2009 but to a large extent correspond to the 2008 figures.3 | harvard Kennedy school, Ash Center for Democratic Gover- nance and Innovation, “From Reformasi to Institutional Transformation: A strategic Assessment of Indonesia’s pros- pects for Growth, Equity and Democratic Governance,” April 2010, 52, http://ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/ indonesia.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011); Jeff neilson, “who owns the carbon? Indonesia’s carbon stores spark international attention,” Inside Indonesia, July-september (2010), http://insideindonesia.org/stories/who-owns-the- carbon-05091343 (accessed February 14, 2011).4 | In 2005 the overall energy, construction and infrastructure sector produced 312 million tonnes of CO2, corresponding to a 15 per cent share.


No other country in the world destroys more forest per day than Indonesia. The rainforest in Sumatra and Kali-mantan has been almost completely stripped.

2010 figures hitting 6.5 per cent.5 Along with China and India, Indonesia is one of the three countries with the fastest growth rates of all the G20 countries (the Group of 20 major advanced and emerging economies).

Indonesia’s industrialisation process is barely limping along and can be largely disregarded from a climate change point of view. This is because so far the country has not succeeded in creating an infrastructure to process its wealth of natural resources (particularly ore, oil and gas). The destruction of the Indonesian rainforest has much wider-reaching conse-quences for the global climate on general and for biodi-versity in particular. In 1966, 77 per cent of the country was still covered with rainforest. since then, 80 per cent of the forest has disappeared,6 though Indonesia still has the third-largest covering of rainforest in the world, behind brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rates of deforestation peaked immediately after 1998 when the suharto era came to an end and the democratic process of transformation took hold. political decentralisation led to more power for provincial leaders, and together with landowners they developed a lucrative source of income with legal and illegal logging.7 This resulted in 3.5 million hectares of forest being destroyed between 2000 and 2005, particularly in sumatra and Kalimantan. no other country in the world destroys more forest per day than Indonesia.8 Traditional structures of society, economic interests and environmental protection are now wrestling with the consequences: the rainforest in sumatra and Kalimantan has been almost completely

5 | Forecasts predict a medium-term annual growth rate of more than six per cent. Cf. helmut hauschild, “Asiens nächste Erfolgsstory,” Handelsblatt, november 22, 2010, http://handelsblatt.com/politik/konjunktur/laenderanalysen/ indonesien-schreibt-asiens-naechste-erfolgsstory/3645102.html (accessed February 14, 2011).6 | Cédric Gouverneur, “biosprit aus palmen. Indonesien opfert seine wälder,” Le monde diplomatique, December 11, 2009, http://monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2009/12/11/a0044.text. name,asks (accessed February 14, 2011).7 | Gaby herzog, sungai Luar, “nach dem ‘holzrausch’ in Kali- mantan”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 21, 2010, http://nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/international/nach_dem_ holzrausch_in_kalimantan_1.8789101 (accessed February 14, 2011).8 | harvard Kennedy school, n. 3, 53.


Indonesia and neighbouring malaysia have turned themselves into world’s biggest oil palm growers, between them supplying around 85 per cent of all world palm oil.

stripped, so fresh, remote provinces such as the thinly-populated papua are now becoming the focus of the logging industry. some sections of the population view both environmental activists and the central government in Jakarta as the enemy, because they both cause local exploitable areas and sources of income to dry up in the name of international climate protection. These internal conflicts also have an international dimension, as the emissions mentioned earlier resulting from logging and peatland destruction have effects on global climate change. Indonesia has five per cent of the world’s peatland, which is particularly effective at storing carbon dioxide (CO2). 40 per cent of Indonesia’s emissions are due to the drying-out and destruction of this peatland and in 2006 this caused more CO2 to be produced in Indonesia than in Germany, the uK and Canada combined during the same period.9

bETWEEN GROWTh POTENTIAL AND GAPS IN ThE LAW

Attempts to clear land by chopping down and burning forest are predominantly due to the rocketing demand for palm oil. This is mainly used in the food industry but is also becoming an increasingly important energy source. palm

oil’s particular composition makes it a more popular form of biodiesel than other products such as rapeseed oil. Over the last few years, Indonesia and neighbouring malaysia have turned themselves into the world’s biggest

oil palm growers, between them supplying around 85 per cent of all world palm oil (current annual production about 40 million tonnes). At the moment the Indonesian government can scent an opportunity to consolidate their position still further. since 1998 they have more than doubled the amount of land available for the cultivation of oil palms from three to nine million hectares, and by 2025 they plan to have a total of 26 million hectares under oil palm cultivation.10

9 | Ibid.10 | half of the plantations will be in Kalimantan and a quarter in papua. Cf. Gouverneur, n. 6; marianne Klute, “schall und Rauch. umweltprobleme und umweltpolitik,” in: Genia Find- eisen, Kristina Großmann, nicole weydmann (eds.), Heraus- forderungen für Indonesiens Demokratie. Bilanz und Pers- pektiven, (berlin: regiospectra, 2010), 225.


The CO2 emissions which are necessary to create the infrastructure for the palm oil industry are currently higher than the energy savings made by using biofuels.

The “biodiesel” label which is viewed so positively in the west as an alternative to carbon-intensive energy sources cannot hide the fact that palm oil planta-tions are having a negative impact on the environment. The CO2 emissions which are necessary to create the infrastructure for the palm oil industry are currently higher than the energy savings made by using biofuels. The Indonesian environmental organisation walhi points out that the central government is not able to generate anywhere near as much income from the forestry sector as it can from the growth of its subsidiary industries. For example, the government makes between one and 2.50 Euro per 100 hectares on permits to operate mines in primary forests. And in any case, 70 per cent of logging is carried out illegally.11

In the area of environmental and climate policy it is clear that the Indonesian government is responsible for ensuring the rule of law and legal certainty.12 This does not only mean the fight against endemic corruption,13 but in the area of the environment and climate in particular it means enforcing existing regulations. This was to some degree made more difficult by the decentralisation of adminis-trative and legal processes in 1998. According to the latest version of the Forestry Law (41/1999), companies have to obtain a permit from the Indonesian ministry of Forestry before they can exploit the forest for commercial purposes. Local administrative departments can also issue licenses to smaller companies, as long as an additional permit is then also obtained from Jakarta. This little-known regulation

11 | Klute, n. 10, 225. It has recently been reported in the Indo- nesian media that the 6.3 million Euro received so far in revenues from mining concessions are counterbalanced by 540 million Euro in losses due to corruption. The newspaper referred to statements by the environmental organisation walhi. Cf. Fidelis E. satriastanti, “Choosing money Over nature will Cost us Dearly: Activists,” The Jakarta Globe, January 13, 2011, A7.12 | winfried weck, “Korruption und Kollusion. Indonesiens schwere bürden auf dem weg zum demokratischen Rechts- staat,” KAS-Länderbericht, October 14, 2010, http://kas.de/ wf/doc/kas_20833-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).13 | Freedom house, “Freedom in the world – Indonesia 2010,” http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year= 2010&country=7841 (accessed February 14, 2011).


Of the eco-crimes recorded in 2010, only 20 per cent of perpetrators were prosecuted. And these were not trivial offences.

has certainly contributed to the fact that at present less than eight per cent of plantation and mining companies in the province of Central Kalimantan have a legal permit. This is why there have recently been loud demands for the law to be tightened up.14

political decentralisation must go hand in hand with a desire to act. In a recent study, the impact of Environmental management and protection Law (32/2009) which gave

the ministry of the Environment more power in the fight against operators with poor environmental practices was judged to be minimal. Of the eco-crimes recorded in 2010, only 20 per cent of perpetrators were prosecuted. And these were not trivial offences – they were causing the sort of environmental damage which leads to floods and landslides and puts the lives of local people in danger.15

INDONESIA’S CONTRIbUTION TO CLImATE PROTECTION

As a member of the G20 and by far the biggest economic power in AsEAn, Indonesia sees itself on the international stage as being the voice of those countries which are currently in the development phase. Criticisms that the government would not follow up on its international goals with concrete actions have proved to be unfounded if we take a look at the Indonesian government’s commitments in this area. president susilo bambang Yudhoyono has placed the environment at the centre of his government’s policy-making. under his leadership, Indonesia has hosted several major international conferences such as the 13th un Climate Change Conference in bali in 2007 and the first world Ocean Conference in sulawesi in 2009. In April 2011 the capital, Jakarta, will host the fifth business for Environment summit, the most important global conference on business and the environment.16

14 | 76 of 967 companies hold appropriate licenses; in the palm oil sector 67 of 325 companies are operating illegally. Cf. Adianto p. simamora, “967 forestry firms under govt scrutiny,” The Jakarta Post, February 2, 2011, 4.15 | satriastanti, n. 11, A716 | The summit was organised by the Indonesian government, the Regional Representatives Council (DvD) and wwF. Cf. Fidelis E. satriastanti, “Chaos Awaits if nothing happens,” The Jakarta Globe, January 10, 2011, A1.


The government has voluntarily taken on a leadership role in this area for other developing and emerging nations. Indonesia has pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 26 per cent in the next ten years, even without international assistance.17 with international support it hopes to achieve a target of 41 per cent but to do this it will have to make better use of existing support mechanisms. The Clean Development mechanism (CDm), set up in 1997, allows developed countries which are required to reduce their emissions in compliance with Kyoto protocol commitments to improve their environmental record by investing in projects in developing countries (“Certified Emission Reductions”). Of the 2,803 CDm projects which developing countries have registered at the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unFCCC) secretariat, only two per cent come from Indonesia (56 projects), while other countries are making much better use of this ecopolitical sale of indulgence between the industrialised and developing world (e.g. malaysia has 88 projects, mexico 125 and brazil 184).18 This is why the Indonesian government is predicting a possible five-fold increase in registered projects.19

REDD: AN ECONOmIC APPROACh TO FOREST PROTECTION

It is also thanks to Indonesia’s efforts that the REDD initiative (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degra-dation) is now part of the international approach to climate protection. The CDm does not take forest protection into account, while the REDD specifically targets this area and is an initiative which holds a lot of promise for countries like Indonesia with large stands of tropical rainforest.

17 | president Yudhoyono first stated this figure of 26 per cent at the G20 summit in pittsburgh. he re-stated this goal at the 15th world Climate Conference in Copenhagen.18 | Cf. unFCCC-CDm, “Registered project activities by host party,” http://cdm.unfccc.int/statistics/Registration/numOfRegistered projbyhostpartiespieChart.html (accessed February 14, 2011).19 | ministry of Finance (ed.), Ministry of Finance Green Paper: Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for Climate Change Mitigation in Indonesia (Jakarta, 2009), 4, http://www.fiskal. depkeu.go.id/webbkf/siaranpers/siaranpdf%5CGreen%20 paper%20Final.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).

Of the 2,803 CDm projects which deve-loping countries have registered at the UNFCCC Secretariat, only two per cent come from Indonesia.


bilateral agreements have been struck between donor and recipient countries within the REDD initiative to take account of international human rights instruments.

In his report on the economic aspects of climate change, nicholas stern discussed the benefits in terms of global warming which would arise from the more active protection of natural forests. 18 per cent of greenhouse gases are caused by deforestation, a figure which – according to stern – can be quickly reduced without the need for expensive new technology.20 According to the country’s national Council for Climate Change, Indonesia should be able to achieve a 22 per cent reduction in carbon emissions in this way. At the 2007 un Climate Change Conference in bali the Rainforest Alliance presented REDD as a possible framework to assist developing and emerging countries in protecting their forests. The basic principle is that forests can be seen from a commercial point of view as carbon sinks, and developing countries can be given incentives in the form of offset payments to preserve their forests and thus contribute to the reduction or capture of carbon

emissions. It will serve to compensate for the expenses incurred by forest protection and for the loss of income which these countries will have to absorb if they are no longer able to turn their forested areas into

profits.21 bilateral agreements have been struck between donor and recipient countries within the REDD initiative to take account of international human rights instruments. This aspect was taken further during the 2009 Copenhagen Conference: in order to counter criticisms that the REDD initiative falls short in the area of sustainability, additional paragraphs were added and it was renamed “REDD+”. The “plus” stands for the inclusion of factors such as nature conservation, sustainable forestry and reforestation.22

The framework outlined by REDD provides an initial point of reference for deliberations on how to protect the world’s forests in a way which benefits both the environment and the economy. To date there have been no binding agreements

20 | nicholas stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (London, 2006), particularly Chapter 25 (Reversing Emissions from Land use Change), 537-538.21 | wwF Germany, “politische maßnahmen: REDD. Industrielän- der finanzieren stopp der tropischen Entwaldung, um Emissi- onen zu verringern,” http://wwf.de/themen/kampagnen/ waelder-indonesiens/rettungsplan/redd (accessed February 14, 2011).22 | marianne Klute, “Die Geheimsprache der Klimapolitiker‟, Suara, 3 (2010), 20-22.


Norway will give one billion U.S. dol-lars if the Indonesian government can provide evidence that they have achie-ved reductions in greenhouse gases.

which could be called “REDD regulations”. Delegates at the last Climate Change Conference in Cancún were in favour of the REDD initiative23, making it more likely that they will sign up to an internationally-binding successor to the Kyoto protocol. but until this point, the success of the REDD initiative is in the hands of those countries which are making bilateral agreements and creating precedents for sustainable forest protection.

GREEN LIGhT FOR REDD IN INDONESIA

Indonesia comes out top amongst all recipient countries when measured against the 3.3 billion Euro24 which have resulted from bilateral or multilateral REDD agreements worldwide. The 40 REDD projects which are currently in existence are mainly financed in one of three ways.25 On a multilateral level, through the united nations’ partici-pation in the REDD’s pilot phase26 and on a bilateral level through agreements between the Indonesian government, Australia and norway.

Last year’s announcements by the Australian government that it would provide the Indo- nesian government with a further 55 million Euro to assist in reducing emissions,27 is still chicken-feed when compared to the pledges made by the norwegian government. Over the next seven to eight years the norwegians will give the Indonesian government

23 | J. Jackson Ewing and Irene A. Kuntioro, “Cancún, shifting goals of climate talks,” The Jakarta Post, December 27, 2010, 7.24 | Keya Acharya, “Top leaders see the green in REDD+,” The Jakarta Post, 3.25 | David Gogarty and Olivia Rondonuwu, “Indonesia chooses climate pact pilot province,” Reuters, December 30, 2010, http://reuters.com/article/2010/12/30/us-indonesia-climate- idusTRE6bT0np20101230 (accessed February 14, 2011).26 | un-REDD pilot countries include bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, panama, papua new Guinea, paraguay, Zambia, Tanzania and vietnam. In October 2010 Central sulawesi was selected to be Indonesia’s pilot province. Cf. also “un-REDD lauds C.sulawesi’s active support for forests,” The Jakarta Post, January 22, 2011, http://thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/22/unredd-lauds- c-sulawesi’s-active-support-forests.html (accessed February 14, 2011).27 | neilson, n. 3; Fidelis E. satriastanti, “Indonesia sees small victories At Cancún Talks,” The Jakarta Globe, December 11/12, 2010, 6.


