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    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

    Judgment reserved on: 17.03.2011 Judgment delivered on: 16.01.2012

    + FAO 291/1996

    Smt.Kamlesh Kumari Appellant.

    Through: Mr.Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Advocate.

    Vs.

    Shri Mehtab Singh Respondent

    Through: Mrs.Mala Goel with Mr.Yashpal Singh,Advocates.

    CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR

    KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.

    1. By this appeal filed under Section 28 of the Hindu

    Marriage Act, the appellant-wife seeks to challenge the

    impugned judgment and decree dated 18.07.1996 passed by

    the learned trial court whereby the divorce petition filed by

    the husband, respondent herein under Section 13 (1) (ia) and

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    (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act was allowed by the court and

    the marriage between the parties was dissolved.

    2. A conspectus of facts based on which the

    respondent filed the divorce petition are that the respondent

    got married to the appellant according to Hindu rites and

    ceremonies on 30.06.1982 at Delhi. It is stated that after the

    marriage on 01.07.1982, the parties went to the house of

    appellants parents at Yusuf Sarai and had lunch there and

    thereafter the appellants parents did not send the appellant

    back along with the respondent and the appellant also

    declined to accompany him without any reason or

    justification. It is further stated that on 11.07.1982, the

    respondent again went to the house of the appellants parents

    to bring her back and requested her parents to send the

    appellant along with him but they refused to do so without

    disclosing any reason. It is further averred that after 15 days

    i.e. in the last week of July, 1982 the respondent again went

    to the house of appellants parents to bring her back,

    however, after reaching there it was found that the appellant

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    was not present at her parents house at that time and on

    persistent enquiries by the respondent her parents told him

    that the appellant had gone to the house of her sisters

    husband(jija) Shri Umed Singh at Village Nilothi, Nangloi,

    Delhi. Thereafter about a month of the marriage of the parties

    i.e. on or about 30.7.82/1.8.82/2.8.82 father of the respondent

    called said Shri Umed Singh to his village Sultanpur Majra

    where the respondent, his elder brother and two uncles were

    also present where Shri Umed Singh blamed father of the

    appellant for telling a lie that the appellant was with him at

    the time when the respondent visited her parents house to

    bring her back to matrimonial home. In the evening of

    21.08.82, one Shri Kalam Singh and Shri Sri Lal went to the

    house of Shri Umed Singh at Village Nilothi and found that

    the appellant was very much there and thus the fact of the

    appellant living with Shri Umed Singh without the consent or

    permission of the respondent was confirmed by them. The

    next day the respondent and his mother also went to the

    house of Shri Umed Singh at 6 p.m and found the appellant

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    present there and when the respondent and his mother tried

    to reason out from the appellant as to why she was living with

    Shri Umed Singh, then she replied that it was her sweet will

    to go anywhere. This fact was also enquired from Shri Umed

    Singh in the presence of the appellant and he said that the

    appellant was his sister-in-law and he had every right over her

    and that she had come to him with her own will. Despite the

    request of the respondent and his mother, the appellant did

    not accompany them to return to her matrimonial home and

    remained there. It is also stated that in the year 1983-84, the

    appellant filed a report with the Social Welfare Board, which

    called Shri Umed Singh, Shri Mohinder Singh and the

    appellants maternal uncle Shri Gian Singh and her brother

    from the appellants side and from the respondents side the

    respondent and his parents were called and on enquiry made

    by the Welfare Board, it was found that the appellant was

    living with her brother-in-law (jija) Shri Umed Singh and there

    was no fault of the respondent and as such reconciliation

    efforts made by the Board could not take place between the

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    parties. It is also averred that the appellant taunted the

    respondent as the educational qualification of the appellant

    was graduate whereas the respondent is a matriculate, which

    caused cruelty to him. It is also stated that the appellant left

    the matrimonial home with the intention not to return again,

    whereas the respondent had made efforts for reconciliation.

    The parties are stated to be living separately since 1.7.82 and

    the appellant has deserted the respondent from the first day

    of marriage without any reasonable cause. The appellant has

    even not made any efforts to come back to the matrimonial

    home as she has been staying with her brother-in-law (jija).

