Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 2004 Adams

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Responsive Regulation in Child Welfare:

Systemic Challenges to Mainstreaming

the Family Group Conference

Paul Adams and Susan M. Chandler

University of Hawaii at Manoa

The purpose of this article is to examine the challenges inherent in trans-forming child welfare services. We apply Braithwaites model of responsiveregulation to the restorative practice of family group conferencing in childwelfare. Shifting the role of the state away from controller of families in thechild protective services system to one of regulatory partner with them isextraordinarily difficult. The paper looks at the complexities of reorientingchild welfare services through the use of family group conferences on alarge scale.

Key words: responsive regulation, restorative justice, family group con-ference, child welfare, child protection

In this article, we argue that Family Group Conferencing(FGC) in child welfare has a transformative potential, but one that

is hard to realize for systemic reasons. We first examine the appli-cation of Braithwaites (2002) model of responsive regulation tochild protective services (CPS) in the United States. We argue thatmodel enables us to understand the relation of two apparentlycontradictory but essential elements of FGCempowerment andthe context of social control or state coercion. We discuss thedifficulties of implementing FGC in the UnitedStates andsuggestthat the range of models and variations currently being practicedacross the country may be in part evidence of and a response tothese difficulties.

Drawing on the experience of the State of Hawaii in adoptinga uniform model of FGC and its application statewide to over

2,000 cases, we conclude with a discussion of the kinds of system

Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1

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94 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

change needed to facilitate and support the mainstreaming ofFGC. The wide variations in FGC and in other forms of familygroup decision-making (FGDM) may be decried as representingcompromisesof core principles that undergird themodel.This va-riety also is making evaluative research difficult since researchersare failing to specify a consistently applied model of the elementsof FGC prior to analyzing its effectiveness. On the other hand,the diversity of forms of FGC may be celebrated both as creativeadaptations to local conditions and cultures and as providing anatural experiment without prejudging the key, efficacious com-ponents of the approach. We sidestep these disputes and takea different path hereone of exploring the systemic context in

which policy-makers and practitioners are attempting to applyFGC principles and processes.

Conferencing as Regulation

Braithwaites (2002) work on restorative justice and respon-sive regulation provides a valuable conceptual framework forthis undertaking. It enables us to see both the restorative aspectsof FGCits relation to indigenous practices aiming at solvingproblems and setting things right, its empowerment of fami-lies, and its widening the circle of care and control beyond theprofessional-client relationshipand FGCs role in the contextof responsive regulation of families. Braithwaites discussion ofresponsive regulation draws on the field of business regulation.It enables us to see, in the complex field of child welfare, howcombining the empowering aspects of FGC with the coercivepower of the state is not necessarily a limitation or contradiction.Rather, empowerment and control are different, but necessaryand mutually enriching aspects of a dynamic model of stateregulation of families to protect children.

The Braithwaite Pyramid

Braithwaite (2002) contends that restorative justice, deter-rence and incapacitation are all limited and flawed theories of

compliance (p. 32). Each needs to be understood and applied ina model that includes all three. In his figure entitled Toward anIntegration of Restorative, Deterrent and Incapacitative Justice,


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Mainstreaming the Family Group Conference 95

IncapacitationIncapacitation

Deterrence

Restorative JusticeVirtuousActor

RationalActor

Incompetentof IrrationalActor

Assumptions

Figure 1

Source: Braithwaite J., Restorative justice and responsive regulation. Oxford &

New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 32.

Braithwaite (2002, p. 32) hierarchically orders these concepts andplaces restorative justice at the base of the pyramid, filling upmost of the space.

The pyramid provides a dynamic, non-formalist model of

governmental regulation, whether of a nursing home, a nuclearpower station, an insurance company, or a family. The formalistapproach to regulation seeks to define in advance which prob-lems or failures of compliance require what official responsesand mandate them in regulations. In responsive regulation, bycontrast, there is a presumption, regardless of the seriousness ofthe offense or violation, in favor of starting official interventionat the base of the pyramid. Moving up the pyramid to deterrenceand,ultimately, incapacitation, is a responsenot to the seriousnessof the harm done but to the failure to elicit reform and repair at the

base with restorative justice processes. Of course, as with otherviolent crimesa shooting spree in progress, for examplean

immediate move to incapacitation (at least temporary) may benecessary in cases of child abuse where there is imminent andcontinuing danger to the child.


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The presumption in favor of starting at the base of the pyra-mid, Braithwaite (2002) argues, not only favors less coercive andcostly state intervention where possible, but also makes more co-ercive measures more legitimate when escalation up the pyramidis necessary. This is important because when regulation is seenas more legitimate, more procedurally fair, compliance with thelaw is more likely (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 33; see also Neff in thisissue).