The most sensitive issue is Indonesia’s obligation not to grant any new con-cessions in peatland or natural forest areas in the next two year period.

one billion u.s. dollars (around 740 million Euro) if they can provide evidence that they have achieved reductions in greenhouse gases by preserving their forests. There is a vital difference between the Australian and the norwegian approach. The Australian government is using REDD as a carbon trading instrument like the CDm and will credit the Indonesian CO2 reductions to its own emissions account. The norwegians, on the other hand, are not trying to side-step their own responsibilities. As a norwegian diplo- mat said: “we are helping Indonesia, but haven’t forgotten that we still have our own homework to do.”28

REDD-PLUS ROADmAP FOR INDONESIA AND NORWAY ENTERS A CRITICAL PhASE

In may 2010 the governments of norway and Indonesia agreed on a three-phase plan to protect the Indonesian forests. This letter of intent is now in the implementation stage.29 In the first phase, a framework is to be drawn up for future work, to include institutions and content. Along with developing a REDD-plus strategy, a government agency is needed which reports directly to the president and which will coordinate future REDD actions. Other tasks include establishing an independent mRv (monitoring, reporting, verification) body and selecting a pilot province.

The second phase involves the creation and strengthening of existing regulations and capacity building. A funding instrument also needs to be set up to funnel the norwegian government’s payments. however the most

sensitive issue at the moment is Indonesia’s obligation not to grant any new concessions in peatland or natural forest areas in the next two year period. while norway will recompense Indonesia for introducing and implementing political reforms in the first two phases, higher payments will be made from 2014, upon the commencement of the third phase and when payments will be based on emission

28 | Interview by the author with diplomats at the norwegian Embassy, Jakarta, January 21, 2011.29 | The Letter of Intent was signed by both governments on may 26, 2010 in Oslo, with the title “Cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”.


Central Kalimantan, named as the pilot province, is the most politically stable province, which was an important se-lection criterion for the Indonesians.

reductions.30 The norwegian government has already paid out 22 million Euro to the Indonesians before the first target has been met.

At present a working group has the task of setting up a REDD agency reporting to the president.31 To show their commitment, the government has invited high-profile experts to join this working group.32 At the end of December Central Kalimantan was named as the pilot province for the agreement. The decision was made by means of a trans-parent selection process. Of the 33 Indonesian provinces, Central Kalimantan produces the second-highest volume of greenhouse gases. with one million hectares of palm oil plantations and a fast-growing coal mining industry it is clear that the province is important in terms of national climate protection policies.33 Indonesian environmental organisations declared themselves satisfied with the selection process and its result, as it can be assumed that useful lessons can be learned for the expansion of the REDD-plus model and the potential conflicts between palm oil and mining companies and environmental interests in Central Kalimantan.34 This province is also the most politically stable, which was an important selection criterion for the Indonesians.35 The runners-up in the selection process, the province of papua, were left empty-handed. The central government in Jakarta had reserva-tions about this province in the far east of the country because of existing political and social tensions and its weak administrative structures.

30 | Emissions mechanisms are calculated in line with the “contributions-for-verified emissions reductions mechanism”. For details on the three phases cf. “Letter of Intent between the Government of the Kingdom of norway and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on ‘Cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation’”, http://norway.or.id/pageFiles/404362/Letter_ of_Intent_norway_Indonesia_26_may_2010.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).31 | Fitrian Ardiansyah und Aditya bayunanda, “A critical year for REDD in Indonesia,” The Jakarta Post, January 10, 2011, 7.32 | n. 28.33 | Gogarty and Rondonuwu, n. 25.34 | Interview by the author with nyoman Iswarayoga, Director for Climate and Energy, wwF Indonesia, Jakarta, January 10, 2011.35 | n. 28.


Environmental activists claim that if the moratorium only protected primary forest, then only three per cent of Indo- nesian forests would be protected from commercial exploitation.

REDD PLUS IN PRACTICE

The required two-year moratorium to protect the areas of primary forest, swamps and peatland is a bone of contention. At the moment president Yudhoyono has on his desk two proposals from the opposing sides.36 The REDD working group led by Kuntoro mangkusubroto is pushing for wide-ranging protection which includes all primary forests, moorland and peatland. The Forestry ministry on the other hand is taking a commercial standpoint in the debate and is arguing that the country’s economic development will be affected if the forest protection measures are too strict.

As a result the ministry’s proposal for the moratorium only includes the protection of primary forest and moorland. Environmental activists were already complaining that this did not go far enough, claiming that if the moratorium only protected primary forest,

then only three per cent of Indonesian forests would be protected from commercial exploitation.37 And the peatland forests which are not covered by the ministry’s proposal are rich in biodiversity. In november 2010 the Forestry ministry was the angry target of green activists and experts when it emerged that it had declared 41 million hectares of forest to be “special forest areas” and hence available for concessions. They made the declaration just in time to avoid the possible enforcement of the moratorium.38

The “ambitious” timetable has been delayed right at the start by the fact that the moratorium did not come into effect on January 1, 2011 as originally planned.39 president Yudhoyono is under increasing pressure as he has to

36 | Adianto p. simamora, “sbY still pondering planned forest moratorium,” The Jakarta Post, http://thejakartapost.com/ news/2011/02/07/sby-still-pondering-planned-forest- moratorium.html (accessed February 14, 2011).37 | Criticism by but nordin, Director of the non-Governmental Organisation save Our borneo, in: Fidelis E. satriastanti, “moratorium won’t save Indonesia’s Forests: Activists,” The Jakarta Globe, January 7, 2011, A6.38 | For example, an open letter from scientists to the governments of norway and Indonesia (november 18, 2010) can be read at http://redd-monitor.org/2010/12/01/scientists- letter-to-norway-and-indonesia-natural-forests-even-when- not-in-their-primary-state-may-have-high-conservation-value (accessed February 14, 2011).39 | n. 28.


Giving individual countries stronger negotiating powers would only serve to weaken the coordinating and unifying function of international conferences in the long-term.

approve the moratorium by presidential decree.40 And at the same time attention is turning to the next, equally thorny questions such as how to monitor reductions in carbon emissions.

CONFLICTS, RISKS AND RESPONSIbILITIES: ThE UNRESOLvED ISSUES

up to now, it seems Indonesia has been determined to profit from REDD both economically and ecologically. Indonesia was not too concerned that the 2010 conference in Cancún produced no binding agreement on a framework for the successor to the Kyoto protocol. before departing for mexico, the Indonesian delegation stressed that bilateral agreements could be the way forward.41 Indeed, this position was in line with the demands made by environ-mental organisations that REDD should be independent of international agreements and still carry on even if there is no post-Kyoto agreement.42 but would this actually contribute to interna-tional climate and environment protection? Giving individual countries stronger negoti-ating powers would only serve to weaken the coordinating and unifying function of international conferences in the long-term and at worst could actually render them obsolete. It remains to be seen whether the norwegian-Indonesian REDD agreement will prove to be a model for bilateral climate and forest protection programmes in the face of all the potential conflicts which are emerging.

1. Conflict between Economic and Environmental Interests

From an environmental perspective, it must be asked how the parties to the agreement will interpret the scope of

40 | Fidelis E. satriastanti, “nGOs Appeal To Govt to Enact Logging moratorium,” The Jakarta Globe, February 8, 2011, http://thejakartaglobe.com/nvironment/ngos-appeal-to-govt- to-enact-logging-moratorium/421320 (accessed February 14, 2011). At the time of writing, the president had still not made his decision. For the current status see http://redd-monitor.org.41 | JG/Agencies, “Indonesia Took home a Little money, but Cancun had Little to shout About,” The Jakarta Globe, December 13, 2010, A1.42 | n. 34.


The west has to take a balanced posi-tion in the palm oil debate. The use of biodiesel from palm oil can no longer compensate for the carbon emissions caused by deforestation.

forest protection. For example, there is the danger that the reforestation programme will be dominated by monoculture in the form of plantations for commercial use rather than the planting of secondary forest.43 Environmental organi-sations in Indonesia recognise that they cannot completely ignore the need for economic growth. wwF Indonesia has proposed that the private sector should also benefit from the norwegian REDD payments if it is foreseen that it can no longer develop under normal conditions.44

The palm oil industry in particular also has an obligation to invest in research, efficiency and innovation. The country may be the market leaders in the palm oil industry, but

Indonesian companies are not as productive as their malaysian counterparts, who make higher profits per hectare of oil palms.45 up to now the government has not been in a position to create investment-friendly condi-

tions as there is a shortage of processing industries for the wealth of crude ore which is mined in Indonesia. The west also has to take a balanced position on the economical and environmental aspects of the palm oil debate. The use of biodiesel from palm oil can no longer compensate for the carbon emissions caused by deforestation to plant oil palm plantations.

2. Conflict between Political and Social Interests

Another challenge is presented by the need for the REDD coordinators in Indonesia to take into account social (special) interests. In a recent study, the Indonesian peace building Institute came to the conclusion that in the past two years there has been no increase in religious or tribal conflicts, whereas conflicts in the area of natural resources have accelerated significantly.46 There are regular conflicts

43 | Frank priess, “people with Low Expectations are seldom Disappointed. Climate summit in Cancún Did not Fail, but was it successful Enough?,” KAS International Reports, 2/2011, 84.44 | n. 34.45 | To date in Indonesia only one third of this land is actually being used for oil palm cultivation. Cf. n. 28.46 | For the purposes of this study, the peace building Institute investigated local media reports. In 2009 the media reported 54 conflicts relating to natural resources. In 2010 the total was 74. Tifa Asrianti, “swelling mining, plantation lead to conflicts, damages,” The Jakarta Post, January 13, 2011, 4.


Indigenous minorities in developing countries are often not sufficiently integrated into the land use process and become victims of decisions made elsewhere.

between palm oil companies and the local population who refuse to move off their land for the sake of the national development goals. There has also been an increase in the number of conflicts between the centre and those provinces where the government has not managed to harmonise national policies with the needs of the local people.

It is important for everyone involved in the REDD programme to have a compre-hensive approach with good communications between all parties and with responsibilities shared out as widely as possible. Commit-ments should be based on a sense of responsibility towards society rather than on obligations to contract partners such as norway or Australia.47 In a country like Indonesia where 48 million people live in the forests (and as a consequence may be deeply affected by decisions made by the plantation and mining sectors), the potential for conflict is high. In addition, indigenous minorities in developing countries are often not sufficiently integrated into the land use process and become victims of decisions made elsewhere.48

The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FpIC) can be seen as an important contribution to any agreement between the political, economic and social groups involved. It means that a community can make joint decisions on projects which affect land ownership and use.49 The united nations also argue that the “right to development” encom-passes the rights of all, including indigenous peoples.50 This is why the REDD+ idea has taken up the FpIC principle. norway has expressed its interest in involving all relevant players and has declared itself satisfied with the imple-mentation of the multi-stakeholders process thus far.51

47 | “Indonesia has to make it clear that the government will not do what norway says but will act in its own right,” nyoman Iswarayoga, Director for Climate and Energy, wwF Indonesia; n. 34.48 | priess, n. 43, 84.49 | Cf. united nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, Article 10, http://un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip (accessed February 14, 2011).50 | un-REDD programme (ed.), Perspectives on REDD+ (Geneva, 2010), 4 et sqq.51 | This process brings together the Indonesian government, representatives of civil society and local communities, for example in workshops which provide a platform for an exchange of views. n. 28.


Political reforms, the adoption of new legal regulations and the strengthe-ning of existing laws are conditions set out at the beginning of the Norwegian road map.

3. Policy Requirements

The debate about the presidential decree for the two-year moratorium proves that environmental protection is ineffective without binding regulations. Otherwise how can illegal loggers be brought to justice or indigenous peoples make their land-ownership claims? In parallel to taking the necessary legal actions, there has to be a paradigm shift in the minds of the decision-makers. where Indonesian businesses have in the past seen felling trees as a way to make profit, now they have to see forest protection and management as a new and lucrative way forward.52

Indonesia will only profit financially from the agreement with norway if the political institutions and agencies on a national and local level act in a transparent and respon-

sible manner.53 political reforms, the adoption of new legal regulations and the strengthening of existing laws are conditions set out at the beginning of the norwegian road map – with good reason.

A process of transformation was set in motion in 1998 (Reformasi) to turn the former dictatorship into a democracy. This process is responsible for introducing democratic and constitutional reforms in every area of policy and at all levels of decision-making. It also has the task of checking the effectiveness of existing legislation. The political and administrative decentralisation which has taken place over the last few years has also had an impact on environmental protection, as important decisions on land use and forest management are now made by local officials.54 In order to protect the forests from the bulldozers there needs to be a pact between local and national institutions which will provide for the provinces having a financial share in the country’s (REDD) payments from abroad.

In developing and emerging countries the question also arises of the geographic limits of political power. In areas where the government has little influence there can be

52 | Call made by Kuntoro magkusubroto, head of the Indonesian REDD plus working group. Cf. Keya Acharya, “Top leaders see the green in REDD+,” The Jakarta Post, 3.53 | harvard Kennedy school, n. 3.54 | ministry of Finance, n. 19, 12.


If the industrialised countries want to win over developing nations to stand with them in the battle against clima-te change, then they need to provide incentives.

additional challenges when it comes to implementing decisions.55 In 2011 the Indonesian Environment ministry will run fire prevention campaigns to highlight the dangers of forest fires. It is also planned to pass new legislation to strengthen the existing laws on environmental protection and management (from 2009) and waste water (from 2008).56 This begins to tackle the problem of limited governmental power, at least from an environmental perspective.

CONCLUSION

Fighting poverty and economic development have been identified by both norway and Indonesia as the priority goals of the REDD-plus letter of intent. In this respect it follows in the footsteps of the un resolution on the “right to development”. If the industrialised countries want to win over developing nations to stand with them in the battle against climate change, then they need to provide incentives which tie in the scientists’ climate predictions with the southern hemisphere’s demands for increased prosperity. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) which was agreed in Cancún with a view to helping developing countries to cope with the consequences of climate change could be a significant step in the right direction.57 The GCF should be ratified at the next Climate Change Conference in Durban, south Africa, in December 2011.

