kant.2007.008

156 Claudia M. Schmidt

Kants Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic,and Moral Anthropology

by Claudia M. Schmidt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Kants critical philosophy is often regarded as standing in a problematic relationto his works in anthropology, or the study of human nature. In the Preface tothe second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant describes his critical projectas a Copernican turn toward the cognitive subject, which might seem to signala reorientation of philosophy around anthropology.1 However, both in the firstCritique and in his subsequent works he relegates empirical anthropology andpractical or moral anthropology to the sidelines of his critical projects in cog-nitive and practical philosophy. Yet Kants formulation of his critical philosophy co-incided almost exactly with the development of his interest in anthropology. Duringthe 1770s, the silent decade in which he formulated his critical philosophy, Kantinitiated a course on anthropology at the University of Knigsberg. This course wasamong the most popular in his regular schedule, and he offered it annually for twen-ty-five years until his retirement. He then published a revised version of his lecturesas the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, a text that is one of his mostaccessible publications, and might even seem uncharacteristically loose and anecdo-tal to readers of his other works. Kant also published a number of shorter works onanthropological topics during this period, and even suggested, in several scatteredremarks, that anthropology in some way encompasses all of the philosophical dis-ciplines.

Many of the difficulties involved in considering the relation of Kants critical phil-osophy to his anthropological works, and also in interpreting the Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View, may be addressed by distinguishing between sev-eral different anthropological projects in his writings.2 In this article I argue that

1 See KrV: B XVI, XXIIn.2 Two earlier monographs have argued for the pervasive role of anthropology in Kants vari-

ous writings. Van de Pitte claims that Kant outlines a complete anthropology, with hiscritical philosophy serving as the pure philosophical core of his fully developed conceptionof man, and mans place in reality. He then traces Kants treatment of human nature,especially the moral vocation of the human species, as an unfolding theme in his later works,though without the precise delineation of the different aspects of Kants approach that I amdeveloping here. See Van de Pitte, Frederick: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist. TheHague 1971, 3 and 116. Firla distinguishes between empirical, transcendental, and appliedanthropology in Kants writings, and shows how these may be related to the different as-pects of his moral philosophy. However, her treatment of transcendental anthropology is

Kant-Studien 98. Jahrg., S. 156182 DOI 10.1515/KANT.2007.008 Walter de Gruyter 2007ISSN 0022-8877

Kants Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 157

during his critical period Kant developed four distinct but interrelated anthropo-logical projects, which I call transcendental, empirical, pragmatic, and moral an-thropology. In the first section I introduce this analysis by tracing the developmentof Kants anthropological interests, as reflected in his published and unpublishedwritings starting in the 1770s. In the subsequent four sections I examine his four an-thropological projects as they are presented in his various writings. I also considersome of the questions concerning Kants conception and execution of these projectsthat arise from the study of these texts.3

1. Kants Study of Anthropology

Kants interest in anthropology developed gradually during the middle of his ca-reer. His early writings of the 1740s and 1750s were mainly concerned with generalmetaphysics and the principles of the natural sciences, although he occasionallyconsidered questions concerning human nature.4 However, while reading Rousseauand the British moralists in the 1760s, he began to explore topics more directly con-cerned with human nature, including aesthetics, psychology, and moral theory.5 To-

limited mainly to Kants discussions of the original predispositions in human nature to-ward various types of action. See Firla, Monika: Untersuchungen zum Verhltnis von An-thropologie und Moralphilosophie bei Kant. Frankfurt a. M. 1981. In my view, both Firlaand Van de Pitte overlook Kants account of the specifically human dimension of the self-knowledge of understanding and reason in his critical philosophy of cognition, which I in-clude in his transcendental anthropology (AA 15: 395). For an earlier and more generaltreatment of Kants philosophical anthropology see Hinske, Norbert: Kants Idee der An-thropologie. In: Die Frage nach dem Menschen. Edited by Heinrich Rombach. Freiburg1966, 410427.

3 Two important volumes on Kants anthropology appeared after this article was accepted forpublication, and thus too late for me to consider here with the detail that they merit: Frier-son, Patrick R.: Freedom and Anthropology in Kants Moral Philosophy. New York 2003;and Essays on Kants Anthropology. Edited by Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain. New York2003.

4 See Werkmeister, W. H.: Changes in Kants Metaphysical Conception of Man. In: IdealisticStudies 5, 1975, 97107; and Antonopoulos, Georges: Lvolution de limage de lhomme chezKant, depuis les premiers crits jusqu lOpus postumum. In: LAnne 1798: Kant et la Naiss-ance de lAnthropologie au Sicle des Lumires. Edited by Jean Ferrari. Paris 1997, 6571.

5 For an intriguing account of Kants activities in the 1760s, including the shifts in his intel-lectual interests and his changing view of his academic vocation, see Zammito, John H.:Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Chicago 2002, 83135 and 179219. ForKants response to Rousseau see Van de Pitte: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist, 4969;Lafrance, Guy: De Rousseau Kant, propos do lanthropologie. In: LAnne 1798, ed.Ferarri, 3341; Geonget, Brigitte: Linfluence de J.-J. Rousseau sur Kant: mythe ou ralit?In: LAnne 1798, ed. Ferrari, 4346; and Kuehn, Manfred: Kant: A Biography. Cambridge2001. On the influence of various British philosophers in eighteenth century Germanthought see Beck, Lewis White: Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors. Cam-bridge, MA 1969, 306339; and Kuehn, Manfred: Scottish Common Sense in Germany,17681800. Kingston, ON 1989.


ward the end of 1773, Kant reported in a letter to Marcus Herz that he had inau-gurated a course in anthropology at Knigsberg during the winter semester of1772/73, as a counterpart to his popular lectures in another empirical discipline,physical geography.6 Kant presented the anthropology course regularly to largeaudiences until his retirement in 1797, and then published the Anthropology froma Pragmatic Point of View in 1798, with a second edition in 1800.7 Kants work inanthropology therefore coincides almost exactly with the development of his criticalphilosophy, from his critical turn in the early 1770s, through the publication ofhis three Critiques and related works in the 1780s and 1790s.8 The evolution ofKants approach to anthropology is also reflected in a number of his manuscripts[Nachlass], including his personal notes [Reflexionen] and lecture notes [Collegent-wrfe]; and also in the succession of lecture transcripts [Nachschriften] that werecompiled and circulated by members of his audience over the years.9 He also pub-lished a number of shorter works in the 1780s and 1790s on various anthropologi-cal topics, including physiology, medicine, heredity, race, psychology, history, andpedagogy.

However, Kants most dramatic references to the significance of anthropology ap-pear in a few enigmatic unpublished remarks from the 1770s to the 1790s. First,in a Reflexion dated by Adickes to around 17761778,10 Kant distinguishes the out-

6 Br, AA 10: 145146. Students entered the university around the age of sixteen, and univer-sity lecturers at the lower rank [Privatdozenten] were paid directly by the students ratherthan the university, so it was in Kants interest as a young lecturer to offer accessible courseswith a wide appeal. However, he continued and expanded his popular lectures even after hisappointment in 1770 as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Knigs-berg. See Kuehn: Kant: A Biography, 6186, 105110, 204218, 406408.

7 The most intensive study of this text is Brandt, Reinhard: Kritischer Kommentar zu KantsAnthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798). Hamburg 1999. Brandt regards the An-thropology is a coherent project in which Kant is presenting an empirical study of humannature that is directed toward pragmatic purposes, which are in turn subordinated to themoral vocation of the human species. However, Brandt denies that Kant adds anything tohis transcendental philosophy in this text. See Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 720.

8 On the development of Kants anthropological interests, and on the response to his lecturesand writings in anthropology, see Malter, Rudolf: Anhang II. In: Kant, Immanuel: Anthro-pologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Edited by Karl Vorlnder, 7th ed. Hamburg 1980,315375. See also Van de Pitte: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist; Brandt: KritischerKommentar, 748; Wood, Allen W.: Kants Ethical Thought. Cambridge 1999, 193336;and Louden, Robert B.: Kants Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings.New York 2000, 62106.

9 See the Collegentwrfe on anthropology (AA 15: III), and the extensive selections from theNachschriften on Kants anthropology course, which have recently (1997) been added to theAcademy Edition (AA 25: III). For an engaging account of such transcripts, and their placein the student culture of Knigsberg, see Ameriks, Karl and Naragon, Steve: TranslatorsIntroduction. In: Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics. Cambridge 1997, XIIIXLIII.For a discussion of the anthropology transcripts see Brandt, Reinhard and Stark, Werner:Einleitung der Herausgeber. AA 25: I, VIICLI.