    3. The appellant in her written statement however,

    admitted the factum of her marriage with the respondent on

    30.6.82 but denied the allegation of cruelty and desertion.

    The appellant has leveled allegation that the respondent and

    his parents used to taunt her on account of bringing

    insufficient dowry and that the main demand of the

    respondent was a two-wheeler scooter which was not met by

    the appellants parents. It is also alleged that the brother of

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    the appellant who had come to take the appellant on 5.7.82

    was humiliated, taunted and was coerced to part with the

    two-wheeler scooter on which he had come to take her back

    and the respondent and his parents warned the brother of the

    appellant that in case the scooter was not arranged at the

    earliest the appellant may not be sent to her matrimonial

    home and the respondent would also not come to take her

    back. It is also alleged that thereafter i.e 5.7.82 the

    respondent never came to take her back. It is denied that the

    appellant was ever living with her brother-in-law (jija) Shri

    Umed Singh or that the respondent and his mother ever went

    to the house of said Shri Umed Singh on 22.8.82 or that the

    appellant was present in the house of Shri Umed Singh on

    that day. It is stated that the appellant was forced to make

    report to Anti Dowry Cell of Delhi Police which report of her

    was referred by the Anti Dowry Cell to the Social Welfare

    Board. The factum of summoning of persons from both sides

    is admitted by the appellant, however, it is denied that the

    Social Welfare Board held in its enquiry that the appellant

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    was living with her brother-in-law (jija) Shri Umed Singh or

    that there was no fault of the respondent. It is asserted that

    the respondent flatly refused before the said Board to bring

    the appellant back to the matrimonial home. It is alleged that

    it was the appellant who had been deprived by the respondent

    and had caused mental agony and torture to her by not taking

    her to the matrimonial home for demand of two wheeler

    scooter and other articles. It is also stated that on an

    application made by the appellant to the Anti Dowry Cell the

    case was proceeded against the respondent and the Anti

    Dowry Cell came to the conclusion that it was a fit case for

    investigation and accordingly a case was registered against

    the respondent for demanding dowry and the respondent and

    his family members were arrested by the police, but

    subsequently were enlarged on bail. It is also alleged that it is

    the respondent who had deserted the appellant since 5.7.82

    and had not bothered to take her back to the matrimonial

    home for his greed of dowry and did not allow her to enter the

    matrimonial home in spite of repeated panchayat meetings

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    between the parties, their relatives and respectable persons

    of the village. It is also stated that the appellant has been

    forced to live with her parents since 5.7.82 due to

    greed/demand of dowry by the respondent.

    4. Based on the above pleadings of the parties, the learned

    trial court framed the following issues:-

    (i) Whether after solemnization of marriage, therespondent treated the petitioner with cruelty? OPP

    (ii) Whether the respondent has deserted the petitionerfor a continuous period of not less than 2 yearsimmediately preceding the presentation of the

    petition.

    (iii) Whether the petition is not in accordance with rules?If so, its effect?

    (iv) Relief.

    5. In support of his case, the respondent examined himself

    as PW-1 besides examining Shri Maya Ram @ Mahe Ram as

    PW-2 and Shri Ram Swarup as PW-3. The appellant, on the

    other hand, examined herself as RW-1, besides examining

    Shri J.B.Gupta as RW-2, Shri Gian Singh (appellants brother)

    as RW-3 and Shri Mahinder Singh as RW-4.