By analogy, accreditation of a professional school, whether oflaw, medicine,nursing,or socialwork,is a processof required self-regulation through a process of self-study andreform. Theaccred-iting body, e.g., the Council on Social Work Education in the case

of U.S. baccalaureate and masters of social work programs, hasa range of escalating options to identify and encourage schoolsto address concerns and come into compliance, culminating inthe ultimate and rarely used action of withdrawing or denyingaccredited status. In extreme situations, withdrawal might beimmediate rather than a final step in a succession of regulatoryactions. Although this option of denying a school accreditation isunderstood by all to be at the Councils disposal as a last resort,site visitors and accreditation commissioners work in collegialpartnership with schools with the shared aim of avoiding escala-tion up the regulatory pyramid.

In applying this model to a business such as a nursing home,

nuclear power station, or insurance company, a regulator wouldbegin to work with the firms management at the base of thepyramid. Both management and regulator are aware that if thefirm proves unable or unwilling to make the changes neededto come into compliance, the next level of regulation will bemore coercive. At the first level, the assumption is that the firmsmanagement is a virtuous actor, with the will and capacity torespond to the regulatory process by taking the steps neededto come into compliance. Regulator and regulated work togetherto prevent a more coercive regulatory response. At the next level,management may have no wish to cooperate with regulators orto make the necessary changes, but is assumed to be a rational

actor whofaced with a fine or other penalty and the threat ofbeingputout of businesswillcalculate that it is betterto comply.


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At the highest level of the regulatory pyramid, managementis assumed to be an incompetent or irrational actor who isunable or unwilling to comply and who therefore needs to beincapacitated by losing its license to operate.

Applying this model to FGC, we seeconferencing as a restora-tive process at the base of the pyramid. Following Marshallswidely quoted definition of restorative justice as process, FGCmay be seen as a process whereby all the parties with a stakein a particular offence come together to resolve collectively howto deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications forthe future (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 11). Conferencing involves corevalues as well as processes, having to do with healing and setting

right, moral learning, community and kin participation, respect-ful dialogue, responsibility, apology, forgiveness. So restorativejustice is about restoring victims, restoring offenders, and restor-ing communities . . . Stakeholder deliberation determines whatrestoration means in a specific context (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 11).

In contrast to youth or criminal justice contexts, conferencingin child welfare is not directly focused on the wrongdoing andthe harm done, nor is there a process, in any usual sense, ofresolving a conflict between offender and victim and betweentheir respective families. Instead the focus is on the future safetyand well-being of the children involved. The extended familypartners with the system professionalsthe family regulators

in order to develop a plan to achieve this. The family membersreceive significantly more information than usual from the stateabout their case, including the actions of the social worker,the official concern about the abuse or neglect, and any otherpertinent facts about resources and constraints that could affectdecision-making. The process is concerned not with holding theoffenderthe maltreating parentpassively accountable forpast actions, but with engaging the extended family group intaking active responsibility for generating and implementing so-lutions. Conferencing aspires to form a true partnership of familyand state, even though the state retains the ultimate veto powerin light of its legal mandate and responsibility to protect children.

In this sense, child welfare conferencing shares with other formsof conferencing and restorative justice certain principlesabout


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healing, moral learning, taking active responsibility for resolvingthe situationbut de-emphasizes others such as apology, makingamends, and forgiveness.

These differences of emphasis notwithstanding, FGCs in childwelfare fit well at the base of Braithwaites regulatory pyramid.They offer a decision-making process in which the regulator (thepublic child welfare agency) works with the family in a respectfulmode that assumes that the family group (if not necessarily theparents) has both the capacity and the caring concern to comeinto compliance with the law and community standards so thatchildren are protected from abuse and neglect. The process tapsinto and mobilizes the knowledge, wisdom, and caring capacity

of the extended family, its culture and community, in order toplan for the childrens safety.

Levels of the Pyramid

FGC, from this perspective, is a process of state-enforced fam-ily self-regulation, a collaborative regulatory process in which theprofessionals and any other community representatives help thefamily design a strategy to come into compliance by provid-ing information, a structure, and access to resources. However,the regulatory context of this empowering, professional-familypartnership is one in which all understand and seek to avoid

escalation up the pyramids levels to a more coercive regulatoryresponse in which the state, through its social workers and/orfamily court, take over the decision-making process. At the apexof the pyramid lies the regulatory option of incapacitation, whichin the case of families in the United States could mean the invol-untarytermination of parental rights anda permanent alternativeplacement for the child, such as adoption.