10 See AA 14: XLXLI.


look of someone who has extensive but unreflective knowledge in any particulardiscipline, which he calls cyclopic knowledge, from someone who also has theperspective provided by critical philosophy:

Not the strength, but the one-eyed-ness here makes the Cyclop. It is also not enough, to knowmany other sciences, but the self-knowledge of understanding and reason. Anthropologiatranscendentalis.11

Here Kant characterizes the self-knowledge of human cognition as transcenden-tal anthropology, although he does not explain this expression or use it in his pub-lished works. Next, at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, he summa-rizes the interests of our reason, including both the speculative and the practical, inthree questions: What can I know?, What should I do? and What may Ihope?12. In a 1793 letter to C. F. Studlin, describing the plan underlying his sys-tem of pure philosophy, he adds a fourth question: What is a human being?, andnotes that this question pertains to anthropology, on which I have lectured an-nually for more than 20 years.13 In his lectures on logic from the 1790s, includingthe version edited by Jsche for publication in 1800, Kant restates these four ques-tions, and then adds that we could regard all of these inquiries as belonging to an-thropology, since the first three questions are related to the last one.14 Finally, in anote in his unfinished final manuscript, he writes that the system of rational knowl-edge arising from transcendental philosophy is required if one would not make therational human being a being that does not know itself.15

2. Transcendental Anthropology

In this article I adopt Kants phrase transcendental anthropology, from the Re-flexion cited above, to designate his account of the a priori principles of rationality

11 AA 15: 395. Nicht die Strke, sondern das einugigte macht hier den Cyclop. Es ist auchnicht gnug, viel andre Wissenschaften zu wissen, sondern die Selbsterkentnis des Verstandesund der Vernunft. Anthropologia transscendentalis. Cf. Anth, AA 07: 227. On this Re-flexion see Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 17; and Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 66f. and199 n. 3.

12 KrV: A 804805/B 832833.13 Br, AA 11: 429. Mein schon seit geraumer Zeit gemachter Plan der mir obliegenden Bear-

beitung des Feldes der reinen Philosophie ging auf die Auflsung der drei Aufgaben: 1) Waskann ich wissen? (Metaphysik) 2) Was soll ich thun? (Moral) 3) Was darf ich hoffen? (Re-ligion); welcher zuletzt die vierte folgen sollte: Was ist der Mensch? (Anthropologie; berdie ich schon seit mehr als 20 Jahren jhrlich ein Collegium gelesen habe).

14 Log, AA 09: 25; cf. AA 28: 533534. For the textual history of the latter passage from the L2transcript of Kants metaphysics lectures, including its probable derivation from a transcriptof his logic lectures, see Ameriks and Naragon: Translators Introduction to ImmanuelKant: Lectures on Metaphysics, XXXf.

15 OP, AA 21: 7. [] wenn man nicht den Vernunftigen Menschen nicht zu einem sich selbstkennenden Wesen machen will.


insofar as these belong to a specifically human subject.16 In the Critique of PureReason Kant introduces the term transcendental for the element of our cognitionthat is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition ofobjects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.17 Kant himself uses this word in hisanalysis of cognition, but not his account of practical reason. However, I will usethe term transcendental anthropology more broadly, to include not only the apriori structure of cognition, but also the a priori structure of volition or practicalrationality in the human subject: that is, the subjective but universal and necessaryconditions that must be presupposed for human moral experience.18

Many of Kants critics since the eighteenth century have objected to what theyregard as his exclusion of any distinctively human traits from the transcendentalsubject of cognition and volition.19 However, in this section we will see that Kantdoes indeed include a transcendental anthropology, in the sense I have indicated, inthe Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and in his criti-cal moral philosophy.20

First, Kant describes the human character of the transcendental subject of cogni-tion in the Critique of Pure Reason by identifying a variety of distinctive and irre-ducible characteristics of the a priori structures of human cognition, as disclosedthrough his transcendental analysis. In the Introduction he maintains that a com-plete system of transcendental philosophy would contain an exhaustive analysis of

16 This phrase is also used by Nobbe to describe Kants account, in the third Critique, of theunity of the human being as the transcendental subject of cognition and action. Nobbe,Frank: Kants Frage nach dem Menschen: Die Kritik der sthetischen Urteilskraft als tran-szendentale Anthropologie. Frankfurt a. M. 1995. As noted above, Firla uses this phrasemainly for Kants account of the original predispositions to different types of action, inFirla: Untersuchungen, 3969. My use of this phrase is parallel to Kitchers use of tran-scendental psychology for Kants account of the a priori principles of cognition belongingto the transcendental subject. However, my usage and analysis differ from hers by explicitlyregarding Kants cognitive subject as a human being, and also by encompassing the practicalas well as cognitive faculties of the human subject. See Kitcher, Patricia: Kants Transcen-dental Psychology. Oxford 1990, especially 329.

17 KrV: B 25. Ich nenne alle Erkenntni transscendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegen-stnden, sondern mit unserer Erkenntniart von Gegenstnden, so fern diese a priori mg-lich sein soll, berhaupt beschftigt. Cf. KrV: A 11; KU, AA 05: 181182.

18 For an earlier instance of the use of the word transcendental to characterize Kants puremoral philosophy see Beck, Lewis White: A Commentary on Kants Critique of PracticalReason. Chicago 1960, 9n and 262n.

19 See for example Williams, Forrest: Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aes-thetic Judgment. In: Kant-Studien 46, 19541955, 172178; and Weiler, Gershon: KantsQuestion What Is Man? In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10, 1980, 123.

20 For a similar argument see Rescher, Nicholas: Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies inKants Theory of Rational Systematization. Cambridge 2000, 6498. Rescher emphasizesthe apparent contingency of the principles of human cognition in Kants account. However,I would argue that this contingency is mitigated by Kants description of the transcendentalprinciples of cognition as conditions that are necessary for the possibility of experience; orconditions that must structure the cognition of any being, human or non-human, whosecognition may be described as experience.


all of human cognition a priori.21 He then identifies sensibility and understand-ing as the two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a com-mon but to us unknown root. These provide the a priori conditions under whichthe objects of human cognition are first given and then thought.22 In the Tran-scendental Aesthetic he describes spatial and temporal intuition as a mode of per-ceiving objects which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarilypertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being.23 Simi-larly, in the Transcendental Analytic he argues that the activity of every humanunderstanding is a cognition through concepts, which is not intuitive but dis-cursive.24 The task of transcendental philosophy is to trace the pure concepts ofcognition to their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding.25

The table of categories provides a complete system of these pure concepts, as foundin human understanding.26 In the Deduction Kant describes the a priori combi-nation of representations in the transcendental unity of apperception as the highestprinciple in the whole of human cognition,27 and identifies the pure imagin-ation, which grounds all cognition a priori, as a fundamental faculty of thehuman soul.28 Finally, he argues in the Transcendental Dialectic that human rea-son produces a system of transcendent concepts and dialectical inferences, in its in-evitable attempt to apply its principles of understanding and inference beyond thelimits of any possible experience.29

Kant also indicates in these passages that other types of rational beings might notpossess our structures of intuition or discursive understanding.30 First, we cannot

21 KrV: A 13/B 27. [] eine ausfhrliche Analysis der ganzen menschlichen Erkenntni apriori [].

22 KrV: A 15/B 29. Nur so viel scheint zur Einleitung oder Vorerinnerung nthig zu sein, daes zwei Stmme der menschlichen Erkenntni gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaft-lichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nmlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durchderen ersteren uns Gegenstnde gegeben, durch den zweiten aber gedacht werden.

23 KrV: A 42/B 59. Wir kennen nichts als unsere Art, sie wahrzunehmen, die uns eigenthm-lich ist, die auch nicht nothwendig jedem Wesen, obzwar jedem Menschen, zukommenmu.

24 KrV: A 68/B 93. Also ist die Erkenntni eines jeden, wenigstens des menschlichen Ver-standes eine Erkenntni durch Begriffe, nicht intuitiv, sondern discursiv.

25 KrV: A 66/B 91. Wir werden also die reinen Begriffe bis zu ihren ersten Keimen und An-lagen im menschlichen Verstande verfolgen [].

26 KrV: B 109f. [] ja selbst die Form eines Systems derselben im menschlichen Verstande en-thlt [].

27 KrV: B 135. [] welcher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen menschlichen Erkenntni ist.28 KrV: A 124. Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft als ein Grundvermgen der men-

schlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntni a priori zum Grunde liegt.29 KrV: A 309/B 366. [] das wird unser Geschfte in der transscendentalen Dialektik sein,

welche wir jetzt aus ihren Quellen, die tief in der menschlichen Vernunft verborgen sind,entwickeln wollen. Cf. KrV: A VII.

30 Among the possible non-human types of rational beings, Kant notes that we can imagineother terrestrial rational beings (Anth, AA 07: 322), different finite rational beings on otherplanets (KrV: A 825/B 853, Anth, AA 07: 332f, KU, AA 05: 467), immaterial rational spirits


judge if the intuitions of other thinking beings are limited by the same formal con-ditions that give intuitions universal validity for human beings.31 Next, we can-not explain the peculiarity of our understanding in operating only by means ofthe categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, any morethan we are able to explain the logical functions of judgment, or why space and timeshould be the forms of our sensible intuition.32 A rational being that does not pos-sess our types of intuition would not use these categories to engage in discursiveunderstanding, since the categories are applied to objects as intuited in time andspace.33 Kant does not consider whether there could be a type of discursive under-standing that does not intuit objects as given in space and time, or if the logicalforms of judgment that govern our understanding would govern this type of discur-sive cognition. However, he indicates that we ourselves cannot conceive of a differ-ent type of intuition or understanding, and that a different type of cognition couldnot properly be called experience.34

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant distinguishes between mere ani-mals, a merely rational being, and a human being, by their capacities for respondingto sensual pleasure, goodness, and beauty. Thus, while sensual pleasure can be en-joyed by animals, and goodness can be recognized by rational beings, beauty can beappreciated only by a being who possesses both a sensuous and a rational nature;and, accordingly, only by human beings among the objects of our experience.35 Kantalso attributes to human beings the unique ability, among all the objects in our ex-perience, to set purposes for ourselves, arising from our capacities for cognition andaction.36 As human beings, we also have a cognitive disposition to organize our rep-resentations of different laws of nature according to the concept of a purposiveorder, which is prescribed as a transcendental principle by reflective judgment. Kantregards this ascription of purposiveness to nature as a contingent operation ofhuman cognition, although one that is required by the human understanding inorder to account for the conformity between its pure concepts, which are given apriori; and particular sets of resembling connections in nature, which are given to usempirically. Finally, the more specific concept of a natural end, through which weexplain the functional operations of an organism, arises from a peculiarity of

(KU, AA 05: 467468), and God (KrV: A 578591, 631642/B 606619, 659670; KpV,AA 05: 124141; KU, AA 05: 482484). On Kants view of the possibility of extraterrestriallife see Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 188 n. 30 and 212 n. 89.