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    6. On issue Nos.1 and 2, the learned trial court returned a

    finding against the appellant and in favour of the respondent

    husband and thus dissolved the marriage of the parties by the

    decree of divorce dated 18.7.1996, feeling aggrieved by which

    the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

    7. Assailing the impugned judgment and decree,

    Mr.Sanjay Kumar Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant

    submitted that sufficient efforts were made by the appellant

    to join back the company of the respondent at the matrimonial

    home and it was the respondent who remained reluctant to

    allow the appellant to join back his company and, therefore,

    the respondent cannot be allowed to take advantage of his

    own wrongs. Counsel further submitted that the learned trial

    court committed a grave illegality in drawing adverse

    inference of her statement during her cross-examination

    where she stated that the respondent-petitioner never came

    to take her from her parents house after 02.07.1982 to mean

    as if she had stayed at her parents house after 02.07.1982 in

    contradiction to her claim of staying at the matrimonial home

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    till 05.07.1982. The contention of counsel for the appellant

    was that this date has been mentioned by the appellant in her

    cross-examination to explain that the respondent in fact had

    never visited her parents house to bring her back after

    02.07.1982. Counsel also submitted that the said deposition of

    the appellant could not have been read by the learned trial

    court in isolation as the same was to be read in conjunction

    with her earlier statement wherein she took a stand that she

    had taken a lunch at her parental house on 02.07.1982 and

    she also denied the suggestion in her cross-examination about

    the alleged visit of the respondent to take her back on

    11.07.82 or on that date the parents of the appellant had

    refused to send her along with the respondent. Counsel for

    the appellant further submitted that the respondent had duly

    admitted in his evidence that the marriage between the

    parties was consummated on the night between 02.07.82 and

    03.07.82, but at the same time took a contrary stand by

    alleging that the appellant never lived with him from

    01.07.82. Counsel also submitted that the respondent took a

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    contrary stand of his alleged visit on 11.07.82 to the parents

    house of the appellant, as in the proceedings under Section

    125 Cr.P.C. the respondent alleged such visit on 08.07.82

    instead of 11.07.82. Counsel further submitted that the

    respondent had showed his reluctance to bring the appellant

    back to the matrimonial home before the Social Welfare

    Board. Counsel further submitted that the respondent had

    even admitted the visit of Mr.Bharat Singh, Counsellor at that

    time for the purpose of reconciliation and also the visit of the

    workers of the Social Welfare Board for the same purpose.

    Counsel also submitted that the appellant was not cross-

    examined by the respondent to contradict the deposition in

    her examination-in-chief wherein she stated that on 02.07.82

    the marriage was duly consummated between the parties.

    Counsel also submitted that even no suggestion was given by

    the respondent to suggest that the appellant did not stay at

    her matrimonial home till 05.07.82 or no Panchayat took

    place at the instance of the appellant or the appellant and her

    parents did not make any efforts after 05.07.82 for her to go

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    back to the matrimonial home. Counsel further argued that

    the appellant had duly proved on record that she was never

    found at the residence of her brother-in-law (jija) Mr.Umed

    Singh at Nilothi. Counsel also argued that the decree of

    divorce cannot be granted on the ground of irretrievable

    breakdown of marriage which is not a ground under Section

    13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In support of his arguments,

    counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following

    judgments:-

    (i) Subhash Chander Sharma Vs. Anjali Sharma 2010(174) DLT 564

    (ii) Suram Pal Singh Vs. Savita 2007(140) DLT 198

    (iii) Krishan Kumar Vs. Shankari 2007(142) DLT 177

    9. Opposing the present appeal, Ms.Mala Goel,

    learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that

    no fault can be found with the findings given by the learned

    trial court in granting the decree of divorce under Section 13

    (1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In support of her

    arguments, counsel submitted that the appellant had deserted

    the respondent on 01.07.82 with the intention to break the

    marriage permanently. Counsel further submitted that the

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    respondent had sufficiently proved on record that the

    appellant was staying with her brother-in-law Shri Umed

    Singh at his residence at Nilothi. Counsel also argued that the

    appellant miserably failed to prove on record that any demand

    of scooter was made by the respondent or his parents.

    Counsel further submitted that in criminal proceedings, the

    appellant also alleged that the demand of Rs.30,000/- was

    made by the respondent along with the scooter which was not

    the defence set up by her in the proceedings before the

    matrimonial court and such contradictory stands of the

    appellant would clearly establish her false claim of setting up

    defence of demand of scooter made by the respondent or his

    parents. Counsel further submitted that no attempts were

    made by the appellant to join back the company of the

    respondent at the matrimonial home and instead she had

    approached the Anti-Dowry Cell so as to falsely implicate the

    respondent and his family members to face the criminal

    proceedings. In support of her arguments, counsel for the

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    respondent placed reliance on the judgment of this Court

    reported in Vimal Kanta Vs. J.M.Kohli176 (2011) DLT 527.

