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Just and Unjust Wars: A Study of the Israeli Wars

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Abstract

The debate as to what constitutes a just war is ancient. Just war theories stem from

philosophical, religious and military thinking. Christian religious thinkers, like St.

Augustine (354-430), and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) spoke of laws of war and

peace, reflecting on the reasons that brought about war (jus ad bellum) and the means

employed in the conduct of war (jus in bello). A contemporary thinker that developed a

liberal theory on just and unjust wars that accentuates moral considerations is Michael

Walzer. He used Clausewitz as a point of departure, aiming to construct an

interdisciplinary liberal theory that brings together political theory, ethics and

international relations. In this paper, I employ Walzer’s theory to assess the

justifications to all Israeli wars from the day of its establishment until nowadays.

Section (I) provides historical-philosophical background and context. Section (II)

accentuates the underpinning principles of Walzer’s theory. Section (III) explains

Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East and its defence conception. Section (IV)

employs Walzer’s theory to analyse the wars. I argue that while the 1948 Independence

War, the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War were

justified, the 1982 Lebanon War, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the 2008-2009

War on Gaza were not.

Key words: Israel, Arab-Israeli conflict, just wars, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, Michael

Walzer, proportionality

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I. Introduction

The history of war is as old as the history of nations. When nations perceive certain

ends as valuable and aim to achieve them no matter what, they might opt to war once

the peaceful means had failed. War is designed to coerce the opponent to abide by the

wishes of the aggressor. Throughout history, nations competing for power waged wars

in order to conquer territories, achieve economic domination or to compel others to

abide by certain religious, cultural and social norms.

Attitudes to war differed from time to time. The Greeks saw war as a necessary

evil, an instrument to be employed from time to time in order to achieve normal,

peaceful life. The Romans assigned far greater importance to war. Its manifestations

found significant place in their language and way of life. The Caesar was called

“Imperator” (Winner in a battle), and the first month of the Roman calendar was called

Mars, God of War.

The debate as to what constitute a just war is also ancient. The old saying “All is

fair in love and war” might be true for love but it is patently untrue for war. Politicians,

diplomats, scholars, theologians and lawyers have devoted a great deal of their time to

address the challenging task of drawing boundaries to what combatants can do in a time

of war. In the Bible we find attempts to discern between just and unjust wars, and to

define just principles in the war conduct. In Deuteronomy, Chapter 20, we find war

codes of conduct that instruct how to treat men, women and children of a conquered

city:

20:10 When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim

peace unto it.

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20:11 And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee,

then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries

unto thee, and they shall serve thee;

20:12 And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee,

then thou shalt besiege it;

20:13 And when the LORD thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou

shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword;

20:14 But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the

city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat

the spoil of thine enemies, which the LORD thy God hath given thee;

20:15 Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee,

which are not of the cities of these nations;

20:16 But of the cities of these people, which the LORD thy God doth give

thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth;

20:17 But thou shalt utterly destroy them; namely, the Hittites, and the

Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites; as

the LORD thy God hath commanded thee:

20:18 That they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they

have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the LORD your God;

20:19 When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to

take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against

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them: for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the

tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege;

20:20 Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat,

thou shalt destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against

the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued (Deuteronomy,

Chapter 20, http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/dt/20.html).

Just war theories stem from philosophical, religious and military thinking.

Christian religious thinkers, like St. Augustine (354-430), and Thomas Aquinas (1225–

1274) spoke of laws of war and peace, reflecting on the reasons that brought about war

(jus ad bellum) and the means employed in the conduct of war (jus in bello). The

Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) wrote (1968, p. 125): “As

war is not an act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the

value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be

purchased”.1 War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of political negotiation by

other, violent means. Policy does not stop when the war breaks: It continues violently.

Therefore, national interests override military interests that, by definition, relate only to

means, not to national ends. Morality is not an obstacle. The only restrictions on the

employment of force relate to abilities.

A contemporary thinker who developed a liberal theory on just and unjust wars

that accentuates moral considerations is Michael Walzer. His book, Just and Unjust Wars,

helped the shaping of the foregoing literature and became a classic text. Walzer used

Clausewitz as a point of departure, aiming to construct an interdisciplinary liberal

theory that brings together political theory, ethics and international relations. In this

1 For a concise history of the just war theory, see Lee (2012, pp. 35-67).

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paper, I employ Walzer’s theory to assess the justifications to all Israeli wars from the

day of its establishment until nowadays. Section (II) accentuates the underpinning

principles of Walzer’s theory. Section (III) explains Israel’s precarious position in the

Middle East and its defence conception. Section (IV) employs Walzer’s theory to analyse

the wars. I argue that while the 1948 Independence War, the 1956 Sinai Campaign

(known also as the Suez War), the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War

were justified, the 1982 Lebanon War, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the 2008-

2009 War on Gaza were not.

Some provisos are in place: I will not discuss the aftermath of the wars. It is

granted that Israel's conduct after the wars was not always justified. I believe, for

instance, that the aftermath of the Six Day War cannot be justified as occupation qua

occupation is morally repugnant. This issue, however, deserves a separate analysis. I

should also note that I will not address the War of Attrition, a nagging war of a constant

drip of casualties with no ends in sight that lasted between March 1969 to August 1970

until official ceasefire between Israel and Egypt was declared (Bar-Siman Tov 1980;

Kober 2009).

In the focus of my analysis are the reasons that brought about war, jus ad bellum,

whether the wars were in self-defence. I analyse only the Israeli side of the conflict. I

will not address the war conduct of Israel’s enemies as my knowledge of languages is

limited (I read mere two languages, Hebrew and English). To adequately assess the

Arab side one needs to master Arabic. Because Israel was militarily attacked in 1948

and in 1973, the issue of jus ad bellum is straightforward and does not require elaborate

analysis.

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When discussing the 1948 War of Independence, the two Lebanon wars (1982 and

2006) and the Gaza Cast Lead Operation I will also attend to questions relating to the

means employed in the conduct of war, jus in bello, the concept of proportionality, and

the treatment of non-combatants. By proportionality it is meant that the evil inflicted on

the enemy does not significantly exceed the resisted evil caused by the enemy. It

requires weighing the moral wrong of an attack against the military advantage that is

aimed to achieve (Lee 2012, p. 156). These questions were less significant in the

conduct of the 1956 Suez Campaign, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur

War. No war is completely free of atrocities but up till now there are no reported

staggering events to suggest that the war conduct was immoral during those three wars.

II. Theory

Any violation of the territorial integrity or the political sovereignty of an independent

state is called aggression (Walzer 2006, p. 52).2 It is a situation in which two or more

parties engage in an armed conflict where human life and fundamental freedoms as well

as the sovereignty of the community are challenged. Walzer (2006, p. 53) writes:

“Aggression is a singular and undifferentiated crime because, in all its forms, it

challenges rights that are worth dying for”.

The victim of aggression fights in self-defence, on behalf of his community, rather

than solely in his name. People have the right to engage in war and even to punish the 2 The definition of aggression that was accepted by the U.N. in 1974 is: “Aggression is the use of armed

force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or

in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N”. United Nations General Assembly

Resolution 3314 (XXIX), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GAres3314.html

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state that decided to violate the serenity of their society. Walzer (2006, pp. 61-62)

summarized the theory of aggression in six points:

1. The international community is composed of independent states whose

governments protect the rights and the interests of their residents.

2. The international law is binding on all sovereign countries. It asserts the rights of

all communities and above all their territorial integrity and political sovereignty.

3. Any threat or use of force by a state against the political sovereignty or the

territorial integrity of another state is an act of aggression and a crime.

4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: Defensive war by the attacked

party, and a war of law enforcement by the attacked party and by any other

nation of the international community.

5. There is no justification for war actions except for aggression. Only the desire to

cause injustice to another state might bring a state to justify declaration of war

and the use of force.

6. Following the defeat of the aggressor, it can also be punished for the world to

see. This principle satisfies the wish for revenge and is also intended for

deterrence, preventing other states from acting in a similar way in the future.

War and Justice are not easily reconcilable. It has been argued that the scene of

war is a world of its own, where the life and existence are at stake. In such world, people

do whatever possible to save their lives and their communities, and therefore one might

argue there is no place for morality and law: Inter arma silent leges – The law is silent in

time of war (Walzer 2006, p. 3).

Walzer rightly objects this point of view and claims that we are living in a moral

world; that decisions are not made in isolation; they contain moral considerations. The

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moral duty should not be postponed just because of the complicated context. In fact,

some decisions are tough and problematic because the world we live in is a moral

world, and because of the moral judgments that humanity is sharing. Indeed, moral

considerations may influence and decide physical considerations. Morality prescribes

certain actions and inactions. As Clausewitz (1968, p. 252) said: “…theory cannot banish

the moral forces beyond its frontier, because the effects of the physical forces and the

moral are completely fused, and are not to be decomposed like a metal alloy by a

chemical process”. We weigh and evaluate the justifications for war, the war conduct

and its outcome through the moral lens.

Walzer uses the terms “justice” and “morals” interchangeably, as if they were one

and the same: the value of justice is mixed with the value of morals. The moral person is

honest and noble.3 Justice is a primary impulse of the human soul, the base of the

community’s basics. The just, or the moral person, is a virtuous person who is guided by

a healthy sense of judgement about what is right for the person to do, and what he

should avoid doing. Following the long tradition mentioned supra, Walzer (2006, p. 21)

suggests that wars need to be analyzed in two levels:

The first level is jus ad bellum – the justice of war, the right to engage war. It

concerns the reasons that brought about the war; ideas about righteous reason,

righteous authority, righteous intention. The justice of the cause is sufficiently great so

as to warrant warfare (Evans 2005, p. 12). Jus ad bellum also concerns the wish for the

war to cease instead of bringing more evil than good to the world; the beliefs that war

3 The Roman jurist Gnaeus Domitius Annius Ulpianus (170-223) explained that justice is the constant and

perpetual will to allot to every man his due. He defined the term “justice”: “Honeste vivere, alterum non

laedere, suum cuique tribuere” (To live honorably, to harm no one, to give to each his own). For critic of

Walzer, see Bellamy (2004); McMahan (2004).

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should be the last resort and that peace is always desired. Still, sometimes war is an ugly

necessity in order to avoid an even greater evil.

The second level, jus in bello, relates to the war conduct, the limitations and

restrictions applied to the war from the very moment it has begun. Jus in bello relates to

the conditions that qualify a person as a combatant, the conditions that qualify

legitimate targets, the strategy and tactics that can be resorted to, in terms of the scale

of the attacks and the weapons that can be used. As Immanuel Kant explained, the

killing of innocent civilians should be avoided as much as possible, otherwise peace

could not be concluded and the hostilities might turn into a war of extermination (Kant

1991, p. 96). The end does not justify the means. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and

1907,4 the Geneva Convention of 19495 and the Additional Geneva Protocol of 19776

have consolidated some of the ideas of the just war theory into international law.

Thus it is possible to fight a just war by unjust means. To characterize war as

just, both the reasons for the war and the war conduct should be just: the war should be

fought in strict accordance to the accepted norms. Any discussion on the morality of war

requires us to first understand the general analytical principles and then to apply them

to the case at hand with meticulous attention to details, facts and events.

In jus ad bellum, the focus of analysis is on the decision-makers, political and

military. In jus in bello the analysis also includes the combatants, the soldiers who are

required to obey orders and to conduct the war. Soldiers are expected to behave as

moral people, with discretion, judgment and ability to distinguish between right and

4 http://www.cfr.org/international-law/hague-conventions-1899-1907/p9597. See also Webster (2011).

5 http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp

6 http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument

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wrong. Sometimes, their moral compass might come into contradiction with immoral

commands. Soldiers should not agree to be accomplices in an unjustified crime which

they can and want to oppose, as they will have to bear the consequences. Soldiers

cannot be relieved by simply saying “I merely obeyed orders”. Some orders carry black

flag above them that neither be obeyed nor ignored.

To win wars, governments invest significant resources in convincing their

citizens in the war’s justifiability. Without popular support, a victory cannot be

achieved. During the war, both political and military decision-makers highlight the

wrong-doing of the opponent and the legitimacy of their own war conduct. It takes

courage to doubt this reasoning as people tend to conform, especially at times of

extreme pressure, when the unity of the nation receives greater importance. The

routine habits of law-abidingness, the natural fears, the sense of patriotism, the basic

loyalty to the State, explains Walzer (2006, p. 39) are all powerful legitimating forces.

An old proverb says, “When guns speak, the muses keep silent”. But with all their might,

the guns cannot cancel out moral considerations. Soldiers must not be mere blind tools

in the hands of their leaders. They are responsible for their deeds and they bear both

rights and obligations. John Rawls opined (1972, p. 381) that if a soldier is given an

order to participate in a war and he believes, rationally and morally, that the principles

which guide the war are immoral, he is duty-bound to refuse to fight: “Actually, if the

aims of the conflict are sufficiently dubious and the likelihood of receiving flagrantly

unjust commands sufficiently great, one may have a duty and not only a right to

refuse”.7 Similarly, during the war no order should be followed blindly, without some

7 Examples for refusal to fulfill murderous orders can be found in the Bible. For example, King Saul

ordered: “'Thou shalt surely die, Ahimelech, thou, and all thy father's house.' And the king said unto the

guard that stood about him: 'Turn, and slay the priests of the Lord; because their hand also is with David,

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reflection. There are some kinds of responsibility which are obligatory for everyone,

notwithstanding rank.

III. Israel’s Precarious Position in the Middle East

Israel is a small country. Its size is roughly 21,200 square kilometers, more or less the

size of the State of Massachusetts (21,456 sq km) which is ranked 45th among the 50

states of the United States.8 The abovementioned size does not include the West Bank

(5,607 sq km),9 which is not officially part of Israel. Israeli law does not apply in the

West Bank, where the majority of the population consists of Palestinians, about 2.5

million, and 500,000 Jewish settlers (Dror 2011, p. 102; BBC News 12 March 2012). On

the eve of Israel's 64th Independence Day, its population was 7,881,000 people; of them

about 75 percent were Jews (Jewish Virtual Library April 2012).

Israel has four Arab neighbor states: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Israel is

different from its neighbors in many crucial respects: religion, culture, language, and

regime. For many years, its neighbours refused to accept it, perceiving Israel as a bone

in their throat. As the Arab states are many times stronger and larger than Israel in

means, size and in population, every threat is taken most seriously. Israel’s history is

thus history of survival.

and because they knew that he fled, and did not disclose it to me.' But the servants of the king would not

put forth their hand to fall upon the priests of the Lord” (1 Samuel, Chapter 22, 16-17).

8 Massachusetts - Location, size, and extent, http://www.city-data.com/states/Massachusetts-Location-

size-and-extent.html

9 5,900 sq km with East Jerusalem. See American Heritage Dictionary: West Bank,

http://www.answers.com/topic/west-bank

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Since its establishment, Israel had to fight. From 1948 until 2010, some 23,000

Israelis were killed in wars and terror attacks (Dror 2011, p. 16). This loss is felt in

every home in Israel. Israel’s objectives were to continue its existence and to uphold the

political prerogatives of nationality. Facing unequal balance of power, unfavourable

geo-strategic conditions and consistent threats of physical annihilation, Israel was

forced to develop a strong army that could withstand the siege. As up until the 1970s

none of its neighbours was willing even to recognize Israel’s existence, not to mention

reaching some form of reconciliation, violence was expected. The Israeli security policy

was dictated by its Arab nations’ strategy that aimed to undermine Israel’s existence

(Gissin 1982). Thus, until the 1970s wars were perceived as an inevitable eruption and

expansion of the constant violence. The periods between wars were perceived as latent

wars. Lack of economic resources, limited geo-strategic depth, and subjective elements

of a post-traumatic nation recovering from the Holocaust led Israel to develop a

defensive strategy that relied first and foremost on its strong army (Dror 2011). The

reasoning was: the world did not rush to save the European Jewry. There was no

reason to think that something significant has changed. The nations still won’t be

propelled to do the work for Israel and to come to its rescue in case of need. Thus, the

development of a strong military power was the most important priority.