Over the next few years the Indonesian government will be in a position to prove that its own initiatives and commitments deserve more than just adaptation and compensation payments. If their initiatives succeed, other developing and emerging countries may also demonstrate more commitment towards protecting the climate and the environment. This process needs to be monitored closely, both internationally and domestically. The international community is responsible for supporting countries in their efforts to fight climate change. In Indonesia’s case it is also

55 | priess, n. 43, 84.56 | Fidelis E. satriastanti, “Indonesia Eyes spot on Green Climate Fund Committee,” The Jakarta Globe, January 6, 2011, A7.57 | between 2010 and 2012 30 billion u.s. dollars should flow into the coffers of the GCF, with a further 100 billion dollars planned in the period to 2020. Cf. Ewing and Kuntioro, n. 23, 7.


a matter of promoting environmentally-friendly growth markets. In terms of demographics, Indonesia currently has the problem of how to satisfy a demand for energy which is growing at a rate of seven to nine per cent each year.58 Coal-fired power stations are still the cheapest source of energy from an Indonesian point of view, although the island archipelago actually contains more than 40 per cent of the world’s geothermal energy, a very green way to produce electricity. Indonesia is dragging its feet in realising this potential. by 2025 the percentage of electricity produced from geothermal energy is set to rise from 8 per cent to 20 per cent.59 Knowledge and research transfers can also help to make it cheaper to utilise geothermal energy, so that new carbon-intensive coal-fired power stations cease to be a viable alternative. CDm projects are another source of revenue which Indonesia has not really exploited so far, but it is unclear how the government proposes to increase CDm projects five-fold.60 On the domestic front, the government finds itself increas-ingly under fire from local environmental organisations. They are demanding less international posturing and more domestic reforms and are particularly critical of Indone-sia’s quest to win a seat on the GCF steering committee. 61 They also believe priority should be given to an action plan which sets out how the government are going to reduce greenhouse emissions by between 26 and 41 per cent over the coming years.

president Yudhoyono’s initiative to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis seems ambitious in the face of the legis-lative reforms and revisions which still need to be carried out. he will only be able to count it a success if the letter of intent with norway is followed by a partnership agreement with all the central players in the political and business spheres, along with environmental groups and the indigenous population. The government has to succeed in this if it wants to justify Indonesia’s image of itself as a strong developing country (not only in the G20 and AsEAn) which can take the lead and provide a role model for other emerging nations.

58 | ministry of Finance, n. 19, 5.59 | nieke Indrietta, “suspended Ambition,” TEMPO, January 25, 2011, 49.60 | ministry of Finance, n. 19, 4.61 | n. 34.


China is often characterised in the media as being the “spoilers” during international climate talks. western politicians are often trying to blame beijing for the lack of progress on climate change. It’s true that China is the biggest producer of greenhouse gases and up to now has not been prepared to accept binding targets for reducing emissions. but it is not always sufficiently recognised in the international debate that China is actually pursuing an ambitious climate policy on a domestic level. China has invested billions in the promotion of alternative energy sources and in increasing energy efficiency and it has already seen some significant results. Instead of using China as its scapegoat, the west should rather offer more support in terms of advice and technology transfers in order to help China shift its economy towards a model which is more sustainable and resource-efficient.

FACTS AND FORECASTS

China is one of the countries which is most affected by climate change. According to estimates, the average temperature rise by 2020 compared to the period 1961 to 1990 could be 1.1 to 2 degrees. serious consequences of this include droughts and reduced rainfall in northern China, while southern China will suffer more flooding due to increased rainfall. This in turn could lead to a serious decline in food production. A decline of five to ten per cent is forecast for the period to 2030, with the second half of the century seeing an estimated 37 per cent drop in the

CLImATE POLICY IN ThE PEOPLE’S REPUbLIC OF ChINA – GROUNDWORK FOR SUSTAINAbLE GROWTh?

Andreas Dittrich

Andreas Dittrich is a Research Assistant at the Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung in shanghai.


In 2008 China was responsible for 19 per cent of global CO2 emissions, and this share is expected to reach 27 per cent by 2030.

production of rice, maize and wheat unless something is done to prevent it.1 Every year the lives of 200 to 400 million Chinese people are already affected by extreme weather events, and around ten million farmers are falling below the poverty line as a result.2

The glaciers on the Qinghai plateau are continuing to melt and the permafrost in Tibet is becoming ever-thinner. Glaciers in China have already retreated by 21 per cent and the permafrost has become four or five metres thinner over the last 50 years. This has the short-term effect of increasing the likelihood of flooding and in the long-term could lead to a shortage of water resources. Rising sea levels mean coastal regions in China, including shanghai and the Yangtse Delta, are threatened by flooding. And it is feared that several species of animals and plants will become extinct, to the detriment of biodiversity.3

China bears an increasingly high responsibility for global climate change because of its rapid economic growth which has until now been largely based on energy-intensive production methods. It is estimated that China has been the biggest producer of CO2 emissions since 2007 and is

responsible for 48.5 per cent of the worldwide increase in emissions between 1990 and 2007.4 It is particularly difficult for China to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because of its reliance on coal as its primary energy

source (over 70 per cent). In 2008 China was responsible for 19 per cent of global CO2 emissions, and this share is expected to reach 27 per cent by 2030. so it is crucial that beijing plays an active role if the global temperature rise is to be limited to less than two degrees compared

1 | Cf. Lin Erda et al., Synopsis of China National Climate Change Assessment Report (II) – Climate Change Impacts and Adap- tion, 2007, 4, http://law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/ capandtrade/Lin%20Erda%202-5-07.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010).2 | Cf. Thomas heberer and Anja D. senz, Regionalexpertise – Destabilisierungs- und Konfliktpotential prognostizierter Umweltveränderungen in China bis 2020/2050, 2007, 3-4.3 | Cf. nDRC, China’s National Climate Change Programme, 2007, 17.4 | Cf. Andreas Oberheitmann and Eva sternfeld, “Climate Change in China – The Development of China’s Climate policy and its Integration into a new post-Kyoto Climate Regime,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 3/2009, 137.


China’s argument is that the developed countries have to bear a historic responsibility for the greenhouse effect and so should be obliged to set ambi-tious reduction targets.

to the pre-industrial era. The International panel on Climate Change (IpCC) has calculated this figure as being necessary to keep the consequences of climate change at a manageable level.5

As far as per-capita emissions levels are concerned, China is still well behind the usA and Europe, which is why beijing has spoken out at international climate talks against absolute and binding reduction targets. China’s argument is that the developed countries have to bear a historic responsi-bility for the greenhouse effect and so should be obliged to set ambitious reduction targets. beijing has invoked the principle of “common but different responsibility” which was stipulated in the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unFCCC). China signed the Kyoto protocol in 1998 and ratified it in 2002 but belongs to the Annex II countries which are not obliged to reduce their emissions. China was in fact able to benefit from the Kyoto protocol, as it gave Annex I countries the opportunity to improve their own carbon footprint through CO2 reduction projects in Annex II countries in the framework of Clean Development mecha-nisms (CDm). by 2008 more than 1,500 CDm actions had been approved in China, and with a share of 34 per cent it is by far the most important location for these kinds of projects.6 During negotiations on a successor agreement to Kyoto, which expires in 2012, beijing has been keen to extend the protocol without any change to the system which differentiates between Annex I countries which have to abide by binding targets and emerging and developing countries that can at most – if they wish – set voluntary goals. In China’s position papers sent to the unFCCC secretariat in February and may 2009 it requested the industrialised countries to reduce their carbon emissions by 40 per cent by 2020 as compared to 1990 levels and suggested they should contribute 0.5 to one per cent of their GDp to help developing countries adapt to climate change.7

5 | Cf. Cheng Qian, Ein Portrait der Klimapolitik Chinas, Germanwatch positionspapier, 2009, 4.6 | Cf. Oberheitmann and sternfeld, n. 4, 139-140.7 | Cf. Gudrun wacker, “Caught in the middle: China’s Crucial but Ambivalent Role in the International Climate negotiations,” in: susanna Dröge, International Climate Policy – Priorities of Key Negotiating Partners, swp, 2010, 60.


beijing is also aware that promoting alternative energy sources and green technologies can help Chinese busines-ses to gain a footing in these markets of the future.

China has already sets its own targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions. In november 2009 its government announced that it would reduce CO2 levels by 40 to 45 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990. This target was also recorded in the Copenhagen Accord of January 2010. At the climate conference in Cancún in December 2010, China even hinted that it might allow international monitoring of its carbon emissions.8 These are the first signs that China is ready to play a more active role in international climate protection. Other positive signs are the growing numbers of delegates sent to take part in international climate talks and the fact that in October 2010 China hosted its first un climate conference in Tianjin.

In general, China is still reluctant to play a more active role in international climate talks, but on a domestic level it has long been aware of the need to reduce energy consumption and CO2 levels in order to achieve important development goals in the areas of the environment and energy security. The long-term effects of climate change have less bearing on political decisions than more immediate environmental problems such as air and water pollution. And in face of

the growing reliance on imports of primary energy sources there is a growing sense that increased energy efficiency and the use of new energies could make a critical contri-bution to China’s energy security. beijing is

also aware that promoting alternative energy sources and green technologies can help Chinese businesses to gain a footing in these markets of the future and become an important pillar in China’s future economic development and the structural change that will be necessary. so reducing greenhouse gases is seen more as a side-effect of protecting the environment, improving energy efficiency and achieving domestic development goals.

8 | Cf. shi Jiangtao, “China’s bid to break Climate Deadlock,” South China Morning Post, December 8, 2010, http://topics. scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/China-bid-to- break-climate-deadlock1 (accessed February 15, 2010).


In 2005 the National Leading Group on Climate Change was created, headed up by Prime minister Wen Jiabao, with the goal of integrating climate policy still further.

ThE mAIN INSTITUTIONS INvOLvED IN ChINA’S POLICIES ON CLImATE, ENERGY AND ThE ENvIRONmENT

high levels of coordination are required to deal with climate policy in a multi-faceted way which integrates governmental, private, domestic and international interests. Formu-lating a coherent climate policy seems to be particularly difficult in China, because responsibilities are still in a state of flux. Energy policy in particular is very fragmented and weak on an institutional level.

The major players in Chinese climate policy can be found in the Foreign ministry and the national Development and Reform Commission (nDRC). under the chairmanship of the nDRC, the national Coordination Committee on Climate Change (nCCCC) has already been in existence since 1988. This is the most important institution in the area of Chinese climate policy. It comprises 17 ministries and bodies and is responsible for formulating a cohesive climate policy in China and leading provincial and local governments in the fight against climate change. The nDRC is the most influ-ential body within the nCCCC and is China’s main representative at international climate conferences. In 2005 the national Leading Group on Climate Change was created, headed by prime minister wen Jiabao, with the goal of further integrating climate policy. This Group includes all ministers who are involved in the areas of energy and environmental policy.9

The nDRC also plays a prominent role in energy policy. The nDRC’s environment department is responsible for energy consumption and energy efficiency. In 2005 the national Leading Group for Energy was created, which was also headed up by the prime minister. This group is responsible for coordinating the work of the main minis-tries and governmental bodies in the area of energy. In accordance with the restructuring plans of the eleventh national peoples’ Congress (npC) in march 2008, a national Energy Commission is also to be set up to develop energy

9 | Cf. Dirk Rommeney, Climate and Energy Policy in the People’s Republic of China (heinrich böll stiftung China, 2008), 15.


strategies, along with the state Energy bureau under the auspices of the nDRC. The state Energy bureau should then be responsible for the administration and supervision of the energy sector. The Centre for Renewable Energy Devel-opment is in charge of research into new technologies and

political concepts in the area of renewable energy sources. This centre reports to the Energy Research Institute, which is also part of the nDRC. The ministry of Environmental protection is in favour of pro-active climate

policies on both a domestic and international level but has little influence on climate policy. Its responsibilities are restricted to planning green projects and drawing up and monitoring environmental specifications.10

GOALS AND ACTIONS OF ChINA’S CLImATE POLICY

since the end of the 1990s, the Chinese government has ramped up its efforts in the areas of environmental protection and climate action. This has manifested itself in the passing of a multitude of laws and resolutions and the publication of plans, guidelines and reports. Of particular note are the Energy Conservation Law of 1998, the China medium and Long-Term Energy Conservation plan of 2004, the Renewable Energy Law (REL) of 2005 and China’s national Climate Change programme (CnCCp) of June 2007, which listed the effects of climate change in China, and concrete actions which have already been taken or are to be taken in the future to fight climate change. The programme has made these plans more specific by setting concrete targets for the reduction of carbon emissions. The medium and Long-Term Development plan for Renewable Energy initiated in 2007 is also important in this context. In this plan the nDRC has laid out guidelines, targets and the political actions which need to be taken in order to expand renewable energies in China in the period to 2020. The eleventh Five Year plan (2005 to 2010) stipulated a reduction in energy consumption by 20 per cent in relation to GDp, which proved to be an extremely ambitious and difficult target. For the first time, this last Five Year plan also made the goal of reducing energy consumption a top priority.11

10 | Cf. ibid., 11-15.11 | Cf. ibid., 10.

The responsibilities of the ministry of Environmental Protection are restricted to planning green projects and drawing up and monitoring environmental spe-cifications.