    10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at

    considerable length and given my thoughtful consideration to

    the arguments advanced by them.

    11. The marriage which was solemnized between the

    parties on 30.06.82 turned ruinous within a short period of 24

    hours as per the respondent and 5 days as per the appellant.

    As per the respondent-petitioner, the appellant did not return

    back with the respondent on 01.07.82 when she was taken by

    the respondent to her parental house. As per the respondent,

    no reasons were advanced either by the appellant or her

    parents for not sending back the appellant with the

    respondent to the matrimonial home. In para 4 (B) of the

    petition, the respondent averred as under.

    4(B). That on 1st of July, 1982, the petitioner and the

    respondent went to the respondents parents house at YusufSarai and had lunch there. The parents of the respondentdid not send the respondent alongwith the petitioner. Therespondent too declined to come alongwith her husband-

    petitioner without any reason and justification. Therefore,

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    the petitioner-husband returned back to his residencehaving been disappointed by the respondents conduct.

    As per the respondent despite making efforts to bring back

    the appellant, the appellant did not return and therefore, the

    respondent filed a petition for divorce under section 13(1)(ia)

    and (ib), i.e cruelty and desertion which vide order dated

    18.7.1996 was decreed in his favour.

    12. To claim a decree on the ground of desertion as

    envisaged in section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act the

    ingredients that need to be proved , so far as the deserting

    spouse is concerned it is (i) factum of separation, (ii) the

    intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end i.e

    animus deserdendi, and so far deserted spouse is concerned,

    (i) absence of consent and (ii) the absence of conduct giving

    reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home

    to form the necessary intention aforesaid. It is also a settled

    legal position that desertion commences when the factum of

    desertion and the animus deserendi co-exist. However, it is

    not necessary that these two conditions should commence at

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    the same time as the de facto separation may commence

    earlier in point of time without the necessary animus and the

    necessary animus may arise later in point of time and then

    coincide with the factum of separation. Desertion has no

    straitjacket formula and in each case an inference has to be

    drawn from the facts of the case. It is the intentional and

    permanent forsaking of one spouse by the other without

    others consent, and without reasonable cause. This was held

    by the Apex Court in the case of Bipin Chander Vs.

    Prabhawati AIR 1957 SC 176. Along with explaining the

    essential conditions which constitute desertion as a ground

    for divorce, the Apex Court in the case of Lachman

    UtamChand Kirpalani vs. Meena Alias Mota (1964) 4

    SCR 331 while reiterating Bipin Chander(supra) held as

    under:

    It would be seen that we have here the interaction of two distinct

    matters which have to co-exist in order that desertion might cometo an end. In the first place, there must be conduct on the part ofthe deserted spouse which affords just and reasonable cause forthe deserting spouse not to seek reconciliation and which absolvesher from her continuing obligation to return to the matrimonialhome. In this one has to have regard to the conduct of thedeserted spouse. But there is one other matter which is also ofequal importance, that is, that the conduct of the deserted spouse

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    should have had such an impact on the mind of the desertingspouse that in fact it causes her to continue to live apart and thuscontinue the desertion. But where, however, on the facts it is clear

    that the conduct of the deserted spouse had had no such effect onthe mind of the deserting spouse there is no rule of law thatdesertion terminates by reason of the conduct of the desertedspouse. It appears to us that the principle that the conduct of thedeserted spouse which is proved not to have caused the desertingspouse to continue the desertion does not put an end to thedesertion appears to be self-evident and deducible from the legalconcepts underlying the law as to desertion.

    Thus it is clear from above, that the deserting spouse should

    have deserted the other spouse without his consent and

    without being there any just and reasonable cause. In a case

    of desertion by the deserting spouse there should be reasons

    sufficient enough for such spouse not to reconcile with the

    deserted spouse. But where the deserting spouse withdraws

    not only physically from the marriage but also from the

    society of the deserted spouse without any reasonable cause,

    the ground of desertion shall be available to the deserted

    spouse.