All Zionist political parties, from the far left to the far right, recognize security

needs and the necessity to maintain a strong army in order to sustain Israel’s

sovereignty. Security is a basic necessity, sine qua non to the promotion of other ends,

including peace. All parties and the whole country unite in the face of security

challenges. The Israeli security policy has the following characteristics:

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a. It is aimed to secure ability to overcome alone challenges posed by

neighbouring national-states.

b. Thus about a third of its annual budget is dedicated to security issues.

c. At the same time, Israel always sought the support of influential

international players and aspired to develop security relationships with

many countries across the globe (Dror 2011).

d. There is no clear borderline between times of war and times of relative

peace (Horowitz 1984, p. 107).

e. Peace is a desired end, a value in itself. But important as certainly peace

is, security is the prime consideration; nothing should undermine Israel’s

security.

f. Zero sum game exists between Israel and its enemies, where gains for the

one necessarily mean loss for the other.

g. Thus, violations of the status-quo by Israel’s enemies are unacceptable.

Such violations are met by active steps to restore the status quo ante.

h. Freedom of naval navigation is crucial. For many years, the sea was the

only gateway which did not pass through hostile territory. The sea should

remain open in accordance with international laws (Alon 1959, p. 347).

i. Threats and intimidation are necessary for deterrence. Threats, of course,

need to correspond to the stakes at any given point. They need to be

credible and sufficient to overcome the challenge posed by the aggressor

(Craig and George 1983).

j. Deterrence is more an act of hostility rather than fear. Such behavioural

model is based on the stick rather than the carrot. Schelling explained

(1963, p. 9): “Deterrence is concerned with the exploitation of potential

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force. It is concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should in

his own interest avoid certain courses of activity”.

k. Thus Israel wishes to be perceived as a resolute and determined actor,

willing to protect its interests, building an image of insistence and will to

apply sanctions, including force when it deems necessary (Yaniv 1985).

As Claude explained (1967, p. 57): “Deterrence is a psychological

phenomenon, deriving from the belief that the power situation does not

favor aggressive action”.10

l. When measures of deterrence failed, military force on varying scales was

used to secure the integrity of the State and its sovereignty.

m. Israeli leaders are well aware of its geo-strategic vulnerability and its

inferiority compared to the Arab world, parts of which wish to destroy it.

Israeli leaders know that Israel cannot match Arab quantitative abilities.

There is no comparison between Israel’s size and population and the Arab

countries’ size and population. Israel lacks strategic depth, is surrounded

by Arab countries, and it lacks natural resources which are in abundance

in Arab lands (Alon 1959, pp. 55-60; Sharon 15 December 1981).

n. Israel has thus developed and produced both defensive and attacking

capabilities (Alon 1959, p. 342) and sophisticated weaponry in order to

maintain “a permanent qualitative advantage over Arab confrontation

states”. Israel aspires to have clear qualitative and technological

superiority (Sharon 15 December 1981; Cordesman 2010).

10 See also Maniv (1987, p. 185).

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o. Israel would try to disrupt the war coalition by damaging the core of its

offensive capability (Sharon 15 December 1981).

p. Israel’s existential imperative leads to ruthless conduct if it is attacked or

threatened (Dror 2011, p. 25).

q. The “Worst Case Scenario” is always in the minds of the decision-makers

as they always believe that the State is under siege. Consequently, the aim

is to secure the widest possible security margins.

r. The perception is one of “Power Politics” orientation, rejecting juridical

and moral codes of behaviour when those seem contradictory to the

above characteristics (Horowitz 1984, p. 107).

The radical Arab stand against Israel of neither peace nor reconciliation or even

mere recognition of its right to exist brought about high level of sensitivity to each

declaration and action against Israel. Understanding the “crazy” characteristics of the

Arab nations was crucial for Israeli strategy (Dror 1973), leading its leaders to think

that the only language the Arabs understand was force. The virulent, unabashed

hostility towards Israel undermined common features of deterrence policy that

customarily assume that rivals act rationally: they calculate risks and benefits; they

avoid taking high risks and are repelled by strong sanctions. Israeli leaders thought in

the past and are still thinking today that Arab leaders are willing to take very high risks

to destroy Israel. The assumption is that Arab extremists have different norms of

rationality than the ones that guide western leaders. The combination of insecurity and

lack of trust in the other’s ability to act rationally lead to frequent collapse of deterrence

in the Middle East, and bring about sporadic eruptions of violence.

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While Israeli leaders believe that Israel should secure its own capabilities to

withstand any challenge against its sovereignty and basic rights, they always sought

powerful allies that might come to help. During the 1950s, France was the sought-after

major power. Indeed, the close relationships between Israel and France led to the 1956

Sinai War. Until the June 1967 War, France was the main supplier of Israel's weapons

but on 3 June, two days before the beginning of the Six Day War, French president

General Charles de Gaulle decreed an arms embargo on Israel and the rosy relationships

came to an end. From then on Israel allied itself with the United States. The bond and

strategic alliance between the two sides has deepened since then, and although the

relationships have had ups and downs, the bond is still said to be unshakeable. On 22

May 2011, President Obama remarked that “the bonds between the United States and

Israel are unbreakable, and the commitment of the United States to the security of Israel

is ironclad” (Obama 22 May 2011).

In crises times, Israel had usually taken three steps which constituted the basis of its

deterrence policy (Bar-Joseph 2001; Yaniv 1985, p. 43): verbal threats by its leaders;

mobilization of reserve soldiers, and negotiations with allies in order to receive their

support and approval (public or discrete) to use force against the enemy. As said, Israeli

leaders understand that they are not able to equally compete with the Arabs on

resources as the Arabs enjoy capabilities that Israel does not have, primarily land,

population, and oil. Thus Israel does not aim to have the same number of soldiers,

airplanes, tanks etc. Israel attempts to retain a certain ratio vis-à-vis its enemies, and to

rely on developed military skills, enhanced technology and superior weapons, supplied

by the Americans, to withstand aggression.

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The centrality of the military-defensive perception in Israel leads to forming

many ties and links between the military and the civilian sectors (Lasswell 1941). The

tendency of the military elite to gather and keep power makes the army an important

player in the economy and politics of Israel (Levy 2012). Retired generals enjoy high

esteem and are well positioned to start a second successful career in business or

politics. Indeed, some generals try both (Peri 1985). At the same time, up until now the

army never challenged the democratic elements of Israeli democracy and has always

subordinated itself to the elected governments. As Horowitz (1977, p. 75) explained,

although Israel is a “Fortress Nation” it is much closer to the Athenian model of

governance than to the Spartanian model as the prominence of security issues does not

lead to limitations on society’s openness and does not threaten to resolve civil conflicts

via military force.

Michael Walzer acknowledges (2006, p. xxiv) that the proper method of practical

morality is casuistic in character. I now turn to apply his theory to the Israeli wars from

1948 until now.

IV. Applications

The Israeli Independence War

From its inception Israel had to face hostile neighbours that refused to come to terms

with its very existence. The war started after the UN partition resolution of 29

November 1947. The initial phase was characterized by Arab attacks on Jewish convoys

and street fighting in Tel Aviv-Jaffa and in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Arab force was

made up of four main components: (1) The Arab Liberation Army (ALA) which had

4,000 fighters. It marched into Palestine on 20 January 1948 from Jordan (Bregman

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2010, p. 15); (2) Volunteers from the Moslem Brothers and Egyptian youth

organizations which had 1,000-1,500 men; (3) Abdall Quader al-Husseini troops which

consisted of some 5,000 men; (4) Hasan Salemmeh troops of 3,000 men. In addition,

some thousand Arab para regulars joined the fighting.

On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the Jewish

state. That same day, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cummingham, the seventh and last

British High Commissioner for Palestine, sailed from Haifa to England. Early morning of

15 May, the newly-founded state of less than one-day-old, was attacked by its

neighbours. The total force of the invading armies was about 23,500 troops, made up of

10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Arab Legion of Transjordan, 3,000 Syrians, 3,000 Iraqis, and

3,000 Lebanese and Arab Liberation Army troops. Against them stood the Israeli

Haganah (Defence) forces which were comprised of native born Sabras and new

immigrants to Israel. In July 1948, the Haganah comprised of more than 63,000 men and

women (Bregman 2010, p. 24). Many of the new immigrants came from the ruins of

Europe, marred and scarred by the Nazi machinery that was utilized with all its might to

destroy them. Many did not have a common language, and did not speak the local

language, Hebrew. These people, who survived the Holocaust, were immediately thrown

into yet another war.

In weaponry and firepower, at the start of the war the Arabs had clear

advantage. As the war progressed, the balance shifted to the Israelis. Weapons arrived

from Europe and the USA. The Israelis needed every bit of help to withstand the attacks

on the three fronts. The brutal war, which had cost the lives of 1 percent of the Jewish

population (5,682 people), lasted more than 15 months. The Israeli forces occupied

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about 2,500 square miles of Arab land which was added to the 5,600 square miles

allocated to them by the UN 1947 Partition Resolution (Morris 2009; Tal 2003).

The 1948 War is a clear example of self-defence. The young Israel, of few-hours-

old, was attacked by all its neighbours who explicitly declared their aim to annihilate

the State. Israel was forced to defend itself against aggression, knowing that defeat

would mean the end of its existence. The war conduct (jus in bello), however, was

problematic. There were cases of theft, looting and rape. There were notorious incidents

of murder and of coerced transfer of civilians outside Israel’s borders. In late 1948, a

policy of clearing the new borders was adopted. Inter alia, the 50,000 inhabitants of Lod

and Ramle were systematically expelled to Arab territory (Morris 1987, p. 237; Morris

2010, p. 317). A notorious massacre took place at Dir Yassin, a village whose inhabitants

waged fight against the Israeli attacking forces on 9 April 1948. In retaliation, after the

village was conquered by the Israeli platoon, some families were executed in cold blood

(Morris 2010, pp. 147-149). Both Arabs and Jews violated codes of moral and failed to

take proper measures to ensure that the life and liberties of innocent civilians remained

intact.11

Sinai 1956 Campaign (The Suez War)

The second major war broke out eight years after the Independence War. Over the

period 1951-1956, Israel lost hundreds of its citizens as a result of terrorist acts

perpetrated by Arab intruders, Fedayeen. They reached targets deep inside Israel’s

11 Nocens in Latin means “engaged in harmful activity”; in-nocens thus means the opposite, people who are

not engaged in harmful activity.

20

territory, within 18 kilometres of Tel Aviv (Stein 2009, p. 169). In September 1955,

Egypt and the Soviet Union signed the Czech-Egyptian arms deal which dramatically

changed the power balance in the Middle-East. The great amount of high-quality

weapons that were transferred to Egypt rang the alarms across the Israeli General Staff.

Massive Soviet backup gave the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, advantage in

power, as well as moral advantage (Bar-On 1994). In October 1955, the threat had

become even greater when Egypt and Syria established a joint military headquarters

(Podeh 1995, p. 165). Nasser’s arrogant statements regarding the annihilation of the

Zionist enemy intensified, along with artillery attacks on Israel’s south border

settlements. The skirmishes along the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian borders were

frequent and most troubling. Numerous border violations continued to take place

during the first months of 1956 (Morris 1997; Varble 2003; Smith 2008). In April 1956,

the situation had worsened when the Egyptian army began crossing the border and to

bomb settlements along Gaza Strip: Kissufim, Ein HaShlosha, Nahal Oz, Nirim and others

(Ben-Gurion 1975, p. 496).

The Egyptian tremendous military boost drew Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan (1991)

to the conclusion that Israel’s sole option was to launch a pre-emptive war.12 Dayan

12 In the field of international relations, pre-emption is about acting against an imminent threat while

prevention involves acting against a more distant threat. Consequently, pre-emption is almost always

justified, as there seem to be no other means available to avert the danger, and aggression is perceived as

an act of last resort. With prevention, the threatened side should exhaust all possible means prior opening

an attack. Freedman (2003) explains that prevention is cold blooded: it intends to deal with a problem

before it becomes a crisis, while preemption is a more desperate strategy used as the crisis escalates.

Without a compelling cause, writes Freedman, preventive war can soon look like any other aggression

and might trigger opposition.

21

wished to break the Egyptian army before it accepts the vast Czech armament (Tal 27

April 1997). Ben-Gurion feared that unless Israel could at least partially match the new

Egyptian arsenal, a full-scale war was inevitable.

Situated in a violent and hostile region, Israel sought powerful friends (see

Section III supra). It first turned to the United States but the American administration

rejected the quite modest request for 48 jets and 60 tanks. Then David Ben-Gurion

turned to the United Kingdom but it also refused to redress the Middle East arms

imbalance. Then Israel turned to France. The architect of negotiations was Shimon

Peres. The newly elected Prime Minister Guy Mollet, and his foreign minister Christian

Pineau, were sympathetic (Ben-Gurion 1975; Tal 2001). In March 1956, Israel received

the first batch of French jets and tanks, followed by a steady flow of additional supplies

that enabled Israel to offset its potential vulnerability.

The French arms sales to Israel were largely derived from a perception that

Israel could well serve France as an ally in confronting Nasser. When Nasser, on 26 July

1956, nationalized the Suez Canal Company, owned and managed by Britain and France,

both governments agreed to pursue a joint military campaign dubbed “Musketeer”. At

first, the British demanded that Israel was neither to be party to their venture nor to be

informed of imminent hostilities. But later the British changed their mind and signed

the Sèvres Accords (October 1956) with France and Israel in which the three countries

collided to wage an attack on Egypt (Nutting 1957; Eden 1968; Lloyd 1978; Kyle 2003;

Shlaim 1997; Verbeek 2003).

The driving force behind the Suez Campaign was the mercurial general, Moshe

Dayan. For a long period of time, Ben-Gurion was hesitant regarding the preliminary

attack, thinking of the threat of entangling in a long war during which the Egyptian

22

bomber planes could bring great devastation to Israel’s civilian home-front. But from

the very moment the decision to initiate a joint attack was accepted, Israeli main

objective was to enlarge its borders. Ben-Gurion had hoped Israel would be able to keep

the lands it conquered during the war. Already before the end of the war, Ben-Gurion

announced that Israel wanted to free the Tiran Straits and that he knew “An uneasy

political struggle is waiting for us”, but as Israel did not flinch in the past, it won’t be

deterred now: “we won’t belittle ourselves before the mighty world when justice is not

with them” (Ben-Gurion 1975, p. 530).

Apart from conquering the land, Israel wanted to achieve three other goals:

a. Impairment of the Egyptian ability to confront Israel, and preventing

Egypt from becoming a stronger power.

b. Destruction of the Fedayeen bases.

c. Opening the Tiran Straits to ships of all national flags, including Israel.

The operation, which began on 30 October 1956, with the dropping of 400

paratroops over the Mitla Pass, had come to an end on 6 November 1956 as a result of

Soviet and American pressure to bring the combat operations to halt. By the end of the

Campaign, the Fedayeen bases were destroyed, and the Tiran Straits were re-opened. As

for land conquest, by the end of the Campaign, Israel held the entire Sinai Peninsula bar

a 15-kilometer strip across the Canal and assumed control over the Straits of Tiran. But

the post-Campaign negotiations forced Israel to evacuate the captured territory.

Interestingly, neither Jordan nor Syria entered the conflict. This decision played a

critical part in their subsequent crucial decision, a decade later, to enter the 1967 War.

Then both countries’ leaders felt that they could not, yet again, remain at the sidelines

watching.

23

Under intense international pressure, Britain was the first (November 1956) to

abandon the Suez Campaign. The next month, France followed suit. Israel reluctantly

began to pull back its forces and by March 1957 it withdrew in full from all Egyptian

territories (Verbeek 2003; Stein 2009, p. 211). The Campaign, however, brought Nasser

to the realization that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was a formidable force, and that

Egypt lacked the power to subdue Israel. Israel thus entered a decade of relative

tranquillity and security up until 1967. During that period, Nasser worked to strengthen

his military capabilities, to bolster his position in the Arab world as the first among

equals, and to bridge the gap between his yearning to destroy Israel and his capabilities

to achieve that end.

Israeli forced withdrawal from Sinai, without any compensation, made its

leaders realize that victory in the battlefield does not assure victory in the international

community. Aftermath diplomacy is no less important than combat ability. The dream of

peace remained far-fetched. Even mere acceptance in the region was not achieved.

Israel’s neighbours remained hostile to its very existence and reiterated their threat to

obliterate the young nation off the face of the earth.