Braithwaite (2002) suggests that in thecase of business regula-tion, Perhaps the most common reason . . . for successive failureof restorative justice and deterrence is that noncompliance isneither about a lack of goodwill to comply nor about rationalcalculation to cheat. It is about management not having the com-

petence to comply (p. 32).Muchthesamemaybesaidaboutfamilies.Thatis,restorative,

empowering practices like FGC as well as more direct control by


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CPS may fail, not because rational and competent adults in thefamily group choose to defy the child welfare regulators (CPS) orfail to appreciate the threat of losing parental rights if they do notcomply, but rather because they lack the capacity or competenceto make the changes required for the safety and well-being oftheir children. Escalation up the pyramid results from failure,for whatever reason, to respond at lower levels of coercion. Themodel also allows for movement back down the pyramid awayfrom coercive interventions when a family demonstrates its willand capacity to plan for and assure the childrens safety. Themodel provides for movement to more or less coercive forms ofsocial control according to the familys behavior.

In Braithwaites model, deterrence represents an intermediateplace in the pyramid between restorative justice and incapacita-tion. This fits well with the use of FGCs in the youth or adult

justice systems, for generally restorative justice occurs in the con-text of violations of criminal law with the potential for impositionand escalation of formal punishment. Although child abuse andneglect violate the law, criminal penalties are rarely invoked ex-cept in the most egregious cases. In those circumstances, criminalsanctions are retributive measures commensurate with the per-ceived seriousness of the offense, not necessarily a response to thefailure of restorative regulation. Deterrence in the form of fines orother penalties analogous to those invoked in the deterrent phase

of business regulation is similarly rare.In child welfare, therefore, deterrence does not seem to fit

neatly between restorative justice at the base of the pyramidand incapacitation at the top. Rather, if restorative justice at the

base takes the form of the collaborative, respectful, non-coercivedecision-making process of FGC, the place of deterrence in themiddle is taken by professional- or court-determined dispositionof the case, imposed with or without the familys agreement. Inpractice, that might mean a temporary custody arrangement forthe child with a stringent time line in which the family must com-ply or the court would begin taking steps toward permanentlyremoving the child. The deterrent for the family is not the threat

of a punishment such as a fine, as might be imposed in a case ofbusinessregulation, but loss of control, of active, decision-makingresponsibility for their children, to the state.


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We may assume that such loss of control is a powerful de-terrent for families that may not wish to comply with legal re-quirements or collaborate with the child welfare authorities, butwho nevertheless have the capacity to make and act on a rationalcalculation of the inevitable consequences of their failure to doso. In Braithwaites scheme, these are rational actors, in contrast

both to the virtuous actors at the base of the pyramidwho seekthe best for their children and willingly collaborate in the restora-tive FGC processand to the incompetent or irrational actors atthe apex who are unable or unwilling to comply. Despite somepeculiarities of the child welfare context, FGCs provide botha form of restorative justice and an empowering, non-coercive,

respectful form of collaborative decision-making at the base ofthe regulatory pyramid.The key to applying the regulatory pyramid to child protec-

tion is to see that the levels of the pyramid do not reflect particularoutcomes but different decision-making processes with differentdegrees of coercion or non-domination. For example, a decisionto remove children permanently from the care of their parents,through guardianship or other mechanisms, could be an outcomearrived at even at the base of the regulatory pyramid. That is, itcould be part of the plan developed by the extended family groupin its private family time and endorsed by the other participantsin the conference, by the responsible agency, and subsequently

by the court. The pyramid in child welfare reflects a continuumfrom state-managed family self-regulation to an outcome unilat-erally imposed by the state, not a continuum of outcomes fromreunification with supportive services to termination of parentalrights.

Empowerment and Coercion

If a formal regulatory philosophy objects to the inconsistencyof punishment implicit in restorative justicethe punishmentdoes not fit the crime, but depends upon the offenders will-ingness and capacity to set things rightan objection may be

made from the opposite direction that truly restorative justice,not to mention empowerment, is impossible in the presence of animplicit threat of escalating coercion.