RENEWAbLE ENERGIES

The promotion of renewable energy sources deserves special attention. In 2005 they made up around 7.5 per cent of China’s primary energy consumption. According to the medium and Long-Term Development plan for Renewable Energy in China should increase this share to ten per cent by 2010 and to 15 per cent by 2020. The share of renewables of electricity production shall be 20 per cent by then.12

hydropower is by far the most important alternative energy source for electricity production in China. by 2007 hydropower projects were already providing 16 per cent of the energy supply. These projects, though, include mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam which has been heavily criticised for its detri-mental effect on the environment and the fact that it forced millions of people from their homes. however, smaller, more environmentally-friendly hydropower projects13 are providing five per cent of the electricity supply, making them the second-largest renewable source for electricity production. In comparison, other renewable energy carriers have so far played a minor role, with photovoltaics still being very marginal.14

China’s Renewable Energy Law which came into force on January 1, 2006 forms the main legal foundation in this area. It is very similar to Germany’s Renewable Energy Law. The Law obliges grid operators to buy all available electricity from renewable sources and to provide electricity producers using renewable energies with a connection to the grid. It also guarantees feed-in subsidies for electricity from renewable energies which are individually set by the state Council pricing authorities, depending on the type of renewable energy, the region or even the particular project. The higher costs are borne by all end consumers across the whole country. prices are regularly adjusted in line with advances in technology. At the moment there

12 | Cf. ibid., 18.13 | The definition of a small hydro project varies around the world. In the Eu it means hydro plants with a capacity up to 10 mw, whereas in China it includes plants up to 30 mw.14 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 43.

by 2007 hydropower projects were al-ready providing 16 per cent of energy supply. These projects, though, included mega-projects that were heavily criticised for their environmental im-pact.


is only one fixed, national subsidy – for electricity from biomass, which is set at 0.25 Renminbi (Rmb) (0.03 Euro) per kilowatt hour and is available for the first 15 years of a biomass power plant’s operating period. subsidies for other renewable energy carriers are set on an individual project basis.15

In the event that grid operators refuse to connect renewable sources of electricity to the grid, the REL stipulates that compensation has to be paid to the electricity producer for loss of income. If the connection is not set up within a certain period of time, the law stipulates a fine. It also provides for preferential loans and tax relief for renewable energy projects, for example, the normal vAT rate of 17 per cent has been reduced to 6 per cent for small hydro projects and to 13 per cent for biogas plants. The REL also requires the establishment of a renewable energy fund to finance investments in renewable energies, tax relief and guaranteed subsidies.16 As a result of these actions, by 2009 China was already the world’s biggest investor in renewable energies, with investments totalling 34.6 billion u.s. dollars (25.3 billion Euro).17

WIND POWER

China has significant wind resources which can be used to produce electricity. however, it faces some major

challenges when it comes to distributing these resources via the grid. The electricity grid on the east coast is well-developed as this is where there is the greatest demand for energy, but the only suitable areas to

build wind farms are in the north west of the country and offshore. Despite these challenges, wind power has huge potential, something which the nDRC massively underesti-mated in the EER in 2005 when it set an installed capacity target of just five gigawatts (Gw) of power by 2010. This target was already reached by 2007, and the 30 Gw goal set for 2020 is likely to be hit by 2012 at the latest, which

15 | Cf. ibid., 41-42.16 | Cf. ibid., 41.17 | Cf. Xinhua, “Cancun Delegates praise China’s Green Energy push,” China Daily Online, http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/ 2010cancunclimate/2010-12/02/content_11645342.htm (December 4, 2010).

On the east coast, there is the grea-test demand for energy. but the only suitable areas to build wind farms are in the north west of the country and offshore.


is why the nDRC is considering raising it to 100 Gw.18 Over the past four years installed capacity in the wind sector has doubled each year and in 2009 it had already reached 25.8 Gw. In that same year China overtook Germany in terms of cumulative capacity, lying second only to the usA. In terms of newly-installed capacity, China came out at the top of the pile. up to now wind farms have mainly been built on the mainland and the development of offshore wind farms is a recent phenomenon. The first offshore project was completed off the coast of shanghai in 2010, with a capacity of 100 mw. Chinese coastal provinces are now planning a major drive in the area of offshore wind farms and are aiming for a total installed capacity of 33 Gw by 2020.

In order to promote wind power the nDRC regularly announces major projects with a capacity of at least 100 mw which are awarded to the contractors with the lowest feed-in fees and the highest proportion of locally-manufac-tured components. until 2010, local content for major public projects was set at a minimum of 70 per cent in order to boost the growth of Chinese manufacturers.19 but now that three of the world’s seven largest manufacturers come from China and have increasingly started to focus on the export trade, the government has stopped this practice in order to avoid other countries in turn restricting market access for Chinese producers. This strong support for domestic manufacturers allowed the three largest wind power companies, sinovel, Xinjiang Goldwind and Dongfang Electric, to increase their share of the Chinese market from 40 to 60 per cent between 2006 and 2009. During the same period the number of international contractors fell from 53 per cent to 11 per cent.20 During the first phase of these wind power projects the government guarantees a fixed subsidy, then after 30,000 hours of operation the normal electricity price is applied. Local grid operators are obliged to buy all the electricity produced and to provide the necessary connections to the grid. 21

18 | Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, 2009, 6, http://china- greentech.com/sites/default/files/CGTR2009-REIndividual.pdf (accessed January 11, 2011).19 | Cf. Li Junfeng et al., China Wind Power Outlook 2010, 2010, 3-6.20 | Cf. “wind in China sails for Clean Energy Race,” South China Morning Post, October 1, 2010.21 | Cf. The China Green Tech Report 2009, n. 18, 11.


Even a target of 100 Gw by 2020 may prove to be too low. various estimates suggest that total installed capacity will reach up to 250 Gw by 2020 and 680 Gw by 2030, on condition that by then the problems of grid integration,

forecasting and the storage of wind power have been resolved. This would mean that by 2020 ten per cent of China’s total energy needs could be supplied by wind power, with the figure rising to 16.7 per cent by 2030.22

China still faces challenges in expanding its wind power sector. The grid infrastructure is insufficiently developed, making it difficult to connect wind turbines to it. Feed-in fees are often too low to guarantee wind farm operators a reasonable profit. And the government’s goals are all focused on installed capacity, despite the fact that targets for actual electricity production would make much more sense.23 On top of this, state-owned companies tend to offer ridiculously low prices at tender, meaning that private and international contractors who would probably carry out the projects in a more sustainable way are often driven out of the market.24

SOLAR POWER

In view of the fact that two thirds of China’s total surface area enjoys more than 2,200 hours of sunshine per year, the country has huge potential for the use of solar power. up to now the use of solar energy in the form of solar thermal or photovoltaic installations remains under-developed and is mainly decentralised. by 2005 the total capacity of all pv installations was 70 mw whereas only three mw were connected to the grid. however, photovoltaics already play an important role in connecting remote regions to the grid. One example is the Township Electrification programme 2002-2004, which provided pv installations with a capacity of 19 mw, bringing electricity to 700 villages and around

22 | Cf. Junfeng et al., n. 19, 83.23 | In China many wind farms have already been built but cannot supply electricity because they are not connected to the grid. Often grid operators just buy shares in wind farms in order to pay lip-service to government regulations but do not follow up on their obligation to actually integrate the wind farms into the grid. Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, n. 18, 7.24 | Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, n. 18, 7.

China still faces challenges in expan-ding its wind power sector. The grid infrastructure is insufficiently develo-ped, making it difficult to connect wind turbines to it.


The Solar Roofs Programme is subsidi-sing building-integrated systems and roof systems. Further subsidies are also being made available.

a million people in the western regions of China.25 solar power is also used intensively for producing hot water: more than 60 per cent of all rooftop solar collectors to provide hot water worldwide can be found in China. The total surface area of these panels is due to be expanded from 80 million m² today to 300 million m² by 2020.26

with a market share of around 40 per cent, China is already the worldwide market leader in the manufacture of photovoltaic installations. however, most of these installations are produced for the export market: In 2009 more than 90 per cent of the produced solar cells with a total capacity of 3.6 Gw were exported. An incentive was needed to encourage greater domestic use of photovoltaic technology, so in June 2009, as part of the Golden sun project, it was decided to provide subsidies for the installation of solar panels. 50 per cent of the costs would be subsidised for open-space installations connected to the grid and 70 per cent for installations not connected to the grid. The solar Roofs programme is also subsidising building-integrated systems in the amount of 15 Rmb (1.66 Euro) per watt and roof systems with a minimum capacity of 50 Kw by 20 Rmb (2.22 Euro) per watt.27 Further subsidies are also being made available on an individual project basis. so for example a pv power plant in Dunhuang has a tariff rate of 1.09 yuan (0.12 Euro), more than three times higher than coal-fired power stations. however this rate is still considered to be too low to guarantee a profitable operation.28

beijing is pressurising local governments to set up their own initiatives to encourage solar installations, but so far these have been slow to materialise. shanghai kicked off its 100,000 solar pv Roof plan whereby 10,000 three Kw solar

25 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 46-47.26 | Cf. Xing Xiaowen, “Xin nengyuan yuanchanye de caizheng butie zi lu” (The development of subsidies for manufacturers in new energies sector), Nanfengchuang (south wind window) 02/2011, 79.27 | Cf. Claudia wittwer, “Erste sonnenstrahlen durchbrechen wolkendecke,” China Kontakt 01/2011, 22.28 | Cf. Zhang Qi, “China hikes 2011 solar power target,” China Daily Online, July 3, 2009, http://chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/ 2009-07/03/content_8350947.htm (accessed January 17, 2011).


panels were to be installed on shanghai’s roofs between 2006 and 2010, with another 90,000 to follow in the years between 2011 and 2015.29 but in light of the fact that up to 2009 the city council did not provide any financial incentives to install small, private pv systems, by July 2009 there was just one private roof-mounted solar instal-lation in the whole of shanghai. For the period 2009 to 2012 shanghai has still only planned to provide financial assistance for larger solar roof installations.30

by 2019 China is planning to build the world’s largest solar power station in the Qaidam basin in Qinghai province in north-western China, with a projected initial capacity of one gigawatt. by 2020 this capacity should rise to 20 Gw

and the government is aiming to increase solar power’s contribution to total energy consumption to five per cent by 2050. It will require a massive effort to achieve these targets, but at the same time they present

domestic and international solar technology manufacturers with huge opportunities for growth. however, international companies are faced with the question of whether they will be largely excluded from public contracts as happened in the wind sector.31

REDUCTION CO2 EmISSIONS FROm vEhICLES

In 2009 China overtook the usA as the world’s largest car market.32 The transport sector’s energy consumption is still relatively low in global terms, at just 9 per cent, but this will increase rapidly in the next few years due to rapid growth in private car use. vehicle CO2 emissions are on course to more than triple by 2055. China is making efforts

29 | Cf. nDRC, shanghai shiwan ge taiyangneng wuding jihua (shanghai’s 100,000 solar Roofs plan), December 28, 2005, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/nyjt/dcyyj/t20051228_55008.htm (accessed January 25, 2011).30 | Cf. Deng Li, “Taiyangneng de wuding minyong zhi lu” (The development of the private use of solar roofs), 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao (business China), July 16, 2009, http://news.163.com/ 09/0716/08/5Eb38vFG000125LI.html (accessed January 25, 2011).31 | Cf. henrique schneider, “vorbereitung auf grünes Zeitalter,” China Kontakt 01/2011, 18.32 | In 2009 a total of 13.6 million vehicles were sold in China. Cf. “beijing hints further subsidies for alternative-fuel vehicles”, South China Morning Post, september 10, 2010.

International companies are faced with the question of whether they will be largely excluded from public contracts as happened in the wind sector.


to limit emissions and so far is the only emerging country that has introduced fuel consumption standards. These standards for new cars are being progressively tightened: In 2008 the limit was at the Eu-3 level and by the end of 2010 a standard in line with Eu-4 is to be implemented. This standard is 40 per cent more strict than the one used in the usA. An additional tax will also be levied on particu-larly large cars.33

China is also trying to encourage the use of alternative drivetrains in vehicles. beijing is planning to invest up to 300 billion Rmb (33.3 billion Euro) in order to become global market leaders in the production of electric and hybrid cars. The nDRC estimates that by 2015 there will already be 3 million hybrids and 1.5 million purely electric cars on China’s roads.34

In 2010 five cities were chosen to run pilot projects encour-aging private households to buy electric cars. beijing granted a subsidy of 60,000 Rmb (6,600 Euro) on every electric vehicle purchased, and this amount could be even higher in future. The first of these pilot projects has been running in shenzhen since may 2010, using 50 electric taxis to show what future mobility could look like. Alongside the assistance provided by the central government, the city council is also subsidising the purchase of electric taxis and taxi drivers are exempted from paying their annual license fees. It is still expensive to buy an electric taxi, costing 80,000 Rmb (8,800 Euro) more than a conventional taxi with a combustion engine, but this extra cost is supposed to be offset within five years through fuel savings. In order to massively expand the use of electric vehicles, shenzhen is planning to build 25 large charging stations and equip 10,000 public car parks with chargers by 2012. by then, it is expected the city will already have 35,000 electric and hybrid cars in use.35

33 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 29-30.34 | Cf. “300b yuan earmarked to develop green cars,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2010.35 | Cf. “Electric-car dreams short-circuited by hype,” South China Morning Post, January 10, 2011; “so who is winning the electric car race?”, South China Morning Post, november 12, 2010.

In order to massively expand the use of electric vehicles, Shenzhen is plan-ning to build 25 large charging stations and equip 10,000 public car parks with chargers by 2012.


INCREASING ENERGY EFFICIENCY

beijing is trying to increase energy efficiency by enforcing stricter regulations and offering energy-saving incen-tives. These efforts are based on the Energy Conservation Law which came into force in 1998 and the medium and Long-Term Energy Conservation plan of 2004. The Energy Conservation Law is aimed at improving industry regulation, promoting structural changes in industry, reducing the economy’s energy consumption and encouraging techno-logical advances in energy conservation. It stipulates that obsolete plant and products must be phased out and sets specific industry standards for energy conservation.36

The Top 1,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises programme sets concrete consumption reduction targets for the country’s 1,000 biggest energy consumers. These companies are responsible for 33 per cent of China’s total energy consumption and for 47 per cent of all industrial energy consumption. It was planned to reduce consumption from 673 million tonnes of coal equivalent (TCE) by 100 million TCE between 2005 and 2010. In order to hit this target, information and training workshops were run, and the companies taking part were obliged to regularly report back on their energy consumption. Targets for improving their energy efficiency were also set for certain industries which require large amounts of energy such as the cement and steel industries and the construction sector.37

Energy-efficient construction is an important area for energy conservation. Experts estimate that buildings in northern China require three times as much energy for heating compared to buildings in similar climate conditions in Europe. The eleventh Five Year plan has pointed out that 120 million TCE could be saved in buildings. To this end, the ministry of Construction introduced energy efficiency standards for buildings and is currently working on restructuring heating costs. The central government was also expected to set a good example by reducing energy consumption in government buildings by ten per cent in the period 2002 to 2010.

36 | Cf. “Energiespargesetz,” in: Robert heuser and Jan De Graaf, Umweltschutzrecht der VR China – Gesetze und Analysen, 519. 37 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 23-24.