    13. Now applying the aforesaid principles of law to the

    facts of the case at hand, the appellant ceased to live with the

    appellant from 1.7.82 and as per the appellant from 5.7.82.

    However it is immaterial as to the date of separation as it is

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    not in dispute that the parties did not live together thereafter

    till the presentation of the petition and thus the essential

    condition that the parties must be living for two years

    separately before the presentation of the petition stands

    fulfilled. Thus the first ingredient of the factum of separation

    stands fulfilled.

    14. Coming to the next ingredient which is the animus

    desrendi, i.e the intention of the appellant to bring the

    cohabitation permanently to an end. As per the respondent

    petitioner the appellant did not return back from her parental

    house on 1.7.82 and the parents of the appellant also refused

    to send her back without any justifiable cause. As per the

    respondent, he again on 11.07.82 went to the parents house

    of the appellant to take her back but again the parents of the

    appellant refused to send her back with the respondent. After

    a gap of 15 days i.e. in the last week of July, 1982 another

    attempt was made by the respondent, but this time the

    appellant was found not present at her parents house and he

    was told by the parents of the appellant that she had gone to

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    her brother-in-law Mr.Umed Singh at village Nilothi. After

    having learnt this fact, the father of the respondent had called

    Mr.Umed Singh on or about 30.07.82 when in the presence of

    Shri Daryao Singh, Shri Mohinder Singh, Shri Hanumant

    Singh and Shri Sri Lal, uncles of the respondent besides his

    family members, Shri Umed Singh blamed his father-in-law

    and informed them that the appellant was not staying with

    him and in fact she was with her parents. As per the

    respondent in the first week of August, 1982, the father of the

    respondent again informed him that the appellant was living

    with Mr.Umed Singh and acting on this information, Shri

    Kalam Singh and Shri Sri Lal visited the residence of Shri

    Umed Singh at village Nilothi on 21.08.82. As per the

    respondent, on the next day, he along with his mother went to

    Shri Umed Singhs house, but the appellant refused to

    accompany the respondent. On being enquired by the

    respondent and his mother the reason as to why she was at

    the residence of Mr.Umed Singh, then she replied that it was

    her sweet will to go anywhere. As per the respondent, even

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    Mr.Umed Singh also told them that the appellant is his sister-

    in-law and he has every right over her and she has come there

    at her own will. No further efforts were made by the

    respondent to bring back the appellant and in the year 1983-

    84 the appellant filed a report with the Social Welfare Board

    and despite the intervention of the Members of the said Board

    no reconciliation could take place between the parties. As per

    the respondent, the appellant had also taken all ornaments

    with her on 01.07.82 and in this manner, the appellant

    deserted him since 01.07.82 and the repeated refusal of the

    appellant not to return back and the continued stay with her

    brother-in-law caused mental cruelty to him.

    15. The appellant, on the other hand, in her written

    statement took a defence that she was never taken back to

    her parents house on 01.07.82. As per the appellant, she was

    brought to the parents house around 4 p.m on 02.07.82 and

    she returned back with the respondent after having taken

    dinner at the parental home at about 9 p.m. It is also the case

    of the appellant that on 02.07.82 the respondent was

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    accompanied by his cousin named Ajit Singh and they

    travelled back in the same taxi which brought them to the

    parents house and on their way back, the respondent and his

    cousin and the taxi driver consumed liquor for about one hour

    and then ultimately they reached back at the matrimonial

    house around 11:30 p.m It is also the case of the appellant

    that the marriage had already been consummated on 01.07.82

    and the respondent cohabitated with the appellant upto

    04.07.82. It is also the case set up by the appellant that on

    05.07.82 in the morning her brother Gian Singh came to take

    her to the parents house in accordance with the customs. It is

    also the case of the appellant that her brother was humiliated,

    taunted and coerced to part with the two-wheeler scooter on

    which he had come with the appellant on 05.07.82. It is also

    the case of the appellant that she was not allowed to live

    peacefully by the parents of the respondent and also the

    respondent himself during the said short period between

    30.06.82 till 04.07.82, during which time all of them kept

    taunting and cursing the appellant and her parents for not

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    bringing sufficient dowry in the marriage. It is also the case of

