ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK,PETITIONER,vs.THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,RESPONDENTS.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the management and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.The FactsThe Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with principal office in Centro Sur, Sto. Nio, Cagayan. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005.1Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced.2On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, as well as the increase in the number of the members of its BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11).3Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSPs consolidated findings and risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008.4Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP.5Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, dated September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the following serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination: 1] negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2" with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or unsound.6Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.7Through its letter, dated September 30, 2008, the BSP furnished ECBI with a copy of the Report of Examination (ROE) as of December 31, 2007. In addition, the BSP directed the banks BOD and senior management to: 1] infuse fresh capital of ?22.643 million; 2] book the amount of ?28.563 million representing unbooked valuation reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October 31, 2008; and 3] take appropriate action necessary to address the violations/exceptions noted in the examination.8Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.9In its letter, dated February 20, 2009, the BSP directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation of Subsection X126.2 of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB).10Still in another letter,11dated March 31, 2009, the ISD II required ECBI to explain why it did not obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and operation of the banks sub-offices.Also, the scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being treated unfairly because the letter of authority to examine allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law and the Bank Secrecy Act.12The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. In its letter,13dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already due for another annual examination and that the pendency of its appeal before the MB would not prevent the BSP from conducting another one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.In view of ECBIs refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued Resolution No. 726,14dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The BSP also wrote a letter,15dated May 26, 2009, advising ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771, which essentially required the bank to follow its directives. On May 28, 2009, the ISD II reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general examination on June 3, 2009.16In its June 2, 2009 Letter-Reply,17ECBI asked for another deferment of the examination due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBIs request and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously scheduled.18Thereafter, the MB issued Resolution No. 823,19dated June 4, 2009, approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees of ECBI. Meanwhile, the MB issued Resolution No. 1164,20dated August 13, 2009, denying the appeal of ECBI from Resolution No. 1255 which placed it under PCA framework. On November 18, 2009, the general examination of the books and records of ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009, was commenced and ended in December 2009. Later, the BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings.21On December 7, 2009, the ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written explanation for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.22In a letter, dated February 1, 2010, the ISD II informed ECBI of MB Resolution No. 1548 which denied its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726.On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 27623placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with the recommendation of the ISD II which reads:On the basis of the examination findings as of 30 September 2009 as reported by the Integrated Supervision Department (ISD) II, in its memorandum dated 17 February 2010, which findings showed that the Eurocredit Community Bank, Inc. a Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the banks financial health and viability despite considerable time given to address the banks financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II as follows:To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; andTo designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. The petitioner presents the followingARGUMENTS:(a)It is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general law embodied in Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Banks Act of 1992.(b)Even if it assumed that Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is applicable, it is still the gravest abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to execute the law with manifest arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to further execute a mandate well in excess of its parameters.(c)The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.24Vivas submits that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they erroneously applied Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, instead of Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Bank Act of 1992 or R.A. No. 7353. He argues that despite the deficiencies, inadequacies and oversights in the conduct of the affairs of ECBI, it has not committed any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He posits that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSPs power is limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks.He contends that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the banks right to due process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the absence of any directive to this effect. Lastly, Vivas assails the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP the unbridled power to close and place under receivership a hapless rural bank instead of aiding its financial needs. He is of the view that such power goes way beyond its constitutional limitation and has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in its own "kingdom of banks."25The Courts RulingThe petition must fail.Vivas Availed of the Wrong RemedyTo begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:Section 30. x x x x.The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.x x x x. [Emphases supplied]Prohibition is already unavailingGranting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.26In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require.x x x x.Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.27As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.28Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.29The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CAEven if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30Doctrine of Hierarchy of CourtsEven in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law.31In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of DiscretionIn any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed Resolution No. 276.Vivas insists that the circumstances of the case warrant the application of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353, which provides:Sec. 11. The power to supervise the operation of any rural bank by the Monetary Board as herein indicated shall consist in placing limits to the maximum credit allowed to any individual borrower; in prescribing the interest rate, in determining the loan period and loan procedures, in indicating the manner in which technical assistance shall be extended to rural banks, in imposing a uniform accounting system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of rural banks; in instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending procedures, audits, test-check of cash and other transactions of the rural banks; in conducting training courses for personnel of rural banks; and, in general, in supervising the business operations of the rural banks.The Central Bank shall have the power to enforce the laws, orders, instructions, rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board, applicable to rural banks; to require rural banks, their directors, officers and agents to conduct and manage the affairs of the rural banks in a lawful and orderly manner; and, upon proof that the rural bank or its Board of Directors, or officers are conducting and managing the affairs of the bank in a manner contrary to laws, orders, instructions, rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board or in a manner substantially prejudicial to the interest of the Government, depositors or creditors, to take over the management of such bank when specifically authorized to do so by the Monetary Board after due hearing process until a new board of directors and officers are elected and qualified without prejudice to the prosecution of the persons responsible for such violations under the provisions of Sections 32, 33 and 34 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended.x x x x.The thrust of Vivas argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He asserts that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSPs power is limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks, and not receivership.Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing.33He adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should prevail over R.A. No. 7653 which is a general law.The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings.34There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.35More importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act.Close Now, Hear LaterAt any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 provides, viz:Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution. [Emphases supplied.]x x x x.Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the application of the doctrine that a special law should prevail over a general law. It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks, including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the banks continuance in business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela,36the Court reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.37[Emphasis supplied]In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38the Court also wrote thatx x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.39The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation of the banks assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public.40Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a summary closure.In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, 2010, containing the findings noted during the general examination conducted on ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009. The memorandum underscored the inability of ECBI to pay its liabilities as they would fall due in the usual course of its business, its liabilities being in excess of the assets held. Also, it was noted that ECBIs continued banking operation would most probably result in the incurrence of additional losses to the prejudice of its depositors and creditors. On top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated the cease-and-desist order of the MB issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the BSP rules and directives. For said reasons, the MB was forced to issue the assailed Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership. In addition, the MB stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and opportunity to address its monetary problem and to restore and improve its financial health and viability but it failed to do so.In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective measures enunciated in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified. Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 was no longer feasible considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions of insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would effectively put a stop to the further draining of its assets.No Undue Delegation of Legislative PowerLastly, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, as the legislature granted the MB a broad and unrestrained power to close and place a financially troubled bank under receivership. He claims that the said provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. The contention deserves scant consideration.Preliminarily, Vivas attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 constitutes collateral attack on the said provision of law. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.41A collateral attack on a presumably valid law is not permissible. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.42Be that as it may, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative power.1wphi1The rationale for the constitutional proscription is that "legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate."43"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative."44In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the economy.WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.SO ORDERED.PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN),G.R. No. 175303

Petitioner,Present:

EIJI* YANAGISAWA,Promulgated:

Respondent.April 11, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO,J.:An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in open court and embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said property, creates a right in favor of the person relying thereon.The latter may seek the annulment of actions that are done in violation of such undertaking.Before us is a Petition for Review[1]of the August 1, 2006 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944, which held:WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 20, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 258, Paraaque City, is herebyANNULLEDandSET ASIDEand a new one entered annulling the Real Estate Mortgage executed on August 25, 1998 in favor of defendant Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.SO ORDERED.[3]Factual AntecedentsRespondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F. Castaeda (Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.[4]On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila(Paraaque townhouse unit).[5]The Registry of Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to Evelyn P. Castaeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] both of legal age.[6]In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case).The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-776, was raffled to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Makati RTC).During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction.He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eijis application and motion moot.On the basis of said commitment, the Makati RTC rendered the following Order dated October 2, 1996:ORDERIn view of the commitmentmade in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva,counsel for the defendant [Evelyn],together with his client,the defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is hereby considered moot and academic.SO ORDERED.[7](Emphasis supplied.)The above Order was annotated on the title of the Paraaque townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791, thus:Entry No. 8729 Order issued by Hon. Josefina Guevara Salonga, Judge, RTC, Branch 149, Makati City,ordering the defendantin Civil Case No. 96-776 entitled Eiji Yanagisawa, Plaintiff-versus-Evelyn Castaeda Yanagisawa, that the properties registered in the name of the defendantwould not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of the petition,the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby considered moot and academic.Date of Instrument October 2, 1996Date of Inscription March 17, 1997 11:21 a.m.[8](Emphasis supplied.)Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan ofP500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN).[9]To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real estate mortgage (REM)[10]in favor of PAFIN over the Paraaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City for annotation on the same date.[11]At the time of the mortgage, Eijis appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA.[12]The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns marriage,[13]and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the Paraaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties.[14]The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her name.Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791.Deeming the mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTCs October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN.[15]The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0431, was raffled to Branch 258 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City (Paraaque RTC).For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn.It admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title with the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City because x x x Evelyn was a good, friendly and trusted neighbor.[16]PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.[17]Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order.[18]Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with her own funds[19]and that she has exclusive ownership thereof.[20]Paraaque Regional Trial Court Decision[21]The Paraaque RTC determined that the only issue before it is whether x x x [Eiji] has a cause of action against the defendants and x x x is entitled to the reliefs prayed for despite the fact that he is not the registered owner of the property being a Japanese national.[22]The Paraaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against them.[23]Thus, the Paraaque RTC dismissed Eijis complaint:WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the plaintiff to state a cause of action against defendants, EVELYN CASTAEDA YANAGISAWA and Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN), this case isDISMISSED.The counterclaim and cross-claim are likewiseDISMISSED.SO ORDERED.[24]Eiji appealed the trial courts decision arguingthat the trial court erred in holding that his inability to own real estate property in the Philippines deprives him of all interest in the mortgaged property, which was bought with his money.He added that the Makati RTC has even recognized his contribution in the purchase of the property by its declaration that he is entitled to half of the proceeds that would be obtained from its sale.Eiji also emphasized that Evelyn had made a commitment to him and to the Makati RTC that she would not dispose of, alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her name while the case was pending. This commitment incapacitates Evelyn from entering into the REM contract.Court of Appeals Decision[25]The CA found merit in Eijis appeal.The CA noted that the Makati RTC ruled on Eijis and Evelyns ownership rights over the properties that were acquired during their marriage, including the Paraaque townhouse unit.It was determined therein that the registered properties should be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof to be divided between Eiji and Evelyn.[26]Contrary to this ruling, the Paraaque RTC ruled that Eiji has no ownership rights over the Paraaque townhouse unit in light of the constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership of lands and that the subject property is Evelyns exclusive property.[27]The appellate court determined that the Paraaque RTCs Decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference.Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other.[28]Forthisreason, theCAannulledandsetasidetheParaaqueRTCsdecision to dismiss Eijis complaint.[29]The CA then proceeded to resolve Eijis complaint.[30]The CA noted that Eiji anchored his complaint upon Evelyns violation of her commitment to the Makati RTC and to Eiji that she would not dispose of, alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her name, including the Paraaque townhouse unit.This commitment created a right in favor of Eiji to rely thereon and a correlative obligation on Evelyns part not to encumber the Paraaque townhouse unit.Since Evelyns commitment was annotated on TCT No. 99791, all those who deal with the said property are charged with notice of the burdens on the property and its registered owner.[31]On the basis of Evelyns commitment and its annotation on TCT No. 99791, the CA determined that Eiji has a cause of action to annul the REM contract.Evelyn was aware of her legal impediment to encumber and dispose of the Paraaque townhouse unit.Meanwhile, PAFIN displayed a wanton disregard of ordinary prudence when it admitted not conducting any verification of the title whatsoever.The CA determined that PAFIN was a mortgagee in bad faith.[32]Thus, the CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.The parties to the annulled mortgage filed separate motions for reconsideration on August 22, 2006,[33]which were both denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in its November 7, 2006 Resolution.[34]PAFIN filed this petition for review.Petitioners ArgumentsPetitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly affirmed theMakati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property.PAFIN insists that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien can have an interest in real property located in the Philippines.