Despite all the efforts, in the medium-term China’s CO2 emissions will conti-nue to grow. by 2030 China will pro-bably have reached European levels in terms of per-capita CO2 emissions.

Alongside the implementation of new energy conservation standards, small, inefficient factories are being shut down. This also applies to coal-fired power stations, which have undergone a massive programme of closures. by 2010 all power stations with a capacity of less than 50 mw were to be closed, along with all power stations with a capacity of less than 100 mw which were more than 20 years old and all other plants which were too far from meeting national or regional standards.38 This resulted in around 7,500 coal-fired power stations being shut down between 2006 and 2009 alone.39 These enforced closures were met with strong resistance from both operators and local govern-ments as they feared cuts in revenues and job losses.

FUTURE ChALLENGES AND PERSPECTIvES FOR ChINA’S CLImATE POLICY

China is faced with the difficult task of uncoupling economic growth from greenhouse gas emissions. Despite all the efforts mentioned here, in the medium-term China’s CO2 emissions will continue to grow. The Director-General of the nDRC’s Department of Climate Change, su wei, believes that realistically an absolute reduction in CO2 emissions will only be achieved in 2050. by 2030 China will probably have reached European levels in terms of per-capita CO2 emissions40, which will lead to ever-stronger demands for the country to reduce its emissions. but if China is to be motivated to accept binding and absolute CO2 reduction targets through reduced energy consumption, western countries will have to step up their own efforts and the usA will have to set reduction targets in line with those of European countries. The west will also need to support China in its efforts to build a low-carbon economy by assisting with advice and technology transfers. In the future technologies for carbon capture and storage (CCs)41 could be particularly important. In the medium-term China will continue to be

38 | Cf. ibid., 28 and 34.39 | Cf. Deborah seligsohn et al., Fact Sheet: Energy and Climate Policy Action in China, 2009, 2.40 | Cf. wacker, n. 7, 60.41 | CCs refers to the capture of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel emissions and its injection and permanent storage in deep geological formations.


highly dependent on coal-fired power stations for electricity production and to date has hardly made any moves in the area of CCs. This support would also take into account that around one fifth of Chinese greenhouse gases are produced by companies manufacturing for the export market.

The people’s Republic must also make investment and technology transfer more attractive. In particular it needs to guarantee that intellectual property rights will be protected and stop giving domestic manufacturers such high levels of preferential treatment.

In order to drive forward the growth of renewable energies, the government should set national, fixed subsidies in order to allow operators to run their businesses in a profitable way. This would give investors a more reliable basis for planning and increase the incentive to build power plants using alternative forms of energy. In adapting its legal framework a cooperation with Germany is conceivable, as China has already worked out its Renewable Energy Law on the basis of the German one as an example. Existing regulations such as the requirement for grid integration must also be implemented more effectively. Financial incentives or fines need to be used in order to encourage grid operators to connect power stations which use wind power, solar power or other new energies to the grid.

There also need to be other incentives to encourage energy conservation such as further increases in electricity, gas and

fuel prices or state subsidies for conversion to green technologies. The implementation of national climate policies seems to be particu-larly difficult at provincial and at the local level. here, concerns about the environment

and energy efficiency generally come well behind short-term considerations such as economic growth and jobs. In an attempt to counter this, the central government has announced that promotion opportunities for government officials will be linked to the results they achieve in the areas of environmental protection and energy efficiency.42

42 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 52-54.

At provincial and local level, concerns about the environment and energy ef-ficiency generally come well behind short-term considerations such as economic growth and jobs.


Civil society also has a significant role to play. The growing environmental problems in the country have served to mobilise large numbers of people to get involved in protecting the environment. The number of green nGOs is growing by the day, and these organisations help to raise awareness of the environment and energy conservation and encourage people to join the fight against climate change. The environment and climate change now have a much higher profile in the Chinese media, making these topics much more mainstream within Chinese society. The ministry of Environmental protection is now increasingly pursuing its goals by working with the media and nGOs. It is to be hoped that in future civil society will have a louder voice in the national climate policy debate.43

Despite all these challenges, China is on the right path when it comes to climate change. The country has moved with the times and set itself ambitious goals, some of which are even stricter than those set by certain industrialised countries. The twelth Five Year plan will probably provide for the establishment of local pilot schemes for a national step in combating climate change.44 Even if we cannot expect to see a radical change in China’s position at the climate conference in Durban at the end of the year, it will continue to move forward on a domestic level. The people’s Republic success will have to be measured upon whether it will manage to achieve the self set goals.

43 | Cf. ibid., 16.44 | Cf. Xinhua, “shouquan fabu: Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wuniangui- hua de jianyi” (Authorised publication: Central government proposals for a twelfth Five Year plan for the development of the nation’s economy and society), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2010-10/27/c_12708501_6.htm (accessed January 20, 2010).


The “Year of the Tiger”, according to the Chinese calendar, ended beginning of February. what a relief for superstiti ous Asians, who have now one problem less to worry about with their offspring. Children born in the “Year of the Tiger” are expected to have serious partnership problems later on as this particular zodiac allegedly forms rather taxing and dominating characters. These attributes are not necessarily welcome, especially for girls. subsequently many Asian couples postpone having children during the tiger years. In singapore, where three quarters of the population have Chinese roots, the birth rate dropped to a historical low.

In 2010 the women in the city state gave birth to 1.16 children on average. Among the Chinese population the birth rate was 1.02 children and therefore considerably below average, beating now even Japan (1.3) and south Korea (1.2). In order to keep the inhabitants’ number and age constant, each woman in singapore should have at least 2.1 children. Following the experience of previous tiger-years in 1974, 1986 and 1998, where the birth rate in the “Tiger City” dropped by up to ten per cent, 2011, the “Year of the Rabbit”, should again produce more babies. however, nobody expects a significant trend reversal as the birth rate has fallen for years, independent of the zodiac. The main problems for young couples in singapore could well be the costs for care and education of their children as well as combining family and careers. The required birth rate of 2.1 children per woman was last recorded in

hARmONY AS A NATIONAL mISSIONSINGAPORE’S WAY OF DEALING WITh ImmIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

Paul Linnarzpaul Linnarz is head of the media programme Asia of the Konrad-Adenauer-stiftung based in singapore.


Today the state’s founder Lee Kuan Yew is emphatically promoting to wel-come young immigrants now and in fu-ture. They are the remedy for an ageing society.

singapore in 1976. After that the birth rate fell more or less continuously. In the eighties, the government thus founded the “social Development unit” (sDu) and the “social Development services” (sDs). They were estab-lished to motivate the singles to marry and, of course, have children. A few years ago both institutions merged to form the “social Development network” (sDn), falling under the control of the ministry for sports and Youth. singapore may well be one of the few countries worldwide, where “Dating parties”, and internet dating agencies (“lovebyte”) are under the responsibility of a state department.

The idea for this marriage policy was initiated by the then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1983. he engaged himself vehemently to make marriage and motherhood really attractive for the well educated women. Today the state’s founder, by now 87 years old, is emphatically promoting to welcome young immigrants now and in future. They are the remedy for an ageing society. “Otherwise, our economy will slow down, like the Japanese economy. we will have a less dynamic and less thriving singapore. This is not the future for our children and grandchildren.”1 In his speech in January, in front of more than 1,000 members of the “Chinese Clan Associations”, Lee emphasised that the first generation of new immigrants will need some time for the integration, however, their children would already be “completely singaporean”.

ExPENSIvE “TOP DESTINATION” FOR ImmIGRANTS

The old state founder’s appeal touches a sensitive subject: Despite its falling birth rate, singapore more than doubled its population during the past thirty years. however, not the dating agencies and the organised flirting were the decisive factors, but the immigration from abroad. If every adult, who wants to emigrate to and who is longing for a life in singapore, would then find somewhere to live in the city, the population would increase by 219 per cent. This makes the small island state at the malacca strait world wide the “top destination” for migrants, according to an analysis by the American Gallup Institute, presented in

1 | The Straits Times, January 19, 2011.


Apart from worries about an increase in competition on the job market, the keyword “immigration” is also mentioned in connection with the develop-ment on the housing market.

August 2010.2 Distinctly behind, on second place lies new Zealand (+184 per cent).

however, many singaporeans also watch the immigration situation with worries. According to a recent telephone survey by REACh, being a mixture of a governmental opinion research institute and a discussion forum in the internet, only 56 per cent of the questioned people were convinced that the present restrictions for immigration at the local job market really protects against applicants from abroad. 18 per cent of those questioned, were against singapore recruiting foreign talents. It is only a minority with an attitude like that, but in a press release about the survey results, REACh had to admit that “a sizeable

number of respondents remain anxious about competition from foreigners or are not convinced that such a policy will expand the pie for all despite repeated assurances from the Government.”3

Apart from worries about an increase in competition on the job market, the keyword “immigration” is also mentioned in connection with the development on the housing market. The prices there rose by 3.8 per cent in the second half of 2010. The Department of statistics of the Citiy state registered an increase of 5,3 percent for private house-holds with low income. The higher increase affects 20 percent of the total number of private households. This is a development with far reaching consequences, says Davin Chor, Economist at the singapore management university, “as a high cost of housing can certainly affect when young couples decide to marry and have children”.4

however, it is the inflation and not the demands on the housing market or the immigration of foreigners that pushes prices up. In December 2010 inflation reached a

2 | Cf. neli Esipova, Julie Ray, “migration Could Triple populations in some wealthy nations”, gallup.com, August 20, 2010, http://gallup.com/poll/142364/migration-Triple-populations- wealthy-nations.aspx (accessed February 16, 2011).3 | REACh, “Reactions to pm’s national Day Rally 2010,” media Release, september 13, 2010, http://www.reach.gov.sg/ portals/0/mediaRelease/Reactions_to_nDR_2010.pdf (accessed march 11, 2011).4 | The Straits Times, February 8, 2011.


Immigration is controlled not only with regard to demographics but also depending on the situation of the eco-nomy. Where integration is concerned, Singapore leaves nothing to chance.

two-year peak. Immigrants and local people are equally affected. According to a survey by ECA International, singapore is on eighth place amongst the most expensive cities in Asia, nearly at the same level as hong Kong and shanghai.5 seen from abroad, however, this does not seem to compromise singapore’s attraction for migrants.

The singapore government has chosen two strategies in order to manage the influx and utilise it for its own development purposes at the same time: Immigration is controlled not only with regard to demographics but also depending on the situation of the economy and above all, where integration is concerned, singapore leaves nothing to chance. Freedom of religion, the housing market, education policy and the media are the cornerstones of a system that reaches out into all cracks and crevices of life.

ThE “RIGhT mIxTURE”

since 2010 more than five million people are living in singapore. That is a million people more than in 2000. 3.2 million people are singapore citizens, eight per cent more than at the beginning of this millennium. There are 541,000 “permanent residents” (pR) with a foreign passport. Their percentage increased significantly by 88 per cent during the last decade. Roughly 1.3 million foreigners work and live in singapore for a limited period. The number of these “non-residents” increased by 73 per cent. Thus every third (36 per cent) of singapore’s inhabitants is a foreigner.

According to the published information of the department for statistics, in January 2011, the number of residents (with and without citizenship) comprises of 74.1 per cent Chinese, 13.4 per cent malaysians, 9.2 per cent Indians and 3.3 per cent people of other nationalities.6 The group of

5 | Cf. ECA International, “singapore climbs to 8th most expensive Asian city,” media Release, December 2, 2010, http://www.eca-international.com/news/press_releases/7278 (accessed February 16, 2011).6 | Cf. Department of statistics, “Demographic Characteristics, Education, Language and Religion,” Census of Population 2010 – Statistical Release 1 (singapur 2010), http://www.singstat.gov. sg/pubn/popn/C2010sr1/cop2010sr1.pdf (accessed February 16, 2011).


Prime minister Lee hsien Loong hold his speech at the occasion of the national holiday in August in three different languages: malayan, mandarin and English.

“permanent residents” comprises of 61.4 per cent Chinese, three per cent malaysians, 20.4 per cent Indians and 15.2 per cent migrants from other world religions.

The terms “Chinese”, “malaysian” or “Indian” in statistics as well as in ordinary language refer not only to the country of origin but also to the affiliation with a certain “ethnic group”. Cultural, linguistic and religious criteria are the factors for grouping people as well as the nationality. Each of singapore’s citizens (“resident”), independent from whether immigrant or local, belongs to one of the different ethnic groups in the register of residents. Therefore there are 2.2 million citizens called “Chinese”, although they were born in singapore. From the nearly 590,000 Chinese of foreign origin, 340,000 come from malaysia and only 175,000 from China, hong Kong and macao. 2,278 Chinese living in singapore were born in Europe. About 470,000 of the nearly half a million “malaysians”, or better “malays”, were born in singapore. nearly 11,000 citizens of Indonesian origin also belong to this group. The “Indians” include also pakistan, bangladesh and sri Lanka.

For several decades singapore has already been a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. It is for that reason that the prime minister, Lee hsien Loong, hold his speech in three

different languages at the occasion of the national holiday in August: malayan, mandarin and English. A decisive factor for the immigration policy of his government is not to shift the “mixing ratio” in the population in favour of or at the expense of an ethnic group. This does not only apply to a percentage of the overall population but for example also to the affiliation with the different religions. The anxiety especially amongst the “minority communities” for a “foreign infiltration” was picked up in a reassuring remark in Lee’s speech at the occasion of the national holiday last year: “The current mix is stable, and contributes to our racial and religious harmony.”7

7 | Text and video on http://www.channelnewsasia.com/nd2010 (accessed march 11, 2011).


The percentage of Christians rose con-siderably from 14.6 to 18.3. It has overtaken the Islam in Singapore today with 14.7 per cent. hinduism has also risen.