In coming to assess the justifiability of this war we need to ask whether the

preventive act was warranted. Walzer claims that preventive war assumes some sort of

scale to measure the danger. Such scale exists in the decision makers’ mind and is called

“balance of power”. In Walzer’s opinion (2006, p. 76), that is the guiding theme of

international politics from the 17th century until today. This idea, in Walzer’s opinion, is

the classic argument in favour of preventive war which is fought to maintain the

balance, striving to prevent an opponent from getting too strong to the point of

dominance.

24

When should the threatened side begin a preventive war? Buchan (1967, p. 169)

explains that a preventive action is a decision to attack when a nation has a reason to

believe it is going to be attacked, or because the strategic situation will likely never

become better for this kind of action. The motivation behind a sudden attack is often the

intent to act before your enemy acts. Because balance of power is a matter of

perception, and fear is a bad guide for action as it is subjective, there is a need for

concrete yardsticks that evoke alarm and signal the threatened side that its security is

threatened. Walzer writes (2006, p. 80): “We don’t want to fight until we are

threatened, because only then can we rightly fight. It is a question of moral security”. He

explains that military alliances, mobilizations, troop movements, border incursions,

naval blockades, “all these, with or without verbal menace, sometimes count and

sometimes do not count as sufficient indications of hostile intent. But it is, at least, these

sorts of actions with which we are concerned” (Walzer 2006, p. 81).

The Sinai Campaign was a justified preventive war because, as Walzer (2006, p.

76) explains, “A preventive war is a war fought to maintain the balance, to stop what is

thought to be an even distribution of power from shifting into a relation of dominance

and inferiority”.13 The criteria set by Walzer were fulfilled in the Sinai Campaign:

justified reasons; serious threats which led to substantive fears; justified goals.

Although no immediate threat to Israel’s existence was present in the short term, the

events that took place before the war cannot be ignored. Between 1951 and 1956, Israel

suffered hundreds of casualties as a result of terrorist attacks. The constant Fedayeen

infiltrations violated Israel’s territory, property and human lives. Being the instructor

and operator of the infiltrators who terrorized the Israeli population, and following the

13 For further discussion, see Frowe (2011, pp. 72-80); Lee (2012, pp. 79-82).

25

Czech arms deal, Egypt endangered the power-balance between Israel and the Arab

states. In addition, Egypt blocked the Tiran Straits and closed its aerial zone for Israeli

airplanes. Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in July 1956 constituted a

great threat to Israel as it violated of its rights as a sovereign state (see Section III supra,

freedom of naval navigation is crucial). De-facto, the direct connection with East Africa,

the Far East and the Persian Gulf was cut. The closure of the Straits hampered oil

mobilization from Iran.

Indeed, the closure of Straits was an act of aggression that challenged the most

basic rights of Israel; its recognition as a sovereign state that deserves equal rights. The

war was not fought for glory or for other inappropriate values, although the way it was

plotted does not set a positive example unto the nations. The other problematic aspect

of the war was Israel’s aim to conquer land, expanding its territory at the expense of

Egypt. Surely, the expansion ambition was not essential to secure Israel’s existence.

Indeed, Israel was coerced to return the conquered land. However, as Walzer claims

(2006, p. 137), when a state fights against aggression, it is allowed to harm the

territorial wholeness and the political sovereignty of the aggressor, as long as its

soldiers do not take civilian lives. Also, Israel did not resort to unjust war methods that

can be considered as criminal, in clear violation of agreed upon morals of war.

The Six Day War

The Suez War brought about eleven years of quiet on the Sinai front. But in 1967, a

string of events pushed Israel and Egypt to yet another bloody confrontation. Moshe

Dayan (1969, p. 9) noted that 13 May was the decisive day. The Soviet Union that

wished to maintain a heightened level of tension in the region so as to cultivate its

26

indispensability in the Arab minds had notified The United Arab Republic (UAR)14 and

Syria about deployment of 10 Israeli brigades on the Syrian border (Oren 2002, p. 55;

Morozov 2008, p. 45). The Soviets suspected that the Israeli government was

contemplating military operations against Syria and warned that Israel intended to

attack its Northern neighbour on 17 May (Ginat 2012, pp. 203-204). Levy Eshkol invited

the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv, Dmitri Chuvakin, to join him on a tour of Israel’s

northern border to see for himself the positioning of the IDF but Chuvakin declined the

invitation (Eban 1977, pp. 318-319; Cohen-Almagor 2012). President Nasser decided to

come to the help of Syria by gathering forces in Sinai.

The mobilization of the Egyptian forces into Sinai was deliberately done in the

most public way. The forces passed through major cities of Egypt. The deployment

aimed to deter Israel from attacking Syria; to focus international attention on the Middle

East; to restrain Syria so it won’t wage war on Israel, and to promote Nasser’s prestige

and standing in the Arab world (Cohen-Almagor 1986, p. 40).

The deployment of the Egyptian army in Sinai was a calculated risk. In February

1960, Nasser had deployed forces in Sinai and after two weeks he redeployed them. No

violence was erupted and Nasser gained considerable esteem in the Arab world. Nasser

decided to repeat an act which he successfully conducted before. He gave publicity to

14 The United Arab Republic (UAR), in Arabic Al-Jumhūrīyah al-Arabīyah al-Muttahidah, was a political

union between Egypt and Syria that started on 1 February 1958 and ended on 28 September 1961 when

Syria, following a military coup, declared itself independent of Egypt. Despite the dissolution of the union,

Egypt retained the name United Arab Republic until 2 September 1971, when it then adopted the name

Arab Republic of Egypt. In describing the 1967 events, I use the names UAR and Egypt interchangeably.

27

the mobilization of forces to garner political appreciation and to convey Israel the

message that the UAR would intervene for Syria if the latter be attacked.

Israel perceived this step as a show-off. Its leaders saw no need to react. They

thought Nasser did not wish to go to war. If he wished to have a publicity stunt, let him

have it. At the same time, caution required to monitor the UAR moves to ascertain that

Israel would be ready in case of need.

Three days later, the situation had escalated. On 16 May, Radio Cairo announced

(Yona 1968): “Egypt will engage in a war with Israel if Syria becomes a target to

aggression that will threat its safety or soil”. The balance of power on the UAR-Israel

front changed as 30,000 Egyptian soldiers, 200 tanks and a large number of jets were

deployed in Sinai, more than doubling the already present 30,000 soldiers (Cohen-

Almagor 1986, p. 43; Sofer 3 June 2007). Equally crucial, UAR demanded that the United

Nations Emergency Force, designed to separate between UAR and Israel and to avert

conflict, leave its positions. Now the threat became serious.

As long as the UNEF was in place, the Egyptian mobilization of forces was not

perceived as deterrence neither by the Arab states nor by Israel. Nasser was criticized

by Jordan and others that the mobilization of forces was just a meaningless show-off

(James 2012, p. 65). Nasser responded to the critics by ordering the UN Secretary

General U Thant to leave Sinai. Astonishingly, U Thant did not convene the UN Security

Council to discuss this demand nor attempted to negotiate this issue with Nasser. With

no proper consultation, he decided to abide by the Egyptian demand and withdrew the

UN forces. Yigal Alon had warned against such a possibility eight years earlier (Alon

1959, p. 342). Israeli government officials and members of general staff begun to worry

that the situation might go downhill and escalate into war (Geist 1974). Chief of Staff

28

Yitzhak Rabin ordered a limited mobilization of reservists and the transfer of forces to

defensive formation facing the Egyptian divisions in Sinai.

The next step in the escalation process happened at the night between 22 and 23

of May, when Nasser ordered to close the Straits of Tiran for Israeli ships. President

Nasser knew that Israel could not sit idly by in the face of such a provocation. In 1956,

Israel went into war because it perceived any form of naval blockade as a breach of its

legitimate vital interests. In the aftermath of the Suez War, the Straits had been

recognized by the world community as an international waterway (Walzer 2006, p. 83).

Nasser knew he was crossing a delicate red line, violating the regional status quo, and in

essence throwing the region into war. The closure of the Straits amounted to nothing

short of casus belli (see Section III supra).15 During a speech given in 1956 in

Washington, Abba Eban said (1959, p. 189):

There is no government, and no nation, whose right for an unrestricted

passage in the Gulf of Eilat, and in the Suez Canal, is greater than the right of

Israel. That right equally belongs to all world’s nations, an unquestionable

right. Egypt is breaching resolution 1888 and breaking the laws of the United

Nations by targeting Israeli ships.16

15 See James (2012, pp. 63-66).

16 Eban referred to the Constantinople Convention. Article I holds: “The Suez Maritime Canal shall always

be free and of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag. Consequently, the High Contracting Parties

agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace. The

Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade”. See Suez Canal Authority,

http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/ShowTreaties.aspx?show=1

29

The Israeli political and military leadership seemed at that time ill-equipped to

address the challenge. To establish a successful deterrence, Israel needs resolute and

determined actors (see Section III supra) but Prime Minister Eshkol and Chief of Staff

Rabin did not seem to be the right leaders at the time. On 28 May, Eshkol who was not

known for his oratory capabilities, delivered a hesitant and wavering speech which did

not help to improve the troubled mood in Israel (Ben-Gurion 1975, p. 804; Gilboa 1968,

p. 119). On 28 May, Eshkol delivered another speech, which was stuttered, obscure and

anything but encouraging. This poor speech had sunk the nation into an anxious

melancholy (Bartov 1978, Vol. I, p. 123; Bar-Zohar 1968, p. 151). As for the military

leader, on 23 May, Chief of Staff Rabin suffered a personal crisis and asked his deputy,

Ezer Weizman, to take command saying “One who made a mistake, has to leave”

(Weizman 1975, p. 259). Rabin felt he miscalculated the crisis and did not respond to

the Egyptian challenge adequately. Weizman refused, thinking that such a step would

only weaken Israel’s position.17

From 23 May until 5 June, the Israeli nation was in a state of emergency, having

to hear Nasser’s repeated declarations that he will drive Israel into oblivion and bring

the Zionist state to its brutal, unavoidable end, and at the same time witnessing

hesitation and inability to decide on the part of its leaders. The Israeli deterrence had

collapsed. Its leaders’ undecidedness projected weakness, encouraged Nasser and

escalated the crisis (Cohen-Almagor 2012; James 2012, p. 66). In this period, when the

nation was waiting for a decisive decision to resolve the crisis, the national morale was

low, and the atmosphere was of a serious leadership crisis. The Israeli economy

struggled as many young men were called to military service; basic products were in

17 Interview with Ezer Weizman, Jerusalem (April 1986).

30

short supply, and businesses closed down (Sofer 3 June 2007). The UAR violation of the

status quo was unacceptable but the public did not trust its leadership’s ability to break

the siege. Calls were raised to refresh the leadership and to bring new, more resolute

people to confront the challenge.

During those two weeks of deliberations and hesitations, called “the waiting

period” (Drukman 1 June 2007), when the Israeli leadership was undecided, exploring

its options, attempts were made to secure international support. Clausewitz (1968)

explains that when one of the parties to a conflict feels that it has found itself in the

weaker position, waiting would be the preferred option, at least at the beginning. While

waiting, the hope is for a situation change, for improvement via external help. Israel

thus decided to wait to garner external help. Foreign Minister Abba Eban embarked on

an intensive diplomatic trip that included Paris, London and Washington as Israel

wanted to exert international pressure on Nasser to open the Straits. Paris and London

had no intention to repeat their 1956 adventure. President de Gaulle used strong words

in warning Israel against any “outbreak of hostilities” (Filiu 2012, p. 251). Washington

was preoccupied with Vietnam and its priority was to maintain its relationships with

the Soviets cold and to avoid escalation. The implicit danger was a confrontation

between the USA and the USSR, thus President Johnson made it clear that he did not

wish to get involved militarily. At the same time, the US was willing to act in the

diplomatic corridors to resolve the Straits issue, securing free passage to Israeli ships

(Nedava 1983; Cohen-Almagor 1986; Cohen-Almagor 2008; Shalom 2008).

On 30 May, Nasser signed a defence pact with Jordan (Shlaim 2012a, p. 108) and

on 4 June he signed another military agreement with Iraq. Those two agreements

increased the sense of siege among the Israeli population. Nasser declared that the

armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were ready on the Israeli borders to face the

31

challenge, and behind them were the armies of Iraq, Algiers, Kuwait, Sudan and the

entire Arab nation. The Arabs were ready for the fight (Eshkol 1967, p. 116). The Israeli

government was now hard-pressed to make a decision. Head of the Mossad, Meir Amit,

was sent to Washington to verify whether the United States intended to take active

steps to avert war. The US was unwilling to solve the crisis alone or in cooperation with

other nations. The Israeli government also wished to ascertain that the US won’t

perceive its planned pre-emptive attack as an unjustified act of aggression (Smith 2012,

p. 175). Fresh on their minds was the aftermath of the Suez War, when President

Eisenhower forced the troops’ withdrawal from Sinai. By the end of May, all diplomatic

efforts were exhausted without yielding any peaceful results. It was incumbent on Israel

to resolve its problems, alone. Once a green light was given by the Americans, the die

was cast. Israel was heading to confront the Arab threat militarily (Shlaim 2012, p. 38;

Cohen-Almagor 1986, p. 64; Cohen-Almagor 2008).

Prime Minister Eshkol was also required to address the internal crisis. On 1 June,

after intensive negotiations, Eshkol succumbed to pressure and passed the defence

portfolio to Moshe Dayan, a popular figure whom the nation seemed to trust. He also

singed a unity agreement with the leaders of the opposition, Gahal

(http://www.idi.org.il/elections_and_parties/Pages/parties_gachal.aspx). Menachem

Begin and Yoseph Sapir joined the government as ministers without portfolios.

By that time, the emerging consensus in government and the military was that

further delays hamper Israel’s security. On 5 June, after failing to secure assistance from

powerful international players (see Section III supra), and following the expansion of

the leadership, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on the Egyptian air force. Whether

Nasser would have attacked remained an open question. While some experts (e.g.

Aharon Yariv) think he was about to attack, others (Shimon Shamir) think he did not

32

(Cohen-Almagor 2012). But the tension was unbearable and needed to be resolved one

way or another. As the two rivals did not engage in talking, and no international player

wished to intervene, the road to war was paved. Henry Kissinger wrote (1980, p. 367):

It is doubted that Nasser wanted a military clash. It is possible to assume that

he was stunned to see how quickly U Thant obliged to his demands. Maybe

Nasser never meant doing anything more than pretending to be a hero.

There are situations in which the circumstances roll quickly and ridicule the

decision makers’ intentions. Then the decision makers are no longer able to

control the circumstances. Once the Egyptian army replaced UNEF, Israel

was left with no choice but to mobilize its soldiers, as its territory is too small

to absorb a first strike. Once the soldiers were mobilized, Israel had only a

few weeks to decide whether or not it goes to war.

Walzer agrees with Kissinger and other researchers who claim that it is unlikely

that Nasser wanted the war, arguing that Nasser would “almost certainly have regarded

it as a great victory if he could have closed the Straits and maintained his army on

Israel’s borders without war” (Walzer 2006, p. 83). Yet Walzer states that Israel’s first

strike was a clear example of a legitimate anticipation (Walzer 2006, p. 85). Thus act of

aggression is allowed not only when a state is not attacked or invaded, but also in a

situation where an instant intention to start an attack or an intervention is dubious.

Walzer (2006, p. 85) thinks that the threat against Israel was sufficient and suggests the

following formula: “States may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever

the failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political

independence”.

33

A country under threat, says Walzer (2006, p. 85), is likened to a person who’s

being hunted by an enemy who announced his intentions to kill or hurt him. It is

obvious that this person is allowed to surprise his enemy if he is capable of doing that.

Walzer emphasizes that measures short of war are preferable to the war act when they

are expected to yield similar results. But usually those measures are subject to objective

constraints, for instance effective time available to try them. In May-June 1967, the

asymmetric structure of forces constrained the time limit for the diplomatic efforts.

When those efforts failed, Israel had no other choice but to resort to military option.

Context, of course, matters a great deal. There is a marked difference between

Belgian military manoeuvres at the Luxembourgian border, and Indian military

manoeuvres at the Pakistani border. While such manoeuvres do not constitute sufficient

threat in the former case, they do constitute sufficient threat in the latter. A preventive

strike is justified when the aggressor provides clear indications of its aim to attack,

when the aggressor is actively preparing for attack, and when inaction on the part of the

threatened side increases the risk of defeat.