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Braithwaite (2002) makes the point that as a matter of fact,very few criminal offenders would participate in restorative con-ferences in the absence of some degree of coercion in the form ofdetection and/or arrest, and perhaps the specter of a trial. A con-ference or sentencing circleputs theoffenders behavior under thescrutinyof family and communityand inevitably involves shame.Shame, as Braithwaite (1989) argued in his earlier classic work,Crime, Shame, and Reintegration, may stigmatize or, in a restorative

justice process, help to reintegrate the offender. In the case ofchild abuse and neglect, the FGC process brings secrets, e.g., ofviolence within the family, out into the open, brings contributing

behavior such as drug use to the attention of both maternal and

paternal relatives, and focuses the attention of all participantson the harm done to the children and the need to protect theirfuture well-being. It is reasonable to assume official investigationand the prospect of court involvement and ultimately of losingones children, create a coercive context that provides a strongand often necessary incentive for abusing or neglecting parentsto collaborate with the conferencing process.

Braithwaites (2002) hypothesis is that restorative justiceworks best in the context of coercion, but where the implicitthreatin this case of loss of control over decisions involvingones childrens futureis in the background. Similarly, Burfordand Pennells (Burford & Pennell, 1996, 1998; Pennell & Burford,

2000) research on an FGDM project to reduce family violencein Newfoundland and Labrador suggested that the sanction,support, and resources of government and professionals couldfacilitate the familys decision to stop violence within it. Vulnera-

ble family members were protected both by widening the circle ofresponsibility and control to include those who love and care foreach other, ending secrecy and isolation and providing for activefamily responsibility for its members, and by the sanction of thelaw. The legal context of FGCthe fact that in New Zealand thestate has veto power if the familys plan is contrary to the princi-ples of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Actsetsup a tension that may make for sharper focus andbetter decisions.

The legal system, similarly, constrains the peoples justiceof FGC by providing a recourse for the protection of individ-ual rights, at the same time as FGC loosens the dead hand of


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bureaucratic-professional domination and unleashes the creativ-ity, wisdom, and active responsibility of families and commu-nities. The hypothesis is that the interweaving of formal andinformal, state and family, professional and community care andcontrol in this way makes for a fairer process and better decisionsthan either would achieve if left to itself (Adams, 2002; Braith-waite, 2002; Strang & Braithwaite, 2001).

Adapting Braithwaites (2002) hypothesis to child welfareconferencing enables us to see, however, even in the social controlsphere of child protection, an important difference between theultimatist social worker who threatens the parent with loss of herchild if she does not comply with her instructions, on the one

hand, and on the other, the process of collaborating with the par-ent and others involved to prevent escalation up the regulatorypyramid. This is true even though all understand that escalationis inexorable if they cannot work together to find ways to keepthe children safe. The focus of the conference is not on blamingor threatening the maltreating parents, but on meeting the needsof the children themselves. The threat is in the background, notthe foreground. This difference makes possible the empoweringnature of an FGC, which enables the family group to tap into itsown knowledge, wisdom, and resources in collaboration with theothers involved,includingthe responsibleagency and profession-als. The family group takes active responsibility for mobilizing

its collective capacity to care for the children and keep them safethrough whatever plan they, rather than the professionals, playthe lead role in developing.

The Promise of FGC

The child welfare FGC brings together those affected by asituation of harm to childrenparents, children, extended familymembers, other community supports or fictive kin, and profes-sionals (such as therapists, school officials, the CPS social worker,and the conference coordinator/facilitator)to provide the fam-ily group with all the pertinent information and engage them in a

planning or decision-making process. It widens the circle of careand responsibility, shares information with the family that underprofessional-dominated practice would be kept confidential to


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the professionals alone, and potentially places the social workersbehavior under scrutiny as well as that of the parents.

FGC in child welfare differs from some other kinds of con-ferencing, mediation, or alternative dispute resolution. It is not athird-party mediated negotiation of a dispute between offenderand victim, or parents and child. It does, however, deal with theaftermath of the (normally undisputed) harm done to the victimand involves a process of taking responsibility for resolving theconcerns about the childs safety andwell-being. Like other formsof restorative justice, it draws on a cultural treasure of pre-statesocieties and ancient civilizations that has persisted in manyindigenous peoples practices around the world. Grounded in

traditions of justice that have roots and resonance in many, per-haps all cultures, as Braithwaite (2002) argues, restorative justicewaseclipsedwiththeemergenceofthemodernstate,whichstoleconflicts and their resolution fromthoseaffected (Christie, 1977).