    the appellant that on 04.07.82 the respondent and her mother

    took in possession all the ornaments which were presented to

    her from both the sides. It is also the case of the appellant

    that the respondent never came to take her back after she

    had left the matrimonial home on 05.07.82 along with her

    brother. The appellant also denied that she was ever living

    with her brother-in-law Umed Singh at village Nilothi. The

    appellant also denied that her brother-in-law was ever called

    by the father of the respondent at Sultanpur Mazra or Shri Sri

    Lal and Shri Kalam Singh ever paid visit to the house of the

    appellant or at the house of Shri Umed Singh at Nilothi or the

    respondent and his mother found the appellant present at the

    house of Shri Umed Singh on 22.08.82. The appellant also

    submitted that the divorce petition filed by the respondent

    was in fact a counter blast to the complaint filed by the

    appellant with the Anti-Dowry Cell. The appellant also took a

    stand that a criminal case was registered against the

    respondent, father, mother, brother, sister and uncle of the

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    respondent and they were arrested by the police for

    committing offences under Section 498-A/406 IPC and later

    on were enlarged on bail. The appellant in the written

    statement also took a plea that her parents and Shri Umed

    Singh received messages through one Shri Bhagwan Singh

    who was a mediator for arranging the said marriage

    regarding the demand of a two-wheeler scooter made by the

    respondent and his parents. In the background of the said

    facts, the appellant in her written statement submitted that

    since 05.07.82 she was deserted by the respondent and no

    efforts were made by the respondent to take her back even

    despite repeated panchayat meetings and efforts made by the

    area MLA Shri Bharat Singh.

    16. Based on the above pleas of the parties, the learned trial

    court held that no such conduct of the respondent was proved

    on record which could have compelled the appellant to leave

    the matrimonial home. The learned trial court further found

    that based on the evidence led by the respondent it was

    sufficiently proved on record that repeated efforts were made

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    by the respondent to visit the house of the appellant to bring

    her back. The learned trial court further found that even the

    parents of the respondent had gone to the house of Shri Umed

    Singh and even Shri Umed Singh was called to their Village to

    be told not to keep the appellant with him and send her back

    to the respondent being her legally wedded wife. The learned

    trial court also found that the respondent and his mother

    went to the house of Shri Umed Singh in Nilothi so as to

    persuade the appellant to return to the matrimonial home but

    with no result. The learned trial court further found that the

    appellant did not examine Smt.Prem and Shri Umed Singh

    who were very material witnesses to deny the version of the

    respondent about stay of the appellant at Umed Singhs place,

    therefore, adverse inference was drawn against the appellant.

    The learned trial court although found that the appellant

    failed to prove that she had been living apart from the

    respondent since 05.07.1982, but in any case the learned trial

    court also found that no effort was made by the appellant or

    her family members to send her back to the matrimonial home

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    even if the date of her returning back to the matrimonial

    home on 05.07.1982 is taken as correct. The learned trial

    court observed that as per ordinary course of human

    behaviour even if the respondent had not come to take her

    back after few days, then certainly the appellant could have

    gone back to the matrimonial home herself or her parents

    should have taken her to the matrimonial home with a view to

    rehabilitate her in the matrimonial home. With regard to the

    alleged stand of the appellant that some meetings were held

    with the members of the Panchayat, the learned trial court

    found that the allegations in this regard were absolutely

    vague and the same could not be proved by the appellant.