At the same time, I believe the Six Day War was a war that no side really wanted.

The energized Nasser, carried away by his own oratory and ambition to build himself as

the undisputed leader of the Arab world, calling for the destruction of Israel in fiery

speeches that had a significant distressing impact on the Israeli society, made a series of

tragic decisions that resulted in war. The snowball rolled down the hill, with each

decision (entering troops into Sinai; ordering the UN peace-keeping force to leave;

closing the Straits of Tiran) inflaming the situation further until the eruption of violence.

It seems that Nasser did not think carefully beforehand what might be the implications

of his fateful moves. Israel projected weakness that not only failed to deter but called for

34

exploitation. The Israeli undetermined leadership was unable to stop the escalation

while no powerful international player took sufficient steps to halt the snowball from

running downhill. Nasser thought he could master brinkmanship policy, but he failed

and drove the region into flames. Negative roles were played by Secretary General of the

UN, U Thant, and the Soviet Union, although also they did not want war. The Soviet

Union wished to heat the region for its own partisan interests but it did not wish a full

scale war (Morozov 2008; Even 2008), while U Thant thought that the “UN is me” and

decided alone to pull out the peace-keeping troops (Cohen-Almagor 2008). UN

undersecretary-general, Ralph Bunche, apparently tried to limit the withdrawal of the

UN troops but it was U Thant who rejected this compromise, arguing that the UN forces

were in Sinai by Egyptian consent and that any demand in a change in UN deployment

would be regarded as a demand for a complete withdrawal (Shalom 2008, p. 278).

Instead of relaxing the crisis, U Thant fuelled it.

It is argued that the Six Day War was a just war. The Israeli government tried to

prevent the war. It sanctioned the use of force as a last resort, after exhausting the

diplomatic channels. Nasser’s miscalculated act of closing of the Straits of Tiran

constituted casus belli. The self-defence criteria were clear. The closure of the Straits

was the final straw which constituted a point of no return for both Egypt and Israel.

There was strong evidence that war was inevitable in the immediate future (Oren 2002;

Cohen-Almagor 2008, 2012). The pre-emptive attack was designed to eliminate or at

least to reduce the threat. Military force was necessary as Nasser was not open to

negotiation. United States, Britain and France, each for its own reasons, did not wish to

intervene in the crisis. Israel was left to its own device; its leaders realized that it was

35

incumbent upon them to resolve the crisis and to restore effective deterrence. Then it

became clear to them that war was unavoidable.

The pre-emptive strike of 5 June 1967 largely decided the outcome of the war.

On this first day of the war, 286 of Egypt’s 420 warplanes were destroyed (Stein 2009,

p. 304).18 As Israel was driven to war, its decision makers did not have clear perspective

as to the goals they wished to attain. To a large extent, they themselves were surprised

by the extent of the army’s achievements. Without a clear perspective regarding war

goals, the military conquest dictated the results, some of which negated the wishes of

the political leadership who trailed behind events (Shlaim 2012, p. 23). Dayan said

(Gilboa 1968, p. 207): “Under no circumstances I wanted to reach the Suez Canal. I

ordered our forces to stop at some distance from it, but the army simply faced me with

fait accompli”.

Before the outbreak of the war, there were no plans to conquer Jordanian and

Syrian territories. The war aims were limited to the Egyptian front: to open the Straits

of Tiran, to destroy the Egyptian army in Sinai, and to restore Israel’s deterrence

capabilities. The allocation of forces to the Jordanian and Syrian fronts were for

defensive purposes, to block potential enemy advance (Shlaim 2012, p. 42). Avi Shlaim,

one of the most critical historians of modern Israel, argues that “The fighting on the

eastern front was initiated by Jordan, not by Israel” (Shlaim 2012, p. 44).19 King Hussein

18 Shlaim (2012a, p. 115) that in all, 400 planes of Arab armies were destroyed on the first day of the war.

19 Strangely, Shlaim (2012, p. 55) concludes that although the Six Day War was a just war, it was “neither

a classic war of choice nor an unambiguous war of no-choice but something in between – an inescapable

war of choice. Israel could have allowed Nasser to get away with violating its maritime rights in the hope

that there would be no further provocations”. With this curious conclusion, the post-Zionist Shlaim

suddenly pops out, mobilizing all his rhetorical power to acrobatically criticize Israel. But Shlaim surely

36

was compelled as an Arab to take part and on 5 June, at 09:30 a.m., opened fire across

the armistice lines in Jerusalem (Shalim 2012a, pp. 114-115). In an interview, Major-

General Uzi Narkis said that the government had no intention to capture the West Bank.

On the contrary, it was opposed to it. The “rein was only loosened when a real threat to

Jerusalem’s security emerged... The end result was something that no one had planned”

(Shlaim 2012, p. 47; Narkis 1997).

As the IDF was progressing rapidly, the government pressed to conquer the West

Bank on the Jordanian front, and later on also the Golan Heights on the Syrian front.

Morally speaking, the end of conquering more land is unjustifiable. At the same time, the

reasoning for capturing Jerusalem and the West Bank was different than the reasoning

for the seizure of other lands. There was a burning yearning to conquer the Old City of

Jerusalem. Levy Eshkol explained that “when the Jordanian attack on Jerusalem began, it

was clear that there was no escape - a new mission was born: the liberation of the Old

City... It was clear that we were going to the Old City” (Shlaim 2012, p. 48). The Jewish

people have deep attachment to holy places in Jerusalem and also in Judea and Samaria

(West Bank). The Western (Wailing) Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem is the most

revered place by Jews. The holy places are part of the history of the Jewish nation.

Nothing similar can be said about the Sinai desert and the Golan Heights.

The IDF had no plans to capture the major Jordanian cities Shchem (Nablus) and

Jenin. But the Jordanian artillery attacked Israeli settlements and endangered the vital

Ramat David military airport (Bartov 1978, Vol. I, p. 126). In Sinai, the IDF continued to

knows that Israel could not have allowed Nasser to get away with violating its maritime rights. He himself

writes (p. 27) that the closure of the Straits constituted casus belli and that while the Israeli economy

could possibly survive the closure of the straits, “the deterrent image of the IDF most certainly could not”.

37

advance because the Egyptians were unable to stop it. As for the Golan, on 6 June the

Syrians began to shell settlements in the Upper Galilee. Although Nasser was the vocal

aggressive leader, we need to bear in mind that the crisis started in Israel’s northern

border and that Nasser’s aggression was due to his rushing to Syria’s assistance. Eshkol

stated that Syria “cannot be allowed to parade in victory... Israel cannot have

overturned all the Arab countries and not Syria” (Oren 2002, p. 292; Lesch 2012, p. 93).

IDF generals assigned great importance to controlling the mountains for their geo-

strategic importance. They believed that the Galilee settlements could not be sustained

in the shadow of the Syrian canons (Bartov 1978, Vol. I, p. 124). IDF Northern

Commander, Major General David Elazar, flew especially to Tel Aviv to meet with Prime

Minister Eshkol to convince him that it was necessary to occupy the Golan Heights to

free the Galilee from Syrian artillery (Bartov 1978, Vol. I, p. 133). But the government

hesitated. Defence Minister Dayan did not wish to open another war front in the north.

The Israeli hesitation and the constant Syrian shelling continued until 9 June, when

ceasefire was declared with the Egyptians (Egypt Accepts United Nations Cease-Fire,

1967/06/09).20 Then the government gave the order to take the Golan (Bartov 1978,

Vol. I, p. 136). Elazar immediately seized the opportunity to conquer this land as well

and by 10 June 1967 the Golan Heights were in Israeli hands. It is a matter for

speculation what would have happened if the Jordanian and Syrians were to refrain

from shelling Israeli towns. The Israeli attack on them was an act of self-defence aimed

to silence the artillery.

20 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/235,

http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/c.hsJPK0PIJpH/b.2715693/k.35CA/United_Nations_Security_Coun

cil_Resolution_S235_9_June_1967.htm

38

Years later, upon reflection, Dayan said that he did not fulfil his role as defence

minister when he did not stop the capturing of the Golan Heights. He said that Elazar

and members of the Galilee kibbutzim exerted pressure on Eshkol to take the Golan, but

this was not justified. In his words: “It is possible to speak in terms of the Syrians are

corrupt; we need to fuck them, this is a good opportunity etc., but this is not a policy.

You do not fuck the enemy because it is corrupt, but because it threatens you, and the

Syrians, on the fourth day of the war, did not threaten us” (Tal 27 April 1997).

Taking land from another country because it is good for agriculture cannot be a

justified aim for aggression. If Dayan is right, and mere greed brought about the

conquering of the Golan Heights, then this was wrong. But Dayan also recognized in the

same interview that the Syrian shot on the kibbutzim from time to time, and constituted

a constant threat to the lives of the Galilee civilians. It seems that Israel wished to seize

the opportunity to defeat the Syrians. Riding on the extraordinary victory in the south,

they wanted to change the geo-strategic balance also in the north by taking the Golan

Mountain that overlooks the entire Galilee. At the same, Ben-Gurion said immediately

after the Six Day War that Israel would need to return all conquered land, with the

exception of Jerusalem and the Golan. He told Dayan that if it was possible to sign a

peace treaty with Syria, then Israel should return the Golan as well (Tal 27 April 1997,

p. 4).

The destruction of the Arab armies and the decisive conquest of Sinai, the West

Bank and the Golan Heights changed the geo-strategic and the political landscape. While

Israel acquired more land to its small territory, it also had, and still has to address the

challenge posed by the conquered people who came with the precious land. The

occupation of the Palestinian people assures repeated eruptions of violence as no

39

people wish to remain occupied. People are born free and wish to lead their lives as free

human beings. When basic freedoms and human rights are denied, people take every

opportunity to rebel against coercion.

Yom Kippur War

The next war took place in 1973. The Israeli wrong conception was that Egypt would

wage war on Israel only after it had obtained advanced fighter-bombers and Scud

missiles (Watnik and Shalom 2012; Bregman 2010, p. 114). In truth, however, President

Anwar Sadat who succeeded Nasser after the latter collapsed and died on 29 September

1970, realized that Moscow was unlikely to provide him with those weapons.

Furthermore, Ashraf Marwan -- son-in-law of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat’s

advisor, and the Mossad agent who was, it has been argued, a double agent -- embarked

on a successful disinformation campaign to fool the Israelis.21 He told the Mossad that

Sadat attempted to attack on 15 May 1973 (Bregman 2010, p. 115; Herzog 1983, p.

181). The Israeli leaders took his warning seriously. On 19 April, Israel mobilized its

reserved forces (see Section III supra). It dispersed them on 12 August. This futile

mobilization cost Israel a fortune - $45 million dollars and it had critical implications.

When Sadat mobilized forces less than two months later in early October, the recent

false mobilization that exhausted vital resources was fresh in the government ministers’

minds. They hesitated to call up the reserves again, fearing another costly false alarm.

21 Uri Bar-Joseph (2005, pp. 47-51, 187, 237) contests the argument that Marwan was a double agent.

Bar-Joseph thinks he was a genuine and successful Israel agent. Bar-Joseph attempts to provide logical

explanations to explain the questionable behaviour of Marwan that evoked the hypothesis that he was a

double agent.

40

The wrong conception, together with misplaced self-confidence and fear of critic,

brought about a successful Egyptian campaign at the start of hostilities (Bar-Joseph

2005, pp. 45-47; Shalev 2010). Israel even ignored an explicit warning of its neighbour,

King Hussein, who on 25 September 1973 flew to Israel to meet Golda Meir and to tell

her that the Syrian army was preparing for war (Nakdimon 29 September 1993;

Bregman 2010, p. 119). Prime Minister Meir did not assign the warning the seriousness

it deserved. She failed to order the necessary defensive steps against a possible attack.

Meir’s conception was based on reports, which were deemed credible, about the

military and political aims of Israel’s enemies. Those reports indicated that Egypt did

not wish to attack Israel (Zeira 15 September 1993). Thus only eleven hours before the

Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal it became clear to the Israeli leaders that war is

about to erupt. They thought, however, that the war would start at 6 p.m. In fact, it

started at 2 p.m. (Nakdimon 14 May 1982, p. 6).

Thus, on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur, 6 October, a few hundred Israeli troops

had to face the entire Egyptian and Syrian armies (Bartov 1978, Vol. II, p. 34; Bregman

2010, p. 126). Mobilization of reserves started only the same day at around 10 a.m., far

too late to halt the powerful Egyptian offence (Allen 1982). Commanders had little

intelligence. They did not know what the scale of the attack was, or where was the

centre of the enemy offensive (Eitan 1985, p. 128).

As in 1948, Israel was forced to defend itself against aggression, knowing that

defeat would mean the end of its existence. The Yom Kippur War was a defensive war.

Israel aimed to stop the advancing enemy and, once that aim was achieved, to restore

the status quo ante (see Section III supra).

41

In the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) lost 2,569 men, with

more than 7,200 wounded and some 300 taken prisoners (Bar-Joseph 2005; Ynet 11

November 2008). This was a significant toll that the Israeli society found difficult to

digest. That war constituted a milestone in the diplomatic and political life of the young

state. In the diplomatic arena, when Sadat re-launched a peace initiative, his hand this

time was not rejected. In the political arena, the Yom Kippur War was instrumental in

paving the way for the Likud Party to power in 1977, at the expense of the long-serving

Labour elite that up until that point established all governments in Israel since 1948.

The Lebanon War

In 1975, Prime Minister Rabin met the Maronite Christian leader Camille Chamoun.

Israel had provided military aid to the Maronites in their struggle against their common

enemy, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In March 1978, following a

shocking terror attack at the heart of Israel by terrorists who arrived from Lebanon,

which resulted in 28 casualties and 78 people wounded, Israel launched a retaliation

attack in Lebanon, Operation Litani. The aim was to destroy the PLO infrastructure from

the Israeli border up to the Litani River. Measures were taken to avoid any

confrontation with Syrian forces. Israel then decided to establish presence in Lebanon

in order to secure its border. Following UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426

which pressured Israel to withdraw its forces,22 on 30 June 1978 Israel pulled out from

most areas in Lebanon except a security zone it established north of its border. Clashes

22

UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/70/IMG/NR036870.pdf?OpenElement

42

with the PLO continued until a ceasefire was declared on 24 July 1981 (Bregman 2010,

p. 152).

The ceasefire was achieved thanks to the tireless efforts of Philip Habib, the

United States President special envoy. The PLO had a curious understanding of the

ceasefire according to which they would refrain from launching terror attacks on Israel

from Lebanon but saw no reason to stop attacking Israel from other locations. Israel,

quite rightly, did not accept this. Ceasefire means the cessation of all violent activities

notwithstanding their origins.

In the summer of 1981, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon hosted Bashir Gemayel,

leader of the Lebanese Christian Phalangas, for dinner at his farm. The two leaders

discussed the future of Lebanon and the cooperation between Israel and the Christians

in Lebanon. Gemayel asked Sharon what government he preferred to have in Lebanon,

narrow (only Christians) or wide (Christians and other religious representation).

Sharon advised him to establish a narrow government. Gemayel responded by asking

Israel’s assistance in his struggle against the Sunni Muslims and ousting the Druze (Naor

1986, p. 73). From that meeting on, it was clear to the IDF commanders who were

present at the dinner that regime change in Lebanon and the election of Gemayel to

president were among the Israeli aims in Lebanon. The Israelis knew that without their

help, Gemayel had little chance to become president. Sharon was determined to make

him one (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984a, pp. 45-51).

On 28 January 1982, six terrorists tried to infiltrate Israel from Jordan (Naor

1986, p. 33). Defence Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan pressed the government

to retaliate in Lebanon, as the PLO headquarters was in Beirut. The government decided

to attack the PLO from the air and the PLO responded by katyusha rockets on Galilee

43

(Naor 1986, p. 38). Some months later, on 3 June 1982, an Abu Nidal (a terror

organization opposed to the PLO) terrorist shot and maimed Shlomo Argov, the Israeli

Ambassador to London. This was the trigger to a long, unnecessary war that galvanized

Israeli society for many years.