The resulting homogenization and impoverishment of justicetraditions has, for our purposes, at least two important aspects.One is the domination of the processing of both conflicts anddisputes, both within and between families, by professionalslicensed by and/or acting on behalf of the statepolice, lawyers,social workers, probation officers, among others. The other isthat in certain fields like child protection where workers facea high level of public skepticism about their professionalism

and competence, their capacity to negotiate solutions with thosedirectly involved is increasingly circumscribed by formal rules,regulations, and procedures (Adams & Krauth, 1995; Adams &Nelson, 1997)

FGC offers a paradigm shift in this context. It fundamen-tally alters the relationship of professionals and the families andcommunities they serve. It de-centers the professional-client re-lationship and widens the circle of responsibility and decision-making to include those whose relationship to the children atrisk is based not on professionalism but on caring and kinship.It rests on the assumption, as Burford and Hudson (2000) putit, that lasting solutions to problems are ones that grow out of,

or can fit with, the knowledge, experiences, and desires of thepeople most affected (p. xxiii). The key shift in practice andin such legislation as mandates it (above all the 1989 Children,


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Young Persons, and Their Families Act of New Zealand) is fromprofessional-dominated practice resting on a model of regulatoryformalism to a process for decision-making and planning thatmobilizes and empowers the childrens kin and community. Itdoes not replace the formal processes of the court system, butand this is surely the potential of restorative justice in modernsocietiesit enables both formal and informal care and control toenrich and constrain each other.

Threats to Implementation in the United States

So much for theory, principles, and promise, but what of thechallenge of translating these into policy and practice in the

UnitedStates? Bringing about such a fundamental shift in the bal-ance of power between child welfare professionals and families,a shift from domination to partnership, is both at the heart ofFGC and a daunting task. Even the New Zealand model, the goldstandard for those who emphasize this aspect of FGC, in practicehas the potential to be subverted by social workers reassertingtheir control over the process and outcome (Lupton & Nixon,1999, Walker, 2003).

In the United States, there are many variations on FGC, mostof which increase this potential to weaken FGCs radical core.These variations both reflect and highlight the political and bu-reaucratic difficulties faced by those who wish to adopt this in-

novation in their child welfare systems.In the remainder of this article, we explore the variations and

thethreatsto implementationin an American context, anddiscusspossible reasons for them. We discuss the case of Hawaii, whichprovided a particularly favorable environment for the adoptionof its own version of FGC. The cultural relationship and contactsof Native Hawaiians with the Maori of New Zealand who pro-vided the early impetus for FGC, the small size of the state, andits pattern of political-bureaucratic centralization allowing forstatewide adoption of a uniform program, all made for statewideadoptability of this innovation. All this is considered in order toarrive at a realistic and sober assessment of the difficulties in-volved in adoption of FGC as an empowering, paradigm-shiftingpractice, and to suggest what systemic changes are needed tosupport the full realization of FGCs potential.


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Model Variations

Pennell (2003) stresses the importance of model fidelityamongthevariety of conferencing programs acrossthe country andartic-ulates several minimum components required for conferencing.Without legislative mandates or judicial guidance in the UnitedStates, as is the case in New Zealand and England, the practicemodels of FGC in the U.S. vary widely. Of particular concern isthe fact that even before the basic model of FGC has been imple-mented widely and empirically tested, criticisms are beginningthat the model is too expensive; should be limited to certain typesof case; and does not need specially trained staff or extensivepreparation time. We lack empirical research with a robust design

that compares outcome variables of family conferencing withmatched control cases. Given this paucity of empirically testedoutcome research on conferences, there is little to guide policy orsocial work practice. However, how do we get to reform if we donot vigorously implement and test new models of practice?

Pennell (2003) identified nine key principles and practices forassessing family conferencing model fidelity. Using the NorthCarolina Family Group Conferencing Project, she developed a25-item questionnaire to evaluate if the family participants, co-ordinators, and service providers understood the conferencingprocess, actually experienced it during the conference and agreedthat the listed conferencing practices had been conducted and its

purposes achieved. Participants were asked questions like [Wasthe] FGC coordinator respectful of the family group? and [Did]the family group have private time to make their plan? (Pennell,2003, p. 19). Her findings are encouraging for two reasons. One,the participants generally agreed that the core principles of FGCwere indeed being implemented and experienced. Secondly, andperhaps most importantly, Pennell is asking the correct question:How widespread is FGC and is there model fidelity? Merkel-Holguin (2003) reports that in 2003, more than 150 communitiesin 35 states and approximately 20 countries are implementingFGDM initiatives. This suggests that a revolution in child welfarepractice is under way. However, given the challenges in imple-menting such a model,we are concernedabout theability of manystates to put this reform in place in ways that are true to FGCscore principles.