[35]Petitioner also seeks the reinstatement of the Paraaque RTCs Decision dated April 20, 2003[36]and prays that this Court render a decision that Eiji cannot have ownership rights over the mortgaged property and that Evelyn enjoys exclusive ownership thereof.As the sole owner, Evelyn can validly mortgage the same to PAFIN without need of Eijis consent.Corollarily, Eiji has no cause of action to seek the REMs annulment.[37]Respondents ArgumentsRespondent argues that he has an interest to have the REM annulled on two grounds:First, Evelyn made a commitment in open court that she will not encumber the Paraaque townhouse unit during the pendency of the case.Second,the Makati RTCs decision declared that he is entitled to share in the proceeds of the Paraaque townhouse unit.[38]Respondent also insists that petitioner is in bad faith for entering into the mortgage contract with Evelyn despite the annotation on TCT No. 99791 that Evelyn committed herself not to encumber the same.[39]IssuesPetitioner raises the following issues:[40]1.Whether a real property in the Philippines can be part of the community property of a Filipina and her foreigner spouse;2.Whether a real property registered solely in the name of the Filipina wife is paraphernal or conjugal;3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned above when the marriage is declared void?4.Whether the Paraaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.Our RulingThe petition has no merit.Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Paraaque townhouse unit.It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC.The CA only clarified that it was improper for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending[41]appeal before the CA.The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC.[42]By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.Cojuangco v. Villegas[43]states:The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.The matter is further explained thus:It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.[44]Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Paraaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the REM.[45]The Court disagrees.A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment.Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eijisincapacity to own real property as their defense to the suit.They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity.But this argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji.This defense does not negate Eijis right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title.Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this defense.Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate courts ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in complete disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791.It did not dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyns capacity to encumber the Paraaque townhouse unit nor the CAs finding that petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith.[46]The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.[47]The following is instructive:An injunction or restraining order must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect until the injunction or restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal.The injuction must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be in its terms.[48]In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised by the petitioner.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit.The August 1, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS andCARMELITA C. LLAMAS,Petitioners,- versus -THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THEREGIONALTRIALCOURTOFMAKATICITYand THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondents.G.R. No. 149588Present:CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,BRION,PERALTA, andVILLARAMA*,JJ.Promulgated:August 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xRESOLUTIONNACHURA,J.:Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner-spouses Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas. On September 29, 2009, this Court promulgated a Decision[1]in the above-captioned case, denying the petition for Annulment of Judgment andCertiorari, with Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners. Petitioners are assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiCityconvicting them of the offense Other Forms of Swindling punishable under Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).Briefly, the antecedent facts are as follows:On August 14, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiwith, as aforesaid, the crime of other forms of swindling in the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:That on or about the 20thday of November, 1978, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No. 4896, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property for the sum ofP12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned amount ofP12,895.00.Contrary to law.After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine ofP18,085.00 each.On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its December 22, 1999 Resolution, the appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 141208. The Court, however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.[2]In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following the ruling inPeople v. Bitanga,[3]the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the September 29, 2009 Decision and, consequently, the annulment of their conviction by the trial court. In their Verified Motion for Reconsideration,[4]petitioners ask this Court to revisit and take a second look at the issues in the case without being unduly hampered by any perceived technical shortfalls of a beleaguered innocent litigant. In particular, they raise the following issues:1.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AND IN LIGHT OF THE CORRECT APPLICATIONS OF DOCTRINAL JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONERS HAD PURSUED THEIR MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS QUEST FOR JUSTICE AS INNOCENT MEN, AND HAD HONESTLY MAINTAINED THAT THEIR RESORT TO REVERSE, SET ASIDE AND/OR ANNUL, IS IN LINE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW,ANY TECHNICAL SHORTFALLS [OR] DEFECTS NOTWITHSTANDING[;]2.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AGAIN IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, PETITIONERS ARE NOT BARRED FROM RAISING SUCH QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT ANY TIME AND IN FACT MAINTAIN THAT RESPONDNET COURTS HADNO JURISDICTIONIN LAW AND ENLIGHTENING DOCTRINES TO TRY AND DECIDE THIS CASE;3.AGAIN WITH ALL DUE RESPECT ANDUNFORTUNATELY, THE VERY JUSTIFYING MERITS OF PETITIONERSAPPROPRIATE INSTANT REMEDY;HAD NOT CONSEQUENTLY BEEN PASSED UPON, TO UPHOLD THE PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONAL CHERISED MANDATE, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE MUST BE UPHELD, EXCEPT ONLY UPON ESTABLISHED AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND4.PETITIONERSVERY HUMBLY BESEECHTHIS HONORABLE COURTS HIGHEST SENSE OF MAGNANIMITY, UNDERSTANDING, JUDICIOUS WISDOM AND COMPASSION, SO THAT JUSTICE MAY TRULY AND JUSTLY BE RENDERED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS AS IT MUST, GIVEN THE VERY UNIQUE AND COMPELLING JUSTIFICATIONS HEREOF[.][5]Petitioners likewise pray for a referral of the case to the CourtEn Bancfor oral argument or to be allowed to submit written supplementary pleadings for them to state the compelling reasons why their motion for reconsideration should be allowed.In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine this case.Admittedly, petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grantpro hac vicethe motion for reconsideration.This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.