On 5 June, the Israeli government convened to examine retaliation options and it

was decided to open a limited military operation; limited in time, 48 hours, and limited

in scope, 40 km deep into Lebanese territory. Prime Minister declared that “we won’t

attack the Syrians” who had a military presence in Lebanon (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p.

18). On 6 June 1982, a great mass of military forces crossed the border into southern

Lebanon but the military orders spoke about the destruction of the Syrian army in

Lebanon (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p. 20). At that time, no one questioned the fact that a

massive quantity of troops (including reserve) and tanks, disproportional for a limited

operation, was mobilized into Lebanon (see Section III supra): “IDF commanders knew

they will reach Beirut. They understood that such enormous forces are not employed

for a mere 48 hours operation” (Shiffer 1984, p. 95; Gvirtz 29 May 1992).

The political decision-makers had different intentions in mind. The government

authorized a limited offensive. As said, “Operation Peace for Galilee” was intended (at

least publicly by some government members) to last no more than 48 hours, aimed to

destroy the PLO in a radius of 40 kilometres north of the Israeli border so as to secure

the Galilee region from rocket attacks (Shiffer 1984, p. 93). Defence Minister Ariel

Sharon, however, aimed at reaching the gates of Beirut, to bring about a regime change

in Lebanon, and to engage with the Syrian military force in Lebanon. Those aims were

known to the military commanders but unknown to the Israeli government (Bregman

44

2010, p. 170; Naor 1986, pp. 15-17; Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, pp. 37, 115; Schiff and

YA'Ari 1984a, p. 56).

As early as October 1981, Sharon told the General Staff that the destruction of

the PLO includes Beirut (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984a, p. 42). In an interview to Maariv

newspaper on 22 January 1982, Sharon said: “I sought to explain to the President of

Egypt what the situation in Lebanon is, the complexities that country is entangled in.

Starting with the political problem of setting up a legitimate government in Lebanon, a

government that will sign a peace treaty with Israel and ending with the sources of

disturbance, the Syrian conquest and the presence of the armed forces of the terrorist

organizations” (Sharon 22 January 1982). In an interview to the Wall Street Journal on

28 May 1982, Sharon reflected on the dilemma that the Syrians posed in Lebanon: “The

problem is that (the PLO) employed quite a part of their artillery and rocket launchers

within the Syrian defensive positions... It's a very sensitive one because you have here

the terrorists, the PLO and you've got the Syrians” (Sharon 28 May 1982). That same

month, Sharon flew to Washington in order to meet with Secretary of State Alexander

Haig in order to ensure American support of his war plans (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984a, p.

72).

Defence Minister Sharon’s Grand Oranim (Pines) plan was to see that Bashir

Gemayel becomes the president, to force the Syrians out of Lebanon, to expel the PLO

from Lebanon, allowing the Christians a free hand with the Palestinian refugees. The

refugees would be forced to leave, and as the Syrians would not allow them into their

own territory, they would leave for Jordan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees would

bring about a regime change also in Jordan, making it into Palestine. Once a Palestinian

State would be installed, Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank would have the

45

option to merge with their brethren in the East Bank (Naor 1986, pp. 30-31; Schiff and

YA'Ari 1984, p. 38; Schiff and YA'Ari 1984a, p. 43; Ben-Yishai 25 May 2012). Thus, the

grand design was to change the region fundamentally in Israel’s favour; with one blow

to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, and to bring regime changes in Lebanon

and Jordan. However, the odds against this plan were too high and far too risky.

The Israeli government was thus manipulated by Defence Minister Sharon whose

plans were far grandeur and far-reaching than the plans the government had in mind.

This could have happened because the government did not have the ability to

understand or to monitor military movements. They felt unable to contest Sharon and

Eitan’s military capabilities (Haber 24 September 1985; Naor 1986, p. 165). Besides

Sharon, there was only one other general in government, Mordechai Zippori, who was

able to comprehend things that the defence minister chose not to say, and to read

military maps. Indeed, Zippori was the first to understand that Sharon was pushing the

government to a wider, extended war.

Sharon presented the government with two options: a direct attack on Syrian

forces, or outflanking them (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p. 147). The government decided in

favour of the latter option, without raising a third option: adhering to the declared goal

of fighting the PLO without engaging the Syrian army. Moreover, the ministers did not

question whether outflanking means only a delay in engaging with the Syrians who

would become trapped between the IDF forces. Lack of military knowledge served

Sharon in his manoeuvring of the government. At the early stages of the war, Prime

Minister Begin gave his defence minister full support and was not too troubled by

Zippori’s nagging questions for clarification.

46

The decision-making process was flawed and the reasoning was not thought

through carefully. The government declared the aim of pushing the PLO outside the

40km zone so as to secure the Galilee from katyusha rockets. Assuming for a moment

that the IDF was successful in doing that, and then it was attacked by PLO forces

situated at a northern point. Then the IDF will be forced to deepen its movement into

Lebanon to secure its forces from attacks. The question begs: How far should the IDF

advance in order to “clean” territory and protect its soldiers from attacks? With such

snowballing effect, the IDF might need to reach not only Beirut, as the IDF did in 1982,

but possibly also Damascus, Riyadh and Baghdad.

The Israeli government continued to seek Washington’s support (see Section III

supra) and during the first three days of the war that support was granted. The

Americans believed that the IDF intended to clean 40km of Lebanese territory from

terrorists and once succeeding in doing that, it would retreat to Israel (Schiff and YA'Ari

1984, p. 183). But what if the terrorists return after the Israeli retreat? That possibility

did not seem to trouble the IDF generals and Defence Minister Sharon. They did not

intend to retreat so fast.

On 8 June, Prime Minister Begin thought that the operation was nearing its end.

In a speech delivered on that day, Begin emphasized that “Once we have reached the

40km line from our northern border, the fighting would stop” (Benziman 1985, p. 248;

Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p. 186). Begin also asserted that Israel was interested to avoid a

conflict with Syria. The reality, however, was completely different: on that same day,

one of IDF’s armoured brigades attacked Syrian forces around the town of Jezzine.

On 10 June, Defence Minister Sharon declared in a government meeting that the

IDF was explicitly ordered not to enter or operate in Beirut (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p.

47

224). But from the forces formation and the maps they held, the IDF commanding

officers knew that they were moving to Beirut.

On 11 June, as a result of American pressure, a ceasefire was declared. If the war

was to end then, the publicly declared aim of the war – securing Israel’s northern

border and freeing Galilee from the threat of rocket terror – was achieved. But at that

point the undeclared aims, as outlined in the Grand Oranim Operation Plan, which

Defence Minister Sharon was aiming to achieve without explicitly detailing the plans to

the government, were not achieved. Yassir Arafat and his men were still in Beirut, the

Syrians were present in Lebanon, and the Lebanese president was their puppet Elias

Sarkis. Thus orders were given to the Israeli divisions to break the ceasefire (Benziman

1985, p. 252). On 12 June, the escalation continued when Prime Minister Begin and a

small number of ministers decided to conquer western Beirut. Sharon successfully

persuaded Begin that this move was essential for Israel’s victory over the PLO. That

decision negated all previous government decisions. Some other ministers within the

government resented that decision and voiced their dissent. Begin found himself in a

minority within the government and the proposed operation inside Beirut was delayed

(Schiffer 1984, p. 108).

Sharon, however, remained convinced that entering Beirut was necessary. On 13

June, a first meeting took place between Israeli paratroopers and representatives of the

Lebanese Christian Phalanges (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p. 235). The meeting was not

authorised by the Israeli government. Prime Minister Begin denied the presence of IDF

troops in Beirut while the media had broadcasted live from the Lebanese capital,

showing the IDF forces inside Beirut (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984, p. 223). Begin either did

not know the facts, or wished to hide them.

48

What about Israeli public opinion? “Operation Peace for Galilee” started with the

aim of destroying the PLO terrorist strongholds in Southern Lebanon so as to secure the

region of Galilee and free it from potential rocket fire. In June 1982, the majority of

Israeli population accepted the government claim that there was moral justification and

necessity for the limited military operation. The public opinion began to change when

the war aims changed to encompass greater Lebanese territory, involving a military

confrontation also with Syria. On 14 June, Sharon explained that the PLO infrastructure

was located in Beirut and if they were allowed to remain then after an arrangement

would be reached, the terrorists simply would return to the security belt. Thus the

“mopping-up” action must destroy the infrastructure (Sharon 14 June 1982). The war

ends were changing together with the advancement of the IDF movement deeper into

Lebanese territory. The government sometimes authorized the army movement before

it took place, sometimes after it took place, and sometimes it did not know what was

taking place.

On 26 June, Sharon redefined the war’s ends: First of all and most importantly,

“the elimination of the PLO, the elimination of the terrorist force in Lebanon”. Second,

“the removal of the Syrian army, which was the one to give protection” and provided

massive support to the terrorists. Third, “we might reach a peace agreement with

another Arab state, in the north” (Sharon 26 June 1982). Those ends were never

approved as such by the government.

In early August 1982, the IDF pressed onto West Beirut. For the first time in

Israel’s short history, the IDF was inside an Arab capital, holding strategic positions

inside Beirut. On 12 August, the Israeli pressure took its toll and Arafat agreed to

evacuate his headquarters. On 21 August, the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut had

49

started. Two days later, on 23 August, Israel’s ally, the Maronite Christian leader Bashir

Gemayel, was elected President of Lebanon. The Israeli decision-makers were very

happy to witness this historic milestone. But as the war progressed and prolonged, and

the IDF suffered more casualties, the Israeli public consensus and legitimation of the

war had eroded significantly. More and more people felt the government had lost

control, that human lives were lost in vein, and that the ends were unrealistic.

In the Hebrew edition of Just and Just Wars, Walzer writes (1984, p. ix) that the

40km war might be justified but Israel did not fight that limited war. Israel, as dictated

by Defence Minister Sharon and the IDF generals, wished to establish a new order in

Lebanon. This was unjustifiable.23 I agree with the latter statement and beg to differ

with the former. The Lebanon War was the first war of choice. The Argov assassination

was a mere pretence to start a war in order to install a new order in Lebanon and to

achieve grandiose aims. Abu Nidal was an enemy of the PLO. There was no justification

to launch an attack across the border.

The Lebanon War was designed to achieve ostentatious and speculative aims. It

was morally suspect and politically dangerous. Israel was willing to commit more and

more forces to install a new order in Lebanon. Israeli leaders knew that once the

Christian militias will take hold of the reins of government, they would urge the

Palestinians to leave Lebanon. In an interview to Israel radio on 14 June 1982, Sharon

said that “our aim in Beirut is not to alter the situation in Lebanon” and also that “What

we want in Lebanon is that there should not be a situation whereby the terrorist

23 Yariv (1985, p. 24) claims that the first part of the war, during which the PLO infrastructure in Southern

Lebanon was destroyed was a just war. Ousting the PLO of Beirut was for Yariv a borderline case as this

goal may be perceived essential to ensure that the PLO will not rebuild its bases in Southern Lebanon. The

other goals were unjustified.

50

organizations can re-establish themselves and act against Israel and against Jewish and

Israeli institutions around the world” (Sharon 14 June 1982). But preventing the

terrorists from re-establishing themselves would require either indefinite Israeli

presence in Lebanon, including Beirut, something that the government denied wishing,

or establishing a friendly regime in Beirut that would cater for the Israeli interests,

something that Sharon denied (“our aim... is not to alter the situation in Lebanon”).

The most important achievement for Israel was the ousting of the PLO from

Lebanon. The siege on Beirut forced Arafat and his men to move to Tunis. The PLO lost

its outposts near the Israeli border and it had to establish its training camps in Tunis

and Algeria. On the other hand, Israel had failed to establish a friendly regime that

would sign a peace treaty and change the face of the Middle East, as its leaders aimed. At

first it seemed that the aim was within reach. In an interview to Oriana Fallaci on 3

September 1982, Sharon said: “We do not wish to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs,

but it would be hypocrisy on our part to say that we would agree to a government that

would be willing to host again the Syrians and the terrorists” (Fallaci, 8 June 2012). As

mentioned, Israel rejoiced when Gemayel was elected president but the joy was short

lived. On 14 September, less than a month later, President Gemayel was assassinated.

The long presence of the IDF in Lebanon, up until 2000, strengthened anti-Israeli forces

in Lebanon including another terrorist organization, the Hezbollah, a far more

sophisticated and dangerous organization than the PLO had ever been in Lebanon. The

Hezbollah became part of the Lebanese government, and its gunmen sit just across the

Israeli border.

The 1982 Lebanon War was an unjustified war of choice and aggression. The

grand design of the war and its conduct, as orchestrated by Defence Minister Sharon

51

and Chief of Staff Eitan, diverted sharply from Israel’s security doctrine. The Israeli

army is called Israel Defence Force for a reason; but this war was ambitious,

adventurous, belligerent and unnecessary. It had put the lives of thousands of troops in

harm’s way in order to reshape the face of the Middle East and to reach far-fetched and

unwarranted aims. Moreover, because Sharon and Eitan had different aims than those

authorized by the government, the war conduct was inappropriate, risking soldiers’

lives without providing them with the necessary protections (Haber 31 May 1985;

Gvirtz 29 May 1992, p. 9). Authorization of military moves was granted sometimes

before conduct and sometimes after. The government was simply faced with fate

accompli army positions as it was manipulated by Sharon (Shavit 3 May 1985;

Klimovitzki 5 June 1992). The war had sunk Israeli forces in the Lebanese swamp for

eighteen long years during which hundreds of soldiers were killed, thousands were

injured while Israel had gained very little politically and militarily. Indeed, the Lebanon

War was a paradigmatic unjust war. The expansion of territory and the effecting of

regime change are both unjustified causes of war (Frowe 2011, p. 53). This is as far as

jus ad bellum is concerned. What about the conduct of war, jus in bello?

The IDF bombarded Beirut and other Lebanese towns, killing scores of civilians.

Oriana Fallaci, the Italian reporter who covered all world wars during that era, said that

she had never seen such fire power landing “in the most savage way” on civilians

(Fallaci 8 June 2012). The fire came from the ground, from the air, and from the sea on

civilian targets: houses, hospitals, hotels, schools and embassies. Responding to this, in

his interview to Fallaci on 3 September 1982, Sharon claimed that the IDF did this

because terrorists were hiding among civilians, using civilians as shields. Fallaci, in turn,

acknowledged that the PLO based its anti-aircraft artillery on hospitals roofs, but she

52

maintained that the Israeli artillery was disproportionate: “every time a mosquito flew

over Beirut, you shot tones of fire on that mosquito” (Fallaci 8 June 2012). Fallaci

showed Sharon a photo of young children, 2 to 4-year-old, all dead and their little bodies

ripped to pieces; then Sharon said that he was “truly sorry” and explained that “we

needed to persuade the terrorists to leave Beirut, and this could be done only by

bombardment” (Fallaci 8 June 2012). Fallaci, a talented interviewer who knew how to

extract from her interviewees what they really thought, then questioned why Israel

continued “the massacre” also after the PLO agreed to leave Beirut? After the 11 of

August, when Philip Habib had finally succeeded to persuade Yassir Arafat to leave,

Sharon ordered twelve relentless hours of fierce brutal bombardment that resulted in

600 casualties. Fallaci wondered why and Sharon answered frankly: “Because Arafat

continued to play, to devise cunning tricks, to lie. Because he laughed at us, that liar. You

can never trust him... They always betray their promises... This is why I bombarded

them. Yes, I sure did... Sure did... but it worked. The following night, between the 12 and

the 13, they accepted our terms, and I stopped” (Fallaci 8 June 2012). Sharon no longer

expressed mercy or sorrow for his actions. Also notice Sharon’s first person

terminology: “I bombarded them”. “I sure did”. “I stopped”. Later in the same interview

Sharon collected himself and said that the government had authorized the

bombardments, and the government had put a stop to the fire. This was not “Sharon’s

war” but “war of the State of Israel” (Fallaci 8 June 2012). But as the interview

prolonged, Sharon reverted again to first person, saying that “I gave those murderers a

gift: the gift of life. I gave them the opportunity to live. They are alive because I chose to

let them live (by enabling them to leave Beirut)” (Fallaci 8 June 2012).