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Good Intentions

While the conferencing model uses the language of familyempowerment, partnerships, and child welfare reform, if it isto be truly implemented, the role of the state in child welfarehas to be dramatically altered. Recent evaluations underscore thedangers of basing policy decisions on evaluations of programsthat may depart substantially from the principles of the innova-tion it seeks to replicate. For example, in the study of the familydecision meeting in Oregon, only a little more than half the familymembers reported knowing they could invite others to the con-ference (Rodgers, 2000). In Miami, 38% of the parents and familymembers interviewed reported that the private family time was

not useful at all (NCJFCJ, 2002). It is hard to believe, howeverthat many families who were offered the opportunity to design asafety plan for their child and believed that their input would beseriously considered by the child welfare agency could not findthis useful. We wonder if these families were truly offered thisopportunity or if the family members believed that the plan had

been made and agreed to in advance by the professionals. In thatcase, private time does indeed become superfluous. We wonderif private time is really being implemented as a period in whichthe family has, and understands it has, the opportunity for takingresponsibility for developing a safety plan. Private family time isnot a part of Oregon Family Unity Meetings, and in Michigan it is

optional. Many communities do not have independent or trainedfacilitators andto date,there is no requiredtrainingforconferencefacilitators.What exactly is happening inside the conference circlein many communities andhow radicallyit differs from traditionalcase conferences with the family present is as yet unclear.

Reform is Hard to Implement

FGC uses an exchange-based model of assessment and issuedefinition that includes the family in all stages of the decision-making about child placement. This arrangement forms a newcollaboration based on shared information and trust between the

state and the family. This is a significant change from the tradi-tional child protection practice in which the public agency andthe court manage most of the information unfettered by the fam-ilys questions or inputs. We have previously described the core


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elements of conferencing as: widening the circle, taking/sharingresponsibility for solutions, culturally competent practice, fam-ily leadership and empowerment, family driven solutions, com-munity partnerships and private family decision making time(Adams & Chandler, 2003). Pennells (2003) key principles andpractices include these and add a few more. She includes cre-ativity in planning; ensuring the conference belongs to the fam-ily group and chang[ing] policies, procedures and resources tosustain partnerships among family groups, communityorganiza-tions and public agencies (p. 17). Creative social workers may beable to apply an empowering model of practice and participate inconferences that meet many of these principles. However, chang-

ing policies, procedures, and resources to promote such practiceis a profound administrative challenge. It is likely that it will bedifficult, in the metaphor of diffusion of innovation as contagion(Smale, 1996, 1998) to infect the public child welfare agency withthe conferencing bug and infuse it throughout the system.

Possible Reasons for the Variations

Merkel-Holguin (2003), after reviewing the FGC literature inthe United States, concludes that the model is not well diffusedacross the nation and is at best a marginalized practice in mostcommunities. When one considers the significant change in val-ues, practice, behavior, and policies of FGC if implemented on

a large scale, it is not surprising that this system reform has nottaken root in many places. The reluctance of professionals to fullyenable consumers to describe their own needs has been reported(Lupton & Nixon, 1999). This has been seen in the strugglestowardthe development of a person-centered practicein the fieldsof mental health and developmental disabilities. In these areas,federal and state laws were required in order to compel stateagencies to implement initiatives that involved consumers andtheir family members in case planning as well as policy making(Rothman, 1990; Stroman, 2003).

Implementation Barriers (Real and Perceived)

Lupton and Nixon (1999) suggest an intriguing reason forsocial workers reluctance to partner with their clientsthat pro-fessionalautonomywasdeclininginpublicchildwelfareagencies


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due to frequent litigation, class action suits, and court consentdecrees. Their theory suggests that whenever a state lost a lawsuitor settled a consent decree, the public agency would hunkerdown further under their rules,make newrules,andconstrict andconstrain workers discretion in an effort to demonstrate and doc-ument that the state was complying with the lawsuit (Rothman,1990). Often the courts or plaintiffs monitoring process resultedin the agencys becoming less responsive and less innovative. Anunintended consequence was more bureaucracy and paperworkand less communication and openness with consumers. Rarely isthis a time of creativity and reform even though that may be whatis required and often what the suit is demanding.

Evenprofessional,masters level social workers losediscretionin these circumstances and see themselves subject to surveillancebyevenmorelevelsofsupervisorswhooverseemultipleelementsof each case, presumably concerned about the case holding upunder attorney scrutiny in court.When this siegementality sets in,individual socialworkers believe that they will be held personallyaccountable for any negative case outcome such as re-abuse ofa child, whether in foster care or in the biological home. Fearof making a mistake leads to high turnover, job burnout, anddissatisfaction (US-GAO, 2003). While there is logic to the ideathat social workers should embrace reform efforts that result inthe sharing of some of the responsibility with family members

and community partners, since this is deeply embedded in theircore values (see NASW Code of Ethics), it is difficult to discernthis level of empowerment in many child welfare agencies.