31 See KrV: A 27/B 43.32 KrV: B 145f. Von der Eigenthmlichkeit unsers Verstandes aber, nur vermittelst der Kate-

gorien und nur gerade durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperception a priorizu Stande zu bringen, lt sich eben so wenig ferner ein Grund angeben, als warum wir ge-rade diese und keine andere Functionen zu Urtheilen haben, oder warum Zeit und Raum dieeinzigen Formen unserer mglichen Anschauung sind.

33 See KrV: B 146152.34 KrV: A 230231/B 283.35 See KU, AA 05: 210.36 See KU, AA 05: 233, 431436.


human understanding, since a possible non-human understanding might be able toexplain all natural objects and events as products of a mechanistic system, withoutreferring to the concept of a purposive structure.37

Kant thus attributes all of the a priori conditions of objective cognition specifi-cally to the structure of human subjectivity: indicating that, while these conditionsare universal for our own species, other conscious beings might have other types ofcognition. However, since Kant also describes the human principles of cognition asconditions for the possibility of experience, the cognition of these other beingscould not be called experience.38

As I am using the phrase, Kants transcendental anthropology also includes hisaccount of the a priori conditions of practical reason, as these belong to a humansubject. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argues that the power of choice [Willkr]in a human being is affected, but not necessitated, by the sensuous impulses that weshare with non-rational animals. This is because human beings, as rational agents,also attribute to ourselves a capacity for self-determination, independently of the in-fluences of these impulses, in the requirement of reason by which we formulate theconcept of an ought and prescribe it to ourselves.39

This argument seems to indicate an inconsistency in Kants view of humanagency, as presented respectively in his systems of theoretical and practical philos-ophy. In his critical theoretical philosophy, Kant argues that all human actions maybe explained as determined by the empirical character of a person with the co-op-erating influence of other causes, according to the order of nature; and may there-fore be predicted with certainty, presumably according to the methods and findingsof empirical anthropology.40 By contrast, practical freedom would be the capacityto determine ones own actions apart from the empirical causes that operate withinthe deterministic system of nature. In the first Critique Kant concludes that we can-not prove the reality, or even the possibility, of practical freedom in human agents,since practical freedom does not conform to the a priori conditions of theoreticalcognition. He concludes, however, that this analysis does not rule out the possibilitythat human freedom can be proven on practical grounds, but merely provides a the-oretical framework in which practical freedom is shown not to conflict with naturalnecessity.41

In the Groundwork Kant describes the human being as an organism that is nat-urally endowed, not only with rational cognition, but also with the capacity to act

37 KU, AA 05: 405. Es betrifft also eine Eigenthmlichkeit unseres (menschlichen) Verstandesin Ansehung der Urtheilskraft in der Reflexion derselben ber Dinge der Natur. Cf. AA 05:179181.

38 KrV: A 230231/B 283.39 KrV: A 534, 547548/B 562, 575576.40 KrV: A 549/B 577. [] so sind alle Handlungen des Menschen in der Erscheinung aus sei-

nem empirischen Charakter und den mitwirkenden anderen Ursachen nach der Ordnungder Natur bestimmt [].

41 See KrV: A 532558/B 560586.


in accordance with the representation of laws.42 This capacity is called the will[Wille]: and, since reason is the faculty by which we derive an action from a law, thewill may also be called practical reason. The purpose of practical reason is not toenable us to satisfy the subjective inclinations arising from our animal nature, but tobring about a good will by judging and directing the maxims of our actions accord-ing to moral imperatives. However, the power of choice in human beings is never in-fallibly determined by pure practical reason, but can yield to our inclinations, or ourspecially constituted faculty of desire.43

As we have seen, in the first Critique Kant argues that theoretical cognition is un-able to establish the reality, or even the possibility, of human freedom. However,in his critical writings in practical philosophy Kant argues that as a rational agentI must regard my actions as free. In the Groundwork, he argues that I must regardmyself as free because I think of myself as able to act according to principles gener-ated by my reason.44 In the second Critique, he argues that I must regard myself asfree because I prescribe to myself the moral law, as a principle that often requires meto act against my inclinations.45 In both texts, however, Kant again maintains thathuman freedom can never be the object of theoretical cognition, but can only bepresupposed as a condition of rational volition or pure practical reason.46 We arethus required to regard the human being from two points of view: as an appear-ance or an object of empirical cognition; and also as an intelligible being or prac-tical subject. We may accordingly distinguish between the empirical and the intelli-gible aspect of a human individual, or between homo phaenomenon and homonoumenon.47

Kant also finds in human nature a propensity to actively desire what is unlawfuleven though he knows that it is unlawful, which he calls a tendency to evil.48 InReligion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason he argues that anthropology, or theempirical observation of human actions, leads us to infer that human nature is per-vaded by an a priori principle of radical evil [radicale Bse], or a maxim of evilaction that is universally present and thus subjectively necessary in all human sub-jects. This maxim belongs to human nature, not because of our natural impulses,

42 GMS, AA 04: 412. Nur ein vernnftiges Wesen hat das Vermgen, nach der Vorstellungder Gesetze, d.i. nach Principien, zu handeln, oder einen Willen.

43 GMS, AA 04: 427. [] ein besonders geartetes Begehrungsvermgen des Subjects [].44 See GMS, AA 04: 447448.45 See KpV, AA 05: 2830.46 See GMS, AA 04: 455463; KpV, AA 05: 4257.47 GMS, AA 04: 457; KpV, AA 05: 4243; KrV: A 532558/B 560586; MS, AA 06: 239. For

an examination of Kants theories of the empirical and intelligible character of a humanagent see Munzel, G. Felicitas: Kants Conception of Moral Character: The Critical Link ofMorality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgment. Chicago 1999.

48 Anth, AA 07: 324. Da aber doch auch die Erfahrung zeigt: da in ihm ein Hang zur th-tigen Begehrung des Unerlaubten, ob er gleich wei, da es unerlaubt sei, d.i. zum Bsen,sei []. Cf. Anth, AA 07: 329, 331332.


but through our free yet universal propensity as individuals to act from the principleof self-love rather than the moral law.49

Even more than in his account of cognition, Kant examines the a priori conditionsof human volition by comparing human beings to other possible types of beings.First, like other animals, human beings are affected by a variety of sensuous incli-nations.50 However, Kant also compares human beings to other possible types ofrational agents. First, he imagines a rational being that possesses reason as a the-oretical faculty, but whose volition is determined by instinct. In such a being, reasonwould not influence its actions, but only allow it to admire its own constitution.51

We can also imagine a rational being whose will is determined infallibly by reason,so that any action that this being recognizes as objectively necessary, by the prin-ciples of pure practical reason, is also subjectively necessary in determining its will.This agent would possess an absolutely good will, or holy will, which we canattribute to an imaginary finite being, and which is traditionally attributed to God.By contrast, human beings do not have a holy will, since they can act from maximswhich conflict with the moral law.52 Kant also imagines a diabolical being withan evil reason, or an absolutely evil will, which would always follow themaxim of resisting the law.53 We might also imagine two other types of beings notdirectly considered by Kant. One is a finite rational agent whose will is subjectivelydetermined by the moral law, but whose faculty of desire is subject to sensuous in-clinations that it therefore cannot satisfy through its actions. This agent would havea holy will, but also sensuous desires that could never become incentives for its ac-tions. Finally, we can imagine a rational being with sensuous desires but with no ca-pacity for action, that can only wait, barnacle-like, for its needs or desires to be sat-isfied. Such a being would be capable of rational cognition, but unable to act inaccordance with either sensuous inclination or practical reason.

Kant therefore develops a transcendental anthropology in his critical philosophi-cal works, by presenting a systematic discussion of the a priori conditions of cogni-tion and action that are distinctive to the human subject. He reinforces and supple-

49 See RGV, AA 06: 1825; cf. MAM, AA 08: 115118; IaG, AA 08: 2022; KU, AA 05:431434. See also Treloar, John: The Crooked Wood of Humanity: Kants Struggle withRadical Evil. In: Philosophy and Theology 3, 1989, 335353; Wood: Kants EthicalThought, 283300; Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 132139; Anderson-Gold, Sharon: Un-necessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Albany,NY 2001; Sussman, David G.: The Idea of Humanity: Anthropology and Anthroponomy inKants Ethics. New York 2001; and Rossi, Philip: The Social Authority of Reason: KantsCritique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind. Albany, NY 2005.