    17. The learned trial court has examined the evidence

    adduced by both the parties in detail and has given an

    extensive judgment holding the respondent husband entitled

    to the decree of divorce. On examining the evidence adduced

    by both the parties, it is quite manifest that the appellant has

    miserably failed to disclose any reasons, much less the

    justifiable reasons for bringing the cohabitation with the

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    respondent permanently to end. The learned trial court has

    not believed the case of the appellant that any demand of two

    wheeler scooter was made by the respondent or his parents,

    or the appellant and her brother were told not to send the

    appellant till the said demand of two wheeler scooter is

    fulfilled by the appellant and her parents. The learned trial

    court also referred to the contradictory pleas raised by the

    appellant in her written statement and in her evidence as

    well as the stand taken by her in the criminal case wherein

    the demand of two wheeler scooter, monetary demand of

    Rs.30,000/- was also alleged to have been made by the father

    of the respondent at the time of bidha ceremony. The trial

    court further found that the allegation leveled by the

    appellant in the written statement with regard to the alleged

    demand of dowry are not very clear and specific as very

    vaguely the appellant in para 4 (b) of the written statement

    took a stand that during the period i.e. 30.6.82 to 4.7.82 she

    was not allowed to live peacefully by the respondent and his

    parents as they kept on taunting and cursing her and her

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    parents as they were not satisfied with the dowry given by

    her parents at the time of marriage. The trial court also

    found that it was not the case of the appellant either in the

    written statement or in the evidence that she was forcibly

    turned out of the matrimonial house thereafter. The trial

    court also observed that the appellant failed to prove the

    exact dates, months or years as to when the alleged

    panchayats meetings took place so as to resolve the

    conflicts of the parties. The trial court also observed that the

    appellant has not filed any record to prove any copy of

    complaint/report of the proceedings of the Anti Dowry Cell or

    the Social Welfare Board where she had made her first

    complaint, so as to prove any efforts made by the appellant

    for reconciliation of the dispute with the respondent.

    18. In my considered view, no fault can be found with

    the said findings of the learned trial court. The appellant has

    nowhere in her written statement or evidence asserted or

    claimed that she made efforts to go back to her matrimonial

    home or her parents tried to send her back. It is surprising

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    that the parents of a daughter who has just been married for

    a day would not want to send her back or at least make any

    effort to send her back. The appellant has also not been able

    to prove that the in laws demanded a two wheeler or

    Rs.30,000 or in any manner taunted her for bringing

    insufficient dowry. It is surprising that with the marriage on

    30.6.82 and the appellant going to the parental house on

    1.7.82, where was the opportunity for the in laws to taunt her

    for getting insufficient dowry or she could be so seriously

    troubled with their conduct that she decided not to come back

    forever. The appellant laid much stress on the fact that the

    respondent refused to take her back when there were

    reconciliation proceedings before the Social Welfare Board. It

    is not surprising that the respondent reacted in the

    irresponsive manner, as the reconciliation proceedings were

    started after the appellant filed a complaint with the anti-

    dowry cell accusing her in laws of a criminal offence, and

    thereafter getting them arrested for offence under section

    498-A/406 IPC, which would have naturally antagonized the

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    respondent to take her back. It is also the case of the

    appellant that the marriage of the parties had already been

    consummated on 1.7.82, while this fact has been disputed by

    the respondent who has deposed that as per the customs

    prevailing in their family the marriage is not consummated on

    the first night. It is immaterial of whether the marriage was

    consummated or not or as to when it was consummated as the

    appellant has maintained the stand that she has lived with the

    respondent till 5.7.82. The relevant question to be examined

    in the facts of the case as to whether the appellant had left

    the matrimonial home with an intention to permanently bring

    cohabitation to an end and secondly whether there was a

    reasonable cause on the part of the appellant to leave the

    matrimonial home due to the conduct of the respondent. As

    already discussed above, the appellant has failed to justify

    her conduct for not returning back to the matrimonial home,

    despite repeated efforts made by the respondent. The

    learned trial court has also not believed the theory of demand

    of two wheeler scooter put forth by the appellant on account

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    of inconsistency raised by the appellant in her pleadings and

    in her evidence and also because of divergent stand taken by

    her in the criminal case filed by her under Sections 498A and

    406 IPC. It is true that the deserted spouse must establish on

    record that sufficient efforts were made by him to bring the

    deserting spouse to the matrimonial home but it is equally

    true that the deserting spouse cannot be expected to sit back

    at the parental home for no justifiable grounds and not to

    return back to the matrimonial home. Neither in the written

    statement nor in the evidence the appellant has shown

    making any such efforts to return back to the matrimonial

    home while on the other hand the respondent has successfully

    proved on record due efforts made by him to bring back the

    appellant to the matrimonial home. Taking into consideration

    the aforesaid, no infirmity or illegality can be found with the

    findings of the learned trail court as far as the ground of

    desertion is concerned.