53

Furthermore, Israel bears responsibility for the conduct of its allies and proxies

in Lebanese territory under its control. Loyal to their own plan to oust the Palestinians

from Lebanon, and wanting to avenge the Gemayel’s assassination, on 16-18 September

1982, Christian Phalangists militia, headed by Elie Hobeika, massacred some 1,700

refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps under the watch of Israeli battalions. Many

citizens in Israel were shocked and appalled. A movement called Soldiers against Silence

was established, calling for the removal from office of Ariel Sharon and for an

immediate end to the war (Folman and Polonsky 2009; Bregman 2010, p. 176).

Hundreds of thousands protestors demanded to investigate the circumstances that led

to the Sabra and Shatila massacre. This was the largest ever demonstration in the

history of Israel up until that time. Under the massive public pressure, the Israeli

government established a committee of inquiry headed by President of the Supreme

Court Yitzhak Kahan to investigate the atrocities. The Kahan Committee found that

Israel had indirect responsibility for the massacre since the IDF had control over the

area. Israeli government officials and military commanders who met with Christian

leaders knew that the Christians were looking for an opportunity to drive the

Palestinians out of Lebanon. They heard time and again that blood will be shed. After

the Gemayel’s assassination, it was clear to the IDF commanders that if given the

opportunity, the enraged Phalangas won’t have any mercy on the Palestinians. Still the

IDF facilitated the entry of the Phalangas into Sabra and Shatila (Schiff and YA'Ari 1984,

pp. 313-327; Schiff and YA'Ari 1984a, pp. 250-285; Naor 1986, p. 161). Prime Minister

Begin was found responsible for not exercising greater involvement and awareness in

the matter of introducing the Phalangists into the camps. Begin heard about the

massacre on the BBC! No one informed him about the entry of the Phalangas into the

refugee camps (Naor 1986, p. 163). Minister of Defence Sharon was found responsible

54

for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge when he approved the entry of the

Phalangists into the camps as well as not taking appropriate measures to prevent

bloodshed. Chief of Staff Eitan did not give the appropriate orders to prevent the

massacre. The Commission recommended that the Defence Minister resign, that the

Director of Military Intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy not continue in his post

and that Brigadier General Amos Yaron, who was the senior IDF commander outside the

refugee camps, not serve in the capacity of a field commander in the Israel Defence

Forces (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut

1983). The Kahan recommendation did not stop Ariel Sharon to become a prime

minister in 2001.

The Lebanon War was very costly: Between 5 June 1982, and 31 May 1985, 1,216

soldiers died (Schiff and YA'Ari, 1984a; Bard,

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Lebanon_War.html). In 1985,

Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, with the exception of a security zone extending

eight miles into south Lebanon to protect Israeli civilians from terror attacks. Only on

24 May 2000, when Prime Minister Ehud Barak was in power, Israel withdrew

completely from Lebanon, ending a 22-year military presence there.

The Second Lebanon War

The Second Lebanon War, known also as the Israel-Hezbollah War, was the second war

of choice. On 12 July 2006, the Hezbollah terrorist organization attacked two Israeli

Defence Forces' armoured Hummer jeeps patrolling along the border with gunfire and

explosives, in the midst of massive shelling attacks on Israel's north. Three soldiers

55

were killed in the attack and two were said to be taken hostage. Hezbollah leader Sheikh

Hassan Nasrallah said: “No military operation will return the Israeli captured soldiers...

The prisoners will not be returned except through one way: indirect negotiations and a

trade of prisoners” (Al Bawaba News 12 July 2006). Later that day, four Israeli Defence

Forces (IDF) soldiers were killed when their tank hit a mine some 6 km inside Lebanese

territory.

The Israeli Defence Forces began heavy artillery and tank fire. Israel Air Force

jets struck roads, bridges and Hezbollah guerrilla positions in southern Lebanon. The air

raids were intended to block any escape route for the guerrillas who may be taking the

captured IDF soldiers to areas further removed from the border in order to prevent an

Israeli rescue mission (Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir 2012). But this was too late.

The information about the kidnapping had arrived considerable time after fact, when

the abductors were well inside Lebanon. The destructive air-strike could not halt the

abductors. It only fuelled the escalation.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convened the government on Wednesday night, 12

July 2006 to decide Israel’s reaction. The government agreed that the attack had created

a completely new situation on the northern border, and that Israel must take steps that

will “exact a price” (Gutkin 13 July 2006) and restore its deterrence (see Section III

supra). Olmert rejected Hezbollah's demand that Israel redeem the kidnapped soldiers'

freedom by releasing Lebanese and Palestinian terrorists jailed in Israel.

That night, Israel bombarded bridges in central Lebanon and attacked Hezbollah

positions along the border. The Hezbollah did not blink and retaliated on 13 July 2006

with Katyusha rockets across northern Israel. One person was killed and dozens were

wounded, including a number of children. Most of the casualties were lightly wounded;

56

one person sustained serious wounds. After hesitations, in order to stop the rocket

attacks, the government decided to launch a full-fledge military operation by mobilizing

heavy forces into Lebanon. Reserves were called to duty as well (see Section III supra).

The Israeli-Hezbollah War ended on 14 August 2006 when the UN Security

Council Resolution (no. 1701) entered into force (Security Council SC/8808 2006). In

the 34 days of fighting, 153 Israelis were killed (Ynet 14 August 2006). 36 of them were

civilians, killed as a result of the rockets campaign. 119 of them were soldiers, killed in

Israel and in Lebanon. 3,970 rockets were fired on Israel (Rofe-Ofir and Grinberg 14

August 2006), an average of 120 rockets a day. Many of those rockets hit buildings,

caused damage and cost lives. About 2,000 people were injured; many of them suffered

shock and anxieties. The estimated damage was more than five billion shekels. On the

Lebanese side the figures are contested. The Hezbollah claims that it had suffered about

250 casualties (International Herald Tribune 21 February 2007). Israel had estimated its

forces killed 600 Hezbollah fighters (International Herald Tribune 21 February 2007). A

UN official estimated the deaths at 500 (Bishop 22 August 2006); Lebanese officials had

also estimated that up to 500 fighters were killed and another 1,500 were injured

(Coughlin 4 August 2006).

The long (34-day) and costly war not only did not weaken the Hezbollah but

greatly enhanced the prestige of the organization inside Lebanon, at the expense of the

Lebanese government (CRS Report 2006), and outside Lebanon in many parts of the

world including Iran, Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank. While the organization suffered

grave losses, it also proved the vulnerability of Israel, and the incapability of the IDF to

bring to a halt rocket attacks. That incapability tempted Hamas to increase the volume

of its rocket attacks on southern Israel and to question Israel’s deterrence.

57

After the war, thousands of people have criticized the government decisions,

demanding the establishment of a national inquiry committee to investigate the war

events. People called for the resignation of the three war architects: Prime Minister

Ehud Olmert, Minister of Defence Amir Peretz, and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz (Cordesman

and Sullivan 2007; Harel, Issacharoff, Cummings and Tlamim 2008). Later Halutz and

Olmert resigned their respective offices, while Peretz lost in the internal Labour

elections to Ehud Barak and was ousted from the Ministry of Defence.

Under public pressure, the government appointed Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, a

respected former Israeli acting Supreme Court Justice and former president of the Tel

Aviv District Court, to chair an investigation committee. The committee had the same

mandate as a state committee of inquiry would have, with two notable differences: Its

members were not appointed by the Supreme Court, and the committee's

recommendations, especially with respect to resignations, did not possess the same

legal weight (Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir 2012). The much expected Winograd

Interim Report was published on 30 April 2007 and caused immediate turmoil. The

Report contended that the decision-making process which had led to the war-opening

was flawed, with serious and dangerous deficiencies (Cohen-Almagor May 2007; Levine

29 May 2007; Tristam 2008):

a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based

on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, nor was it based on a careful

study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of

these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military

gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military

strike would inevitably lead to rockets fired on the north of Israel; the effective military

58

response to such rocket attacks was an extensive and prolonged ground operation to

capture the areas from which the rockets were fired - which would have entailed a high

“cost”. Such operation did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly

raised with the political leaders before it was decided to strike Lebanon from the air.

b. Consequently, in deciding to go to war, the government did not consider the whole

range of options in response to the soldiers’ abduction. This failure reflected weakness

in strategic thinking, which undercut the response to the violent event.

c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained, in part, through ambiguity in the

presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even

contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision,

without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized

commencement of a military campaign without considering how it will be possible to

end it.

d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and in part were not achievable

by the authorized modes of military action.

e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not

alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the

authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans

- early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case it was

decided to launch a ground operation.

f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the

military mode of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary,

declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would

59

continue till they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable

their achievement.

The Winograd Committee concluded that the primary responsibility for these

serious failings rested with Prime Minister Olmert, Minister of Defence Peretz and Chief

of Staff, Dan Halutz. They singled out these three tragic figures because it was likely that

had any of them acted more prudently, the decisions in the relevant period and the

ways they were made as well as the outcome of the war would have been significantly

more positive for Israel. Nevertheless, the Interim Report (April 2007) stopped short of

personal recommendations regarding the failed trio.

The Prime Minister “bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the

decisions of "his" government and the operations of the army” (Winograd Committee

Interim Report April 2007: section 99, 129-30). Olmert also came under criticism for

rushed actions at the outset of the war, and for failing to consult with either military or

non-military experts. “The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact

that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one”, the

Report said (Winograd Committee Interim Report April 2007: section 135, 135). “He

made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the

IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs” (Winograd

Committee Interim Report April 2007: section 121, 133). Olmert was also criticized for

failing to “adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of

Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing” (Winograd Committee

Interim Report April 2007: section 128, 134). “All of these”, the Report said, “add up to a

serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence” (Winograd

Committee Interim Report April 2007: section 135, 136).

60

The findings levelled heavy criticism at Defence Minister Amir Peretz for his

irresponsible conduct. Peretz “did not have knowledge or experience in military,

political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic

principles of using military force to achieve political goals” (Winograd Committee

Interim Report April 2007: section 139, 136). Despite these deficiencies, the Report

stated, “He made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with

experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security

establishment” (Winograd Committee Interim Report April 2007: section 158, 140). In

fact, the Committee found, “his serving as minister of defence during the war impaired

Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges” (Winograd Committee Interim Report

April 2007: section 161, 140).

Chief of Staff Dan Halutz bore more blame, since Olmert and Peretz were

inexperienced in military matters. Halutz reacted impulsively to the kidnapping of the

two reserve soldiers. He was criticized for entering the war “unprepared” (Winograd

Committee Interim Report April 2007: section 174, 142), and for failing to inform the

cabinet of the true state of the IDF ahead of the ground operation. According to the

Winograd findings, the army and its chief of staff “were not prepared for the event of the

abduction despite recurring alerts” (Winograd Committee Interim Report April 2007:

section 16, 116). The Committee also found that Halutz had failed to “present to the

political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the convergence

between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions” (Winograd Committee

Interim Report April 2007: section 188, 143). Winograd said that Halutz displayed lack

of professionalism and lack of judgment. Winograd added that, despite his lack of

experience, Olmert did not request help, or questioned the plan that was put to him.

61

Peretz also came under similar criticism for not inspecting the war plan with sufficient

care.

The Interim Report had criticized the entire government, by saying that the

cabinet voted to go to war without understanding the implications of the decision: “The

government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing

the policy of “containment”, or combining political and diplomatic moves with military

strikes below the “escalation level”, or military preparations without immediate

military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction”

(Winograd Committee Interim Report April 2007: 123-5). In one crucial meeting that

lasted two and a half hours, without substantive deliberation, and without examining

different alternatives for action, the government had authorized a wide military

campaign. The government did not adequately consider how this campaign might

progress, without inquiring what would be its aims, without probing the implications of

the Hezbollah counter-attacks on Israeli society. More than one million citizens had to

evacuate their homes during the duration of the war (Cohen-Almagor May 2007;

Winograd Commission submits Interim Report April 2007). It is staggering to know that

one government meeting preceded the decision to bomb targets in Beirut. The

government had no idea that by this they forced the region into war. This is quite

disturbing: No checks and balances. No monitoring mechanisms (New York Times, 30

January 2008).

The Winograd Committee stopped short of recommending Prime Minister

Olmert he had to take responsibility and resign. Olmert behaved irresponsibly when he

appointed Amir Peretz to be Minister of Defence. He did this out of partisan political

considerations, knowing full well that Peretz was unqualified for this heavy

62

responsibility. By this Olmert abandoned security considerations, and drove Israel’s

enemy to try the inexperienced trio (Olmert, Peretz and Halutz). Halutz was the first

chief of staff in the history of young Israel who came from the air force. He had no

experience in commanding ground forces. In his mind, the key for military success was

to control the skies. Israel did control the skies as the Hezbollah had no air force, but it

was unable to stop the incessant barrages of rockets on northern Israel. When the

government opened war, it had knowingly decided to subject one million people to

continuous rocket attacks, without providing them with adequate shelters and defence

(Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir 2012).

The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War was an unjustified war of choice. It was an

exaggerated and disproportionate response to an act of guerrilla warfare. The Israeli

government responded hastily and without much thinking to the Hezbollah attack.

Rushing into action without proper examination is irresponsible. A responsible

government is required to ponder the consequences of its decisions and to calculate the

cost-benefits of conduct before and during conflict. The government should have

announced immediately after the kidnapping of the two soldiers that it regarded the

Hezbollah attack as a severe breach of international law, and that it will respond in the

time and manner it sees fit, reassuring the Hezbollah as well as the citizens of Israel that

such attack will not pass unnoticed. The way to respond to guerrilla warfare is by

guerrilla warfare. The IDF has several elite platoons that are suitable for the job. There

is no need to rush into action and to escalate tensed situations into unnecessary wars.

Israel did not retrieve the kidnapped soldiers. Its massive attack on Lebanon brought

about large-scale retaliation that subjected the north of the country to continuous

rocket attacks that resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees and hundreds of

63

people killed or maimed. If at all, the war strengthened the Hezbollah in Lebanon, and

weakened Israeli deterrence. By 2012, the Hezbollah has taken half of Lebanon, and is

much more powerful militarily and politically than the Lebanese government. The

Hezbollah is heavily financed by Iran and Syria, and it has significantly increased its

offensive capabilities from 14,000 rockets in 2006 to at least 45,000 rockets (Gilad

2012, p. 4).

The war ends were unjustified. On 12 July 2006, Israeli leaders convened to

discuss what they would wish to achieve militarily. The term used was “reshaping”:

reshaping deterrence (see Section III supra); reshaping the rules of the game; reshaping

Israel’s response to kidnapping. Chief of Staff Halutz summarized that there should be a

direct action in Lebanon in which unproportional harm will be inflicted on the Hezbollah

(Winograd Committee Final Report January 2008, p. 70). Israel wanted to inflict on the

Hezbollah a massive attack so as to teach the organization a lesson. The lesson was to

never try to abduct another Israeli soldier. Thus, from the start, the war was unjustified

from both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello aspects. Israel transgressed into

Lebanese territory to teach Hezbollah an unforgettable lesson and on the way killed

Lebanese civilians and destroyed Lebanese infrastructure. Keeping proportional

measures was not sought. Quite the contrary: Israeli leadership wanted to smash the

Hezbollah with all IDF might. This cannot be justified.

For the analysis of the Israel-Hezbollah War as well as the Cast Lead Operation

infra and for deciding whether the war conduct was justified, two issues are of utmost

importance: first, the Principle of Proportionality; second, the treatment of non-

combatants, especially when it is difficult to discern between combatants and non-

64

combatants. This issue is covered by the Principle of Distinction also termed

Principle of Discrimination. The two issues are inter-related.

As for the first issue, Article 57 of Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva

Conventions (1977) emphasises that the attacking side should “refrain from deciding to

launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury

to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Article

57 further stresses that “When a choice is possible between several military objectives

for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the

attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to

civilian objects.”24

Proportionality, Walzer observes (2006, p. 120), is a tricky issue as it should be a

matter of adjusting means to ends but during wartimes there is “an overwhelming

tendency” to adjust ends to means, i.e., to redefine initially narrow goals and then,

during fighting, to inflate the ends. But excessive harm is prohibited. It is not

permissible to do any mischief which does not tend materially to the end of victory nor

one that its conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison to the amount of mischief.