50 See KrV: A 533534/B 561562; GMS, AA 04: 395396; KpV, AA 05: 6162.51 See GMS, AA 04: 395.52 See GMS, AA 04: 412414; cf. KpV, AA 05: 3233, 82, 122123.53 RGV, AA 06: 35. [] eine vom moralischen Gesetze aber freisprechende, gleichsam bos-

hafte Vernunft (ein schlechthin bser Wille) enthlt dagegen zu viel, weil dadurch derWiderstreit gegen das Gesetz selbst zur Triebfeder [] erhoben und so das Subject zu einemteuflischen Wesen gemacht werden wrde. Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 366.


ments this project in the Anthropology, especially in his further discussions ofmetaphysics, taste, and morality.54 Kants account of the a priori conditions ofhuman subjectivity is a plausible candidate for the encompassing philosophical dis-cipline that he seems to posit in his Reflexion concerning anthropologia transcen-dentalis, and by raising the question What is man? in the Jsche Logic.

Two of the most influential twentieth-century commentators on Kants Anthro-pology, Heidegger and Foucault, have called attention in different ways to the prob-lem of establishing the demarcation between Kants transcendental and empiricalanthropology. On the one hand, Heidegger criticizes Kant for failing to consider theecstases of past, present and future in his account of transcendental subjectivity.However, he then dismisses the Anthropology as a text in empirical anthropology,thereby overlooking Kants account of the temporal structure of human cognitionand volition in that text, especially his discussions of memory and prediction.55 Fou-cault also notes that Kant introduced a separation between transcendental and em-pirical anthropology.56 However, he argues that Kant implicitly extends the domainof his critical philosophy in the Anthropology by recognizing the finitude and his-toricity of the human transcendental subject, especially in his discussions of tem-porality and language.57 Thus, according to Foucault, Kants Anthropology servesto further interpret and expand his transcendental philosophy.

54 See Anth, AA 07: 130, 141143, 244, 282, 324333. These passages provide evidence, in re-sponse to Brandt, that Kant does indeed further develop his transcendental account of cog-nition and volition in the Anthropology, though this admittedly is not his central concern inthis text. See Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 17f. See also Renaut, Alain: La place de lan-thropologie dans la theorie kantienne du sujet. In LAnne 1798, ed. Ferrari. Paris 1997,4963.

55 See Anth, AA 07: 182189. See Heidegger, Martin: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,5th ed. Translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington, IN 1997, 89173.

56 Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Translatedby A. Sheridan. New York 1970, 340f.

57 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 191196. Foucaults essay was the introduction to his translation ofKants Anthropology, a translation submitted to the Sorbonne in 1960 as his complement-ary thesis, along with his dissertation, Foucault, Michel: Folie et draison: Histoire de lafolie lge classique. Paris 1961. Published in English as Madness and Civilization. Trans-lated by R. Howard. New York 1965. Foucaults translation of the Anthropology was pub-lished in 1964, but the Introduction was left unpublished and is required to remain so underthe terms of his will, though the manuscript may be studied in the Centre Michel Foucault atthe Bibliothque du Salchoir in Paris. For further discussions see Zller, Gnter: MichelFoucaults Dissertation ber Kants Anthropologie: Bericht und Beschreibung. In Kant-Stu-dien 86, 1995, 128f; Miller, James: The Passion of Michel Foucault. New York 1993, 142;and Terra, Ricardo: Foucault lecteur de Kant: de lanthropologie lontologie du prsent. InLAnne 1798, ed. Ferrari, 159171.


3. Empirical Anthropology

Although Kant occasionally refers to empirical anthropology in his critical philo-sophical writings, his most thorough empirical study of human nature appears inthe Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Important aspects of his empiri-cal anthropology are also developed in his lectures on education, published after hisretirement by F. T. Rink as Kants Pedagogy; and in several shorter works from hiscritical period.

In the first Critique Kant describes a complete anthropology as a projectedcounterpart to the empirical doctrine of nature.58 This complete anthropology in-cludes the study of the conscious states of a human subject as given to inner sense: astudy that he also calls empirical psychology [empirische Psychologie].59 How-ever, empirical anthropology also includes a study of the moving causes of humanaction, as given through observation or outer sense.60

In the third Critique Kant regards the study of our physical and emotional re-sponses to the sublime and the beautiful as belonging to empirical anthropology.He then describes the empirical study of human nature, by introspection and obser-vation, as a psychological or even a physiological enquiry. By physiologicalhere he does not mean a study of the biological correlates of conscious states, butrather a study of the sequences of intuitions in inner or outer experience.61 Thisstudy may be distinguished from a rational physiology of the mind, which exam-ines the a priori structure of the transcendental unity of apperception. Instead, em-pirical anthropology explores the already-structured succession of human con-scious states.62

In the Preface of the Anthropology Kant uses the term physiology in a differentsense. Here he states that A systematic treatise comprising our knowledge of man(anthropology) can adopt either a physiological or a pragmatic point of view. Ofthese, physiological knowledge of man investigates what nature makes of him,while pragmatic anthropology examines what man as a free agent makes, or can

58 KrV: A 848/B 876. Es ist also blo ein so lange aufgenommener Fremdling, dem man aufeinige Zeit einen Aufenthalt vergnnt, bis er in einer ausfhrlichen Anthropologie (dem Pen-dant zu der empirischen Naturlehre) seine eigene Behausung wird beziehen knnen.

59 In this article I will not consider Kants more specific discussions of rational psychology andempirical psychology, or the critical debates over their relation to each other. For a valuabletreatment of this issue see Hatfield, Gary: Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychol-ogy: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant,edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge 1992, 200227.

60 KrV: A550/B 578. In Ansehung dieses empirischen Charakters giebt es also keine Frei-heit, und nach diesem knnen wir doch allein den Menschen betrachten, wenn wir lediglichbeobachten und, wie es in der Anthropologie geschieht, von seinen Handlungen die bewe-genden Ursachen physiologisch erforschen wollen.

61 See KU, AA 05: 277, 286; cf. KrV: A 347/B 405.62 See KrV: A 846848/B 874876.


and should make, of himself.63 In the Anthropology he thus seems to be identifyingphysiology as a biological discipline, and then indeed sets aside the physiologicalapproach, including any questions concerning the biological states that might becorrelated with our cognitive and affective faculties, as beyond the scope of his in-vestigation, and perhaps even beyond our cognitive grasp. Instead, he is concernedin this text with pragmatic anthropology; or the knowledge of human nature arisingfrom social observation, since this is the part of anthropology that is pragmaticallyuseful.64 However, one might object that a knowledge of human biology, along withthe knowledge arising from the observation of human behavior, both belong to theempirical study of human nature; and should thus be distinguished, as two types ofempirical inquiry, from a study of either the pragmatic or moral principles thatmight direct our use of this knowledge.65

The Anthropology is largely concerned with empirical anthropology: or withclassifying, describing, and in some cases explaining the conscious states of humansubjects as given through inner sense, and the observable actions of human individ-uals as given to outer sense. Indeed, the Anthropology is organized as a survey ofthe empirical faculties and characteristics of the human species, as these are given tous through introspection and observation.

Kant divides the Anthropology into two Parts: the Anthropological Didactic,which he subtitles On the Way to Know the Inner Nature as well as the Outer Na-ture of Human Beings, and the Anthropological Characteristic, which he sub-titles On the Way to Know the Inner Nature of Human Beings from their OuterNature.66 Interestingly, Kant apparently considered alternative titles for these divi-sions, judging by the marginal notes in his surviving manuscript of the publishedAnthropology. In these notes he describes the Anthropological Didactic as askingWhat is a human being? and the Anthropological Characteristic as askingHow to know the individuality of each human being. He then identifies theformer as a Doctrine of Elements and the latter as a Doctrine of Method. Theseterms reflect his more usual distinction between a Doctrine of Elements and Doc-

63 Anth, AA 07: 119. Eine Lehre von der Kenntni des Menschen, systematisch abgefat (An-thropologie), kann es entweder in physiologischer oder in pragmatischer Hinsicht sein. Die physiologische Menschenkenntni geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die Natur ausdem Menschen macht, die pragmatische auf das, was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sichselber macht, oder machen kann und soll. Cf. Anth, AA 07: 136, 166, 176, 214, 286; Br,AA 10: 145f.

64 See Anth, AA 07: 119.65 Kant discusses human biology in several shorter works, including his review of Moscatis

study of human and animal posture (AA 02: 421425), along with his own essays on raceand the inheritance of physical characteristics (AA 02: 427443; AA 08: 89106, 157184),his comments on Smmerings discussion of the brain (AA 12: 3035); and his essays onmedicine (AA 08: 58; SF, AA 07: 97116).

66 Anth, AA 07: 125, 283. Anthropologische Didaktik: Von der Art, das Innere sowohl alsdas uere des Menschen zu erkennen; and Die anthropologische Charakteristik: Vonder Art, das Innere des Menschen aus dem ueren zu erkennen.


trine of Method in his critical writings, and might indeed provide a better indicationof the structure of the Anthropology than the published headings.67

Kant entitles the three books of the Anthropological Didactic On the CognitiveFaculty [Vom Erkenntnivermgen], On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeas-ure [Das Gefhl der Lust und Unlust], and On the Faculty of Desire [Vom Be-gehrungsvermgen] as this includes the emotions and passions.68 He begins themuch shorter Characteristic by examining theories of temperament and physiog-nomy that have sought to explain the characteristics of individuals; and then con-siders various characteristics that he believes may be attributed to the two sexes andto different nations. In his section on the different races he considers the dual ten-dencies in human genetics toward homogeneity and diversity. He concludes theCharacteristic by considering the character of the human species as a whole, includ-ing its historicity and its moral vocation.