Threats to the implementation of FGC abound. Implementa-tion may be seen as requiring too much time and overtime payfor workers, as too expensive or just unnecessary since there islittle evidence to support its superiority. With its creativity andvariety of elements, a familys safety plan is likely to look verydifferent from one drawn up by a public child welfare agencyand a traditional agency may be unenthusiastic about embracingsuch differences. Child welfare workers in Hawaii estimate thatover 80%of thecompliance plans in child protection cases include

some or all of the same components: substance abuse treatment,anger management, and parenting classes (Hawaii Departmentof Human Services, 2002). This seems to be what the CPS workers


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funded by the National Council of Juvenile and Family CourtJudges (NCJFCJ, 2003) to facilitate systems change in the process-ing of child abuse and neglect cases (NCJFCJ, 2000).

After several staff trainings conducted by experts from NewZealand, Honolulu was selected as thepilot site for a conferencingproject. The state agency chose to contract out all of the neededconferencing services, including the initial planning and organiz-ing of the conferences, as well as the facilitation of the conference.The state contracted with the private agency, Effective Planningand Innovative Communication (EPIC) for all staff training ofcommunity-based facilitators as well as the CPS workers. Thedecision to privatize this reform effort, which had support from

many community organizations, social services agencies, andState legislators, is believed to have been an essential factor inthe successful statewide implementation of conferencing. EPICwas a newly formed, non-profit agency with the single goal ofconducting family group conferences. It immediately establishedhigh standards of professional practice for its entire program staff.Conference facilitators are required to have at least a bachelorsdegreeandexperienceinworkingwithchildrenaswellasdemon-strated multi-cultural practice experience. In each conference,there must be a professionally trained group facilitator as wellas a neighborhood-based community facilitator to insure familycomfort and participation.

The pilot project began as a court diversion effort using con-ferencing to divert CPS cases away from the judicial system.This diversion goal, rather than family empowerment or childwelfare reform, perhaps is one reason why conferencing in thesefirst demonstration projects has been implemented successfully.The judges in Honolulu wanted to test strategies that includedparents and other family members early in the case processingandhave them actively participate in the decision-making relatedto their children. The court wanted to open up its proceedingsand make the whole experience more humane. The project alsoaimed to increase family participation as a strategy to move thecases through the system more quickly.

The child welfare agency director in Hawaii was a strongsupporterof thispractice reform. Improvingcommunication withfamily members and providers, and diverting cases out of the


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system completely or having families spend less time in thesystem was a primary agency goal. After one year, the courtstopped funding the project and since 1997 the Department ofHuman Services has been the primary advocate for conferencingandnowfinances theentire program with state andfederal funds.

Elements of a Successful Innovation

A key ingredient for organizational change is the commit-ment and involvement of leaders throughout the agency, ac-cording to Sahonchik (2003, p. 1). This is classic managementadvice, however leadership in a child welfare agencyis often quitedecentralized with local branches, or county structures. Daft andMarcic (2001) suggest that political appointees at the top of a pub-lic human service agency rarely can bring about lasting change,since the permanent civil service staff may decide to just wait outtheir latest reform idea and wait for the next political appointee toarrive with yet another agenda for change. To inoculate againstthis known resistance to change strategy, seven-year contractswere written in Hawaii with EPIC to ensure that FGC wouldendure past the changes of the political administration.

Where conferences have taken hold, there has been a conflu-ence of forces, from inside the public child welfare agency and inthe external environment that joined to make conferencing possi-

ble (see special FGC issue of American Humanes Protecting Chil-dren (2003)). Smale (1996) wrote that changes in practice comeabout through convergent thinking and contagious processes (p. 20). The first ideas about conferencing came from visitsfrom Maori leaders meeting with Hawaiian leaders concernedabout the high rates of incarcerated Hawaiian and part-Hawaiianyouths and an overrepresentation of Pacific Islander children inthe child welfare system. This dialog, along with broad legislativeand community-wide support for a blueprint for child welfarereform initiative as well as a newDirector of Human Services witha social work background, focused attention on conferencing asa strategy for improving child protective services. However, like

many reform efforts, many inside CPS did not see the need forany innovation or reform, because they did not see a problem.To introduce change into a system that does not see a problem,


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rarely succeeds. However, when discussions focus on finding aconsensus on a common vision, values, mission, and principles,agreements can often be found. Trainings that were titled, Howto reduce your caseload using family group conferencing werepopular.