Two criteria are proposed for the determination of excess (2006, p. 129): (1) military

necessity to achieve victory, and (2) weighing the immediate harm to individuals and

“potential injuries to the permanent interests of mankind” against the contribution that

mischief makes to attain victory. Walzer acknowledges (2006, p. 129) that

proportionality is a hard criterion to apply for there is disagreement regarding the

24 See also Kasher (2007).

65

values against which the destruction of war is to be measured. He, however, clarifies

(2006, p. 131) that armies are not entitled to do anything that seem necessary to

achieve victory. There are moral limits on the use of force. By moral limits Walzer

means human rights, first and foremost the rights to life and liberty (2006, p. 135).

Consequently, a military operation that foreseeably causes incidental civilian casualties

and destruction far greater than the security threat, whose victory objectives are

blurred and undefined, cannot be justified. The incidental damage to civilian life and

property should not be excessive in relation to the military objectives.

Proportionality is especially a tricky issue in Israel, observes Dror (2011, pp. 17,

27) because the “vast majority of Israelis and the state-craft elite” think it is based on a

fundamental misunderstanding by the West of the nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict and

also hypocritical application of the principle as many Israeli believe that more demands

are made on Israel than on its enemies and many other countries which are behaving

much worse. As a result of this thinking, the criterion of proportionality does not

necessarily apply in the war conduct. Measures of “reasonableness” adjusted to the

stakes of each situation and to the overall situation take precedence.

As for the second issue, the Principle of Distinction, the first core principle of

the Law of Armed Conflict as postulated in Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva

Conventions (1977), is that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and

military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military

66

objectives.”25 It is thus unlawful to deliberately target civilians. Civilians should never be

the object of attack. Civilians did not do anything wrong; they do not take part in the

fighting; they are unable to defend themselves, and they do not constitute a threat. This

is why they are called non-combatants and it is not necessary to kill them in order to

win.

In addition, Article 50 of the Geneva Conventions (1977) further holds that “The

presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the

definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character”

(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470-750064?OpenDocument) while Article 57

emphasises that the attacking side should “take all feasible precautions in the choice of

means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,

incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”

(http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm). Various estimates claim some 900 to 1,200

Lebanese civilian deaths and 4,409 citizens injured, loss of 15,000 housing units, $10

billion in economic and infrastructure costs (Cordesman 11 March 2008; Report of the

Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1,

A/HRC/3/2 23 November 2006, p. 3).

The issue, I should stress, is not merely numerical. Proportionality is not merely

about the number of people killed on each side to the conflict. Instead, proportionality

25 Although the State of Israel is not a party to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, it

accepts that this provision accurately reflects customary international law. See HCJ 769/02 Public

Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, at ¶ 20 (11 December 2005). See also

McKeogh (2002).

67

concerns the measures taken to reach the declared military objectives while considering

the likely side effects. The positive results of the military conduct should be measured in

terms of the protection it has provided to the State and its citizens at the conclusion of

the military conduct and its aftermath. The negative results should be measured in

terms of the death, suffering and destruction inflicted on the enemy (Kasher 2009, p.

65). The Israel-Hezbollah War employed excessive measures in order to achieve

unattainable goals. Those measures had yielded massive, quite unnecessary and

unjustified destruction. I find it quite worrying that Yehezkel Dror, one of Israel’s

foremost social scientists and a member of the Winograd Committee, who was quite

critical of the war conduct, seems uncritical regarding Israel’s foregoing the Principle of

Proportionality. Dror explains (2011, p. 27) in a neutral fashion that the criterion of

“proportionality” does not necessarily apply in Israel’s existential imperative.

Prime Minister Olmert who came to office as the person who will bring peace to

Israel, who was willing to bring forward daring ideas that would solve once and for all

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, proved to be a great disappointment. Olmert spoke of the

establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and was willing to

accept a token number of Palestinian refugees (Ben 17 December 2009; Sackur 2009).

However, the person who was elected on a clear and explicit peace plan, who was the

Peace Camp great hope led Israel to two wars in three years: July-August 2006 -- Israel-

Hezbollah War, and Israel-Hamas War 2008-2009, Operation Cast Lead. Olmert left

behind a very different legacy from the one he had in mind when he assumed PM

responsibilities (Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir 2012). He was resolute and

determined in waging war and did very little to promote peace. These two wars plus

corruption allegation brought about the premature end of Olmert’s term in office in

2008 and paved the way for Benjamin Netanyahu to return to power.

68

Operation Cast Lead

Between 2000 and 2008, Israel was bombarded by some 12,000 rockets and mortar

shells. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005 did not relax the situation and the

attacks continued. In 2008, Hamas intensified its terror, firing some 3,000 rockets and

mortar shells (State of Israel July 2009). Since 2004, 92% of Sderot residents (a town of

20,000 inhabitants) have experienced a Qassam rocket falling on their or an adjacent

street. 17 Israelis were killed by Qassam rockets fired from Gaza and hundreds were

injured and maimed. Furthermore, the rocket terror gravely affected, for worse, some

million civilians whose lives was put to risk on a daily basis. On 27 December 2008

Israel had enough. After years of constant rockets on its civilian towns, patience was

exhausted. Yet again, Prime Minister Olmert wished to re-establish Israel’s deterrence

by being resolute, determined and extremely harsh. Olmert said: "The government's

position was from the outset that if there is shooting at the residents of the south, there

will be a harsh Israeli response that will be disproportionate" (New York Times 1

February 2009). Defence Minister Ehud Barak detailed the three objectives of the

offensive (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 27 December 2008): inflicting on Hamas a

forceful blow, fundamentally changing the situation in Gaza, and ending the rocket

attacks against Israeli citizens.

The IDF air force attacked Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations’

targets. The leading Palestinian organization in Gaza, Hamas, and its sister

organizations retaliated by intensifying the rocket fire on Israeli neighbouring towns.

The continuous barrages of rockets forced Israel on 3 January 2009 to launch a ground

campaign. This was a massive campaign, involving many army units and including the

69

mobilization of reserves (see Section III supra). On 8 January 2009, after 14 days of

fighting, the UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire in the Gaza Strip.

The resolution (No. 1860), submitted by Britain, passed with 14 votes. Only the United

States abstained from voting.

The resolution "stresses the urgency of and calls for an immediate, durable and

fully respected cease-fire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza”. It

also called for arrangements in Gaza to prevent arms smuggling to Palestinian

“militants” (i.e., terrorists) and reopen border crossings, and for "unimpeded provision"

and distribution of aid in Gaza (UN Resolution No. 1860,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9567.doc.htm). However, only on 17

January 2009, after 21 days, Israel declared an end to fighting. Only then Israel felt that

the operation's objectives were “fully met”. The timing was arbitrary. There was not

substantial reason to believe that then the defiant Hamas will stop firing rockets. On 21

January 2009, the IDF finally left Gaza.

During the offensive, thirteen Israelis were killed, including three civilians. The

numbers on the Palestinian side are contested but their loss was far weightier.

According to the Hamas-run health ministry in the Gaza Strip, 1,324 Palestinians were

killed, most of them civilians; among them were 412 children and 110 women (Or 19

March 2009). The Gaza-based Palestinian Center for Human Rights, which documents

Palestinian casualties on a regular basis, argues that some 1,300 people, of them two-

third civilians, were killed in the operation. 288 children and 121 women were among

the civilians who died (Bronner 19 March 2009). A later report, published on 27

December 2009 by the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, holds that between

27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, 1,385 Palestinians were killed, 762 of whom

70

did not take part in the hostilities. Of these, 318 were minors under age 18. More than

5,300 Palestinians were wounded, of them 350 seriously. More than 3,500 residential

dwellings were destroyed, and 20,000 people became homeless (B’Tselem Report 27

December 2009). Defence for Children International (DCI)-Palestine published the

names of 352 children who were killed by the Israeli troops (14 April 2010). Whether

they were aware of this or not, the IDF soldiers operated in accordance with the Biblical

teachings of Deuteronomy cited supra. Those teachings and present international

humanitarian laws are very different things.

The IDF published its own data concerning the majority of Palestinians killed,

after cross-checking their names with other lists of militants. The IDF figures relate to

1,167 Palestinian fatalities in Operation Cast Lead. Among them, 709 were Hamas and

Islamic Jihad terrorist and 295 were civilians. The IDF was unable to establish the

affiliation of the remaining 162 fatalities (Greenberg 22 April 2009).26

Every society is justified to defend its civilian population and the integrity of its

territory. No country would allow rocket fire on its cities and towns. Indeed, it is the

duty and responsibility of governments to take the necessary measures to see that their

citizens will be able to lead their lives in peace, free of terror attacks. A government that

does not take such measures betrays its most important responsibility. Thus the

reasons that brought about war, jus ad bellum, were justified: Israel was right to open a

military operation in Gaza to stop the extensive rocket terror and to deter Hamas and

other terrorist organizations (Kasher 2009, p. 62; Report of the United Nations Fact

Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, henceforth Goldstone Report 2009, p. 31). The

problems in Cast Lead relate to the war conduct, jus in bello.

26 The numbers add up to 1166 people.

71

Two concerns stood in the forefront of the Israeli generals which were absolutely

legitimate. Indeed, these concerns are shared by every commander in any battlefield: to

minimize casualties and to see that no soldier will fall in enemy’s hands. The first

concern dictates that direct engagement with the enemy should be taking place only

where it is absolutely necessary. Artillery, tanks bombardment, and fighting from the air

are all preferable to direct engagement of the infantry. Secondly, as the image of the

captured soldier, Gilad Shalit, was very much on the minds of all soldiers, the last thing

the IDF commanders wanted was to see yet another soldier captured by Hamas. Thus,

keep a safe distance from the enemy to avoid any possibility of abduction. The problem

with such modes of fighting, however, is collateral damage.27 Artillery, tank fire, and

helicopter fire are not pin-point measures to fight an enemy, especially when the enemy

resorts to guerrilla fighting and is hiding within the civilian population. The challenge

the IDF faced was formidable. The result was that hundreds of innocent civilians were

killed.

Here as was the case in the Israel-Hezbollah War, the Principle of Proportionality

and the Principle of Distinction are crucial. Yet again, a military operation that

foreseeably causes incidental civilian fatalities and devastation far greater than the

security threat, whose victory objectives are blurred and open-ended, cannot be

justified. The unintended civilian damage must not be excessive compared to the

27 For discussion on collateral damage and the double effect doctrine which differentiate between the

intended harm and the foreseen harm, see Hurka (2002); Bellamy (2004, pp. 847-848); Kasher and Yadlin

(2005); McMahan (2009, 2010); Frowe (2011, pp. 140-152); Lee (2012, pp. 173-181). The foreseeable

deaths of innocent civilians do not render a war unjust so long as they are not directly intended as the

object of warfare but are the unavoidable side effects of just force. On the other hand, the intentional

killing of non-combatants is considered a war crime.

72

military value of the objective (Luban 2009, p. 5). In discussing anti-guerrilla war,

Walzer explains that soldiers cannot know for sure whether an opponent, dressed in

civilian clothes, is a fighter who might kill them or an innocent civilian.28 Walzer writes

(2006, p. 192) that the situation imposes “a terrible strain” on conventional troops but

the lives of soldiers come first. Thus a soldier who fires at every male between the ages

of fifteen and fifty is “probably justified” in doing so. Walzer explains (2006, p. 192) that

the innocent deaths that result from such fighting are the responsibility of the guerrillas

and their civilian supporters. But, at the same time, as aforesaid, there are moral limits

on the use of force (Walzer 2006, p. 135). The harms inflicted during the war conduct

must be proportionate to the good that is protected, and it must not be excessive. For

instance, there is no need to destroy the whole house in order to take down a sniper on

its roof.29

The Principle of Distinction imposes obligations on both parties to an armed

conflict. McMahan (2009, p. 225) rightly suggests that non-combatants rarely bear what

he terms “a significant degree of responsibility” for their country’s unjust war as most

civilians have little or no capacity to affect the actions of their government even if they

voted for the government. Even if civilians approve of the war, this is insufficient for the

forfeiture of a person’s right not to be attacked and killed. Granted that it is practically

impossible to fight a war without killing some non-combatants. Israel is correct that

28 For further discussion on just war theory and terrorism, see Walzer (2006a, 2006b); McMahan (2006).

29 Israel High Court of Justice said that shooting at a terrorist sniper is proportionate even if as a result an

innocent civilian is harmed. But the building should not be bombed from the air which might result in

scores of its residents and passersby killed. See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.

The Government of Israel (December 2005),

http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf

73

identifying combatants in a heavily populated area is difficult, and that Hamas fighters

at times mixed and mingled with civilians. But, that reality does not lift Israel’s

obligation to take all feasible measures to minimize harm to civilians. The issues pertain

to the aggressor’s intention that is not easily discerned if not explicitly declared or

found in writing as well to the scope and scale of the harm which are objective data that

can be estimated and quantified.

Undoubtedly, terrorism changes the landscape of armed conflict. It is difficult to

conduct moral fighting when terrorists hide within civilian population and use them as

human shields. Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups had endangered

Palestinian civilians by firing rockets from residential neighbourhoods and storing

weapons in them. The Israeli military had repeatedly blamed Hamas for causing civilian

casualties, saying its fighters operated from buildings like schools, medical facilities,

religious institutions, residential homes and commercial premises (BBC News 2 July

2009). However, soldiers have the responsibility to minimize as best they can the risk of

harming non-combatants. Amnesty International, a human rights organization that

carried research about the war conduct, said that civilian deaths "could not be explained

as resulting from the presence of fighters shielding among civilians, as the Israeli army

generally contends" (BBC News 2 July 2009), adding that the destruction of homes,

businesses and public buildings was in many cases "wanton and deliberate" and "could

not be justified on the grounds of military necessity” (BBC News 2 July 2009). The

indiscriminate attacks “failed to distinguish between legitimate military targets and

civilian objects,” violated the Principle of Distinction, the “prohibition on indiscriminate

or disproportionate attacks, and the prohibition on collective punishment” (Amnesty

International 2009).

74

The Amnesty Report alleges that:

Israeli tanks often fired into Palestinian houses up to 2km or more away,

killing scores of unarmed civilians, many of them children and women. In all

the cases investigated by Amnesty International, the victims were neither

caught in the crossfire of battles between soldiers and militants, nor were

they shielding militants. The pattern is of single tank rounds, not a barrage,

fired into homes whose occupants were going about their normal activities –

a further indication that there were no battles raging nearby (Amnesty

International 2009, p. 19).

The Amnesty Report also details cases of close-range shooting against

innocent civilians (Amnesty International 2009, pp. 24-27). The detailed Goldstone

Report (2009) of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict

argues that in many cases Israel could have done much more to spare civilians

without sacrificing its stated and legitimate military aims. The IDF should have

refrained from attacking clearly marked civilian buildings, and from actions that

might have resulted in a military advantage but at the cost of too many civilian

lives. The Report called Israel’s military assault on Gaza “a deliberately

disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian

population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to

provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and

vulnerability” (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 525; BBC News 16 September 2009).30

That assessment and critic was based on the brute facts of reality as well as on

30 Luban (2012, p. 323) explains that allowing soldiers to act as vengeful judges distorts judgment and

proportionality. Rage provides a poor measure of how much hurt the avenger has experienced and how

badly the wrongdoer has acted. For further discussion, see Gross (2009); Ziegler and Otzari (2012).

75

Prime Minister Olmert’s clear statement, made on 31 January 2009, that “there

will be a harsh Israeli response that will be disproportionate" (New York Times 1

February 2009).

Walzer argues (2006, p. 192) that the responsibility lies with the guerrilla fighters

who put the soldiers in an impossible position. In a more recent article reflecting on the

Gaza War and the concept of proportionality, Walzer (2009) argues that proportionality

does not mean “tit for tat”; proportionality implies a measure and a justified reasoning.

Thus it is justified to attack a Qassam factory even if that would entail the killing of

civilians who are working on the rocket production. But it is not justifiable to attack a

textile factory.