“mUSCULAR SECULARISm”

Due to a controlled residence and working permit strategy, the percentages of the various ethnic groups in relation to the total population has only changed insignificantly over the past decade. more significant are the results of the last census in 2010, which show deviations concerning religious affiliations: over the past decade the percentage of buddhists fell from 42.5 to now 33.3 per cent. Taoism has risen to a percentage of now 10.9 compared to 2000, where the percentage was 8.5. The percentage of Christians rose considerably from 14.6 to 18.3. It has overtaken the Islam in singapore today with 14.7 per cent (2000: 14.9 per cent). hinduism has also risen from 4 per cent 10 years ago to 5.1 per cent at present.8

Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution of the city state. That means that the religions with the largest number of followers in singapore have a right to a certain number of statutory holidays. Christmas is therefore celebrated as well as the buddhist vesak celebrations, the Chinese new Year or the hari Raya for muslims. The holidays affect the whole population. schools, offices and authorities for example stay closed on those days. At the same time the government is, however, watching very closely that no fundamentalist influences are spread. Also authorities react very sensitively to public criticism of other religions and missionary activities and publica-tions that could disturb the “religious harmony” are legally prohibited.9

muslim women are not allowed to wear a head scarf (“tudung” in singapore) at state schools. Each breach of this regulation for obligatory school uniform can have consequences going as far as being excluded from lessons. however, male sikhs are allowed to wear their turban in school. At the end of the eighties the religious education (“Religious Knowledge Curriculum”) at schools was replaced

8 | Cf. The Straits Times, January 13, 2011.9 | Cf. inter alia “maintenance of Religious harmony Act,” http://statutes. agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve. pl?actno=REvED-167A (accessed February 16, 2011).


The “mother tongue” policy dictates a school education with at least two languages. Originally this was imple-mented with a view to the economic development.

by a “Civic and moral Education programme”. In 2009 singapore’s vice president, wong Kan seng reasoned the principle of “muscular secularism” with the words: “we are not a Christian singapore, or a muslim singapore, or a buddhist or hindu singapore. we are a secular singapore, in which Christians, muslims, buddhists, hindus and others all have to live in peace with one another.”10

TOWER WIThOUT bAbEL

There is hardly another country in the world, where “communication” plays a larger role than in singapore, where more than every third inhabitant is of foreign origin. For that reason English became the first teaching language back in the sixties. The reason behind this was to ensure that the different population groups in singapore are able to communicate with each other “neutrally”. On the other hand the lingua franca dominates every day life even today, because it promotes the international competition for singapore, which depends on export and international financial service providers.

with its declared aim “to integrate new arrivals into our society, so that over time they will become singaporean in their outlook and identity”,11 the government promotes not

only the mutual English language but also the mother tongues of other ethnical groups. The so-called “mother tongue” policy dictates a school education with at least two languages. Originally this was implemented with a view to

the young state and its economic development. promoting and maintaining the knowledge of mandarin for example meant that trading with China became easier. Apart from that, teaching in the mother-tongue of various different ethnic groups today is also supposed to encourage cultural roots and traditions.

English is already taught in Kindergarten to about half of the three to six year olds, alongside with the three main languages Chinese (mandarin), Tamil and malay (bahasa).

10 | Kumar Ramakrishna, “‘muscular’ versus ‘Libera’. secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in singapore,” RSIS Working Paper, no. 202 (singapore, 2010), 9 et seq.11 | Cf. n. 7.


Students who are neither Chinese nor malaysian are allowed to choose Chi-nese or malay respectively as third language. This is taught outside regu-lar school hours.

starting with primary school, most subjects are taught in English. During the first to fourth school year (“foundation stage”) Tamil is offered together with non-Tamil languages such as hindi, bengali, Gujarati, punjabi and urdu. The “orientation stage” during the fifth and sixth school year divides the mother-tongue lessons into basic, standard and raised levels. primary school ends after the sixth year with an exam. The result decides, whether the child prepares for a “special”, “express”, “normal (academic)” or “normal (technical)” career during the following years.

“special” and “express” have been designed for four years until year 10. both categories finish with an exam, the so-called “O-Level”. The difference mainly consists of the teaching of languages. besides English, Chinese, Tamil and malay are taught; however “special” means that the teaching is based on a higher level. students who do not fulfil the minimum requirements (defined by the state) for the mother-tongue at “O-Level” have to stay on for another year.

Instead of or in addition to the above three most important languages, many schools have a choice – apart from the obligatory English – of French, German, Arabic and Japanese. some international schools also offer spanish or Korean. They are sometimes preferred as substitute mother-tongue (even by Chinese, malaysians and Indians, respectively the ethnic groups described as such), when children and youths who lived in these countries for several years and come or return to singapore with the start of their school education. students who are neither Chinese nor malaysian are allowed to choose Chinese or malay respectively as third language. This is taught outside regular school hours.

both “normal” branches are more directed towards technical or business management (book-keeping, admin-istration) teaching. They finish after five years with an “O-Level” exam. On a higher level, the school career ends after altogether twelve years either with an “International baccalaureate Ib Diploma” resp. “Ib Certificate” or with the so-called “A-Level”.


more and more primary school pupils speak English either exclusively or most of the time at home with their parents, siblings and relatives.

“Language” as a means for integration in singapore is not an “either, or”, but an “as well as” of English (plus third foreign language) and mother-tongue. As from next

year, the teaching and learning methods for mother-tongue lessons is going to be improved, due to an analysis by the “language review committee”, presented in January, according to which more and more primary

school pupils speak English either exclusively or most of the time at home with their parents, siblings and relatives.

Amongst the school starters of Chinese origin, the percentage increased from 28 per cent twenty years ago to 59 per cent today. Amongst school starters of Indian origin English dominates now with 58 per cent (1991: 49 per cent). 37 per cent of the malaysian class mates mainly communicate in English with their parents. Twenty years ago it was only 13 per cent. “If you want to keep the language, (…) you have to teach them (the pupils) to use it”, Education minister ng Eng hen urged, when presenting the report to the teachers. he continued with regard to homes and society; “homes will have to support that kind of environment, and the community will have to support that kind of environment.”12 hence, the government explicitly intents a lively manifold of languages.

There are two measures, which are supposed to stop the decrease: by 2015 there are going to be another 500 teachers for mother-tongue lessons, in addition to the already existing 6,666 teachers. more important however is the news, that teaching methods are changing. with reference to examples from the u.s., China, India, malaysia and Australia, exams will in future test the ability of “active and interactive” communication, and students will no longer have to put up with materials of “archaic scenarios”, old-fashioned subjects and content.

PERCENTAGES AGAINST ENCLAvES

The greater part of singapore’s population lives in blocks of flats, which normally consist of several hundred apart-ments. since the late sixties the houses are part of the public housing construction. The “housing and Development

12 | The Straits Times, January 19, 2011.


Singapore’s “Ethnic Integration Policy” dictates who is entitled to purchase and sell hDb flats and in which buil-ding they are allowed to live.

board” (hDb), part of the ministry for national Deve- lopment, is in charge. The flats are of different sizes and interior and are generally not rented but bought and sold again when moving. Only people who have a monthly income of not more than 8,000 singapore Dollars (at present about 4,600 Euro) are entitled to purchase a hDb flat. The upper limit refers to the family income of each household.

Even on the housing market the government of this immigration country does not leave anything to chance. with the aim to promote the “racial integration and harmony”, to avoid “racial enclaves”, and to ensure a “balanced ethnic mix among the various ethnic communities”, singapore has subscribed to the so-called “Ethnic Inte- gration policy” EIp.13 It dictates who is entitled to purchase and sell hDb flats and in which building they are allowed to live.

singapore citizens and the groups of malaysian origin “permanent residents”, are partly excluded from these regulations. The common culture and history between singapore and malaysia are given as reason. “permanent residents”, who belong to another ethnic group, are only allowed to occupy eight per cent of all flats in a block and only five per cent of all flats in the immediate neigh-bourhood. Is this quota fulfilled, potential purchasers of a flat can be refused to buy in this particular building and they have to try another block of flats. sellers also have to submit to this quota. The question, whom to sell the flat to, is therefore not only depending on the offer but also on the ethnic origin of the interested people.

Despite their common history and culture, care is taken that with respect to the singapore citizens and the “permanent residents” of malaysian origin, one ethnic group does not occupy all flats in one block of flats. The upper limit for citizens of Chinese origin with or without passport, is 84 per cent of all flats in the immediate neighbourhood and not

13 | housing and Development board, “Ethnic Integration policy & spR Quota,” http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/buy ResaleFlatEthnicIntegrationpolicy_EIp?OpenDocument (accessed February 16, 2011).


Singapore heavily relies on less or even hardly qualified people from abroad. Since the late sixties, the city state has repeatedly eased the regulations for an influx of foreign workers.

more than 87 per cent of all apartments in one building. The quota for malaysians is 22 respectively 25 per cent, for “Indians and Others” 12 respectively 15 per cent.14 The remaining flats are to be occupied by citizens with other ethnic origin. The EIp quota for each block of flats corre-sponds roughly to the percentage of the different ethnic groups in the total population.

“permanent residents” as well as singapore citizens receive financial support when buying a hDb-flat. It is a maximum of 30000 singapore Dollars. This is another incentive to promote integration, because since last year, perspective flat owners who have citizenship receive 10,000 singapore Dollars more than a “permanent resident”. since couples who are younger than 35 are only allowed to buy hDb-flats if they are married, the regulation “citizens come first” refers to both partners. Even in a mixed marriage between a citizen and a “permanent resident”, the state cuts the allowance to a maximum of 20,000 singapore Dollars. The remaining 10,000 singapore Dollars are paid retro-spectively to those who decide to apply for a singapore passport after having bought the flat or who have at least a child with singapore citizenship.

JObS ARRANGED bY QUOTAS

The present benchmark figures for the immigration policy were fixed in the “manpower 21 plan” by the singapore

Government in 1999, thus strengthening its position internationally as “city of talents”, powered by the knowledge and innovation of the “new Economy”. biomedicine, chemis- try, electronics and environmental techno-

logy as well as financial service providers and health care were identified as being the most promising growing markets. well trained foreign specialists, scientists and engineers with special knowledge in these areas were and still are welcome to the country. Apart from that singapore heavily relies on less or even hardly qualified people from

14 | housing and Development board, “policy changes to support an inclusive and cohesive home,” media Release, march 5, 2011 http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/ agencies/hdb/press_release/p-20100305-4/Attachmentpar/ 0/file/press_Release-sC_spR-EIp-spR_Q.pdf (accessed march 28, 2011).


All enterprises are dictated to how many foreign workers they are allo-wed to have altogether and how many from certain countries, in relation to the total number of employees.

abroad. since the late sixties, the city state has repeatedly eased the regulations for an influx of foreign workers, especially for the construction sector, transport industry, shipbuilding as well as nurses for hospitals and old peoples’ homes. many less qualified female foreigners are employed as domestic workers.

Residence and work permits are granted in a staggered manner, depending on the monthly income, qualifica-tions and the area of employment respectively the area of activity (type of business). The question how many low skilled foreign workers with a so-called “R” pass are allowed to work for which economy sector in singapore is organised according to fixed quotas. The country of origin is an important deciding factor.15 All enterprises, depending on the kind of business, are dictated to how many foreign workers they are allowed to have altogether and how many from certain countries, in relation to the total number of employees. For every “R” pass owner, employers have to make a contribution to the state. The monthly income of a “R” pass owner must not exceed 1,800 singapore Dollars (about 1,000 Euro at present).

Employees who earn at least 7,000 singapore Dollars a month (about 4,000 Euro at present) qualify for a “p1” work permit. work permit owners are allowed to bring their next of kin into the country (partner and children under 21). partners and children, however, fall under a special status “Dependant’s pass”, which must be applied for separately. Foreigners with a “p1”-work permit are also entitled to apply for a “personalised Employment pass”. This pass increases the residence permit to five years maximum. people who lose their job within this period are allowed to stay in singapore up to six months without income, in order to find a new job. “p1” work permit or “pEp” permit give foreigners the chance to apply for the status of “permanent resident” and citizenship.

15 | For the building industry e.g. workers from malaysia, China, India, sri Lanka, Thailand, bangladesh, myanmar, philippines, pakistan, hong Kong, macao, south Korea and Taiwan can be recruited at present. For the manufacturing industry only workers from malaysia, China, hong Kong, macao, south Korea and Taiwan are permitted.


If sectors in the economy are not per-forming well, then fewer foreigners are allowed into the country. Work permits for migrants are sectorally in-creased during booming phases.

A “p2”-work permit requires a monthly salary of at least 3,500 singapore Dollars (at present 2,000 Euro). A “p2” owner can also become a “permanent resident”, should however wait at least about two years. The rest of the regulations correspond to the “p1” status.

The “Q1” work permit is issued with a monthly salary of at least 2,500 singapore Dollars (approx. 1,450 Euro). Only when reaching this salary level, foreign workers are allowed to bring their next of kin into the country. below this level, starting with a salary from 1,800 singapore Dollars, the so-called “s” pass is issued. For this group the employers have to make a monthly contribution. Occuption quota also apply. The foreign owner of an “s” pass is also entitled to the status of “permanent resident” and citizenship. As a rule, however, applying for this will only be successful after a residence of four to five years.

work permits of a p, Q or s status are normally issued for one to two years. A repeated extension can be applied for, as long as the applicant has a regular income. The status of “permanent resident”, however, will be granted for five years initially, followed by an extension of a further five years and more. Losing a job and regular income does not e.g. force a “permanent resident”, to leave the country, contrary to the “non-residents”. “pRs” can already apply for citizenship after two years. They pay a monthly contri-bution to the “Central provident Fund” (CpF), just the same as singapore citizens. This saving will provide security for old age. The money from the CpF may also be used, under certain conditions, to purchase a hDb-flat. They are considered a provision for old age in singapore.

The “Employment pass”, in its different stages, controls immigration not only under demographic but also under

economic aspects. If some sectors in the economy are not performing well, then fewer foreigners are allowed into the country and vice versa, work permits for migrants are sectorally increased during booming phases. The proportion of “non-residents”, compared

to the growth in population in 2008, was 4.2 per cent, while only 0.6 per cent respectively 0.7 per cent of the growth was “permanent residents” and new citizens. when in 2009


According to the “maintenance of Reli- gious harmony Act″, publications crea-ting “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different reli-gious groups″ are prohibited.

the global economy and financial crisis reached singapore, the percentage of new “non-residents” compared to the population growth sank to one per cent last year. The percentage of new “permanent residents” sank to 0.2 per cent.