In the Preface Kant indicates that we derive the data for empirical anthropologyfrom two methods of study: our observation of others, and self-observation. How-ever, both are subject to two difficulties. First, human beings tend to become evasiveif they realize that they are under observation. This is readily apparent in our ob-servations of other people, who often become embarrassed when they notice thatsomeone is watching them, and may even attempt to deceive the observer. However,Kant maintains that we cannot observe our own inner states effectively through in-trospection if we are agitated by strong emotions, and can attain only a limited in-sight into ourselves even in our calmer moments. Second, particular circumstancesof place and time tend to obscure the object of anthropological study, by producinghabits that may be regarded as another nature.69 Kant thus implies that empiricalanthropology is a study of our first nature, or an empirically accessible universalhuman nature, insofar as we can distinguish this from the second nature of ha-bits, in others or ourselves, arising from the influence of a specific social and his-torical context. However, Kant himself frequently considers the influence of suchconditions over human cognition and activity in the course of his study.70

67 AA 07: 412. Anthropologie 1ster Teil Anthropologische Didactik Was ist der Mensch? 2terTeil Anthropologische Characteristik Woran ist die Eigenthmlichkeit jedes Menschen zuerkennen. Der erstere ist gleichsam die Elementarlehre die zweite die Methodenlehre derMenschenkunde. Cf. AA 07: 354356. See Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 70f.

68 Anth, AA 07: 127, 230, 251.69 Anth, AA 07: 121. Ort und Zeitumstnde bewirken, wenn sie anhaltend sind, Ange-

whnungen, die, wie man sagt, eine andere Natur sind [].70 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 130131, 133, 170171, 191, 208210, 306308, 311320. Kant had al-

ready shown an interest in the varieties of human thought and culture in his 1757 announce-ment for his lectures in physical geography (AA 02: 112). See Hinske: Kants Idee derAnthropologie, 415. On Kants approach to the cultural context of human experiencesee Arens, Katherine: Kant, Herder, and Psychology. In: Herder Today: Contributions fromthe International Herder Conference, 1987. Edited by Kurt Mller-Vollmer. Berlin 1990,190206.


In addition to introspection and direct observation, Kant suggests that we mayalso draw upon various types of secondary sources for anthropology. These includetravel literature, along with world history, biography, and even plays and novels.Although its depictions of situations and individual characteristics are fictitious andoften exaggerated, imaginative literature may be used in anthropology because itselements are drawn from observing actual human conduct, and therefore corre-spond to human nature in kind.71

Kant explicitly refers in the Anthropology to data arising from both introspectionand observation, including these types of secondary sources. First, he reportsthe presumably shared insights of self-observation by using I or we.72 Next,he offers observations concerning the behavior of human beings, both in general[der Mensch], and as members of various groups, such as children, women, andnationalities.73 Finally, he occasionally offers examples from imaginative literature,travel reports, and history.74 It is therefore inaccurate to describe the Anthropologyexclusively as a work of either introspective psychology or social-scientific observa-tion.75

Kant also considers the scientific status of anthropology.76 In his critical philo-sophical writings, Kant reserves the term science [Wissenschaft] for a systematicbody of knowledge developed from a priori principles.77 However, in the Preface ofthe Anthropology he evidently uses Wissenschaft to signify a systematically or-dered body of empirical knowledge. He initially remarks that it might be difficultfor anthropology to attain the rank of a formal science, because of the imperfec-tions in its methods of introspection and observation. On the other hand, he alsodescribes anthropology as a generally useful science, which could even be sys-tematically formulated by developing an exhaustive list of headings for re-searchers to use in cataloguing their empirical observations of human beings: a list

71 Anth, AA 07: 121. Endlich sind zwar eben nicht Quellen, aber doch Hlfsmittel zur An-thropologie: Weltgeschichte, Biographien, ja Schauspiele und Romane. [] so wie sie etwaein Richardson oder Molire entwarf, ihren Grundzgen nach aus der Beobachtung deswirklichen Thun und Lassens der Menschen genommen werden mssen: weil sie zwar imGrade bertrieben, der Qualitt nach aber doch mit der menschlichen Natur bereinstim-mend sein mssen.

72 See for example Kants account of attention: Anth, AA 07: 132140.73 See Anth AA 07: 127128, 303320.74 See Anth, AA 07: 180181, 198199.75 Weiler and Kitcher both suggest that Kants empirical anthropology is based largely on ob-

servation rather than introspection: see Weiler: Kants Question What is Man? 16; andKitcher: Kants Transcendental Psychology, 11. For a discussion emphasizing both aspectsof his project see Firla: Untersuchungen zum Verhltnis von Anthropologie und Moral-philosophie bei Kant, 1839.

76 On Kants remarks concerning the scientific character of anthropology see Brandt: Kri-tischer Kommentar, 3743; and Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 6668.

77 See KrV: B VIIXLIV.


that he might have been intending to initiate in his own divisions of the Anthro-pology text.78

The content of Kants empirical anthropology can be indicated by a summary ofhis main topics in the text. In Book I, On the Cognitive Faculty, he describes theempirical development and expressions of human self-consciousness; the scope andvariations in our power of attention; the operation of the five senses; the effects ofnovelty, change, contrast, and even intoxicants on our cognition; the empirical ac-tivities of wit and imagination; the variations among individuals in our capacitiesfor memory and prediction; and the different types of cognitive disorders and tal-ents. In Book II, On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure, he examines the feel-ings of sensory pain and pleasure; along with aesthetic pleasure or taste, which ispartly sensuous and partly intellectual, and its relation to morality.79 In Book III,On the Faculty of Desire he divides the manifestations of desire into two types:momentary affective states, or emotions [Affecten]; and affective dispositions orpassions [Leidenschaften]. He then examines both types of desires in their physi-cal, phenomenological, and cognitive dimensions; their degrees of strength in dif-ferent individuals; their influence on human health, and their effects on the mindand will (and vice versa). In the Anthropological Characteristic, as we have seen,he considers the various qualities by which we attempt to characterize individualsand groups. Kant concludes the Characteristic, and the Anthropology as a whole,with a general characterization of human species: we are a species of animals whoare capable of making ourselves rational; endowed with technical, pragmatic andmoral predispositions; and constantly engaged, both individually and collectively,in addressing problems that arise in our natural and social existence.80

There are many evident weaknesses in Kants empirical anthropology. First, herarely indicates the sources for any of his generalizations, such as introspection, di-rect observation, conversational reports, or published documents. Secondly, he doesnot explain or justify the methods that he uses to derive generalizations concern-ing human nature from either introspection or observation. Indeed, in the case ofintrospection, he initially advises us against attending too persistently to our own

78 Anth, AA 07: 121122. Eine systematisch entworfene und doch populr [] in pragma-tischer Hinsicht abgefate Anthropologie fhrt den Vorteil fr das lesende Publicum beisich: da durch die Vollstndigkeit der Titel, unter welche diese oder jene menschliche,ins Praktische einschlagende beobachtete Eigenschaft gebracht werden kann, so viel Ver-anlassungen und Aufforderungen demselben hiemit gegeben werden, jede besondere zueinem eigenen Thema zu machen, um sie in das ihr zugehrende Fach zu stellen; wo-durch die Arbeiten in derselben sich von selbst unter die Liebhaber dieses Studiums ver-theilen und durch die Einheit des Plans nachgerade zu einem Ganzen vereinigt werden; wo-durch dann der Wachsthum der gemeinntzigen Wissenschaft befrdert und beschleunigtwird.

79 Anth, AA 07: 239.80 Anth, AA 07: 321333. On this passage, in relation to Kants other discussions of the orig-

inal predispositions toward action in human nature, see Firla: Untersuchungen, 3969; andSussman: Idea of Humanity, 181227.


thoughts and feelings as mere subjective states, since he believes that this practiceleads to emotional and cognitive disturbances. On the other hand, he concedes wemust observe various acts of the representative power to pursue critical inquiriesin logic and metaphysics.81 He also appeals to his own introspective experience in atleast one domain, by presenting his efforts to counteract his hypochondria as evi-dence that the mind is able to counteract its morbid feelings.82 In the Metaphysicsof Morals he advises us to engage in moral self-examination, even though we cannever attain a completely accurate insight into our own motives.83 He thus recom-mends several types of introspection in various contexts, including reflective episte-mological analysis, an experimental assessment of ones own successes or failuresat cognitive and emotional self-discipline, and a retrospective review of ones ownemotional and volitional history.