The UN Mission, led by Judge Richard Goldstone from South Africa, once the lead

war crimes prosecutor for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, did not attempt an

exhaustive look at the war, instead focusing on 36 cases that it said constituted a

representative sample. In 11 of these episodes, it said the Israeli military carried out

direct attacks against civilians, including some in which civilians were shot “while they

were trying to leave their homes to walk to a safer place, waving white flags and, in

some of the cases, following an injunction from the Israeli forces to do so” (Goldstone

Report 2009, p. 15). In all but one of these civilian attacks, the report said, “the facts

indicate no justifiable military objective” for them (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 15).

The UN Mission study of incidents in which the Israeli armed forces repeatedly

opened fire on civilians who were not taking part in the hostilities and who posed no

threat to them indicates that the instructions given to the Israeli armed forces moving

into Gaza provided for a low threshold for the use of lethal fire against the civilian

population (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 228). In the incidents investigated, the Israeli

76

armed forces did not use their best efforts to provide humanitarian organizations access

to the wounded. On the contrary, the facts indicate that, while the circumstances

permitted giving access, the Israeli armed forces arbitrarily withheld it. The conduct of

the Israeli armed forces amounted to violations of the right to life where it resulted in

death, and to a violation of the right to physical integrity, and to cruel and inhuman

treatment in other cases, which violated articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 233).31

The UN Mission argues that in many cases Israel could have done much more to

spare civilians without sacrificing its stated and legitimate military aims. It should have

refrained from attacking clearly marked civilian buildings, and from actions that might

have resulted in a military advantage but at the cost of too many civilian lives (Goldstone

Report 2009, p. 274). In these cases, Israel must investigate, and Hamas is obliged to do

the same. They must examine what happened and appropriately punish any soldier or

commander found to have violated the law.

The UN Mission recognizes fully that the Israeli armed forces, like any army

attempting to act within the parameters of international law, must avoid taking undue

risks with their soldiers’ lives, but neither can they transfer that risk onto the lives of

civilian men, women and children. The fundamental principles of distinction and

31 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights holds: “Every human being has the

inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.

Article 7 states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific

experimentation”. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm

77

proportionality apply on the battlefield, whether that battlefield is a built up urban area

or an open field (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 524).

The UN Goldstone Report cited other possible crimes by the Israelis, including

“wantonly” destroying food production, water and sewerage facilities; striking areas, in

an effort to kill a small number of combatants, where significant numbers of civilians

were gathered; using Palestinians as human shields (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 280-

281); and detaining men, women and children in sand pits (Goldstone Report 2009, p.

20). It also called Israel’s use of weapons like white phosphorus “systematically

reckless” (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 249), and called for banning it in urban areas.

Indeed, Human Rights Watch Report, Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White

Phosphorus in Gaza (March 2009), provides witness accounts of the devastating effects

that white phosphorus munitions had on people and their property in Gaza. When used

in open areas, white phosphorus munitions are not illegal, but the IDF repeatedly

exploded it unlawfully over populated neighbourhoods, killing and wounding civilians

and damaging civilian infrastructures.32

The UN Mission acknowledged the significant efforts made by Israel to issue

warnings to the Gazan civilian population through telephone calls, leaflets and radio

broadcasts and accepted that in some cases, particularly when the warnings were

sufficiently specific, they encouraged residents to leave an area and get out of harm's

way. However, the Mission also noted factors that significantly undermined the

effectiveness of the warnings issued. These included the lack of specificity and thus

credibility of many pre-recorded phone messages and leaflets. The credibility of

instructions to move to city centres for safety was also diminished by the fact that the

32 See also Amnesty International (2009, pp. 27-36) and infra, testimonies of reserve soldiers.

78

city centres themselves had been the subject of intense attacks during the air phase of

the military operations (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 13). Amnesty International (2009, pp.

50-51) also reviewed the Israeli warnings and declared them ineffective. They were too

general and confusing as they reached residents all over Gaza. The UN Mission

examined the practice of dropping lighter explosives on roofs (so-called “roof

knocking”). It concluded that this technique was not effective as a warning and

constituted a form of attack against the civilians inhabiting the building (Goldstone

Report 2009, p. 13).

The UN Mission rejected the analysis of present and former senior Israeli

officials that, because of the alleged nature of the Hamas government in Gaza, the

distinction between civilian and military parts of the government infrastructure was no

longer relevant in relation to Israel’s conflict with Hamas. The Mission also rejected

Israel’s argument that Israel should “put pressure” on Hamas by targeting civilian

infrastructure to attain its war aims as this argument was incompatible with the

cardinal principle of distinction (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 118). During Cast Lead

Operation, about one million Palestinians in the vicinity of Gaza City had no electricity

for one or two weeks. About 500,000 Palestinians had no running water, and sewage

poured down the streets (Gisha August 2009, p. 15). Consequently, the health system

had not functioned adequately as hospitals were unable to treat the thousands of

wounded people with limited electricity, heating systems and fresh water (Gisha August

2009, pp. 25-26).

Defending sovereignty and enabling citizens to lead their lives free of the threat

of terror and violence are certainly relevant justified goods. The UN Mission concluded

that the rocket and mortars attacks, launched by Palestinian armed groups operating

79

from Gaza, had caused terror in the affected communities of southern Israel. The attacks

had caused loss of life as well as physical and mental injury to civilians. The attacks also

damaged private houses, religious buildings and property and eroded the economic and

cultural life of the affected communities (Goldstone Report 2009, p. 541; MacFarquhar

16 September 2009; Goldstone 17 September 2009). But the goal of ensuring life free

from rocket terrorism needs to be balanced against the inflicted harms. As Walzer

argues, not everything is justified. Walzer explains (2006, p. 156) that the natural

consequence of war is that civilians are put in harms’ way. This is why war is such a

hellish affair. We cannot ask soldiers not to kill any civilians. There are justified military

operations and unintended deaths, thus an absolute rule against attacking civilians does

not apply. But we can ask soldiers to minimize the dangers they impose, and we can ask

them not to kill civilians for trivial purposes. “And if saving civilian lives means risking

soldier’s lives, the risk must be accepted” (Walzer 2006, p. 156).

The IDF Code of Ethics (The IDF Spirit,

http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/ethics.htm) speaks of Purity of Arms,

holding that the “IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only for

the purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain their

humanity even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to

harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their

power to avoid causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” The facts

contest Israel’s argument (State of Israel July 2009, p. 79) that IDF troops had adhered

to Purity of Arms during the Gaza military campaign.

Asa Kasher, who drafted the IDF’s Code of Ethics, published in 2005 an article

with Major General Amos Yadlin in which he clarified the Principle of Military Necessity.

80

The authors explained that the military act should be carried out in a manner that

“strictly protects human life and dignity by minimizing all collateral damage to

individuals not directly involved in acts or activities of terror”, further explicating the

Proportionality Condition which holds that the military act should take into account

“the relationship between its contribution to the defense of citizens from dangers of

terror and the collateral damage it causes” (Kahser and Yadlin 2005). But, at the same

time, Kasher and Yadlin (2005) argued that “jeopardizing combatants rather than

bystanders during a military act against a terrorist would mean shouldering

responsibility for the mixed nature of the vicinity for no reason at all”. In a later article

reflecting on Cast Lead, Kasher (2010) legitimized the war conduct by explicitly writing:

“Israel should favor the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of the well-warned

neighbors of a terrorist when it is operating in a territory that it does not effectively

control, because in such territories it does not bear the moral responsibility for properly

separating between dangerous individuals and harmless ones”. Indeed, in Cast Lead the

obvious priority was to shield soldiers’ lives at the expense of civilian casualties. This

explains the substantive collateral damage that the IDF had inflicted on the Gazan

population. However, putting innocent civilians in harm’s way in order to protect Israeli

soldiers is wrong and dangerous. As Margalit and Walzer (2009) argue, such practice

erodes the distinction between combatants and noncombatants which is critical for the

conduct of a just war.

A group of Israeli soldiers who took part in Cast Lead testified that widespread

abuses were committed against civilians under "permissive" rules of engagement and

the culture of impunity. The troops said they had been urged to fire on any building or

person that seemed suspicious and said civilians were sometimes used as human

81

shields. Breaking the Silence, a campaign group made up of Israeli soldiers, gathered

anonymous accounts from 26 soldiers. "We were told soldiers were to be secured by

fire-power. The soldiers were made to understand that their lives were the most

important, and that there was no way our soldiers would get killed for the sake of

leaving civilians the benefit of the doubt”, said one soldier (Cohen-Almagor July-August

2009). "People were not instructed to shoot at everyone they see, but they were told

that from a certain distance when they approach a house, no matter who it is - even an

old woman - take them down”, said another (Cohen-Almagor July-August 2009; Scoop 9

June 2008).33

According to testimonies from the 14 conscripts and 12 reserve soldiers:

• Rules of engagement were either unclear or encouraged soldiers to do their utmost to

protect their own lives whether or not Palestinian civilians were harmed.

• Civilians were used as human shields, entering buildings ahead of soldiers

• Large swathes of homes and buildings were demolished. Accounts say that this was

often done because the houses might be booby-trapped, or cover tunnels. Testimony

mentioned a policy referred to as "the day after", whereby areas near the border were

razed to make future military operations easier

• Some of the troops had a generally aggressive, ill-disciplined attitude

• There were incidents of vandalism of property of Palestinians

• Soldiers fired at water tanks because they were bored, at a time of severe water

shortages for Gazans

33 See also Amnesty International (2009, pp. 9-10, 19) and Harel (19 March 2009).

82

• White phosphorus was used in civilian areas in a way some soldiers saw as gratuitous

and reckless. One of the first issues probed by the defence establishment was the use of

phosphorus shells. The IDF stressed that the Navy's use of the shells adhered to the

restrictions posed by international law, but following the criticism voiced over their use,

the military decided to halt such fire on 7 January 2009. Nonetheless, several incidents

in which phosphorus shells were used were recorded after the cease and desist order

was given – a fact the IDF attributed to the directive not reaching all troops (Greenberg

22 April 2009). The UN Mission was concerned not only with the inordinate risks the

Israeli armed forces took in using white phosphorus, but also the damage it caused in

fact. In speaking with medical experts and practitioners, it was impressed by the

severity and sometimes untreatable nature of the burns caused by the substance

(Goldstone Report 2009, p. 249).

• Many of the soldiers said there had been very little direct engagement with Palestinian

militants (Cohen-Almagor July-August 2009).

I said supra that no sovereign state should tolerate such terror. Indeed, the

primary role of any state is to guarantee its citizens’ safety. But Cast Lead’s conduct did

not take ample consideration of the Gaza citizens, perceiving all as combatants or

accessories at fault just by being residents of the Hamas territory (“Hamastan”).34 As

34 In his defence of Cast Lead Operation, Amos Guiora (2009, p. 13) explains quite unconvincingly that the

IDF broadened legitimate targets to include “passive supporters”. This new paradigm is broader than

“aiding and abetting” in the criminal law paradigm. “Passive support” extends to individuals who knew of

Hamas’ activity (missile firing, note that Guiora speaks of missiles and not rockets; the Qassams, however,

cannot be described as “missiles”) and one can assume passively supported the policy knowing that at

some point Israel would respond. I do not think that the just war paradigm should be expanded in such a

permissive collateral way, and I do not think that a civilian can be held responsible for a fire rocket

83

McMahan notes (2004, p. 728), even morally responsible noncombatants normally

make little contribution to their country’s unjust aggression thus attacking them would

not diminish the threat their country poses or to promote a just cause. Far too many

innocent lives were lost during the bloody operation which was conducted in such a

way that would provide maximum security to Israeli soldiers, often at the expense of

Gaza citizens who happened to be in harm’s way. Granted that military commanders

should always aspire to protect the soldiers they command but this does not justify

heavy fire toward the general direction of the enemy and the adoption of compromising

standards of war conduct that takes the lives of civilians lightly. The Gaza campaign

violated the jus in bello proportionality principles. Prime Minister Olmert was blunt and

honest to acknowledge that by saying: "if there is shooting at residents of the south

there will be an Israeli response that will be harsh and disproportionate by its nature to

the shooting at residents of Israel and at our forces" (New York Times 1 February 2009).

Israel disagrees with the findings and recommendations of the Goldstone Report,

which reflects “many misunderstandings and fundamental mistakes with regard to the

Gaza Operation” (State of Israel January 2010). At the same time, on 22 April 2009, the

Deputy Chief of Staff admitted that alongside Operation Cast Lead's achievements, there

were several mishaps, some of which resulted in the loss of Palestinian civilian lives.

Major-General Dan Harel stressed that the numbers of these operational malfunctions

was small, adding that "each case has been investigated and we are learning their

lessons”. Hamas, he added, must shoulder some of the blame since "it placed civilians in

the front lines. None of the investigations conducted so far have turned up so much as

conducted from the roof of his house. I would assume, conversely, that the terrorist did not ask the

resident’s permission before positing the rocket launcher on his roof and that if the civilian were to

protest, that would not necessarily prevent the terrorist from launching the rocket.

84

one case in which an Israeli soldier deliberately targeted Palestinian civilians, and

should any such case be found, we will deal with it to the full extent” (Greenberg 22

April 2009). The IDF had set up several inquiry committees to study all “mishaps” which

include some 150 investigations of separate incidents (State of Israel January 2010) but

for meting out justice, independent inquiry committee is required, one that is absolutely

impartial, with no suspect, apparent or obvious conflict of interest; one that would be

able to scrutinize all pertinent files, including those classified as strictly confidential;

one with substantial authority and ability to enforce severe sanctions, including jail

sentence to commanders and regular soldiers who did not adhere to Purity of Arms, and

who knowingly violated the Principles of Proportionality and Distinction. Nothing short

of such an independent and authoritative committee will not be able to dismiss the war

crimes allegations against the IDF during the bloody days of Operation Cast Lead.

V. Conclusion

Zionism is aimed to secure a Jewish home for all Jews in Israel. The Zionist idea has

remained contested. Hamas does not recognize the Zionist venture. It wishes to

eradicate Israel from the map and to establish Palestine at its expense. Leaders of a

major Islamic nation, Iran, voice the same desires. Two of Israel’s neighbours, Syria and

Lebanon, are in a state of war with the Jewish state and contest its borders. For more

than sixty years since its establishment, Israel has withstood many challenges and

overcame sturdy opposition. To be successful, Zionism must find a way to integrate into

the Middle East and to garner acceptance especially among the nations surrounding

Israel.

85

At present, many Israelis are quite content with satisfying security needs and see

no urgency or need to establish peace with Israel’s neighbours. They believe that the

status quo is good for Israel. However, in reality there is no status quo, as Israel

continues to build the settlements, thus is hampering the possibility of striking a deal

with the Palestinians in the future. The situation on the ground keeps changing

supposedly in favour of Israel. The Palestinians observe as their future state is shrinking

in front of their eyes and there is very little that they can do about it. Furthermore, the

occupation remains in reality and is undermining the vital ingredients needed for peace

talks: good faith and trust. Under occupation, Palestinians lack freedom and control

over their lives. Their economic activities, the allocation and management of their

natural resources, their health and well-being, their ability to move are in the hands of

Israel (Cohen-Almagor 2013).

I believe that if there is a will, there is a way. Both sides should aspire to peace in

order to reach peace. Both sides need to understand that peace is a precious commodity

and therefore be prepared to pay a high price for its achievement, reaching a solution

that is agreeable to both. The peace deal should be attractive to both, equally. It cannot

be one-sided, enforced or coerced. The key to Israel’s survival is to omprehensively

resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Otherwise, the cycle of violence will continue and

every few years Israel might face further challenges to its very existence.

The situation is becoming more and more complicated as countries are

developing long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities. The potential for attack

might come not only from Israel’s neighbours but also from remote countries, like Iran.

Israel has dominated the balance of power with its neighbours in terms of modern

conventional systems, recapitalization and foreign military support (Cordesman 2010,

86

p. 44) but the regional geo-political dramatic changes and the techno-military

advancements introduce further weighty challenges to Israel’s deterrence and defensive

capabilities. Israel’s ability to overcome alone those fateful tests and challenges is

questioned. Powerful allies do not rush to involve themselves in conflicts with

significant regional powers such as Iran. The worst case scenario (see Section III supra)

includes total nuclear annihilation against which wide security margins are difficult to

ascertain. Thus peace should be Israel’s security strategy. Finding ways to integrate into

the Middle East and to bring to a halt the continued cycle of violence and war are

essential. Without resolving the Palestinian problem, Israel’s existence will continue to

be threatened.

87

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