One strategy used in Hawaiis DHS to infuse the idea ofconferencing throughout the agency was to make trainings andworkshop attendance competitive rather than mandatory, whichhad been the usual custom. Staff needed to submit in writingwhy they wanted to attend and the number of participants waslimited. This made the training seem like a scarce commodity andseemed to draw people to it.

After the first few trainings, a core group of innovators af-fectionately called the bungee jumpers emerged. These werethe staff that immediately liked the idea of conferences as a phi-losophy of practice and volunteered to try it out. One rural unit

became the first test site. Subsequently, the model of expansionand diffusion was to move unit by unit geographically as thestaff got trained. The hope was that conferencing would becomecontagious. The use of a private, not-for profit agency to conducttheconferences allowed theworkers who first adopted thereformto get help with their cases, which was a strong incentive. Asconferencing spread throughout the units, it became clear thatsome supervisors supported the reform and some did not. When

supervisors did not support conferencing, their units made littleuse of it. To better track the level of infusion of the innovation, theagency established a goal of two conferences in every unit eachquarter, monitored each units progress, and publicized the data.Supervisors who did not have conferences were reminded aboutthe goal and were encouraged to send staff (or go themselves) formore training.

Resistance to adopting themodelcamein many forms.Mostly,workers explained their resistance by saying that the families inthe caseload did not have the capacity to attend a conferenceor there was no extended family or supports to draw upon.Of course, if a worker does not look for such support, he or

she will rarely find it. Some workers complained that certaincases were just not appropriate. Although never explicit, this

became a belief among the non-reformers. Agency-wide policies


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and procedures needed to be developed to provide incentivesfor workers to participate. Flex-time and glide time workinghours were implemented so workers could attend conferencesin the evening or on the weekends as well as use comp-time orovertime to encourageworker participation. To insure that familyagreements were honored, a new policy established in 2002 thatno agreement made within a conference could be overruled bya supervisor who had not attended the conference. There wasconcern among theworkers who had never attended a conferencethat families would design safety plans that were not safe andsocial workers would not be able to veto a familys plan. Whilethere is a written policy that permits such a veto, to date it has

never been needed or used.While there have been over two thousand conferences con-vened throughout the state of Hawaii, the reform is still notconsistently implemented throughout the state. Some CPS unitssimply do not refer cases to conferences. The strategy remains tocontinue training in each unit and work to show social workersthe benefits of conferencing. A state law was passed encouragingtheuseofconferencingandrequiringCPSworkerstoexplainwhya conference should not be held for all voluntary cases. Familiesdo not yet have the right to a conference, but perhaps this is thenext essential step to insure its implementation.

ConclusionIn synthesizing his two major areas of work, on restorative

justice and responsive regulation, Braithwaite (2002) providesa framework for understanding the tension at the heart of so-cial work in general, and child welfare in particular, betweenempowerment and control. Family group conferencing bringsto the project of child protection a form of restorative justicewithin a framework of responsive regulation that suggests thepotential for improving decision-making, procedural justice, andcompliance. It hasradical implications for practice andpolicythatgenerate serious challenges to implementation in an Americanlegal and professional context, even in a state with many forces

favorable to such an innovation.Shifting therole of thestate away from controller of families in

the child protective services system to one of regulatory partner


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with them is extraordinarily difficult. Hawaiis experience sug-gests that adoption of FGC in the mainstream of child welfareand implementation of its core values, principles, and practicesrequire a reorientation of professional practice and bureaucraticfunctioning. The regulatory pyramid provides a framework forunderstanding child protection both as a form of state regulationand as a shared responsibility of families and communities. Farfrom abdicating state responsibility to protect children, it situatesFGC within an inexorable process of adapting the level of statecoercion to the response of the family to regulatory intervention.Far from offering only the appearance of empowerment to mask

bureaucratic and professional domination and appropriation of

informal family and community decision-making control andcapacity, the regulatory pyramid shows the potential and thevaluethough not the inevitability in practiceof active familyresponsibility and empowerment at its base.

We have argued that when restorative practices work well,formal and informal care and control constrain and enrich eachother. Perhaps the same may be true of the large-scale adoptionand diffusion of an innovation like FGC, which both dependupon administrative support and legislative mandateor at leasta favorable legislative and judicial environmentand also re-quire creative adaptation by local stakeholders and practitioners.Given the pressures to compromise on core principles we have

discussed, it may be that only adoption on a large enough scaleof FGC as a paradigm shift, a fusion of restorative justice andresponsive regulation in child welfare, can provide the empiricalinformation we need to improve both theory and practice.

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Documents

Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 2004 Adams