On the whole especially the number of low earners was reduced. In June the number of fully employed workers with a monthly income of 1,200 singapore Dollars (at present about 690 Euro) and less was 262,000, about five per cent below the level of the previous year. Last year 77.1 per cent of all citizens between 25 and 64 were employed. The employment rate in singapore is as high as it used to be in 1991.16

successes like these are picked up and reported in length by the media in the south-East Asian city state. They, too, are part of the integration policy. press and radio produce in various languages of the largest ethnic groups (English, Chinese, malay and Tamil). According to the “maintenance of Religious harmony Act”, publications creating “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different religious groups” are prohibited for press and radio.17

Despite an impressive economic development and immense efforts with regard to integration, the subject remains sensitive: “I do not deceive myself for one moment that our differences of race, culture, language, religion, have disappeared”, singapore’s state founder warned in January at the presentation of the book Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going,18 published by the “singapore press holdings”. According to the state founder, the present and future generations have to take responsi-bility “to understand the vulnerability, the fragility of our society and keep it in cohesion, keep it united and keep it

16 | The Straits Times, December 1, 2010.17 | Cf. “maintenance of Religious harmony Act,” http://statutes. agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno= REvED-167A (accessed February 16, 2011).18 | AFp, “preserve racial, religious unity: Lee Kuan Yew,” asiaone news, January 21, 2011, http://news.asiaone.com/news/ AsiaOne%2bnews/singapore/story/A1story20110121-2596 11.html (accessed February 16, 2011).


as it is today, tolerant of each other, accommodating each other”.19 muslims as well as non-muslims did not want to let some remarks in the book pass uncommented. Lee, who today carries the title “minister mentor”, and to whom the press sometimes only refers to as “mm”, is quoted in an online contribution of “Today” with the text: “I think we were progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam came, and if you asked me for my observations, the other communities have easier integration – friends, intermar-riages and so on, Indians with Chinese, Chinese with Indians – than muslims. That’s the result of the surge from the Arab states.” It continues: “I would say, today, we can integrate all religions and races except Islam. I think the muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate.”20 Lee hsien Loong, the son of the state founder and present prime minister, reassures the public end of January: “but my own perspectives on how things are in singapore based on my interaction with the malay community, the mosque and religious leaders and the grassroots leaders, is not quite the same as mm’s.” The opinions mentioned in his father’s book are, so the prime minister, of personal nature.21

19 | Ibid.20 | s. Ramesh, “It’s a matter of perspective,” todayonline.com, January 31, 2011, http://todayonline.com/singapore/ EDC110131-0000092 (accessed February 16, 2011).21 | s. Ramesh, “muslims have done much to strengthen integration, says pm Lee,” channelnewsasia.com, January 30, 2011, http://channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/ view/1107843/1/.html (accessed February 16, 2011).


POST-ELECTION SLOvAKIAThE FIRST hALF-YEAR OF ThE CENTER-RIGhT GOvERNmENT

Grigorij Mesežnikov

Grigorij mesežnikov is one of the most influential analysts of slovakian politics. he is co-founder and president of the Institute for publicAffairs (IvO) in bratislava.

The year 2010 was full of significant events in slovakia. The citizens decided about the new government for the upcoming four years, about the quality of relationship with its southern neighbor hungary, the trends in relationships between the majority slovak population and minority groups, especially ethnic hungarians, and how the slovak Republic should act as a member state of Eu in deciding on participation in the eurozone bailout. It was the year of complicated decisions for both citizens and politicians.

RESULTS AND CONTExT OF ThE 2010 SLOvAK PARLIAmENTARY ELECTIONS

In the year 2010 there was a major political power shift in the country. After the parliamentary elections in June, the new ruling coalition has been formed, having an absolute majority of mandates in parliament (79 out of 150). Four parties have created the coalition, two of which had had seats in parliament in 2006-2010 term as opposition parties (slovak Democratic and Christian union, sDKÚ-Ds and Christian Democratic movement, KDh), one party (most-híd, bridge) was created by fragmentation of another opposition parliamentary party (party of hungarian Coalition, smK), and one party was founded in 2009 as a brand new political formation (Freedom and solidarity, sas).

The fundamental agreement regarding the formation of the new ruling coalition has been reached by the representa-tives of the four center-right parties sDKÚ-Ds, sas, KDh and most-híd virtually instantly after the announcement of the election results. For confirmation of the solidity


and constancy of this position the leading representatives of these parties have unanimously refused not only to negotiate with smer-social Democracy party (smer-sD, Direction) about possible coalition cooperation, but also just to meet with its delegates. The reasons for this refusal have not been only program- and ideology-based differences between smer-sD and center-right parties. The reasons have been much deeper, having origins in previous election terms: an unacceptable authoritarian attitude of smer-sD to execution of power, attempts of this party to de-legitimize and criminalize center-right opposition parties and their representatives in the years

2006-2010, the conflictual-type-personality of Robert Fico, who has been oriented on a constant evocation of political confronta-tions and last but not least the incriminating, suspicious background behind creation and

activities of smer-sD. This party was actually founded as a power-political project of certain entrepreneurs with unclear, dubious financing, which during its administration was building a system, based on party cronyism, creating spawn for corruption. possible coalition alliance with smer-sD, therefore, might have been discrediting for the center-right parties.

For many citizens of sR four years of nationalist-populist government of smer-sD, sns and Ľs-hZDs led by Fico had symbolized an era of arrogance of power, breaching of the basic rules of law, deepening of the state debt, confrontational anti-minorities politics and primitive aggressive nationalism. The election confirmed that this politics had been disliked by a substantial part of the society, and even the good share of the popular vote for smer-sD, which has been forced to step down, has not changed anything about it. Four years of smer-sD government have clearly shown that this party had never been a standard social-democratic formation, for which it has been presenting itself. It is a political project, based on personal power ambitions of Fico, former deputy of the post-communist party of the Democratic Left (sDĽ), and economic interests of a narrow group of entrepreneurs, who had become wealthy during vladimír mečiar’s era thanks to the wild privatization and generous state orders. It has always been, in fact, a typical populist formation,

Smer-SD was actually founded as a power-political project of certain entrepreneurs, which during its administra-tion was building a system, based on party cronyism.


whose ideological quintessence has been the combination of etatist rhetoric in the form of declaring “strong social (welfare) state” and an old-fashioned ethnic nationalism, presenting defense of “national state” interests and resistance to “Great hungary’s politics”.

source: statistical Office of the slovak Republic, 2010

PROGRAm bASIS AND ACTIvITY OF ThE NEW GOvERNmENT

In the beginning of July 2010, several days after the signing of a new coalition agreement between four center-right parties, president Ivan Gašparovič appointed Iveta Radičová, deputy chairperson and election leader of sDKÚ-Ds, as prime minister of the government. For the first time in the history of the country, the highest government position has been assigned to a woman, for the first time

Table 1Results of parliamentary elections in Slovakia, June 12, 2010

PartyTotal ballots cast

Share of the popular vote (%)

Seats in parliament

European Democratic party (EDs) 10,332 0.40 —

union – party for slovakia (Únia) 17,741 0.70 —

party of Romani Coalition (sRK) 6,947 0.27 —

paliho Kapurková 14,576 0.57 —

Freedom and solidarity (sas) 307,287 12.14 22

party of Democratic Left (sDĽ) 61,137 2.41 —

party of hungarian Coalition (smK) 109,638 4.33 —

people’s party – movement for a Democratic slovakia (Ľs-hZDs)

109,480 4.32 —

Communist party of slovakia (Kss) 21,104 0.83 —

slovak national party (sns) 128,490 5.07 9

new Democracy (nD) 7,962 0.31 —

Association of slovak workers (ZRs) 6,196 0.24 —

Christian Democratic movement (KDh) 215,755 8.52 15

people’s party Our slovakia (Ľsns) 33,724 1.33 —

slovak Democratic and Christian union – Democratic party (sDKÚ-Ds)

390,042 15.42 28

AZEn – Alliance for Europe of nations 3,325 0.13 —

smer – social Democracy (smer-sD) 880,111 34.79 62

most–híd [bridge] 205,538 8.12 14


The new government has unequivo-cally taken over the political legacy of the second government of mikuláš Dzurinda that had implemented the series of deep structural, especially social-economic, reforms.

since the fall of the communist regime in 1989, there is not a single person in the slovak government, who would have been a former member of the Communist party (in Fico’s government there were ten such people out of 16). These two facts have also shown the nature of change that 2010 parliamentary election has brought to slovakia.

The program of the new government, approved by the parliament in August 2010, contains a set of measures aimed at expanding the space for free market economy mechanisms, strengthening the democratic character of

the state, keeping the institutions of public power stable and functioning, strengthening the genuine independence of judiciary and increasing transparency in public life. The new government has unequivocally taken over the political legacy of the second government of mikuláš Dzurinda from

2002-2006 electoral term, when that conservative-liberal cabinet had implemented the series of deep structural, especially social-economic, reforms. Those, in return, had transformed slovakia to the Central-European “reform tiger”, with their top accomplishment, integrating the country into Eu and nATO. After four years of nationalist leftist government led by Fico, that had been promoting the model of “strong social state” and had been trying to amend some of Dzurinda’s reforms, the exceptional position of slovakia as a successful transforming country became history.

After the first six-month of the new government, some changes in several areas are worth noticing. The main slogans of the new politics have become consolidation of public finances, increase in the transparency in public life, fight with corruption and cronyism, restoring the feel of justice and trust of citizens towards the state. The atmosphere in the society has changed quickly. The tension in slovak-hungarian relations has decreased, both inter-ethnic and inter-state. Radical nationalist discourse, which had been fed for several years by nationalist sns with an active assistance of smer-sD, has perished almost completely. Also those aggressive attacks on independent media and nGOs that Fico’s government had been regularly practicing have vanished into history.


The new government virtually imme-diately after its onset has begun to realize the program of increasing trans-parency and strengthening control in handling the public resources.

GOvERNmENT PRIORITIES: TRANSPARENCY AND CONSOLIDATION OF ThE ECONOmY

In the very initial period of its administration, the new government has focused not only on the implementation of its program declaration, but also on summarizing the current state of affairs, which Fico’s cabinet had bequeathed. It was important to elucidate to the general public the real results of “building of the social state” in the version of smer-sD, which thanks to the compelling “social” rhetoric has been persistently disposing with the high support from the general public. ministers of Radičová’s cabinet have released information about the cronyist or openly corrupt background of many previous government’s projects, about suspicious, non-transparent circumstances of public procurement and about numerous cases of uneconomical treatment with state resources. It has been referring to several ministries – Defense, Labor, social Affairs and Family, Transportation, Economy, Culture, Education, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Finance. In some cases, criminal charges have been filed to the prosecutor’s office for the suspicion of offence. In these cases the inves-tigation has begun. unprecedented release of information about misuse by the former government representatives with strong, in some cases, even macroeconomic impact, has been significant in two aspects: first, the new government’s commitment to fight with corruption and cronyism, and second, the depth and extent of cronyism and corruption achieved in the previous election term.

The new government virtually immediately after its onset has begun to realize the program of increasing trans-parency and strengthening control in handling the public resources. here its effort has had a concrete, tangible form. Central register of contracts has been made available on the internet to the general public after parliament had approved the distinct novel of Civil Code. These contracts were signed by state organs in purchasing of goods and services.

As slovakia’s economy is feeling negative impacts of global economy crisis as well as impacts of problematic social-economical politics of the former government, the cabinet


Despite the conflicting relations, the opposition is not marginalized in parliament, whereas the new coalition is set to negotiate legitimate request from opposition.

of Radičová has concentrated its efforts first and foremost on public finances stabilization. It has managed to pass the collection of austerity economical measures, aimed at decreasing the state budget deficit. whereas during Fico’s cabinet this deficit had increased from three per cent in 2006 to almost eight per cent in 2010, Radičová’s cabinet has planned its decrease to less than five per cent in 2011. Although current coalition parties had promised before the elections not to increase taxes, after revelation of the real state of the state budget and after a long discussion they have made one exception – to temporarily increase the value added tax (vAT) about one per cent – from former 19 to 20 per cent. Increased vAT, however, would have been valid only during the time, when the state budget deficit would have exceeded three per cent, as soon as the deficit would have been less, the original tariff of vAT would be restored.

CORRECTION OF FICO’S DEFORmATIONS

There has been recently some progress in stabilizing the political democracy, the institutions of the constitutional system and the principles of rule of law. In an era of pursuing the methods of “tyranny of the majority”, the coalition of smer-sD, sns and Ľs-hZDs had openly marginalized opposition parties in parliament, making its mps mere political extras, had weakened the controlling function of parliament and had negatively influenced the quality of legislation. In contrast, the new majority has been pursuing its will in parliament without breaching the principles of procedural consensus and has not been jeopardizing the

parliament’s basic functions. proposals and remarks of opposition mps have not been a priori rejected only because they have been made by opposition delegates. Despite the conflicting relations between opposition

and ruling coalition, the opposition is not marginalized in parliament, whereas the new coalition as a whole as well as its individual parties are set to negotiate and accept legitimate request from opposition.

The new government has developed a remarkable effort in order to correct legislative and political deformations inherited by Fico’s government. In the legislation area, it


The overall status from the perspec-tive of execution of rights of minority groups’ members to use their mother tongue today is still worse than before amendments initiated by Fico’s ruling coalition.

has involved mainly laws related to the status of minority groups, even though the correction has been up until now rather partial. For instance, parliament has passed the amendment of state Language Act, which softened several regulations of the amendment of this same law adopted during Fico’s rule which had had distinctly restrictive character towards the rights of minority groups’ members to use their mother tongue. The new amendment, however, has kept the most controversial regulation – fines for breaching the law, even though it has canceled its mandatory character and has lowered the limits of fines. The case of the amendment of a state Language Act is an illustrative example of how complicated the restoration to the original state is that had existed before inappropriate legislative changes. Although some problematic regulations of the amendment adopted during Fico’s rule have been finally removed, the overall status from the perspective of execution of rights of minority groups’ members to use their mother tongue today is still worse than before amendments initiated by Fico’s ruling coalition.

Also the amendment of the state Citizenship Act has been submitted to parliament. In case of being passed, it would eliminate the possibility to be involuntary deprived of the slovak citizenship for those citizens of slovakia who acquired the citizenship of a foreign state. with this legislation Fico’s government in summer 2010 reacted to the amendment of a state Citizenship Act passed by the hungarian parliament. The proposal for the hungarian amendment was made by the ruling party Fidesz. The amendment of Radičová’s cabinet should have annulled the validity of the hungarian law on the slovakia’s territory and should have revoked the fees for not informing the authorities about acquiring of foreign state citizenship introduced by Fico’s government. Alongside the positive effect on inter-ethnic relations in slovakia and status of members of hungarian minority, the aforementioned amendment might, in case of being passed, contribute to the continuing improvement of bilateral relationship between slovakia and hungary.