Next we may consider Kants use of external observation as a method in anthro-pology. While he argues in the first Critique that we must regard the human indi-vidual, from a theoretical point of view, as part of the deterministic system of na-ture, Kant does not provide a systematic account of the principles involved in thenaturalistic explanation of human action.84 That is, he does not clearly indicate howsuch inward factors as beliefs, desires, and emotional dispositions and such out-ward factors as heredity and environment are to be related to each other in provid-ing an account of individual actions.85 He also does not examine critically the prin-ciples by which we attribute beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions to social groups,or to individuals as members of a group. Kants silence concerning the sources of hisanthropological data, along with his lack of critical attention to the principles bywhich he attempts to explain the actions of individuals and groups, are reflected inhis many superficial, patronizing, and methodologically unreflective generaliz-ations, especially concerning women, nationalities, and races. For example, heclaims that women are motivated almost exclusively by a desire to influence men,especially their husbands or potential husbands, by charm, frailty, or scolding. Hethus fails to examine more deeply the underlying concerns of women in these rela-tionships, the social constraints that have rendered women dependent upon men,

81 Anth, AA 07: 133. Die verschiedenen Acte der Vorstellungskraft in mir zu beobachten,wenn ich sie herbeirufe, ist des Nachdenkens wohl werth, fr Logik und Metaphysik nthigund ntzlich. Cf. Anth, AA 07: 132134.

82 See Anth, AA 07: 212213; SF, AA 07: 97116.83 See MS, AA 06: 441442.84 Rudolf Makkreel argues that in the Anthropology Kant develops a framework for describ-

ing human nature, but without attempting to present any principles for explaining humanaction. See Makkreel, Rudolf: Kant on the Scientific Status of Psychology, Anthropology,and History. In: Kant and the Sciences. Edited by Eric Watkins. Oxford 2001, 185201.However, one might maintain that pragmatic anthropology must presuppose the possibilityof explaining and predicting human actions, since pragmatic counsel is intended to help usinfluence the empirical characteristics and actions of human beings.

85 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 217218, 285321.


the consequences of this dependence, and the other interests and motivations of in-dividual women in his own society and throughout history.86

Many of the auditors of Kants anthropology lectures were intrigued and de-lighted by his empirical observations concerning human nature. According to R. B.Jachmann, [h]is perceptive observations, which bore the stamp of a deep knowl-edge of people and nature, were clothed in a delivery filled with wit and geniality,which charmed every listener.87 On the other hand, two of the most thoughtfulcritics of his published Anthropology, Goethe and Schleiermacher, were disap-pointed by its superficial and evidently pandering generalizations, especially con-cerning women, national groups, artists, and wits.88 Kants attempts to describe andexplain empirical human consciousness and behavior are perhaps the weakest as-pect of his anthropological project. However, by engaging in these attempts he atleast establishes a place within his general system of knowledge, as structured by hiscritical philosophy, for studying the empirical dimensions of human cognition, af-fectivity, and volition.

4. Pragmatic Anthropology

As we might expect, Kant explains and develops his pragmatic anthropology es-pecially in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, although this work isorganized more directly as a text in empirical anthropology. He also contributes tohis pragmatic anthropology in several of his other texts, including his writings onmedicine and the Pedagogy.89

Kant describes pragmatic anthropology as the investigation of what man as afree agent makes, or can and should make, of himself.90 This might initially seemto be a study of individual self-cultivation. However, he later indicates that everyhuman individual also has a pragmatic predisposition to use other people skilfullyfor his purposes, which is required for collective activity and thus for civilization.91

86 Anth, AA 07: 303311. Two recent discussions of Kant on gender, nationality and race,which call attention to the inadequacy of his empirical data and generalizations, and also tothe tension between these passages and his transcendental and moral universalism, are pro-vided in Wood: Kants Ethical Thought, 114, 333336; and Louden: Kants Impure Ethics,82106.

87 From a letter quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 330.88 From Goethes letters to Schiller and Voigt, and from Schleiermachers 1799 review in the

Athenum, as quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 335337 and 338343.89 On Kants pragmatic anthropology, and its relation to his critical project, see Firla: Unter-

suchungen, 384417; and Wilson, Holly L.: A Gap in American Kant Scholarship: PragmaticAnthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy. In: Akten des Siebenten In-ternationalen Kant-Kongress. Edited by Gerhard Funke. Bonn 1991, II.2, 403419.

90 Anth, AA 07: 119. [] die pragmatische auf das, was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sichselber macht, oder machen kann und soll.

91 Anth, AA 07: 322. [] andere Menschen zu seinen Absichten geschickt zu brauchen [].


In Kants view, pragmatic anthropology therefore seems to be the use of our empiri-cal knowledge of human nature to influence individuals, either oneself or otherpeople. However, in the Anthropology he in fact gives more attention to the self-im-provement of the individual than our attempts to influence others. Pragmatic an-thropology is thus a skill that we may cultivate, like other skills, in order to pur-sue our specific purposes.92 The pragmatic aspect of Kants anthropology wasespecially praised by a Dutch general who attended his lectures while in Knigsberg:It is there that I acquired the principles which have since served to direct me in myrelations with men; and I have recognized their justice by the felicitous applicationwhich I have often made of them.93

Kant indicates that his goal in the Anthropology is to provide knowledge of theworld [Weltkenntnis], which he distinguishes from an extensive knowledge ofthings in the world, such as animals, minerals, and even human biology. Instead,pragmatic anthropology seeks knowledge of man as a citizen of the world, or ofthe human individual as a participant in the social world.94 Even in this context,however, one might attempt to know the world merely as a spectator, by observ-ing the play of human social life; or aspire to know ones way about in theworld in order to engage effectively in the interplay of social life.95 This practicaluse of our empirical knowledge is the concern of Kants pragmatic anthropology.

This description of pragmatic anthropology, as including the use of other peoplefor our own purposes, might initially seem inconsistent with a basic principle ofKants moral theory. This is the principle, as stated in the second formulation of thecategorical imperative, that we must always regard the human being, and indeedevery rational being, as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this orthat will at its discretion. Here and elsewhere, however, Kant does not rule outusing other people as a means for ones own ends, as long as we regard the otherperson at the same time as an end.96 In the Anthropology Kant describes a varietyof pragmatic techniques for influencing the actions of others. However, he con-demns the inclination of human beings to manipulate others, which is often associ-

92 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 413420; MS, AA 06: 444446.93 From the memoirs of Dirk van Hogendorp, as quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 331.94 AA 07: 120. Eine solche Anthropologie, als Weltkenntni, welche auf die Schule folgen

mu, betrachtet, wird eigentlich alsdann noch nicht pragmatisch genannt, wenn sie ein aus-gebreitetes Erkenntni der Sachen in der Welt, z.B. der Thiere, Pflanzen und Mineralien inverschiedenen Lndern und Klimaten, sondern wenn sie Erkenntni des Menschen als Welt-brgers enthlt.

95 AA 07: 120. Noch sind die Ausdrcke: die Welt kennen und Welt haben in ihrer Bedeutungziemlich weit auseinander: indem der Eine nur das Spiel versteht, dem er zugesehen hat, derAndere aber mitgespielt hat.

96 GMS, AA 04: 428. Nun sage ich: der Mensch und berhaupt jedes vernnftige Wesenexistirt als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht blo als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche fr diesenoder jenen Willen, sondern mu in allen seinen sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf anderevernnftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck betrachtet wer-den. Cf. KpV, AA 05: 87, 131132.


ated with desires for wealth or social status.97 In addition, Kant argues that we eachhave a duty to pursue our own perfection by cultivating our talents: a process that isfurthered by the methods of self-improvement offered by pragmatic anthropology.However, human beings can also use their talents for morally repugnant purposes,such as cheating others.98 Accordingly, we must regard pragmatic anthropology,like other skills, as morally neutral; and examine separately the purposes for whichwe seek either to influence other human beings or to improve ourselves, as we shallsee below.

Kants pragmatic proposals in the Anthropology are generally directed towardcorrecting deficiencies or disorders in the cognitive faculties or affective disposi-tions of human beings; and toward cultivating the talents, promoting the health,and enhancing the sociability of individuals. Here are some examples of his prag-matic proposals. We may cultivate control over our power of attention in order toavoid dwelling upon the physical or behavioral shortcomings of others, since suchnotice is embarrassing to them and distracting to ourselves.99 In planning a socialintroduction, or recommending a book or play, we should not praise the object toomuch, since this raises the expectations of the audience and often leads to disap-pointment.100 An effective mnemonic device should organize the material to be re-membered into a clear and orderly system.101 Inventive genius cannot be taught, butthose who possess it must learn certain mechanical basic rules [gewisser mechan-ischer Grundregeln]102 to achieve genuine creativity in a given field. Someone who ispale with anger is afraid of his own imminent loss of control and should be fearedimmediately, while a flushed countenance indicates that its possessor is vindictiveand should be feared in the future.103

Kant concludes the Anthropological Didactic by describing the highest combi-nation of the morally with the physically good for human beings: this is the union ofwell-being with virtue in our social interactions, reflecting a disposition that wecall humanity.104 Indeed, he proceeds subtly toward the conclusion that the bestsetting for cultivating humanity is a good meal in good company, and accord-ingly offers a series of recommendations for a successful dinner party. On his view, adinner party should include three to nine people, in a balanced combination of menand women, advancing in their conversation from news to reasoning to jokes, sincethese conditions tend to promote good will and good digestion.105 He also describesthe types and amount of drinks that promote sociability, the importance of accom-

97 See Anth, AA 07: 271274.98 See Anth, AA 07: 205; cf. GMS, AA 04: 393394.99 See Anth, AA 07: 131132.

100 See Anth, AA 07: 173.101 See Anth, AA 07: 183185.102 Anth, AA 07: 224225.103 See Anth, AA 07: 260.104 Anth, AA 07: 277. Die Denkungsart der Vereinigung des Wohllebens mit der Tugend im