[6]It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.It is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.[7]This Court notes that the case was allowed to run its course as a petition forcertiorari, such that in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, it said Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review oncertiorarix x x. Likewise, in its February 10, 2003 Resolution,[8]the Court said, It appearing that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, in his own behalf and as counsel for petitioners, has failed to file their reply to the Solicitor Generals comment on the petition for review oncertiorariwithin the extended period x x x.Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one forcertiorari.Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one forcertiorari, the doctrine inPeople v. Bitanga[9]no longer finds application in this case.Next, we proceed to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:ART. 316.Other forms of swindling. The penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:x x x2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;x x xIn every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime chargedandthe complicity or participation of the accused.[10]For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the burden to prove the confluence of the following essential elements of the crime:1.that the thing disposed of be real property;2.that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;3.that there must be express representationby the offender that the real property is freefrom encumbrance; and4.that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.[11]One of the essential elements of swindling underArticle 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of disposing the encumbered real property is made to the damage of another. In this case, neither the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion that there was damage suffered by complainantAvila, or any finding that his rights over the property were prejudiced.On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the land even as the cases were being heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion over the property was not disturbed. Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title. This, however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually decided in petitioners favor.[12]If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would have been committed by the vendor, as the element of damage would then be lacking.[13]The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration isGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009 isSETASIDEand a new one is enteredACQUITTINGpetitioners of the crime charged on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154243 December 22, 2007DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO,petitioners,vs.P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before the Court is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on March 6, 2007. In said Decision, the Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process during the summary hearing.Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following reasons:1. The summary proceeding was null and void because no hearing was conducted; and2. The evidence presented at the summary hearing does not prove that respondent is guilty of the charges against him.Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding further questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2 Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings. InSamalio v. Court of Appeals,1the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words,it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.2(Emphasis supplied)The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore, be struck down.To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him.However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the Regional Trial Court is one forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as held inPeople v. Court of Appeals,3where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action forcertiorari.Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the administrative case against respondent was filed way back in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of procedure.The general rule is that the filing of a petition forcertioraridoes not toll the running of the period to appeal.4However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. InGinete v. Court of Appeals5andSanchez v. Court of Appeals,6the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the country.In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy ofcertiorariinstead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section 41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer.It was only inQuiambao v. Court of Appeals,7promulgated in 2005 orafter respondent had already filed the petition forcertiorariwith the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors haveconcurrent jurisdiction over administrative casesfiled against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8InLand Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9the Court stressed thus:After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.10Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher interest of substantial justice.WHEREFORE,respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is partlyGRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated March 6, 2007 isMODIFIEDsuch that respondent is hereby allowed to file his appeal with the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution.SO ORDERED.MAJOR GENERAL G.R. No. 165835CARLOS F. GARCIA, PetitionerSANDIGANBAYAN and AZCUNA,the OFFICE OF THE TINGA,OMBUDSMAN,CHICO-NAZARIO, and Respondents. GARCIA,JJ. Promulgated: June 22, 2005x ------------------------------------------------------------------ xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.: Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed thisPetitionfor certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent SandiganbayansResolution[1]dated 29 October 2004 andWrit of Preliminary Attachment[2]dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances. On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[3]violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379,[4]Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as CaseNo. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.[5] Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth. On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, aPetition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment[6]against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia,et al. It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined that aprima faciecase exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income, if any.