RULING COALITION vS. OPPOSITION: ShOWDOWN

The situation in the new ruling coalition was relatively stable in the second half of 2010. no serious conflicts were registered. Relations between the ruling parties were well-balanced, no party aspired for dominance. Although the leader of opposition Fico was continuously repeating that the ruling coalition was in fact zlepenec (an-organic glued-together bunch of things), held together only by the desire of power, in reality the program-based accordance of the four parties in the fundamental issues of practical politics proved to be a very strong bond, which made it possible to pass 53 laws and amendments of laws in parliament during four months from August to December 2010 virtually without any hesitations.

Due to the inexperience of some political newcomers, especially from the sas party, information about compli-cated negotiations on reaching a coalition consensus sometimes was leaked into the media before an agreement had been reached. This was making an impression as if there was a chaos in coalition. After reaching the principle agreement about support of submitted legislation proposals, however, these were then passed smoothly in parliament. The only exception was the amendment of the excise tax on beer, when four mps from KDh, surprisingly even to their own party, abstained during the voting. The amendment thus was not passed. Coalition cooperation, however, was not weakened by this minute hesitation.

The special case has been the situation within sDKÚ-Ds and relations between Iveta Radičová, prime minister and

deputy of this party, and mikuláš Dzurinda, chairman of the party and minister of Foreign Affairs. After both of them have become members of the new cabinet, considerations and speculations have started to arise as to whether it would have caused “sparkling”

between two politicians and whether the different mutual subordination, one inside the party and another inside the government, would have led to tension and conflicts. nothing of that kind, however, has occurred yet. Radičová has been repeatedly emphasizing that she has not been having any ambitions to become the chairperson of the

Speculations have started to arise as to whether the different mutual sub-ordination, Dzurinda inside the party and Radičová inside the government, would have led to tension and conflicts.


party at this time and that she is fully supporting Dzurinda in remaining in his post. Dzurinda, reciprocally, has been continuously repeating that from his position of chairman he is unconditionally supporting Radičová as prime minister and that by doing so he is also expressing the position of the entire party. Fico, though, claims that Radičová is a weak prime minister in comparison to himself during 2006-2010 electoral term, since she is not chairperson of her party as he has been. however the reality is quite different. In certain situations Radičová has shown to her coalition partners from sas, KDh and most-híd and to the members of the government that she has taken full responsibility for being prime minister with all the competences that go with it. she has been using these competences in such a way that no one has had doubts as to who is being the leader of coalition and government. she has several times sharply revised ministers of her government when deciding about concrete measures, and with no regard to these revisions being always well justified, she has demonstrated her strong political position very clearly.

Alongside the program-based accord among the current coalition parties, there has been another strong bond within the ruling coalition: the existence smer-sD, the common political rival with strong power-based ambitions. The profile of this party and the results of its rule are well known to the current ruling parties. All of the center-right formations concordantly continue to refuse any possible coalition cooperation with smer-sD. They also realize very well that any kind of enfeeblement in their unity would play out well for Fico who believes in effectiveness of his own populist promises, being compelling to his voters, and in case of some turbulences within ruling coalition he would rely on his important ally – president Gašparovič who was elected in 2009 with support of smer-sD and until now was always loyal to this party.

since Fico’s initial expectations that the ruling coalition in its current composition will not be able to last long have not been fulfilled, the opposition leader has changed rhetoric and started to openly express his preparedness to create a “big coalition” with center-right parties, including sDKÚ-Ds. Despite the fact that sDKÚ-Ds has adopted

All of the center-right formations conti-nue to refuse any coalition cooperation with Smer-SD. They also realize very well that any kind of enfeeblement in their unity would play out well for Fico.


ĽS-hzDS did not reach five per cent threshold to get into parliament and SNS is fighting for political survival. Fico’s Smer-SD thus is jeopardized to stay alone in opposition also after the elections in 2014.

the provision about refusal of coalition cooperation with smer-sD on its last congress in December 2010, it did not discourage him from making such announcements, whereas sDKÚ-Ds chairman Dzurinda has labeled this party as “a bunch of corrupted communists”.

nobody in the current ruling coalition, obviously, is ready to offer coalition cooperation to smer-sD, so all of Fico’s talks about a “big right-left coalition” are a mere bluff. The only intention of these talks is to create an illusion that smer-sD is a standard program-based party with a wide coalition potential. It has been shown that nationalist and populist excesses of smer-sD as a ruling party has decreased its potential to make coalition alliances with

program-moderate parties to such an extent, that its only potential coalition allies might have been parties like mečiar’s authoritarian Ľs-hZDs or slota’s radical-nationalist sns, with whom Fico had ruled during 2006-2010 electoral term. mečiar’s party, however, did

not reach five per cent threshold to get into parliament and sns is fighting for political survival on the background of harsh intra-party conflicts and considerable drop in voters’ preferences almost under five per cent threshold. Fico’s smer-sD thus is jeopardized to stay alone in opposition also after the elections in 2014.

ThE ELECTION OF A PROSECUTOR GENERAL: COALITION ON ThE EDGE OF DOWNFALL

Efficient politics of the new government, especially the smooth passing of the laws in parliament, obviously does not necessarily mean that the center-right coalition is not exposed to real problems in its inner functioning. The test of coalition unity was the problematic prosecutor general’s election in parliament in December 2010. It was, from the political point of view, an exceptionally significant case, when quite unexpectedly and to the big surprise of the new ruling coalition itself, the new cabinet came near its own collapse due to the result of the election.

The electoral term for the incumbent general prosecutor Dobroslav Trnka expired in February 2011. According to the Constitution, the prosecutor general is to be elected


in parliament, then to be sworn in by the president. Due to the differences between ruling coalition and opposition, but also due to differing stances of ruling parties among themselves about a candidate (ruling parties had proposed two candidates at first) the prosecutor had not been elected in parliament in the first round. he has not been elected in the second round either, when ruling coalition has proposed only one common candidate and parliamentary opposition has pursued the reelection of the incumbent prosecutor general Trnka, whereas for the successful reelection in the ballot only one more vote has been needed. The results of the ballot have revealed that at least six ruling coalition mps voted for the opposition candidate, whereas no delegates of ruling parties neither before, nor after the ballot have publicly presented the support for Trnka.

unexpected result of the ballot was even more startling, since prime minister Radičová publicly declared before the election that she would have resigned if prosecutor general Trnka had been reelected – which according to the Constitution automatically means resignation of the entire government. Trnka’s remaining in the post for another electoral term would be according to Radičová in contra-diction with the commitment to bring principal changes to judiciary. According to the prime minister, the incumbent prosecutor general who had demonstrated passivity in investigation of certain politically sensitive cases (or sometimes, conversely, had actively contributed to mar the investigation), cannot be the symbol of change. The fact, that only one more vote was needed for the reelection of Trnka during the second round of the ballot has shown that without any obvious political reasons, without the intra-coalition crisis, only due to some hidden internal political manipulations, the government of Radičová and the new ruling coalition could have ceased its existence.

hardly anyone had doubted before the election that Radičová would fulfill her promise to resign in case of Trnka having been reelected. If that was the case after all, the probability of forming a four parties’ center-right coalition would be slim at best. smer-sD leader Fico would have certainly played the political game with his loyal ally,

Without any obvious political reasons, without the intra-coalition crisis, only due to some hidden internal political manipulations, the government of Radičová could have ceased its exis-tence.


Fico had been calculating with Radi- čová’s resignation. That did not happen. The ruling coalition’s failure, however, paradoxically, has not undermined its unity.

president Gašparovič, goal of which would have been the gradual return to power, in certain circumstances also via premature elections.

Fico was, however, washing his hands during impatient expectation of such a development little prematurely. After

the announcement of the results of the ballot he allegedly blanched. probably on the basis of clandestine internal information, he had been calculating with Radičová’s resignation. That did not happen. The ruling coalition’s

failure, however, paradoxically, has not undermined its unity. Conversely, it has created an even stronger bond. It has led the coalition to the decision to change the election method and introduce the public voting instead of the secret one. Although this decision has created various reactions (opposition subjected it to harsh criticism), representatives of ruling coalition have been claiming that in parliamentary democracy based on principles of public politics, the principle of public openness in executing the mp’s mandate should not have had any exceptions, especially not in electing the public officials. Government representatives have stated that the ballot method should have been without any reservations applicable for citizens in executing their suffrage, but elected representatives of citizens should have been executing their mandate as transparently as possible and information about their voting in laws passing and in electing officials should have been publicly accessible, so that citizens would be able to adequately evaluate the activity of their mps. As the reaction of opposition having been accusing the ruling coalition that the change in election method to being public is denying the principle of democracy, coalition politicians have stated that introducing public voting in electing officials in parliament does not limit mps’ decision in voting, as well as it does not limit the mps’ public voting in passing laws.

The case of unsuccessful election of the prosecutor general has revealed the real risk of behind-the-scenes machina-tions with corrupted background. since the speculations that the decision of the six coalition mps to support the candidate of opposition could be related to corruption have been expressed by mps themselves, then in this situation


The announced intention to reduce the number of electoral terms for general prosecutor to just one, thus making it less prone to politicizations, would have to be anchored by the law.

the change from ballot to public voting may have a positive anticorruption effect. Another potentially positive aspect of the prosecutor general’s election may be the intention of ruling coalition to amend his competences and to bring the system of prosecution, built on inorganic – for the liberal democracy – monocratic principle, closer to modern constitutionalism, even though the entire restructuring of the prosecution’s system may probably need more time. The positive effect may also be the announced intention to reduce the number of electoral terms for general prosecutor to just one, thus making it less prone to politicizations. This intention would have to be anchored by the law.

The prosecutor general’s election has set the mirror not only to ruling coalition, which possesses some disloyal mps, but also to parliamentary opposition, viewpoints of which have been confirming that the constitutional framework scope of the liberal democracy seems too narrow. The warning signal that the most powerful opposition party smer-sD would have been able under certain circumstances to leave the constitutional frame was the announcement of Fico that in case of changing the method of the prosecutor general’s election, smer-sD might proceed in accordance with Article 32 of the Constitution: “The citizens shall have the right to resist anyone who would abolish the democratic order of human rights and freedoms set in this Constitution, if the activities of constitutional authorities and the effective application of legal means are restrained.” Announcement of the intention to “activate” the aforementioned Article of the Constitution in the situation, when there is no any “abolishing of the democratic order of human rights and freedoms”, but only due to the party’s disagreement with submitted proposition for legitimate and legal change of existing legislative standards is raising questions as to what extent is the internal character and overall political constellation of opposition smer-sD in accordance with values and principles of the liberal democracy.


Fico’s government had promised to approve the loan to Greece, but before the elections it had hesitated to sub-mit the loan contract to parliament for ratification.

LOAN TO GREECE: FICO’S LEGACY TRAPS

One of the most extraordinary steps of the new slovak government has been a rejection to provide the loan to Greece in terms of European union mechanism of eurozone bailout. This entire case was the result of several factors playing out, mostly of intra-political character.

The former government of Fico had promised to approve the loan to Greece, it had even negotiated the conditions with brussels, but before the elections in June it had hesitated

to submit the loan contract to parliament for ratification. It had proceeded quite arrogantly towards the opposition, which had demanded to release its conditions and had insisted on calling a separate parliamentary session. This session was, however, marred by the ruling coalition of smer-sD, sns and Ľs-hZDs, since it had the majority in parliament. when the polls showed that the general public had not been supportive in helping Greece, Fico as an authentic populist tried to sweep the whole problem under the carpet in order not to unnecessarily irritate his voters. he had claimed that the new government would have been handling that after the elections. who knows how things would have wound up if the new government had been consisting of smer-sD? we will never find out.

After the elections, the government has been composed by four center-right parties, and they rejected the loan for Greece. They did so because during the pre-election race they had put themselves into a big conflict with smer-sD, which they had accused of not negotiating with the opposition about such a significant issue, hiding the actual conditions of helping Greece from the general public. They further criticised that during negotiations in brussels, the government had not utilized the opportunity to influence the parameters of eurozone bailout mechanism.

According to the center-right parties, Fico had played the dual role, as an opportunistic extras in brussels and as a buck passer then in slovakia. The opposition had promised before elections that, if they managed to take over the power, they would reevaluate the conditions of helping Greece and should they discover, that those conditions


Several experts claim that the poten-tial positive economical effect of the decision to refuse to help Greece will be much weaker than the impact of Slovak’s deteriorated image.

were inconvenient for the country, they would refuse to help. The economy experts of the opposition parties have been showing that slovakia as a less developed post-communist country with weaker macroeconomic indicators cannot fulfill the role of a donor to a more developed country like Greece. After taking over the power by the center-right parties, the new government has announced that slovak economy after four years of Fico’s populist rule has been in worse state than the opposition had been expecting before elections. The growth of GDp had dramatically dropped in comparison to previous years and had reached negative numbers. The deficit of state budget had risen to almost eight per cent. Except that, the representatives of the new government have claimed that the Eu had not taken into consideration all aspects while deciding about the Greek bailout. According to them, Greece had allegedly performed a moral hazard with its public finances in previous years. Radičová’s government thus adopted a resolution that the loan to Greece would not have been provided. The government, however, has joined the European Financial stability Facility.

The cabinet has submitted the Greek loan contract to parliament in August 2010, which Fico had at the very last moment put in the drawer. As expected, the mps of ruling coalition have rejected the contract (with an exception of one mp of KDh). however, the voting of smer-sD mps, which had been accusing the new government of breaching the agreement negotiated by the former government with Eu, has been symptomatic. not a single mp of smer-sD has voted for this contract: the entire fraction simply not participated in voting.

The decision of the new government to refuse to help Greece has met with support of the majority of country’s population. however, several experts and influential intel-lectuals have pointed out its problematic sides. They claim that the potential positive economical effect of this decision will be much weaker than the possible negative impact of country’s deteriorated image, refraining due to the intra-political reasons from basic principles of solidarity on which Eu has been built.


WhAT NExT?

what are the perspectives for future development? There are indications that in 2011 the new ruling coalition should be able to preserve the degree of internal consolidation it achieved shortly after it took over power and adopted initial practical measures. however, public support for this administration will directly depend on its success in tackling the most pressing social problems and its ability to explain certain unpopular but inevitable measures to citizens.

smer-sD is a formidable political rival that will undoubtedly use all displays of discontent to undermine the pro-reform government’s position and create favorable conditions for its own return to power. but this tactic may not be successful, provided that the new ruling coalition avoids enervating internal conflicts, resists the temptation of cronyism and prefers matter-of-fact solutions aimed at improving socio-economic situation of those citizens the opposition considers its potential voters.

Article current as at 7th February 2011.

Documents

KAS International Reports 04/2011