Umgange ist die Humanitt.105 See Anth, AA 07: 277281; cf. MS, AA 06: 428.


modating a variety of culinary tastes, and the rules by which the host should seek toguide the conversation.106 This type of sociability produces a well-being that pro-motes virtue, while a solitary mortification of the flesh is, by contrast, a distortedsemblance of virtue.107

5. Moral Anthropology

Kants pragmatic proposals are directed, as imperatives of skill, toward pur-suing ones own happiness. However, this pursuit does not constitute the entirepractical value of empirical anthropology. On the contrary, Kant maintains that theoverriding principle of human action, as the self-determined action of a rationalbeing, is action according to the moral law. While this law is recognized by everyrational being through pure practical reason, Kant indicates that we must also con-sult empirical anthropology in order to apply the moral law to human beings.108

The metaphysics of morals thus requires, as its practical counterpart, a moralanthropology, in which we may consider the subjective conditions in humannature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics ofmorals.109

Kant did not devote any of his writings exclusively to moral anthropology. How-ever, he examines various aspects of moral anthropology, though not by this name,in the Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason [Methodenlehre der rei-nen praktischen Vernunft] in his second Critique, and his Doctrine of the Methodsof Ethics [Ethische Methodenlehre] in the Metaphysics of Morals.110 He also dis-

106 See Anth, AA 07: 170172; 242; 278281.107 See Anth, AA 07: 282; cf. MS, AA 06: 469474.108 See GMS, AA 04: 388389, 410412. I argue elsewhere that Kant implicitly distinguishes

between the application [Anwendung] of the a priori moral law to an empirically givenhuman nature in order to produce a system of duties for human beings, as seen in hismetaphysics of morals; and the application of the law in cultivating a moral disposi-tion in human individuals, which is the concern of moral anthropology. See Schmidt,Claudia M.: The Anthropological Dimension of Kants Metaphysics of Morals. In: Kant-Studien, 2005, 6684.

109 MS, AA 06: 217. Das Gegenstck einer Metaphysik der Sitten, als das andere Glied derEintheilung der praktischen Philosophie berhaupt, wrde die moralische Anthropologiesein, welche, aber nur die subjective, hindernde sowohl als begnstigende Bedingungen derAusfhrung der Gesetze [] enthalten wrde [].In the Groundwork Kant uses the phrase practical anthropology for the empirical partof ethics, as a parallel to empirical physics, and a contrasting but complementary disciplineto the metaphysics of morals (GMS, AA 04: 388389). He further notes that the meta-physics of morals needs anthropology for its application to human beings [die zu ihrerAnwendung auf Menschen der Anthropologie bedarf] (GMS, AA 04: 412). However, henever clearly indicates whether the practical anthropology that he mentions in theGroundwork is equivalent to his later moral anthropology, or corresponds more closelyinstead to either his empirical or his pragmatic anthropology.

110 KpV, AA 05: 151161; MS, AA 06: 477485.


cusses moral education in the Pedagogy; and the moral progress of the humanspecies in various writings from his critical period.111

In the second Critique Kant considers the methods by which pure practical reasonmay be given access to the human mind and influence on its maxims, so that ob-jectively practical reason can be made subjectively practical.112 The Doctrine ofMethod seeks to show how the pure representation of virtue can be made an incen-tive for the human mind, in order to promote the cultivation of a moral character.This project however has never yet been widely brought into practice, so experiencecannot show anything about its results.113 In the Metaphysics of Morals he arguesthat a virtuous disposition is not innate in human beings, but must be acquired bypure practical reason as it comes to prevail over our inclinations and becomes con-scious of the supremacy arising from this freedom. Kant then argues that while thedecision to cultivate virtue is made completely in one moment, the power to act vir-tuously must be exercised and cultivated through moral asceticism, in order tocounteract the inner enemy within the human being.114 This cultivation of a vir-tuous disposition proceeds through moral education in children, and an ongoingprocess of self-discipline in adults.

Kant develops a discussion of moral education in several of his writings.115 In thePedagogy he indicates that the innocence of children is amoral compared to good-ness in adults, since the latter is attained through virtue, or a self-discipline arisingfrom reason that is directed toward moral conduct.116 We may promote the moralculture [moralische Cultur] of children by teaching them to formulate and actupon moral maxims through their own reason: a process that we call the formationof character. Children should first be taught to follow both the moral and non-moral rules appropriate to their ages and activities, thereby helping them cultivatea habit of self-discipline. At the next stage, we should teach children their dutiestoward themselves and others, by rules and examples appropriate to their ages,and show that these duties are directed toward honoring oneself and other human

111 On Kants moral anthropology in these passages see Firla, Untersuchungen; and Munzel,G. Felicitas: Kant on Moral Education, or Enlightenment and the Liberal Arts. In: Reviewof Metaphysics, 2003, 4373.

112 KpV, AA 05: 151. Vielmehr wird unter dieser Methodenlehre die Art verstanden, wie manden Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft Eingang in das menschliche Gemth, Einfluauf die Maximen desselben verschaffen, d.i. die objectiv praktische Vernunft auch subjectivpraktisch machen knne.

113 KpV, AA 05: 153. For a discussion of Kants account of moral character, and his theory ofits development, see Munzel: Kants Conception of Moral Character.

114 MS, AA 06: 477. [] die Tugend knne nicht durch bloe Vorstellungen der Pflicht,durch Ermahnungen (parnetisch), gelehrt, sondern sie msse durch Versuche der Bekmp-fung des inneren Feindes im Menschen (ascetisch) cultivirt, gebt werden [].

115 For recent discussions of Kants views on education see Munzel: Kants Conception ofMoral Character, 254333; Munzel: Kant on Moral Education, or Enlightenment and theLiberal Arts, 4373; and Louden: Kants Impure Ethics, 3361.

116 Pd, AA 09: 492.


beings. If they disobey these moral rules, they should be punished through cold andcontemptuous treatment, to convey the gravity of their failure to honor human dig-nity.117

As children reach the age of ten, they may be guided more directly in forming theconcept of duty.118 This process should begin with a moral catechism in which theteacher asks questions to draw answers from the students own reasoning, and thencompiles the results in a formula that can be memorized by the student. This cat-echism should direct the attention of the student to the nature and the dignity ofduty, in contrast to all incentives based on inclinations.119 After this, we shoulddraw children into moral dialogue by giving them examples of actions and char-acters for moral judgment. This type of discussion not only sharpens their power ofjudgment, but also promotes respect for the moral law.120 This moral cultivation isfinally tested in their teenage years, when young people must start resisting sexualtemptation, honoring all human beings in spite of their inequalities in civic life, anddeveloping the skills and dispositions needed for adult life.121

Kant also offers advice for cultivating a virtuous disposition in adults. First, tomaintain and exercise an existing moral disposition, he encourages us to build onour ordinary propensity to discuss moral topics by considering casuistic problems,and also by discussing and evaluating real persons and actions.122 Next, we mayhelp cultivate a moral disposition in immature or delinquent adults by directingtheir attention toward their own freedom, in which they may find relief from beingentirely subject to their needs and desires, and instead embrace self-respect as theirhighest goal for themselves.123 Finally, in his Ethical Ascetics and in the ReligionKant advises us to cultivate the dispositions of mind to be both valiant and cheer-ful in fulfilling our duties, to compensate for the sacrifice of superficial pleasuresrequired by the practice of virtue.124 He contrasts moral asceticism, in this sense, toself-punishment, which arises from self-loathing and produces a secret hatred forthe commands of virtue. On the contrary, he maintains that the discipline of virtu-ous conduct can become meritorious and exemplary only through the cheerfulnessthat accompanies it.125

117 See Pd, AA 09: 480489.118 See KpV, AA 05: 155157; Pd, AA 09: 480485.119 See MS, AA 06: 478484; cf. 411413; Pd, AA 09: 490.120 See KpV, AA 05: 154160.121 See Pd, AA 09: 496499.122 See MS, AA 06: 411; KpV, AA 05: 153154.123 See KpV, AA 05: 160161; cf. Anth, AA 07: 294295.124 MS, AA 06: 484. Die Regeln der bung in der Tugend [] gehen auf die zwei Gemths-

stimmungen hinaus, wackeren und frhlichen Gemths [] in Befolgung ihrer Pflichten zusein.

125 MS, AA 06: 485. Die Zucht (Disciplin), die der Mensch an sich selbst verbt, kann dahernur durch den Frohsinn, der sie begleitet, verdienstlich und exemplarisch werden. Cf.RGV, AA 06: 23fn.