    19. The petitioner also claimed divorce on the ground

    of cruelty as envisaged in section 13(1)(ia), which finding was

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    given in favour of the respondent and the decree of divorce

    vide the impugned passed. The appellant has also averred

    that in the present appeal the respondent has not argued the

    ground of cruelty and thus the same is deemed to have been

    abandoned by the respondent. Making cruelty as a ground for

    divorce in conjunction with the ground of desertion has

    become a common practice but it cannot be lost sight of the

    fact that the two are completely distinct grounds and have

    different barometers on which they are judged. The

    respondent has not averred any instance of cruelty strongly or

    has made a case that the conduct of the appellant was such so

    as to cause mental agony so that they are not able to live with

    each other. Hence, the findings of the learned trial court on

    the ground of cruelty are hereby set aside.

    20. Before parting with the judgment, the agonizing

    facts of the case need to be reiterated. The appellant was of

    20 years of age and the respondent 22 when they got married

    in 1982. The petition for divorce was filed by the respondent

    husband 5 years after the marriage i.e in 1987, and the

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    decree of divorce granted in 1996. The present appeal was

    filed by the appellant before this court in 1996 itself and has

    come for the final decision in the year 2012. The fact that the

    parties who stayed together for a mere 24 hours spent close

    to 30 years in alleys of courts to get rid of each other, is

    nothing but appalling to say the least. The institution of

    marriage, which is considered the holy union of two souls, is

    made mockery of by such like cases and it is no wonder that

    the relevance of this pious bond is under scanner by the youth

    today. Each marriage has its bittersweet moments which are

    cherished by the couple in the sunset of their lives. The

    companionship of the years spent together is a comforting

    pillar of strength in their old age and it is most unfortunate

    that the parties in the present case were devoid of making

    any such memories, more so because of their own faults. This

    poignant adjudication has again drawn the mind to wonder

    about the litigative voyage in our courts, especially in

    matrimonial cases, which leaves the parties with no hope,

    zeal, or time to start their lives afresh. It would also be

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    pertinent to mention here that as per the mandate of section 9

    of The Family Courts Act, 1984 and section 23(2) of the Hindu

    Marriage Act, the Matrimonial Courts should make every

    positive endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the

    parties so that the matter can be amicably settled on mutually

    acceptable terms at the very threshold. The courts should

    make efforts at the initial stage itself so that the burden of the

    courts is also lessened and the parties are also saved from the

    arduous litigation. The services of the mediators and

    counselors especially appointed for this purpose are at the

    disposal of the Family Courts, and should be utilized to the

    fullest so that parties are reconciled or agree to part mutually

    and amicably. Let the object of section 9 of the Family Courts

    Act and section 23(2) HMA not be defeated by a ritualistic

    exercise but a concerted, cohesive and conscientious effort on

    the part of the Matrimonial Courts to bring the parties to a

    pacific agreement. In-time intervention of the courts dealing

    with marital disputes with devotion of sufficient hearings at

    the initial stage itself may save such parties this long ordeal.

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    The courts should make sustained and persistent attempts

    even when the pleadings are complete and evidence led, as it

    will certainly yield potent results. The present case is nothing

    but a venomous irony that the vengeance which was caused in

    one day between the parties was nurtured by them for three

    decades, and I hope that they realize that it has bereft them of

    everything that matrimonial life would have instore, leaving

    them now with nothing but remorse.

    21. In the light of the above, the present appeal is

    dismissed.

    22. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to all the

    Matrimonial Courts functioning in various District Courts at

    Delhi.

    January, 2012 KAILASH GAMBHIR, JDc/mg