[7] Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the questionedResolutiongranting the relief prayed for. The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as respondenta quo) filed aMotion to Dismiss[8]in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the presentPetition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner argues in thisPetitionthat the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the civil action for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2[9]of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,[10]as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 14[11]and 14-A.[12] Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions, petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquinos issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction overcivil actionsfiled against President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal action.Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential damages or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than those filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.[13] Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379. Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379,[14]namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.[15] He argues that only informations for perjury were filed and there has been no information filed against him for violation of R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to certify that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been committed and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also supposedly bereft of the required certification which should be made by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been the Office of the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this case. The petition being fatally defective, the same should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes. In theirComment,[16]respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these have been settled inRepublic vs. Sandiganbayan[17]which categorically ruled that there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.[18] Respondents argue that under the Constitution[19]and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan, thus: Sec. 4.Jurisdiction.TheSandiganbayanshall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1)Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:.(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioners argument that the petition for forfeiture is civil in nature and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof.[20] Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture as a civil case, since it has been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it is only the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature.[21] The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separateComment,[22]likewise relying onRepublic v. Sandiganbayanto argue that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the amendments of R.A. No. 7975[23]and R.A. No. 8294[24], although it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner belongs.[25]In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution[26]and R.A. No. 6770.[27] The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11)[28]of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the Ombudsman has been affirmed also inRepublic vs. Sandiganbayan.[29] The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioners allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him failed to comply with the procedural and formal requirements under the law. It asserts that all the requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is actually no longer required since the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate and prosecute the case as discussed above.[30] In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the presentPetitionshould be dismissed for blatant forum-shopping. Even as petitioner had filed aMotion to Dismissas regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the instantPetitionraising exactly the same issue, even though theMotion to Dismissin Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending resolution. Worse, it appears that theMotion to Dismissand the instantPetitionwere filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. Petitioner refutes these arguments in hisReply[31]and enunciates that the Sandiganbayans criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate theprima faciedetermination in forfeiture proceedings from the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor General. Petitioner also points out in hisReply[32]to theCommentof the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept of violation of certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence, when reference was made to violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379, the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby highlighting respondent Sandiganbayans lack of jurisdiction over the civil case for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime carries with it the corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-shopping. The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed. The seminal decision ofRepublic v. Sandiganbayan[33]squarely rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379.Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486,[34]original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court.[35] P.D. No. 1606[36]was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court.[37] Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.[38]Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[39]abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty not higher thanprision correccionalor its equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860[40]and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.[41] On the foregoing premises alone, the Court inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan,deduced that jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan.[42] It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No. 7975[43]and R.A. No. 8249[44]since both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379.Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d)Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.[45] In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it being civil in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actionscollapses completely.The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: [T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actionsin remand, therefore, civil in nature.[46] Then,Almeda, Sr.v. Perez,[47]followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegallyacquiredin favor of the State. It noted that theprocedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action.[48]However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a penalty. InCabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,[49]the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings,viz:In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)."Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedingsin rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature ofcriminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one count is good. According to the auth