Kant recommends several other human social practices that tend to promote vir-tue, such as outward expressions of respect,126 along with friendship127 and a cheer-ful sociability.128 He also argues that the cultivation of taste, or a disinterested en-joyment of beauty and the sublime, both in nature and in art, contributes to thedevelopment of virtue.129

Finally, Kant indicates in several of his later writings that the larger context forindividual moral education and cultivation is the imperative, arising from purepractical reason, that we, as individual human agents, should contribute to the cul-tural and moral progress of our species.130

In the Pedagogy, Kant argues that children should be educated, not merely fortheir future lives as individuals, or even as citizens of a state, but also as members ofthe human species, who may contribute to improving the conditions of human life.Children should therefore receive a progressive and cosmopolitan education, whichincludes self-discipline, theoretical instruction, training in various skills, the culti-vation of social graces, and moral improvement. However, Kant maintains that thelarger task of education is to develop the various talents in human nature, in orderto advance the human species toward its perfection, or the fulfillment of its des-tiny.131 In the Anthropology Kant describes human beings similarly, as a species ofrational animals who are capable of using their reason to preserve, educate, andgovern themselves in society; and are destined to advance through the ongoing de-velopment of their technical, pragmatic, and moral capabilities.132

However, Kant also considers several of the perennial problems, both natural andsocial, that tend to obstruct the progress of humanity. These include the temporaldiscrepancy between sexual maturity and civic maturity; the short productive life ofscientists and intellectuals; and the difficulty of determining who should be assignedthe task of moral education, since no one is free from the evil in human nature.133

Yet while these problems seem to require a response on both pragmatic and moralgrounds, he offers little or no indication here of how we might address them. On theother hand, in other texts from the 1790s, especially the Pedagogy, Toward Per-petual Peace, and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant describes

126 See Anth, AA 07: 151153, 244.127 See MS, AA 06: 469474.128 See Anth, AA 07: 277282; MS, AA 06: 473474.129 See Anth, AA 07: 244f; KU, AA 05: 296354.130 On Kants view of the progress of the human species see Pieper, Annemarie: Ethik als Ver-

hltnis von Moralphilosophie und Anthropologie: Kants Entwurf einer Transzendental-pragmatik und ihre Transformation durch Apel. In Kant-Studien 69, 1978, 314329;Kleingeld, Pauline: Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants. Wrzburg1995; Wilson, Holly H.: Kants Integration of Morality and Anthropology. In Kant-Studien88, 1997, 87104; Wood: Kants Ethical Thought, 193336; Louden: Kants ImpureEthics, 14075; and Anderson-Gold: Unnecessary Evil.

131 See Pd, AA 09: 441454.132 See Anth, AA 07: 321325.133 See Anth, AA 07: 325327; cf. Pd, AA 09: 449, 496499.


the roles, respectively, of educational institutions, national and international laws,and religious communities in promoting the cultural and moral advance of thehuman species. He also recommends reforms in these institutions to enhance theireffectiveness, presumably based on his empirical knowledge of human nature andhis pragmatic knowledge of the methods by which we may improve human sociallife.

Fulfilling the duties of virtue seems to contribute directly to the progress of thehuman species, since these duties consist in cultivating our own perfection and pro-moting the happiness of others.134 However, Kant argues that human culture ad-vances not only through the moral intentions of individuals, but also through the ef-fects of the radical evil in human nature. In the third Critique, and again in theAnthropology, he argues that human culture has progressed as a result of conflictsboth within and between human societies, in which history has brought good out ofevil by impelling human beings to develop constitutional government and a cosmo-politan society.135 He therefore maintains, as indicated already in his Idea for a Uni-versal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, that we are required by pure practicalreason to trace the progress of the human species in history, even if this progressseems to be overshadowed by our destructive tendencies.136

Kant concludes that pure practical reason, under the guidance of reflective judg-ment, leads us to regard the development of moral agency in human beings as thefinal end of nature. We attribute this agency to each human person as a supersen-sible being, although we can never judge accurately, even in our own case, if any ofour individual actions are indeed the product of a good will.137

In his reflections concerning moral anthropology, Kant thus indicates that wemay seek to cultivate a virtuous disposition in human beings through specific edu-cational methods, political systems, religious institutions, and sociable activities.We accordingly have a duty to promote these activities and institutions. However,Kants account of the influence of historical conditions over the development ofmoral character returns us to the question left open by his attempt to considerhuman agency within its transcendental, empirical and practical context: Is thehuman being to be regarded as a noumenal or as a phenomenal agent? If the humanbeing is a noumenal agent, then we must apparently deny that any empirical causes,including social and historical factors, could influence the actions of this agent. Ifthe human being is a phenomenal agent, and thus subject to empirical influences, wemust apparently deny human freedom.138 The problem of justifying moral anthro-

134 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 421423; MS, AA 06: 385388.135 See KU, AA 05: 429434; Anth, AA 07: 327331.136 See IaG, AA 08: 1531; cf. SF, AA 07: 8394.137 See KU, AA 05: 434436; KpV, AA 05: 154; MS, AA 06: 447; RGV, AA 06: 20.138 This problem is underscored by Louden in: Kants Impure Ethics: 1619, 180182; and by

Anderson-Gold in: Unnecessary Evil, 1f. For a qualified defense of Kant, see Wood: KantsEthical Thought, 17882. This question is the main topic of Frierson: Freedom and An-thropology in Kants Moral Philosophy.


pology in the context of Kants dual approach to human agency thus remains one ofthe most intriguing challenges in his overall anthropological project.

6. Conclusion

In this study I have argued that Kant develops four anthropological projects dur-ing his critical period, which I have called respectively transcendental, empirical,pragmatic, and moral anthropology. Although he emphasizes different projects inhis various writings, I have shown that elements of each project are distributed andcombined in many of his texts. In particular, the Anthropology from a PragmaticPoint of View emerges as a diversified compilation of arguments and conclusionsbelonging to all four of his anthropological projects. Accordingly, I recommend as ahermeneutical principle that we should trace elements of any of these projects asthey appear in each text, rather than characterizing any of his writings in advance asbelonging exclusively to his transcendental, empirical, pragmatic, or moral anthro-pology.

The combination of these four anthropological projects is already apparent inKants 1773 letter to Herz, in which he describes his initial plan for the anthropol-ogy lectures, in contrast to other approaches to this topic among his contempor-aries:

This winter I am presenting, for the second time, a lecture course on anthropology, which I amnow thinking of making into a regular academic discipline. Only my plan is entirely different.My intention is to reveal, through this, the sources of all the sciences: of morals, of skill, of so-cial relations, of the method of educating and governing human beings, hence of everythingpractical. I therefore seek phenomena and their laws, rather than the first principles of thepossibility of modifying human nature in general. For this reason I have entirely omitted thesubtle and, in my view, eternally futile investigations concerning the manner in which the or-gans of the body are connected with thoughts. I am so unceasingly offering observations, evenfrom common life, that my listeners, from the first beginning to the end, never find it a drybusiness, but instead always an entertaining one, since they constantly have occasion to com-pare their ordinary experience with my remarks. From this, in my view, very pleasant set ofteachings from observation, I am working in the intervals on a preliminary study, for the aca-demic youth, of skill, of prudence, and even of wisdom: a study which, together with physicalgeography, is distinct from all other instruction, and may be called knowledge of the world.139

139 Br, AA 10: 145f. Ich lese in diesem Winter zum zweyten mal ein collegium privatum derAnthropologie welches ich ietzt zu einer ordentlichen academischen disciplin zu machengedenke. Allein mein Plan ist gantz anders. Die Absicht die ich habe ist durch dieselbe dieQvellen aller Wissenschaften die der Sitten der Geschiklichkeit des Umganges der MethodeMenschen zu bilden u. zu regiren mithin alles Praktischen zu erfnen. Da suche ich alsdennmehr Phnomena u. ihre Gesetze als die erste Grnde der Mglichkeit der modification dermenschlichen Natur berhaupt. Daher die subtile u. in meinen Augen auf ewig vergeblicheUntersuchung ber die Art wie die organe des Korper mit den Gedanken in Verbindungstehen ganz wegfllt. Ich bin unablig so bey der Beobachtung selbst im gemeinen Lebenda meine Zuhrer vom ersten Anfange bis zu Ende niemals eine trokene sondern durch


Kants study of the sources of all sciences would evolve into what I call his tran-scendental anthropology; his discussion of phenomena and their laws would bedeveloped in his empirical anthropology; and his investigation of the method ofeducating and governing human beings belongs to his pragmatic anthropology,and points toward his moral anthropology. His distinction between these four pro-jects would become clearer during his critical period, although he would continue tocombine different elements of these projects in his various writings, especially in thepublished Anthropology.

List of the English Translations

I have quoted from the following translations of the indicated works by Kant,with my own occasional revisions. Any translations from Kants other writings,cited in the Academy edition, are my own.

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. TheHague 1974.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Im-manuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 41108. Cambridge 1996.

Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Immanuel Kant:Practical Philosophy, 133271. Cambridge 1996.

Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood.Cambridge 1997.

Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews.Cambridge 2000.

Correspondence. Translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge 1999.Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young. Cambridge 1992.Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Immanuel Kant: Practical

Philosophy, 363603. Cambridge 1996.Kant on Education. Translated by Annette Churton. Boston 1900.Opus Postumum. Edited by Eckart Frster. Translated by Eckart Frster and Mi-

chael Rosen. Cambridge 1993.Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Translated by George di Giovanni.

In: Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, 57171. Cambridge 1996.

den Anla den sie haben unaufhrlich ihre gewhnliche Erfahrung mit meinen Bemer-kungen zu vergleichen iederzeit eine unterhaltende Beschftigung habe. Ich arbeite in Zwi-schenzeiten daran, aus dieser in meinen Augen sehr angenehmen Beobachtungslehre eineVorbung der Geschiklichkeit der Klugheit und selbst der Weisheit vor die academische Ju-gend zu machen welche nebst der physischen geographie von aller andern Unterweisungu

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